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Subject: International Relations

  • How India can adapt to global geoeconomic churn

    Context

    As India returns to a high growth path after a slowdown in the last decade, its geopolitical salience in the world will continue to rise.

    India’s growth story

    •  Today, India’s GDP is $3.1 trillion and could cross, according to some estimates, $8 trillion by the end of this decade.
    •  India’s total trade, which was about $38 billion in 1991-92, is expected to touch $1.3 trillion this year.
    •  This is about 40 percent of India’s GDP and underlines the fact that India is more deeply tied to the world than ever before.
    • The world itself is in a geo-economic churn making the transition to $8 trillion a challenging one.

    Geo-economic and geopolitical changes in the global order

    Geo-economic changes

    • It was Edward Luttwak, the well-known American strategist, who triggered a global discourse on the idea of geoeconomics in a seminal article in 1990 amidst the end of the Cold War.
    • Using economic dominance for political gain: The rapid economic rise of China in the last three decades and Beijing’s success in leveraging its growing economic clout for political gain is widely seen as a classic example of geoeconomics.
    • Economic interdependence: Luttwak’s warning against illusions of economic interdependence and globalization have been borne out by major changes in US-China relations in recent years.
    • The dramatic expansion of economic interdependence between China and America over the last four decades — what some called “Chimerica” — was the principal evidence for the thesis that geopolitics and ideology no longer mattered.
    • Chimerica was held up as an efficient economic fusion that underscored the virtues of economic globalization.
    • However, economic nationalism has re-emerged in both countries today.
    • The US is also strengthening domestic research and industrial capabilities to compete more effectively with China.
    • China too has adopted the economic strategy of “dual circulation” that focuses on strengthening domestic capabilities and reducing exposure to external factors.

    How geopolitical and geoeconomic changes are influencing India’s free trade policies

    • At the end of 2019, India has walked out from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) suggesting that the costs of joining a China-centered regional economic order are unacceptable.
    • Deepening engagement with complementary economies: India’s move towards free trade agreements with countries like Australia, Britain, UAE, and Israel.
    • Domestic orientation: Much like the US and China, India is now taking a number of initiatives to promote domestic manufacturing in a range of sectors under the banner of “Atmanirbhar Bharat”.

    Way forward for India

    • Until now, India had the luxury of treating its foreign, economic, and strategic policies as separate domains.
    • An integrated approach to policies: Adapting to the current global geo-economic churn demands that Delhi finds better ways to integrate its financial, trade, technological, security, and foreign policies.
    • Above all India needs a strategy that can respond to the imperatives of building domestic capabilities, developing geo-economic partnerships, and constructing geopolitical coalitions with like-minded countries.

    Consider the question “How the current geo-political and geo-economic policies are shaping India’s trade policies? Suggest the approach India need to adapt to the structural changes taking place in the global order?” 

    Conclusion

    India’s selective trade arrangements and the policies to promote domestic manufacturing have drawn much criticism. While those arguments must continue, they must be related more closely to the structural changes in the international economic order.

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  • 30 years of India-Israel Diplomatic Relations

    A recent speech by the PM Modi has marked three decades since New Delhi established formal diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv on January 29, 1992, when P.V. Narasimha Rao was the Prime Minister.

    India-Israel Relation: A Backgrounder

    (I) Recognition of Israel

    • Both nations became independent almost at the same time, in the late 1940s, following a long struggle against British Colonialism.
    • Though India had recognized Israel on September 17, 1950, full-fledged diplomatic relations between the countries were established on January 29, 1992.
    • Their diplomatic relationship was previously based on popular consensus and only much later became official.

    (II) India’s reluctance for extending ties

    • The popular perception of Israel was negative as it was a state formed on religion and analogous to Pakistan.
    • This was because during that time India was a young state that needed to take into account Arab states’ numerical impact at the United Nations.
    • Furthermore, it could not afford to antagonize its Muslim population by establishing ties with a Jewish state.
    • Sympathizing the Palestinian cause is a by-product of these motives.

    (III) India’s shift towards Israel

    • Though India voted against a UN resolution for the creation of Israel, once Israel is created, India officially recognized Israel (in 1950).
    • But full diplomatic ties were established only in 1992.

    Reasons for India prioritizing Israel

    • India’s exclusion from OIC: The formation of an Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in 1969 which neglected the sentiments of Indian Muslims by blocking India’s membership to this group by Pakistan is one of the primary triggers for the change instance.
    • Backing of Kashmir: India has received no backing from the Arab countries on the Kashmir Issue. There have been no serious attempts by the Arab world to put pressure on Pakistan to reign in the cross-border insurgency in Kashmir.
    • Support in crucial wars: Israel supported India during the Indo-Pak wars even before full diplomatic ties were established.
    • India’s US allegiance: With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of the US as a superpower, India started aligning itself with the US, and this further added to our improved relations with Israel.
    • Deviation from NAM: After decades of Non-Alignment and Pro-Arab policy, in 1992 India changed its stance and established full diplomatic ties with Israel.
    • Support at global forums: Israel has always been a vocal supporter of India’s permanent seat in the UNSC.
    • Technology: India’s world-class institutes of higher education could benefit from the strong culture of research and high-end innovation that thrives in Israel.

    Israeli interests in India

    • India presents a massive market for Israel’s manufactured goods and technology.
    • India has for long enjoyed great goodwill among Israel’s citizens as the only country in the world where Jews have not faced anti-Semitism.
    • There are many instances of Jews under Hitler’s persecution finding shelter in India including some that were said to have been facilitated by Nehru.
    • The minuscule Jew community was able to rise to eminence in various fields.
    • Israel cherishes its admirers in India for its ability to thrive in spite of very adverse situations in its short history as an independent nation.

    Collaborations between India and Israel

    [A] Military collaboration

    • Against terrorism: India and Israel have increased collaboration in military ventures since both nations face the threats of rising radical terrorism and separatism.
    • Arms trade: India is the largest buyer of Israeli military equipment and Israel is the second-largest defense supplier to India after Russia.
    • Security: Working groups in areas of border management, internal security and public safety, police modernization, and capacity building for combating crime, crime prevention, and cybercrime were established.
    • Defence R&D: IAI is developing the Barak 8 missile for the Indian Navy and Indian Air Force which is capable of protecting sea vessels and ground facilities from aircraft and cruise missiles.

    [B] Political collaboration

    • Since the up-gradation of relations in 1992, defense and agriculture have become the two main pillars of the bilateral engagement.
    • The political ties have become especially cordial under the Modi Government.
    • In 2017, Prime Minister Modi became the first-ever Indian Prime Minister to visit Israel.

    [C] Agriculture collaboration

    • India has chosen Israel as a strategic partner (G2G) in the field of agriculture.
    • This partnership evolved into the Indo-Israel Agricultural Project (IIAP), under the Indo-Israel Action Plan, based on an MOU signed by Indian and Israeli ministers of Agriculture in 2006.
    • The partnership aims to introduce crop diversity, increase productivity & increase water use efficiency.
    • India has a lot to learn from the dryland agriculture of Israel. The Economic Survey 2016-17 batted for Indo-Israel cooperation in drip-irrigation technologies.

    [D] Economic collaboration

    • India is Israel’s third-largest trading partner in Asia after China and Hong Kong.
    • In recent years, bilateral trade has diversified to include several sectors like pharmaceuticals, agriculture, IT and telecom, and homeland security.
    • Major exports from India to Israel include precious stones and metals, chemical products, textiles, etc.
    • Major imports from Israel include chemicals and mineral products, base metals and machinery, and transport equipment. Potash is a major item of Israel’s exports to India.

    Various deterrents in ties

    • Bilateral Trade and investment still below potential: From just $200 million in 1992, bilateral trade (excluding defense) peaked at about $5 billion in 2012 but since then it has dropped to about $4 billion. Also, bilateral trade has not diversified much—diamonds and chemicals still make up for the large chunk of the pie.
    • Connectivity between the two countries is still poor with just one direct flight from Mumbai 3 times a week and no direct flights from Delhi.
    • Historical retrenchment: India’s consistent support for a sovereign, independent, viable, and united Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, living within secure and recognized borders, side by side, and at peace with Israel and Pro-Arab stance has been a sticky point.
    • Limited People to People ties and cultural differences: Israelis and Indian approach business differently and often find it difficult to get on the same page.
    • India’s support for Palestinian Cause: Though formal ties were established in 1992, the ideological divide resurfaces time and again due to India’s affinity for Palestine.

    Way forward

    • Indian policy appears to be guided primarily by strategic considerations.
    • There is a strong need to use soft power diplomacy to build people-to-people bridges and to add to economic benefits through robust inter-country tourism.
    • The Indian and Israeli markets do not compete with one another but complete one another.
    • A potential quadrilateral with US and UAE can help this relationship soar to new heights.

     

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    Also read:

    Indo-Abrahamic Accord: A new QUAD

  • India-Oman Relations

    India is laying out the red carpet for Oman’s top defence official Mohammed Nasser Al Zaabi, who will be in India for a four-day official visit.

    India-Oman Relations: A Backgrounder

    • The Sultanate of Oman is a strategic partner of India in the Gulf.
    • Both nations are linked by geography, history and culture and enjoy warm and cordial relations.
    • An Indian consulate was opened in Muscat in February 1955 which was upgraded to a consulate general in 1960 and later into a full-fledged embassy in 1971.
    • The first ambassador of India arrived in Muscat in 1973.

    History of the ties

    • Oman, for many years, was ruled by Sultan Qaboos bin Said al Said, who was a friend of India.
    • Sultan Qaboos, the longest-reigning leader of the modern Arab world, died in January ‘2020 at the age of 79.
    • He was a man who was, as a student, taught by Shankar Dayal Sharma who went on to become the President of India.
    • Sultan Qaboos’s father, an alumnus of Ajmer’s Mayo College, sent his son to study in Pune for some time, where he was former President Shankar Dayal Sharma’s student.

    Economic ties

    • Expatriate community: Oman has over five hundred thousand Indian nationals living there making them the largest expatriate community in Oman. They annually remit $780 million to India.
    • Bilateral trade: In 2010, bilateral trade between India and Oman stood at $4.5 billion. India was Oman’s second-largest destination for its non-oil exports and its fourth-largest source for Indian imports.
    • Energy: India has been considering the construction of a 1,100-km-long underwater natural gas pipeline from Oman called the South Asia Gas Enterprise (SAGE).

    Defense cooperation

    Oman is the first Gulf nation to have formalized defense relations with India.

    • Naval cooperation: The Indian Navy has berthing rights in Oman, and has been utilizing Oman’s ports as bases for conducting anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.
    • Tri-services base: In February 2018, India announced that it had secured access to the facilities at Duqm for the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy. Duqm had previously served as a port for the INS Mumbai.
    • Arms trade: The standard issue rifle of the Royal Army of Oman is India’s INSAS rifle.
    • Bilateral exercises: Naseem al-Bahr (Arabic for Sea Breeze) is a bilateral maritime exercise between India and Oman. The exercise was first held in 1993.

    Significance of Oman for India

    • Oman is India’s closest defense partner in the Gulf region and an important anchor for India’s defense and strategic interests.
    • It is the only country in the Gulf region with which all three services of the Indian armed forces conduct regular bilateral exercises and staff talks, enabling close cooperation and trust at the professional level.
    • It also provides critical operational support to Indian naval deployments in the Arabian sea for anti-piracy missions.

    Duqm port and its strategic imperative

    • In a strategic move to expand its footprint in the Indian Ocean region, India has secured access to the key Port of Duqm in Oman for military use and logistical support.
    • This is part of India’s maritime strategy to counter Chinese influence and activities in the region.
    • The Port of Duqm is strategically located, in close proximity to the Chabahar port in Iran.
    • With the Assumption Island being developed in Seychelles and Agalega in Mauritius, Duqm fits into India’s proactive maritime security roadmap.
    • In recent years, India had deployed an attack submarine to this port in the western Arabian Sea.

    Deterrent in ties: Chinese influence in Oman

    • China started cultivating ties with the Arab countries following the former Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan.
    • Beijing has cultivated close ties with Oman and the latter was, in fact, the first country to deliver oil to China.
    • As of today, 92.99 per cent of Oman’s oil exports go to China, making China Oman’s largest oil importer.
    • Oman and China signed an agreement to establish an Oman-China Industrial Park at Duqm in 2016.
    • China has identified Oman as a key country in the region and has been enhancing defence ties with it steadily.

    Way forward

    • India does not have enough energy resources to serve its current or future energy requirements. The rapidly growing energy demand has contributed to the need for long term energy partnerships with countries like Oman.
    • Oman’s Duqm Port is situated in the middle of international shipping lanes connecting East with West Asia.
    • India needs to engage with Oman and take initiatives to utilise opportunities arising out of the Duqm Port industrial city.

     

  • What is America COMPETES Act?

    The US has unveiled the Creating Opportunities for Manufacturing, Pre-Eminence in Technology, and Economic Strength (COMPETES) Act of 2022 that proposes to open up new vistas for talented individuals from across the world with a new start-up visa.

    What is the COMPETES Act?

    • The bill provides $52 billion to encourage more semiconductor production in the US, and $45 billion for grants and loans to improve supply chain resilience and manufacturing, among other programs.
    • It also includes funding to address social and economic inequality, climate change, and immigration.
    • For instance, it provides an exemption for STEM PhDs from the green card cap and creates a new green card for entrepreneurs.
    • The bill also authorizes $600 million a year to construct manufacturing facilities to make the US less reliant on solar components made in Xinjiang, China.

    Key provisions in the Act

    • The Act amends the Immigration and Nationality Act to create a new classification of “W” non-immigrants for entrepreneurs with an ownership interest in a start-up entity.
    • It seeks to establish procedures for foreign nationals with an ownership interest in a start-up entity to self-petition for lawful permanent resident status as an immigrant entrepreneur.
    • The bill exempts from the numerical limits on immigrant visas certain foreign nationals (and the spouses and children of such aliens) who have earned a doctoral degree in STEM.

    Implications for Indians

    • It would mean more opportunities in the US for Indian talent, and for skilled workers.
    • Every year, the US administration issues 85,000 H-1B work permits.
    • Every year, Indians and Indian companies corner a lion’s share of the H-1B work permits issued that year.
    • With this new category, Indian professionals will likely have a better shot at opportunities that the Act is likely to provide.

     

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  • Places in the news: Sittwe Port

    Context

    Notwithstanding the unfortunate developments since the Tatmadaw took over, a recalibration exercise for developing a robust relationship with Naypyidaw is the need of the hour.

    Need for proactive neighbourhood policy with Myanmar

    • Security and economic interests: India should implement an unbiased and proactive “Neighbourhood First” strategy that facilitates the Act East policy crucial for India’s long-term security and economic interests.
    • Myanmar — regardless of who governs its polity — is not only the decisive lynchpin for India’s Act East policy but critical for the economic development and security of India’s Northeast.
    • China factor: Such a policy should take into account the measures that China has taken to arm the Tatmadaw.

    How to support Myanmar?

    • Critical requirements: India should find ways to support Naypyidaw for its critical requirements of systems and platforms like UAVs, surveillance systems and communication equipment.
    • Economic engagement: There is a need for dynamic economic engagement with Myanmar, to expedite the completion of the earlier agreement on the operationalisation of the Sittwe port, the establishment of an oil refinery and joint vaccine production facilities at a cost of $6 billion.
    • People-to-people goodwill: India also needs to proactively employ the existing “people-to-people” goodwill and proximate ties between the two armies.
    • Engage with military leadership to stop highhandedness: India has the singular advantage of acceptability from both factions in Myanmar and it is, therefore, imperative that it takes the lead in engaging with the ruling military leadership, to stop the highhandedness.
    • The visit by India’s Foreign Secretary to Myanmar in the last week of December 2021 was significant.
    • It conveyed the message that India, notwithstanding its commitment to democracy, is amenable to conduct business with the country, regardless of who is in the seat of power.

    Conclusion

    It is of the utmost importance for India to positively engage Naypyidaw and stave off attempts to exploit Myanmar by countries inimical to India’s growth. Any ambiguity or delay in India’s constructive engagement with Myanmar would only serve the interests of anti-India forces.

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  • India’s challenge in European geopolitics

    Context

    For India, an important strategic priority today is to rebalance the Indo-Pacific. Delhi, however, recognises that this expansive challenge can’t be met by any one power, including the US. A larger European role in securing Asia therefore becomes critical.

    Importance of Russia in balancing China

    • Peace with Russia in Europe might be necessary for America to focus on Asia has been the key motivation behind President Joe Biden’s decision to intensify engagement with Vladimir Putin in the last few months.
    • On the question of Ukraine’s membership of NATO, the US and its European allies have suggested that membership is certainly not imminent; but they are unwilling to say Ukraine will “never” be admitted.

    Contradiction in Europe

    • 1] Europe remains geopolitically unstable: None of the three European settlements of the 20th century — in 1919 after the First World War, in 1945 after the Second World War, and in 1991 after the Cold War — has endured.
    • 2] The difficulty of integrating Russia into a European order: Russia was part of the great power system in Europe through the 18th and 19th centuries.
    • If the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution put Russia and the West at odds with each other, the collapse of the Soviet Union has not resolved the contradiction.
    • 3] Growing tension between the US and Europe: Since the Second World War, Europe has relied on the US for its security.
    • However, Europe has never stopped resenting the American dominance over its geopolitics.
    • The EU’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, has repeatedly objected to the US and Russia deciding the future of Ukraine over European heads.
    • But Russia does not take the EU seriously and is betting on negotiations with the US.
    • 4] Europe still remains a weak security actor:  While the EU has become a powerful economic entity (with its $17 trillion GDP), it remains a weak security actor.
    • Whatever might be the outcome from the gathering conflict over Ukraine, these European contradictions are not going to disappear any time soon.

    Why Europe remains a weak security actor?

    • Dominance of the US and Russia: The ambition to construct a strong geopolitical personality for the EU is hobbled by divisions over the role of Russia and the US in the region.
    • Mutual suspicions: The historically rooted mutual suspicions among European states also plays role.
    • Reluctance to spend on defence: This is compounded by the reluctance to spend more on defence and the inability to develop collective defence arrangements outside of NATO led by the US.

    Suggestions for India

    • The contradictions in Europe demand that Delhi discard its tendency to view the region through the “East versus West” binary.
    • Delhi today could profitably take a leaf out of the book of the Indian national movement.
    • In the late 18th century, as European powers competed for influence in the subcontinent, many Indian princes sought to take advantage of the contradictions between Britain and France.
    • Imperial Germany supported the formation of a nationalist government of India in Kabul in 1915 headed by Raja Mahendra Pratap Singh.
    • Eager to accelerate Indian independence during the Second World War, Netaji turned to Germany and Japan, the world’s newest great power.
    • The sharpening struggle for Indian independence, and more broadly the liberation of Asia between the two World Wars, inevitably involved exploiting the contradictions between different imperial powers.
    •  This was complicated, however, by rapid realignment among the major powers —friends became adversaries and enemies became allies.
    • The Indian and Asian national movements were deeply divided in coping with the shifting great power dynamic.
    • The world enters a similar moment today that could rearrange relations between the US, UK, Europe, Russia, China and Japan.

    Consider the question “What are the contradictions in Europe today? How these contradiction can play role in India’s international relations with the European countries?”

    Conclusion

    Greater engagement with Europe and dealing with its multiple contradictions must necessarily be important elements of India’s international relations today.

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  • What Russia really wants

    Context

    Vladimir Putin, who annexed Crimea in 2014 has now mobilised some 100,000 troops on the Ukraine border.

    How insecurity and history plays role in Russia’s actions

    • Russia, the world’s largest country by land mass, lacks natural borders except the Arctic Ocean in the north and the Pacific in the far east.
    • Its vast land borders stretch from northern Europe to Central and north east Asia.
    • The country’s heartland that runs from St. Petersburg through Moscow to the Volga region lies on plains and is vulnerable to attacks.
    • In the last two centuries, Russia saw two devastating invasions from the west — the 1812 attack by Napoleonic France and the 1941 attack by Nazi Germany. 
    • After the Second World War, Russia re-established its control over the rim land in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, which it hoped would protect its heartland.
    • But the disintegration of the Soviet Union threw its security calculations into disarray, deepening its historical insecurity.

    NATO’s expansion after disintegration of the Soviet Union

    • When the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia lost over three million square kilometres of sovereign territory.
    •  In the last months of the Soviet Union, the West promised that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) would not “expand an inch to the east”.
    • The United States and the United Kingdom repeated the pledge after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
    • But despite the promises, NATO continued expansion.
    • In March 1999, in the first enlargement since the end of the Cold War, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (all were members of the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact) joined NATO.
    • Five years later, seven more countries — including the three Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, all of which share borders with Russia — were taken into the alliance.
    • Russia felt threatened but was not able to respond.
    • But in 2008, when the U.S. promised membership to Georgia and Ukraine in the Bucharest summit, Russia, which was coming out of the post-Soviet retreat, responded forcefully.

    How Russia see NATO expansion as threat to its dominance on Black Sea

    • Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania, all Black Sea basin countries, are NATO members.
    • Ukraine and Georgia are the other countries that share the Black Sea coast, besides Russia.
    • Russia was already feeling squeezed on the Black Sea front, its gateway to the Mediterranean Sea.
    • If Ukraine and Georgia also join NATO, Russia fears that its dominance over the Black Sea would come to an end.
    • So, in 2008, Mr. Putin sent troops to Georgia over the separatist conflict in South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
    • In 2014, when the Kremlin-friendly regime of Ukraine was toppled by pro-western protesters, he moved to annex the Crimean peninsula, expanding Russia’s Black Sea coast, thereby protecting its fleet based in Sevastopol in Crimea.

    Restoring the rim land

    • In recent years, Mr. Putin has tried to turn every crisis in the former Soviet region into a geopolitical opportunity.
    • South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the self-proclaimed republics that broke away from Georgia, are controlled by Russia-backed forces.
    •  In 2020, when protests erupted in Belarus after a controversial presidential election, Mr. Putin sent assistance to the country to restore order.
    • In the same year, Russia sent thousands of “peacekeepers” to end the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan.
    • Earlier this year, Belarus leader Alexander Lukashenko, with Mr. Putin’s backing, manufactured a migrant crisis on the Polish border of the European Union.
    • This month, when violent unrest broke out in Kazakhstan, the largest and wealthiest country in Central Asia, its leader turned to Russia for help.

    How do geopolitical circumstances favour Russia?

    • The U.S.’s ignominious withdrawal from Afghanistan has left the Central Asian republics deeper in the Russian embrace.
    • Europe is very much dependent on Russian gas, which limits its response.
    • For years, the West, the winner of the Cold War, discounted Mr. Putin.
    • Having failed to defeat the Taliban in Afghanistan, NATO is unlikely to pick a war with Russia over Ukraine.

    Conclusion

    By destabilising Georgia and Ukraine and re-establishing Russia’s hold in Belarus, Caucasus and Central Asia, Moscow has effectively stalled NATO’s further expansion into its backyard.

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  • Preventing genocide

    Context

    Incendiary speeches at a religious assembly include calls for the genocide of Muslims in India and can be seen as part of an ongoing pattern of targeting minorities.

    Background of the convention against genocide

    • India’s role: India has signed and ratified the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948.
    • In 1946, Cuba, India and Panama co-sponsored General Assembly Resolution 96(I), which affirmed genocide as a ‘crime under international law’.
    • As a result of this resolution, a convention on the prohibition of genocide was drafted, which was passed by the General Assembly in 1948 and came into effect in 1951, with more than 150 states party to the convention presently.
    • Legal obligation: Legal obligations on states that are party to the convention include:
    • the obligation not to commit genocide,
    • to prevent genocide, and to punish genocide(Article I),
    • to enact legislation to give effect to the provisions of the convention (Article V);
    • to provide for effective penalties for those found guilty of criminal conduct (Article V); and
    • the obligation to try those charged with genocide in a competent tribunal (Article VI).

    No legislation enacted by India

    • Since signing the Genocide Convention and ratifying it, to date India has not enacted any legislation in accordance with Article VI of the Genocide Convention.
    • At the outset, India is in violation of its international obligation to criminalise genocide within its domestic law per Articles V, VI and VII, and to take all means to ensure the prevention of genocide.
    •  Indian domestic law shows that there are no comparable provisions for the prosecution of any mass crimes, least of all genocide.
    • Indian Penal Code provisions relating to rioting, unlawful assembly and ‘promoting enmity between different groups’ do not embody the basic elements of the crime of genocide, which is against a collectivity or a group, with the specific intent to cause its destruction.
    • These also do not pertain to another key aspect of the Genocide Convention – that of prevention, and creating the conditions in which such hate speech and other associated acts are not allowed to flourish.

    Significance of the Gambia’s proceedings before the ICJ against Myanmar

    •  The Gambia has initiated proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against Myanmar on the basis of the Convention.
    • The ICJ, relying on a previous case of Belgium v. Senegal, stated, “It follows that any State party to the Genocide Convention, and not only a specially affected State, may invoke the responsibility of another State party with a view to ascertaining the alleged failure to comply with its obligations erga omnes partes, and to bring that failure to an end.”

    Conclusion

    It is more imperative than ever that international legal protections against genocide are incorporated in domestic legislation. Furthermore, the fact that India has international legal obligations under the Genocide Convention which it is not adhering to must be rectified.

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  • Making sense of Pakistan’s new national security policy

    Context

    The national security policy statement issued last week by the government of Pakistan acknowledges the need for change.

    Why does it matter for India?

    • India’s stakes in a stable Pakistan are higher than anyone else in the world.
    • Therefore, Delhi must pay close attention to the internal debates within Islamabad on the imperatives of major change in Pakistan’s national direction.
    • But as critics in Pakistan insist, the policy offers no clues on how to go about it.
    • The classified version probably has a clear strategy on how to accelerate economic growth, build national cohesion, and revitalise its foreign and security policies.

    Overview of India’s transformation after 1990s

    • The crises that Pakistan confronts today are quite similar to those Delhi faced at the turn of the 1990s.
    • Economic challenge: India’s post-Independence old economic model was on the verge of collapse.
    • Political instability: The era of massive domestic political mandates was over and weak coalitions government were in place.
    • Challenges in International relations: The Soviet Union, India’s best friend in the Cold War, fell off the map and the Russian successor was more interested in integrating with the West.
    • India found that its political ties with all other major powers — the US, Europe, China and Japan — were underdeveloped at the end of the Cold War.
    • Pakistan, meanwhile, was running proxy wars in India even as it mobilised international pressures against Delhi on Kashmir.
    • Within a decade, though, India was on a different trajectory.
    • . Its reformed economy was on a high growth path.
    • India was hailed as an emerging power that would eventually become the third-largest economy in the world and a military power to reckon with.
    • Delhi also cut a deal with Washington to become a part of the global nuclear order on reasonable terms.
    • This involved a series of structural economic reforms, the recasting of foreign policy, and developing a new culture of power-sharing within coalitions and between the Centre and the states.

    The economic transformation of Bangladesh

    • The economic transformation of Bangladesh has been equally impressive.
    • Since Sheikh Hasina returned to power in 2009, Bangladesh focused on economic development, stopped support to terrorism, and improved ties with the larger of its two neighbours — India. 
    • As a result, Bangladesh’s economy in 2021 (GDP at $350 billion) is well ahead of Pakistan ($280 billion).

    How Pakistan missed the opportunity

    • Pakistan chose a different path.
    • Having ousted the Soviet superpower from Afghanistan in the late 1980s, Pakistan was ready to apply the model of cross-border terrorism to shake Kashmir loose from India and turn Afghanistan into a protectorate.
    • Supporting jihadi groups was seen as a low-cost strategy to achieve Pakistan’s long-standing strategic objectives in the neighbourhood.
    • These grand geopolitical obsessions left little bandwidth for the much-needed economic modernisation of Pakistan.
    • Islamabad, which relentlessly pursued parity with Delhi, now finds that the Indian economy at $3.1 trillion is more than 10 times larger than that of Pakistan.

    Factors that explain change in Pakistan’s policy

    • Diminishing role in geopolitics: In the past, Pakistan had much success in pursuing a foreign policy that not only balanced India with the support of the West, but also carved out a large role for itself in the Middle East and more broadly the Muslim world.
    • Today, barring the United Kingdom, Pakistan’s equities in the West have steadily diminished.
    • Weakened ties in the Middle East: Meanwhile, it has weakened its traditionally strong ties in the Middle East with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
    • Weakened ties with the US: Although its all-weather ties with China have gone from strength to strength, the unfolding conflict between Washington and Beijing has put Pakistan in an uncomfortable strategic situation.
    • Pakistan’s support for violent religious extremism has also begun to backfire.
    • A permissive environment for terrorism has now attracted severe financial penalties from the international system.

    India’s changed approach towards Pakistan

    • Delhi, which was prepared to make concessions on Kashmir in the 1990s and 2000s, has taken Kashmir off the table and is ready to use military force in response to major terror attacks.
    • Delhi’s attitude towards Islamabad now oscillates between insouciance and aggression.
    • Unlike in the past, the West is no longer pressuring India to accommodate Pakistan on Kashmir.
    • The US is eager for India’s support in balancing China in the Indo-Pacific.

    Conclusion

    All these shifts together have compelled Pakistan to rethink its policies.  There is no guarantee that the change will be definitive and for the good. But if it is, Delhi should be prepared to respond positively.

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  • Domestic and geopolitical risks India faces in 2022

    Context

    Risks in 2022 could be both domestic and geopolitical, with many precepts that the world has been accustomed to being at risk. Democracy itself could face serious headwinds this year.

     Challenges to democracy

    • The world has recently seen the rise of authoritarian rulers in many countries.
    • What is worrisome is that democratic tenets which have been under attack in recent years appear set to face more onslaughts this year.
    • The United States, which was widely viewed as a major bulwark for democracy, appears to have developed certain pathological infirmities.

    Geopolitical challenges and risks

    [1] Disruption by China

    • The role of China is possibly the most disrupting one, given the challenge it poses to the existing international order.
    • Militarily, China is openly challenging U.S. supremacy in many areas, including ‘state-of-the-art weaponry’ such as hyper-sonic technology.
    • China is now threatening Taiwan, which could well become one of the flashpoints of conflict in 2022.
    • The dip in China’s economic profile in the past year and more could also lead to new tensions in the Asia-Pacific region in 2022.

    [2] Russia-Ukraine conflict

    • The other major risk of a war in 2022, stems from the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine — the latter being backed by the U.S. and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces.
    • During the past three decades, NATO has expanded its reach almost a 1,000 miles to the east in violation of an earlier tacit understanding.
    • Russia appears determined that Ukraine should be the ‘last frontier’ and, if need be, ensure this through military force.
    • The situation has grave possibilities and could result in a series of cyclical outcomes with considerable damage potential.

    [3] Instability in the vast region

    • Unrest in Kazakhstan: The current unrest in Kazakhstan, which till recently was one of the more stable Central Asian nations, is perhaps symptomatic of what is in store.
    • Recent events in Kazakhstan demonstrates a sharper cleavage between the U.S.-led West and its principal opponents, Russia and China.
    • This is not a good sign for the world already wracked by a series of coups or internecine strife as in Ethiopia, Libya and certain regions of West Asia and North Africa.

    [4] Return of Taliban and security implications for India

    • Shift in balance of power: Of particular significance to India is that the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan has led to a material shift in the balance of power in India’s periphery.
    • Developments in Afghanistan have fuelled the ambitions of quite a few ‘anti-state militant groups’ across the region.
    • Even in Pakistan, the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has become energised and is enlarging its sphere of action to other parts of Asia, notably Kazakhstan.
    • This will have an unsettling effect across large parts of Asia.
    • New evidence suggests that on India’s eastern flank, viz. Indonesia, a resurgence of radical Islamist activities is taking place.
    • The Jemaah Islamiyah has reportedly become more active in Indonesia.

    [5] India’s border issue with China

    • The most serious issue that India confronts today is how to deal with a China that has become more confrontational.
    • India’s membership of the Quad still rankles as far as China’s psyche is concerned, and during 2022, may well result in China embarking on new adventurist actions at many more points on the Sino-Indian border compelling India to react.
    • Additionally, India will need to determine how best to respond to China’s provocations.
    • Strengthen military posture: India would need to strengthen its military posture, both as a means to deter China and also to convince India’s neighbours that it can stand up to China.

    Challenges ahead for India

    • Challenge in Central Asia: Diplomatically, in 2022, India may find itself vulnerable in dealing with the turmoils which have occurred in two areas of strategic interest to it, viz. Central Asia and West Asia.
    • Challenge in West Asia: In West Asia, the challenge for India is how to manage its membership of the Second Quad (India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the U.S.) with the conflicting interests of different players in the region.
    • Limits to balancing: There is a limit to the kind of balancing act that India can perform, whether it be with regard to buying S-400 missile systems from Russia, risking potential sanctions from Washington under Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) or manoeuvering between the Arab States, Israel, Iran and the U.S. in West Asia.

    Conclusion

    Facing a host of unprecedented challenges, India’s leaders and diplomats must not only take stock of the dangers that exist but also be ready on how to manage the risks that are well evident.

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