Subject: International Relations

Context

When Prime Minister Narendra Modi hosts the five Central Asia leaders at the Republic Day Parade on January 26, it will send a strong signal — of the new prominence of the Central Asian region in India’s security calculations.

Why India needs effective continental policy

• Factors intensifying geopolitical competition: China’s assertive rise, withdrawal of forces of the United States/North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) from Afghanistan, the rise of Islamic fundamentalist forces, the changing dynamics of the historic stabilising role of Russia (most recently in Kazakhstan) and related multilateral mechanisms — the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, and the Eurasian Economic Union — have all set the stage for a sharpening of the geopolitical competition on the Eurasian landmass.
• Progress in ties: India’s continental strategy, in which the Central Asian region is an indispensable link, has progressed intermittently over the past two decades — promoting connectivity, incipient defence and security cooperation, enhancing India’s soft power and boosting trade and investment.
• It is laudable, but as is now apparent, it is insufficient to address the broader geopolitical challenges engulfing the region.
• To meet this challenge, evolving an effective continental strategy for India will be a complex and long-term exercise.

Leveraging maritime power

• India’s maritime vision and ambitions have grown dramatically during the past decade, symbolised by its National Maritime Strategy, the Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) and major initiatives relating to the Indo-Pacific and the Quad, in which maritime security figures prominently.
•  It was also a response to the dramatic rise of China as a military power.
• Importance: Maritime security is important to keeping sea lanes open for trade, commerce and freedom of navigation, resisting Chinese territorial aggrandisement in the South China Sea and elsewhere, and helping littoral states resist Chinese bullying tactics in interstate relations.
• However, maritime security and associated dimensions of naval power are not sufficient instruments of statecraft as India seeks diplomatic and security constructs to strengthen deterrence against Chinese unilateral actions and the emergence of a unipolar Asia.
• Bulwarks against Chinese maritime expansionist gains are relatively easier to build and its gains easier to reverse than the long-term strategic gains that China hopes to secure on continental Eurasia.
• Centrality of Central Asia: Like Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) centrality is key to the Indo-Pacific, centrality of the Central Asian states should be key for Eurasia.

Challenges for India

1] Connectivity challenge

• Connectivity means nothing when access is denied through persistent neighbouring state hostility contrary to the canons of international law.
• India has been subject for over five decades to a land embargo by Pakistan that has few parallels in relations between two states that are technically not at war.
• Lack of alternative route: Difficulties have arisen in operationalising an alternative route — the International North-South Transport Corridor on account of the U.S.’s hostile attitude towards Iran.
• With the recent Afghan developments, India’s physical connectivity challenges with Eurasia have only become harder.
• The marginalisation of India on the Eurasian continent in terms of connectivity must be reversed.

2] India must be aware of the limitations of the US

• The ongoing U.S.-Russia confrontation relating to Ukraine, Russian opposition to future NATO expansion and the broader questions of European security including on the issue of new deployment of intermediate-range missiles, following the demise of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty will have profound consequences for Eurasian security.
• The U.S. would be severely stretched if it wanted to simultaneously increase its force levels in Europe and the Indo-Pacific.
• A major conflict — if it erupts in Central Europe, pitting Russia, Ukraine and some European states — will stall any hopes of a substantial U.S. military pivot to the Indo-Pacific. 
• India should be cognisant of the limitations of geography, obvious gaps between strategic ambition and capacity but also the inherently different standpoints of how major maritime powers view critical questions of continental security.
• India is unique as no other peer country has the same severity of challenges on both the continental and maritime dimensions.

Way forward for India

• India would need to acquire strategic vision and deploy the necessary resources to pursue our continental interests without ignoring our interests in the maritime domain.
• This will require a more assertive push for our continental rights — namely that of transit and access, working with our partners in Central Asia, with Iran and Russia, and a more proactive engagement with economic and security agendas ranging from the SCO, Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).
• Striking the right balance between continental and maritime security would be the best guarantor of our long-term security interests.

Conclusion

India will need to define its own parameters of continental and maritime security consistent with its own interests. In doing so, at a time of major geopolitical change, maintaining our capacity for independent thought and action will help our diplomacy and statecraft navigate the difficult landscape and the choppy waters that lie ahead.

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Context

Nearly 20 months after the border crisis began in Ladakh, China has pressed on with aggressive diplomatic and military gestures against India.

Recent anti- India moves by China

• Beijing recently renamed 15 places in Arunachal Pradesh, following the six it had done in 2017.
• China justifies the renaming as being done on the basis of its historical, cultural and administrative jurisdiction over the area — these old names existed since ancient times which had been changed by India with its “illegal occupation”.
• On January 1, 2022, Beijing’s new land border law came into force, which provides the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with full responsibility to take steps against “invasion, encroachment, infiltration, provocation” and safeguard Chinese territory.

India’s response

• Delhi has run out of proactive options against Beijing that will force the Chinese leadership to change course on its India policy.
• The two countries have an increasingly lopsided trade relationship driven by Indian dependency on Chinese manufacturing, a situation further worsened by the Government’s mishandling of the novel coronavirus pandemic.
• To restore the status quo ante on the LAC as of April 2020, India undertook internal balancing of its military from the Pakistan border to the China border and external rebalancing through a closer partnership with the United States in the Indo-Pacific.
• Because of the China factor, the U.S. is currently looking away even as India mistreats its minorities and its democracy stands diminished.
•  India’s difficult diplomatic and military engagement with China is going to leave it more dependent on U.S. support, rendering India more vulnerable to American pressure on ‘shared values’.
• With a rising China as its neighbour and a more self-centred U.S. – which is uncomfortable with India’s reliable partner, Russia — as its friend, Delhi continues to face difficult choices.

Conclusion

Put under the harsh glare, India has been found wanting in its ability to deal with future challenges. The immediate challenge, however, remains China. It cannot be wished away and must be tackled.

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Context

The latest in the series of aggressive Chinese actions is the use of lawfare through the passing of the “Land Boundary Law” on October 21 which became effective this week.

Background of the Chinese approach

• The last residue of the Qing dynasty was wiped out in the 1911 revolution when China was established as a republic.
• The republic was again overthrown in 1949 by the Chinese Communist Party.
• Three successive Chinese governments in China refused to delineate or demarcate the boundary with either Tibet or India.
• British archival records, many declassified points to attempts made by Imperial Britain to formally formulate a boundary with China.
• Yet, all three regimes were united in their refusal to accept a formal limiting of China’s territorial expanse and kept their response ambiguous.
• Even during the Simla Convention of 1913-14, when the Republic was ascendant in China, there was a vehement refusal to recognise any demarcation of boundaries between Tibet and China.

Strong-arm tactics against India

• Having operated from a maximalist position to settle its borders with 12 of its 14 neighbours so far, China has attempted to use the same strong-arm tactics with both India and Bhutan.
• It has offered to forgo its claims in the larger parts of North Bhutan in lieu of gaining a relatively smaller area in West Bhutan.
• Threat to Siliguri corridor: This seeming magnanimity is calculated to expand into the Chumbi Valley in the South, threatening the narrow and strategic Siliguri corridor in India.
• In its latest move, China has made a new claim on Sakteng sanctuary in Bhutan which may form a launchpad for future operations against Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh.
• China has also strengthened its collusion with Pakistan.
• There is a deliberate attempt by China to physically link with Pakistan in the Northern Areas by removing the Indian wedge of DBO, the doorway to the Karakoram Pass.
• A Training Mobilisation Order (TMO) issued by Xi Jinping in January 2020 called for “confrontational training” for its troops and officers to assess their preparedness, especially in light of the new reforms undertaken by the PLA.
• These factors seem to be the tactical beginnings of China’s grand strategy which also saw China flexing in the South China Sea and Taiwan, almost simultaneously.

China making use of lawfare and implications for India

• The latest in the series of aggressive Chinese actions is the use of lawfare through the passing of the “Land Boundary Law”.
• Formalises and legalises land Chinese grab: The law formalises and legalises China’s geographic creep towards Tawang, Arunachal Pradesh and parts of eastern Ladakh and creates conditions for using newly-constructed border villages close to the LAC for claiming sovereignty over disputed areas.
• The import of the law is most critical for India but will affect China’s disputes with other countries too.
• What China has done, therefore, is convert a territory dispute over borders into a sovereignty dispute which precludes any give or take of territory.
• China will attempt to settle its Han population in the Tibetan regions, reversing established demographic patterns and at the same time.
•  Future negotiations over territory, if they occur, will then refer to the Border Defence Cooperation Agreements of 2005 and 2012 which call for border settlements to be done keeping in mind the local population in the border regions.

Way forward

• A deliberate thought process needs to be evolved to offset our disadvantages as purely military actions may not solve the situation in the long term.

Conclusion

What emerges clearly is that by adopting the Land Boundary Law, in conjunction with its physical actions on the LAC, China has consolidated its position in eastern Ladakh and kept possibilities open in Arunachal Pradesh.

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Context

The visit by United States Secretary of State  Antony J. Blinken to Southeast Asia in December 2021 underscores the importance that is being accorded to this region by the Joe Biden administration.

Take aways from the visit

[1] Projecting the US as reliable partner

• The idea was to present the U.S. as a reliable partner in meeting the challenges that the Indo-Pacific region is facing.
• For instance, completely aware that the Southeast Asian nations are averse to choosing sides in this U.S.-China competition, Mr. Blinken made it a point to mention that “individual countries will be able to choose their own path and their own partners.

[2] Tackling China challenge

• Both China and the U.S. are trying to lure the Association of Southeast Asian Nation (ASEAN) countries to their side — China with its grand economic infrastructure investment deals and the U.S. through recent high profile official visits as well as through the Build Back Better World initiative and Blue Dot Network.
• In Southeast Asia, the U.S.-China competition is most visible in two areas; one is the South China Sea and the second is the investment in fulfilling the infrastructure development needs of Southeast Asian countries.
• The U.S. has continued its Freedom of Navigation operations in the disputed waters of the South China Sea.
• In his remarks in Indonesia, Mr. Blinken stressed America’s determination “to ensure freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, where Beijing’s aggressive actions there threaten the movement of more than $3 trillion worth of commerce every year”.

[3] Closing the gap on infrastructure

• Southeast Asia has been one of the top recipients of Chinese investments under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
• How these investments have driven countries such as Cambodia and Laos to do China’s bidding in the ASEAN even at the cost of compromising ASEAN’s unity is a known fact.
• Mr. Blinken reiterated that the U.S. remains committed to help close the gap on infrastructure.
• The infrastructure coordination group launched by the Quad members is seeking to catalyse even more investment and is looking to partner with Southeast Asia on infrastructure and many other shared priorities.
• Washington is promising to do more under the Build Back Better World initiative and the Blue Dot Network.

Way forward

• The ASEAN countries, even after the release of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, do not have a uniform approach when it comes to dealing with the U.S. and China.
• These differing approaches are also challenging the much vaunted ASEAN centrality in the Indo-Pacific.
• Though external players will have a limited role in ensuring that the unity within ASEAN is restored, providing proper alternative models of investments for development in sectors such as infrastructure, digital economy, supply chain, and health for the Southeast Asian nations will be critical.

Conclusion

The economic framework, investment plans and promises outlined need to be made operational quickly if Washington is to show that it is indeed serious about sustained commitment toward the Indo-Pacific.

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Context

In 2021, Indian diplomacy was characterised by a readiness to deal with friends and foes alike.

Challenges faced by India diplomacy in 2021

• The US leadership change: Coping with the change from President Donald Trump to President Joe Biden and the consequent changes in U.S. policy were big enough to keep the world leaders on tenterhooks.
• Pandemic:  With the increased onslaught of the pandemic, India suddenly became the epicentre of the tragedy.
• The exposure of the inefficiency of India’s health system and put the country in the defensive and weakened its credibility as it tried to contribute to the resolution of global issues.
• Aggression by China: For India, the biggest preoccupation of 2021 was the effort to get China to disengage in areas in Ladakh.
• Dialogue, military preparedness and economic pressure met with limited success.
• Afghanistan crisis: Afghanistan turned out to be a bigger crisis than expected, with the Taliban’s walkover in Kabul.
• Bringing some civility to the Taliban in Kabul became a high priority in the face of a Pakistan-China-Taliban axis with some support from Russia and Iran.
• Issue of permanent membership of the UN Security Council: Unprecedented in the history of the UN, an event at the Security Council was chaired by the Prime Minister.
• Significant inputs were provided during discussions on issues like maritime security, peacekeeping and anti-terrorism for active consideration in the future.
• Although it is illusory to believe that the way has been cleared for India’s permanent membership of the Security Council, India’s diplomatic capabilities and its commitment to the UN have demonstrated yet again.

What marks the change in the style of Indian diplomacy?

• From selective alignment, India moved to universal engagement, even to the extent of convening meetings with antagonists.
• Engagements with the U.S. went beyond familiarisation with the new government to increased commitment to Quad and acceptance of AUKUS and formation of the ‘western Quad’, with the U.S., Israel and the UAE.
• Engagement with Russia: Major agreements were signed with Russia, despite the American threat of CAATSA against S-400 missiles and the Russian inclination to align with China in the days to come.
• The engagement with China at the level of commanders and diplomats was intense, and ministerial interaction continued even when China tore up many fundamental agreements that sustained the dialogue for many years.
• Patience, diligence and firmness: India attended a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting, where a sub-group led by China took its own decisions on Afghanistan.
• We also attended a meeting of Russia, China and India.
• Perhaps because of the unique geopolitical situation, India gave particular importance to its presidency of the UN Security Council in August 2021.
• Engagement with Myanmar: The Foreign Secretary’s visit to Myanmar to engage the military junta at a time when opposition leaders are in prison may raise eyebrows in many countries, but this is another instance of India’s readiness to engage those in power to explore possibilities of friendship and co-operation.
•  The intention is to prevent China from having a field day in Myanmar.

Conclusion

Sadly, the extraordinary efforts made by India have not been fruitful in the cases of China and Afghanistan.  But India’s new style of diplomacy will have an impact in shaping the world of the future.

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