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Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • Difficulties faced by India and Russia in following convergent policies

    The article analyses the challenges in the India-Russia relations against the background of changing global order.

    Context

    • India decided to pull out of Russia’s Kavkaz 2020 military exercises, where it was scheduled to participate alongside other Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) member states.

    Russia’s role in India-China dispute

    • The ongoing conflict between two prominent members, and both close partners of Russia, has given rise to concerns about its impact on India-Russia ties.
    • Moscow has been playing a quiet diplomatic role during the recent border clashes without actively taking sides.
    • Recent visits by India’s Defence Minister to Russia saw detailed discussions around furthering the India-Russia defence relationship alongside the promise to accelerate certain supplies based on New Delhi’s requirements.
    • The September visit coincided with the biannual Indo-Russian naval exercises, INDRA.

    India-Russia relations

    • India and Russia have spent the past few years strengthening their partnership, particularly since the 2018 Sochi informal summit.
    • From substantive defence engagement to regional questions in Central Asia, Afghanistan and West Asia, a conversation with Moscow remains an important element of Indian foreign policy.
    • India and Russia are pragmatic players looking at maximising their strategic manoeuvrability,
    • Both recognise the value of having a diversified portfolio of ties. .
    • India on its part has sought to include Russia in its vision of the Indo-Pacific that does not see the region as ‘a strategy or as a club of limited members’.
    • Reports indicate that a proposal for a India-Russia-Japan trilateral is being explored.

    Multilateral forums and Challenges in India-Russia relation

    • The multilateral forums are important as they foster continued India-Russia cooperation at the bilateral and multilateral levels.
    •  Increasingly divergent foreign policies of its members pose challenges of agenda-setting and overall scope.
    • At this moment of flux, countries such as India and Russia are keeping all their options open.
    • We live in a ‘curious world’ where one cannot view engagement with different parties as a ‘zero-sum game’.
    • Worsening India-China ties or a burgeoning China-Russia relationship does not automatically mean a breakdown of the India-Russia strategic partnership.
    •  It is the combination of a changing regional order, closer Russia-China ties and India’s alignment with the United States and other like-minded countries to manage Beijing’s rise that has the potential to create hurdles for India-Russia cooperation in the Asia.

    Consider the question “Despite difficulties in pursuing convergent policies, India-China relations retains its relevance. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    Although the evolving global order makes it difficult for India and Russia to pursue fully convergent policies, it does not preclude the bilateral relationship from retaining its relevance.

  • Role for India in Afghan peace push

    The U.S. objectives

    • Following  4 were the states as objectives of the Afghan peace process.
    • 1) An end to violence by declaring a ceasefire.
    • 2) An intra-Afghan dialogue for a lasting peace.
    • 3) The Taliban cutting ties with terrorist organisations such as al Qaeda.
    • 4)  U.S. troop withdrawal.

    Evolving Indian stand in the peace process

    • India’s vision of a sovereign, united, stable, plural and democratic Afghanistan is one that is shared by a large constituency in Afghanistan, cutting across ethnic and provincial lines.
    • At Doha meeting, India’s External Affairs Ministerreiterated that the peace process must be “Afghan led, Afghan owned and Afghan controlled”.
    • But Indian policy has evolved from its earlier hands-off approach to the Taliban.
    • U.S. and Russian representatives suggested if India had concerns regarding anti-India activities of terrorist groups, it must engage directly with the Taliban. In other words.

    Limited interest of the major powers

    • Major powers have limited interests in the peace process.
    • The European Union has made it clear that its financial contribution will depend on the security environment and the human rights record.
    • China can always lean on Pakistan to preserve its security and connectivity interests.
    • For Russia, blocking the drug supply and keeping its southern periphery secure from extremist influences is key.
    • That is why no major power is taking ownership for the reconciliation talks, but merely content with being facilitators.

    Conclusion

    A more active engagement will enable India to work with like-minded forces in the region to ensure that the vacuum created by the U.S. withdrawal does not lead to an unravelling of the gains registered during the last two decades.

  • Indus Water Treaty turns 60

    September 19 this year marks the 60th anniversary of the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) between India and Pakistan.

    Tap to read more about Indus River System:

    Drainage System | Part 3

    Indus Waters Treaty, 1960

    • The Indus Waters Treaty is a water-distribution treaty between India and Pakistan, brokered by the World Bank signed in Karachi in 1960.
    • According to this agreement, control over the water flowing in three “eastern” rivers of India — the Beas, the Ravi and the Sutlej was given to India
    • The control over the water flowing in three “western” rivers of India — the Indus, the Chenab and the Jhelum was given to Pakistan
    • The treaty allowed India to use western rivers water for limited irrigation use and unrestricted use for power generation, domestic, industrial and non-consumptive uses such as navigation, floating of property, fish culture, etc. while laying down precise regulations for India to build projects
    • India has also been given the right to generate hydroelectricity through the run of the river (RoR) projects on the Western Rivers which, subject to specific criteria for design and operation is unrestricted.

    Based on equitable water-sharing

    • Back in time, partitioning the Indus rivers system was inevitable after the Partition of India in 1947.
    • The sharing formula devised after prolonged negotiations sliced the Indus system into two halves.
    • Equitable it may have seemed, but the fact remained that India conceded 80.52 per cent of the aggregate water flows in the Indus system to Pakistan.
    • It also gave Rs 83 crore in pounds sterling to Pakistan to help build replacement canals from the western rivers. Such generosity is unusual of an upper riparian.
    • India conceded its upper riparian position on the western rivers for the complete rights on the eastern rivers. Water was critical for India’s development plans.

    India plays resilient

    • That the treaty has remained “uninterrupted” is because India respects its signatory and values trans-boundary Rivers as an important connector in the region in terms of both diplomacy and economic prosperity.
    • There have been several instances of terror attacks which could have prompted India, within the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, to withdraw from the IWT.
    • However, on each occasion, India chose not to do so.

    Significance of the treaty

    • It is a treaty that is often cited as an example of the possibilities of peaceful coexistence that exist despite the troubled relationship.
    • Well-wishers of the treaty often dub it “uninterrupted and uninterruptible”.
    • The World Bank, which, as the third party, played a pivotal role in crafting the IWT, continues to take particular pride that the treaty functions.

    Need for a rethink

    • The role of India, as a responsible upper riparian abiding by the provisions of the treaty, has been remarkable.
    • However, of late, India is under pressure to rethink the extent to which it can remain committed to the provisions, as its overall political relations with Pakistan becomes intractable.

  • Our larger China picture

    Context

    • After the skirmish at the border, Beijing started to concentrate troops, armoured vehicles and munitions opposite our posts in Aksai China at Galwan.

    2 interpretations of China’s move

    • First believes that the Chinese exercise was a territorial snatch in Aksai Chin, which they believe is entirely theirs.
    • The move was accompanied by a “lesson” to the Indians on aggressive Indian behaviour in not conceding Aksai Chin.
    • The second school of thought in India believes that territory has nothing to do with it.
    • They believe that, due to growing economic power, Beijing will lay down the rules of world governance.

    How it matters for India

    • India contest China’s entire southern border, refuse to join the Belt and Road initiative, create an anti-China maritime coalition, compete with them for influence in South East Asia and Africa.
    • India is also unsupportive of their crackdown on Taiwan, Hong Kong and Xinjiang and move ever closer to the United States.
    • When China assumes hegemonic power after 2030, India is going to get a nasty surprise.
    • Secularism, democracy and the rights of man will play no part in Chinese foreign policy.
    • China will overturn every international, financial, trade, diplomatic, arms control and nuclear agreement that the world has put together in seven decades.

    Way forward

    • We in India need to conduct a large and vociferous debate on Chinese intentions.
    • If the Chinese intention is to “teach us a lesson” we need a new national strategy, combining diplomatic and military means.
    •  If our national goal is to concentrate on the creation of wealth and growing GDP, let us proclaim it, tighten our belt, look down and avoid conflict.

    Conclusion

    What China wants is Indian acceptance of Beijing’s benign superiority, and that is a purely Chinese trait, not to be confused with the known rules of international diplomacy. Talking from a position of inferiority will not lead to an equitable solution. But first, a national debate.

  • India needs to change the framework of non-involvement

    Realignment of relations is taking place in the Middle East with wider implications for the future of the region. India needs to reconsider its framework based on the non-involvement.

    Recent geopolitical developments

    • India-China tensions have soared over the border issue.
    • The Afghan peace process is underway with the first direct talks between Kabul and the Taliban insurgents at Doha, in Qatar.
    • The normalisation of the relations between Israel and Arab countries began with the UAE and Bahrain normalising the relations.

    Issues with the development

    • The chances of failure in Afghanistan are real.
    • The momentum behind the normalisation of ties between Israel and the Gulf kingdoms, may not necessarily lead to broader peace in the Middle East.
    • The US initiatives in Afghanistan and Arabia are driven by President Donald Trump’s quest for diplomatic victories.

    Why it matters to India

    1) The vulnerability of the peace process

    • Because of competing interests, the peace process in Afghanistan and the Middle East remain vulnerable.
    • The unfolding dynamic will alter the geopolitical landscape in both places.
    • Whether peace breaks out in Afghanistan or not, the Taliban is here to stay.
    • As UAE and Bahrain join Egypt and Jordan in having formal relationships with Israel, the contradiction between Arabs and Israelis is no longer the dominant one in the region.

    2) India should recognise the importance of Arabia

    •  India’s strategic community tends to take too narrow a view of the Arabian salience.
    • The focus is mostly on ensuring oil supplies, promoting manpower exports, and managing the Pakistan problem.
    • We should consider that the Afghan peace talks are taking place in Qatar, a tiny Gulf Kingdom.
    • The UAE and Saudi Arabia were the only countries to recognise the Taliban government in the late 1990s.
    • This time around, they appear to have taken a backseat.
    • Delhi will need to pay more attention to the unfolding realignments between the Arabs and non-Arab states like Iran, Turkey and Israel.

    3) Paradox of American power

    • The U.S. is being seen as a declining power in the matters of the Middle East and Afghanistan.
    •  But the reality remains that the US is the one forcing a change in both the places.

    4) Implications of strategic vacuum created by the U.S. exit

    • As the US steps back from the region, the resulting strategic vacuum is likely to be filled by Russia and China.
    • Russia and China are quite active in both the Middle East and Afghanistan.
    •  China’s future role in Afghanistan, in partnership with Pakistan, could be quite significant and will be of some concern for India.
    • Regional powers have already acquired much say in the new geopolitics of the Middle East.
    • Qatar and UAE punch way above their weight, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are locked in a major contest for regional influence.

    5) Domestic politics in the country

    • Religious radicalism, sectarian and ethnic divisions, and the clamour for more representative governments are sharpening conflicts within and between countries.
    • The collapse of the oil market is undermining the region’s economic fortunes.
    • Collapsing oil market is also making it harder for political elites to address the emerging political challenges.

    Consider the question “Middle East is going through the major realignment of relations. What are its implications for India?.

    Conclusion

    As the old order begins to crumble in the greater Middle East, the question is no longer whether India should join the geopolitical jousting there; but when, how and in partnership with whom.

  • Neither war nor peace between India and China

    The article analyses the challenges in the India-China border dispute and the recent events of Chinese aggression.

    Trust deficit

    • The recent Chinese actions have set back trust between the two countries by decades.
    • Trust made sense when both sides could assume that the other side either did not have the capacity or would not rapidly deploy troops in strategic positions at the border.
    • With the building of infrastructure on both sides, this trust was bound to break.
    • Even after temporary disengagement, both sides will now have distrust about the deployment of the other side.
    • An infrastructure-thick environment will require a permanent presence and closer deployments.

    Challenges

    •  At the level of the army, India seems to have consistently misread the PLA’s intentions.
    •  The closer the armies get, the greater the risks.
    • There is a political logic that does not bode well. There is still speculation on why the Chinese are taking an aggressive posture.
    • The very fact that we are not sure of Chinese motives means it is hard to know their endgame.

    Chinese fears

    • At a basic level, they will want to secure their interests in CPEC.
    • Tibet issue has also been a sensitive issue for China.
    •  Chinese interest in Nepal is less to encircle India. It is to ensure Nepal is not used as a staging ground of resistance in Tibet.

    Tibet issues in India-China relations

    • On Tibet issue India is in an awkward situation.
    • Due to the presence of the Dalai Lama in India, China will see it as a potential threat to its cultural hegemony in Tibet.
    • Ladakh and Tawang are also important pieces in that cultural consolidation.
    • The Sino-India peaceful relations were premised on keeping the Tibet issue in check.
    • But just as we are not sure of Chinese motives, they may not be sure of our motives either.

    New paradigm in India’s foreign policy

    • India growing power means it needs a new paradigm of foreign policy.
    • This policy will supposedly safeguard India’s interests more assertively.
    • If diplomatically not well managed, this change also causes great uncertainty in the international system.
    • India’s Pakistan policy is premised entirely on keeping them guessing on what we might do, including possible military options and altering the territorial status quo.
    • Our domestic ideological articulation of India’s position ranges from reclaiming PoK to Aksai Chin.
    • We cannot abandon Tibetans.
    • This underscores a narrative of uncertainty over our intentions.

    Conclusion

    Our own trumpeted departure from the past, without either the diplomatic preparation, domestic political discipline, and full anticipation of military eventualities, does not make it easy for others to understand our endgame.

  • Chushul Valley and its Significance

    The Chushul sub-sector has come into focus in the standoff between the Indian and PLA troops.

    Tap to read more about Himalayan River System

    What is the Chushul Valley?

    • The Chushul sub-sector lies south of Pangong Tso in eastern Ladakh.
    • It comprises high, broken mountains and heights of Thatung, Black Top, Helmet Top, Gurung Hill, and Magger Hill besides passes such as Rezang La and Reqin La, the Spanggur Gap, and the Chushul valley.
    • Situated at a height of over 13,000 feet close to the LAC, the Chushul Valley has a vital airstrip that played an important role even during the 1962 War with China.

    What is its strategic importance to India?

    • Chushul is one among the five Border Personnel Meeting points between the Indian Army and the People’s Liberation Army of China.
    • It enjoys tremendous strategic and tactical importance because of its location and terrain, which make it a centre for logistics deployment.
    • This sector has plains that are a couple of km wide, where mechanized forces, including tanks, can be deployed. Its airstrip and connectivity by road to Leh add to its operational advantages.
    • Indian troops have now secured the ridgeline in this sub-sector that allows them to dominate the Chushul bowl on the Indian side, and Moldo sector on the Chinese side.
    • They also have a clear sight of the almost 2-km-wide Spanggur gap, which the Chinese used in the past to launch attacks on this sector in the 1962 War.

    How is Chushul important to China?

    • Simply put, Chushul is the gateway to Leh. If China enters the Chushul, it can launch its operations for Leh.
    • After the initial attacks, including on the Galwan valley by the Chinese in October 1962, the PLA troops prepared to attack Chushul airfield and the valley to get direct access to Leh.
    • However, just before the attacks were launched, the area was reinforced by the 114 Brigade in November 1962, which also had under its command two troops of armour and some artillery.

    What are the challenges in this area?

    • An immediate challenge is of a flare-up as troops of the two countries are deployed within a distance of 800 to 1,000 metres of each other at Black Top and Reqin La.
    • Logistics also pose a major challenge. There is a need to carry water and food to the top which soldiers cannot do.
    • The harsh winter that lasts for eight months of the year poses a big challenge.
    • It is very difficult to dig in and make shelters on the ridgeline. The temperature falls to minus 30 degrees Celsius, and there are frequent snowstorms.

  • What is the 13th Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution, and why is it contentious?

    After the Rajapaksas’ win in the November 2019 presidential polls and the August 2020 general election, the spotlight has fallen on two key legislations in Sri Lanka’s Constitution.

    Sri Lankan amendments in news

    • One, the 19th Amendment was passed in 2015 to curb powers of the Executive President, while strengthening Parliament and independent commissions.
    • The Rajapaksa government has already drafted and gazetted the 20th Amendment.
    • The other legislation under sharp focus is the 13th Amendment passed in 1987, which mandates a measure of power devolution to the provincial councils established to govern the island’s nine provinces.

    What is the 13th Amendment?

    • It is an outcome of the Indo-Lanka Accord of July 1987, signed by the then PM Rajiv Gandhi and President J.R. Jayawardene, in an attempt to resolve the ethnic conflict and civil war.
    • The 13th Amendment, which led to the creation of Provincial Councils, assured a power-sharing arrangement to enable all nine provinces in the country, including Sinhala majority areas, to self-govern.
    • Subjects such as education, health, agriculture, housing, land and police are devolved to the provincial administrations.
    • But because of restrictions on financial powers and overriding powers given to the President, the provincial administrations have not made much headway.
    • In particular, the provisions relating to police and land have never been implemented.

    Why is it contentious?

    • The 13th Amendment carries considerable baggage from the country’s civil war years. It was opposed vociferously by both Sinhala nationalist parties and the LTTE.
    • The opposition within Sri Lanka saw the Accord and the consequent legislation as an imprint of Indian intervention.
    • It was widely perceived as an imposition by a neighbour wielding hegemonic influence.
    • The Tamil polity, especially its dominant nationalist strain, does not find the 13th Amendment sufficient in its ambit or substance. However, some find it as an important starting point, something to build upon.

    Why is it significant?

    • Till date, the Amendment represents the only constitutional provision on the settlement of the long-pending Tamil question.
    • In addition to assuring a measure of devolution, it is considered part of the few significant gains since the 1980s, in the face of growing Sinhala-Buddhist majoritarianism.

    Its criticism

    • Critics argue that in a small country, the provinces could be effectively controlled by the Centre.
    • The opposition camp also includes those fundamentally opposed to sharing any political power with the Tamil minority.
    • All the same, all political camps that vehemently oppose the system have themselves contested in provincial council elections.
    • The councils have over time also helped national parties strengthen their grassroots presence and organisational structures.

  • Non-War Military Tactics used by China

    An annual report from the U.S. Department of Defense describes Chinese leaders’ use of tactics short of armed conflict to further the country’s objectives, citing border conflicts with India and Bhutan among the examples.

    Try this question:

    Q. What are Non-War Military Activities (NWMA)? Discuss how China is using NWMA as a tool for its overtly ambitious expansionist policy.

    Various non-war military tactics

    The report describes Non-War Military Activities (NWMA) as one of two kinds of military operations (the other is war) used by the PLA. NWMA can be conducted internationally or domestically and encompass activities in multiple domains.

    (1) Provoking armed conflict

    • China calibrates its coercive activities to fall below the threshold of provoking conflict with the United States, its allies and partners, or others in the Indo-Pacific region.
    • It can notably include operations in which the PLA uses coercive threats and/or violence below the level of armed conflict against states and other actors to safeguard its expansionism.
    • These tactics are particularly evident in China’s pursuit of its territorial and maritime claims in the South and East China Seas as well as along its border with India and Bhutan.

    (2) Neo-imperialist tools

    • China also employs non-military tools coercively, including economic tools during periods of political tensions with countries that China accuses of harming its national interests.
    • The Belt and Road Initiative is leading to a greater overseas military presence for China in the guise to protect its economic interests.

    (3) Multilateralism as a strategic messaging tool

    • The report says that China uses multilateral forums and international organisations to generate new opportunities to expand its influence, strengthen its political influence.
    • It promotes strategic messaging that portrays China as a responsible global actor, advances its development interests, and limit outside interference in and criticism of its initiatives.
    • The Brazil Russia India China South Africa (BRICS) grouping and Shanghai Cooperation Organization are among those cited as examples of this alleged phenomenon.

  • India needs an internationalism that is rooted in realism

    The article analyses India’s approach towards regional integration in Asian unity and internationalism and its consequences.

    Clash between internationalism and nationalism

    • Three current developments reveal the clash between grandiose internationalism and the intractable nationalism.
    • 1) India pulled out of the military exercise of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which was to herald a new era of Eurasian unity.
    • Sharpening contradictions between India and China comes in the way of uniting such a large geopolitical space.
    • 2) Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s claim to leadership of the Muslim world that has run into resistance from a large section of the Arab rulers.
    • 3) The tension between the globalism of the US foreign policy establishment and Donald Trump’s “America First” nationalism.

    Internationalism and threats to it

    • Western liberalism has had more power than anyone else to promote internationalism.
    • But the liberal internationalist effort at constructing supra-national institutions now faces big setbacks.
    • The greatest resistance to the liberal internationalist vision has not come within the US.
    • Trump channelled the American resentments against the globalist excesses of the Wall Street, Washington and the Silicon Valley.

    India’s nationalism

    • Indian nationalism was inevitably influenced by liberal internationalism, socialism, communism, pan-Islamism, pan-Asianism and Third-Worldism to name a few.
    • Both the Asian Relations Conference (Delhi 1947) and the Afro-Asian Conference (Bandung 1955) showed up the deep differences among the Asian elites.
    • India then turned its back on Asianism to claim the leadership of the broader Non-Aligned Movement.
    • After the Cold War, India re-embraced Asianism in the 1990s when it unveiled the Look East Policy.
    • India also joined the Asian regional institutions led by the Association of South-East Asian Nations.

    RCEP joining issue

    • Few could have anticipated that Delhi would walk out of one of the most consequential agreements negotiated by the ASEAN — the RCEP — that sought Asia-wide economic integration.
    • Delhi believed that the contradiction between India’s domestic commercial interests and a China-led Asian economic regionalism was irreconcilable.

    India’s approach toward Asian regionalism

    • Eurasian regionalism led by Moscow and Beijing is also facing tensions and there is deepening conflict between Indian and Chinese interests.
    • India’s diplomatic finesse on the SCO has become increasingly unsustainable after Chinese aggression in eastern Ladakh.
    • India underestimated the economic and political consequences of China’s rapid rise while seeking economic regionalism in East Asia and the multi-polar world with Russia and China.
    • India took a benign view of Chinese power and has been shocked to discover otherwise in 1962 and in 2020.

    Conclusion

    India today needs more internationalism, than less, in dealing with the Chinese power. But it must be an internationalism that is rooted in realism and tethered to India’s economic and national security priorities.