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Subject: International Relations

  • 60 Years of Antarctic Treaty

    The 1959 Antarctic Treaty (wef 1961) recently celebrated its 60th anniversary.

    Antarctic Treaty

    • The Antarctic Treaty and related agreements are collectively known as the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS).
    • It regulates international relations with respect to Antarctica, Earth’s only continent without a native human population.
    • For the purposes of the treaty system, Antarctica is defined as all of the land and ice shelves south of 60°S latitude.
    • The treaty entered into force in 1961 and currently has 54 parties.
    • The treaty sets aside Antarctica as a scientific preserve, establishes freedom of scientific investigation, and bans military activity on the continent.
    • The treaty was the first arms control agreement established during the Cold War.
    • India is a signatory of this treaty since 1983.

    Why is it significant?

    • Negotiated during the middle of the Cold War by 12 countries with Antarctic interests, it remains the only example of a single treaty that governs a whole continent.
    • It is also the foundation of a rules-based international order for a continent without a permanent population.

    Key provisions

    • The treaty is remarkably short and contains only 14 articles.
    • Principal provisions include promoting the freedom of scientific research, the use of the continent only for peaceful purposes, and the prohibition of military activities, nuclear tests and the disposal of radioactive waste.

    What the treaty says about territorial claims

    • The most important provision of the treaty is Article IV, which effectively seeks to neutralise territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.
    • For the Antarctic territorial claimants, this meant a limit was placed on making any new claim or enlargement of an existing claim.
    • Likewise, no formal recognition was given to any of the seven territorial claims on the continent, by Argentina, Australia, Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway and the United Kingdom.
    • Russia, the United States and China — signatories with significant Antarctic interests who have not formally made territorial claims — are also bound by the limitations of Article IV.
    • And one sector of Antarctica is not subject to the claim of any country, which effectively makes it the last unclaimed land on earth.
    • The treaty also put a freeze on any disputes between claimants over their territories on the continent.

    How the treaty has expanded

    • Though the compact has held for 60 years, there have been tensions from time to time.
    • Argentina and the UK, for instance, have overlapping claims to territory on the continent.
    • When combined with their ongoing dispute over the nearby Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, their Antarctic relationship remains frosty.
    • Membership of the treaty has grown in the intervening years, with 54 signatories today.

    Where to from here?

    • While the Antarctic Treaty has been able to successfully respond to a range of challenges, circumstances are radically different in the 2020s compared to the 1950s.
    • Antarctica is much more accessible, partly due to technology but also climate change.
    • More countries now have substantive interests in the continent than the original 12.
    • Some global resources are becoming scarce, especially oil.

    Answer this PYQ:

    Q.The term ‘IndARC’, sometimes seen in the news, is the name of:

    (a) An indigenously developed radar system inducted into Indian Defence

    (b) India’s satellite to provide services to the countries of Indian Ocean Rim

    (c) A scientific establishment set up by India in Antarctic region

    (d) India’s underwater observatory to scientifically study the Arctic region

    Back2Basics: Indian Antarctic Program

    • The Indian Antarctic Program is a multi-disciplinary, multi-institutional program under the control of the National Centre for Polar and Ocean Research, Ministry of Earth Sciences.
    • It was initiated in 1981 with the first Indian expedition to Antarctica.
    • The program gained global acceptance with India’s signing of the Antarctic Treaty and subsequent construction of the Dakshin Gangotri Antarctic research base in 1983 superseded by the Maitri base from 1989.
    • The newest base commissioned in 2012 is Bharati, constructed out of 134 shipping containers.

    Various missions

    In 1981 the Indian flag unfurled for the first time in Antarctica, marking the start of Southern Ocean expeditions under the environmental protocol of the Antarctic Treaty (1959).

    (1) Dakshin Gangotri

    The first permanent settlement was built in 1983 and named Dakshin Gangotri. In 1989 it was excavated and is being used again as supply base and transit camp. It was decommissioned in the year 1990 after half of it got buried under the ice.

    (2) Maitri

    The second permanent settlement, Maitri, was put up in 1989 on the Schirmacher Oasis and has been conducting experiments in geology, geography and medicine. India built this station close to a freshwater lake around Maitri known as Lake Priyadarshini.

    (3) Bharati

    Located beside Larsmann Hill at 69°S, 76°E, Bharati is established in 2015.  This newest research station for oceanographic research will collect evidence of continental breakup to reveal the 120-million-year-old ancient history of the Indian subcontinent.

    (4) India Post Office in Antarctica

    It was established in the year 1984 during the third Indian expedition to Antarctica. It was located at Dakshin Gangotri. This post office was indeed situated in a stunning location and it was more than just a post office. An interesting fact about this place is that as many as 10,000 letters were posted and canceled in this post office in total in the first year of its establishment.

  • Bhutan’s Tax Inspectors Without Borders (TIWB) Programme

    Tax Inspectors Without Borders (TIWB) programme has been recently launched.

    TIWB Program

    • TIWB is a joint initiative of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
    • India was chosen as the Partner Jurisdiction and has provided the Tax Expert for this programme.
    • It aims to aid Bhutan in strengthening its tax administration by transferring technical know-how and skills to its tax auditors, and through sharing of best audit practices.
    • The focus of the programme will be in the area of International Taxation and Transfer Pricing.
    • This programme is another milestone in the continued cooperation between India and Bhutan and India’s continued and active support for South-South cooperation.

  • Why does China consistently beat India on soft power?

    The article compares India with China in terms of soft-power both countries exert based on the measures produced by Lowy Institute in Australia.

    What is soft power?

    • Joseph Nye, who gave us the notion of soft power, suggests that it consists of foreign policy, cultural and political influence.
    • Foreign policy influence comes from the legitimacy and morality of one’s dealings with other countries.
    • Cultural influence is based on others’ respect for one’s culture.
    • Political influence is how much others are inspired by one’s political values.
    • Soft power is difficult to measure.

    The Lowy Institute in Australia has produced various measures which correspond roughly to foreign policy influence, cultural influence and political influence.

    1) India’s foreign policy influence

    • In diplomatic influence, overall, India ranks sixth and China ranks first among 25 Asian powers.
    • On networks, India nearly matches China in the number of regional embassies it has but is considerably behind in the number of embassies worldwide (176 to 126).
    • Multilaterally, India matches China in terms of regional memberships, but, crucially, its contributions to the UN capital budget are completely dwarfed by Chinese contributions (11.7 per cent to 0.8 per cent of the total).
    • In surveys of foreign policy leadership, ambition, and effectiveness, China ranks first or fourth on four measures while India ranks between fourth and sixth in Asia.

    2) Cultural influence

    • Lowy’s overall measure of cultural influence ranks India in fourth place and China in second place in Asia.
    •  Cultural influence is then divided into three elements, of which “cultural projection” and “information flows” are the most important.
    • In cultural projection, India scores better on Google searches abroad of its newspapers and its television/radio broadcasts.
    • India also exports more of its “cultural services” defined as “services aimed at satisfying cultural interests or needs”.
    • China does better on several other indicators.
    • For instance, India has only nine brands in the list of the top 500 global brands whereas China lists 73.
    • On the number of UNESCO World Heritage sites, India has 37 while China has 53.
    • Respect for the Indian passport also lags.
    • Chinese citizens can travel visa-free to 74 countries while Indians can only do so to 60.
    • In terms of information flows, in 2016–17, India hosted a mere 24,000 Asian students in tertiary education institutions whereas China hosted 2,25,000.
    • On total tourist arrivals from all over the world, India received 17 million, while China received 63 million.

    3) Political influence

    • In 2017 the two were not ranked that far apart in political influence.
    • The governance effectiveness index shows India scoring in the top 43 per cent countries worldwide and ranked 12th and China scoring in the top 32 per cent and ranked 10th.
    • On “political stability and absence of violence/terrorism”, India ranked 21st, and China ranked 15th.

    Consider the question “What do you understand by the term soft-power? How would you assess India’s soft-power potential in terms of various parameters?”

    Conclusion

    Soft-power theorists suggest that the ability to persuade rests on the power of attraction. We in India may think we are more attractive than China. The numbers show otherwise.

  • What is Chicago Convention of 1944?

    A private commercial flight was forced to make an emergency landing in Minsk by a MiG-29 fighter jet of Belarus.  The incident received considerable global attention.

    How justified was Belarus in taking such a decision?

    • The answer lies at the junction of Belarus’s domestic laws as a sovereign country and international laws governing the action that states can legitimately take to deal with threats to security, real or perceived.
    • The issue of the use of military aircraft to neutralize potential threats posed by civilian aircraft acquired a different kind of urgency in the aftermath of terrorist attacks in the US on September 11, 2001.
    • Generally speaking, international law grants sovereignty to nations over their airspace as it does in territorial waters.

    The Chicago Convention of 1944

    • The Convention on International Civil Aviation, better known as the Chicago Convention of 1944, to which Belarus is a signatory state, prohibits any unlawful intervention against a civilian aircraft.
    • At the same time, it has various provisions under Article 9 which permit a sovereign state the right to impose restrictions.
    • This includes enforced landings at a designated airport in its territory, in “exceptional circumstances or during a period of emergency, or in the interest of public safety”.
    • Once a flight has landed, Article 16 provides the host country the right to board/search the aircraft.
    • This is probably the clause that provided cover for the local authorities to board Mr. Morales’s aircraft in Austria in 2013.
    • But the Chicago Convention applies only to civilian aircraft of the contracting parties.

    Other such laws

    • International law might also have to be examined in light of the International Air Services Transit Agreement (IASTA), also concluded in Chicago in 1944.
    • According to this agreement, contracting states grant to one another the freedom of air transit in respect of scheduled international air services, that is, the privilege to fly across territories without landing.
    • Belarus is not a signatory of IASTA.

  • Russia-China Relations and its effects on India-Russia Relations

    The article highlights Russia’s increasing inclinations towards China and its implications for India.

    Context

    Russian President Vladimir Putin has recently asserted that both the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, and the Chinese President, Xi Jinping, are “responsible” enough to solve issues between their countries, while underlining the need to debar any “extra-regional power” to interfere in the process.

    Implications for India-Russia ties

    • By this remark, Russia expects India to give up all efforts to reverse Beijing’s encroachment strategies.
    • The remarks can only be seen as reinforcing China’s claim that the Quadrilateral or Quad is aimed at containing China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific region.
    • Russia’s continued criticism of the Indo-Pacific and the Quad suggests the divergent perspectives of India and Russia on how to deal with China’s rise to global prominence.
    • While India needs Russia’s partnership for its defence needs, India cannot endorse the Russian perspective on the Indo-Pacific and the Quad
    • The Russian attitude toward China’s growing power and influence will be the touchstone of Russia’s relations with India.
    • Russia has rejected the Indo-Pacific construct in favour of the Asia-Pacific on the ground that the first is primarily an American initiative designed to contain both China and Russia.
    • With the rise of populist nationalism amidst the decline of globalisation, the resolution of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute appears a difficult task.

    Background of India’s balancing strategies

    • Following the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), India soon realised Russia was much weaker than the erstwhile USSR and incapable of helping India balance potential threats from Beijing. 
    • On the other hand, Russia began to cast Moscow as the leader of a supposed trilateral grouping of Russia-India-China against a U.S.-led unipolar world.
    • Russia became an early proponent of the ‘strategic triangle’ to bring together the three major powers.
    • India’s fear of the unipolar moment too made it easier for India to become part of this initiative.
    • But China’s dismissive attitude toward Indian capabilities, coupled with an emerging China-Pakistan nexus, prevented the success of this trilateral.
    • India, instead, invested its diplomatic energies in rapprochement with the United States.
    • Thus, India decided to get integrated in the economic order it once denounced.
    • Economic liberalisation also allowed India to buy sophisticated weapons from a wider global market that included suppliers such as Israel and France.
    • As the logic of intensive engagement with the West was effectively established, strategic partnership with the U.S. was a logical corollary.
    • India has been searching for other major powers to balance against China as it does not have the sufficient means for hard balancing.
    • India has deepened its ties with Japan and Australia in a way that is close to soft balancing. 
    •  among all of India’s balancing efforts, the stupendous growth in ties with the U.S. has been the greatest source of concern for China which views the India-U.S. rapprochement as containment.

    Way forward for India-Russia ties

    • While other powers such as France, Australia, Japan and Russia will have an impact on the emerging maritime structures of the Indo-Pacific region, it is the triangular dynamic between India, China and the U.S. that is going to be the most consequential.
    • Russia is yet to realise that it will gain immensely from the multilateralism that the Indo-Pacific seeks to promote.
    • Being China’s junior partner only undermines Moscow’s great-power ambitions.
    • Given Russia’s preoccupation with ‘status’ rivalry with the U.S., Russia’s view of India-China relations seems understandable.
    • But there is a danger in permitting it to harden into a permanent attitude as an increasingly pro-Beijing Russia might adopt more aggressive blocking of India’s policy agendas.
    • That is why India is particularly interested in a normalisation of relations between Washington and Moscow.
    • The normalisation of relations between the U.S. and Russia will help India steer ties among the great powers.

    India-China ties

    • Non-alignment, painful memories of colonial subjugation, opposition to great-power hegemony, and strong beliefs in sovereignty and strategic autonomy have been the key influencers in shaping India’s and China’s engagement with each other as well as the western world.
    •  But this has begun to change as Beijing is asserting its hegemony over Asia.
    • In such circumstances, multilateral forums such as the Russia-India-China (RIC) grouping and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) have little practical value for Indian diplomacy.
    • Without China’s reciprocity, options before India are limited.
    • The response cannot be just symbolic or rhetorical. The absence of any material evidence of reciprocity is bound to doom an attempt at Sino-Indian rapprochement.

    Conclusion

    China is undoubtedly the most powerful actor in its neighbourhood but it cannot simply have its way in shaping Asia’s new geopolitics.

  • NATO and China

    In a communiqué issued following the June 14 summit of its member-states in Brussels, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for the first time, explicitly described China as a security risk.

    Try answering this question:

    Q.NATO has been an ideal vehicle for power-projection around the world by the US. Critically comment.

    China as a global threat

    • China has never figured in NATO summit declarations before, except for a minor reference in 2019 to the “opportunities and challenges” it presented.
    • But China’s stated ambitions and assertive behaviour present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to NATO security.
    • China has reacted sharply. It has urged NATO to view China’s development rationally, stop exaggerating various forms of China threat theory.
    • The other two threats identified by the NATO communiqué are on predictable lines: Russia and terrorism.

    Focus over two nations

    • There is a significant difference, however, between a strategic focus on countering Russia and casting China as a “systemic challenge”.
    • This goes back to NATO’s founding mandate and subsequent history.

    What is NATO, btw?

    • NATO, the planet’s largest — and largest-ever — military alliance, was formed in 1949 by 12 Allied powers to counter the massive Soviet armies stationed in Eastern and Central Europe after Second World War.
    • According to Paul-Henri Spaak, the second Secretary-General of NATO, it was, ironically enough, Joseph Stalin who is the true father of NATO.
    • It was Stalin’s overreach — especially with the Berlin blockade of 1948-49 and the orchestrated coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948 — that convinced a diverse set of war-ravaged European nations to come together under an American security blanket.
    • The collective defence principle enshrined in NATO’s Article V states that “an attack against one ally is considered as an attack against all allies”.
    • The formation of NATO, and its Soviet counterpart, the Warsaw Pact, in 1955, inaugurated the Cold War era.

    NATO and its relevance now

    • NATO was completely successful in its mission of protecting the “Euro-Atlantic area” from Soviet expansion and preventing war between the two superpowers.
    • When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, questions were raised about NATO’s relevance and future.
    • Since the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) became irrelevant when the Communist bloc disappeared, one cannot justify the continuation of a military alliance formed to protect Europe from Communist expansion.

    Post-Cold War era mandate of NATO

    • Its bureaucracy succeeded in refashioning NATO for the post-Cold war era.
    • The refashioning rested on a paradigm shift — from collective defence, which implied a known adversary, to collective security, which is open-ended, and might require action against any number of threats.
    • The threat included unknown ones and non-state actors.
    • In other words, the elimination of one threat to Europe — communist Russia — did not necessarily mean that security risks to Europe have vanished.

    Why dismantle a beneficial arrangement

    • Another factor in the persistence of NATO is that, like all successful alliances, it has been a mutually beneficial arrangement.
    • For Europe, it was an attractive bargain where, in exchange for a marginal loss in autonomy, it enjoyed absolute security at a cheap price.
    • Not having to spend massively on defence allowed Europe to focus on building powerful economies and invest its surplus in a strong welfare state.
    • NATO also offered the added bonus of keeping Germany down — historically a major factor for peace and stability in the region.

    An effective American weapon

    • For the US, NATO has been an ideal vehicle for power projection around the world — in places beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya.
    • It views NATO as a tool to ensure the primacy of American interests across the globe.
    • Unsurprisingly, NATO’s post-Cold War role has evolved in tandem with U.S. foreign policy priorities.
    • The NATO doctrine of “enlargement”, which Russia calls “expansion”, is essentially about extending the American military footprint by bringing in new members.
    • That is how NATO’s membership today stands at 30, having added 14 members between 1999 and 2020.

    The final truth

    • The Biden administration wants to mobilize NATO member-states behind its larger objective of containing China.
    • NATO’s European member states may view China as an economic rival and adversary, but they are unconvinced by the American line that it is an outright security threat.
    • This line also, in a way, points to the underlying logic behind NATO’s persistence in the post-Soviet world.
    • Unlike the Soviet Union, China offers no alternative vision of society that could make Western capitalism insecure.
    • In fact, its own economy is already deeply integrated into Western markets. China, nonetheless, is perceived as posing a ‘threat’.
    • It remains to be seen how far an ageing Europe would be willing to commit itself to a strategic path that prefers confrontation to collaboration like the US.

    Also read:

    India & NATO

  • A new era of partnership in social innovations that can benefit all South Asians

    Pandemic know no borders. So, dealing with it has necessited global cooperation. The article introduce us to some of the cross-country collaborations in dealing with the pandemic, igniting the hope for new era social partnership to the advantage of South Asia.

    Regionally-coordinated strategy against pandemic

    • Containing Covid pandemic has necessitated global cooperation.
    • The deadly pandemic surge in 2021 makes a regionally coordinated, evidence-driven strategy critical.
    • It is necessary to construct multi-stakeholder regional coalitions to devise new solutions and frugal innovations that can be applied across South Asia.
    • Given our shared and mostly similar social, economic and cultural contexts, local successes must be amplified across South Asia.
    • Despite wide variation in how nations have responded to the pandemic, the most successful strategies find commonality in their adherence to science and attention to local context.

    How successful interventions could be applied across the subcontinent

    • Beliefs, priorities, traditions and aversions to behavioural change are more similar across South Asia.
    • This means that interventions that are successful in changing behaviour in one place are highly likely applicable in other parts of the subcontinent.
    • For example, Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) campaigns to solve the problem of open defecation, developed by Bangladeshi NGOs in partnership with an Indian consultant is now broadly applied across South Asia and beyond.
    • The Grameen Bank microcredit model was an indigenous South Asian innovation that spread rapidly.
    • India’s digitised social protection ecosystem with Aadhaar ids and Jan Dhan accounts serves as a model for the region.

    Changing social norm around mask-wearing

    • The new pan-South Asian consortium in response to Covid-19 evolved out of an experiment conducted in Bangladesh around mask-wearing in rural communities termed as NORM.
    • It was observed that a combination of no-cost distribution, information, reinforcing the message, modeling and endorsement by community leaders (NORM) leads to large, sustained increases in mask usage.
    • NORM implementation teams based in Lahore, Ahmedabad, Peshawar, Hyderabad, Dhaka, Kathmandu and Delhi are learning from each other’s successes and failures.
    • The Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) quickly implemented the model to reach over one million members in Gujarat.
    •  Additional 1.5 million masks were shipped from Bangladesh to support SEWA’s outreach to other states.
    • Lahore’s commissioner worked with the research team to adapt the NORM model to an urban setting.
    • To manage mild and moderate cases of Covid-19 in rural India, where institutional health care access is limited a host of physicians, scientists and community-based organisations created the Swasth Community Science Alliance.
    • The Masking-Treatment-Vaccine Preparation (MTV) approach offers a sensible strategy to mitigate the pandemic until universal vaccination is achieved.

    Conclusion

    We need to come together to solve problems that affect us all. Let the lasting legacy of this pandemic be a new era of partnership in social innovations that can benefit all South Asians.

  • G7 Open Societies Pact on Universal Rights

    India has signed off on a joint statement by G-7 and guest countries on “open societies” that reaffirm and encourage the values of “freedom of expression, both online and offline, as a freedom that safeguards democracy and helps people live free from fear and oppression”.

    What is the Open Societies Pact?

    • The ‘Open Societies Statement’ was adopted at the end of an outreach session titled ‘Building Back Together—Open Societies and Economies’, where PM Modi was invited as a lead speaker.
    • The joint statement was signed by the G-7 countries, and India, South Korea, Australia and South Africa, with host British Prime Minister Boris Johnson calling them “Democracies 11”.
    • It refers to “politically motivated internet shutdowns” as one of the threats to freedom and democracy.
    • It affirms “human rights for all, both online and offline, as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other HR instruments, and opposition to any form of discrimination, so that everyone can participate fully and equally in society”.

    Why needs such a pact?

    • Democracy and freedom were a part of India’s civilizational ethos”.
    • However, the common concern is that open societies are particularly vulnerable to disinformation and cyber-attacks.

    Impact of the pact

    • While the statement is directed at China and Russia, India has been under scrutiny over Internet curbs in Jammu and Kashmir.
    • Moreover, the center is locked in a face-off over its new IT rules with tech giants such as Twitter, which described a police search at its offices in India last month as a “potential threat to freedom of expression”.

  • The road from Galwan, a year later

    What happened in Galwan?

    • The Indian and Chinese armies are engaged in the standoff in Pangong Tso, Galwan Valley, Demchok and Daulat Beg Oldie in eastern Ladakh.
      • A sizable number of Chinese Army personnel even transgressed into the Indian side of the de-facto border in several areas including Pangong Tso.
      • The actions on the northern bank of Pangong Tso are not just for territorial gains on land, but enhanced domination of the resource-rich lake.
    • The stand-off at Ladakh’s Galwan Valley has escalated in June 2020 due to the infrastructure projects that India has undertaken in the recent years. India is building a strategic road through the Galwan Valley – close to China – connecting the region to an airstrip.
      • China is opposed to any Indian construction in the area. In 1962, a stand-off in the Galwan area was one of the biggest flashpoints of the 1962 war.
    • The border, or Line of Actual Control, is not demarcated, and China and India have differing ideas of where it should be located, leading to regular border “transgressions.” Often these don’t escalate tensions; a serious border standoff like the current one is less frequent, though this is the fourth since 2013.
      • Both countries’ troops have patrolled this region for decades, as the contested 2,200-mile border is a long-standing subject of competing claims and tensions, including a brief war in 1962.
    • Reasons: The violent clash happened when the Chinese side departed from the consensus to respect the LAC and attempted to unilaterally change the status quo.
      • It is part of China’s ‘nibble and negotiate policy’. Their aim is to ensure that India does not build infrastructure along the LAC. It is their way of attaining a political goal with military might, while gaining more territory in the process.

    The current situation in Ladakh

    •  With a continued deployment of 50,000-60,000 soldiers, the Indian Army has been able to hold the line to prevent any further ingress by the PLA.
    • There has been no progress in talks after the disengagement at Pangong lake and Kailash range in February.
    • Outside of Ladakh, the Indian Army remains in an alert mode all along the LAC to prevent any Chinese misadventure but the bigger change has been its reorientation of certain forces from Pakistan border towards the China border.
    • The Ladakh crisis has also exposed India’s military weakness to tackle a collusive threat from China and Pakistan.

    External balancing

    • To deal with the threat of combined China and Pakistan, the Government opened backchannel talks with Pakistan which led to the reiteration of the ceasefire on the Line of Control.
    • The Ladakh crisis has also led the Government to relook external partnerships, particularly with the United States.
    • The U.S. military officials have earlier spoken of the intelligence and logistics support provided to the Indian forces in Ladakh.
    • The military importance of the Quad remains moot, with India reportedly refusing to do joint naval patrolling with the U.S. in the South China Sea, the two treaty allies of the U.S., Japan and Australia, also refused.

    Challenges for India

    • India attempts to counter the growing Chinese influence in the neighbourhood have faltered, exacerbated by the mishandling of the second wave of the novel coronavirus pandemic.
    • With the widening power gap between New Delhi and Beijing, the challenge is as much economic as it is geopolitical.
    • Despite the border crisis and the Indian restrictions on Chinese technology companies, China displaced the U.S. to be India’s biggest trade partner in 2020-21, up to nearly 13% of India’s total trade compared to 10.4% a year ago.
    • For the past few decades, Indian planners operated on the premise that their diplomats will be able to manage the Chinese problem without it developing into a full-blown military crisis.
    • Militarily, Chinese incursions in Ladakh have shown that the idea of deterrence has failed.
    • India has learnt that it can no longer have simultaneous competition and cooperation with China.
    • A new reset in bilateral ties, àla the early 1990s, is difficult because China is now in a different league, competing with the U.S.

    Conclusion

    The events of the past one year have significantly altered India’s thinking towards China. The relationship is at the crossroads now. The choices made will have a significant impact on the future of global geopolitics.

    B2BASICS

    Line of Actual Control

    • Demarcation Line: The Line of Actual Control (LAC) is the demarcation that separates Indian-controlled territory from Chinese-controlled territory.
    • LAC is different from the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan:
      • The LoC emerged from the 1948 ceasefire line negotiated by the United Nations (UN) after the Kashmir War.
      • It was designated as the LoC in 1972, following the Shimla Agreement between the two countries. It is delineated on a map signed by the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) of both armies and has the international sanctity of a legal agreement.
      • The LAC, in contrast, is only a concept – it is not agreed upon by the two countries, neither delineated on a map or demarcated on the ground.
    • Length of the LAC: India considers the LAC to be 3,488 km long, while the Chinese consider it to be only around 2,000 km.

  • A template for Indian engagement with the West

    The article highlights the significance of the recent G-7 summit for India.

    India’s engagement with the West

    • Two important messages emerge from India’s participation in G-7 with the members of the G-7 and three other invited guests — Australia, South Africa and South Korea.
    • First is that India is a “natural ally” of the G-7 and its partners.
    • The other is the emphasis on shared democratic values that bind India with the West.
    • The two ideas are certainly not new to India’s foreign policy, but they acquire special importance at the current juncture.
    • In the last few years, India embarked on an expansive engagement with Europe.
    • This G-7 summit can be seen as the beginning of an institutionalisation of India’s cooperation with the West.

    What makes this G-7 Summit different from the past Summits?

    • China factor: After the 2008 financial crisis, the more representative G-20, which includes China, Russia, India and many others, seemed to supersede the G-7.
    • But amidst the growing sense that China has gamed the global economic order to America’s disadvantage, there has been renewed interest in like-minded coalitions like the G-7.
    • Widening the base of G-7: There is also the recognition of the case for widening the base of institutions like the G-7 beyond the geographic West to include large democracies like India.
    • Coalition of democracies: The case for a “coalition of democracies” was certainly gaining ground over the last two decades within American academia and the political class.
    • But economic globalisation and the absence of great power rivalry meant there was no compelling policy urgency to construct an “alliance of democracies”.
    • That condition has altered radically in the last few years amidst the growing US tensions with China and Russia. 

    Dealing with the challenges presented by China

    • U.S. President Biden declared his main objective as rallying democracies to meet the great challenges of our time, especially those presented by China.
    • G-7 summit has responded to Biden’s call in the following forms:
    • 1) By offering the outline of a potential alternative to China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative.
    • 2)By calling for a reorientation of global supply chains away from China.
    • 3) By demanding a fresh inquiry into the origins of the Covid-19 pandemic in China.
    • 4) By reprimanding Beijing policies in Xinjiang and Hong Kong.
    • 5) By raising concerns about the conflict across the Taiwan Strait.
    • However, there is a strong view that the door must be kept open for engagement with China on issues like climate change while calling out its unacceptable policies.

    India’s relations with China: New context for engagement with West

    • The rupture in the US engagement with China coincides with the rapid deterioration in India’s relations with China.
    • This also sets up a new context for India’s partnership with the West.
    • If the Indo-Pacific provides a regional basis for India’s engagement with the US and Europe, mitigating climate change and the management of the Covid-19 pandemic provides a global template for India’s engagement with the West.

    Way forward

    • The case for renewal and reform of democratic institutions is urgent in both the US and India.
    • So is the need for sustained consultations between India and its Western partners on a range of new challenges presented by digital technologies, including radicalisation, disinformation, electoral interference, cyber-attacks and the role of large social media companies. 
    • The statement on open societies provides a sound basis for such an engagement.

    Conclusion

    India must begin institutionalisation of its relationship with the West and increase its engagement on various common issues including the China challenge.