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Subject: Disaster Management

  • In parched Maharashtra, why drought can’t be declared yet

    Why in the News

    Maharashtra cannot formally declare a drought despite a rainfall deficit across 31 of its 36 districts, because the rules governing central relief fix an assessment window that has not yet opened. Under National Disaster Response Fund (NDRF) norms, a kharif drought assessment can begin only from 5 October, once the monsoon starts to withdraw, and a rabi assessment only in March 2027. Opposition leaders have asked that a drought be declared, and the Chief Minister has said the government is taking all steps necessary to deal with an alarming situation. The contested point is that a declaration framework built around fixed seasonal windows cannot respond to a crop failure that has already occurred.

    Why has a drought not been declared yet?

    1. The kharif window: NDRF rules allow a drought assessment for the kharif season, which runs from June to October, to begin only from 5 October, once the monsoon starts to withdraw.
    2. The rabi window: For the rabi season, which runs from October to April, the assessment can be held only in March 2027.
    3. What the timing means on the ground: The kharif crop has already failed, so the assessment that decides relief will measure a loss that was complete before the window opened.

    Who declares a drought, and on what basis?

    1. No single national definition: There is no definition of drought accepted across India, so the threshold is not uniform between States.
    2. The State declares: States hold the authority to declare a drought based on local conditions.
    3. The Centre holds the money: The State’s report must conform to the parameters specified under NDRF norms, and disaster relief funds are unlocked by the Centre.
    4. Why the two halves do not match: A State can act on local conditions but cannot fund the response on its own, so the operative standard is the central one whatever the State’s own assessment says.

    What are the NDRF parameters for a declaration?

    1. Crop loss: The extent of loss to the standing crop is the primary trigger.
    2. The moisture adequacy index: The index measures how far available soil moisture meets crop water requirement, and it is used to assess soil health for the purpose of the declaration.
    3. Rainfall deficit: The deficit must be up to 70 per cent.
    4. Sowing shortfall: Sowing must fall below 50 per cent of the total cultivable kharif or rabi area.
    5. Drinking water and groundwater: Drinking water shortage must be severe and groundwater tables must be shrinking.
    6. Fodder shortage: Availability of fodder for livestock must be short.
    7. Food production and migration: A decline in food production and labour migration in search of work are both counted.

    What do the rainfall and sowing figures show?

    1. The driver: The rain deficit this season is El Nino driven, and it has hit an agriculture dependent State economy directly.
    2. The spread of the deficit: The India Meteorological Department (IMD) records that 31 of 36 districts in Maharashtra are rain deficient, with 20 of them facing a deficit of 25 per cent to 58 per cent.
    3. The gaps between spells: In more than 100 of the State’s 355 drought hit talukas, gaps between rain spells have stretched to 40 to 60 days.
    4. A delayed sowing: Kharif sowing began only on 15 July against the normal 10 June, and rain failure after sowing then stunted flowering and fruiting.
    5. The area lost: The main kharif crop, sown across 147 lakh hectares, has withered.
    6. The crops worst hit: Soybean and cotton, the mainstay of small and marginal farmers in Marathwada and Vidarbha, are the worst affected. The dry spell has also stunted sugarcane growth in Marathwada and parts of western Maharashtra.
    7. Rain that damaged rather than helped: Where rain did fall it was short and intense, which damaged soil health and caused erosion in some areas.
    8. The structural exposure: Maharashtra’s agriculture is largely rain fed, and its irrigation potential, at under 20 per cent, is far below that of States such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar.

    How bad is the water storage position?

    1. Major and medium dams: Data up to 20 September shows the State’s 138 major dams at 85 per cent of capacity and 264 medium dams at 65 per cent, against 96 per cent and 77 per cent at the same point last year.
    2. The smallest storages are worst off: The State’s 2,630 small and micro dams stand at 43 per cent against 57 per cent a year ago, and these are the storages that villages draw on directly.
    3. The regional split: Marathwada, which has the most dams at 929, holds 46 per cent against 81 per cent last year. Amravati division stands at 64 per cent, Nagpur at 72 per cent, Nashik at 83 per cent, Pune at 88 per cent and Konkan at 76 per cent.
    4. Why drinking water is the immediate concern: Storage has to carry the State through the dry months to the next monsoon, so a deficit measured in September is a supply problem for the following summer.

    What has the State done in the meantime?

    1. Loss assessment has begun: The State government has begun surveys and panchanamas to assess crop loss, so that the administration can quantify losses in food production and in money terms.
    2. A proposal after the window opens: Maharashtra has decided to submit a proposal to the Centre for financial assistance after 5 October.
    3. A central team follows: Before relief funds are released, a central team will visit the affected regions and make its own assessment.
    4. Relief already announced: The Chief Minister announced a farm loan waiver of Rs 40,385 crore during the monsoon session in July, with an additional Rs 50,000 incentive for farmers who repaid their loans regularly.

    Challenges to the drought declaration framework

    1. Relief is timed to the calendar rather than to the failure: An assessment window keyed to monsoon withdrawal starts counting after the loss is complete, so compensation arrives a season late. Eg. A kharif crop lost in August is assessed only from October under the present norms.
      The Fix: Allow a provisional interim assessment on a triggered basis once sowing and rainfall thresholds are breached, with the final assessment reconciling it later.
    2. Taluka level averages hide the worst affected villages: Declaration works off administrative units, so a severely affected pocket inside a unit that is only moderately deficient receives nothing. Eg. Rain spell gaps vary sharply between talukas within the same division in the present season.
      The Fix: Use village level rainfall and satellite crop condition data as the unit of assessment, as crop insurance already does.
    3. Rainfall totals do not capture distribution: A season can end close to the normal total and still destroy the crop through long dry spells at flowering. Eg. Short intense spells this season damaged soil and caused erosion while adding to the recorded total.
      The Fix: Weight dry spell length and the timing of rainfall against crop growth stages in the declaration parameters, not only the seasonal deficit.
    4. The measure of damage is production, not income: Parameters built around crop loss and food production miss the loss of farm wage work and of livestock income that follows a failed season. Eg. Labour migration is counted as an indicator of drought rather than compensated as a loss.
      The Fix: Attach an automatic expansion of rural employment guarantee workdays and fodder camp funding to a declared drought, independent of the crop loss estimate.
    5. Rain fed districts carry the shock every time: Where irrigation potential is under 20 per cent, the same districts fail in every deficit year and relief substitutes for capacity that was never built. Eg. Marathwada and Vidarbha carry the worst crop loss in the current season, as in earlier deficit years.
      The Fix: Tie drought relief transfers to a schedule of watershed treatment and micro irrigation coverage in the districts that receive them most often.

    Conclusion

    The declaration is a funding instrument and not a description of conditions, which is why a State can be in drought and not declared to be in one. The gap this exposes is between a relief architecture organised around seasons and a rainfall pattern that no longer arrives in them. The immediate status is that the State is conducting crop loss surveys and will submit its proposal once the assessment window opens. The winter season is the one to watch, since the rabi position is not assessed until March 2027.

    Back2Basics: National Disaster Response Fund

    1. Statutory basis: The Fund is constituted under the Disaster Management Act, 2005, and is held by the central government to supplement a State’s own response effort.
    2. Relationship with the State fund: A State first meets relief from its State Disaster Response Fund, and the NDRF is accessed when that fund is inadequate for a disaster of severe nature.
    3. How it is financed: It is financed through a cess levied for the purpose and through budgetary support, and it is audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General.
    4. Coverage: It covers notified disasters including drought, cyclone, flood, earthquake, hailstorm, landslide, pest attack, cloudburst and cold wave.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2014, GS3, 12.5 marks] Drought has been recognised as a disaster in view of its party expense, temporal duration, slow onset and lasting effect on various vulnerable sections. With a focus on the September 2010 guidelines from the National disaster management authority, discuss the mechanism for preparedness to deal with the El Nino and La Nina fallouts in India.”

  • Don’t let borders blind us to Himalayan risks

    Why in the News

    The floods in Nepal have been widely labelled a Glacial Lake Outburst Flood (GLOF), and emerging evidence points instead to an avalanche that turned into a cascading debris flow hazard. The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Water Resources, in its 2023 report on glacier management in the Himalaya, had already recorded that no mechanism exists for transboundary coordination on glacier linked risks and that existing water treaties carry no provisions for them. The Committee treated transboundary coordination as the core challenge rather than a secondary one. The contested point is that the Himalayan cryosphere and its river systems form one connected risk system, while the institutions that manage that risk remain organised around political boundaries.

    What is a Glacial Lake Outburst Flood?

    1. Mechanism: A lake held back by a natural dam of glacial debris or ice releases its water suddenly when that dam fails.
    2. Cascading character: The release carries high energy and picks up rock and sediment on the way down, so the damage downstream comes from the debris as much as from the water.
    3. Triggers: An avalanche falling into a lake, a cloudburst, seismic shaking or the thawing of frozen ground supporting a moraine can each breach the dam.
    4. Why the label travels loosely: A flood can follow the same downstream path without being an outburst at all, which is what the Nepal episode now appears to be.

    Why does a Himalayan hazard refuse to stay inside one country?

    1. Rivers as carriers of risk: Rivers in South Asia are treated as sources of water to be allocated between states, and they are also the channel through which hazard moves from one country to the next.
    2. Origin and impact are separable: The event originated in northern Nepal and Nepal bore the immediate brunt, which does not place downstream India outside the risk.
    3. One ecological region: The Himalayan cryosphere, the river systems below it and the climate dynamics above it make South Asia a single ecological unit rather than a collection of separate political territories.
    4. A geography blind response fails: Institutions built around boundaries cannot manage a hazard whose pathway is decided by the slope of a river.

    What do India’s own episodes show about cascading Himalayan risk?

    1. Bhote Koshi, 2014: A landslide on the Bhote Koshi impounded a lake behind the slide debris. India worked with Nepal to breach that lake in a controlled manner and reduce the downstream impact.
    2. South Lhonak, 2023: The South Lhonak GLOF in Sikkim demonstrated the speed and the scale at which a Himalayan hazard reaches settlements and critical infrastructure.
    3. Costs are systematically understated: Damage accounting stops at assets destroyed and leaves out the setback to infrastructure, livelihoods and development trajectories that runs for years afterwards.
    4. Disruption is a standing condition: Repeated interruption of critical infrastructure and of water systems is a recurring feature of the region rather than a peripheral concern.

    What did the Parliamentary Standing Committee actually recommend?

    1. Scope of the 2023 report: The Committee examined glacier management in the Himalaya, covering flash floods associated with glacial melting and the risk of glacial lake outbursts.
    2. Systematic data gathering: It recommended sustained data collection and monitoring of glaciers across the Indian Himalayan Region, so that actionable plans rest on measurement rather than on estimate.
    3. A diplomatic route, not a technical one: It urged the Ministry of Jal Shakti to press the Ministry of External Affairs for an agreement with neighbouring Himalayan countries, which places the remedy in foreign policy rather than in water administration.
    4. The gap it named: The absence of both a coordination mechanism and of treaty provisions was recorded as a finding of a parliamentary committee, so the omission is documented rather than merely alleged.

    How does cryosphere risk change the balance between riparians?

    1. Geography sets the distribution: River courses are fixed by geography, and with them the distribution of power and of vulnerability among the countries along a basin.
    2. Upstream advantage is not absolute: An upstream riparian holds the water and holds the hazard at the same time, so risk can disrupt and even reverse the power relations that allocation bargaining assumes.
    3. Treaties written for allocation alone: Water treaties in the region divide flows between parties and carry nothing for a surge of water and debris that arrives without notice.
    4. Rivers enter geopolitics: River basins can no longer sit at the edge of the region’s geopolitical conversation, because the risk they now transmit is strategic rather than only environmental.

    What would a regional architecture built around shared risk contain?

    1. A Himalayan early warning network: A connected network across the range would convert monitoring done separately by each country into warnings that travel down the basin.
    2. Shared cryosphere risk assessments: Assessment conducted jointly gives each country the upstream picture it cannot generate from inside its own borders.
    3. Common alert protocols: Common protocols for GLOF and flash flood alerts make a warning issued in one country readable and actionable in the next.
    4. Joint exercises: Regular exercises involving the disaster management agencies of the countries concerned test whether the protocols work before an event rather than during one.
    5. India as convenor: India has the reach to convene such an arrangement and to build institutions around shared risk rather than around allocation disputes.
    6. Imperfect institutions still count: Regional institutions in South Asia are weak, and the scale of the emerging risk makes continuing to marginalise them harder to justify.

    Challenges to a Himalayan transboundary early warning system

    1. Hydrological data is treated as strategic information: Countries in the basin withhold real time river and snow data because it carries military and negotiating value. Eg. Upstream data sharing on the Brahmaputra has lapsed during periods of bilateral tension.
      The Fix: Route cryosphere and lake level data through a technical body with a standing mandate, so transmission does not depend on the state of political relations in a given year.
    2. No treaty covers glacier linked hazard: The region’s water agreements are allocation instruments and create no duty to warn. Eg. The Indus Waters Treaty, 1960 and the Ganges Water Treaty, 1996 both set shares of flow and neither addresses outburst risk.
      The Fix: Add a hazard notification protocol as a separate instrument, so it can be agreed without reopening the allocation bargain each treaty settled.
    3. Warning time is measured in minutes: A debris laden surge moving down a steep valley reaches the first settlements faster than a conventional alert chain can act. Eg. The 2021 Chamoli event in Uttarakhand destroyed a hydropower site within minutes of the initial failure.
      The Fix: Place automated sensors at the lake and along the valley that trigger sirens directly, removing the human decision step from the first stage of the alert.
    4. Infrastructure is sited on the hazard path: Hydropower and road projects occupy the narrow valleys that a surge uses, which converts a natural event into an economic loss. Eg. The Teesta III project in Sikkim was breached in the 2023 outburst.
      The Fix: Make an outburst assessment a condition of clearance for any new project in a glacial basin, with existing designs reviewed against it.
    5. Monitoring is split across agencies: Glacier science, weather forecasting and disaster response sit in separate institutions with no single owner for cryosphere risk. Eg. Glacier monitoring, satellite mapping and alert dissemination are handled by different national bodies in India.
      The Fix: Name one authority accountable for glacial lake risk, with the mapping, forecasting and alert functions reporting into it.

    Conclusion

    The hazard travels by river and the response travels by treaty, and the two follow different maps. A parliamentary committee has already recorded that neither a coordination mechanism nor a treaty provision exists for glacier linked risk, and that recommendation has not produced an agreement with any neighbouring Himalayan country. What to watch is whether the Ministry of External Affairs opens a negotiation on hazard notification distinct from the allocation question, since that separation is what would let an agreement move at all.

    Glacial Lake Outburst Floods in India

    1. Expanding lakes: Glacial lakes in India expanded by 33.7 percent between 2011 and 2024.
    2. High risk concentration: 67 high risk lakes in India recorded an increase of over 40 percent in surface area, with Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh as the main expansion zones.
    3. Transboundary lakes: Glacial lakes across Nepal, Bhutan and China recorded a 10.81 percent increase over the same period.
    4. Mapped inventory: The National Remote Sensing Centre mapped 28,043 glacial lakes larger than 0.25 hectare across the Indus, Ganga and Brahmaputra basins in a 2023 report, covering Indian and transboundary territory.

    Government Initiatives for Glacial Lake Risk Management

    1. National GLOF Risk Mitigation Project: A Rs 150 crore project covering Arunachal Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Sikkim and Uttarakhand for structural and non structural mitigation at identified lakes.
    2. Central Water Commission glacial lake monitoring: It monitors 902 glacial lakes and has built a Risk Indexing Framework to rank lakes by priority.
    3. NDMA Committee on Disaster Risk Reduction: The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) works with Himalayan States and Union Territories to identify high risk lakes and put mitigation measures in place.
    4. Mandatory outburst studies for dams: Assessments became compulsory for new dams after 2023, and existing dam designs are under review against the same standard.
    5. Mission Mausam: It upgrades weather forecasting and multi hazard early warning systems, including alerts relevant to glacial lake risk.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Discuss the recent measures initiated in disaster management by the Government of India departing from the earlier reactive approach.”

  • Bihar flooded despite rainfall deficit; Nepal isn’t the reason

    Why in the News

    Bihar has flooded in a season of deficit rainfall. The State received 601.1 mm of rain between 1 June and 8 September, 27% below normal, and the Disaster Management Department recorded 2,157 villages across 14 districts affected. The Water Resources Minister has said this year’s flood pattern differed from previous years, with the Ganga rising first rather than the rivers that enter Bihar from Nepal. Discharge at the Valmikinagar Barrage on the Gandak stayed below what officials had expected, and the flooding continued anyway. The explanation offered is a backwater effect, so the immediate cause sits downstream in the main river rather than upstream across the border.

    What is a backwater effect?

    1. How a tributary drains: A tributary can discharge into a main river only for as long as the water level in the main river stays below its own.
    2. What happens when the main stem rises: A high stage in the main river holds the tributary’s water back and spreads it across the tributary’s own floodplain, with no additional rain falling there.

    Why did Bihar flood on a rainfall deficit?

    1. The seasonal shortfall: Rainfall from 1 June to 8 September was 601.1 mm, 27% below normal, and the deficit stood at 30% as late as 1 September.
    2. The month ran the other way: Rainfall during September itself was 31% above normal, so the cumulative figure conceals the period when the flooding worsened.
    3. Localised extremes: Individual rain events delivered 214.92 mm in East Champaran and 154.55 mm in Sitamarhi.
    4. The recorded damage: By 9 September the Disaster Management Department reported 2,157 villages in 14 districts affected and about 40.51 lakh people hit.
    5. Seasonal totals are the wrong measure: A flood is produced by the intensity and timing of rain and by upstream discharge, not by the season’s aggregate.

    How was this year’s flood sequence different?

    1. The usual order: The Bagmati, Kamla, Kosi and Gandak, which enter Bihar from Nepal, normally rise first, and the Ganga follows.
    2. What happened instead: The Ganga became the first source of concern this year, which inverted the sequence the State’s flood response is built around.
    3. The catchment is not local: The Ganga’s catchment extends far beyond Bihar, so it carries water generated by rainfall upstream, including in Uttar Pradesh.
    4. The stated drivers: The Disaster Management Department’s Principal Secretary identified rainfall around the Allahabad and Varanasi region and the resulting downstream discharge as important factors, with discharge from neighbouring States a major factor for the other rivers too.

    Why did opening the Valmikinagar Barrage not settle the Gandak?

    1. The gates were opened early: When floods hit Nepal on 26 August, Bihar opened all 36 gates of the Valmikinagar Barrage on the Gandak, which was then below its normal levels.
    2. The peak came in under expectation: Discharge at the barrage reached 1,50,200 cusecs (cubic feet per second, the volume of water passing a point each second) and then declined, below what officials had expected.
    3. Flooding continued regardless: The Gandak and the Punpun could not drain once the Ganga had swelled, which is the backwater effect at work.
    4. A second local input: The Punpun was also carrying heavy rainfall from Jharkhand.
    5. A flood travels: A river flood is a moving event, so a peak recorded at one gauge is transferred downstream and the flooded area is far larger than the area that recorded the heaviest rain.

    What do Bihar’s embankments do, and what do they not do?

    1. The length built: The State has built more than 3,730 km of river embankments.
    2. What they have protected: These structures have historically shielded around 3,600 sq km of land during floods.
    3. The limit of the structure: Embankments do not remove the underlying vulnerability of one of India’s flattest and most sediment heavy alluvial landscapes.
    4. Sediment raises the bed: The Ganga, Gandak, Kosi and Bagmati carry enormous quantities of sediment, and accumulation within a channel lifts the riverbed relative to the land beside it. Silt is a permanent condition of Bihar’s rivers rather than an event.

    Why has the Farakka Barrage entered the flood argument?

    1. The State’s contention: State leaders hold that the Farakka Barrage has trapped large volumes of silt along the Ganga over the five decades since it was built.
    2. The claimed consequence: That accumulation has made the riverbed shallower, so even normal seasonal monsoon flows now spill over the banks and produce annual flooding across the plains.
    3. A treaty deadline gives it timing: The 1996 India Bangladesh Farakka Treaty expires in December 2026, and demands in Bihar are for a review of the pact.

    What in Bihar’s own geography keeps exposure high?

    1. The rivers move: The Ganga, Gandak and Kosi constantly reshape their channels, so the land at risk is not fixed from one year to the next.
    2. People live at the water’s edge: High population density means many communities are settled close to rivers, and a rise in level turns into an evacuation rather than an inconvenience.

    Challenges to Bihar’s flood management

    1. An embankment concentrates risk at its weakest point: A breach releases water at high velocity onto land that the structure had kept dry for decades, so the damage is deeper than an unprotected flood. Eg. The Kosi breach at Kusaha in 2008 shifted the river’s course and displaced over three million people in Bihar.
      The Fix: Hold a pre positioned stock of boulders and geobags at identified weak reaches before each monsoon rather than mobilising material after a breach.
    2. Land behind the line cannot drain itself: An area sealed off from the river also loses the outlet for its own rainfall, so ground protected from flooding turns permanently waterlogged. Eg. Large tracts in the Kosi and Bagmati belts of north Bihar have gone out of cultivation from persistent waterlogging.
      The Fix: Build and maintain sluices and drainage channels through the embankment line with a fixed operating protocol for the monsoon months.
    3. Flood moderation depends on storage that does not exist: Peak attenuation on the Kosi and the Gandak requires reservoirs upstream in Nepal that have never been constructed. Eg. A high dam at Barahkshetra on the Kosi has been under discussion since the 1950s without being built.
      The Fix: Separate real time data sharing and joint forecasting from the dam negotiation, so warning improves without waiting on construction.
    4. Warnings are issued off levels already recorded: Forecasts rest on gauge readings at the moment of the peak, which leaves little lead time on terrain where water spreads sideways for tens of kilometres. Eg. A level based warning gives downstream districts only hours once an upstream gauge has crossed its danger mark.
      The Fix: Build district level inundation forecasts from upstream rainfall and barrage release data rather than from gauge readings alone.

    Conclusion

    Bihar’s flood risk is no longer set mainly by how much rain falls inside the State. It is set by the level of the main river the State has to drain into, and by channels whose beds have risen relative to the land beside them. The unresolved tension is that the structures protecting settled land also hold in the sediment that raises those beds, so each decade of protection shortens the next decade’s margin. What to watch is whether flood planning shifts from adding embankment length to sediment management, drainage behind the line and forecasting built on upstream data.

    Back2Basics: Farakka Barrage

    1. What it is and where: A barrage on the Ganga in Murshidabad district of West Bengal, commissioned in 1975, a short distance upstream of the border with Bangladesh.
    2. Why it was built: It diverts a part of the Ganga’s flow into a feeder canal to the Bhagirathi and Hooghly, to flush silt and maintain navigability for the port of Kolkata.
    3. A barrage, not a dam: It regulates and diverts flow through gates rather than impounding a large storage reservoir behind it.
    4. The water sharing arrangement: An agreement between India and Bangladesh shares the dry season flow measured at the barrage in ten day cycles between 1 January and 31 May.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024, GS3, 15 marks] What is disaster resilience? How is it determined? Describe various elements of a resilience framework. Also mention the global targets of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030).”

  • Disaster preparedness must put communities at centre

    Why in the News

    The catastrophe unfolding across Nepal is being read as a warning for the Himalaya and for mountain regions worldwide rather than as one country’s disaster. The reading rests on field research with disaster-affected communities in Nepal, including flood-affected elders, women, men and local leaders in Kharapani in the Pokhara Valley after the Seti River flood, and on separate field research on earthquake recovery in Kathmandu. Those communities reported inadequate warning, limited preparedness and delayed recovery support. They did not reject science or technology, and asked instead for warnings that function and for the equipment and training to act on them. The contest is between a preparedness system measured by its ability to detect the next hazard and one measured by whether the detection reaches a household with the authority and the means to move.

    Why does a mountain disaster become a regional problem?

    1. Mountains hold the water other regions live on: They store snow and ice, feed major rivers and sustain societies far beyond their own slopes.
    2. The physical base is changing across all mountain systems: From the Hindu Kush Himalaya to the Andes, the Alps and the Rocky Mountains, warming is altering glaciers, snowpack, permafrost and water flows.
    3. The consequences land downstream: Environmental change in the highlands cascades into social, economic and health crises in the plains that depend on those flows.

    What did flood-affected communities report?

    1. The loss was continuing rather than momentary: Residents described a long relational disaster covering the loss of relatives, homes, livestock and businesses.
    2. The damage extended past property: They described grief, disrupted livelihoods and frustration with the institutions meant to respond.
    3. Three failures were named: They reported inadequate warning, limited preparedness and delayed recovery support.

    What do affected communities ask for?

    1. Working warnings, not more instruments: Communities asked for functioning warnings, local flood-information centres, communication technologies, rescue equipment and preparedness training.
    2. An unread warning protects nobody: A warning that does not reach people, is not trusted, or is disconnected from evacuation and response plans provides no protection.
    3. The people at risk hold usable knowledge: Affected populations are knowledge holders and leaders in their own right, not recipients waiting for expert instruction.

    What five responsibilities does mountain preparedness now carry?

    1. Transboundary monitoring and data sharing: Glaciers, rivers, landslides and flood pathways cross political borders, so Nepal, India, China, Bhutan and other Himalayan countries need faster exchange of upstream observations, satellite information, river conditions and warnings. Scientific cooperation of this kind is life-saving regional infrastructure.
    2. Community-centred warnings: Information must reach people in trusted languages and forms, warnings must be tested, communities must know where to go, and women, elders, youth and marginalised groups must hold meaningful authority in preparedness decisions.
    3. Preparedness as a permanent public responsibility: Local information centres, evacuation plans, shelters, community response teams, health-system continuity and rescue equipment all require sustained investment rather than post-disaster allocation.
    4. Ecosystem-sensitive mountain development: Roads, tourism, hydropower and mining bring benefits, and poorly planned versions of each amplify exposure to the hazard.
    5. International climate responsibility: Nepal has contributed a tiny share of historical emissions and faces profound risk from a changing cryosphere, so climate finance, loss and damage support, scientific capacity and locally controlled adaptation are questions of justice rather than charity.

    Challenges to community-centred disaster preparedness

    1. The first responder tier is the least resourced: Panchayati Raj Institutions and urban local bodies carry the immediate response duty without matching funds, trained staff or defined roles. Eg. Relief work and maintenance of community assets sit with panchayats under the Eleventh Schedule, and States have devolved neither dedicated disaster staff nor untied funds against that entry.
      The Fix: Earmark a fixed share of the State Disaster Response Fund for village-level preparedness and train elected representatives through the National Disaster Management Authority and National Institute of Rural Development and Panchayati Raj modules.
    2. Spending is tilted towards relief rather than prevention: The disaster fund architecture keeps response funds far larger than mitigation funds, so preparedness competes for the smaller pool every year. Eg. India’s mitigation funds were created only after the response funds had been operating for years, and the tilt towards relief persists.
      The Fix: Move early warning systems, retrofitting and nature-based works into the National and State Disaster Mitigation Funds with a published annual drawdown target.
    3. Warnings fail at the last mile: Alerts are generated centrally and lose their audience before reaching the household, which is where the decision to move is actually taken. Eg. Real-time disaster information systems and last-mile dissemination remain uneven between States.
      The Fix: Test each warning chain through a drill that measures how many households received and acted on an alert, rather than how many messages were dispatched.
    4. Himalayan hazard data stops at the border: Glacial lakes, landslide dams and river surges form upstream of national boundaries, where the agencies that will face the flood have no observation rights. Eg. The South Lhonak lake outburst flood in Sikkim in October 2023 destroyed the Teesta III dam downstream and killed dozens of people.
      The Fix: Convert existing bilateral hydrological exchanges into a standing Himalayan hazard data protocol with fixed transmission times and a named receiving authority in each country.

    Conclusion

    Preparedness is being judged by the wrong instrument. Detection capacity has improved across the Himalaya; the authority to act on a detection still sits several administrative tiers above the people who must move. The unresolved tension is that the tier holding the legal duty to respond holds neither the money nor the staff to prepare, and the tier holding both is too distant to run an evacuation. Whether that changes is visible in one measurable thing over the next monsoon: whether any Himalayan State publishes household-level reach data for its warning system, instead of counting alerts issued.

    Disaster Management in India

    1. Where the mandate sits: The Ministry of Home Affairs oversees disaster management through its Disaster Management Division, which coordinates response, relief and preparedness for natural and human-made disasters, excluding drought and epidemics.
    2. A four-tier institutional structure: The National Disaster Management Authority is chaired by the Prime Minister, State Disaster Management Authorities by Chief Ministers and District Disaster Management Authorities by District Collectors, with primary responsibility resting on State governments.
    3. A fund architecture with four pillars: The National and State Disaster Response Funds finance relief, and the National and State Disaster Mitigation Funds finance risk-reduction projects.
    4. How resilience is defined: The Hyogo Framework for Action, 2005, defines disaster resilience as the capacity of a system or community exposed to hazards to adapt, by resisting or changing, so as to maintain an acceptable level of functioning.

    Laws and Rules Governing Disaster Management

    1. Disaster Management Act, 2005: It establishes structures and processes for disaster management at national, State, district and local levels, and mandates the creation of the National, State and District Disaster Management Authorities.
    2. Disaster Management (Amendment) Act, 2025: It modernises the 2005 framework for urban risk, climate extremes and data-driven response.
    3. It allows States to set up Urban Disaster Management Authorities in State capitals and Municipal Corporation cities. Eg. Karnataka’s authority for the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike.
    4. It mandates national and State disaster databases covering risk assessments and real-time disaster data.
    5. It gives statutory status to the National Crisis Management Committee and the High-Level Committee.
    6. Constitution (Seventy-third Amendment) Act, 1992: Article 243G empowers Panchayati Raj Institutions to prepare plans and implement schemes, and the Eleventh Schedule places relief work and maintenance of community assets among their functions.

    Government Initiatives for Disaster Preparedness

    1. National Disaster Management Plan: Issued in 2016 and revised in 2019, it is India’s first all-hazard plan aligned to the Sendai Framework.
    2. Disaster Management Plan of the Ministry of Panchayati Raj: Framed under Section 37 of the Disaster Management Act, 2005, it builds community-based planning from the village to the district panchayat.
    3. Aapda Mitra: It trains community volunteers in first response, search and rescue in disaster-prone districts.
    4. SACHET and the Common Alerting Protocol: They push multi-hazard alerts to every phone in an affected geography from one standardised feed.
    5. Coalition for Disaster Resilient Infrastructure: Launched by India in 2019, it is an international organisation of over 50 countries working on disaster-proofing critical infrastructure.

    Key Facts about Disaster Risk Reduction

    1. Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction, 2015-2030: Adopted at Sendai in Japan, it carries four priorities for action and seven global targets.
    2. The United Nations custodian: The UN Office for Disaster Risk Reduction anchors global disaster risk reduction and runs the Sendai Framework Monitor for reporting against the seven targets.
    3. India’s stated vision: The Prime Minister’s Ten-Point Agenda on Disaster Risk Reduction was announced in 2016 at the Asian Ministerial Conference.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024, GS3, 15.0 marks] What is disaster resilience? How is it determined? Describe various elements of a resilience framework. Also mention the global targets of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030).”

  • Fragile ecology, competing interests: The red flags in building Himalayan dams

    Fragile ecology, competing interests: The red flags in building Himalayan dams

    Why in the News

    A glacier collapse near the China Tibet border has triggered floods in Nepal that have killed over 1,100 people, with thousands still missing. The event has renewed expert concern about recent human made changes in a mountain system whose climatic conditions are shifting quickly. 13 hydropower plants, including several under construction projects, were affected.

    Why is the Himalayan system already fragile?

    1. A naturally unstable mountain system: The Himalayas are prone to earthquakes, landslides, avalanches and flash floods before any human intervention is added.
    2. The topography concentrates risk: The region carries lakes formed by melting glaciers, fast flowing rivers and steep slopes, in a zone highly vulnerable to strong earthquakes.
    3. Climate change acts on the pace of natural processes: Temperature change affects the pace and frequency of snow melting and thawing, and of glacial lake outburst floods (GLOFs), which occur when water collected from melting glaciers overflows its containing barrier.
    4. Attribution and risk are separate questions: Linking any single disaster directly to climate change still requires more scientific assessment, and the overall level of risk appears to be increasing.

    How does infrastructure build up compound the toll?

    1. Dams carry a genuine benefit: Dams and reservoirs regulate the flow of water and extend access to services for people living in remote regions.
    2. Construction alters the geology: Building a dam disturbs the geology of the area and makes it more prone to earthquakes, and the drilling and tunnelling required for further projects extends that effect.
    3. Damage runs through the assets themselves: The loss of hydropower plants in this flood dented both generation capacity and access to power.
    4. Exposure has risen with use: Infrastructure build up and high tourist footfall together compounded the disaster’s toll.

    How extensive is Himalayan hydropower now?

    1. Across the Tibetan region: One recent study identified at least 193 dams built or planned across the wider Tibetan region since 2000.
    2. In Nepal: A Nepal hydropower database lists more than 570 projects at different stages.
    3. The largest single project: China is building a massive dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo, the upper course of the Brahmaputra, near Arunachal Pradesh.
    4. A fault beneath it: In July, Chinese researchers flagged an active fault line, a fracture between two blocks of rock, directly beneath the Yarlung Tsangpo mega dam.

    Why is Himalayan dam building also a geopolitical contest?

    1. Infrastructure as a sovereignty marker: Chinese infrastructure building in Tibet is treated by China as a marker of sovereignty over Tibet, not only as an energy programme.
    2. The response is more dams: India, Nepal and Bhutan have responded with their own set of dams, and India is helping Bhutan build a series of hydropower projects.
    3. Signalling and counter signalling: The result is a pattern of signalling and counter signalling in which project decisions answer each other rather than answering the basin’s hydrology.

    What is missing in transboundary cooperation?

    1. No substantial ecosystem cooperation: There has been no substantial cooperation between China and Nepal, or between China and India, on managing the shared ecosystem.
    2. The existing mechanism is narrow: Disasters in the 2000s prompted a memorandum of understanding between India and China in 2002, with an expert level mechanism on transboundary rivers created in 2005. That mechanism has to be expanded to cover other aspects such as GLOFs.
    3. Transparency differs across the border: Nepal officially publishes fairly detailed project and licensing information. Chinese project level information exists but stays scattered across separate official documents and announcements rather than in a comparable consolidated public database.
    4. No real time upstream data: There is no clearly established public system between China and Nepal for continuous, real time sharing of upstream river flow, reservoir operations or glacial lake conditions from Tibet.
    5. Early warning fails at the border: Gaps in information and data sharing between countries complicate early warning for hazards that originate across a boundary.
    6. No arbitration route: Downstream countries lack the consensus to build alliances that can deal with China, and there is no scope for international arbitration. Even a signed agreement would face a state that does not follow such international norms, as the South China Sea dispute shows.

    What would stronger cooperation require?

    1. Continuous data sharing: Cooperation would necessarily include continuous sharing of hydrological, weather and climate data across the boundary.
    2. Paying for upstream observation: Where sustained monitoring carries a cost, downstream countries could co invest in upstream observation systems or pay for specialised datasets, creating a model that benefits both sides.
    3. Standing operational machinery: Automated public warning systems, joint scientific studies and regular emergency exercises would complement the data arrangements.
    4. A landscape rather than a national frame: A nation state centric, container approach does not fit the Himalayas, since these disasters do not confine themselves within national boundaries and their ramifications run across the landscape.

    Challenges to hydropower expansion in the Himalayas

    1. Projects sit in the highest seismic risk zones: Much of the Himalayan arc falls in seismic zones IV and V, so a design earthquake is a live engineering assumption rather than a remote one. Eg. The 2011 Sikkim earthquake damaged structures at the Teesta III project and halted work.
      The Fix: Make site specific seismic hazard assessment and independent design review a published precondition for financial closure, not a post clearance formality.
    2. Sediment load shortens the working life of a project: Himalayan rivers carry among the world’s highest silt loads, which abrades turbines and fills reservoirs faster than design assumptions allow. Eg. Run of the river plants on the Alaknanda and Bhagirathi shut down repeatedly during the monsoon for desilting.
      The Fix: Require measured basin sediment yield data in the detailed project report and size desilting capacity against it rather than against a regional average.
    3. Cascade layouts convert one failure into several: Projects built in series on the same river mean an upstream breach delivers debris and water straight into the next structure. Eg. The 2021 Chamoli flood destroyed the Rishiganga project and then struck the Tapovan Vishnugad project downstream.
      The Fix: Assess clearances at the level of the whole river cascade, so cumulative and cascading failure is evaluated once rather than project by project.
    4. Tunnelling destabilises slopes and drains aquifers: Long headrace tunnels cut through fractured rock, dewater springs and remove support from the slopes above. Eg. Land subsidence in Joshimath in 2023 followed years of tunnelling and construction in the same valley.
      The Fix: Publish pre construction and post construction spring discharge and slope movement monitoring for every tunnelled project, with construction halted on a defined trigger.
    5. Rehabilitation is settled before the risk is understood: Displaced communities are resettled onto land whose hazard exposure has not itself been mapped. Eg. Resettlement colonies for Himalayan projects have been sited on debris fans and old landslide zones.
      The Fix: Require the resettlement site to carry its own hazard clearance before the displacement award is finalised.

    Conclusion

    Himalayan risk now runs through infrastructure as much as through geology. The two positions that cannot both hold are that dams are national assets worth building at scale and that the floods which destroy them cross three borders within minutes, with no obligation on the upstream state to say what is coming. Data sharing, not engineering standards, is the binding constraint on early warning. The concrete thing to watch is whether the India China expert level mechanism is widened past monsoon river flow data to cover glacial lake and reservoir conditions.

    [2023, GS3, 10 marks] Dam failures are always catastrophic, especially on the downstream side, resulting in a colossal loss of life and property. Analyze the various causes of dam failures. Give two examples of large dam failures.”

  • Lessons India, China, and Nepal must learn

    Lessons India, China, and Nepal must learn

    Why in the News

    A catastrophic flood in Nepal’s Rasuwa district, triggered by a glacial collapse near Langtang Lirung, has exposed vulnerabilities in Himalayan border management, infrastructure, disaster response and regional climate cooperation.

    Why does a border not contain a Himalayan disaster?

    1. A natural disaster does not recognise the line: The border as a geometric line, whose breach by another sovereign nation is treated as the uppermost national security concern, is not respected by a flood or an avalanche.
    2. Dependence-generating diplomacy no longer works: Nation states cannot afford to treat the sharing of information and expertise as a favour extended by one side to the other.
    3. Interdependence is the operating requirement: Data sharing, joint studies, institutional collaboration, non-sovereignty-centric treatment of climate change impact and a close inter-governmental early warning framework have become central.
    4. Science has to be converted into a public good: Translating findings into simple public awareness material is part of the same task.
    5. Border forces face a different threat set: Border defence personnel need retraining for security threats that now arrive as physical hazards rather than as incursions.
    6. Traditional knowledge belongs in operations: Human security in far-flung terrain depends on drawing on local knowledge in response operations rather than on external protocols alone.

    What does the flood expose in the region’s power system?

    1. Over 15 hydro projects were damaged on one river: The flood struck that many projects along the Trishuli, and the downstream exposure it created runs from national to trans-border scale.
    2. The cascade crosses four countries: Effects within Nepal, China and India, and further downstream in Bangladesh, can disrupt cross-border energy trading and regional power pools, producing energy insecurity.
    3. India’s oldest stake on the river is destroyed: India’s Central Water and Power Commission initiated the first hydel project on the Trishuli in 1953, an agreement was signed in 1958, and the 21 MW run-of-the-river project was commissioned at Tuphe in June 1972 at a cost of Rs 13.55 crore. It supplied power to Kathmandu for decades and now remains largely decimated.
    4. Highways were built along the river belts: Many China-built highways to Kathmandu run through valleys, including the 115 km Kathmandu to Kodari highway built in 1967 through the Sunkoshi valley, sited for strategic reasons and for easy access to sand and boulders.
    5. Ribbon development followed the alignment: Huge settlements have grown along those highways, which places population directly in the river’s path.
    6. Donors are reconsidering large infrastructure: This flood and others have pushed the funders of big infrastructure projects to rethink their strategies.

    Why does the response arrive from the wrong place?

    1. The first responder is the first victim: The impact falls at a very local level, where the area’s residents are both, and the response comes from distant capital-centric institutions in Kathmandu.
    2. Sikkim recorded the same pattern in 2023: Massive calving from the South Lhonak glacier’s snout triggered a glacial lake outburst flood in North Sikkim in October that year, and the Teesta rose 15 to 20 metres within hours.
    3. The damage crossed two States and a border: Downstream townships in Sikkim, West Bengal and Bangladesh were buried in slush and debris.
    4. The loss was 60 per cent of a State’s output: Damage was estimated at over Rs 25,000 crore, close to that share of Sikkim’s 2022-23 Gross State Domestic Product.
    5. Generation loss alone crossed Rs 19,000 crore: The 1,800 MW of capacity destroyed accounted for that much of the total.
    6. Local institutions had no capacity to absorb it: Municipalities and panchayats stood helpless before the scale of destruction, without training, technique, orientation, awareness, preparedness or the means to cope.
    7. No agency owned the warning function: No early warning mechanism existed, and no agency was responsible for creating one.
    8. The remedy named is relocation of capacity: National institutions and resources need to be based at the local level rather than at the capital.

    Why is there no common Himalayan climate policy?

    1. The region has no framework spanning its levels: The Himalayan region lacks a robust climate policy framework covering the local, national and regional levels together.
    2. The scientific warning is already published: The International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development (ICIMOD), the Kathmandu based intergovernmental knowledge centre for the Hindu Kush Himalaya, has published evidence-based reports warning of tipping points in the region’s deteriorating glaciology.
    3. India’s own instruments are national and sectoral: India has a National and State Action Plan on Climate Change with eight sectoral missions, including one for the Himalayas.
    4. The regional treaty exists on paper: The SAARC Convention on Cooperation on Environment was signed and took effect in 2013.
    5. The problem is fragmentation rather than absence: These scattered approaches have to be brought onto a common platform.

    Challenges to disaster preparedness in the Himalaya

    1. Disaster money is triggered by damage, not by risk: Spending flows overwhelmingly to relief and compensation after an event rather than to the monitoring and evacuation capacity that would reduce it. Eg. A separate National Disaster Mitigation Fund had to be created under the Disaster Management Act, 2005 precisely because response funds were not being spent on mitigation.
      The Fix: Ring-fence a fixed share of the mitigation fund for high altitude monitoring and evacuation infrastructure, with annual utilisation published State by State.
    2. Hill towns are built without a carrying capacity assessment: Settlements expand on slope debris and old landslide material without any study of how much construction the ground will bear. Eg. Land subsidence at Joshimath in January 2023 forced the evacuation of hundreds of families from a town built on old landslide debris.
      The Fix: Complete and publish carrying capacity studies for Himalayan towns, and hold new construction approvals until each town’s study is on record.
    3. No single agency owns glacier hazard: Glacier and glacial lake monitoring is split across geological, polar research and university institutions, so no body publishes a standing national risk list. Eg. India’s glacial lake inventories have been compiled separately by different agencies using different thresholds for what counts as a risk lake.
      The Fix: Designate one nodal agency to maintain and annually publish a national inventory of high risk glaciers and lakes.
    4. Reconstruction rebuilds the same exposure: Post-disaster funding restores roads, bridges and power projects on their original alignments, which returns the assets to the position that failed. Eg. Highways and hydel assets damaged in the 2013 Kedarnath floods were substantially rebuilt along the same valley routes.
      The Fix: Make a relocation-or-redesign assessment a condition of releasing post-disaster reconstruction funds for any asset in a hazard zone.
    5. Transboundary rivers carry no data obligation: Upstream flow, lake level and slope movement data are treated as strategic information rather than as a safety input owed to a downstream population. Eg. Countries in the region share river data under bilateral arrangements limited to defined seasons and defined stations.
      The Fix: Put glacier, lake and flow monitoring data into a standing regional exchange with agreed release timelines and an automatic alert threshold.

    Conclusion

    The Rasuwa flood underscores that Himalayan disasters demand cross-border cooperation, not isolated national responses. India must strengthen valley-level early warning systems, ensure real-time upstream data sharing, and establish clear institutional responsibility to prevent future disasters.

    Back2Basics: International Centre for Integrated Mountain Development

    1. Formation: An intergovernmental knowledge and learning centre established in 1983, with its headquarters at Kathmandu in Nepal.
    2. Membership: It serves eight regional member countries, namely Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, China, India, Myanmar, Nepal and Pakistan.
    3. Coverage: Its mandate is the Hindu Kush Himalaya region, spanning the mountain systems from Afghanistan to Myanmar.
    4. Function: It produces regional assessments on glaciers, water, biodiversity and mountain livelihoods, including the Hindu Kush Himalaya Assessment reports.

    [2019, GS3, 10 marks] Disaster preparedness is the first step in any disaster management process. Explain how hazard zonation mapping will help in disaster mitigation in the case of landslides.”

  • Himalayas’ hanging glacier threat

    Himalayas’ hanging glacier threat

    Why in the News

    A Nature study identified 219 hanging glaciers in the Alaknanda basin, highlighting rising Himalayan flood risks as glacier instability assessments remain limited despite repeated major incidents.

    What is a hanging glacier?

    1. A perched ice mass: It is ice sitting on a steep slope in a position from which it can detach as a mass rather than melt away in place.
    2. Instability is defined by velocity: An unstable glacier is one whose velocity may change by an order of magnitude or more over a comparatively short period.
    3. The instability redistributes the ice: That change redistributes ice across the glacier, accompanied by geometric, structural and tectonic shifts, and the redistribution is what produces a hanging glacier on a steep slope.
    4. Detachment starts a chain rather than an event: A break-off can trigger secondary hazards such as a glacial lake outburst flood, where a lake dammed by loose moraine debris is breached and releases its water downstream.

    What did the Alaknanda inventory actually measure?

    1. 219 hanging glaciers in one basin: The study identified that number across the Alaknanda basin of the Garhwal Himalaya.
    2. The unstable ice clusters upstream: Nearly a third of it is concentrated in the Upper Alaknanda basin.
    3. The inventory carries area and volume: The glaciers cover 71.7 ± 3.5 sq km with an estimated ice volume of 2.39 ± 0.42 cubic km, including 0.74 ± 0.14 cubic km of hanging ice mass.
    4. The named driver is warming and variability: Himalayan glaciers are increasingly exhibiting geometric and dynamic instability owing to rapid warming and climate variability.
    5. The method is new to this range: Hanging glaciers have been studied extensively in the Alps, and basin scale assessments in the Himalaya remain limited.
    6. The work is Indian institutional: It was carried out by researchers at the School of Earth, Ocean and Climate Sciences at the Indian Institute of Technology Bhubaneswar and the Divecha Centre for Climate Change at the Indian Institute of Science, Bengaluru.

    What would a break-off do in the Badrinath and Mana sector?

    1. Simulated avalanche flows exceed 50 metres in height: The study’s simulations place flows above that height in that sector of Uttarakhand.
    2. Settlements sit directly in the path: A severe event on that scale would swallow major settlements and infrastructure.
    3. The exposed population is seasonal as well as resident: Badrinath is one of the Char Dham shrines and Mana sits at the head of the same route, so footfall peaks in the months when the slopes are least stable.

    Why is exposure rising faster than the ice is failing?

    1. Built exposure more than doubles by 2030: Buildings and infrastructure land area at risk in the basin is projected to be 120 per cent higher in 2030 than in 2000.
    2. The exposed population rises by 17 per cent: The number of people living in those at-risk areas is projected to surge by that share.
    3. Identification and monitoring are the first response: Systematic identification and monitoring of high-risk glaciers is what the study calls for to reduce downstream hazard.
    4. Land-use planning is the second half of it: Risk-informed land-use planning has to run alongside monitoring in mountain regions.
    5. Monitoring is cheap against the loss it prevents: Much greater funding of monitoring programmes is required, and that funding is small compared with the cost of lost lives and livelihoods, per the Director of the International Cryosphere Climate Initiative.

    What separated Chamoli from Blatten?

    1. Chamoli killed over 200 people in 2021: A massive wall of ice and rock collapsed into the Rishiganga valley, destroying hydropower plants and sweeping away bridges.
    2. Blatten killed one person: A large ice-rock avalanche buried most of that Swiss village four years later.
    3. The difference was preparedness, not luck: A second study published in Nature in March attributes the survival to preparedness, monitoring and rapid response.
    4. Precursory signs were acted on: Authorities and residents in Blatten responded to signs of slope instability, which enabled a timely evacuation.
    5. The hazards are cascading rather than isolated: These events should be treated as cascading hazards rather than as separate landslides, avalanches or floods, per the head of planetary sciences at the University of Aberdeen’s School of Geosciences.
    6. Attribution should not be rushed during the emergency: Establishing which process caused an event should not be hurried during the immediate emergency response.

    Challenges to monitoring hanging glaciers in the Himalaya

    1. The instrument network is sparse and seasonal: High altitude weather and movement sensors are few and go offline through winter, so precursor slope movement is unobserved in the months it develops. Eg. Glacier mass balance in India is measured on a handful of benchmark glaciers such as Gangotri and Chhota Shigri rather than basin wide.
      The Fix: Fund a permanently telemetered high altitude sensor network, with satellite radar interferometry as the standing backup layer.
    2. A hazard map does not bind a builder: Slope and glacier instability assessments are advisory inputs, so they do not stop an approval for a road or a power project below an unstable face. Eg. Construction continued in the Rishiganga and Dhauliganga valleys after repeated warnings about instability in those catchments.
      The Fix: Make valley level hazard zonation a statutory input to environmental clearance for any project above a set altitude.
    3. Warning does not reach the valley floor: An identified hazard produces a scientific alert rather than a siren in the settlement that would be hit. Eg. Workers at downstream barrage sites in the 2021 Chamoli event had no alert before the flood wave arrived.
      The Fix: Install siren based valley warning tied to the sensor network, with a mandated evacuation drill calendar for every downstream settlement and project.
    4. Pilgrim traffic concentrates people in the exposed months: The season when the route is open is the season when avalanche and outburst risk is highest, so peak exposure and peak hazard coincide. Eg. Char Dham footfall peaks between May and October, which is also the melt and monsoon window.
      The Fix: Route daily pilgrim entry against a published hazard advisory rather than against a fixed carrying capacity number alone.

    Conclusion

    The hanging glacier threat shows that Himalayan disaster risk is becoming a race between environmental instability and expanding human exposure. Continuous monitoring, enforceable hazard zoning, real-time warnings and evacuation preparedness can turn scientific knowledge into lives saved and resilient mountain development.

    Back2Basics: Alaknanda River

    1. Source: It rises at the Satopanth and Bhagirath Kharak glaciers in the Chamoli district of Uttarakhand.
    2. Status in the Ganga system: It is one of the two headstreams of the Ganga, and it carries the larger discharge of the two at their meeting point.
    3. Panch Prayag: Its five confluences are Vishnuprayag, Nandprayag, Karnaprayag, Rudraprayag and Devprayag.
    4. Formation of the Ganga: It joins the Bhagirathi at Devprayag, and the river takes the name Ganga from that point onward.

    [2020, GS1, 10 marks] How will the melting of Himalayan glaciers have a far-reaching impact on the water resources of India?

  • The mountains have sounded a warning, we ignore it at our peril

    The mountains have sounded a warning, we ignore it at our peril

    Why in the News

    Flash floods have swept down from the mountains on the Nepal Tibet border into Nepal’s Rasuwa district. A glacial lake outburst flood (GLOF) sent a massive avalanche of water and mud down the Lhende River about 20 km east of the Rasuwagadhi border crossing, sweeping away villages, settlements and a large number of people downstream. The avalanche may have been triggered by a 4.4 magnitude earthquake recorded in the area minutes earlier. At least six hydropower projects downstream were destroyed, costing Nepal 405 MW of capacity, which is 12 per cent of its national total. The tension is that the Himalaya has produced this exact sequence repeatedly, and hydropower schemes and hill tourism have expanded on the same valleys after each event. A second front has opened across the border, where China is building the Medog dam at the great bend of the Brahmaputra and hydrological information sharing with India has never been regular.

    What is a glacial lake outburst flood?

    1. How the lake forms: A mountain river upstream is blocked by a portion of a glacier breaking away or by an avalanche. The blockage impounds a lake behind it.
    2. How the lake bursts: The loose banks of that lake give way under water pressure, and a huge volume of water and debris then hurtles downstream through narrow valleys.

    What did the flood take out beyond the power projects?

    1. The path of the surge: The floods spread south from Rasuwa into the Dhading, Gorkha and Nuwakot districts of Nepal, and the impact carries across the border into India. Chinese media reported similar loss of life and property on the Tibetan side, in Gyirong county.
    2. Indian pilgrims caught in it: Over 160 Indian pilgrims are reported missing. The hotels and guest houses they were staying in were washed away in the flood.
    3. A trade and pilgrimage artery closed: Rasuwagadhi is the most important border crossing between Nepal and Tibet for trade and for tourism, including pilgrim tours to Kailash Mansarovar. Cross border trade and traffic are likely to remain suspended for the foreseeable future.
    4. The recovery horizon: Rebuilding the lost generating capacity may take several years, and it is a loss Nepal can ill afford.
    5. India’s immediate response: India sent urgent medical and food supplies to Nepal. It also despatched specialised rescue teams.

    How large is the hazard the Himalaya now carries?

    1. Glacier area: There are 48,000 sq km of glaciers spread over the Himalaya, and another 18,000 sq km sit in the Karakoram.
    2. Mapped lakes: Researchers have mapped over 5,000 glacial lakes in the Himalaya. About 500 of them are classified as hazardous or significantly hazardous.
    3. Recorded events: There have been at least 388 recorded GLOF instances in the Himalaya Karakoram mountains, and their frequency has been increasing in recent years.
    4. What these glaciers support: Himalayan glaciers are the source of the rivers that sustain the entire Indo-Gangetic plain, which is populated by over 500 million people.

    Why has the record of past disasters not changed construction in the valleys?

    1. Dharali, August 2025: A GLOF event at Dharali in Uttarakhand, on the route to Gangotri, caused large scale loss of life and property.
    2. Kedarnath, 2013: The Kedarnath flash flood was caused by a combination of torrential rains and a GLOF at Chorabari lake to the north. The surge of flood waters and debris washed away towns and settlements along the highway to Gangotri.
    3. The rules that followed it: There was talk of assessing and strictly observing the human carrying capacity of these remote pilgrimage places. No construction within 500 metres of the river banks was to be permitted thereafter.
    4. What actually happened: Hotels and guest houses have mushroomed once again on the river banks. No lessons have been learnt from the earlier event.
    5. The load on the shrine towns: During the pilgrimage season Kedarnath may see a daily turnover of 15,000 to 20,000 pilgrims.
    6. Construction at extreme altitude: Prefabricated guest houses, restaurants and dhabas operate even at 18,000 feet, with gas cylinders transported back and forth for heating and cooking. There are no proper arrangements for waste management.
    7. The direction policy is moving in: The Uttarakhand government is reportedly considering opening Badrinath and Kedarnath for pilgrimage the whole year round.

    What has hydropower already lost to these events?

    1. Teesta-III, October 2023: A GLOF from South Lhonak lake in Sikkim completely washed away the 1200 MW Teesta-III hydropower dam and power station.
    2. Rishiganga, 2021: A sudden flash flood triggered by a glacial collapse in Chamoli in Uttarakhand wiped out the Rishiganga hydropower project. It also blocked the associated Chamoli tunnel.
    3. The seismic overlay: Hydropower development continues apace in the Himalaya, which is a known active seismic zone, so the outburst risk and the earthquake risk compound each other.
    4. The response to the evidence: Major hydropower projects continue to be pursued across the mountain zone, creating mounting risks to life and property, and those risks are being cynically ignored.

    Why is the Medog dam a transboundary risk for India?

    1. Scale of the project: China has begun constructing the gigantic Medog dam at the great bend of the Brahmaputra river just across the border. It is slated to deliver 300 billion kWh of power annually.
    2. How large that is: The largest hydro project in existence anywhere in the world, the Gezhouba on the Yangzi River, is rated at 15.6 billion kWh of power annually.
    3. The fault line under it: Chinese scientists have warned that the project sits very close to the Paizhen Fault, a major fracture in the Earth’s crust, which makes it vulnerable to seismic events. A major earthquake in the project vicinity could send a massive discharge of flood waters and debris into India’s Northeast.
    4. The information gap: The sharing of information and early warning between India and China has never been regular. It has been subject to the state of their political relations.
    5. The wider river geography: Several rivers rise on the Tibetan plateau and flow through Nepal and India. Flash floods on some of these cross border rivers have already caused large scale damage on the Indian side.

    Challenges to GLOF risk management in the Himalaya

    1. Warning systems are built for the wrong signal: A system designed to track the gradual movement of glacial water cannot register a sudden wall of debris. Eg. The Bhote Koshi warning system did not detect the surge that hit Rasuwa. Fix. Pair water level gauges with seismic and acoustic sensors that read mass movement rather than a change in river stage.
    2. A hazard rating triggers no building restriction: Classifying a lake as hazardous carries no automatic consequence for what may be built below it. Eg. A 2021 study by scientists from IIT Roorkee, IISc Bengaluru and the universities of Dayton, Graz, Zurich and Geneva flagged instability around South Lhonak lake, and the lake burst two years later killing at least 50 people. Fix. Attach a mandatory downstream no build corridor to every lake a national risk index rates as high.
    3. Clearance is granted one project at a time: A chain of dams on the same river is appraised as separate schemes, so the cumulative surge risk down the valley is never assessed. Eg. The Alaknanda and Bhagirathi basins in Uttarakhand carry dozens of projects on hydrologically connected rivers. Fix. Require a basin level cumulative impact assessment before any new project is cleared in an outburst exposed valley.
    4. Monitoring authority is split across agencies: Glacier survey, weather forecasting and dam safety sit with different bodies, so no single office can order action on a lake that is filling. Eg. The National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA) has itself proposed an integrated glacier monitoring authority coordinating the Geological Survey of India, the India Meteorological Department (IMD) and the Indian Space Research Organisation. Fix. Create that authority and give it the power to direct downstream evacuation.
    5. Nothing tests a dam that is already built: Outburst assessments became mandatory for new dams only after the Sikkim event, and existing designs are under review rather than under obligation. Eg. The requirement followed the loss of a 1200 MW station rather than preceding it. Fix. Set a dated deadline for retrofitting or de-rating existing Himalayan dams that fail a surge simulation.

    Conclusion

    The hazard sits in one country and the damage arrives in another. No amount of engineering on the Indian side changes that. What India can change is its access to upstream data, which at present moves when relations are warm and stops when they are not. The marker to watch is whether the Medog construction timetable comes with a year round data sharing commitment, because that data is the only warning the Northeast would get.

    Disaster Risk Reduction in India

    1. What it covers: Disaster risk reduction cuts exposure and vulnerability through prevention, mitigation and preparedness, rather than through relief paid after an event.
    2. Who runs it: The Ministry of Home Affairs coordinates disaster management through its Disaster Management Division. Response is primarily a State government responsibility.
    3. The four fund pillars: The National Disaster Response Fund (NDRF) and State Disaster Response Fund (SDRF) finance relief. The National and State Disaster Mitigation Funds (NDMF and SDMF) finance risk reduction projects alone.
    4. Scale of the commitment: The Fifteenth Finance Commission allocated Rs 2.28 lakh crore for 2021 to 2026 across preparedness, mitigation, response and reconstruction.

    Laws and Rules Governing Disaster Risk Reduction

    1. Disaster Management Act, 2005: Establishes structures and processes at the national, State, district and local levels.
    2. Authorities created: The NDMA chaired by the Prime Minister, State Disaster Management Authorities chaired by the Chief Minister, and District Disaster Management Authorities headed by the District Collector.
    3. Disaster Management (Amendment) Act, 2025: Modernises the 2005 framework for urban risk, climate extremes and data driven response.
    4. Urban Disaster Management Authorities: States may set up city specific authorities in State capitals and municipal corporation cities.
    5. Statutory databases: National and State disaster databases covering risk assessments, mitigation plans and real time data are now mandated.
    6. Plan ownership shifts: The NDMA and State authorities now prepare the disaster plans, earlier a task of the National and State Executive Committees.

    Government Initiatives for Disaster Risk Reduction

    1. National GLOF Risk Mitigation Project: A Rs 150 crore project covering Arunachal Pradesh, Himachal Pradesh, Sikkim and Uttarakhand.
    2. Central Water Commission lake monitoring: The Commission monitors 902 glacial lakes and has a Risk Indexing Framework to prioritise high risk ones.
    3. Common Alerting Protocol based Integrated Alert System: A Rs 354.83 crore project delivering geo-targeted warnings through SMS, television, radio, sirens and satellites.
    4. Mission Mausam (2024 to 2026): Strengthens weather forecasting and multi-hazard early warning, including for outburst related risks.

    Key Facts about Disaster Risk Reduction

    1. Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015 to 2030): The global blueprint adopted at Sendai in Japan, carrying four priorities and seven global targets.
    2. The United Nations custodian: The United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction anchors the agenda and runs the Sendai Framework Monitor.

    Challenges in Disaster Risk Reduction

    1. Mitigation stays funded far below response: The roughly 80:20 tilt in the fund architecture privileges relief spending over prevention. Eg. Under the mitigation fund in 2025-26 the High Level Committee approved Rs 507.37 crore for panchayat led community risk reduction, a fraction of what response draws. Fix. Set a floor share of the disaster corpus spendable only on early warning, retrofitting and nature based solutions.
    2. India’s deadliest hazards are not notified disasters: Heatwaves and lightning sit outside the notified list, so States cannot draw relief for deaths from them. Eg. The Centre has not accepted the Sixteenth Finance Commission recommendation to notify them. Fix. Notify both with an IMD linked declaration trigger and a stated compensation protocol.
    3. The urban authority created in 2025 barely exists: City specific authorities are a State mandate, and only one State has set one up. Eg. Karnataka constituted an urban authority for the Bruhat Bengaluru Mahanagara Palike. Fix. Fund the rollout centrally and fix a clear interface with the municipal corporation.
    4. The local tier remains under-empowered: Panchayats and urban local bodies are the first responders yet hold neither trained staff nor untied funds. Eg. The Aapda Mitra volunteer scheme trains community responders but reaches a small share of vulnerable districts. Fix. Route a fixed share of the mitigation fund to the local body with a training and equipment condition.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2024, GS3, 15 marks] What is disaster resilience? How is it determined? Describe various elements of a resilience framework. Also mention the global targets of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030).”

  • Behind Nepal floods, rising risk of glacier collapse (Explainer)

    Behind Nepal floods, rising risk of glacier collapse (Explainer)

    Why in the News

    Flash floods that swept through parts of Nepal and Tibet this week followed a glacial collapse in the Himalayas. The collapse sent a mass of ice and rock debris into the Lhende Khola and Bhote Koshi river system, and this debris reached inhabited valleys downstream. Glaciologists say such collapses are becoming more frequent because of faster warming in the Himalayas, and disaster planning for hydropower siting and early warning has not kept pace with this rising risk.

    What is a glacial collapse?

    1. Sudden mass failure of a glacier: A glacial collapse is the sudden detachment of a large mass of ice, rock and water from a glacier resting on a steep mountain slope.
    2. Triggered by geological and physical factors: Earthquakes, temperature changes and other physical changes unfolding within a glacier can trigger a collapse.

    How does a glacier’s own structure fail under stress?

    1. Formation builds a heavy, moving mass: Snow that survives several melting seasons compresses into firn (a granular midpoint stage between fresh snow and glacial ice) before recrystallising into the solid ice of a glacier.
    2. Gradient driven flow creates fracturing stress: Once a glacial mass is heavy enough it flows outward along the mountain gradient. This acceleration creates stress that exceeds the strength of the ice, and sustained movement eventually fractures it.
    3. Surface melting weakens the ice from within: Meltwater pools inside surface cracks over repeated freeze and thaw cycles. This repeated pressure eventually splits the ice all the way through.

    Why do wet base glaciers in the Himalayas pose a distinct collapse risk?

    1. Soft beds trap and channel meltwater: Where a glacier rests on soft mud or clay, trapped water moves through networks of cracks within the ice and travels toward the base.
    2. Subglacial tunnels concentrate large volumes of water: In wet base Himalayan glaciers, water collects at the base in large quantities and is occasionally connected by tunnels, so a collapse can release a concentrated volume of water at once.

    Why can a single glacial collapse trigger a second wave of flooding?

    1. Debris blocks the river before it breaks free: Collapsed ice and rock piles can block narrow river channels and form temporary natural dams downstream.
    2. A dam break repeats the flood: When such a temporary dam breaks under continuous pressure, it unleashes a second round of flooding, as happened in Nepal this week.

    Challenges to managing glacial collapse risk

    1. Rising baseline risk from faster warming: The incidence of glacier breakages in the Himalayas has increased because the region is warming faster than the global average. Eg. This week’s Nepal and Tibet collapse and debris flow into the Lhende Khola and Bhote Koshi system is one instance of this rising baseline risk. Fix. Expand year round remote seismic monitoring and high altitude early warning systems across the central Himalayan glacier belt, not only at individual high risk sites.
    2. Search and rescue capacity has not kept pace: More frequent and physically more demanding glacial collapse events place a growing burden on search and rescue missions in remote high altitude terrain. Eg. Reaching debris blocked valleys along the Bhote Koshi system after this week’s floods required search teams to operate in terrain cut off by the same collapse. Fix. Pre position high altitude search and rescue teams and equipment at seasonal staging points along known glacial risk corridors before the summer melt season.
    3. Critical infrastructure remains sited in high risk zones: Hydropower plants and other critical infrastructure continue to be built in areas exposed to glacial collapse and the flooding it can trigger. Eg. Downstream hydropower installations on Himalayan rivers were damaged in the 2021 Rishiganga Dhauliganga disaster in Uttarakhand, when an upstream ice and rock avalanche triggered a sudden flash flood. Fix. Make hazard zonation for glacial collapse and outburst flood risk a mandatory clearance requirement before critical infrastructure is sited in glacier fed river valleys.
    4. Upstream glacial instability is not systematically shared across borders: Himalayan river systems cross national boundaries, but instability observed on a glacier upstream is not routinely communicated to downstream countries before a disaster strikes. Eg. This week’s collapse originated in Tibet and Nepal before its effects reached downstream valleys, showing how upstream instability in one country can affect communities in another with little warning. Fix. Establish a standing India, Nepal and China data sharing mechanism for real time glacial and river monitoring in shared Himalayan basins.

    Conclusion

    Himalayan glacial collapses are becoming more frequent as regional warming outpaces the historical baseline, and this week’s Nepal and Tibet floods are a fresh instance of that pattern. The next step for disaster managers is to convert scattered seismic monitoring and hazard mapping efforts into a standing, cross border early warning system, before the next collapse rather than after it.

  • [28th August 2026] The Hindu OpED: New-age fires

    [28th August 2026] The Hindu OpED: New-age fires

    Question (2024, GS3): “What is disaster resilience? How is it determined? Describe various elements of a resilience framework. Also mention the global targets of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (2015-2030).”
    Linkage: The lack of a “distinct safety regime” for highly vulnerable environments like ICUs represents a core gap in India’s disaster resilience framework. This question challenges candidates to describe how to move from a structural vulnerability to a resilient system using global standards like the Sendai Framework.

    Mentor Comment

    India’s fire risk profile has shifted over the past 15 years from industrial facilities, large offices and mass gatherings toward residential buildings, hotels and hospitals, with electrical fires, driven by heavier appliance use, overloaded circuits and poor maintenance, now predominant. Intensive Care Units are especially vulnerable because of their oxygen rich environments, and this month back to back fires struck neonatal Intensive Care Units in Amravati, Maharashtra, and Chhindwara, Madhya Pradesh. Despite a string of near identical incidents since the 2024 Jhansi fire in which 18 newborns died, ICU fires have still not produced a single, distinct safety regime for the units most at risk.

    What happened in this month’s neonatal ICU fires?

    1. Amravati: The fire was extinguished within 30 minutes, but smoke proved fatal for three babies who were already being treated for complications, with a faulty ventilator suspected as the cause.
    2. Chhindwara: A short circuit in a warmer at the district hospital’s Neonatal Intensive Care Unit triggered a fire in which three newborns, only days old, suffered burns.

    Why should ICU fires be treated as a distinct safety category?

    1. They are sealed spaces that fill with smoke fast: Intensive Care Units are sealed compartments where smoke accumulates quickly, and in a Neonatal Intensive Care Unit patients cannot evacuate on their own, making regular evacuation drills essential.
    2. A safer design already exists on paper: A best case setup includes three independent exits, with at least two allowing horizontal evacuation, automatic sprinklers, independent power lines for major equipment, oxygen cylinder supports positioned away from electrical sockets, and fire drills held every two years.

    What regulatory response has followed past ICU fires?

    1. A professional body called for mandatory certification: Following an earlier Neonatal Intensive Care Unit fire in Delhi, the National Neonatology Forum called for mandatory fire safety certification for Neonatal Intensive Care Unit equipped hospitals, regular power audits and analogue addressable alarms.
    2. A named evacuation protocol followed: The same push produced a standard evacuation protocol, now known as RACE, for Rescue, Alarm, Confine, and Extinguish or Evacuate.
    3. New national guidelines offer a starting point: The 2026 National Guidelines on Fire and Life Safety in Healthcare Facilities can serve as a starting point for building ICU and Neonatal Intensive Care Unit specific safety standards.

    What risk do post fire investigations typically miss?

    1. Electrical harmonics is a largely unaudited factor: Neonatal Intensive Care Unit equipment is packed with electronic components that draw distorted current, which can silently overheat neutral wiring, transformers and loose connections without ever tripping a circuit breaker.
    2. Generic findings may be hiding the real cause: Post fire reports that cite generic “short circuits” or “technical faults” may be missing this harmonic driven degradation entirely, leaving the underlying risk unaddressed even after an inquiry closes the case.

    Challenges to ICU fire safety

    1. Fire safety certification is not uniformly enforced: Many hospitals, particularly outside metro cities, operate without a valid fire safety no objection certificate or lapse on renewal. Eg. Investigations after major hospital fires, including the Jhansi Neonatal Intensive Care Unit fire in which 18 newborns died, have repeatedly found expired or absent fire clearances. Fix. Link a hospital’s fire safety certificate renewal to its registration and accreditation status, so a lapsed certificate automatically suspends the facility’s licence to operate.
    2. Backup power for critical equipment is often shared, not independent: Ventilators, warmers and monitors frequently run off the same power lines as general hospital load, so a single fault can cut life support equipment. Eg. A suspected equipment fault caused this month’s Amravati Neonatal Intensive Care Unit fire. Fix. Mandate a dedicated, separately fused power line for every ICU bed’s life support equipment, independent of the hospital’s general electrical circuit.
    3. Frontline staff are rarely trained for ICU specific evacuation: Evacuating patients who cannot move on their own requires drilled procedures that most hospital staff never practise. Eg. Regular ICU evacuation drills remain the exception rather than the norm even at accredited hospitals nationally. Fix. Make a biennial ICU evacuation drill, as already recommended for Neonatal Intensive Care Units, a mandatory condition of hospital accreditation across all critical care units, not only newborn wards.

    Conclusion

    ICU and Neonatal Intensive Care Unit fires have recurred at roughly the same scale and for the same reasons since the 2024 Jhansi fire, with certification calls and evacuation protocols repeatedly following each incident without preventing the next one. Treating ICU fires as a distinct safety category, backed by independent power lines, harmonics audits and enforced certification, is what remains to convert a decade of incident specific responses into a standing safety regime.