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Subject: International Relations

  • Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs)

    Indian Navy is scheduled to hold another Passage Exercise (PASSEX) with the US to undertake Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOP).

    Try this question:

    Q.What do you mean by Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs)? What are its legal backings?  Discuss its significance.

    Freedom of Navigation Operations

    • FONOPs are closely linked to the concept of freedom of navigation, and in particular to the enforcement of relevant international law and customs regarding freedom of navigation.
    • Freedom of navigation has been thoroughly practised and refined, and ultimately codified and accepted as international law under UNCLOS, in a legal process that was inclusive and consent-based.
    • The drafting of UNCLOS was driven in part by states’ concerns that strong national maritime interests could lead to excessive maritime claims over coastal seas, which could threaten freedom of navigation.
    • FONOPs are outgrowths of this development of international law, based on sovereign equality and international interdependence.

    Significance of FONOPs

    • FONOPs are a method of enforcing UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) and avoiding these negative outcomes by reinforcing freedom of navigation through practice.
    • It is exercised by sailing through all areas of the sea permitted under UNCLOS, and particularly those areas that states have attempted to close off to free navigation as defined under UNCLOS.

    Back2Basics: UNCLOS

    • The Law of the Sea Treaty formally known as the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was adopted in 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It entered into force in 1994.
    • The convention establishes a comprehensive set of rules governing the oceans and to replace previous U.N. Conventions on the Law of the Sea
    • The convention defines the distance of 12 nautical miles from the baseline as Territorial Sea limit and a distance of 200 nautical miles distance as Exclusive Economic Zone limit.

  • Greater Male Connectivity Project (GMCP)

    Following up on India’s announcement of a $500 million package to the Maldives, the Exim Bank of India and the Maldives’s Ministry of Finance signed an agreement for $400 million in Male.

    Try this question from 2014:

    Q.Which one of the following pairs of islands is separated from each other by the ‘Ten Degree Channel’?

    (a) Andaman and Nicobar

    (b) Nicobar and Sumatra

    (c) Maldives and Lakshadweep

    (d) Sumatra and Java

    Greater Male Connectivity Project

    • The GMCP consists of a number of bridges and causeways to connect Male to Villingili, Thilafushi and Gulhifahu islands that span 6.7 km.
    • It would ease much of the pressure of the main capital island of Male for commercial and residential purposes.
    • When completed, the project would render the Chinese built Sinamale Friendship bridge connecting Male to two other islands, thus far the most visible infrastructure project in the islands.
    • At present, India-assisted projects in the region include water and sewerage projects on 34 islands, reclamation project for the Addl island, a port on Gulhifalhu, airport redevelopment at Hanimadhoo, and a hospital and a cricket stadium in Hulhumale.

  • Deterrence in Australia-China Ties

    Australia and China’s cordial economic ties, established over the last three decades, have been soured this year over several points of friction.

    Try this question

    Q. Discuss the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (or the Quad) and its purpose to establish “Asian Arc of Democracy”.

    Various points of friction

     (1) Australia’s Covid-19 inquiry

    • Australia’s appeal for an independent global inquiry into the origins and initial response of Covid-19 created fury in Beijing.
    • China alleged that Australia was teaming up with the US to spread “anti-China propaganda”.

    (2) Tension over journalists

    • The second diplomatic spat began with the detention of an Australian news anchor based in Beijing by the Chinese authorities after she was suspected of “criminal activities” that endangered China’s national security.
    • The Australian government said the journalist was held under “residential surveillance” at an unknown location.
    • Following this, the journalists sought refuge in Australian diplomatic missions, as they were not allowed to leave the country.

    (3) Ideological issues

    • The two countries have also been at loggerheads on other ideological issues previously too.
    • After reports of China keeping Uighur Muslims in state-run detention camps surfaced, Australia was swift to respond and expressed “deep concern” over the “human rights situation.”
    • Australia also supported Hong Kong’s autonomy cause. It decided to extend visas for Hong Kong residents.
    • In both instances, China responded staunchly and asked Australia to not meddle in its “internal matters.”

    (4) Economic dependence

    • China is Australia’s largest trading partner in terms of both exports and imports.
    • China’s share in Australia’s exports reached a record A$117 billion, or 38 per cent, in 2019, more than any other country.
    • Australian sectors like mining, tourism, education benefit from trade with China. China even imports products such as milk, cheese, wine and meat.
    • Over the years, it has been increasing its investment in Australian infrastructure and real estate products too.

  • H-1B visa amid the U.S. elections

    Trump administration’s two moves on the visa could have implication for both  India and corporate America. It needs to be seen whether the situations will remain the same after the Presidential elections in the U.S.

    Context

    • The U.S. President announced a hike in the salaries for those arriving in the U.S. on H-1B or skilled-worker visas.

    Implications for India

    • This hike is expected to cut visa applications by around 33%.
    • Trump administration has in its earlier executive actions banned the issuance of new skilled worker visas and new green cards.
    • India’s export of services to the U.S. is estimated to be at $29.6 billion in 2018, 4.9% more than in 2017, and 134% more than 2008 levels.
    • The U.S. has been issuing 85,000 H-1B visas annually, of which 20,000 are given to graduate students and 65,000 to private sector applicants, approximately 70% of which are granted to Indian nationals.
    • The visa issuance ban, combined with the mandatory salary floor soon to be instituted, will seriously hit U.S. imports of services from India.

    Criticism of the move

    • A federal judge in the Northern District of California blocked the enforcement of the new visa ban, ruling that the President “exceeded his authority” under the U.S. Constitution.
    • Google CEO hit out at the ban, saying, “Immigration has contributed immensely to America’s economic success, making it a global leader in tech, and also Google the company it is today.”

    Consider the question “What makes the H-1B visa important for India? What are the implications of the recent rise in the salary floor by the U.S. for the visa on India?”

    Conclusion

    While the ban and floor limit on salary come in the election milieu, India should prepare for the after election scenario.

  • Confusion on what the Quad is and its future

    The article analyses the basics of India’s foreign policy and its implications for the Quad.

    Context

    • There is confusion on what the Quad is and its future in India’s international relations.
    • Sustaining that confusion is the proposition that India is abandoning non-alignment in favour of a military alliance with the US in order to counter the China threat.

    4 Question on Quad’s future and India’s role

    1) What is the nature of alliance?

    • Alliances involve written commitments to come to the defence of the other against a third party.
    • Working of alliance varies according to the distribution of power within the members of an alliance and the changing nature of the external threat.
    • Alliances come in multiple shapes and forms — they could be bilateral or multilateral, formal or informal and for the long-term or near term.
    • Alliances feature in India’s ancient strategic wisdom and contemporary domestic politics in India.
    • Yet, when it comes to India’s foreign policy, alliances are seen as a taboo.
    • Part of the problem is that India’s image of alliances is frozen in the moment when India became independent.
    • After the Second World War, a newly independent India did not want to be tied down by alliances of the Cold War.
    • That notion is seen as central to Indian worldview.

    2) Does India forge alliances?

    • Contrary to conventional wisdom, India has experimented with alliances of different kinds.
    • During the First World War, some nationalists aligned with Imperial Germany to set up the first Indian government-in-exile in Kabul.
    • In the Second World War, Subhas Chandra Bose joined forces with Imperial Japan to set up a provisional government.
    • Policy of non-alignment among the great powers also did not rule out alliances in a different context.
    • For example, when Bhutan, Nepal and Sikkim turned to Delhi for protection amidst Maoist China’s advance into Tibet during 1949-50, Nehru signed security treaties with them.
    • India turned to the US for military support to cope with the Chinese aggression in 1962.
    • Indira Gandhi signed a security cooperation agreement with the Soviet Union in 1971 to cope with the crisis in East Pakistan.
    • Then, as now, there was much anxiety in Delhi about India abandoning non-alignment.
    • India does do alliances but the question is when, under what conditions and on what terms.

    3)  Is the US offering India an alliance against China?

    • The current political discourse in Washington is hostile to alliance-making.
    • President Donald Trump does not miss an opportunity to trash US alliances.
    • In any case, formal commitments do not always translate into reality during times of war.
    • Even within the long-standing US military alliances with Japan and the Philippines, there is much legal quibbling over what exactly is the US’s obligation against, say, Chinese aggression.
    • In case of the Quad, it is quite clear that Washington is not offering a military alliance, nor is Delhi asking for one.
    • Because it knows India has to fight its own wars.
    • Both countries, however, are interested in building issue-based coalitions in pursuit of shared interests.

    4) Instrumental nature of alliance

    • Agreements for security cooperation are made in a specific context and against a particular threat.
    • When those circumstances change, security treaties are not worth the paper they are written.
    • Consider India’s security treaties with Nepal, Bangladesh and Russia.
    • The 1950 Treaty was designed to protect Nepal against the Chinese threat.
    • Now, Nepali communists have long argued that the Treaty is a symbol of Indian hegemony.
    • India’s 1972 security treaty with Bangladesh did not survive the 1975 assassination of the nation’s founder, Mujibur Rahman.
    • India’s own enthusiasm for the 1971 treaty with Moscow waned within a decade.
    • Today Beijing is Moscow’s strongest international partner, a reality that has a bearing on India’s strategic partnership with Russia.

    What India can learn from China about alliances

    • Mao aligned with the Soviet Union after in 1949 and fought the Korean War against the US during 1950-53.
    • He broke from Russia in the early 1960s and moved closer to the US in the 1970s.
    • Mao, who denounced US alliances in Asia, was happy to justify them if they were directed at Russia.
    • He also welcomed Washington’s alliance with Tokyo as a useful means to prevent the return of Japanese nationalism and militarism.
    • Having benefited from the partnership with the US, China is trying to push America out of Asia and establish its own regional primacy.
    • Delhi could learn from Beijing in not letting the theological debates about alliances cloud its judgements about the extraordinary economic and security challenges India confronts today.

    Conclusion

    The infructuous obsession with non-alignment diverts Delhi’s policy attention away from the urgent task of rapidly expanding India’s national capabilities in partnership with like-minded partners.

  • Conference on Disarmament (CD)

    India has supported the holding of negotiations on a Comprehensive Nuclear Weapons Convention at the Conference on Disarmament (CD). It reiterated its commitment to the disarmament of nuclear weapons in a step-by-step non-discriminatory process.

    List out various factors which are preventing the nuclear disarmaments amongst the nations.

    About the Conference on Disarmament (CD)

    • The CD is a multilateral disarmament forum established by the international community to negotiate arms control and disarmament agreements based at the Palais des Nations in Geneva.
    • The Conference meets annually in three separate sessions in Geneva.
    • The Conference was first established in 1979 as the Committee on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community.
    • It was renamed the Conference on Disarmament in 1984.

    Recent developments from India

    • India has not revised its key principles regarding the weapons in its arsenal.
    • Raksha Mantri has earlier hinted at a possibility of changing the No First Use (NFU) principle by declaring that ‘circumstances’ will determine the “No First Use” stance.

    India stands committed

    • India believes that nuclear disarmament can be achieved through a step-by-step process underwritten by a universal commitment and an agreed multilateral framework.
    • India remains convinced of the need for meaningful dialogue among all states possessing nuclear weapons, for building trust and confidence.
    • India also remains committed to negotiations regarding a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty in the CD on the basis of the report of the Special Coordinator or CD/1299 which dates to March 24, 1995.

    B2BASICS

    India’s No first use doctrine

    For India, Nuclear weapons are political weapons and not weapons of war and their sole purpose is to deter the use of nuclear weapons by India’s adversaries. India has nit only established itself as a responsible nuclear state, but guided the world about how to be a responsible nuclear state through No first use policy.

    Features of India’s nuclear doctrine:

    1. Building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent.
    2. A “No First Use” policy i.e. nuclear weapons to be used only in case of any nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere.
    3. Non use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states.
    4. Nuclear retaliatory attacks to be authorised only by civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority.
    5. Nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage.
    6. India may retaliate with nuclear weapons to retaliate against attack  with biological or chemical weapons.
    7. Strict controls on export of nuclear and missile related materials and technologies.
    8. A commitment to goal of nuclear weapon free world.

  • Quad

    The article discusses the future course of action for the Quad and issues it faces in the present circumstances.

    Evolution of the Quad

    • In 2007, the Quad (the United States, Japan, India, and Australia) was an idea whose time had not yet come.
    • The global financial crisis was yet to happen as America continued to enjoy its ‘unipolar moment’.
    • The American still expected China to become a ‘responsible stake-holder’.
    • America required Chinese goodwill in handling issues with North Korea and Iran, and the War on Terror.
    • Japan and Australia were riding the China Boom to prosperity.
    • If India was ambivalent at the time, it was because this mirrored the uncertainties of others.

    China’s reaction and naval expansion

    • When the idea of Quad was barely on the table; the Chinese, labelled it as an Asian version of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
    • The real reason for China’s hyperreaction was out of concern that such a grouping would “out” China’s plans for naval expansion by focusing on the Indo-Pacific maritime space.
    • Once the idea of Quad 1.0 had died down, China advanced a new claim — the Nine-Dash Line — in the South China Sea.
    • It undertook the rapid kind of warship building activity
    • It built its first overseas base in Djibouti.
    • It started systematically to explore the surface and sub-surface environment in the Indian Ocean beyond the Malacca Straits.
    • China’s dismissal of the Arbitral Award in the dispute with the Philippines on the South China Sea and its militarization of the islands has given a second chance to the Quad.

    Quad: A plurilateral mechanism

    • The Quad nations need to better explain that the Indo-Pacific Vision is an overarching framework being discussed in a transparent manner.
    • They should also explain that the objective of Indo-Pacific vision is of advancing everyone’s economic and security interests.
    • The Quad is a plurilateral mechanism between countries that share interest on specific matters.
    • In 2016, China itself established a Quadrilateral Cooperation and Coordination Mechanism with Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan.
    • The Quad is no exception.

    Way forward

    • The forthcoming Ministerial Quad meeting will be an opportunity to define the idea and chart a future path.
    • Needless provocation of China should be avoided.
    • Other countries might be invited to join in the future.
    • An outreach to the Indian Ocean littoral states is especially important since there are reports from some quarters suggesting that India is seeking to deny access to some extra-regional countries through the Indian Ocean.

    Conclusion

    A positive agenda built around collective action in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, monitoring shipping for search and rescue or anti-piracy operations, infrastructure assistance to climatically vulnerable states, connectivity initiatives and similar activities, will re-assure the littoral States that the Quad will be a factor for regional benefit, and a far cry from Chinese allegations that it is some sort of a military alliance.

  • What’s behind the Armenia-Azerbaijan clashes?

    Fresh clashes erupted on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, threatening to push the countries back to war 26 years after a ceasefire was reached.

    Try this PYQ:

    Q.Turkey is located between-

    (a) The Black Sea and Caspian Sea

    (b) The Black Sea and Mediterranean Sea

    (c) Gulf of Suez and the Mediterranean Sea

    (d) Gulf of Aqaba and the Dead Sea

    The conflict

    • The largely mountainous and forested Nagorno-Karabakh, home for some 150,000 people, is at the centre of the conflict.
    • Nagorno-Karabakh is located within Azerbaijan but is populated, mostly, by those of Armenian ethnicity (and mostly Christian compared to the Shia Muslim majority Azerbaijan).
    • The conflict can be traced back to the pre-Soviet era when the region was at the meeting point of Ottoman, Russian and the Persian empires.

    A legacy of soviet era

    • Once Azerbaijan and Armenia became Soviet Republics in 1921, Moscow gave Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan but offered autonomy to the contested region.
    • In the 1980s, when the Soviet power was receding, separatist currents picked up in Nagorno-Karabakh.
    • In 1988, the national assembly voted to dissolve the region’s autonomous status and join Armenia.
    • But Baku suppressed such calls, which led to a military conflict.
    • When Armenia and Azerbaijan became independent countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the clashes led to an open war in which tens of thousands of people were killed.
    • The war lasted till 1994 when both sides reached a ceasefire (they are yet to sign a peace treaty and the border is not clearly demarcated).

    Issue over control

    • By that time, Armenia had taken control of Nagorno-Karabakh and handed it to Armenian rebels. The rebels have declared independence, but have not won recognition from any country.
    • The region is still treated as a part of Azerbaijan by the international community, and Baku wants to take it back.

    What is the strategic significance of the region?

    • The energy-rich Azerbaijan has built several gas and oil pipelines across the Caucasus (the region between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea) to Turkey and Europe.
    • This includes the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline (with a capacity of transporting 1.2 billion barrels a day), the Western Route Export oil pipeline, the Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline and the South Caucasus gas pipeline.
    • Some of these pipelines pass close to the conflict zone (within 16 km of the border). In an open war between the two countries, the pipelines could be targeted, which would impact energy supplies.

    What’s Turkey’s role?

    • Turkey has historically supported Azerbaijan and has had a troublesome relationship with Armenia.
    • In the 1990s, during the war, Turkey closed its border with Armenia and it has no diplomatic relations with the country.
    • The main point of contention between the two was Ankara’s refusal to recognise the 1915 Armenian genocide in which the Ottomans killed some 1.5 million Armenians.
    • On the other end, the Azeris and Turks share strong cultural and historical links. Azerbaijanis are a Turkic ethnic group and their language is from the Turkic family.

    Where does Russia stand?

    • Moscow sees the Caucasus and Central Asian region as its backyard. But the current clashes put President Vladimir Putin in a difficult spot.
    • Russia enjoys good ties with both Azerbaijan and Armenia and supplies weapons to both.
    • But Armenia is more dependent on Russia than the energy-rich, ambitious Azerbaijan. Russia also has a military base in Armenia.
    • But Moscow, at least publicly, is trying to strike a balance between the two. Like in the 1990s, its best interest would be in mediating a ceasefire between the warring sides.

  • Challenges India faces in managing relations in neighbourhood

    The article analyses the inherent challenges India faces in managing good relations with its neighbours.

    Duality challenge

    • Even for the Britishers, it was an unceasing struggle to sustain its primacy in the region.
    • The notion of regional primacy certainly persisted in the Nehru era.
    • Primacy was hard to sustain after Independence even within the immediate neighbourhood.

    Five reasons stand out

    1) Partition of the subcontinent

    • The problems generated by the great division of the Subcontinent on religious lines continue to animate the region.
    • Partition created the challenges of settling boundaries, sharing river-waters, protecting the rights of minorities, and easing the flow of goods and people.
    • The burden of the Subcontinent’s history is not easily discarded.

    2) Unification of China

    • The unification of China amidst the Partition of India had profoundly transformed the geopolitical condition of India.
    • Beyond the bilateral territorial dispute in the Himalayas, the emergence of a large and purposeful state on India’s frontiers was going to be a problem given the ease with which it could constrain Delhi within the Subcontinent.

    3) India’s choice in favour of de-globalisation

    • Independent India’s conscious choice in favour of de-globalisation led to a steady dissipation of commercial connectivity with the neighbours.
    •  India’s economic reorientation since the 1990s and the rediscovery of regionalism did open possibilities for reconnecting with its neighbours.
    • Delhi today is acutely aware of the need to revive regional connectivity.
    • There is much progress in recent years — note, for example, the recent launch of a ferry service to the Maldives or the reopening of inland waterways with Bangladesh.
    • Integrating India’s regional economic and foreign policy remains a major challenge-Consider the recent fiasco of onion exports to Bangladesh.

    4) Rise of political agency in the neighbourhood

    • India ignores the rise of political agency among neighbourhood elites and mass politics that they need to manage.
    • Their imperatives don’t always coincide with those of Delhi.
    • It is unlikely that Delhi can completely insure itself against the intra-elite conflicts in the neighbourhood.

    5) Influence of domestic politics on foreign policy

    • Can India persistently champion Tamil minority rights in Sri Lanka without incurring any costs with the Sinhala majority?
    • But asking that question takes us to India’s own domestic politics.
    • Can Delhi ignore sentiments in India’s Tamil Nadu in making its Sri Lanka policy?
    • Indian Prime Minister did not attend the Colombo Commonwealth Summit in 2013 because of the Tamil minority issue.
    • The Teesta Waters agreement was not concluded due to political reasons.

    Ways forward

    • Timely responses to problems.
    • Preventing small issues from becoming big.
    • Aligning Delhi’s regional economic policy with India’s natural geographic advantages .
    • These are some important elements of any successful management of India’s perennial neighbourhood challenges.

    Conclusion

    There are no easy answers to the regional difficulties that trouble all governments in Delhi. The source of the problem lies in the deeply interconnected nature of South Asian societies administered by multiple sovereigns.

  • UN and the retreat from multilateralism

    As the U.N. enters into 75th year of its existence, it faces several challenges. The article discusses such challenges.

    Challenges to the multilateralism

    1) Withdrawal of the main stakeholders: U.S. and the U.K.

    • The U.S. is withdrawing from multilateralism and so it the U.K.
    • Brexit has shown that nationalism remains strong in Europe.
    • Nevertheless, the most important development is the position of the U.S.
    • The U.S., which created the international system as we know today, is no longer willing to be its “guarantor of last resort”.
    • U.S. President Donald Trump stressed “America First” and suggested that others too should put their countries first.

    2) China’s reluctance

    • China has stepped in to take advantage of the West’s retreat from multilateralism.
    • But China is not embracing the idea of multilateralism.
    • China’s Belt and Road Initiative consists of a series of bilateral credit agreements with recipient countries with no mechanism for multilateral consultation or oversight.
    • The European Union’s and U.S.’s sanctions against Russia have driven it closer to China.
    • Work of the UN Security Council has been affected by the lack of consensus between its permanent members.

    3) Turkey’s interventions

    • Turkey has intervened in Syria, Libya, and the Eastern Mediterranean, which is a breach of international law.
    • The last was a reference to Turkey sending a drilling ship in Greek and Cypriot exclusive economic zones.
    • Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan made a detailed reference to the Jammu and Kashmir issue.
    • As Turkey has assumed the position of UN General Assembly President, statement and its actions matters.

    4) Paucity of resources

    • Over 40 UN political missions and peacekeeping operations engage 95,000 troops, police, and civil personnel. it suffers from a paucity of resources.
    • The UN peacekeeping budget, a little over $8 billion, is a small fraction of the $1.9 trillion military expenditure governments made in 2019.
    •  Most of the humanitarian assistance, developmental work, and budgets of the specialised agencies are based on voluntary contributions.
    • There are calls for increasing public-private partnerships. This is not a satisfactory arrangement.
    • The UN provides ‘public goods’ in terms of peace and development often in remote parts of the world.
    • There may not be enough appetite on the part of corporations. The UN remains an inter-governmental body.

    5) Climate action

    • President Trump mentioned that China’s emissions are nearly twice of those of the U.S.
    • Despite its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the U.S. has reduced its carbon emissions by more than any country in the world.
    • President Xi said that after peaking emissions by 2030, China will achieve carbon neutrality before 2060.
    • President Macron said that he was determined to see the EU agree on a target of achieving carbon neutrality by 2050.

    Consider the question “As the world is facing the retreat from multilateralism, what are the challenges facing the U.N. in the current global order?”

    Conclusion

    What does the UN bring to the developing countries? It gives them greater political space. We need to support reform not only to expand the permanent members’ category of the Security Council but also to revitalise the role of the General Assembly. The retreat from multilateralism would undermine the UN’s capacity to face diverse challenges.