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Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • US Secretary of state Visit to India

    Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo makes his way to India next week, exactly a week before the election. This article discusses the various aspects that could form the part of the discussion.

    Difference in U.S’s and India’s position on Quad

    • He has stated that meeting in India “would include discussions about how free nations can work together to thwart threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party”.
    • Just a few weeks ago, at the Quad Foreign Ministers meeting, U.S. Secretary of State had called for collaboration to protect people and partners from the Chinese Communist Party’s exploitation, corruption, and coercion.
    •  In contrast, India has maintained that its membership of the Quad is aligned to its Indo-Pacific policy, and by no means directed against any country.
    • While Chines aggression is changing India’s priorities, any shift in India’s position on the Quad at the U.S.’s prompting must also benefit India.

    What should be the part of U.S.-India collaboration

    • It is critical to study just how India hopes to collaborate with the U.S. on the challenge that Beijing poses on each of India’s three fronts: at the LAC, in the maritime sphere, and in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) region surrounding India.
    • On the maritime sphere, discussions will include strengthening ties in the Indo-Pacific, enhancing joint military exercises like the ‘Malabar’ and completing the last of the “foundational agreements” with the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation (BECA).
    • In Male, the U.S. has announced a defence agreement that will pave the way for a strategic dialogue.
    • And unlike in the past, India has not objected this agreement with Male for entering in its area of influence in the Indian Ocean Region, as it will allow the U.S. to counter Chinese influence there.
    • With Sri Lanka the U.S. is in discussions on infrastructure projects, and progress on its “Millenium Challenge Corporation” (MCC) offer of a five-year aid grant of about $480 million.
    • At a time when India is delaying Sri Lanka’s requests for debt relief, given its own economic constraints, the U.S. aid offer will be seen as one way of staving off China’s inroads into Sri Lanka.
    • Most important will be how the U.S. and India can collaborate on dealing with India’s most immediate, continental challenge from China: at the LAC.
    • Apart from enhancing and expediting U.S. defence sales to India, there is must the U.S. could promise to India.
    • The U.S. must also commit to keeping the pressure on Pakistan on terrorism, despite the U.S. need for Pakistan’s assistance in Afghan-Taliban talks.
    • A firm U.S. statement in this regard may also disperse the pressure the Indian military faces in planning for a “two-front” conflict with China.

    Resolving other key issues with the U.S.

    • Resolution of Trade issues, an area the Trump administration has been particularly tough, and restoration of India’s Generalised System of Preferences status for exporters should also be priority.
    • The government could press for more cooperation on 5G technology sharing, or an assurance that its S-400 missile system purchase from Russia will receive an exemption from CAATSA sanctions.

    Conclusion

    By inviting Secretary of State this close to the U.S. elections, New Delhi has taken a calculated and bold gamble, however, our leaders must drive a harder bargain to consolidate the pay-offs from the visit.

    Back2Basics: What is CAATSA?

    • The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) is a U.S. federal law that imposes economic sanctions on Iran, Russia and North Korea.
    • The bill came into effect on August 2, 2017, with the intention of countering perceived aggressions against the U.S. government by foreign powers.
    • It accomplishes this goal by preventing U.S. companies from doing business with sanctioned entities.

  • Opportunities for India in Bangladesh’s economic success

    Bangladesh is expected to cross India in terms per capita income. This speaks volumes about the achievements of Bangladesh when contrasted with Pakistan. At the same time, it has several implications for the region. The elaborates on such implications.

    What other countries can learn from Bangladesh

    • The International Monetary Fund’s latest World Economic Outlook published recently predicts that Bangladesh’s per capita GDP will overtake that of India this year.
    • The projected difference is rather small — $1,888 to $1,877 — and unlikely to last beyond this year.
    • International development institutions are convinced that the rest of the subcontinent and developing countries around the world can learn much from Dhaka’s experience — the so-called “Bangladesh model”.

    5 Implications for the region

    1) Rising global interest in the subcontinent

    • Rapid and sustained economic growth in Bangladesh has begun to alter the world’s perception of the subcontinent.
    • India and Pakistan dominated the region and other countries were considered small.
    • But Bangladesh was far from being small, demographically it’s  the eighth-largest nation in the world.
    • The economic rise of Bangladesh is changing some of that.

    2) Changing economic weights of Bangladesh and Pakistan

    • This year, Bangladesh’s GDP is expected to reach about $320 billion.
    • The IMF did not have the 2020 numbers from Pakistan to report but in 2019, Pakistan’s economy was at $275 billion.
    • The IMF suggests that Pakistan’s economy will contract further this year.
    • Bangladesh has controlled its population growth and Pakistan has not.
    • Dhaka has a grip over its inflation and Islamabad does not.
    • There is no question that Pakistan’s negative geopolitical weight in the world will endure.
    • But Bangladesh’s growing economic muscle will help Dhaka steadily accumulate geopolitical salience in the years ahead.

    3) Accelerate regional integration

    • Bangladesh’s economic growth can accelerate regional integration in the eastern subcontinent.
    • The region’s prospects for a collective economic advance are rather dim.
    • Due to Pakistan’s opposition to economic cooperation with India and its support for cross-border terror, the main regional forum for the subcontinent, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (Saarc), is dormant.
    • Instead of merely praying for the revival of Saarc, Delhi could usefully focus on the BBIN.
    • BBIN is sub-regional forum among Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal, activated in the middle of last decade — has not advanced fast enough.
    • It is time for Delhi and Dhaka to take a fresh look at the forum and find ways to widen the scope and pace of BBIN activity.
    • Meanwhile, there is growing interest in Bhutan and Nepal for economic integration with Bangladesh.

    4) Increasing importance of Bangladesh in geopolitics of Indo-Pacific

    • The economic success of Bangladesh is drawing attention from a range of countries in East Asia, including China, Japan, South Korea, and Singapore.
    • The US, which traditionally focused on India and Pakistan, has woken up to the possibilities in Bangladesh.
    • Bangladesh does not want to get into the fight between Beijing and Washington, but the great power wooing of Dhaka is bound to intensify in the new geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific.

    5) Development of India’s eastern and north-eastern states could accelerate

    • Bangladesh’s economy is now one-and-a-half times as large as that of West Bengal; better integration between the two would provide a huge boost for eastern India.
    • Also, connectivity between India’s landlocked Northeast and Bangladesh would provide a boost to the development of north-eastern states.
    • Delhi and Dhaka are eager to promote greater cooperation, but there has been little political enthusiasm in Kolkata.
    • In Assam, the issue of migration continues to impose major political constraints.

    Way forward

    • Parliamentary approval of the boundary settlement in 2015, despite the opposition, was a step in the right direction from India.
    • So was the acceptance of the 2014 international arbitration award on the maritime boundary dispute between India and Bangladesh.
    • But the positive dynamic surrounding the bilateral relationship acquired a negative tone in the second amidst the poisonous rhetoric in India around the Citizenship Amendment Act.
    • There is much room for course correction in Delhi and to shift the focus from legacy issues to future possibilities.

    Conclusion

    Both the countries need to jointly develop and pursue with Dhaka an ambitious framework for shared prosperity.

  • Four lessons for the Quad from Asia’s history and geopolitics

    The article highlights the 4 issues related to the history and geopolitics of Asian that the Quad members should pay attention to while formulating the future course of action. 

    The 4 factors

    If the Quad is to prosper as a geopolitical construct, it would do well to heed four lessons drawn from the long arc of Asia’s history and geopolitics.

    1) Lack of existence of Indo-Pacific system

    • There has never been Indo-Pacific system ever since the rise of the port-based kingdoms of Indochina in the first half of the second millennium.
    •  There were two Asian systems — an Indian Ocean system and an East Asian system — with intricate sub-regional balances.
    • The effort by a U.S. to artificially manufacture to combine the Indo and the Pacific into a unitary system is unlikely to succeed.

    2) Lack of peaceful existence dominated by any power

    • The Indo-Pacific region possesses no prior experience of long period of peace, prosperity and stability engineered from its maritime fringes.
    • Rather, dynamic long cycles of Chinese influence radiating outwards have alternated with sharp periods of turmoil.
    • The of ASEAN-centred multilateralism is more in tune with regional tradition and historical circumstance.
    • For their part, the Indo-Pacific’s ‘flanking powers’, India and Japan, have never balanced Chinese power throughout their illustrious histories.

    3) India must use its leverage judiciously

    •  The sea lines of communication constitute the important links connecting Indian Ocean to the Western Pacific.
    • It is also a valuable arena of leverage vis-à-vis Chinese shipping and resource flows.
    • This leverage must be wielded judiciously on India’s terms, not on the Quad’s terms.
    • The Quad, after all, has little to offer materially with regard to New Delhi’s continental two-front dilemma.
    • However, ceding this chokepoint leverage will invite overwhelming Chinese pressure against the full range of India’s South Asian interests — to which the other Quad members possess neither will nor desire to answer.

    4) Check on China’s India Ocean Ambitions

    •  The Quad has a valuable role to play as a check on China’s Indian Ocean ambitions.
    • India must develop ingrained habits of interoperable cooperation with its Quad partners.
    • This interoperable cooperation could pre-emptively dissuade China from mounting a naval challenge in its backyard.

    Conclusion

    The Quad must consider these factors while formulating the future course of action.

  • Greater Male Connectivity Project (GMCP)

    Following up on India’s announcement of a $500 million package to the Maldives, the Exim Bank of India and the Maldives’s Ministry of Finance signed an agreement for $400 million in Male.

    Try this question from 2014:

    Q.Which one of the following pairs of islands is separated from each other by the ‘Ten Degree Channel’?

    (a) Andaman and Nicobar

    (b) Nicobar and Sumatra

    (c) Maldives and Lakshadweep

    (d) Sumatra and Java

    Greater Male Connectivity Project

    • The GMCP consists of a number of bridges and causeways to connect Male to Villingili, Thilafushi and Gulhifahu islands that span 6.7 km.
    • It would ease much of the pressure of the main capital island of Male for commercial and residential purposes.
    • When completed, the project would render the Chinese built Sinamale Friendship bridge connecting Male to two other islands, thus far the most visible infrastructure project in the islands.
    • At present, India-assisted projects in the region include water and sewerage projects on 34 islands, reclamation project for the Addl island, a port on Gulhifalhu, airport redevelopment at Hanimadhoo, and a hospital and a cricket stadium in Hulhumale.

  • Deterrence in Australia-China Ties

    Australia and China’s cordial economic ties, established over the last three decades, have been soured this year over several points of friction.

    Try this question

    Q. Discuss the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or the Quad) and its purpose to establish “Asian Arc of Democracy”.

    Various points of friction

     (1) Australia’s Covid-19 inquiry

    • Australia’s appeal for an independent global inquiry into the origins and initial response of Covid-19 created fury in Beijing.
    • China alleged that Australia was teaming up with the US to spread “anti-China propaganda”.

    (2) Tension over journalists

    • The second diplomatic spat began with the detention of an Australian news anchor based in Beijing by the Chinese authorities after she was suspected of “criminal activities” that endangered China’s national security.
    • The Australian government said the journalist was held under “residential surveillance” at an unknown location.
    • Following this, the journalists sought refuge in Australian diplomatic missions, as they were not allowed to leave the country.

    (3) Ideological issues

    • The two countries have also been at loggerheads on other ideological issues previously too.
    • After reports of China keeping Uighur Muslims in state-run detention camps surfaced, Australia was swift to respond and expressed “deep concern” over the “human rights situation.”
    • Australia also supported Hong Kong’s autonomy cause. It decided to extend visas for Hong Kong residents.
    • In both instances, China responded staunchly and asked Australia to not meddle in its “internal matters.”

    (4) Economic dependence

    • China is Australia’s largest trading partner in terms of both exports and imports.
    • China’s share in Australia’s exports reached a record A$117 billion, or 38 per cent, in 2019, more than any other country.
    • Australian sectors like mining, tourism, education benefit from trade with China. China even imports products such as milk, cheese, wine and meat.
    • Over the years, it has been increasing its investment in Australian infrastructure and real estate products too.

  • H-1B visa amid the U.S. elections

    Trump administration’s two moves on the visa could have implication for both  India and corporate America. It needs to be seen whether the situations will remain the same after the Presidential elections in the U.S.

    Context

    • The U.S. President announced a hike in the salaries for those arriving in the U.S. on H-1B or skilled-worker visas.

    Implications for India

    • This hike is expected to cut visa applications by around 33%.
    • Trump administration has in its earlier executive actions banned the issuance of new skilled worker visas and new green cards.
    • India’s export of services to the U.S. is estimated to be at $29.6 billion in 2018, 4.9% more than in 2017, and 134% more than 2008 levels.
    • The U.S. has been issuing 85,000 H-1B visas annually, of which 20,000 are given to graduate students and 65,000 to private sector applicants, approximately 70% of which are granted to Indian nationals.
    • The visa issuance ban, combined with the mandatory salary floor soon to be instituted, will seriously hit U.S. imports of services from India.

    Criticism of the move

    • A federal judge in the Northern District of California blocked the enforcement of the new visa ban, ruling that the President “exceeded his authority” under the U.S. Constitution.
    • Google CEO hit out at the ban, saying, “Immigration has contributed immensely to America’s economic success, making it a global leader in tech, and also Google the company it is today.”

    Consider the question “What makes the H-1B visa important for India? What are the implications of the recent rise in the salary floor by the U.S. for the visa on India?”

    Conclusion

    While the ban and floor limit on salary come in the election milieu, India should prepare for the after election scenario.

  • Challenges India faces in managing relations in neighbourhood

    The article analyses the inherent challenges India faces in managing good relations with its neighbours.

    Duality challenge

    • Even for the Britishers, it was an unceasing struggle to sustain its primacy in the region.
    • The notion of regional primacy certainly persisted in the Nehru era.
    • Primacy was hard to sustain after Independence even within the immediate neighbourhood.

    Five reasons stand out

    1) Partition of the subcontinent

    • The problems generated by the great division of the Subcontinent on religious lines continue to animate the region.
    • Partition created the challenges of settling boundaries, sharing river-waters, protecting the rights of minorities, and easing the flow of goods and people.
    • The burden of the Subcontinent’s history is not easily discarded.

    2) Unification of China

    • The unification of China amidst the Partition of India had profoundly transformed the geopolitical condition of India.
    • Beyond the bilateral territorial dispute in the Himalayas, the emergence of a large and purposeful state on India’s frontiers was going to be a problem given the ease with which it could constrain Delhi within the Subcontinent.

    3) India’s choice in favour of de-globalisation

    • Independent India’s conscious choice in favour of de-globalisation led to a steady dissipation of commercial connectivity with the neighbours.
    •  India’s economic reorientation since the 1990s and the rediscovery of regionalism did open possibilities for reconnecting with its neighbours.
    • Delhi today is acutely aware of the need to revive regional connectivity.
    • There is much progress in recent years — note, for example, the recent launch of a ferry service to the Maldives or the reopening of inland waterways with Bangladesh.
    • Integrating India’s regional economic and foreign policy remains a major challenge-Consider the recent fiasco of onion exports to Bangladesh.

    4) Rise of political agency in the neighbourhood

    • India ignores the rise of political agency among neighbourhood elites and mass politics that they need to manage.
    • Their imperatives don’t always coincide with those of Delhi.
    • It is unlikely that Delhi can completely insure itself against the intra-elite conflicts in the neighbourhood.

    5) Influence of domestic politics on foreign policy

    • Can India persistently champion Tamil minority rights in Sri Lanka without incurring any costs with the Sinhala majority?
    • But asking that question takes us to India’s own domestic politics.
    • Can Delhi ignore sentiments in India’s Tamil Nadu in making its Sri Lanka policy?
    • Indian Prime Minister did not attend the Colombo Commonwealth Summit in 2013 because of the Tamil minority issue.
    • The Teesta Waters agreement was not concluded due to political reasons.

    Ways forward

    • Timely responses to problems.
    • Preventing small issues from becoming big.
    • Aligning Delhi’s regional economic policy with India’s natural geographic advantages .
    • These are some important elements of any successful management of India’s perennial neighbourhood challenges.

    Conclusion

    There are no easy answers to the regional difficulties that trouble all governments in Delhi. The source of the problem lies in the deeply interconnected nature of South Asian societies administered by multiple sovereigns.

  • Gilgit-Baltistan: The land of peaks, streams and disputes

    Seven decades after it took control of the region, Pakistan is moving to grant full statehood to Gilgit-Baltistan (GB), which appears as the northernmost part of the country in its official map.

    Try this PYQ:

    Q. If you travel through the Himalayas, you are likely to see which of the following plants naturally growing there?

    1. Oak
    2. Rhododendron
    3. Sandalwood

    Select the correct option using the code given below:

    (a) 1 and 2 only

    (b) 3 only

    (c) 1 and 3 only

    (d) 1, 2 and 3

    Pak occupation of GB

    • During the first Indo-Pak war of October 1947, Pakistan occupied 78,114 sq km of the land of Jammu and Kashmir, including the ‘Northern Areas’.
    • The Northern Areas is the other name of Gilgit-Baltistan that Pakistan has used for administrative reasons because it was a disputed territory.
    • This November, Pakistan will pave the way for fuller political rights for the roughly 1.2 million residents of the region, which will become the fifth State of Pakistan after Sindh, Punjab, Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.

    GB through history

    • One of the most mountainous regions in the world that is rich with mines of gold, emerald and strategically important minerals, GB is known for its extraordinary scenic beauty, diversity and ancient communities and languages.
    • The political nature of Gilgit-Baltistan has been directionless from the beginning.
    • Pakistan initially governed the region directly from the central authority after it was separated from ‘Azad Jammu and Kashmir’ on April 28, 1949.
    • On March 2, 1963, Pakistan gave away 5,180 sq km of the region to China, despite local protests.
    • Under Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the name of the region was changed to the Federally Administered Northern Areas (FANA).
    • Pakistan passed the Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self Governance Order in 2009, which granted “self-rule” to the ‘Northern Areas’.

    Sense of alienation

    • GB is largely an underdeveloped region.
    • One of the main reasons for the rebellion in the region in 1947 was the sense of alienation that the population felt towards the Dogra rulers of Srinagar, who operated under the protection of the British government.

    It’s geographical features

    • It’s home to K-2, the second tallest mountain in the world.
    • Tourism remains restricted by many factors, including military hostility, though the region has some of the ancient Buddhist sculptures and rock edicts.
    • It is also home to an old Shia community, which often finds itself subjected to persecution in Pakistan’s urban centres.
    • At present, a Governor and an elected Chief Minister rule the region, which is divided into Gilgit, Skardu, Diamer, Astore, Ghanche, Ghizer and Hunza-Nagar.

    Indian protest

    • Following Pakistan’s announcement of holding the legislative election in Gilgit-Baltistan, India reiterated its territorial sovereignty over the region.
    • India has consistently opposed Pakistan’s activities in Gilgit-Baltistan. It also opposed the announcement of the commencement of the Diamer-Bhasha dam in July this year.
    • There have been local and international concerns as reports suggest priceless Buddhist heritage will be lost once the dam is built.
    • India has objected to the use of Gilgit-Baltistan to build and operate the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

    GB resists

    • Gilgit-Baltistan in recent years has witnessed sporadic protests against Islamabad.
    • The protests were fuelled by the loss of land and livelihood of the locals to mega projects that are being championed by Pakistan and its international partners like China.
    • There is a growing feeling that full statehood will help the locals fight their battles inside Pakistan on an equal basis.
    • On the other hand, there is a widespread feeling that Pakistan, under pressure from China, is firming up its control over Gilgit-Baltistan, eventually creating conditions for the declaration of the LoC as the International Border.

    China’s vested interest

    • Gilgit-Baltistan is important for China as it is the gateway for the CPEC.
    • Significantly, the ongoing stand-off with China at the LAC in Eastern Ladakh has a Gilgit-Baltistan connection.
    • The Darbuk-Shyok-DBO road of India is viewed as a tactical roadway to access the Karakoram Pass, which provides China crucial access to Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan.
    • Full statehood for the region may give Pakistan a political and legal upper hand and strengthen China’s position in the region.

  • India needs a China plan

    The article discusses the issue of dealing with China in the aftermath of clashes on the border.

    Understanding the importance of Tibet

    • Tibet is the roof of the world, with vast mineral and natural resources.
    • The mighty rivers that emanate from its expansive glaciers — such as the Brahmaputra, the Yangtse, the Yellow river, the Mekong, the Salween and the Indus — together with thousands of their tributaries have nurtured civilisations in peripheral countries for centuries.
    • The Kailash Mansarovar is centered in this region.
    • In an act of naked aggression, China occupied Tibet in 1959.
    • A buffer was eliminated, and the de facto boundary of China became contiguous to that of India.
    • That boundary was deliberately left undemarcated to enable further expansion.

    Understanding China’s stand

    • China has land borders with 14 neighbours covering an estimated 22,100 kilometres.
    • Post-independence, and as its economic status increased, so did its military muscle.
    • China embarked on claims based on perceived imbalances of treaties forced on countries when they were weak.
    • Some of these have since been resolved after bloody clashes such as with Russia and Vietnam, while others have been resolved using a combination of lucrative offers.
    • Russia accepted half of China’s claim, Kazakhstan was given lucrative economic deals, Kyrgyzstan retained 70% of the land, ceding just 30%, and so on.

    Way forward

    • The road ahead will have to be evolved and based on a study of the manner in which China has negotiated its boundary disputes with 12 of its neighbours.
    • Under the prevailing circumstances, it has become imperative to form a group of experts.
    • This group will plan and prepare, short-, medium- and long-term goals to achieve them within a suggested time frame.

     Conclusion

    Let us play down the rhetoric and adopt a pragmatic approach. It can no longer be a part-time issue to be addressed only when a crisis occurs. The crisis is upon us now.

  • What are Abraham Accords?

    The White House has marked the formal normalization of Israel’s ties with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and the Kingdom of Bahrain has created a significant inflexion point in regional history and geopolitics.

    Try this question:

    Q. What are Abraham Accords? Discuss how the Israel-Gulf synergy could impact India’s relations with Israel.

    What are Abraham Accords?

    • The Israel–UAE normalization agreement is officially called the Abraham Accords Peace Agreement.
    • It was initially agreed to in a joint statement by the United States, Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on August 13, 2020.
    • The UAE thus became the third Arab country, after Egypt in 1979 and Jordan in 1994, to agree to formally normalize its relationship with Israel as well as the first Persian Gulf country to do so.
    • Concurrently, Israel agreed to suspend plans for annexing parts of the West Bank. The agreement normalized what had long been informal but robust foreign relations between the two countries.

    New friendships

    • Externally, Israel, the UAE and Bahrain share the common threat perception of Iran.
    • Internally, while all three have their respective hotheads opposing this reconciliation, these seem manageable.
    • They are relatively more modern societies which share the overarching and immediate priority of post-pandemic economic resuscitation.
    • They have lost no time to set up logistics such as Internet connectivity and direct flights to pave the way for more active economic engagement.
    • If these sinews evolve, other moderate Arab countries are likely to join the Israel fan club.

    India and the Gulf

    • Now India has stronger, multifaceted and growing socioeconomic engagements with Israel and the Gulf countries.
    • With over eight million Indian diasporas in the Gulf remitting annually nearly $50 billion, annual merchandise trade of over $150 billion.
    • It sources nearly two-thirds of India’s hydrocarbon imports, major investments, etc. Hence it is natural to ask how the new regional dynamic would affect India.

    The Israel-GCC synergy

    • With defence and security cooperation as a strong impetus, both sides are ready to realize the full potential of their economic complementarity.
    • The UAE and Bahrain can become the entrepôts to Israeli exports of goods and services to diverse geographies.
    • Israel has niche strengths in defence, security and surveillance equipment, arid farming, solar power, horticultural products, high-tech, gem and jewellery, and pharmaceuticals.
    • Tourism, real estate and financial service sectors on both sides have suffered due to the pandemic and hope for a positive spin-off from the peer-to-peer interactions.
    • Further, Israel has the potential to supply skilled and semi-skilled manpower to the GCC states, particularly from the Sephardim and Mizrahim ethnicities, many of whom speak Arabic.
    • Even the Israeli Arabs may find career opportunities to bridge the cultural divide. Israel is known as the start-up nation and its stakeholders could easily fit in the various duty-free incubators in the UAE.

    Implications of the new trinity

    • Geopolitically, India has welcomed the establishment of diplomatic relations between the UAE and Israel, calling both its strategic partners.
    • In general, the Israel-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) breakthrough widens the moderate constituency for peaceful resolution of the Palestine dispute, easing India’s diplomatic balancing act.
    • However, nothing in West Asia is monochromatic: The Israel-GCC ties may provoke new polarization between the Jihadi fringe and the mainstream.
    • The possibility of the southern Gulf becoming the new arena of the proxy war between Iran and Israel cannot be ruled out, particularly in Shia pockets.
    • India would have to be on its guard to monitor and even pre-empt any threat to its interests in the Gulf.

    Way forward

    • Israeli foray into the Gulf has the potential to disrupt the existing politico-economic architecture India has carefully built with the GCC states.
    • India has acquired a large and rewarding regional footprint, particularly as the preferred source of manpower, food products, pharmaceuticals, gem and jewellery, light engineering items, etc.
    • Indians are also the biggest stakeholders in Dubai’s real estate, tourism and Free Economic Zones.
    • In the evolving scenario, there may be scope for a profitable trilateral synergy, but India cannot take its preponderance as a given.