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Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • U.S.-Asia coordination to preserve global order

    The focus of this article is on the U.S. policy in the Indo-Pacific and its relations with its allies there in countering China.

    Instances of China’s aggression

    • Galwan Valley is not an exception in Beijing’s recent behaviour in Asia.
    • China has also engaged in a tense geopolitical confrontation with its other neighbours.
    • Stand-offs with Vietnam and Malaysia in the South China Sea and threatening Australia with boycotts are a few examples.

    Response to China

    • Beijing’s aggressiveness is fueling debates about the underlying costs of reliance on China.
    • China’s aggression is also increasing support for closer coordination between other Indo-Pacific partners.
    • Indian, Japan, Malaysia, and Australia have all taken concrete steps to reduce their economic exposure to Beijing.
    •  India and Australia recently inked a new military logistics agreement in the “virtual summit”.
    • A similar agreement between Delhi and Tokyo may follow.
    • The Quadrilateral Dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States is growing stronger and even expanding.
    • And recently Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) issued one of their strongest statements to date on the South China Sea.
    • The ASEAN statement insisted that maritime disputes must be resolved in accordance with the UN Law of the Sea treaty.

    Asian multilateralism: Born out of crises

    • Recently the “Milk Tea Alliance”, reaction of people, born to forge solidarity between Taiwanese, Hong Kongers, and Southeast Asians online to deal with Chinese cyberbullying.
    • The Chiang Mai Initiative — a financial swap mechanism between China, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia — emerged in the aftermath of the late 1990s financial crisis.
    • ASEAN, created in 1967, did not convene its first heads of state meeting until fall of Saigon in 1976 in the Vietnam War.

    Role of the U.S.

    • The COVID-19 crisis is remaking the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific.
    • The ongoing crisis has made countries aware of seriousness of Chinese dominance.
    • This situation has given the U.S. opportunity it has long sought: 1) More credible multilateral coordination among allies, 2) Pushback against online disinformation. 3) The desire to better integrate like-minded economies and supply chains.
    • But the crisis is also raising renewed questions about the American leadership.
    • The question now facing the U.S. is whether or not it can harness this new regional momentum.

    Alienating allies

    • U.S. continues to make unforced errors that create distance with U.S. allies and partners.
    • For example, its focus on cutting support for the WHO and asserting that COVID-19 originated in a Wuhan lab alienated Canberra.
    • Similarly, the administration’s suspension of various worker visas will almost certainly have serious repercussions in India.

    What should be the U.S. approach to Asia?

    • The U.S. needs to make two major shifts.
    • First, U.S. policy needs to start supporting, rather than attempting to commandeer, regional efforts to build a less China-centric future for the Indo-Pacific.
    • While Chinese aggression provides powerful motivation for coordination, U.S. partners are seeking an agenda that is framed in broader terms than simply rallying to counter Beijing.
    • If the U.S. wants to reduce reliance on Beijing and “re-couple” investments and supply chains among allied nations, it is going to have to make compromises.
    • U.S. should work with Indo-Pacific partners on the issues that they prioritise and provided them with space for independent action.
    • Second, Washington should avoid repeating Beijing’s mistakes of bullying.
    • U.S. should offer a clear alternative in word and deed to China’s “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy.
    • Moves such as demanding that a G-7 communiqué refer to COVID-19 as the “Wuhan virus” and blocking mask shipments to close allies are the kind of counterproductive bullying.

    Options for Asian countries

    • Beijing’s recent aggression is not an aberration but part of a growing pattern.
    • As Beijing’s confidence in its growing material and military power solidifies, its neighbours will need to think carefully about the long-term decisions necessary to preserve an open regional order.
    • Facing the unprecedented health and economic crises spawned by COVID-19, the U.S. and Asian partners will need to coordinate more closely.
    • Asian countries should strengthen their own regional networks.
    • This Asian network will challenge the views of those in both Washington and Beijing who would see the region only as a sparring ground.

    Conclusion

    For American and Asian leaders, the choice is stark: encourage and foster this trend, recognising that stronger regional coordination will require more compromises as well as tougher choices, or resist it and risk being left behind.

  • Azad Pattan Hydel Project

    Pakistan and China have signed an agreement for the 700 MW Azad Pattan hydel power project on the Jhelum River in Sudhoti district of PoK.

    Try this question from CSP 2019:

    Q.What is common to the places known as Aliyar, Isapur and Kangsabati?

    (a) Recently discovered uranium deposits

    (b) Tropical rain forests

    (c) Underground cave systems

    (d) Water reservoirs

    Azad Pattan hydel project

    • The project is a run-of-the-river scheme with a reservoir located near Muslimabad village, 7 km upstream from the Azad Pattan bridge, in district Sudhnoti, one of the eight districts of PoK.
    • It is one of five hydropower schemes on the Jhelum.
    • Upstream from Azad Pattan are the Mahl, Kohala, and Chakothi Hattian projects; Karot is downstream. Like Kohala and Azad Pattan, Karot too is being developed under the CPEC framework.
    • The project will comprise a 90-metre-high dam, with a 3.8 sq km reservoir.
    • The $ 1.5-billion project is the second power project under the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

    Other projects in PoK

    • Kohala project is a 1,124 MW hydel project that will come upon the Jhelum near Muzaffarabad. This project is one of the biggest investments by China in PoK.
    • The Karot Hydropower station, the third project being executed by China on the Jhelum is on the boundaries of Kotli district in PoK and Rawalpindi district in Pakistan’s Punjab province.
    • Two hydel projects are planned in Gilgit Baltistan – Phandar Hydro Power, and Gilgit KIU.
    • Most recent in the news was Diamer-Bhasha dam in the PoK.

  • India’s Military Ties with Nepal

    Soldiers from Nepal form a significant part of the Indian Army’s legendary Gurkha regiment. Here is a brief explainer on the origin and evolution of these ties.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q.“India has special and time-tested military ties with Nepal”. Analyse.

    India’s military ties with Nepal: The origin

    • India’s military connection with the Himalayan country goes back to the reign of Maharaja Ranjit Singh whose army in Lahore enlisted Nepalese soldiers called Lahure or soldiers of fortune.
    • British India raised the first battalion of the Gurkha Regiment as the Nasiri regiment on April 24, 1815.
    • By the time the First World War started, there were 10 Gurkha regiments in the British Indian Army.
    • When India got freedom, these regiments were divided between the British and Indian armies as per the Britain–India–Nepal Tripartite Agreement signed in November 1947.
    • Six Gurkha regiments with a lakh-odd soldier came to India, which went on to raise another regiment called 11 Gurkha Rifles who chose not to transfer to the British Army.

    Can Nepali citizens join the Indian Army?

    • Yes, any Nepali can join the Indian Army, both as a jawan and as an officer.
    • A citizen of Nepal can take the NDA or CDS exams and join the Indian Army as an officer.
    • Col Lalit Rai, who received a Vir Chakra for the bravery of his battalion, the 1/11 Gurkha Rifles, during the Kargil war, is one such officer of Nepalese descent.
    • The Nepalese army also sends its officers for training to India’s military academies and combat colleges.

    Do the soldiers from Nepal enjoy the same rights as the Indian troops?

    • Yes, they enjoy the same benefits as the India troops both during service and after retirement.
    • They get the same medical facilities as the Indian soldiers, and often medical teams from the Indian Army tour Nepal.
    • Unlike the British, who started giving the Nepalese soldiers pension only a few years ago, the Indian Army has never discriminated against the Nepalese soldiers, who can avail of healthcare facilities in India as well.
    • The Indian Army also runs welfare projects in Nepal villages, including small water and power projects.

    The honorary chief of the Nepalese army

    • Yes, this convention dates back to 1972 when then Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, a Gurkha regiment officer, fondly called Sam Bahadur by his troops, was made the honorary chief of the Nepalese army.
    • Ever since the Army chief of India is the honorary chief of the Nepalese army and vice-versa.

    Joint exercises

    • Joint military exercise ‘SURYA KIRAN is an annual event which is conducted alternatively in Nepal and India.
    • It is an important exercise in terms of the security challenges faced by both nations in the realm of changing facets of global terrorism.

  • Afghanistan–Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA)

    Pakistan has allowed Afghanistan to send goods to India using the Wagah border. The decision is a part of Islamabad’s commitment under the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA).

    A statement based question can be asked upon the agreement on terms like:

    1. Reciprocal trade with India

    2. Railways/Road/Air transit whether allowed

    About the agreement

    • The APTTA is a bilateral trade agreement signed in 2010 by Pakistan and Afghanistan.
    • It calls for greater facilitation in the movement of goods amongst the two countries.
    • The 2010 agreement supersedes the 1965 Afghanistan Transit Trade Agreement, which granted Afghanistan the right to import duty-free goods through Pakistani seaports, mostly notably from Karachi.

    Features of the agreement

    • Trade-in goods smuggled into Pakistan once constituted a major source of revenue for Afghanistan.
    • The 2010 APTTA allows for both countries to use each other’s airports, railways, roads, and ports for transit trade along designated transit corridors.
    • The agreement does not cover road transport vehicles from any third country, be it from India or any Central Asia country.
    • However, the signed Agreement permits Afghanistan trucks access to the Wagah border with India, where Afghan goods will be offloaded onto Indian trucks.
    • This agreement does not permit Indian goods to be loaded onto trucks for transit back to Afghanistan.
    • Instead, Afghan trucks offloaded at Wagah may return to Afghanistan loaded only with Pakistani, rather than Indian goods in an attempt to prevent the formation of a black market for Indian goods in Pakistan.

  • Chabahar Rail Project

    The Iranian government has decided to proceed with the construction of Chabahar Rail Project on its own, citing delays from the Indian side in funding and starting the project.

    What is the issue?

    • Four years ago, India and Iran signed an agreement to construct a rail line from Chabahar port to Zahedan, along the border with Afghanistan.
    • The Iranian Railways will proceed without India’s assistance, using approximately $400 million from the Iranian National Development Fund.
    • The development comes as China finalizes a massive 25-year, $400 billion strategic partnership deal with Iran, which could cloud India’s plans.

    The Chabahar Rail Project

    • It is a 628 km Chabahar-Zahedan line, which will be extended to Zaranj across the border in Afghanistan.
    • The entire project would be completed by March 2022.
    • It was meant to be part of India’s commitment to the trilateral agreement between India, Iran and Afghanistan to build an alternate trade route to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

    Why did Iran omit India from the project?

    • Despite several site visits by engineers, and preparations by Iranian railways, India never began the work, ostensibly due to worries that these could attract U.S. sanctions.
    • The U.S. had provided a sanctions waiver for the Chabahar port and the rail line to Zahedan, but it has been difficult to find equipment suppliers and partners due to worries they could be targeted by the U.S.
    • India has already “zeroed out” its oil imports from Iran due to U.S. sanctions.

    The contentious partnership with China

    • Iran and China are close to finalising a 25-year Strategic Partnership which will include Chinese involvement in Chabahar’s duty-free zone, an oil refinery nearby, and possibly a larger role in Chabahar port as well.
    • The cooperation will extend from investments in infrastructure, manufacturing and upgrading energy and transport facilities, to refurbishing ports, refineries and other installations.
    • It is also rumoured that the Chabahar port will be leased to China surpassing India.
    • Iran had proposed a tie-up between the port at Gwadar and Chabahar last year and has offered interests to China in the Bandar-e-Jask port 350km away from Chabahar, as well as in the Chabahar duty-free zone.

    Back2Basics: India-Iran Partnership over Chabahar Port

    • In 2016, India signed a deal with Iran entailing $8 billion investment in Chabahar port and industries in Chabahar Special Economic Zone.
    • The port is being developed as a transit route to Afghanistan and Central Asia.
    • India has already built a 240-km road connecting Afghanistan with Iran.
    • All this were expected to bring cargo to Bandar Abbas port and Chabahar port, and free Kabul from its dependence on Pakistan to reach the outer world.
    • Completion of this project would give India access to Afghanistan and beyond to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Europe via 7,200-km-long multi-modal North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).

  • Broader strategic challenge of dealing with China

    • Identifying the nature of the threat posed by China is important to formulate a response. This article discusses the plan of action on the diplomatic, strategic and economic front to deal with Chinese aggression.

    Economic angle of China’s expansionism

    • The Chinese growth model needed to find subservient emerging markets.
    • In these markets, China can park huge debts and make investments to keep feeding China’s high growth rates.
    • Friendly foreign debt-investment markets were needed to compensate for over-investment at home.
    • The Belt and Road Initiative was rolled out as a meeting point for China’s geo-strategic and geo-economic interests.
    • China has expanded its global footprint by signing on about 100 countries to the BRI.
    • China has made aggressive moves on most of its non-submissive neighbours in the South China Sea.
    • China has also made moves against its traditional rivals like Japan and Taiwan to independent-minded nations like South Korea and Australia.
    • China sees itself as a global power whose time has come.

    India needs to play clearer role

    • Rise of China is shaking up global alignments and shaping new world order.
    • The Trump administration is increasingly being criticised for not providing global leadership.
    • India could afford to be largely non-aligned during the 20th century Cold War.
    • Our size and economic momentum necessitate that we play a clearer role in the Cold War’s 21st-century sequel.
    • India’s foreign policy has lacked a clear vision about China.
    • India has been deepening our strategic relationship with the US but without wanting to alarm China.

    India’s relation with neighbours

    • India’s relations with other neighbouring nations have also become a cause of concern.
    • Pakistan has practically become a minion state for the Chinese – the $62-billion CPEC is a case in the point.
    • Nepal is no longer on our list of all-weather friends.
    • Chinese influence is growing in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh — both signatories to the BRI.
    • And just last week, Beijing, sent another appallingly stern message to our loyal friend, Bhutan, by making ridiculous territorial claims.

    What should be India’s plan of action

    • Dealing with China will require conviction and exercising a range of military, diplomatic and economic options.
    • One forum we need to build on and provide leadership to is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.
    •  India should now propose the expansion of the Quad’s scope with a possible exploration of a collective defence architecture like NATO.
    • The membership of the Quad should be expanded to include Vietnam, South Korea, New Zealand, and Malaysia.
    • On the economic front, India must welcome the US proposal to expand G7 to include India, Russia, Australia and South Korea without China as a member.
    • Next area of focus should be strengthening ties with our neighbourhood.
    • Effort must be made to regain the relationship with Russia.

    Conclusion

    China must be made to choose: Is it willing to push the equally proud, equally numerous, equally historical and glorious civilisation to the south in this long-term direction for a few square kilometres of territory and a round of chest-thumping?

  • UAE in support of Open Skies Agreement with India

    The UAE is keen to have an open sky agreement with India.

    Open Skies Agreement! Look how confusing does it sound compared to the Open Skies Treaty between the US and Russia.

    What is the Open Skies Agreement?

    • The National Civil Aviation Policy, 2016, allows the government to enter into an ‘open sky’ air services agreement on a reciprocal basis with SAARC nations as well as countries beyond a 5,000-kilometre radius from New Delhi.
    • This implies that nations within this distance need to enter into a bilateral agreement and mutually determine the number of flights that their airlines can operate between the two countries.
    • India has open sky agreements with Japan, Greece, Jamaica, Guyana, Czech Republic, Finland, Spain and Sri Lanka.
    • India also has an open sky agreement with the US, among other countries.

    Why UAE wants such an agreement with India?

    • There are about 1,068 flights a week between India and the UAE operated by the airlines of the two countries under the bilateral Air Service Agreement.
    • India has open skies policy with SAARC countries and those beyond the 5,000-km radius.
    • UAE wants India to revisit this policy.

    Must read:

    U.S. set to exit the ‘Open Skies Treaty’ Copy

  • Patrolling Points along LAC

    The standoffs between Indian and Chinese troops in Ladakh on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), where initial steps towards disengagement have taken place, are around a number of patrolling points or PPs in Galwan, Hot Springs and Gogra areas.

    Do you know?

    The Galwan River flows from the Aksai Chin region occupied by China in the UT of Ladakh.  It originates in the area of Samzungling on the eastern side of the Karakoram Range and flows west to join the Shyok River.  It is one of the upstream tributaries of the Indus River.

    What exactly are Patrolling Points?

    • PPs are patrolling points identified and marked on the LAC, which are patrolled with a stipulated frequency by the security forces.
    • They serve as a guide to the location of the LAC for the soldiers, acting as indicators of the extent of ‘actual control’ exercised on the territory by India.
    • By regularly patrolling up to these PPs, the Indian side is able to establish and assert its physical claim about the LAC.

    Are all the Patrolling Points numbered?

    • Some of the PPs are prominent and identifiable geographical features, such as a pass, or a nala junction where no numerals are given.
    • Only those PPs, where there are no prominent features, are numbered as in the case of PP14 in Galwan Valley.

    Do all Patrolling Points fall on the LAC?

    • Mostly, yes. Except for the Depsang plains in northern Ladakh, where PP10, PP11, PP11A, PP12 and PP13 – from Raki Nala to Jivan Nala – do not fall on the LAC.
    • These are short of the LAC, on the Indian side.

    Are these Patrolling Points not manned?

    • The PPs are not posts and thus not manned. Unlike on the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan, the border with China is not physically held by the Army all along.
    • They are just physical markers on the ground, chosen for their location and have no defensive potential or tactical importance for the Army.

    How is the claim asserted on LAC?

    • The claim is asserted by the Army or joint Army-ITBP patrols as they show more visible presence in these areas.
    • This is done by physically visiting PPs with a higher frequency, as the deployment has moved closer to the LAC and due to improved infrastructure.
    • As the Chinese may not see when the Indian patrols visit these PPs, they will leave come cigarette packets or food tins with Indian markings behind.
    • That lets the Chinese know that Indian soldiers had visited the place, which indicates that India was in control of these areas.

    Who has given these Patrolling Points?

    • These PPs have been identified by the high-powered China Study Group, starting from 1975 when patrolling limits for Indian forces were specified.
    • It is based on the LAC after the government accepted the concept in 1993, which is also marked on the maps with the Army in the border areas.
    • But the frequency of patrolling to PPs is not specified by the CSG – it is finalised by the Army Headquarters in New Delhi, based on the recommendations made by the Army and ITBP.

    PP under dispute

    • PPs 10 to 13 in Depsang sector, PP14 in Galwan, PP15 in Hot Spring, and PP17 and PP17A in Gogra are currently being disputed by both sides, where the standoffs have taken place in the past nine weeks.

  • U.S. stance on CAATSA unchanged

    Recently India had planned for the purchase of Mig-19 fighter aircraft with Russia at an estimated Rs. 18,148 crore. The U.S has reacted to countries, including India, on sanctions for the purchase of Russian arms has not changed.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q.What is CAATSA law? Discuss how it will impact India’s ties with Russia.

    About CAATSA

    • CAATSA stands for Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).
    • It is a US federal law that imposed sanctions on Iran, North Korea, and Russia.
    • The bill provides sanctions for activities concerning:

    (1) cybersecurity, (2) crude oil projects, (3) financial institutions, (4) corruption, (5) human rights abuses, (6) evasion of sanctions, (7) transactions with Russian defence or intelligence sectors, (8) export pipelines, (9) privatization of state-owned assets by government officials, and (10) arms transfers to Syria.

    A cause of worry

    • While the US has become its second-largest defence supplier, mainly of aircraft and artillery, India still relies heavily on Russian equipment, such as submarines and missiles that the US has been unwilling to provide.
    • Seventy per cent of Indian military hardware is Russian in origin.
    • India is set to receive the S-400 Triumf air defence system.

    Is India the only country facing CAATSA sanctions?

    • Notably, Russia is India’s major defence supplier for over 6 decades now, and Iran is India’s second-largest oil supplier.
    • By coincidence, CAATSA has now been invoked by the US twice already, and both times for countries buying the Triumf system from Russia.
    • In September 2018, the US announced sanctions for the procurement of the S-400 Triumf air defence system and Sukhoi S-35 fighter aircraft.
    • Washington expelled Turkey from the F-35 fighter jet programme in July this year after the first delivery of S-400s was received.
    • India is neither like China, which has an inimical relationship with the U.S., and hence not bound by its diktats, nor like Turkey which is a NATO ally of the US.

  • De-escalation begins on LAC

    Three weeks after the worst military clashes in decades, India and China have begun the process of disengagement at contentious locations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

    Must read:

    [Burning Issue] India-China Skirmish in Ladakh

    China is moving back

    • In the Galwan Valley, Chinese troops have shifted 2 kilometres from the site violent clashes while some tents had been removed by the PLA in the Finger 4 area of Pangong Tso.
    • India’s claim is till Finger 8 as per the alignment of the LAC.
    • Some rearward movement of vehicles was seen at the general area of Galwan, Hotsprings and Gogra.
    • Without giving the specific distances moved, the source said the pullback at each location would be confirmed after verification.

    Lessons learnt

    • The lesson for us in Doklam is that disengagement is not enough in order to declare an end to tensions at the LAC.
    • It is necessary that we define endpoints up to where the troops must withdraw to and no understanding should be reached without the restoration of status quo ante.
    • Endpoint variances reflect the potential for future troubles along the LAC.