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Subject: International Relations

  • Visualizing the Himalaya with other coordinates

    A conceptual audit of questions related to geopolitics and security concerns while talking or thinking about the Himalaya is perhaps long overdue.

    About the Himalayas

    • The Himalayas are a mountain range in South and East Asia separating the plains of the Indian subcontinent from the Tibetan Plateau.
    • The range has many of Earth’s highest peaks, including the highest, Mount Everest, at the border between Nepal and China.
    • Lifted by the subduction of the Indian tectonic plate under the Eurasian Plate, the Himalayan Mountain range runs west-northwest to east-southeast in an arc 2,400 km.
    • It consists of parallel mountain ranges: the Sivalik Hills on the south; the Lower Himalayan Range; the Great Himalayas, which is the highest and central range; and the Tibetan Himalayas on the north.
    • The Karakoram are generally considered separate from the Himalayas.

    Identity of Himalayas: Only as a frontier

    • We have been examining the Himalaya mainly through the coordinates of geopolitics and security while relegating others as either irrelevant or incompatible.
    • In a certain sense, our intellectual concerns over the Himalaya have been largely shaped by the assumption of fear, suspicion, rivalry, invasion, encroachment and pugnacity.
    • If during colonial times it was Russophobia, then now it is Sinophobia or Pakistan phobia that in fact determines our concerns over the Himalayas.
    • Ironically it is the Delhi-Beijing-Islamabad triad, and not the mountain per se, that defines our concerns about the Himalayas.

    A national Himalaya

    • Border issues has given birth to the political compulsion of territorializing the Himalaya on a par with the imperatives of nationalism.
    • Thus the attempt to create a national Himalaya by each of the five nations (Nepal, Bhutan, India, Pakistan, and Tibet/China) fall within this transnational landmass called the Himalaya.

    India and the Himalayas

    • India’s understanding of the Himalayas is informed by a certain kind of realism, as it continues to remain as space largely defined in terms of sovereign territoriality.
    • It may be perceived that such an alternative conceptualization of Himalayas is not only possible but also necessary.

    Various initiatives

    • National Mission on Himalayan Studies: It is a classic case in point that provides funds for research and technological innovations, but creating policies only for the Indian Himalayan Region (IHR).

    A historical logjam of territorialization

    • The Himalayas territorialization bears a colonial legacy which also sets up its post-colonial destiny as played out within the dynamics of nation-states.
    • The arbitration of relationships between and among the five nation-states falling within the Himalayan landmass has failed to transcend.
    • The lines of peoplehood and the national border never coincided; thus, it was bound to give birth to tensions while working out projects predicated upon national sovereignty.
    • Given this historical logjam, what we can only expect is the escalation of territorial disputes as the immediate fallout.

    Borders and their differences

    • It needs to be recognized that political borders and cultural borders are not the same things.
    • Political borders are to be considered as space-making strategies of modern nation-states that do not necessarily coincide with cultural borders.
    • It needs to be realized that the domain of non-traditional security (cases of ecological devastation, climate change) is equally important.

    Conclusion

    • The Himalaya is a naturally evolved phenomenon should be understood through frameworks that have grown from within the Himalaya.
    • Viewing the Himalayas as a space of political power is a violent choice, which actually enriched ultra-sensitivity towards territorial claims and border management.

  • Needed, a more unified Asian voice for Afghanistan

    Context

    As the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) end their presence in Afghanistan and set off a churn in the neighbourhood, Central Asia is emerging as a key player.

    Challenges India faces in playing a leading role in Afghanistan

    • Events of the past few years, and the decisions of Russia, the US and China have kept India out of a leading role in Afghanistan.
    • India’s original hesitation in opening talks with the Taliban has cut India out of the current reconciliation process.
    • India’s efforts to build on trade with Afghanistan, shore up development projects and increase educational and training opportunities for Afghan youth have been appreciated, but these cannot grow bigger due to a number of factors.
    • The end of any formal dialogue between India and Pakistan since 2016 and trade since 2019, have resulted in Pakistan blocking India’s over-land access to Afghanistan.
    • India’s alternative route through Chabahar, though operational, cannot be viable or cost-effective also long as U.S. sanctions on Iran are in place.
    • India’s boycott of the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2017, and now tensions at the Line of Actual Control make another route to Afghanistan off-limits.
    • The U.S. has announced a formation of a “Quad” on regional connectivity — U.S.-Uzbekistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan that does not include India.

    Why Central Asian countries are interested in Afghanistan?

    • The hope is that the Central Asian window, with the “Stans” (five Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan) will open new possibilities for India.
    • Calculations of Central Asian neighbours are three-fold:
    • The first is that prosperity for these land-locked countries can only flow from access through Afghanistan to the closest ocean, i.e. the Indian Ocean.
    • Second, that all transit through Afghanistan depends on guarantees of safe passage from the Taliban, backed by the group’s mentors in Pakistan.
    • Third, each of the “Stans” are now a part of China’s BRI, and tying their connectivity initiatives with Beijing’s will bring the double promise of investment and some modicum of control over Pakistan.

    Way forward for India

    • Given the odds, India’s room for manoeuvre with these five countries on Afghanistan appears limited but not without hope.
    • Work on common concerns: To begin with, India and the Central Asian States share common concerns about an Afghanistan overrun by the Taliban.
    • Their common concerns are the worries of battles at their borders, safe havens for jihadist terror groups inside Afghanistan and the spill-over of radicalism into their own countries.
    • Support financially: It is necessary for India to work with them, and other neighbours to shore up finances for the government in Kabul, particularly to ensure that the government structure does not collapse.
    • Cooperation on anti-terrorism: As part of the SCO’s Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), India must also step up its engagement with the Central Asian countries on fighting terror.
    • India can support the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) in terms of airpower.
    • Better ties between neighbours: South Asia must learn from Central Asia’s recent example in knitting together this region more tightly, a task that can only be completed with better ties between India and Pakistan.
    • India’s furtive discussions with the Taliban leadership in Doha make little sense unless a less tactical and more strategic engagement with Pakistan is also envisaged.

    Conclusion

    Countries of Central Asia and South Asia need to find a more unified voice, as they have in recent weeks. Afghanistan’s future will affect both regions much more than it will the distant global powers that currently dominate the debate.

  • South China Sea Dispute

     

    Pentagon chief has said that Beijing’s expansive claims in the South China Sea have “no basis in international law”, taking aim at China’s growing assertiveness in the hotly contested waters.

    South China Sea Dispute

    • It is a dispute over territory and sovereignty over ocean areas, and the Paracels and the Spratlys – two island chains claimed in whole or in part by a number of countries.
    • China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia, and Brunei all have competing claims.
    • Alongside the fully-fledged islands, there are dozens of rocky outcrops, atolls, sandbanks, and reefs, such as the Scarborough Shoal.
    • China claims by far the largest portion of territory – an area defined by the “nine-dash line” which stretches hundreds of miles south and east from its most southerly province of Hainan.
    • Beijing says its right to the area goes back centuries to when the Paracel and Spratly island chains were regarded as integral parts of the Chinese nation, and in 1947 it issued a map detailing its claims.
    • It showed the two island groups falling entirely within its territory. Those claims are mirrored by Taiwan.

    Spat over Chinese claims

    • China has backed its expansive claims with island-building and naval patrols.
    • The US says it does not take sides in territorial disputes but has sent military ships and planes near disputed islands, calling them “freedom of navigation” operations to ensure access to key shipping and air routes.
    • Both sides have accused each other of “militarizing” the South China Sea.
    • There are fears that the area is becoming a flashpoint, with potentially serious global consequences.

  • The convergence and lag in Indo-US partnership

    Context

    As the Indian leadership reviews US ties this week with the visiting Secretary of State, Antony Blinken, a paradox stands out.

    Deepening Indo-US ties

    • India and the US have come a long way since the 1990s.
    • There is growing political and security cooperation, expanding economic engagement, widening interface between the two societies, and the intensifying footprint of the Indian diaspora in the US.
    • Convergence of interests: That ambition, in turn, is based on the unprecedented convergence of Indian and American national interests.
    • Agenda for cooperation: The two countries have already agreed on an ambitious agenda for bilateral, regional and global cooperation.

    Debate in India over Indo-US relation: A paradox

    • The discourse within India’s strategic community continues to be anxious.
    • Some of the questions that animate the media and political classes have not changed since the 1990s.
    • Issues in the debate: Debate focuses on US’s stand on the Kashmir issue, democracy and human rights and its impact on India-US relations.
    • Contradictory fears: There are also contradictory fears such as whether the US extend full support in coping with China.
    • While we expect the US to give guarantees on supporting us, we insist that India will never enter into an alliance with the US.
    • Small state syndrome in India: As India’s relative weight in the international system continues to grow, it creates much room for give and take between India and the US.
    • Yet, a small state syndrome continues to grip the foreign policy elite.
    • The situation is similar on the economic front.
    • Although India is now the sixth-largest economy in the world, there is unending concern about the US imposing globalisation on India.
    • Even as India’s salience for solutions to climate change has increased, India’s debate remains deeply defensive.

    Factors responsible paradox

    • Missing the big picture: The narrow focus on the bilateral precludes an assessment of the larger forces shaping American domestic and international politics.
    • That, in turn, limits the appreciation of new possibilities for the bilateral relationship.
    • Underinvestment in American studies: The problem is reinforced by India’s under-investment in public understanding of American society.
    • Russia and China have put large resources in American studies at their universities and think tanks.
    • The Indian government and private sector will hopefully address this gap in the not-too-distant future.

    Policy shifts unfolding in the US

    • Domestic economic policies: If the economic policy drift in the last four decades was to the right, Biden is moving left on the relationship between the state and the market — on raising taxes, increasing public spending and addressing the problem of sharp economic inequality.
    • Economic policy and globalisation: Biden has also joined Trump in questioning America’s uncritical economic globalisation of the past.
    • If Trump talked of putting America First, Biden wants to make sure that America’s foreign and economic policies serve the US middle class.
    • Foreign policy: Biden has concluded that four decades of America’s uncritical engagement with China must be reconstituted into a policy that faces up to the many challenges that Beijing presents to the US.
    •  Biden is also focused on renewing the traditional US alliances to present a united front against China.
    • He is also seeking to overcome Washington’s hostility to Russia by resetting ties with Moscow.

    Question of democracy and human rights

    • Democracy is very much part of America’s founding ideology.
    • But living up to that ideal at home and abroad has not been easy for the United States over the last two centuries.
    • Delhi and Washington will also have much to discuss on the challenges that new surveillance technologies and big tech monopolies pose to democratic governance.
    • The exclusive American focus on democracy promotion has been rare, costly and unsuccessful.
    • India’s own experience at spreading democracy in its neighbourhood is quite similar.
    • But that discussion is only one part of the expansive new agenda — from Afghanistan to Indo-Pacific, reforming global economic institutions to addressing climate change, and vaccine diplomacy to governing new technologies that beckon India and the United States.

    Conclusion

    As they intensify the bilateral cooperation, the two sides will hopefully turn the Indo-US partnership from a perennial curiosity to a quotidian affair.

  • SAARC

    Context

    Despite the framework SAARC provides for cooperation amongst South Asian nations, it has remained sidelined and dormant since its 18th summit of 2014 in Kathmandu. No alternative capable of bringing together South Asian countries for mutually beneficial diplomacy has emerged.

    Common challenges facing South Asia

    • The region is beset with unsettled territorial disputes, as well as trans-border criminal and subversive activities and cross-border terrorism.
    • The region also remains a theatre for ethnic, cultural, and religious tensions and rivalries besides a current rise in ultra-nationalism
    • Nuclear-armed neighbours India and Pakistan are at loggerheads.
    • US military withdrawal from Afghanistan has fuelled fears of intensification of these trends.

    Significance of SAARC

    • As the largest regional cooperation organisation, SAARC’s importance in stabilising and effectively transforming the region is becoming increasingly self-evident.
    • SAARC is needed as institutional scaffolding to allow for the diplomacy and coordination that is needed between member-states in order to adequately address the numerous threats and challenges the region faces.
    • Though SAARC’s charter prohibits bilateral issues at formal forums, SAARC summits provide a unique, informal window — the retreat — for leaders to meet without aides and chart future courses of action.
    • The coming together of leaders, even at the height of tensions, in a region laden with congenital suspicions, misunderstandings, and hostility is a significant strength of SAARC that cannot be overlooked.
    • In March last year, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi seized the Covid-19 crisis and utilised SAARC’s seal to convene a video conference of SAARC leaders.
    • Such capacity to bring member-states together shows the potential power of SAARC.

    What role SAARC can play in Afghanistan

    • Commitment to get rid of terrorism: The third SAARC summit in 1987 adopted a Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism and updated it in 2004 with the signing of an additional protocol.
    • These instruments demonstrate the collective commitment to rid the region of terror and promote regional peace, stability, and prosperity.
    • Using the network of institutions: In 36 years of existence, SAARC has developed a dense network of institutions, linkages, and mechanisms.
    • SAARC members are among the top troop-contributing countries to UN peacekeeping missions.
    • Joint peacekeeping force: With the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, a joint peacekeeping force from the SAARC region under the UN aegis could be explored to fill the power vacuum that would otherwise be filled by terrorist and extremist forces.

    Consider the question “What role SAARC can play in stabilising the region after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan? Is SAARC still relevant for the region?”

    Conclusion

    Allowing SAARC to become dysfunctional and irrelevant greatly distorts our ability to address the realities and mounting challenges facing SAARC nations.

    Back2Basics: About SAARC

    •  In 1985, at the height of the Cold War, leaders of South Asian nations — namely Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka — created a regional forum.
    • The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established with the goal of contributing “to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another’s problems.”
    • Afghanistan was admitted as a member in 2007.

  • OPEC Reaches Compromise With U.A.E. Over Oil Production

    Context

    The end to the UAE’s weeks-long impasse with Saudi Arabia and Russia, a non-OPEC state, was brought about by Sunday’s deal.

    What was the deal about?

    • United Arab Emirates (UAE), said to hold the world’s largest untapped crude reserves, had demanded an increase in its oil output quotas.
    • The end to the UAE’s weeks-long impasse with Saudi Arabia, one of the world’s biggest crude exporters, and Russia, a non-OPEC state, was brought about by Sunday’s deal.
    • Under its terms, the UAE’s demand for an increase in its oil output quotas, in recognition of its higher production capacity, has been conceded.
    • The baselines have also been raised for Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, and Kuwait.
    • The bloc will now step up crude production by 400,000 barrels a day starting in August.
    • The output boost is in response to rising oil prices in the wake of the rebound in economic activity.
    • The cartel had cut oil production by 9.7 million barrels a day (mbd) as oil demand fell from 100 mbd to 91.1 mbd and prices plummeted from $70 in January 2020 to around $20 in April.

    Strain in Saudi Arabia-UAE relations

    • The UAE has played hardball during the bloc’s attempts to deal with the pandemic-induced price volatility.
    • Thus, while the internal rift has been resolved for now, the danger cannot be ruled out of an increasingly economically and politically assertive UAE flexing its muscle.
    • Bilateral relations between the traditional allies, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have been especially strained since the UAE established diplomatic ties with Israel last year and withdrew troops from the Saudi-spearheaded war in Yemen the year before.
    • A more recent arena of tension is the tariffs Riyadh has imposed on imports from the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council.
    • Saudi Arabia will now exclude from the GCC tariff agreement goods made by companies with a workforce of less than 25% of locals and industrial products with less than 40% of the added value after their transformation process.
    • Home to a predominantly migrant population, the move could hit the UAE especially hard.

    OPEC’s concerns

    • The OPEC, forecast in 2016 that a strict implementation of the Paris climate accord could see the demand for oil peak by 2030.
    • There is an eagerness to maximise the returns on their substantial hydrocarbon resources, amid growing speculation of a peak in oil demand within sight.
    • The International Energy Agency (IEA), which in 2016 forecast a continued rise in oil consumption until the 2040s, has more recently hinted at about a 5% rise or fall relative to the demand before the pandemic within a decade.
    • OPEC’s other concerns are the stabilization of world oil prices without jeopardizing national expenditure programs, and the diversification of economies in anticipation of the unfolding global energy transition.

    Conclusion

    The latest OPEC compromise echoes growing recognition of the delicate balance between competing domestic and global priorities.

    B2BASICS

    OPEC

    • The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is a permanent, intergovernmental organization, created at the Baghdad Conference in 1960, by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela.
    • It aims to manage the supply of oil in an effort to set the price of oil in the world market, in order to avoid fluctuations that might affect the economies of both producing and purchasing countries.
    • It is headquartered in Vienna, Austria.
    • OPEC membership is open to any country that is a substantial exporter of oil and which shares the ideals of the organization.
    • Gabon terminated its membership in January 1995. However, it rejoined the Organization in July 2016.
    • As of 2019, OPEC has a total of 14 Member Countries viz. Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates(UAE), Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Republic of Congo, Angola, Ecuador, and Venezuela are members of OPEC.

     

  • ‘Open talks’ with the Taliban is India’s strategic necessity

    Context

    With over a third of Afghanistan’s more than 400 districts under Taliban control, the talk-to-the-Taliban option is indeed the best of the many less than perfect options available to India.

    India need a reset in its Afghanistan policy

    • India has ‘temporarily’ closed its consulate in Kandahar.
    • This follows the decision to suspend operations in the Indian consulates in Jalalabad and Herat.
    • India’s decision to partially “withdraw” from Afghanistan shows that betting only on the government in Kabul was a big mistake,
    • It also shows that India realises the threat the Taliban poses to Indian assets and presence in Afghanistan.
    • To safeguard its civilian assets there as well as to stay relevant in the unfolding ‘great game’ in and around Afghanistan, India must fundamentally reset its Afghanistan policy.
    • India must, in its own national interest, begin ‘open talks’ with the Taliban before it is too late.
    • Open dialogue with the Taliban should no longer be a taboo; it is a strategic necessity.

    Reason for avoiding open talks with Taliban

    • There are at least five possible reasons why India appears to want to keep the Taliban engagement slow and behind closed doors.
    • First, if India chooses to engage the Taliban directly, it could make Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani, to look towards China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) for national security and personal political survival.
    • Second, India is also faced with the dilemma of who to talk to within the Taliban given that it is hardly a monolith.
    • Third, given the global opprobrium that Taliban faced in its earlier avatar and the lack of evidence about whether the outfit is a changed lot today, New Delhi might not want to court the Taliban so soon.
    • Fourth, there is little clarity about what the Taliban’s real intentions are going forward and what they would do after ascending to power in Kabul.
    • Fifth, it would not be totally unreasonable to consider the possibility of Pakistan acting out against India in Kashmir if India were to establish deeper links with the Taliban.

    Reasons India should engage with the Taliban openly

    • Wide international recognition: Whether we like it or not, the Taliban, is going to be part of the political scheme of things in Afghanistan, and unlike in 1996, a large number of players in the international community are going to recognise/negotiate/do business with the Taliban.
    • Countering Pakistan: The Taliban today is looking for regional and global partners for recognition and legitimacy especially in the neighbourhood.
    • So the less proactive the Indian engagement with the Taliban, the stronger Pakistan-Taliban relations would become.
    • A worldly-wise and internationally-exposed Taliban 2.0 would develop its own agency and sovereign claims including perhaps calling into question the legitimacy of the Durand Line separating Pakistan and Afghanistan, something Pakistan was always concerned about. T
    • The Taliban would want to hedge their bets on how far to listen to Pakistan.
    • That is precisely when New Delhi should engage the Taliban.
    • Security of civilian assets: India needs to court all parties in Afghanistan, including the Taliban if it wants to ensure its security of its civilian assets there.
    • It makes neither strategic nor economic sense to withdraw from Afghanistan after spending over $3 billion, something the Government seems to be prepared to do
    • Being a part of Afghanistan’s future course: If India is not proactive in Afghanistan at least now, late as it is, Russia, Iran, Pakistan and China will emerge as the shapers of Afghanistan’s political and geopolitical destiny, which for sure will be detrimental to Indian interests there.
    • Continental grand strategy:  Backchannel talks with Pakistan and a consequent ceasefire on the Line of Control, political dialogue with the mainstream Kashmiri leadership, secret parleys with Taliban all indicate that India is opening up its congested north-western frontier.
    •  Except for the strategic foray into the Indo-Pacific, India today is strategically boxed in the region and it must break out of it. Afghanistan could provide, if not immediately, India with such a way out.

    Consider the question ” India’s Afghan policy is at a major crossroads; to safeguard its civilian assets there as well as to stay relevant in the unfolding ‘great game’ in and around Afghanistan, New Delhi must fundamentally reset its Afghanistan policy. Comment.” 

    Conclusion

    In the end, India’s engagement with the Taliban may or may not achieve much, but non-engagement will definitely hurt Indian interests.

    Back2Basics: Durand Line

    • Durand Line, boundary established in the Hindu Kush in 1893 running through the tribal lands between Afghanistan and British India, marking their respective spheres of influence.
    • In modern times it has marked the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
    • The acceptance of this line—which was named for Sir Mortimer Durand, who induced ʿAbdor Raḥmān Khān, amir of Afghanistan, to agree to a boundary—may be said to have settled the Indo-Afghan frontier problem for the rest of the British period.

  • China’s role in stabilising Afghanistan

    Context

    Amid the gloom that has enveloped Afghanistan, one hope for many countries has been China’s potential role in stabilising it.

    Factors that call for China to play role in Afghanistan

    • Scope for India-China cooperation: In the past, even India thought that Afghanistan would be a natural area for India and China to work together.
    • But little came out of the understanding after the Wuhan summit in 2018.
    • Northern neighbours: Afghanistan’s northern neighbours, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan all have expanding political and economic ties with China but have traditionally relied on Russia for their security.
    • They might support a larger role for Beijing in Afghanistan in partnership with Russia.
    • Iran, Kabul’s western neighbour, also has deepening ties with China.
    • Bilateral cooperation with the U.S.: Washington, now locked in an escalating confrontation with Beijing, sees Afghanistan as a potential area of bilateral cooperation. 
    • Role of Pakistan: Beijing is indeed critical in Pakistan’s plans for Afghanistan.
    • Afghan leaders have also been eager to draw China’s BRI into their plans for economic modernisation.
    • China was also important for Kabul’s political calculus in limiting Pakistan’s quest for dominance.

    Two challenges in China playing role in stabilising Afghanistan

    1) Caution in Chinese policy

    • The first relates to the deep sources of caution in Chinese policy.
    • Neither the prospect of mining Afghanistan’s natural resources nor the vanity of being the newest superpower will compel China to rush into the Afghan vacuum.
    • China has deep concerns about Taliban’s ideology and its potential role in fomenting instability in its restive Muslim-majority province, Xinjiang. 
    • Beijing cannot depend on its special relationship with the Pakistan army to ensure the security of China’s frontiers as well as its investments in Afghanistan.
    •  The growing attacks on CPEC projects in Pakistan, underline the difficulty of pursuing economic development amid endemic violence.

    2) Priorities of Taliban

    • The second set of problems relate to the priorities of Taliban.
    • It remains to be seen whether the economic development of Afghanistan is a top priority for the Taliban or not.
    • Also, is it open to let in foreign capital and all the baggage that comes with it?
    • More fundamentally, there is no clarity on the role of economic modernisation in Taliban’s fierce insistence on the creation of an Islamic emirate in Afghanistan.

    Conclusion

    It is against this backdrop that the chances of China playing a major role in stabilising Afghanistan remain slim.

  • Explained: India’s Afghan investment

    As the Taliban push ahead with military offensives across Afghanistan, preparing to take over after the exit of US and NATO forces, India faces a situation in which it may lose all its stakes.

    India-Afghan ties

    • After a break between 1996 and 2001, when India joined the world in shunning the previous Taliban regime (only Pakistan, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia kept ties).
    • One-way New Delhi re-established ties with the country in the two decades after the 9/11 attacks was to pour in development assistance, under the protective umbrella of the US presence.
    • India built vital roads, dams, electricity transmission lines and substations, schools and hospitals, etc. India’s development assistance is now estimated to be worth well over $3 billion.
    • And unlike in other countries where India’s infrastructure projects have barely got off the ground or are mired in the host nation’s politics, it has delivered in Afghanistan.

    A soft corner

    • Afghanistan is vital to India’s strategic interests in the region.
    • It is also perhaps the only SAARC nation whose people have much affection for India.
    • Taliban takeover would mean a reversal of nearly 20 years of rebuilding a relationship that goes back centuries.

    Projects across the country

    [1] SALMA DAM

    • Already, there has been fighting in the area where one of India’s high-visibility projects is located — the 42MW Salma Dam in Herat province.
    • The hydropower and irrigation project, completed against many odds and inaugurated in 2016, is known as the Afghan-India Friendship Dam.
    • In the past few weeks, the Taliban have mounted attacks in nearby places, killing several security personnel.
    • The Taliban claim the area around the dam is now under their control.

    [2] ZARANJ-DELARAM HIGHWAY

    • The other high-profile project was the 218-km Zaranj-Delaram highway built by the Border Roads Organisation. Zaranj is located close to Afghanistan’s border with Iran.
    • With Pakistan denying India overland access for trade with Afghanistan, the highway is of strategic importance to New Delhi, as it provides an alternative route into landlocked Afghanistan through Iran’s Chabahar port.

    [3] AFGHAN PARLIAMENT

    • The Afghan Parliament in Kabul was built by India at $90 million.
    • It was opened in 2015; PM Modi inaugurated the building.
    • A block in the building is named after former PM AB Vajpayee.

    [4] STOR PALACE

    • In 2016, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and PM Modi inaugurated the restored Stor Palace in Kabul, originally built in the late 19th century.
    • It is famous for the 1919 Rawalpindi Agreement by which Afghanistan became an independent country.

    [5] POWER INFRA

    • Other Indian projects in Afghanistan include the rebuilding of power infrastructure such as the 220kV DC transmission line from Pul-e-Khumri, the capital of Baghlan province to the north of Kabul.
    • Indian contractors and workers also restored telecommunications infrastructure in many provinces.

    [6] HEALTH INFRA

    • India has reconstructed a children’s hospital it had helped build in Kabul in 1972 —named Indira Gandhi Institute for Child Health in 1985 — that was in shambles after the war.
    • ‘Indian Medical Missions’ have held free consultation camps in several areas.
    • Thousands who lost their limbs after stepping on mines left over from the war have been fitted with the Jaipur Foot.
    • India has also built clinics in the border provinces of Badakhshan, Balkh, Kandahar, Khost, Kunar, Nangarhar, Nimruz, Nooristan, Paktia and Paktika.

    [7] TRANSPORTATION

    • According to the MEA, India gifted 400 buses and 200 mini-buses for urban transportation, 105 utility vehicles for municipalities, 285 military vehicles for the Afghan Army.
    • It also gave three Air India aircraft to Ariana, the Afghan national carrier, when it was restarting operations.

    [8] OTHER PROJECTS

    • India has contributed desks and benches for schools, and built solar panels in remote villages, and Sulabh toilet blocks in Kabul.
    • New Delhi has also played a role in building capacity, with vocational training institutes, scholarships to Afghan students, mentoring programmes in the civil service, and training for doctors and others.

    Various ongoing project

    • India had concluded with Afghanistan an agreement for the construction of the Shatoot Dam in Kabul district, which would provide safe drinking water to 2 million residents.
    • Last year, India pledged $1 million for another Aga Khan heritage project, the restoration of the Bala Hissar Fort south of Kabul, whose origins go back to the 6th century.
    • Bala Hissar went on to become a significant Mughal fort, parts of it were rebuilt by Jahangir, and it was used as a residence by Shah Jahan.

    Bilateral trade

    • Despite the denial of an overland route by Pakistan, the India-Afghanistan trade has grown with the establishment in 2017 of an air freight corridor.
    • In 2019-20, bilateral trade crossed $1.3 billion.
    • The balance of trade is heavily tilted — exports from India are worth approximately $900 million, while Afghanistan’s exports to India are about $500 million.
    • Afghan exports are mainly fresh and dried fruit.
    • Some of this comes overland through the Wagah border; Pakistan has permitted Afghan trade with India through its territory.
    • Indian exports to Afghanistan take place mainly through government-to-government contracts with Indian companies.
    • Exports include pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, computers and related materials, cement, and sugar.
    • Trade through Chabahar started in 2017 but is restricted by the absence of connectivity from the port to the Afghan border.

  • Regional powers and the Afghanistan question

    Context

    A regional conclave of foreign ministers taking place in Dushanbe this week under the banner of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) should give us a sense of the unfolding regional dynamic on Afghanistan.

    SCO addressing challenges in Afghanistan

    • Geography, membership and capabilities make the SCO an important forum to address the post-American challenges in Afghanistan.
    • The SCO was launched 20 years ago by China and Russia to promote inner Asia stability. 
    • The current members of the SCO are China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and India.
    • The SCO has four observer states — Iran, Afghanistan, Mongolia and Belarus.
    • The idea of a regional solution to Afghanistan has always had much political appeal.
    • But divergent regional strategic perspectives limit the prospects for a sustainable consensus on Afghanistan.

    Implications of the US exit for the region

    • The quiet satisfaction in Moscow, Beijing, Tehran and Rawalpindi at the US’s exit from Afghanistan, however, is tinged by worries about the long-term implications of Washington’s retreat
    • Regional players have to cope with the consequences of the US withdrawal and the resurgence of the Taliban.
    • Neither Moscow nor Beijing would want to see Afghanistan becoming the hub of international terror again under the Taliban.
    • For China, potential Taliban support to the Xinjiang separatist groups is a major concern.
    • Iran can’t ignore the Sunni extremism of the Taliban and its oppressive record in dealing with the Shia, and Persian-speaking minorities.
    • Pakistan worries about the danger of the conflict spilling over to the east of the Durand Line, and hostile groups gaining sanctuaries in Afghanistan.

    Three factors that drive India’s Afghan policy

    • The US exit means a new constraint on Delhi’s ability to operate inside Afghanistan.
    • There is also the danger that Afghanistan under the Taliban could also begin to nurture anti-India terror groups.
    • If India remains active but patient, many opportunities could open up in the new Afghan phase.
    • Three structural conditions will continue to shape India’s Afghan policy.
    • One is India’s lack of direct physical access to Afghanistan.
    • This underlines the importance of India having effective regional partners.
    • Second, it remains to be seen if Pakistan’s partnership with China and the extension of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor into Afghanistan can address Pakistan’s inability to construct a stable and legitimate order in Afghanistan.
    • Third, the contradiction between the interests of Afghanistan and Pakistan is an enduring one.
    • While many in Pakistan would like to turn Afghanistan into a protectorate, Afghans deeply value their independence.
    • All Afghan sovereigns, including the Taliban, will inevitably look for partners to balance Pakistan.

    Way forward for India

    • India must actively contribute to the SCO deliberations on Afghanistan, but must temper its hopes for a collective regional solution.
    • At the same time, Delhi should focus on intensifying its engagement with various Afghan groups, including the Taliban, and finding effective regional partners to secure its interests in a changing Afghanistan.

    Conclusion

    India should pursue the regional solution to Afghanistan challenge after the US exit while increasing the engagement with the various players in Afghanistan including the Taliban.