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Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • Importance of maritime domain for India and role of Quad in it

    While highlighting the importance of navy for India, the article examines the need to define the role and relation between the Quad and Malabar.

    The salience of navy for India

    • It took confrontation in the Himalayas to bring focus on India’s maritime domain clearly indicates that the salience of maritime power is not yet understood in India.
    • On its northern and western fronts, India faces a formidable challenge and can at best hope for stalemate due to two factors :
    • 1) Economic, military and technological asymmetry between China and India.
    • 2) Active China-Pakistan nexus.
    • Attention has, therefore, been focused on the maritime domain, where it is believed that India may have some cards to play.
    •  While preparing to fight its own battles with determination, it is time for India to seek external balancing (read Quad) — best done via the maritime domain.

    Evolution of Malabar Exercise

    • Above is the backdrop against which one must see the progressive evolution of Exercise “Malabar”,
    • At beginning, it was a bilateral event involving just the Indian and US navies.
    • It became tri-lateral with the inclusion of Japan in 2015.
    • And now it has transformed into a four-cornered naval drill that will also include Australia.
    • Apart from its geo-political significance for the Indo-Pacific, this development poses two conundrums.
    • Firstly, given the same composition, what is the distinction, now, between “Malabar” and the “Quad”?
    • Secondly, does Malabar 2020 mark the release of Australia from China’s thralldom?

    Defining the roles and relation betwee Malabar and Quad

    • The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or Quad has its roots in the Core Group of four senior diplomats representing the US, India, Japan and Australia.
    • The group was formed to coordinate relief efforts after the Great Asian Tsunami of December 26, 2004.
    • The present Quad has obviously retained this tradition and its members have neither created a charter nor invested it with any substance.
    • The Quad is 16 years old now, and Malabar 28.
    • Both have served a useful purpose, and a reappraisal of the roles and relationship of the Quad-Malabar concepts is, therefore, overdue.
    • Since it is India which faces a “clear and present danger”, it should boldly take the initiative to do so.

    Need for the Indo-Pacific Concord

    •  In order to rein in China’s hegemonic urges, there is need for affected nations to come together to show their solidarity and determination in a common cause.
    • In this context, there is need to create a broad-based “Indo-Pacific Concord”, of like-minded regional democracies.
    • This should be an organisation with a maritime security charter, which has no offensive or provocative connotations.
    • Using the Quad and Malabar templates, a shore-based secretariat can be established in a central location like Port Blair, in the Andaman Islands, which would schedule and conduct periodic multinational naval exercises.
    • The exercises could be structured to hone the skills of participating navies in specialisations like humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, countering non-traditional threats, undertaking search-and-rescue operations and establishing networked maritime domain awareness.
    • The Concord could also designate forces to uphold maritime security or “good order at sea”.

    What Australia joining Quad means

    •  The prospect of Australia belatedly joining the Quad is expected to reinforce the Quad and enhance its credibility.
    • But there are reasons for India to be circumspect it.
    • Memories are still alive of its past political ambivalence towards India, its criticism of our naval expansion and its vociferous condemnation of the 1998 nuclear tests.
    • Nor should one overlook Beijing’s recent influence on Australia’s foreign policy.
    • This influence on Australia’s foreing policy caused it to flip-flop over the sale of uranium to India as well as its peremptory withdrawal from the Quad in 2008.

    Implications of singing of BECA with the U.S.

    • India signing the BECA (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement) with the US last of the four “foundational agreements” would enhance interoperability between the respective militaries.
    • However, there is need to pay heed to two valid concerns:
    • 1) Regarding the possible compromise of information impinging on India’s security.
    • 2) Whether these agreements will barter away the last vestiges of India’s strategic autonomy.

    Consider the question “The changing geopolitical equations has necessitated the formation of Indo-Pacific Concord by the democracies of the region.” In light of this, elaborate on India’s role in Quad and its implications for the region”

    Conclusion

    Indians, given our history, should never lose sight of the truism in international relations, that it is the unerring pursuit of national interests that guides the actions and policies of every nation.

  • Looking back at India’s journey at the UN

    The article examines India’s journey at the UN as it enters it 75year. It also analyses the challenges India faced at the UN and tracks India’s transformation from being an outlier to the high table.

    Three phases of India’s presence at the UN

    • Seven and a half decades of India at the UN may be viewed with reference to roughly three distinct phases.

    First phase: From independence to 1989

    • The first phase lasted until the end of Cold War in 1989.
    • During this phase, India had learnt to explore and enhance its diplomatic influence in easing armed conflicts in Asia and Africa by disentangling them from the superpower rivalry.
    • India also leaned that the UN could not be relied upon to impartially resolve vital security disputes such as Jammu and Kashmir.
    • India strove to utilise the UN only to focus on common causes such as anti-colonialism, anti-racism, nuclear disarmament, environment conservation and equitable economic development.
    • India seemed to claim the moral high ground by proposing, in 1988 three-phase plan to eliminate nuclear weapons from the surface of earth.
    • But it resisted attempts by neighbouring countries to raise bilateral problems.
    • Defeat in 1962 war against China meant a definitive redesign of the country’s diplomatic style to privilege bilateral contacts over the third party role by the UN.

    Second phase: 1990s

    • The 1990s were the most difficult decade for India in the UN.
    • The 1990s were marked by the sudden end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the United States as the unrivalled power.
    • Besides, the uncertain political climate along with the balance of payments crisis constrained the country’s capability to be active in various bodies, especially in the Security Council (UNSC) and the General Assembly.
    • There was a change in India’s foreign policy: At the UN as India showed pragmatism in enabling the toughest terms on Iraq even after Gulf War or in reversing position on Zionism as racism.
    • At the same time, growing militancy in Kashmir in the early 1990s helped Pakistan to internationalise the dispute with accusations about gross human rights violations by India.
    • India to seek favours from Iran and China in the Human Rights Commission to checkmate Pakistan.
    • The violation of the sovereignty principle by NATO intervention against Yugoslavia in 1999 without the authorisation of the UNSC deeply disturbed India.
    • At the same time call for an end to aerial attacks on Yugoslavia did not garner much support in the UNSC.
    • India’s diplomatic difficulties was exposed when it suffered a defeat in the hands of Japan in the 1996 contest for a non-permanent seat in the UNSC.
    • India resolutely stood against indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995.
    • India strongly rejected the backdoor introduction for adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996.
    • It is against this background that India surprised the world in 1998 with its Pokhran nuclear weapon tests, ignoring the likely adverse reaction from the nuclear club.

    Third phase: Rise in influence in 21st century

    • The impressive economic performance in the first decade of the 21st century due to economic liberalisation and globalisation policies, helped a great deal in strengthening profile.
    • This is only aided by its reliable and substantial troop contributions to several peacekeeping operations in African conflict theatres.
    • India has emerged as a responsible stakeholder in non-traditional security issue areas such as the spread of small and light weapons, the threat of non-state actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and the impact of climate change.
    • India has scaled up its contributions to development and humanitarian agencies, while India’s share to the UN assessed budget has registered a hike from 0.34% to 0.83%.
    • India’s successful electoral contests for various prestigious slots in the UNSC, the Human Rights Council, the World Court, and functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council indicates its growing popularity

    Major unsuccessful initiatives by India

    • Two major initiatives India has heavily invested in are stuck:
    • 1) The draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism it drafted and revised with the hope of helping consensus.
    • It encountered reservations on provisions regarding definition of terrorist and the convention’s application to state armed forces.
    • 2) Second is the question of equitable expansion of the UNSC to enable India to attain permanent membership along with other claimants from Asia, Africa and Latin America.
    • The move has been stuck for more than 25 years because of a lack of unity among the regional formations.
    • It also includes opposition from some 30 middle powers such as Italy and Pakistan which fear losing out to regional rivals in the event of an addition of permanent seats.
    •  The only realistic possibility seems to settle for a compromise, i.e. a new category of members elected for a longer duration than the present non-permanent members without veto power.

    Priorities at the UNSC as a non-permanent member

    • India’s future role will depend on its ability to deal  economic slowdown and a troubled relationship with China.
    • This is pertinent as India will soon begin its two-year term as a non-permanent UNSC member (January 1, 2021).
    • Its areas of priority will continue to be the upholding of Charter principles, act against those who support, finance and sponsor terrorists, besides striving for securing due say to the troop contributing countries in the management of peace operations.
    • It is reasonable to assume (based on earlier patterns) that India will work for and join in consensus on key questions wherever possible.
    • But it may opt to abstain along with other members including one or two permanent members.

    Consider the question “Elaborate on the transformation in India’s role at UN. What are the challenges India may face as a non-permanent member of the UNSC” 

    Conclusion

    As a non-permanent UNSC member now, India needs to uphold the Charter principles in the backdrop of a turbulent world.

  • US Secretary of state Visit to India

    Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo makes his way to India next week, exactly a week before the election. This article discusses the various aspects that could form the part of the discussion.

    Difference in U.S’s and India’s position on Quad

    • He has stated that meeting in India “would include discussions about how free nations can work together to thwart threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party”.
    • Just a few weeks ago, at the Quad Foreign Ministers meeting, U.S. Secretary of State had called for collaboration to protect people and partners from the Chinese Communist Party’s exploitation, corruption, and coercion.
    •  In contrast, India has maintained that its membership of the Quad is aligned to its Indo-Pacific policy, and by no means directed against any country.
    • While Chines aggression is changing India’s priorities, any shift in India’s position on the Quad at the U.S.’s prompting must also benefit India.

    What should be the part of U.S.-India collaboration

    • It is critical to study just how India hopes to collaborate with the U.S. on the challenge that Beijing poses on each of India’s three fronts: at the LAC, in the maritime sphere, and in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) region surrounding India.
    • On the maritime sphere, discussions will include strengthening ties in the Indo-Pacific, enhancing joint military exercises like the ‘Malabar’ and completing the last of the “foundational agreements” with the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation (BECA).
    • In Male, the U.S. has announced a defence agreement that will pave the way for a strategic dialogue.
    • And unlike in the past, India has not objected this agreement with Male for entering in its area of influence in the Indian Ocean Region, as it will allow the U.S. to counter Chinese influence there.
    • With Sri Lanka the U.S. is in discussions on infrastructure projects, and progress on its “Millenium Challenge Corporation” (MCC) offer of a five-year aid grant of about $480 million.
    • At a time when India is delaying Sri Lanka’s requests for debt relief, given its own economic constraints, the U.S. aid offer will be seen as one way of staving off China’s inroads into Sri Lanka.
    • Most important will be how the U.S. and India can collaborate on dealing with India’s most immediate, continental challenge from China: at the LAC.
    • Apart from enhancing and expediting U.S. defence sales to India, there is must the U.S. could promise to India.
    • The U.S. must also commit to keeping the pressure on Pakistan on terrorism, despite the U.S. need for Pakistan’s assistance in Afghan-Taliban talks.
    • A firm U.S. statement in this regard may also disperse the pressure the Indian military faces in planning for a “two-front” conflict with China.

    Resolving other key issues with the U.S.

    • Resolution of Trade issues, an area the Trump administration has been particularly tough, and restoration of India’s Generalised System of Preferences status for exporters should also be priority.
    • The government could press for more cooperation on 5G technology sharing, or an assurance that its S-400 missile system purchase from Russia will receive an exemption from CAATSA sanctions.

    Conclusion

    By inviting Secretary of State this close to the U.S. elections, New Delhi has taken a calculated and bold gamble, however, our leaders must drive a harder bargain to consolidate the pay-offs from the visit.

    Back2Basics: What is CAATSA?

    • The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) is a U.S. federal law that imposes economic sanctions on Iran, Russia and North Korea.
    • The bill came into effect on August 2, 2017, with the intention of countering perceived aggressions against the U.S. government by foreign powers.
    • It accomplishes this goal by preventing U.S. companies from doing business with sanctioned entities.

  • Opportunities for India in Bangladesh’s economic success

    Bangladesh is expected to cross India in terms per capita income. This speaks volumes about the achievements of Bangladesh when contrasted with Pakistan. At the same time, it has several implications for the region. The elaborates on such implications.

    What other countries can learn from Bangladesh

    • The International Monetary Fund’s latest World Economic Outlook published recently predicts that Bangladesh’s per capita GDP will overtake that of India this year.
    • The projected difference is rather small — $1,888 to $1,877 — and unlikely to last beyond this year.
    • International development institutions are convinced that the rest of the subcontinent and developing countries around the world can learn much from Dhaka’s experience — the so-called “Bangladesh model”.

    5 Implications for the region

    1) Rising global interest in the subcontinent

    • Rapid and sustained economic growth in Bangladesh has begun to alter the world’s perception of the subcontinent.
    • India and Pakistan dominated the region and other countries were considered small.
    • But Bangladesh was far from being small, demographically it’s  the eighth-largest nation in the world.
    • The economic rise of Bangladesh is changing some of that.

    2) Changing economic weights of Bangladesh and Pakistan

    • This year, Bangladesh’s GDP is expected to reach about $320 billion.
    • The IMF did not have the 2020 numbers from Pakistan to report but in 2019, Pakistan’s economy was at $275 billion.
    • The IMF suggests that Pakistan’s economy will contract further this year.
    • Bangladesh has controlled its population growth and Pakistan has not.
    • Dhaka has a grip over its inflation and Islamabad does not.
    • There is no question that Pakistan’s negative geopolitical weight in the world will endure.
    • But Bangladesh’s growing economic muscle will help Dhaka steadily accumulate geopolitical salience in the years ahead.

    3) Accelerate regional integration

    • Bangladesh’s economic growth can accelerate regional integration in the eastern subcontinent.
    • The region’s prospects for a collective economic advance are rather dim.
    • Due to Pakistan’s opposition to economic cooperation with India and its support for cross-border terror, the main regional forum for the subcontinent, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (Saarc), is dormant.
    • Instead of merely praying for the revival of Saarc, Delhi could usefully focus on the BBIN.
    • BBIN is sub-regional forum among Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal, activated in the middle of last decade — has not advanced fast enough.
    • It is time for Delhi and Dhaka to take a fresh look at the forum and find ways to widen the scope and pace of BBIN activity.
    • Meanwhile, there is growing interest in Bhutan and Nepal for economic integration with Bangladesh.

    4) Increasing importance of Bangladesh in geopolitics of Indo-Pacific

    • The economic success of Bangladesh is drawing attention from a range of countries in East Asia, including China, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore.
    • The US, which traditionally focused on India and Pakistan, has woken up to the possibilities in Bangladesh.
    • Bangladesh does not want to get into the fight between Beijing and Washington, but the great power wooing of Dhaka is bound to intensify in the new geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific.

    5) Development of India’s eastern and north-eastern states could accelerate

    • Bangladesh’s economy is now one-and-a-half times as large as that of West Bengal; better integration between the two would provide a huge boost for eastern India.
    • Also, connectivity between India’s landlocked Northeast and Bangladesh would provide a boost to the development of north-eastern states.
    • Delhi and Dhaka are eager to promote greater cooperation, but there has been little political enthusiasm in Kolkata.
    • In Assam, the issue of migration continues to impose major political constraints.

    Way forward

    • Parliamentary approval of the boundary settlement in 2015, despite the opposition, was a step in the right direction from India.
    • So was the acceptance of the 2014 international arbitration award on the maritime boundary dispute between India and Bangladesh.
    • But the positive dynamic surrounding the bilateral relationship acquired a negative tone in the second amidst the poisonous rhetoric in India around the Citizenship Amendment Act.
    • There is much room for course correction in Delhi and to shift the focus from legacy issues to future possibilities.

    Conclusion

    Both the countries need to jointly develop and pursue with Dhaka an ambitious framework for shared prosperity.

  • Four lessons for the Quad from Asia’s history and geopolitics

    The article highlights the 4 issues related to the history and geopolitics of Asian that the Quad members should pay attention to while formulating the future course of action. 

    The 4 factors

    If the Quad is to prosper as a geopolitical construct, it would do well to heed four lessons drawn from the long arc of Asia’s history and geopolitics.

    1) Lack of existence of Indo-Pacific system

    • There has never been Indo-Pacific system ever since the rise of the port-based kingdoms of Indochina in the first half of the second millennium.
    •  There were two Asian systems — an Indian Ocean system and an East Asian system — with intricate sub-regional balances.
    • The effort by a U.S. to artificially manufacture to combine the Indo and the Pacific into a unitary system is unlikely to succeed.

    2) Lack of peaceful existence dominated by any power

    • The Indo-Pacific region possesses no prior experience of long period of peace, prosperity and stability engineered from its maritime fringes.
    • Rather, dynamic long cycles of Chinese influence radiating outwards have alternated with sharp periods of turmoil.
    • The of ASEAN-centred multilateralism is more in tune with regional tradition and historical circumstance.
    • For their part, the Indo-Pacific’s ‘flanking powers’, India and Japan, have never balanced Chinese power throughout their illustrious histories.

    3) India must use its leverage judiciously

    •  The sea lines of communication constitute the important links connecting Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific.
    • It is also a valuable arena of leverage vis-à-vis Chinese shipping and resource flows.
    • This leverage must be wielded judiciously on India’s terms, not on the Quad’s terms.
    • The Quad, after all, has little to offer materially with regard to New Delhi’s continental two-front dilemma.
    • However, ceding this chokepoint leverage will invite overwhelming Chinese pressure against the full range of India’s South Asian interests — to which the other Quad members possess neither will nor desire to answer.

    4) Check on China’s India Ocean Ambitions

    •  The Quad has a valuable role to play as a check on China’s Indian Ocean ambitions.
    • India must develop ingrained habits of interoperable cooperation with its Quad partners.
    • This interoperable cooperation could pre-emptively dissuade China from mounting a naval challenge in its backyard.

    Conclusion

    The Quad must consider these factors while formulating the future course of action.

  • Greater Male Connectivity Project (GMCP)

    Following up on India’s announcement of a $500 million package to the Maldives, the Exim Bank of India and the Maldives’s Ministry of Finance signed an agreement for $400 million in Male.

    Try this question from 2014:

    Q.Which one of the following pairs of islands is separated from each other by the ‘Ten Degree Channel’?

    (a) Andaman and Nicobar

    (b) Nicobar and Sumatra

    (c) Maldives and Lakshadweep

    (d) Sumatra and Java

    Greater Male Connectivity Project

    • The GMCP consists of a number of bridges and causeways to connect Male to Villingili, Thilafushi and Gulhifahu islands that span 6.7 km.
    • It would ease much of the pressure of the main capital island of Male for commercial and residential purposes.
    • When completed, the project would render the Chinese built Sinamale Friendship bridge connecting Male to two other islands, thus far the most visible infrastructure project in the islands.
    • At present, India-assisted projects in the region include water and sewerage projects on 34 islands, reclamation project for the Addl island, a port on Gulhifalhu, airport redevelopment at Hanimadhoo, and a hospital and a cricket stadium in Hulhumale.

  • Deterrence in Australia-China Ties

    Australia and China’s cordial economic ties, established over the last three decades, have been soured this year over several points of friction.

    Try this question

    Q. Discuss the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or the Quad) and its purpose to establish “Asian Arc of Democracy”.

    Various points of friction

     (1) Australia’s Covid-19 inquiry

    • Australia’s appeal for an independent global inquiry into the origins and initial response of Covid-19 created fury in Beijing.
    • China alleged that Australia was teaming up with the US to spread “anti-China propaganda”.

    (2) Tension over journalists

    • The second diplomatic spat began with the detention of an Australian news anchor based in Beijing by the Chinese authorities after she was suspected of “criminal activities” that endangered China’s national security.
    • The Australian government said the journalist was held under “residential surveillance” at an unknown location.
    • Following this, the journalists sought refuge in Australian diplomatic missions, as they were not allowed to leave the country.

    (3) Ideological issues

    • The two countries have also been at loggerheads on other ideological issues previously too.
    • After reports of China keeping Uighur Muslims in state-run detention camps surfaced, Australia was swift to respond and expressed “deep concern” over the “human rights situation.”
    • Australia also supported Hong Kong’s autonomy cause. It decided to extend visas for Hong Kong residents.
    • In both instances, China responded staunchly and asked Australia to not meddle in its “internal matters.”

    (4) Economic dependence

    • China is Australia’s largest trading partner in terms of both exports and imports.
    • China’s share in Australia’s exports reached a record A$117 billion, or 38 per cent, in 2019, more than any other country.
    • Australian sectors like mining, tourism, education benefit from trade with China. China even imports products such as milk, cheese, wine and meat.
    • Over the years, it has been increasing its investment in Australian infrastructure and real estate products too.

  • H-1B visa amid the U.S. elections

    Trump administration’s two moves on the visa could have implication for both  India and corporate America. It needs to be seen whether the situations will remain the same after the Presidential elections in the U.S.

    Context

    • The U.S. President announced a hike in the salaries for those arriving in the U.S. on H-1B or skilled-worker visas.

    Implications for India

    • This hike is expected to cut visa applications by around 33%.
    • Trump administration has in its earlier executive actions banned the issuance of new skilled worker visas and new green cards.
    • India’s export of services to the U.S. is estimated to be at $29.6 billion in 2018, 4.9% more than in 2017, and 134% more than 2008 levels.
    • The U.S. has been issuing 85,000 H-1B visas annually, of which 20,000 are given to graduate students and 65,000 to private sector applicants, approximately 70% of which are granted to Indian nationals.
    • The visa issuance ban, combined with the mandatory salary floor soon to be instituted, will seriously hit U.S. imports of services from India.

    Criticism of the move

    • A federal judge in the Northern District of California blocked the enforcement of the new visa ban, ruling that the President “exceeded his authority” under the U.S. Constitution.
    • Google CEO hit out at the ban, saying, “Immigration has contributed immensely to America’s economic success, making it a global leader in tech, and also Google the company it is today.”

    Consider the question “What makes the H-1B visa important for India? What are the implications of the recent rise in the salary floor by the U.S. for the visa on India?”

    Conclusion

    While the ban and floor limit on salary come in the election milieu, India should prepare for the after election scenario.

  • Challenges India faces in managing relations in neighbourhood

    The article analyses the inherent challenges India faces in managing good relations with its neighbours.

    Duality challenge

    • Even for the Britishers, it was an unceasing struggle to sustain its primacy in the region.
    • The notion of regional primacy certainly persisted in the Nehru era.
    • Primacy was hard to sustain after Independence even within the immediate neighbourhood.

    Five reasons stand out

    1) Partition of the subcontinent

    • The problems generated by the great division of the Subcontinent on religious lines continue to animate the region.
    • Partition created the challenges of settling boundaries, sharing river-waters, protecting the rights of minorities, and easing the flow of goods and people.
    • The burden of the Subcontinent’s history is not easily discarded.

    2) Unification of China

    • The unification of China amidst the Partition of India had profoundly transformed the geopolitical condition of India.
    • Beyond the bilateral territorial dispute in the Himalayas, the emergence of a large and purposeful state on India’s frontiers was going to be a problem given the ease with which it could constrain Delhi within the Subcontinent.

    3) India’s choice in favour of de-globalisation

    • Independent India’s conscious choice in favour of de-globalisation led to a steady dissipation of commercial connectivity with the neighbours.
    •  India’s economic reorientation since the 1990s and the rediscovery of regionalism did open possibilities for reconnecting with its neighbours.
    • Delhi today is acutely aware of the need to revive regional connectivity.
    • There is much progress in recent years — note, for example, the recent launch of a ferry service to the Maldives or the reopening of inland waterways with Bangladesh.
    • Integrating India’s regional economic and foreign policy remains a major challenge-Consider the recent fiasco of onion exports to Bangladesh.

    4) Rise of political agency in the neighbourhood

    • India ignores the rise of political agency among neighbourhood elites and mass politics that they need to manage.
    • Their imperatives don’t always coincide with those of Delhi.
    • It is unlikely that Delhi can completely insure itself against the intra-elite conflicts in the neighbourhood.

    5) Influence of domestic politics on foreign policy

    • Can India persistently champion Tamil minority rights in Sri Lanka without incurring any costs with the Sinhala majority?
    • But asking that question takes us to India’s own domestic politics.
    • Can Delhi ignore sentiments in India’s Tamil Nadu in making its Sri Lanka policy?
    • Indian Prime Minister did not attend the Colombo Commonwealth Summit in 2013 because of the Tamil minority issue.
    • The Teesta Waters agreement was not concluded due to political reasons.

    Ways forward

    • Timely responses to problems.
    • Preventing small issues from becoming big.
    • Aligning Delhi’s regional economic policy with India’s natural geographic advantages .
    • These are some important elements of any successful management of India’s perennial neighbourhood challenges.

    Conclusion

    There are no easy answers to the regional difficulties that trouble all governments in Delhi. The source of the problem lies in the deeply interconnected nature of South Asian societies administered by multiple sovereigns.

  • Gilgit-Baltistan: The land of peaks, streams and disputes

    Seven decades after it took control of the region, Pakistan is moving to grant full statehood to Gilgit-Baltistan (GB), which appears as the northernmost part of the country in its official map.

    Try this PYQ:

    Q. If you travel through the Himalayas, you are likely to see which of the following plants naturally growing there?

    1. Oak
    2. Rhododendron
    3. Sandalwood

    Select the correct option using the code given below:

    (a) 1 and 2 only

    (b) 3 only

    (c) 1 and 3 only

    (d) 1, 2 and 3

    Pak occupation of GB

    • During the first Indo-Pak war of October 1947, Pakistan occupied 78,114 sq km of the land of Jammu and Kashmir, including the ‘Northern Areas’.
    • The Northern Areas is the other name of Gilgit-Baltistan that Pakistan has used for administrative reasons because it was a disputed territory.
    • This November, Pakistan will pave the way for fuller political rights for the roughly 1.2 million residents of the region, which will become the fifth State of Pakistan after Sindh, Punjab, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

    GB through history

    • One of the most mountainous regions in the world that is rich with mines of gold, emerald and strategically important minerals, GB is known for its extraordinary scenic beauty, diversity and ancient communities and languages.
    • The political nature of Gilgit-Baltistan has been directionless from the beginning.
    • Pakistan initially governed the region directly from the central authority after it was separated from ‘Azad Jammu and Kashmir’ on April 28, 1949.
    • On March 2, 1963, Pakistan gave away 5,180 sq km of the region to China, despite local protests.
    • Under Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the name of the region was changed to the Federally Administered Northern Areas (FANA).
    • Pakistan passed the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self Governance Order in 2009, which granted “self-rule” to the ‘Northern Areas’.

    Sense of alienation

    • GB is largely an underdeveloped region.
    • One of the main reasons for the rebellion in the region in 1947 was the sense of alienation that the population felt towards the Dogra rulers of Srinagar, who operated under the protection of the British government.

    It’s geographical features

    • It’s home to K-2, the second tallest mountain in the world.
    • Tourism remains restricted by many factors, including military hostility, though the region has some of the ancient Buddhist sculptures and rock edicts.
    • It is also home to an old Shia community, which often finds itself subjected to persecution in Pakistan’s urban centres.
    • At present, a Governor and an elected Chief Minister rule the region, which is divided into Gilgit, Skardu, Diamer, Astore, Ghanche, Ghizer and Hunza-Nagar.

    Indian protest

    • Following Pakistan’s announcement of holding the legislative election in Gilgit-Baltistan, India reiterated its territorial sovereignty over the region.
    • India has consistently opposed Pakistan’s activities in Gilgit-Baltistan. It also opposed the announcement of the commencement of the Diamer-Bhasha dam in July this year.
    • There have been local and international concerns as reports suggest priceless Buddhist heritage will be lost once the dam is built.
    • India has objected to the use of Gilgit-Baltistan to build and operate the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

    GB resists

    • Gilgit-Baltistan in recent years has witnessed sporadic protests against Islamabad.
    • The protests were fuelled by the loss of land and livelihood of the locals to mega projects that are being championed by Pakistan and its international partners like China.
    • There is a growing feeling that full statehood will help the locals fight their battles inside Pakistan on an equal basis.
    • On the other hand, there is a widespread feeling that Pakistan, under pressure from China, is firming up its control over Gilgit-Baltistan, eventually creating conditions for the declaration of the LoC as the International Border.

    China’s vested interest

    • Gilgit-Baltistan is important for China as it is the gateway for the CPEC.
    • Significantly, the ongoing stand-off with China at the LAC in Eastern Ladakh has a Gilgit-Baltistan connection.
    • The Darbuk-Shyok-DBO road of India is viewed as a tactical roadway to access the Karakoram Pass, which provides China crucial access to Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan.
    • Full statehood for the region may give Pakistan a political and legal upper hand and strengthen China’s position in the region.