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Subject: Federal System

  • [op-ed snap] Naga peace plan lost in haze of optics, obstinacy

    Context

    The government-imposed deadline of October 31 for concluding talks with Naga groups has passed. And nothing concrete has come out of the Framework Agreement signed in 2015.

    Events so far

    • Framework Agreement with Naga rebel leader Thuingaleng Muivah was signed in 2015.
      • The agreement expresses an intent to work towards the final agreement.
      • The progress on the said agreement has stalled since then.
    • Problem with the Framework Agreement: It was signed only with Muivah’s leading faction, National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah), or NSCN (I-M).
      • Exclusion of major players: The agreement excluded half a dozen more groups, besides Naga citizenry in Nagaland and contiguous Naga homelands in the neighbouring states of Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, and Assam.
      • This weakened the process.

    Efforts made by the government

    • Appointment of an interlocutor: The government-appointed R.N. Ravi as the government’s interlocutor. That move signalled the seriousness from the government’s side.
    • Reach out toward the other players: The government reached out to Nagas across the board.
    • The government reached out to other rebel factions, much to the irritation of NSCN (I-M), and began peace talks with them in end-2017.
    • A breakaway faction of I-M’s arch enemies, NSCN’s Khaplang, joined the process in 2019.
    • Government-led outreach attempted to bring on board non-Naga people in Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, and Assam.

    What is offered in the process and related issues

    • Disarmament, rehabilitation, and assimilation: A talks with I-M spelt out disarmament, rehabilitation, and assimilation of cadres and leaders through induction in paramilitary forces and political structures
    • Expanded legislature: An expanded legislature in Nagaland, for inducting the rebels and more legislative representation and relative autonomy in Naga homelands outside Nagaland.
    • Disagreement over flang and the separate state-constitution: Other Naga rebel groups agreed to what was offered by the government.
    • I-M remained intransigent over the dual use of a Naga flag alongside the Indian flag, and its constitution—
    • This I-M-scripted constitution is regressive, offers far less than what Nagas enjoy under Indian constitutional provisions, and effectively proposes Muivah as the overarching figure of Naga politics, development and destiny.
    • Unacceptance by the other groups: This is evidently unacceptable to numerous Nagas—let alone non-Nagas—for whom Muivah, a Tangkhul Naga from Manipur’s Ukhrul region, remains a divisive figure.

    Conclusion

    There is a need to reconcile the difference between the different groups and reach a proposed agreement as soon as possible for the welfare of the communities and the region as a whole.

  • [op-ed snap] The Indian Constitution’s unitary tilt

    Context

    The Centre-State conflict over CAA, and the Constitutional obligation on the state to implement the laws made by the Parliament, has once again brought to the fore the fault lines in the Indian federalism.

    The opposition of the States to the Central law

    • Several state governments have declared that they would not implement the CAA.
    • Legislative Assembly of Kerala passed the resolution stating that the law contradicts the basic values.
    • The resolution is only symbolic.
    • Passage of such a resolution is not constitutionally barred.
    • But it may not be in tune with the federal scheme under the Constitution.

    What are the obligations on the States?

    • Article 256 obligates the State governments to ensure the implementation of the laws made by Parliament.
    • The Centre may give such direction as may appear to be necessary to ensure compliance with the laws made by Parliament.
    • The refusal to enforce the law even after the Centre issues direction would empower the President to impose the President’s Rule in the State.
    • Neither the refusal to implement not the official protests registered by the States carry much legal force.
    • The Calcutta High Court directed the state government to remove anti-CAA advertisements from the website.
    • The High Court barred the state from campaigning against a parliamentary law.

    The diminishing role of the Opposition

    • The parliament has been reduced to a site for procedural formalities.
    • There is a poor understanding of the role of the parliamentary Opposition in Indian politics.
    • Once the elections are over the Opposition is expected not to meddle in the governance.
    • The absence of Leader of Opposition in the Parliament for the last 6 years manifests this attitude.
    • Further, in the absence of the Opposition showing any resilience, national politics seems to be operating without a credible political check.

    The unitary tilt of the Constitution

    • Single-party dominance at the Centre has always revealed the tendency of our Constitution to concentrate the power.
    • The concentration of power is embedded in the very structure of the Constitution.
    • A ‘centrist bias’ of the Constitution further augments the power of single-party dominance.
    • Against the backdrop of the fissiparous tendencies in the backdrop of partition, it was justified for the founders to be hesitant in favour of stronger federalism.

    The rise of Electoral federalism

    • Change in voting patterns.
    • Over the last couple of years, there is huge vote swings between national and State elections in the same constituencies and separated by only a few months.
    • In other words, federalism is not a mere legal division of power, the democracy and voters too are becoming federal.
    • This embrace of electoral federalism may be one of the most significant achievements of Indian democracy.
    • Hence, parties that lose in national elections can still win State elections and form governments.
    • The State governments are thus filling the opposition deficit at the Centre.
    • This shift of opposition from Delhi to State capitals is likely to become the politics over federalism.

    Conclusion

    • The conflict that CAA triggered might become a template for future contestations over the federal question, while the politics seem to be ripe for the advancement of federalism.

     

  • Interstate River Water Dispute

    Importance for Exams

    • Mains : Understand the issue, why is it not resolved yet. Steps taken this year. why they are expected to yield better results compared to the past.
    • Prelims : Make a note of the institutional framework(composition, functions,etc) involved : Provisions of Art. 262, ISWD Act, CRA, CMC, CSC and the newly proposed CRMB.

    In News

    The Kaveri River water dispute between Karnataka and Tamil Nadu(TN) has been lingering on for decades. It crops up whenever there is scanty rainfall leading to shortage of water in Kaveri.
    This year, Kaveri has seen lesser monsoon rains leading to four main reservoirs in its Karnataka basin being partially full. The situation forced Karnataka to turn on it’s commitment of water sharing leading to resentment from TN.

    Timeline

    25 August : Citing a bad monsoon, Karnataka govt announced, it was not in a position to release the TN share of water forcing TN to approach the supreme court.
    5 September : Supreme Court directs Tamil Nadu to approach the Cauvery Supervisory Committee(CSC). CSC asks for data, delays ruling.
    19 September : Cauvery Supervisory Committee asked Karnataka to release 3,000 cusecs per day from September 21 to 30.
    20 September : SC doubled the quantum to 6,000 cusecs from September 21 to 27. directed the centre to constitute within four weeks the Cauvery Water Management Board(CWMB) as directed by Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal(CWDT) in its 2007 award.
    Riots follow.

    Core Issues

    Historical water use : Since the ancient times, TN had been an agrarian state with more area under agriculture than karnataka. Hence it has depended more on Kaveri. This is the reason why TN has always pushed for a lion’s share and has been awarded one by various tribunals. Karnataka is opposed to this line of thought.
    Present dependence : Karnataka farmers are unhappy because their share of water allows them to grow 1 paddy crop + 2nd less water-intensive crop while their counterparts in TN grow 3 crops a year. Karnataka finds it grossly unfair to release water for Tamil Nadu farmers who want to sow their 2nd crop while its own farmers struggle with the first.

    Ref : http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/cauvery-water-dispute-karnataka-tamil-nadu-supreme-court-3019228/

    The Deadlock

    The reasons for the deadlock are as follows
    1. Institutional failure
    – This issue raises the larger question of the effectiveness of the constitutional provisions of Art 262 relating to Inter-state river water disputes and the Inter-state Water Disputes Act, 1956. River water disputes across India suffer from deadlock.
    – CRA and CMC. CRA is political body with no experts. CMC plays a supportive role to the CRA. Neither Karnataka nor Tamil Nadu has endorsed the role and function of these bodies.

    Ref : http://www.frontline.in/static/html/fl1919/19190090.htm

    2. Politicization of the issue
    The issue has been blown out of proportion for political gains in respective states. It’s very important that the role of politicians and courts come down in deciding technical issues like these and the advice rendered by technocrats is given more importance.
    The proposed Cauvery River Management Board (CRMB) tries to address this issue by having technocrats at decisions making level.

    CM Karnataka Interview

    Way forward

    Cauvery River Management Board (CRMB)
    – The Board will take decisions on water usage and distribution.
    – The Board will also see to it that states ensure proper hydraulic structures at relevant sites.
    – It will determine the amount of water to be received by the states

    The idea is to cut down the dependence on monsoon. The board will ensure adequate storage in the reservoirs before the monsoons till the end of May each year. in case monsoons are delayed, the stored water can help minimize distress.
    In case of consecutive bad years, the Board will handle the issue appropriately by distributing water in a planned manner with minimum distress.

    Ref : http://www.oneindia.com/india/explained-how-will-cauvery-management-board-work-2214962.html

    http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/cauvery-management-board-will-have-representatives-from-karnataka-tn-cwc/article9132098.ece

    Historical Developments

    Only to help you understand the current issue better. Depth not required.

    1892 : Agreement between Madras Presidency and Mysore.
    1924 : 2nd Agreement under the supervision of GoI.
    1970 : fact-finding committee appointed.
    1990 : Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal (CWDT)is set-up under under the Inter-state Water Disputes Act, 1956.
    Interim orders passed in 1991, 1992 and 1995.
    1998 : Kaveri River Water Scheme notified by the govt. consisting of Cauvery River Authority (CRA) and Cauvery Monitoring Committee (CMC).
    2007 : After 16 years, it announces its award.
    Its distribution is as follows
    – Tamil Nadu -419 tmc ft
    – Karnataka – 270 tmc ft
    – Kerala – 30 tmc ft
    – Puducherry – 7 tmc ft
    This award is challenged by the states. Special Leave Petitions were filed and the Court granted leave.
    2013 : On the direction of the Supreme Court, Govt notified the final reward as proposed by the Tribunal in 2007.

     


    RSTV Debates

  • Delhi Full Statehood Issue

    source

    Should Delhi be given statehood?

    • Why in news?
    • Background
    • What is the present status of Delhi?
    • Arguments favoring statehood in Delhi
    • Why not to give statehood?
    • The way ahead

    Why in news?

    Recently Supreme Court has sought more clarity on the scope and boundaries of the relationship between the Delhi government and the Centre as at times, both the Centre and Delhi government contest each other’s right to administer and govern the National Capital and demands have been raised to give statehood to Delhi.

    Background

    The elected governments have time and again felt crippled in decision-making as the assembly does not have powers like other state assemblies. All political parties that have been in power in Delhi have lamented this and raised the demand for full statehood for the national capital.

    What is the present status of Delhi?

    • Presently, Delhi enjoys the character of a special Union Territory that has some unique institutions like an elected Legislative Assembly and a High Court.
    • In 1991, the Parliament, through the 69th amendment, introduced Article 239AA (Special Provisions with respect to Delhi) and conferred the right upon the people of the NCT of Delhi to elect their own legislature and government to make laws under certain entries of the state list of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution and execute these laws respectively.
    • This amendment, however, did not confer full statehood upon Delhi and powers with respect to public order, land and police remained with the Union government.

    Argument favoring statehood to Delhi

    • Two power centres create confusion

    In the current system, power is divided between the chief minister and the Central government through the LG. This dual control creates an inherent tension between the two power centres.

    • Union government exercises immense authority

    Though Delhi Assembly is given the powers to govern and make laws on all but three subjects – public order, police and land but the Union government has been violating this constitutional provision and has been exercising authority on several subjects.

    • Law & order should be the state government’s responsibility

    Delhi Police reports to the Union Home ministry and this ties their hands in ensuring maintenance of law and order in the capital. To avoid the tussle, the Centre can create and deploy a central police force for guarding its buildings and for diplomatic duties. For law and order duties, Delhi’s elected government must be in full command.

    • Delhi’s land cannot be under Centre’s control

    The Delhi government cannot decide on its own the use that the city’s land should be put to. This leads to conflict at times.

    • Delhi does not have its own officers

    Each state of India has its own Public Service Commission that recruits bureaucrats to run the state government’s administrative machinery. Delhi, being a Union territory, does not have a cadre of officers of its own and is part of a common cadre shared with other UTs.

    • It is argued that if Delhi had its own cadre, like all states have, the impasse between the offices of the CM and the LG would not have arisen.
    • National capitals all over the world have sufficient powers
    • Experts say even if some national capitals like Washington DC, London and Paris are not states, all of them have a governance structure that gives the local government legislative, financial and administrative powers. Delhi has none of these.
    • As Delhi expands, clarity over jurisdiction of the local government will become increasingly imperative.
    • Some experts have argued that the assembly should be dissolved and the Centre be given full charge of the national capital. However, the abolition of an assembly once created will mean taking away the democratic rights of the people.

    Why not to give the statehood?

    • Delhi is different than other UTs because as the nation’s capital, it must reflect the best that the country offers. And that is only possible if land-use, zoning plans and building regulations are managed in consonance with the standards expected of a capital city. Parallels cannot be drawn with state capitals like Mumbai, Bangalore or Chennai (although that is constantly being done).
    • Statehood would bring land allocation under the city government, whose concern for the country’s capital would yield to satiating local demands.
    • In the national capital, the protection of dignitaries and the maintenance of public order are the highest priorities. The upkeep of maximum standards of security is how the safety of the capital is judged. An attack on a Union minister or diplomat would guarantee an ‘unsafe’ tag not just for Delhi but the country. So, police cannot be kept solely in the hands of state government.
    • An important point against the grant of statehood to the Delhi is the inability of its city government to bear the cost of police salaries and the pension liabilities of all city government employees, which are today borne entirely by the Centre.
    • It would weaken the case for delegation of authority under various statutes which is feasible and a necessity.

    What’s the way ahead

    • Full statehood will definitely bring better opportunities for the residents of Delhi and financial increments for the government’s budget but not without its own share of responsibilities like provision of top security infrastructure for law & order and internal security
    • From the point of view of the citizens of Delhi, what matters is that systems are transparent and day-to-day work is attended to. This does not need statehood—only good governance

    References:

  • President’s Rule

    The Case that changed the fate of President’s Rule

    The indiscriminate use of President’s rule to thwart away the state governments who did not meet the ideology of Union led to the landmark verdict in the S.R. Bommai vs Union Of India, 1994, which curtailed the misuse of Article 356.


    Article 356, what? 

    Under Article 356, the President can dismiss a State Government or dissolve a State Assembly or keep it under suspended animation in the event of a failure of the constitutional machinery in that State.

    Lets know the background of the case, shall we?

    In the 1970s & 1980s, it almost became common practice for the central govt. to dismiss state govts led by opposition parties.

    • The Indira Gandhi regime and post-emergency Janata Party were noted for this practice.
    • Indira Gandhi’s government between 1966-1977 is known to have imposed President’ rule in 39 times (not states).
    • In 1989, Karnataka CM S.R. Bommai was denied an opportunity to test his majority in the Assembly by the Governor and his govt. was dismissed.

    What do the Constitutional Experts have to say on Art. 356?

    Article 356 has always been the focal point of a wider debate of the federal structure of government in Indian polity.

    • Dr. B R Ambedkar had envisaged that Art. 356 shall remain the dead letter in the Indian constitution.
    • The Sarkaria Commission on central-state relations has recommended that Article 356 must be used very sparingly, in extreme cases, as a measure of last resort, when all the other alternatives fail to prevent or rectify a breakdown of constitutional machinery in the state.

    What was the S.R. Bommai case?

    S.R. Bommai vs Union of India, delivered in March 1994, had sharply limited the constitutional power vested in the Central Government to dismiss a State government.

    SC established strict guidelines for imposing President’s rule. This case laid down the conditions under which State govts may be dismissed, and mechanisms for that process.

    In terms of the legality of the imposition of President’s Rule in States under Article 356, the SC in this case overruled its own precedent in the case of State of Rajasthan v Union of India 1977 case.

    Let’s briefly understand the State of Rajasthan v Union of India 1977 case

    • SC held that the power of the President to impose President’s Rule is not above and beyond judicial review entirely.
    • The court might insist on substantial evidence in support of the Centre’s charges against a state if the latter accuses the Centre of acting mala fide.

    The Court in the Bommai case, narrowed down the circumstances and the manner in which such powers could be exercised.

    What are conditions for the valid exercise Article 356?

    There was a shift in constitutional jurisprudence as the principle of federalism was part of the basic structure of the Constitution, and this principle could only be deviated from in exceptional and extraordinary circumstances, i.e. where constitutional rule was not possible in the State.

    • The majority enjoyed by the Council of Ministers(CoM) in the state shall be tested on the floor of the house and not subjectively decided by the Governor.
    • Center shall give a warning and a time-period of 1 week to the concerned state.
    • Courts cannot question the advice tendered by the CoM to the President, but court can scrutinizethe material basis of the satisfaction of President.
    • Until the proclamation is approved by the Parliament, President shall not take any irreversibleaction, i.e. he should not dissolution of assembly.
    • Courts have the power to reverse the actions of President, if the Art. 356 is used inappropriately.
    • Art. 356 shall be used sparingly, otherwise it will destroy the constitutional balance between the Center & States.
    Published with inputs from Pushpendra | Image: Frontline
  • Special Category Status and States

    • What is ‘Special Category’ status?
      What benefits do states having ‘Special Category’ status enjoy?
    • Who accords the category status to state and how?
    • Which states held Special category status?
    • Lacunas in the working of Special Category status
    • Why the status has been removed?
    • Way ahead now

    What is ‘Special Category’ status?

    • ‘Special category’ status is a classification given by Centre to assist in development of those states that face geographical & socio-economic disadvantages like hilly terrains, strategic international borders, economic & infrastructural backwardness and non-viable state finances.
    • The classification came into existence in 1969 as per the suggestion given by the Fifth Finance Commission, set up to devise a formula for sharing the funds of Central govt. among all states.

    What benefits do states having ‘Special Category’ status enjoy?

    • Significant concession in excise & customs duties, income tax and corporate tax
    • 30 percent of planned expenditure (central budget) goes to ‘special category’ states
    • Special Category states are benefited because of Normal Central Assistance which was skewed in favour of these states. These states get more funds in terms of NCA and most part of these funds was in the form of grants rather than loans.
    • Special Central Assistance given to SCS is also an additional amount which can be used by the concerned state for economic development.
    • Centre bears 90% of the state expenditure (given as grant) on all centrally-sponsored schemes and external aid while rest 10% is given as loan to state. For general category, the respective grant to loan ratio is 30:70 where as external aid is passed on in the same ratio as received at the centre.
    • Unspent money does not lapse and gets carry forward.

    Hence, special-category status catalyses the inflow of private investments and generates employment and additional revenue to state. Since centre bears 90% of state expenditure on all centrally-sponsored schemes, state can take more welfare-based schemes from the new savings.

    Further, more grants from centre helps in building state infrastructure and social sector projects. As a result, special-category state gets to bridge its development deficit.

    Who accords the category status to state and how?

    Special Category’ status had been granted in the past by the Union government to States having certain characteristics based on the recommendations of the National Development Council.

    These include

    i) hilly terrain;

    ii) low population density and/or sizeable share of tribal population;

    iii) strategic location along borders with neighbouring countries;

    iv) economic and infrastructure backwardness; and

    v) non-viable nature of State finances.

    Special Category States

    source

    Which states held Special category status?

    11 states used to have ‘special category’ status, namely, Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Sikkim, Tripura, Jammu & Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh, and Uttarakhand.

    Lacunas in the working of Special Category status

    • Firstly, the way Special Category Status were assigned to a state has been a matter of debate. Various committees used different parameters to classify a state in Special Category status.
    • Some states lobby central government to classify them in special category. This was to be corrected and the consent of majority of state must be taken before granting a special category status to any state.
    • Moreover there should have been a general consensus among states related to principle used for granting the SCS.
    • Secondly, data reveals that even after awarding Special category status not much economic progress has been noticed among states. This may mean that for economic development it’s important to follow sound economic policy. Benefit of SCS may act as a stimulus but rest depends on the individual state policy.
    • Third, the amount of proceeds that states receive has increased after 14th finance commission. So the structure does not seem to have any specific relevance in present context.

    Why has the status been removed now?

    The Finance Ministry’s reasoning for withdrawing the status is that the higher 42% devolution takes into account all needs of states.

    Way ahead?

    Following the demand for Special Status by Bihar, a committee was appointed under Dr. Raghuram Rajan in 2013. This committee suggested that States classified as ‘Special Category States’ and those seeking inclusion in that category, would find that their need for funds and special attention more than adequately met by a basic allocation to each State and the categorisation of some as ‘least developed’.

    Considering special status to any new State will result in demands from other States and dilute the benefits further. It is also not economically beneficial for States to seek special status as the benefits under the current dispensation are minimal. States facing special problems will be better off seeking a special package.


    References: