Subject: Bilateral Relations

Quad as new feature of Indo-Pacific

• Australia’s participation in the Malabar exercises marks the emergence of the Quad as a new feature of the Indo-Pacific geopolitics.
• The question is India’s ability to take full advantage of the possibilities after the US elections to construct a wide range of new international coalitions.
• Likely changes could envelop a range of old institutions like the Five Eyes and the G-7 grouping that coordinates Western policies on global economic management.
• We could also see the creation of a new League of Democracies that will addres issues like including the defence of shared values, commerce, corruption, taxation, climate change and digital governance.

Phases of India’s international aspiration

• The consolidation of the Quad reflects the political will in Delhi to break free from old shibboleths and respond to security imperatives.
• The post-Quad era opens a new phase in which India, for the first time, can help shape global institutions.
• First phase: Idealism was the hallmark of India’s internationalism in the 1950s, the harsh politics of the Cold War quickly dampened it.
• Second phase: In the 1970s, India embraced the radical agenda of a New International Economic Order, as the leader of the Non-Aligned Movement and the Group of 77. The results were meagre.
• Third phase began with the end of the Cold War.
• And as India’s own economic model collapsed, India had to focus on economic reform and prevent the world from intruding too much into its internal affairs.
• The fear of the US activism on Kashmir and nuclear issues saw Delhi turn to Russia and China in search of a “multipolar world” that could constrain American power.
• The BRICS forum with Russia, China, Brazil and South Africa became emblematic of this strategy.
• Delhi also figured out that it was not possible for BRICS to constrain Beijing, since China was so much bigger than the other four members put together.
• Fourth phase in India’s multilateralism is marked by three features — the relative rise in Delhi’s international standing, the breakdown of the great power consensus on economic globalisation, and the breakout of the US-China rivalry.

Efforts to tackle China

• The Trump administration has already sought to imagine the Quad’s possibilities beyond the defence domain.
• The invitation to India to join a Five Eyes meeting came amidst the bipartisan calls in the US Congress for the expansion of the forum and the inclusion of India.
• The “Quad Plus” dialogue has variously drawn in Brazil, Israel, New Zealand, South Korea, and Vietnam for consultations with the Quad members on coordinating the responses to the pandemic.
• India is also engaged with Japan and Australia in developing resilient supply chains to reduce the reliance on China.
• President Trump has proposed the expansion of G-7 grouping to include Australia, India, Russia and South Korea.
• The last few months has seen the Trump administration promote a “Clean Network” that eliminates untrustworthy vendors from telecom systems, digital apps, trans-oceanic cables and cloud infrastructure.
• Clean Network is now a broader effort to build secure technology ecosystems among like-minded countries.
• Britain is said to be developing plans to convene a coalition of 10 democracies, including India, that can contribute to the construction of secure 5G networks and reduce the current dependence on China.
• France and Canada have invited India to join the Global Partnership on artificial intelligence that now includes 15 countries.
• The objective is to promote responsible development of AI that is consistent with shared democratic values.

Conclusion

Delhi’s participation in the sweeping rearrangement of the global structures will have major consequences for India’s economic prosperity and technological future. Unlike in the past, Delhi now has the resources, leverage and political will to make a difference to the global order

The growing pace of India-US bilateral engagement has raised hopes in several quarters. However, there are several issues that must be considered and need to avoid excessive optimism. 

Timing of 2+2 dialogue

• The India-US 2+2 third meeting was held in Delhi only a week before the US presidential elections.
• The government felt that it was important to seal the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) without delay.
• Other reason could be government’s assessment that there is bipartisan support in the US for higher and positive bilateral ties.

Need for caution in India’s approach

• In India-US ties, the leading outside consideration is China.
• A Biden presidency, should that be the choice of the American people, would seek to ensure that China’s rise is not at the cost of the US’s global pre-eminence.
• However, the strategy and methods it employs would be different from that of its predecessor.
• Further, even a Trump 2 administration, with the election done, may change course in its China approach.
• Hence, caution and prudence are good diplomatic watchwords.
• It is good that the agreements for a full defence engagement with the US are in place.
• But it is one matter to have them done and an entirely different one insofar as the nature and intensity of cooperation.
• So, India’s tradition of relying on its own strengths in matters of national security should not be eroded in the hope that an outside power would provide useful inputs.

Alliance Vs. Partnership

• India-US ties are in the framework of a partnership, not an alliance.
• The partnership may not be based on opposition to an outside element, the alliance almost always is.
• Alliances also demand a much higher price than partnerships, through loss of autonomy if the ally is a bigger power.

Excessive enthusiasm on Quad may be premature

• The 2+2 joint statement does not name China but its thrust is clear.
• The Quad is based on a commonality of concerns on account of China’s actions.
• India’s decision to go along with a more purposive group, including through its maritime exercises, is in keeping with its interests.
• The real direction that the Quad will take has to await the US’s overall China strategy over the next few years.
• Excessive enthusiasm on the Quad front may, therefore, be premature.

Way forward

• India has to change the nature of its economic and commercial ties with China.
• Thus, the joint statement’s reference on the need to “enhance supply chain resilience and to seek alternatives to the current paradigm” was timely, though here, again, the future US approach is not entirely certain.
• The areas where the bilateral partnership has the potential of evolving most positively for India relate to health, education and science and technology.
• There should not be any reluctance in developing ties in defence industries, too, but it cannot be forgotten that no country will part with any of its critical technologies.
• But there cannot be a substitute for developing indigenous capacity for India’s needs for weapon systems.

Conclusion

India-US ties will move positively forward but there will be imponderables ahead, principally arising out of US strategies towards China. But, a close embrace of another country is always problematic.

The article draws parallels in the past in India and China’s engagement with West Asia and contrasts it with the present approach adopted by China in dealing with the region.

Strategic autonomy

• According to a former Foreign Secretary of India, Vijay Gokhale, the ideation of ‘strategic autonomy’ is much different from the Nehruvian era thinking of ‘non-alignment’.
• Speaking in January 2019, Mr. Gokhale said: “The alignment is issue based, and not ideological.”

India’s engagement with West Asia

• Pre-dating 2020, India’s outreach to West Asia sharpened since 2014.
•  Oil-rich Gulf states looked at India as investment alternative away from the West to deepen their own strategic depth.
• India also doubled down on its relations with the likes of Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, giving open economic and political preference to the larger Gulf region.
• While engagements with Israel moved steadily forward, Iran lagged behind, constrained by U.S. sanctions, which in turn significantly slowed the pace of India-Iran engagements.

China’s engagement with West Asia

• China’s overtures have been steadily more adventurous as it realises two major shifts that have taken place in West Asia.
• First, the thinking in the Gulf that the American security safety net is not absolute.
• Second, the Gulf economies such as Saudi Arabia, even though trying to shift away from petro dollar, will still need growing markets to sell oil to in the coming decade as they reform their economic systems.
• The obvious two markets here are China and India.

Similarity in India and China’s approach to West Asia

• Both India and China employed similar versions of ‘non-alignment’ thinking is in West Asia based on equitable engagement with the three poles of power in Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel.
• Both countries did it without getting involved into the region’s multi-layered conflicts and political fissures.
• However, deteriorating U.S.-China ties, the COVID-19 pandemic that started in China, followed by the Ladakh crisis, is forcing a drastic change in the geopolitical playbooks of the two Asian giants, and, by association, global security architectures as well.

Changing approach of China

•  A report in September shone a light on a $400 billion, 25-year understanding between Iran and China, with Beijing taking advantage of abandonment of the Iran nuclear deal.
• China is no longer happy with a passive role in West Asia, and through concepts such as “negative peace” and “peace through development”.
• In concert with tools such as the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing is now ready to offer an alternative model for “investment and influence”.
•  It remains to be seen, however, how China balances itself between the poles of power while backing one so aggressively.

Stability of the region and opportunity for India

• From India’s perspective, the overt outreach to the Gulf and the ensuing announcements of multi-billion-dollar investments on Indian shores by entities from Saudi Arabia and the UAE is only New Delhi recognising the economic realities of the region. 
• Despite entanglements in the Yemen war and general tensions between the Gulf states and Iran, the likes of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and so on have maintained relatively strong and stable economic progression.
• Israel’s recent peace accords with the UAE and Bahrain add much further weight towards a more stable Gulf region — the caveats withstanding that the operationalisation of the accords is smooth and long-lasting.

Consider the question “Despite turbulence in the region, India’s engagement with West Asia has always been characterised by non-alignment and ethos of equitable engagement. In light of this, elaborate on India’s approach to the region and region’s importance for India.”

Conclusion

While in the recent past, the Indo-Pacific, with the development of the Quad, has taken centre stage, other geographies such as West Asia have also started to showcase bolder examples of New Delhi and Beijing’s metamorphosing approaches towards the international arena.

Changing geopolitical factors have accelerated further the deepening of India-US ties. The article analyses the current circumstances and evolution of the bilateral relations.

Background against which 2+2 dialogue taking place

• The 2+2 dialogue between India and the United States in Delhi this week marks an important moment in bilateral relations.
• The 2+2 dialogue comes just three weeks after the foreign ministers of the Quad — or the Quadrilateral Security Framework — met in Tokyo.
• It also takes place amidst a profound structural shift in great power politics as well as turbulence in the international economic order intensified by the coronavirus pandemic.
• The dialogue follows India’s first-ever participation in a meeting of the exclusive Five Eyes grouping that facilitates intelligence-sharing among the US, Canada, UK, Australia and New Zealand.
• A few days ago, Delhi announced the much-awaited expansion of the annual Malabar exercises to include Australia.

Background of the past engagements

• Signing the historic civil nuclear initiative ended India’s prolonged atomic isolation in the world laid the outline of a broader framework for security cooperation.
• Due to the deep divisions within the national security establishment, the leadership and some political constraints faced by the government, the coalition broke up.
•  The focus was on keeping visible distance from the US in the name of non-alignment, strategic autonomy, and the quest for a multipolar world.
• The relationship survived those years, thanks to the US’s perseverance.

3 Factors responsible for rapid progress in the US-India ties

1) Chines aggression on northern border

• The huge military crisis on the northern borders with China that is well into the sixth month is the first factor.
• In the past, India avoided closer security ties with the US in deference to Beijing’s sensitivities.
• In contrast, the government now has refused to pay heed to Chinese sensitivities over its policy on security cooperation with the US.

2) Disruption caused by the corona pandemic

• The coronavirus has sharpened the US debate on the dangers of excessive economic interdependence on China.
• Meanwhile, India has begun to reduce its commercial ties to Beijing in response to the PLA’s Ladakh aggression.
• This has created the conditions for a new conversation between India and the US on rearranging global supply chains away from China.
• So, the Quad Plus conversations have drawn in Brazil, Israel, New Zealand, South Korea and Vietnam with a view to rearrange the global supply chain.

3) Focus on critical technologies

• Third factor is critical technologies like artificial intelligence that promise to transform most aspects of modern life — including security, political economy and social order.
• Delhi and Washington are now focused on finding ways to collaborate on the critical technologies of the 21st century and work with their partners in setting new global rules for managing them.

Conclusion

As the regional and global order faces multiple transitions, the incentives for Delhi and Washington to sustain and advance India-US partnership are stronger than ever before and will continue into the next administration.

Though it is the election held in the US for the election of the US President, it is closely followed throughout the world given the dominant position of that country in the world and impact of the US Presidents decision on the world. This article analyses the implications for India in both the scenarios re-election of Trump or Joe Biden winning the election.

Implications for India

• Broader foreign policy decisions will have significant implications for India.
• Particularly consequential will be how a second Trump administration or a Biden administration perceive and approach China and, relatedly, the question of America’s role in the world.
• The outcome will depend on the choices that the next American president makes on key personnel and policies.

Analysing Trump administration’s approach to China from India’s perspective

• The Trump administration’s more hawkish view of China broadly converges with Indian concerns about a rising China’s actions and intentions.
• And it has facilitated the Trump administration to assign India an important role in its strategic framework, including through the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept.
• This has laid the basis for defence and security cooperation, helped to manage differences with Delhi on trade, Russia, Iran, and human rights, and vocal American support for India in the ongoing crisis with China.
• Unlike India’s subtler approach to highlighting Beijing’s malign behaviour, the administration’s more explicit one has put a global spotlight on Chinese assertiveness.
• However, there are aspects of President Trump’s China approach that have caused concerns in Delhi.
• There has been concern about Trump striking a deal with Chinese leader Xi Jinping since summit in April 2017.
• The administration subsequently pivoted to competition with China that summer.
• Concerns have also been raised due to neglect in the Trump administration of developments related to Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Huawei/ZTE.
• The other aspects of Trump’s China approach that have given Delhi pause are its ideological dimensions, as well as responses like tariffs that have hurt India too.
• On the similar lines American withdrawal from international institutions and agreements that has served to benefit Beijing.
• The China prism has had its limits — it has not, for instance, resulted in concessions to India on trade and immigration.

What would be Joe Biden’s to approach towards China and implications for India

• And there is recognition among most Democrats that the US-China relationship today is different from what it was in 2009, 2012 or 2016.
• An Obama administration China hand noted that opinion in the US on approach to China has “moved from balancing co-operation and competition, to competition and confrontation”.
• But what a Biden administration sees as the terms of strategic competition with China and how it might choose to blend in cooperation will have implications for India.
• Its outcome will depend in part on the president’s views, who holds key foreign and economic policy positions, as well as Beijing’s approach.
• India will closely watch how Biden might respond to any overtures from Beijing.
• It will particularly worry about any signs that Washington would be willing to limit competition or criticism in return for Chinese cooperation on certain administration priorities.
• More broadly, it will look at whether Biden administration’s Asia policy derives from its China policy or vice versa.
• Other aspects of Biden’s preferred approach might suit India, for instance:
• 1) acting collectively with allies and partners rather than unilaterally,
• 2) Not imposing tariffs that hit allies and partners along with China,
• 3) Recommitting to international organisations in ways that could blunt Chinese influence.
• India might also broadly approve of — and could benefit from — the 3Ds of a Biden foreign policy: Domestic (renewal), deterrence, and democracy.
•  If a Biden administration sees engagement with China on climate change, global health security and non-proliferation as a priority that will complicate the Indian government’s options and require adjustments.
• Moreover, with either Trump or Biden, foreign economic policy choices and budgetary ones for example, spending at home versus abroad will have crucial implications for India.

Conclusion

India will need to consider what America’s choice on November 3 will mean for American power and purpose — because assessments of that could determine how Beijing decides to act in the region and globally.

While highlighting the importance of navy for India, the article examines the need to define the role and relation between the Quad and Malabar.

The salience of navy for India

• It took confrontation in the Himalayas to bring focus on India’s maritime domain clearly indicates that the salience of maritime power is not yet understood in India.
• On its northern and western fronts, India faces a formidable challenge and can at best hope for stalemate due to two factors :
• 1) Economic, military and technological asymmetry between China and India.
• 2) Active China-Pakistan nexus.
• Attention has, therefore, been focused on the maritime domain, where it is believed that India may have some cards to play.
•  While preparing to fight its own battles with determination, it is time for India to seek external balancing (read Quad) — best done via the maritime domain.

Evolution of Malabar Exercise

• Above is the backdrop against which one must see the progressive evolution of Exercise “Malabar”,
• At beginning, it was a bilateral event involving just the Indian and US navies.
• It became tri-lateral with the inclusion of Japan in 2015.
• And now it has transformed into a four-cornered naval drill that will also include Australia.
• Apart from its geo-political significance for the Indo-Pacific, this development poses two conundrums.
• Firstly, given the same composition, what is the distinction, now, between “Malabar” and the “Quad”?
• Secondly, does Malabar 2020 mark the release of Australia from China’s thralldom?

Defining the roles and relation betwee Malabar and Quad

• The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or Quad has its roots in the Core Group of four senior diplomats representing the US, India, Japan and Australia.
• The group was formed to coordinate relief efforts after the Great Asian Tsunami of December 26, 2004.
• The present Quad has obviously retained this tradition and its members have neither created a charter nor invested it with any substance.
• The Quad is 16 years old now, and Malabar 28.
• Both have served a useful purpose, and a reappraisal of the roles and relationship of the Quad-Malabar concepts is, therefore, overdue.
• Since it is India which faces a “clear and present danger”, it should boldly take the initiative to do so.

Need for the Indo-Pacific Concord

•  In order to rein in China’s hegemonic urges, there is need for affected nations to come together to show their solidarity and determination in a common cause.
• In this context, there is need to create a broad-based “Indo-Pacific Concord”, of like-minded regional democracies.
• This should be an organisation with a maritime security charter, which has no offensive or provocative connotations.
• Using the Quad and Malabar templates, a shore-based secretariat can be established in a central location like Port Blair, in the Andaman Islands, which would schedule and conduct periodic multinational naval exercises.
• The exercises could be structured to hone the skills of participating navies in specialisations like humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, countering non-traditional threats, undertaking search-and-rescue operations and establishing networked maritime domain awareness.
• The Concord could also designate forces to uphold maritime security or “good order at sea”.

What Australia joining Quad means

•  The prospect of Australia belatedly joining the Quad is expected to reinforce the Quad and enhance its credibility.
• But there are reasons for India to be circumspect it.
• Memories are still alive of its past political ambivalence towards India, its criticism of our naval expansion and its vociferous condemnation of the 1998 nuclear tests.
• Nor should one overlook Beijing’s recent influence on Australia’s foreign policy.
• This influence on Australia’s foreing policy caused it to flip-flop over the sale of uranium to India as well as its peremptory withdrawal from the Quad in 2008.

Implications of singing of BECA with the U.S.

• India signing the BECA (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement) with the US last of the four “foundational agreements” would enhance interoperability between the respective militaries.
• However, there is need to pay heed to two valid concerns:
• 1) Regarding the possible compromise of information impinging on India’s security.
• 2) Whether these agreements will barter away the last vestiges of India’s strategic autonomy.

Consider the question “The changing geopolitical equations has necessitated the formation of Indo-Pacific Concord by the democracies of the region.” In light of this, elaborate on India’s role in Quad and its implications for the region”

Conclusion

Indians, given our history, should never lose sight of the truism in international relations, that it is the unerring pursuit of national interests that guides the actions and policies of every nation.