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Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • Challenges India faces in managing relations in neighbourhood

    The article analyses the inherent challenges India faces in managing good relations with its neighbours.

    Duality challenge

    • Even for the Britishers, it was an unceasing struggle to sustain its primacy in the region.
    • The notion of regional primacy certainly persisted in the Nehru era.
    • Primacy was hard to sustain after Independence even within the immediate neighbourhood.

    Five reasons stand out

    1) Partition of the subcontinent

    • The problems generated by the great division of the Subcontinent on religious lines continue to animate the region.
    • Partition created the challenges of settling boundaries, sharing river-waters, protecting the rights of minorities, and easing the flow of goods and people.
    • The burden of the Subcontinent’s history is not easily discarded.

    2) Unification of China

    • The unification of China amidst the Partition of India had profoundly transformed the geopolitical condition of India.
    • Beyond the bilateral territorial dispute in the Himalayas, the emergence of a large and purposeful state on India’s frontiers was going to be a problem given the ease with which it could constrain Delhi within the Subcontinent.

    3) India’s choice in favour of de-globalisation

    • Independent India’s conscious choice in favour of de-globalisation led to a steady dissipation of commercial connectivity with the neighbours.
    •  India’s economic reorientation since the 1990s and the rediscovery of regionalism did open possibilities for reconnecting with its neighbours.
    • Delhi today is acutely aware of the need to revive regional connectivity.
    • There is much progress in recent years — note, for example, the recent launch of a ferry service to the Maldives or the reopening of inland waterways with Bangladesh.
    • Integrating India’s regional economic and foreign policy remains a major challenge-Consider the recent fiasco of onion exports to Bangladesh.

    4) Rise of political agency in the neighbourhood

    • India ignores the rise of political agency among neighbourhood elites and mass politics that they need to manage.
    • Their imperatives don’t always coincide with those of Delhi.
    • It is unlikely that Delhi can completely insure itself against the intra-elite conflicts in the neighbourhood.

    5) Influence of domestic politics on foreign policy

    • Can India persistently champion Tamil minority rights in Sri Lanka without incurring any costs with the Sinhala majority?
    • But asking that question takes us to India’s own domestic politics.
    • Can Delhi ignore sentiments in India’s Tamil Nadu in making its Sri Lanka policy?
    • Indian Prime Minister did not attend the Colombo Commonwealth Summit in 2013 because of the Tamil minority issue.
    • The Teesta Waters agreement was not concluded due to political reasons.

    Ways forward

    • Timely responses to problems.
    • Preventing small issues from becoming big.
    • Aligning Delhi’s regional economic policy with India’s natural geographic advantages .
    • These are some important elements of any successful management of India’s perennial neighbourhood challenges.

    Conclusion

    There are no easy answers to the regional difficulties that trouble all governments in Delhi. The source of the problem lies in the deeply interconnected nature of South Asian societies administered by multiple sovereigns.

  • Gilgit-Baltistan: The land of peaks, streams and disputes

    Seven decades after it took control of the region, Pakistan is moving to grant full statehood to Gilgit-Baltistan (GB), which appears as the northernmost part of the country in its official map.

    Try this PYQ:

    Q. If you travel through the Himalayas, you are likely to see which of the following plants naturally growing there?

    1. Oak
    2. Rhododendron
    3. Sandalwood

    Select the correct option using the code given below:

    (a) 1 and 2 only

    (b) 3 only

    (c) 1 and 3 only

    (d) 1, 2 and 3

    Pak occupation of GB

    • During the first Indo-Pak war of October 1947, Pakistan occupied 78,114 sq km of the land of Jammu and Kashmir, including the ‘Northern Areas’.
    • The Northern Areas is the other name of Gilgit-Baltistan that Pakistan has used for administrative reasons because it was a disputed territory.
    • This November, Pakistan will pave the way for fuller political rights for the roughly 1.2 million residents of the region, which will become the fifth State of Pakistan after Sindh, Punjab, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

    GB through history

    • One of the most mountainous regions in the world that is rich with mines of gold, emerald and strategically important minerals, GB is known for its extraordinary scenic beauty, diversity and ancient communities and languages.
    • The political nature of Gilgit-Baltistan has been directionless from the beginning.
    • Pakistan initially governed the region directly from the central authority after it was separated from ‘Azad Jammu and Kashmir’ on April 28, 1949.
    • On March 2, 1963, Pakistan gave away 5,180 sq km of the region to China, despite local protests.
    • Under Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the name of the region was changed to the Federally Administered Northern Areas (FANA).
    • Pakistan passed the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self Governance Order in 2009, which granted “self-rule” to the ‘Northern Areas’.

    Sense of alienation

    • GB is largely an underdeveloped region.
    • One of the main reasons for the rebellion in the region in 1947 was the sense of alienation that the population felt towards the Dogra rulers of Srinagar, who operated under the protection of the British government.

    It’s geographical features

    • It’s home to K-2, the second tallest mountain in the world.
    • Tourism remains restricted by many factors, including military hostility, though the region has some of the ancient Buddhist sculptures and rock edicts.
    • It is also home to an old Shia community, which often finds itself subjected to persecution in Pakistan’s urban centres.
    • At present, a Governor and an elected Chief Minister rule the region, which is divided into Gilgit, Skardu, Diamer, Astore, Ghanche, Ghizer and Hunza-Nagar.

    Indian protest

    • Following Pakistan’s announcement of holding the legislative election in Gilgit-Baltistan, India reiterated its territorial sovereignty over the region.
    • India has consistently opposed Pakistan’s activities in Gilgit-Baltistan. It also opposed the announcement of the commencement of the Diamer-Bhasha dam in July this year.
    • There have been local and international concerns as reports suggest priceless Buddhist heritage will be lost once the dam is built.
    • India has objected to the use of Gilgit-Baltistan to build and operate the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

    GB resists

    • Gilgit-Baltistan in recent years has witnessed sporadic protests against Islamabad.
    • The protests were fuelled by the loss of land and livelihood of the locals to mega projects that are being championed by Pakistan and its international partners like China.
    • There is a growing feeling that full statehood will help the locals fight their battles inside Pakistan on an equal basis.
    • On the other hand, there is a widespread feeling that Pakistan, under pressure from China, is firming up its control over Gilgit-Baltistan, eventually creating conditions for the declaration of the LoC as the International Border.

    China’s vested interest

    • Gilgit-Baltistan is important for China as it is the gateway for the CPEC.
    • Significantly, the ongoing stand-off with China at the LAC in Eastern Ladakh has a Gilgit-Baltistan connection.
    • The Darbuk-Shyok-DBO road of India is viewed as a tactical roadway to access the Karakoram Pass, which provides China crucial access to Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan.
    • Full statehood for the region may give Pakistan a political and legal upper hand and strengthen China’s position in the region.

  • India needs a China plan

    The article discusses the issue of dealing with China in the aftermath of clashes on the border.

    Understanding the importance of Tibet

    • Tibet is the roof of the world, with vast mineral and natural resources.
    • The mighty rivers that emanate from its expansive glaciers — such as the Brahmaputra, the Yangtse, the Yellow river, the Mekong, the Salween and the Indus — together with thousands of their tributaries have nurtured civilisations in peripheral countries for centuries.
    • The Kailash Mansarovar is centered in this region.
    • In an act of naked aggression, China occupied Tibet in 1959.
    • A buffer was eliminated, and the de facto boundary of China became contiguous to that of India.
    • That boundary was deliberately left undemarcated to enable further expansion.

    Understanding China’s stand

    • China has land borders with 14 neighbours covering an estimated 22,100 kilometres.
    • Post-independence, and as its economic status increased, so did its military muscle.
    • China embarked on claims based on perceived imbalances of treaties forced on countries when they were weak.
    • Some of these have since been resolved after bloody clashes such as with Russia and Vietnam, while others have been resolved using a combination of lucrative offers.
    • Russia accepted half of China’s claim, Kazakhstan was given lucrative economic deals, Kyrgyzstan retained 70% of the land, ceding just 30%, and so on.

    Way forward

    • The road ahead will have to be evolved and based on a study of the manner in which China has negotiated its boundary disputes with 12 of its neighbours.
    • Under the prevailing circumstances, it has become imperative to form a group of experts.
    • This group will plan and prepare, short-, medium- and long-term goals to achieve them within a suggested time frame.

     Conclusion

    Let us play down the rhetoric and adopt a pragmatic approach. It can no longer be a part-time issue to be addressed only when a crisis occurs. The crisis is upon us now.

  • What are Abraham Accords?

    The White House has marked the formal normalization of Israel’s ties with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Kingdom of Bahrain has created a significant inflexion point in regional history and geopolitics.

    Try this question:

    Q. What are Abraham Accords? Discuss how the Israel-Gulf synergy could impact India’s relations with Israel.

    What are Abraham Accords?

    • The Israel–UAE normalization agreement is officially called the Abraham Accords Peace Agreement.
    • It was initially agreed to in a joint statement by the United States, Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on August 13, 2020.
    • The UAE thus became the third Arab country, after Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994, to agree to formally normalize its relationship with Israel as well as the first Persian Gulf country to do so.
    • Concurrently, Israel agreed to suspend plans for annexing parts of the West Bank. The agreement normalized what had long been informal but robust foreign relations between the two countries.

    New friendships

    • Externally, Israel, the UAE and Bahrain share the common threat perception of Iran.
    • Internally, while all three have their respective hotheads opposing this reconciliation, these seem manageable.
    • They are relatively more modern societies which share the overarching and immediate priority of post-pandemic economic resuscitation.
    • They have lost no time to set up logistics such as Internet connectivity and direct flights to pave the way for more active economic engagement.
    • If these sinews evolve, other moderate Arab countries are likely to join the Israel fan club.

    India and the Gulf

    • Now India has stronger, multifaceted and growing socioeconomic engagements with Israel and the Gulf countries.
    • With over eight million Indian diasporas in the Gulf remitting annually nearly $50 billion, annual merchandise trade of over $150 billion.
    • It sources nearly two-thirds of India’s hydrocarbon imports, major investments, etc. Hence it is natural to ask how the new regional dynamic would affect India.

    The Israel-GCC synergy

    • With defence and security cooperation as a strong impetus, both sides are ready to realize the full potential of their economic complementarity.
    • The UAE and Bahrain can become the entrepôts to Israeli exports of goods and services to diverse geographies.
    • Israel has niche strengths in defence, security and surveillance equipment, arid farming, solar power, horticultural products, high-tech, gem and jewellery, and pharmaceuticals.
    • Tourism, real estate and financial service sectors on both sides have suffered due to the pandemic and hope for a positive spin-off from the peer-to-peer interactions.
    • Further, Israel has the potential to supply skilled and semi-skilled manpower to the GCC states, particularly from the Sephardim and Mizrahim ethnicities, many of whom speak Arabic.
    • Even the Israeli Arabs may find career opportunities to bridge the cultural divide. Israel is known as the start-up nation and its stakeholders could easily fit in the various duty-free incubators in the UAE.

    Implications of the new trinity

    • Geopolitically, India has welcomed the establishment of diplomatic relations between the UAE and Israel, calling both its strategic partners.
    • In general, the Israel-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) breakthrough widens the moderate constituency for peaceful resolution of the Palestine dispute, easing India’s diplomatic balancing act.
    • However, nothing in West Asia is monochromatic: The Israel-GCC ties may provoke new polarization between the Jihadi fringe and the mainstream.
    • The possibility of the southern Gulf becoming the new arena of the proxy war between Iran and Israel cannot be ruled out, particularly in Shia pockets.
    • India would have to be on its guard to monitor and even pre-empt any threat to its interests in the Gulf.

    Way forward

    • Israeli foray into the Gulf has the potential to disrupt the existing politico-economic architecture India has carefully built with the GCC states.
    • India has acquired a large and rewarding regional footprint, particularly as the preferred source of manpower, food products, pharmaceuticals, gem and jewellery, light engineering items, etc.
    • Indians are also the biggest stakeholders in Dubai’s real estate, tourism and Free Economic Zones.
    • In the evolving scenario, there may be scope for a profitable trilateral synergy, but India cannot take its preponderance as a given.

  • Difficulties faced by India and Russia in following convergent policies

    The article analyses the challenges in the India-Russia relations against the background of changing global order.

    Context

    • India decided to pull out of Russia’s Kavkaz 2020 military exercises, where it was scheduled to participate alongside other Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) member states.

    Russia’s role in India-China dispute

    • The ongoing conflict between two prominent members, and both close partners of Russia, has given rise to concerns about its impact on India-Russia ties.
    • Moscow has been playing a quiet diplomatic role during the recent border clashes without actively taking sides.
    • Recent visits by India’s Defence Minister to Russia saw detailed discussions around furthering the India-Russia defence relationship alongside the promise to accelerate certain supplies based on New Delhi’s requirements.
    • The September visit coincided with the biannual Indo-Russian naval exercises, INDRA.

    India-Russia relations

    • India and Russia have spent the past few years strengthening their partnership, particularly since the 2018 Sochi informal summit.
    • From substantive defence engagement to regional questions in Central Asia, Afghanistan and West Asia, a conversation with Moscow remains an important element of Indian foreign policy.
    • India and Russia are pragmatic players looking at maximising their strategic manoeuvrability,
    • Both recognise the value of having a diversified portfolio of ties. .
    • India on its part has sought to include Russia in its vision of the Indo-Pacific that does not see the region as ‘a strategy or as a club of limited members’.
    • Reports indicate that a proposal for a India-Russia-Japan trilateral is being explored.

    Multilateral forums and Challenges in India-Russia relation

    • The multilateral forums are important as they foster continued India-Russia cooperation at the bilateral and multilateral levels.
    •  Increasingly divergent foreign policies of its members pose challenges of agenda-setting and overall scope.
    • At this moment of flux, countries such as India and Russia are keeping all their options open.
    • We live in a ‘curious world’ where one cannot view engagement with different parties as a ‘zero-sum game’.
    • Worsening India-China ties or a burgeoning China-Russia relationship does not automatically mean a breakdown of the India-Russia strategic partnership.
    •  It is the combination of a changing regional order, closer Russia-China ties and India’s alignment with the United States and other like-minded countries to manage Beijing’s rise that has the potential to create hurdles for India-Russia cooperation in the Asia.

    Consider the question “Despite difficulties in pursuing convergent policies, India-China relations retains its relevance. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    Although the evolving global order makes it difficult for India and Russia to pursue fully convergent policies, it does not preclude the bilateral relationship from retaining its relevance.

  • Role for India in Afghan peace push

    The U.S. objectives

    • Following  4 were the states as objectives of the Afghan peace process.
    • 1) An end to violence by declaring a ceasefire.
    • 2) An intra-Afghan dialogue for a lasting peace.
    • 3) The Taliban cutting ties with terrorist organisations such as al Qaeda.
    • 4)  U.S. troop withdrawal.

    Evolving Indian stand in the peace process

    • India’s vision of a sovereign, united, stable, plural and democratic Afghanistan is one that is shared by a large constituency in Afghanistan, cutting across ethnic and provincial lines.
    • At Doha meeting, India’s External Affairs Ministerreiterated that the peace process must be “Afghan led, Afghan owned and Afghan controlled”.
    • But Indian policy has evolved from its earlier hands-off approach to the Taliban.
    • U.S. and Russian representatives suggested if India had concerns regarding anti-India activities of terrorist groups, it must engage directly with the Taliban. In other words.

    Limited interest of the major powers

    • Major powers have limited interests in the peace process.
    • The European Union has made it clear that its financial contribution will depend on the security environment and the human rights record.
    • China can always lean on Pakistan to preserve its security and connectivity interests.
    • For Russia, blocking the drug supply and keeping its southern periphery secure from extremist influences is key.
    • That is why no major power is taking ownership for the reconciliation talks, but merely content with being facilitators.

    Conclusion

    A more active engagement will enable India to work with like-minded forces in the region to ensure that the vacuum created by the U.S. withdrawal does not lead to an unravelling of the gains registered during the last two decades.

  • Indus Water Treaty turns 60

    September 19 this year marks the 60th anniversary of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) between India and Pakistan.

    Tap to read more about Indus River System:

    Drainage System | Part 3

    Indus Waters Treaty, 1960

    • The Indus Waters Treaty is a water-distribution treaty between India and Pakistan, brokered by the World Bank signed in Karachi in 1960.
    • According to this agreement, control over the water flowing in three “eastern” rivers of India — the Beas, the Ravi and the Sutlej was given to India
    • The control over the water flowing in three “western” rivers of India — the Indus, the Chenab and the Jhelum was given to Pakistan
    • The treaty allowed India to use western rivers water for limited irrigation use and unrestricted use for power generation, domestic, industrial and non-consumptive uses such as navigation, floating of property, fish culture, etc. while laying down precise regulations for India to build projects
    • India has also been given the right to generate hydroelectricity through the run of the river (RoR) projects on the Western Rivers which, subject to specific criteria for design and operation is unrestricted.

    Based on equitable water-sharing

    • Back in time, partitioning the Indus rivers system was inevitable after the Partition of India in 1947.
    • The sharing formula devised after prolonged negotiations sliced the Indus system into two halves.
    • Equitable it may have seemed, but the fact remained that India conceded 80.52 per cent of the aggregate water flows in the Indus system to Pakistan.
    • It also gave Rs 83 crore in pounds sterling to Pakistan to help build replacement canals from the western rivers. Such generosity is unusual of an upper riparian.
    • India conceded its upper riparian position on the western rivers for the complete rights on the eastern rivers. Water was critical for India’s development plans.

    India plays resilient

    • That the treaty has remained “uninterrupted” is because India respects its signatory and values trans-boundary Rivers as an important connector in the region in terms of both diplomacy and economic prosperity.
    • There have been several instances of terror attacks which could have prompted India, within the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to withdraw from the IWT.
    • However, on each occasion, India chose not to do so.

    Significance of the treaty

    • It is a treaty that is often cited as an example of the possibilities of peaceful coexistence that exist despite the troubled relationship.
    • Well-wishers of the treaty often dub it “uninterrupted and uninterruptible”.
    • The World Bank, which, as the third party, played a pivotal role in crafting the IWT, continues to take particular pride that the treaty functions.

    Need for a rethink

    • The role of India, as a responsible upper riparian abiding by the provisions of the treaty, has been remarkable.
    • However, of late, India is under pressure to rethink the extent to which it can remain committed to the provisions, as its overall political relations with Pakistan becomes intractable.

  • Our larger China picture

    Context

    • After the skirmish at the border, Beijing started to concentrate troops, armoured vehicles and munitions opposite our posts in Aksai China at Galwan.

    2 interpretations of China’s move

    • First believes that the Chinese exercise was a territorial snatch in Aksai Chin, which they believe is entirely theirs.
    • The move was accompanied by a “lesson” to the Indians on aggressive Indian behaviour in not conceding Aksai Chin.
    • The second school of thought in India believes that territory has nothing to do with it.
    • They believe that, due to growing economic power, Beijing will lay down the rules of world governance.

    How it matters for India

    • India contest China’s entire southern border, refuse to join the Belt and Road initiative, create an anti-China maritime coalition, compete with them for influence in South East Asia and Africa.
    • India is also unsupportive of their crackdown on Taiwan, Hong Kong and Xinjiang and move ever closer to the United States.
    • When China assumes hegemonic power after 2030, India is going to get a nasty surprise.
    • Secularism, democracy and the rights of man will play no part in Chinese foreign policy.
    • China will overturn every international, financial, trade, diplomatic, arms control and nuclear agreement that the world has put together in seven decades.

    Way forward

    • We in India need to conduct a large and vociferous debate on Chinese intentions.
    • If the Chinese intention is to “teach us a lesson” we need a new national strategy, combining diplomatic and military means.
    •  If our national goal is to concentrate on the creation of wealth and growing GDP, let us proclaim it, tighten our belt, look down and avoid conflict.

    Conclusion

    What China wants is Indian acceptance of Beijing’s benign superiority, and that is a purely Chinese trait, not to be confused with the known rules of international diplomacy. Talking from a position of inferiority will not lead to an equitable solution. But first, a national debate.

  • India needs to change the framework of non-involvement

    Realignment of relations is taking place in the Middle East with wider implications for the future of the region. India needs to reconsider its framework based on the non-involvement.

    Recent geopolitical developments

    • India-China tensions have soared over the border issue.
    • The Afghan peace process is underway with the first direct talks between Kabul and the Taliban insurgents at Doha, in Qatar.
    • The normalisation of the relations between Israel and Arab countries began with the UAE and Bahrain normalising the relations.

    Issues with the development

    • The chances of failure in Afghanistan are real.
    • The momentum behind the normalisation of ties between Israel and the Gulf kingdoms, may not necessarily lead to broader peace in the Middle East.
    • The US initiatives in Afghanistan and Arabia are driven by President Donald Trump’s quest for diplomatic victories.

    Why it matters to India

    1) The vulnerability of the peace process

    • Because of competing interests, the peace process in Afghanistan and the Middle East remain vulnerable.
    • The unfolding dynamic will alter the geopolitical landscape in both places.
    • Whether peace breaks out in Afghanistan or not, the Taliban is here to stay.
    • As UAE and Bahrain join Egypt and Jordan in having formal relationships with Israel, the contradiction between Arabs and Israelis is no longer the dominant one in the region.

    2) India should recognise the importance of Arabia

    •  India’s strategic community tends to take too narrow a view of the Arabian salience.
    • The focus is mostly on ensuring oil supplies, promoting manpower exports, and managing the Pakistan problem.
    • We should consider that the Afghan peace talks are taking place in Qatar, a tiny Gulf Kingdom.
    • The UAE and Saudi Arabia were the only countries to recognise the Taliban government in the late 1990s.
    • This time around, they appear to have taken a backseat.
    • Delhi will need to pay more attention to the unfolding realignments between the Arabs and non-Arab states like Iran, Turkey and Israel.

    3) Paradox of American power

    • The U.S. is being seen as a declining power in the matters of the Middle East and Afghanistan.
    •  But the reality remains that the US is the one forcing a change in both the places.

    4) Implications of strategic vacuum created by the U.S. exit

    • As the US steps back from the region, the resulting strategic vacuum is likely to be filled by Russia and China.
    • Russia and China are quite active in both the Middle East and Afghanistan.
    •  China’s future role in Afghanistan, in partnership with Pakistan, could be quite significant and will be of some concern for India.
    • Regional powers have already acquired much say in the new geopolitics of the Middle East.
    • Qatar and UAE punch way above their weight, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are locked in a major contest for regional influence.

    5) Domestic politics in the country

    • Religious radicalism, sectarian and ethnic divisions, and the clamour for more representative governments are sharpening conflicts within and between countries.
    • The collapse of the oil market is undermining the region’s economic fortunes.
    • Collapsing oil market is also making it harder for political elites to address the emerging political challenges.

    Consider the question “Middle East is going through the major realignment of relations. What are its implications for India?.

    Conclusion

    As the old order begins to crumble in the greater Middle East, the question is no longer whether India should join the geopolitical jousting there; but when, how and in partnership with whom.

  • Neither war nor peace between India and China

    The article analyses the challenges in the India-China border dispute and the recent events of Chinese aggression.

    Trust deficit

    • The recent Chinese actions have set back trust between the two countries by decades.
    • Trust made sense when both sides could assume that the other side either did not have the capacity or would not rapidly deploy troops in strategic positions at the border.
    • With the building of infrastructure on both sides, this trust was bound to break.
    • Even after temporary disengagement, both sides will now have distrust about the deployment of the other side.
    • An infrastructure-thick environment will require a permanent presence and closer deployments.

    Challenges

    •  At the level of the army, India seems to have consistently misread the PLA’s intentions.
    •  The closer the armies get, the greater the risks.
    • There is a political logic that does not bode well. There is still speculation on why the Chinese are taking an aggressive posture.
    • The very fact that we are not sure of Chinese motives means it is hard to know their endgame.

    Chinese fears

    • At a basic level, they will want to secure their interests in CPEC.
    • Tibet issue has also been a sensitive issue for China.
    •  Chinese interest in Nepal is less to encircle India. It is to ensure Nepal is not used as a staging ground of resistance in Tibet.

    Tibet issues in India-China relations

    • On Tibet issue India is in an awkward situation.
    • Due to the presence of the Dalai Lama in India, China will see it as a potential threat to its cultural hegemony in Tibet.
    • Ladakh and Tawang are also important pieces in that cultural consolidation.
    • The Sino-India peaceful relations were premised on keeping the Tibet issue in check.
    • But just as we are not sure of Chinese motives, they may not be sure of our motives either.

    New paradigm in India’s foreign policy

    • India growing power means it needs a new paradigm of foreign policy.
    • This policy will supposedly safeguard India’s interests more assertively.
    • If diplomatically not well managed, this change also causes great uncertainty in the international system.
    • India’s Pakistan policy is premised entirely on keeping them guessing on what we might do, including possible military options and altering the territorial status quo.
    • Our domestic ideological articulation of India’s position ranges from reclaiming PoK to Aksai Chin.
    • We cannot abandon Tibetans.
    • This underscores a narrative of uncertainty over our intentions.

    Conclusion

    Our own trumpeted departure from the past, without either the diplomatic preparation, domestic political discipline, and full anticipation of military eventualities, does not make it easy for others to understand our endgame.