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Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • Pakistan’s new Political Map

    Recently Pakistani PM announced a new political map of Pakistan.

    Do you think that the recent launch of new political maps depicting Indian territories by Pakistan would make any difference on the international community’s stance on Kashmir?

    A chain reaction

    • With this, Pakistan became the third country to launch a new political map after India and Nepal did the same.
    • India had reiterated its territorial claims in J&K, and Ladakh with the new map; this triggered a reaction from Nepal which contested Indian claims in the Kalapani region of Pithoragarh district.

    What are the features of the new map?

    • The new political map of Pakistan has claimed the entire region of Jammu and Kashmir stretching all the way to the edge of Ladakh.
    • The map also claims Junagarh and Manavadar, a former princely State and territory, respectively that are part of present-day Gujarat.
    • Pakistan also claimed the entire territory and water bodies that fall in the Sir Creek region in the westernmost part of India.

    Defiance of old agreements

    • The territorial claims of Pakistan are, however, of a far greater extent and challenge many of the past understandings and treaties.
    • This clearly runs counter to the Simla Agreement which treated Kashmir as a bilateral matter.
    • It leaves out a claim line at the eastern end of J&K indicating Pakistan’s willingness to make China a third party in the Kashmir issue.

    How different is it from previous ones?

    • A similar map has been part of school textbooks of Pakistan for many years which highlights the territorial aspiration of Pakistan over the northern part of the subcontinent.
    • The document also maintains bits of reality on the ground as it shows the Line of Control in Kashmir in a red-dotted line.
    • The map may be used to provide legal cover for some of Islamabad’s territorial ambitions, especially in Kashmir and Sir Creek.

    A Cartographical warfare

    • The map is likely to lead to changes in Pakistan’s position on territorial disputes with India.
    • By demanding the entire J&K region, Pak is changing the main features of its Kashmir discourse as it includes the Jammu region prominently.
    • The inclusion of Junagarh and Manavadar opens fundamental issues of territorial sovereignty of India.
    • Manavadar, a princely territory, joined India on February 15, 1948, and Indian troops marched into Junagarh in September that year incorporating it into Indian Territory.
    • By normalizing Islamabad’s claims over these former princely territories, Pakistan is most likely to assert its rights over the former princely State of Hyderabad as well.

    What does Pakistan plan to gain by this exercise?

    • Sir Creek is a collection of water bodies that extend from the Arabian Sea deep inside the territory of Kutch and is rich in biodiversity and mangrove forests.
    • India’s position on Sir Creek is based on the Kutch arbitration case of 1966-69.
    • The new map can be used to reassert Pakistan’s claims regarding the Rann which it had lost in the arbitration conducted in Geneva.
    • India’s position regarding Sir Creek is based on the fact that the arbitration had granted the entire Rann and its marshy areas to India while leaving the solid land across the Rann to Pakistan.
    • By demanding the demarcation to shift towards the eastern bank, Pakistan appears to be going back also on the spirit of the Rann of Kutch arbitration where the overwhelming evidence of maps supported India’s claims.

    Are there any claims on its western borders?

    • The map is silent about territorial claims in the west and northwest of Pakistan.
    • It indicates Islamabad’s acceptance of the Durand Line as the border with Afghanistan.
    • The reality on the ground, however, shows problems that continue to haunt Pakistan on that front as well where law and order have been difficult to maintain because of free movement of armed fighters.
    • A deadly clash between Afghan civilians and Pakistani troops near its Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province is a usual discourse.
    • The resultant situation has placed Afghan and Pakistani troops in a confrontational position.

  • Global coalition of democracies amid Chinese assertion

    In the recent speed Mike Pompeo, the US Secretary of State, floated the idea of an ‘alliance of democracies’. This article discusses its implications for India.

    Two propositions on China

    • The US Secretary of State laid out two propositions.
    • One is that nearly five decades of US engagement with China have arrived at a dead-end.
    • Second is that the US can’t address the China challenge alone and called for collective action.
    • He mused on whether “it’s time for a new grouping of like-minded nations, a new alliance of democracies.”

    How it matters for India?

    • Both the propositions signal the breakdown of the relationship between the world’s two most important powers.
    • They also reflect on the need to create new frameworks to cope with emerging global challenges.
    • China, is a large neighbour of India and America, is India’s most important partner makes the new context rather different from the Cold War.

    Concerns for India in the propositions

    •  Many in Delhi would like to know if the current direction of China policy will endure if Joe Biden wins the presidential election in November.
    • India must pay close attention to the unfolding China debate in the US.
    • India also note the structural changes in American engagement with China over the last two decades.
    •  Delhi will certainly avoid calling the group proposed by US Secretary of State an “alliance”.
    • India would rather have it described as a “coalition of democracies”.

    Idea of ‘Coalition of democracies’

    • Over the last many years, India has become comfortable with the idea of a political partnership with the world’s leading democracies.
    • India also supported past US initiatives like-Clinton Administrations “Community of Democracies”, Bush Administrations democracy promotion fund at the UN.
    • Delhi has also welcomed President Trump’s initiative to convene an expanded gathering of the G-7 leaders.
    • The idea of democracies working together has an enduring appeal for the US.
    • India figures in this American vision is relatively new. So is Delhi’s readiness to reciprocate.

    Consider the question “In the ongoing geopolitical situation the U.S. has proposed the idea of ‘alliance of democracies’. Where does India feature in this vision and what are the implications of it for India.”

    Conclusion

    Constructing a global coalition of democracies will take much work and quite some time. But engaging with that initiative, amidst the rise and assertion of China, should open a whole range of new possibilities for Indian foreign and security policies.

    Original article:

    https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/us-india-democracy-china-cold-war-global-economy-6526409/

  • Indian foreign policy and decline in soft power in neighbourhood

    The article examines the issue of declining political capital in India’s neighbourhood and the factors responsible for this. 

    India’s standing in neighbourhood: Past

    • Not long ago, India was seen as a natural rising power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region.
    • It was the de facto leader of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
    • It has historical and cultural ties with Nepal.
    • It enjoyed traditional goodwill and influence in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.
    • It had made investments worth billions of dollars in Afghanistan and cultivated vibrant ties with the post-Taliban stakeholders in Kabul.
    • It had committed itself to multilateralism and the Central Asian connectivity project, with Iran being its gateway.
    • It was competing and cooperating with China at the same time.

    India’s relations in with the neighbourhood: Present

    • India is perhaps facing its gravest national security crisis in 20 years, with China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
    • SAARC is defunct.
    • Nepal has turned hostile having adopted a new map and revived border disputes with India.
    • Sri Lanka has tilted towards China.
    • Bangladesh is clearly miffed at the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019.
    • When Afghanistan is undergoing a major transition, India is out of the multi-party talks.
    • Iran has inaugurated a railway link project connecting the Chabahar port, on the Gulf of Oman, to Zahedan.

    What are the factors responsible for this?

    When we dig deep, three problems can be found which are more or less linked to this decline.

    1) Alignment with US

    • As India started moving away from non-alignment, there has been a steady erosion in India’s strategic autonomy.
    • India’s official policy is that it is committed to multilateralism.
    •  When India started deepening its partnership with the United States, New Delhi began steadily aligning its policies with U.S. interests.
    • The case of Iran is the best example.
    • India’s deepening defence and military ties with the U.S.  probably altered Beijing’s assessment of India.
    • One of the reasons for the shift could be Beijing’s assessment that India has already become a de facto ally of the U.S.
    • The forceful altering of the status quo on the border is a risky message as much to New Delhi as it is to Washington.

    2) Domestic politics

    • The passing of the CAA is regionalisation of the domestic problems of the countries in India’s neighbourhood.
    • Bangladesh took offence at the CAA and the National Register of Citizens, there were anti-India protests even in Afghanistan.
    • CAA also drove new wedges between India and the countries that had a Muslim majority and were friendly to India in the neighbourhood.
    • The abrogation of the special status of Jammu and Kashmir was another such move.
    • But it damaged India’s reputation as a responsible democratic power and gave propaganda weapons to Pakistan.
    • The change of status quo in Jammu and Kashmir, could be another factor that prompted the Chinese to move aggressively towards the border in Ladakh.

    3) Misplaced confidence

    • Great powers wait to establish their standing before declaring that they have arrived.
    • China bided its time for four decades before it started taking on the mighty U.S.
    • India should learn from at least these modern examples.
    • If it did, it would not have used high-handedness in Nepal during the country’s constitutional crisis and caused a traditional and civilisational ally to turn hostile.
    • The updated political map which India released in November rubbed salt into the wound on the Nepal border.

    Consider the question “India’s standing in its neighbourhood has been on the decline for some time now. Examine the factors responsible for this.”

    Conclusion

    To address the current crises, India has to reconsider its foreign policy trajectory. It does not lack resources to claim what is its due in global politics. What it lacks is strategic depth.

    Original article:

    https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/needed-a-map-for-indias-foreign-policy/article32206877.ece

  • Deepening ties with South Korea

    South Korea’s technological advancement and manufacturing capabilities can be helpful in India’s economic growth and human resource development. Seoul’s successful development story of the last few decades can complement Modi’s vision of making a “New India” by 2022.

  • India should not jump to conclusion in dealing with Iran

    Two events which happened in quick succession raised concern in India. Iran’s decision to continue the railway project on its own and the reports of deal with China, both the events weighs heavily on India’s interests. This article examines the future course of action which India must adopt in such a situation.

    Context

    • Iran and China are close to concluding a 25-year strategic partnership.
    • This is being linked to reports that Iran has decided to undertake the construction of the Chabahar-Zahedan railway line on its own.
    • The project has not been handed over to China — at least not yet — so the “India loses, China wins” narrative is premature.

    What does the China-Iran deal indicate?

    • China attaches importance to Iran, which is a key source of energy supplies, a part of Belt and Road Initiative, and a potentially lucrative market.
    • However, like India, China has also in parallel cultivated closer relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
    • China continues to have a strong relationship with Israel.
    • As China’s economic, military and technological capabilities have increased, its profile in this strategically important region has also expanded.

    What should be India foreign policy approach towards Iran

    • While acknowledging changed regional geopolitical landscape, India should pursue continue the policy of maintaining positive relations with Iran, the Arab states and Israel.
    • India will have more room for manoeuvring in the region by continuing to maintain a strong and friendly relationship with Iran.
    • One should also not exclude the possibility of a Democratic US President reviving the Iran nuclear deal.
    •  The revival of the deal will open the door for US and European companies to resume business with Iran.
    • It is the reinstatement of severe economic sanctions that has led Iran to turn to China, but the latter has remained cautious.
    • The pursuit of a closer security partnership with the US does not mean that India should follow the US lead on its other important relationships.

    Concerns for India

    • While maintaining the relations, India should not monitor closely the development of relations between China and Iran, which could complicate our security interests on our western flank. 
    • Of particular concern is a reference to China constructing a new port at Jask at the mouth of the Hormuz strait.
    •  If the port were operated by China, India’s maritime security would be at further risk.
    • It would also be of deep concern to the Arab states who will suffer from any closing of the Hormuz Strait while Iran remains less affected.
    • This is an issue on which the Arab states may well react adversely to China.
    • India, too, should press its concerns on Iran while working on a counter-strategy.

    Consider the question “Balancing the contrasts has been the basis of India’s relations with Iran. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    India should continue its engagement with Iran while pressing for its concerns at the same time in particular when it comes to Iran’s relations with China endangering India’s interest.

  • Exploring options to tackle China

    There are several options which India could explore in dealing with China with less cost but significant effectiveness. Diplomacy is one of them. What are the other options? Read the article to know…

    Context

    • China’s aggression and Galwan valley incident dismantles the Border Agreements of 1993, 1996, 2005 and 2013.
    • Understanding China’s objectives become critical in this situation.

    Analysing China’s objectives

    • Humbling India in the eyes of Asia and the world was all important for China.
    • Despite China’s territorial aggression, it would be a mistake to think that China is preparing for a conflict over territory.
    • China is well aware that it cannot be certain whether it will emerge a victor from an all-out conflict with India.
    •  China cannot afford to jeopardise its future for the present.
    • China has been intent on transforming the Asian region in its own image, and, simultaneously, seeking to become a continental and a maritime power.

    What are the options to deal with China

    • India may well find non-military tools not only more cost-effective but also less risky.
    • 1)  Exploiting the current widespread opposition to China, India must try to create international opinion in its support regarding border violations.
    • 2) Cultivation of foreign leaders with a view to draw their specific attention to China’s aggressive policies and designs is the second option.
    • India’s involvement with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) should prove invaluable in this respect.
    • 3) India must also overhaul its ‘messaging’ capacity.
    • It should make greater use of technology to send across its message and ideas in its vicinity and across the globe, highlighting its peaceful intentions in stark contrast to China’s aggressive policies and tactics.
    • 4)  India must pay particular attention to relations with countries in its neighbourhood, such as Nepal and Bangladesh, and allies such as Iran and Vietnam.
    • Relationship with these countries seems to have frayed at the edges, with India being more intent on strengthening relations with the West.
    • Smaller countries of Asia, which constantly face China’s aggressive interference in their internal affairs, have not received much support from India, and this needs India’s attention.
    • 5) India’s true strength is its unity in diversity. A truly united and resilient India is the best antidote to China’s attempts to humble India.
    • China has never been able to properly understand, the strength India seems to derive from its spiritual, religious and cultural attributes, which are a part of its civilisational heritage.
    • 6) India would do well to take pole position in propagating ‘Himalayan Buddhism’ which China has been seeking to subvert to achieve its ends.

    Consider the question “To counter the challenges manifested by China through recent events India needs to explore along with other options the subtler tools of power available to it. Examine the other tools available with India.”

    Conclusion

    Military no doubt project the country’s power but there are other options with less cost and significant benefits. India should focus on these options as well while dealing with China.

  • Costs of neglecting new Arabian business

    The article contrasts the over-emphasis put on the ties with Iran with the neglect of ties with Arab countries in India’s foreign policy. It explores the inherent difficulties in dealing with Iran. And opportunities for India in Arab countries.

    Context

    • Iran is accorded high priority in India’s foreign policy.
    • This stands in stark contrast to the under-appreciation of relationship with Arab countries.

    Reasons for a special relationship with Iran

    • Historical connections.
    • Civilisational bonds.
    • Energy supplies.
    • Regional security.
    • Geographic and demographic size, the geopolitical location next door.
    • Natural resources and the extraordinary talents of its people.

    Importance of Arab countries for India

    • Millions of Indian immigrants in the Arab nations.
    • Massive hard currency remittances from them, and the density of commercial engagement with the Arab Gulf is important for India.
    • The UAE and Saudi Arabia have, in recent years, extended invaluable support in countering terrorism and blocked attempts to condemn India in the Muslim world.

    Let’s analyse the issue of railway contract in Iran

    • Large countries with major foreign investments and projects win some and lose some.
    • Then there is no escaping the political risk associated with foreign projects.
    • And politics, both domestic and international, is all-consuming in Iran.
    • The sanctions regime imposed by the US has crippled the Iranian economy.
    • India is careful not to attract the US sanctions.
    • India did gain an exemption from the US sanctions regime for its participation in the Chabahar port project in Iran.
    • But they don’t apply to some of the partners suggested by Iran in the railway project.
    • So, Iran would like India to break the US sanctions regime.
    • A prudent India is resisting that temptation.
    • It would rather lose the railway contract than get into the raging crossfire between the US and Iran.

    Issue of balancing the relations with Iran and U.S.

    • India’s Iran policy cannot be seen as a test of India’s “strategic autonomy”.
    • Some expect Delhi to conduct its relationship with Iran without a reference to either a cost-benefit calculus or Iran’s troubled relationship with others with whom India has important partnerships.
    • No government in Delhi can buy into that proposition.
    • Criticism of the government policy is similar to what happened in 2005 over India’s stance on Iran’s covert nuclear programme.
    • Delhi’s vote against Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency drew criticism.
    • But governments stand proved right when Iran concluded a nuclear deal of its own with the US and major powers, a decade later.
    • Iran surely can take care of its own interests, and there is little reason why Delhi must back Tehran in every one of its fights with Washington.

    India should focus on Arab countries

    • The Arab world has had its doors open for political, economic and technological cooperation with India.
    • Three moderate Arab nations — Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE — are confronting radical forces in the region and are valuable partners for India in countering forces of destabilisation.
    •  There is real Chinese economic action in the Arab world as the region embraces China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
    • India is no minor economic force in the Arab world, having had a much longer engagement with the region than China.
    • Delhi must up its own commercial game in the Arab world, and one of the new possibilities for India lies in the domain of new technologies.
    • There is emerging sentiment among the Gulf Arabs to reduce the over-dependence on oil, promote alternative energy sources, invest in higher education, and develop technology hubs.

    Consider the question “India’s relations with Iran has always been driven by the geopolitical contexts. This poses an inherent challenge for both countries. In light of this examine the importance of Iran for India and challenges India’s foreign policy faces in dealing with Iran.”

    Conclusion

    India must focus on elevating India’s economic partnership with the Arab world to the next level. For India, the costs of neglecting the new possibilities for wide-ranging Arabian business are far higher than a lost railway contract in Iran.

  • Changing dynamics in China-Pakistan collusion against India

    India has always been aware of the China-Pak collusion and their mutual support to each others’ actions. But the underlying basis has been changing now. It is no longer Pakistan seeking Chinese support in J&K as much as it is the other way around.

    Preparedness for a two-front war

    • The debate regarding India’s capability to fight a war in which there is full collusion between China and Pakistan has generally remained inconclusive.
    • Most detractors of the belief regarding China’s military-operational support to Pakistan, have leaned on the argument that China will adopt a policy to suit its interests.
    • Both in 1965 and 1971, China made some promises to Pakistan but chose to stay away.
    • Of course, that was during the Cold War — a completely different international strategic environment.

    China-Pakistan collection action in Kashmir

    • Pakistan increased its proxy campaign in J&K almost in sync with two China-related trends.
    • First, enhanced PLA assertiveness in Eastern Ladakh.
    • Second, the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
    • A progressively altering Chinese attitude towards the Kashmir issue started to take shape as early as 2008-09, with issuing stapled visas to Indians residing in J&K and denial of a visa to the Northern Army Commander were signs of it.
    • This support was also witnessed on issues like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Pakistan’s involvement in global terrorism and the abrogation of Article 370.

    Pincer approach in Ladakh

    • It is no longer Pakistan seeking Chinese support for its adventurism as much as it is the other way around.
    • The mutuality of interests has increased and military coordination has become a larger part of the overall strategy.
    • China may force further escalation this season depending upon how the world responds to its expansionism.
    • China could also adopt a posture which prepares it, along with Pakistan, towards a future “pincer approach” in Ladakh.
    • Along with Ladakh — Arunachal, Sikkim and the Central Sector are very part of the expanded collusive strategy.
    • But it is Ladakh where the effect is intended most and it is there that the pincer approach may prove more challenging for India.

    Suggestions for India

    • Assuming that confrontation with the Sino-Pak combine is inevitable now or later, one of the ways for India to offset this is to project sufficient capability.
    • The diplomatic and military domains have to play this out effectively.
    • India cannot be seen to be alone or militarily weak.
    • It has tremendous support internationally which must translate into a higher level of strategic support.
    • Militarily, Pakistan should never be able to perceive that it will be allowed to fight as per choice and conceived strategy.
    • China’s success or failure in such adventurism will set the course of its future strategy against its multiple adversaries.
    • That is the psyche which India must exploit to prevent escalation and win this and impending standoffs without fighting.
    • This needs a rapid and all-out national effort with the highest priority accorded to it, including budgeting.

    Conclusion

    India cannot afford to focus only on the northern borders. A firm and full strategy to deal with Pakistan in all contingencies has now become imperative.

  • Concerns over Australia in the Malabar Exercise

    While the idea of inviting Australia to join Malabar is being explored, we must not forget the concerns with it. This article examines such concerns.

    Context

    • India’s Ministry of Defence discussed the issue of adding Australia to the trilateral Malabar naval exercise.
    • If materialised, it will be the first time since 2007 that all members of Quad-India, U.S., Japan and Australia will participate in a joint military drill.

    Possible consequences of the move

    • The Chinese leadership sees the maritime Quadrilateral as an Asian-NATO that seeks only to contain China’s rise.
    •  India’s intention to involve Australia in the Malabar drill could only be construed as a move directed against Beijing.

    India’s perspective

    • Following the stand-off in Ladakh, many Indian analysts believe the time is right for India to shed its traditional defensiveness in the maritime domain.
    • The realists advocate an alliance with the U.S., Japan and Australia to counter Chinese moves in the Indian Ocean.

    Concerns

    1) Contrary message to China

    • While India and China are negotiating a truce, Australia’s participation in the Malabar exercise sends contrary signals to Beijing.
    • If China responded aggressively in the Eastern Indian Ocean, it could needlessly open up a new front in the India-China conflict.

    2) Only modest gains for India

    • U.S. and its Pacific partners want to form a maritime coalition to implement a ‘rules-based order’ in the Indo-Pacific littorals.
    • India’s priority is to acquire strategic capabilities to counter a Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
    •  Indian Navy is yet to develop the undersea capability to deter Chinese submarines in the eastern Indian Ocean.
    • With U.S. defence companies hesitant to share proprietary technology the gains for India, in exchange for signing up the ‘military-quad’, are modest.
    • Without strategic technology transfers, Indian Navy’s deterrence potential in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) will not improve much.

    3) Operational issue: India will be drawn into power dynamics of the Asia-Pacific

    • With the strategic contest between the U.S. and China, there is every possibility that the military-Quad will be used to draw India into the security dynamics of the Asia-Pacific.
    • The U.S. would expect its Indo-Pacific partners, including India, to assist the U.S. Navy in its South China Sea endeavour.
    •  The U.S. and Japanese navies have little spare capacity for sustained surveillance and deterrence operations in the IOR.
    • Australia is an exception and is ready and able to partner India in securing the Eastern Indian Ocean.

    4) Timing

    • A balancing coalition must come together at a time when the nature and magnitude of the threat are wholly manifest.
    • But, despite a growing presence in the Indian Ocean, the Chines Navy is yet to physically threaten Indian interests at sea.
    • So, the onus of the first move to precipitate a crisis in the Eastern Indian Ocean lies with the Indian Navy.

    Conclusion

    Upgrading the trilateral Malabar to a quadrilateral, without acquiring the requisite combat and deterrence capability, could yield gains for India in the short term, but would prove ineffective in the long run.

  • Iran ties need quiet diplomacy

    India ties with Iran are significant for more than one reasons. Two countries share cultural bonds, Iran holds a special place when it comes to India’s energy security. Yet, India often finds itself in a difficult position as it tries to walk the tightrope between the U.S. sanction and maintaining the relations with Iran. 

    Context

    • Concerns were raised in India over its exclusion by Iran from the 628 km long rail link between Chabahar and Zahidan.
    • Iran has since clarified that it is not the case and India could join the project at a later stage.
    • It happened just as China and Iran were close to signing a deal on an economic and security partnership.

    Importance of Chabahar and the rail link

    • Chabahar could provide connectivity for Afghanistan through Iran in order to lessen its dependence on Karachi port.
    • This plan has enjoyed support in Delhi, Kabul and Tehran since 2003.
    •  Road and rail links from Chabahar to Zahidan and then 200 km further on to Zaranj in Afghanistan, need to be built.

    Progress on the project

    • Iran was under sanctions during 2005-13, so there was little progress.
    •  Meanwhile, India concentrated on the 220 km road to connect Zaranj to Delaram on the Herat highway, and completed it in 2008.
    • After the sanctions on Iran eased in 2015,  A memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed with Iran in 2016.
    • This MoU aimed to equip and operate two terminals at the Shahid Beheshti port as part of Phase I of the project.
    • The Trilateral Agreement on Establishment of International Transport and Transit Corridor between Afghanistan, Iran and India was signed.
    • In addition to $85 million of capital investment, India also committed to providing a line of credit of $150 million for port container tracks.
    • Phase I was declared operational in 2018 and India’s wheat shipments to Afghanistan have been using this route.
    • A special economic zone (SEZ) at Chabahar was planned but re-imposition of U.S. sanctions has slowed investments into the SEZ.
    • India was given a waiver from U.S. sanctions to continue cooperation on Chabahar.
    •  Despite the waiver, the project has suffered delays.

    Growing Iran-China relations

    • In 2016, just as sanctions were eased, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Tehran and proposed a long-term comprehensive, strategic partnership.
    • Iran kept the negotiations going for years because of reluctance to grow too close to China.
    • Meanwhile, tensions in the region have been growing since last year with missile strikes in Saudi Arabia and a U.S. drone strike killing Gen. Qassim Soleimani.
    • As a veto-wielding member, China can help Iran at the UNSC.
    • Even so, the Iran- China comprehensive, strategic partnership road map has run into opposition in the Majlis[Iranian Parliament].

    India’s concerns over Iran-China deal

    • What is alarming for New Delhi is that Beijing is also concluding a security and military partnership with Tehran.
    • Initial reports in Iran have suggested China will deploy 5,000 security personnel to protect its projects in Iran.
    • Some reports suggest Kish Island in the Persian Gulf, located at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz, maybe “sold” to China.
    • With a growing Chinese presence, India is also concerned about its strategic stakes around the Chabahar port project.

    Way forward for India

    • Though China has a greater capacity to resist U.S. sanctions, Iran realises the advantage of working with India as it enjoys a sanctions waiver from the U.S. for Chabahar.
    • Iran and India also share an antipathy to a Taliban takeover in Afghanistan.
    • This is why Iran would like to keep the door open.
    • Nevertheless, India needs to improve its implementation record of infrastructure projects in its neighbourhood.
    • There are numerous tales of Indian cooperation projects in Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, etc suffering delays and cost overruns that only make it easier for China to expand its footprint in India’s neighbourhood.

    Consider the question “India-Iran ties circumscribed by each other’s compulsion and geopolitical constraints. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    India should continue to remain politically engaged with Iran so that there is a better appreciation of each other’s sensitivities and compulsions.

    With inputs from:

    https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-in-china-iran-indias-concerns-6511177/