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Subject: International Relations

  • Indo-Pacific region

    As India tries to diffuse the tension along the disputed northern border with China, it must focus on the other potential fronts that China could open. India Ocean could be the next one. This article examines the centrality of the Indian Ocean for China and their approach to the region.

    India’s Indo-Pacific vision

    • This vision is based on our historical associations with this region.
    • This vision also acknowledges the importance of the Indian Ocean in building prosperity in this century.
    • So, the key points of this vision are thus-
    • 1) Inclusiveness, openness and ASEAN centrality and unity.
    • 2) India does not see the Indo-Pacific Region as a strategy or as a club of limited members.
    • 3) It is not directed against any country.

    China should have equal access

    • China is not a littoral state in the Indian Ocean.
    • Historically, Chinese naval activity was limited to the East China Sea, the Bohai Sea, the Yellow Sea, and the South China Sea.
    •  In today’s context, China is the second-largest economy and the world’s largest trading nation.
    • The sea-lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean are vital to her economy and security.
    • Under international law, China should have equal access to the Indian ocean.

    China’s “Malacca Dilemma”

    • China thinks that others would block the Malacca Straits to “contain” the Chinese.
    • So, China has strategized to dominate not just the Malacca Straits, but the ocean beyond it.
    • The PLA Navy (PLAN) made its first operational deployment in the Gulf of Aden in 2008.
    • In 2009 China planned for overseas base or facility.
    • In 2010 a China State Oceanic Administration report alluded to plans to build aircraft carriers.

    BRI: Overcoming the deficiencies China face in India Ocean

    • The US hegemony and India’s regional influence in the Indian Ocean are thought of as a challenge to China.
    • So, China focused on 3 inherent deficiencies that they wanted to overcome.
    • (a) China is not a littoral state.
    • (b) Its passage through key maritime straits could be easily blocked.
    • (c) The possibility of US-India cooperation against China.
    • How to overcome these deficiencies?
    • (1) carefully selecting sites to build ports — Djibouti, Gwadar, Hambantota, Sittwe and Seychelles.
    • (2) By conducting activities in a low-key manner to “reduce the military colour as much as possible”.
    • (3) By not unnerving India and America by cooperating at first, then slowly penetrating into the Indian Ocean, beginning with detailed maritime surveys, ocean mapping, HADR, port construction and so on.

     China acting on the plans

    • The PLA’s new base in Djibouti is the prototype for more “logistics” facilities to come.
    • More port construction projects like Gwadar and Hambantota, are being offered to vulnerable countries.
    • These projects are commercially unviable but have military possibilities,
    • Chinese “civilian” vessels routinely conduct surveys in the EEZ of littoral states.
    • In January 2020 the PLA Navy conducted tripartite naval exercises with Russia and Iran in the Arabian Sea.
    • They have the largest warship building programme in the world.

    Consider the question “What constitutes India’s Indo-Pacific vision? Elaborate on the factors that explain China’s reluctance to subscribe to this vision.”

    Conclusion

    The idea of Indo-Pacific might potentially derail the carefully crafted Chinese plan. So, they now wish to cause alarm by raising fears about Great Power “strategic collision” caused by the so-called American-led “containment” strategy. It is important to look past their propaganda.

  • Italian Marines case judgement could set a dangerous precedent

    The tribunal’s judgement in the Italian marines case was in Italy’s favour. But the basis used in the judgement could set a wrong precedent. India also ensures a fair trial against the marines in Italy. So, what would be the wrong precedent and why would be trial against marines will continue in Italy? Read to know…

    Background

    • On February 15, 2012 two Italian marines were held for killing two Indian fishermen
    • Fishermen were in India’s Contiguous Zone, 20.5 nautical miles off the Kerala coast.
    • And the marines were part of a security contingent on the Enrica Lexie, an Italian commercial oil tanker.

    What is said in the judgement

    • The tribunal was established by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).
    • ITLOS was under the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
    • Only the operative portion of the tribunal’s award is available till now.
    • It held that the marines were entitled to immunity in relation to the acts that they committed.
    • The tribunal also said that India is precluded from exercising its jurisdiction over the Marines.
    • However, the tribunal found that by firing on the fishermen Italy was guilty of “violating India’s freedom and right of navigation”.
    • The tribunal majority agreed with the Italian plea that the marines had immunity for they were state officials.

    The judgement could set the wrong precedent

    • India’s stand was that UNCLOS is not concerned with issues relating to immunity.
    • Immunity of state officials has to be governed by specific multilateral or bilateral treaties or agreements.
    • It should not be invoked to settle issues of jurisdiction.
    • Even if Italian marines are considered as state officials, they were serving on a commercial vessel.
    • Italy did so unilaterally without the cover of any multilateral or bilateral arrangement.
    • There is no convention that such persons as the marines in such cases are immune from local criminal jurisdiction.
    • Only heads of states, heads of governments and foreign ministers customarily enjoy immunity abroad apart from accredited diplomats who are covered by the
    • Countries may now enact specific laws to give immunity to their military and para-military personnel and others by declaring them state official.
    •  This can lead to an increase in tensions generally and especially between inimical states.

    What should be the next course of action for India

    • Indian government should ensure that Italy is made to pay fully for the loss of life and the suffering it has caused in this matter.
    • The government should also ensure that it closely monitors the case proceedings in the Italian court against two marines.
    • This is also a time for the executive and judicial branches of the Indian state to introspect on how they handled the whole affair politically, diplomatically and legally.

    Consider the question “The judgement of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Italian marines case was based on the immunity of state officials. What could be the implication of invoking immunity of state official in this judgement? What should be the next course of action for India?”

    Conclusion

    As a good international citizen, India has accepted the tribunal’s award. Now it must ensure that Italy fully honours it. The matter remains open.

  • Ladakh and its Geo-strategic Importance

    With the long-standing border standoff with China, Ladakh, a rugged, high-altitude region that is generally far removed from the lives and imagination of most Indians, has become part of our daily conversations and worries.

    Let’s have a look at a short primer on the region, its history, and some of the places where Indian soldiers are locked in conflict with the Chinese army. Try remembering its geographical features.

    Ladakh through the History

    • Lying between the Kunlun mountain range in the north and Himalayas to the south, Ladakh was originally inhabited by people of Indo-Aryan and Tibetan descent.
    • Historically the region included the valleys of Baltistan, Indus, and Nubra, besides Zanskar, Lahaul and Spiti, Aksai Chin, Ngari and Rudok.
    • Located at the crossroads of important trade routes since ancient times, Ladakh has always enjoyed great geostrategic importance.
    • At the beginning of the first century AD, Ladakh was part of the Kushan Empire. Till the 15th century, it was part of Tibet and was ruled by dynasties of local Lamas.
    • Later it changed hands multiple times, alternating between the kingdoms of Kashmir and Zhangzhung.
    • In 1834, Gen Zorawar Singh, a general of Raja Gulab Singh who ruled Jammu as part of the Sikh empire, extended the boundaries of Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s kingdom to Ladakh.

    Partition, Pakistan and Chinese occupations

    Immediately after India’s Partition, tribal raiders (the disguised Pakistani Army) attacked Ladakh. They captured Kargil and were heading for Leh when they were confronted by the Indian Army, who got back Kargil.

    • Although India has always considered Aksai Chin to be part of Jammu and Kashmir, in the 1950s the Chinese built a highway, called western highway or NH219, connecting Tibet with Xinjiang through this region.
    • It was always more easily accessible to the Chinese than to the Indians, who were across the Karakoram.
    • India learnt of this road in 1957, and it was one of the causes of the 1962 India-China war, after which China strengthened its control over this region.
    • China today claims Aksai Chin to be part of Hotan County of its Xinjiang province.
    • Pakistan ceded the Shaksgam Valley, which was part of the Baltistan region north of the Karakoram, to China following a Sino-Pakistani agreement signed on March 2, 1963.

    Ladakh through the Chinese eyes

    • China’s forays into the region began after the 1949 Communist Revolution, when Chairman Mao Zedong, a veteran of guerrilla warfare, began consolidating China’s periphery as part of his expansionist designs.
    • The PLA occupied Tibet in 1951 and then began to eye Ladakh.
    • The reason was that the road connecting Kashgar in Xinjiang to Lhasa in Tibet had to pass through Aksai Chin, which was held by Indians but was seldom patrolled by them.

    Galwan Valley in the limelight

    • The Tibetan revolt of 1959 and the Dalai Lama’s flight to India saw China further strengthening its military presence in Ladakh to ensure the security of NH 219.
    • India reacted with its ‘forward policy’ as part of which it began setting up Army posts in the region to prevent Chinese expansion.
    • This resulted in the initial clash between the Indian and Chinese forces in the Kongka Pass area in 1959.
    • Later, Galwan Valley became the scene of action when the Indian Army established a post to cut off the Chinese post in the Samjunjling area, marking the beginning of the 1962 war.

    Pangong Tso: The contested lake

    • In the latest face-off, Indian troops first spied the Chinese on the banks of Pangong Tso.
    • This lake, which is one-third in India and two-thirds in China, is of great tactical significance to the Chinese who have built infrastructure along both its sides to ensure the speedy build-up of troops.
    • Chinese incursions in this region aim at shifting the LAC westward so that they are able to occupy important heights both on the north and the south of the lake, which will enable them to dominate the Chushul Bowl.
    • The narrow Chushul valley, which lies on the road to Leh with Pangong Tso to its north, was an important target for the Chinese even during the 1962 war. It was here that the Battle of Chushul was fought.

    Strategic SSN: To the far north

    • The area spanning Galwan, Depsang plateau, and Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO), is called Sub-Sector North (SSN).
    • This enclave that lies to the east of the Siachen glacier is of immense significance given its proximity to the Karakoram Pass, close to China’s western highway or NH 219 going to Aksai Chin.
    • It’s the SSN that provides land access to Central Asia through the Karakoram Pass.
    • Domination of this area is also crucial for the protection of the Siachen glacier, lying between the Saltoro ridge on the Pakistani side and the Saser ridge close to the Chinese claim line.
    • The Galwan heights overlook the all-weather Durbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DSDBO) Road, which connects Leh to DBO at the base of the Karakoram Pass that separates China’s Xinjiang Region from Ladakh.
    • Domination over these heights allows China to easily interdict this road.

    Why is China stubborn on Galwan?

    • Occupation of Galwan will neutralize the tactical advantage India gained by building the all-weather Durbuk-DBO road over the last two decades.
    • Last year, the Border Road Organisation (BRO) made this rugged terrain even more accessible by completing the 430-metre-long bridge across the Shyok River.
    • With this, the Darbuk route to DBO became available round the year, and the travel time of troops to the SSN was halved.
    • It was this bridge, coupled with the ongoing work on a link road to LAC in this area, prompted the PLA to enter Galwan.

  • In an uncertain world a seat at the UNSC

    As a non-permanent member of the UNSC for the next two years, India will have to navigate through a tumultuous world. Anti-terrorism will be top priority for India.

    India at UNSC

    • India will be back in the United Nations Security Council for a two-year term beginning January 1, 2021.
    • Two-year term will be a critical time in the history of the UN.
    • It is hoped that by then COVID-19 will have subsided, a U.S. President will have been elected.
    • And the contours of a new world order may have emerged.

    How elections take place

    • The basic contest for the non-permanent seats takes place in the respective regional groups and their sub-groups.
    • Voting in the General Assembly is to fulfil the requirement of countries having to secure a two-thirds majority of the member states.
    • But regional endorsement is becoming difficult.
    • Last time, it was Kazakhstan which vacated the place for India.
    • This time, it was Afghanistan. India could not have got the endorsement without such gestures from friendly countries.

    What will be India’s priorities as a member of UNSC

    • India will continue to provide leadership and a new orientation for a reformed multilateral system.
    • How far the UN will be able to reform itself in the new situation remains uncertain.
    • The UN did not succeed in either defining terrorism or in adopting the Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.
    • Counter-terrorism will be one of the highest priorities for India at the UNSC.

    Permanent member of India issue

    • India’s election as a non-permanent member has understandably ignited the hope that its quest for permanent membership.
    • Nothing is farther from the truth.
    • Seeking to amend the Charter to add new permanent members is difficult task.
    • None of the proposals has the possibility of securing two-thirds majority of the General Assembly and the votes of the five permanent members.
    • A majority of the UN members are against the privileges of the permanent members, particularly the veto.
    • India’s performance in the Council will not lead to its elevation to permanent membership as the opposition to any expansion is not India-specific.

    Role of India as non-permanent member

    • The non-permanent members have a collective veto over every resolution in the Council.
    • As a part of collective veto, India will have a higher profile at the UN for the next two years
    • Permanent members can prevent the adoption of resolutions by themselves through veto.
    • But they need at least nine votes to get a resolution passed.
    • India will also have a rare peep into the consultations chamber of the UNSC, which is closed to non-members of the Council.
    • India will get involved in many issues in which it may not have any direct interest.
    • Since India does not have a veto, it shall have to proceed cautiously not to offend anyone.

    Consider the question “India has been chosen as the non-permanent member of the UNSC and will be there at the critical time in the history of the UNSC. What should be India’s priority and approach as a member of the UNSC?”

    Conclusion

    India’s mission in New York has earned a reputation that it is next only to the permanent members in influence. But whether it will be able to deal with traditional challenges in novel ways will depend on the turns and twists in an uncertain world.

  • Crisis facing the global order

    The corona crisis has laid bare the fissures in the global order. This article examines the four issues that are principal global challenges. Pandemic has accentuated these challenges.

    Principal global challenges

    • 1) Geopolitical tensions 2) Climate crisis. 3) Global mistrust. 4) The dark side of the digital world —  are four issues which U.N. Secretary-General Guterres listed as primary threats.
    • The four challenges have, for now, been overshadowed by the corona pandemic crisis.

    1.Climate change challenge

    • The drop in emissions in 2020 is projected to be about 8 per cent down on last year.
    • This drop will just put us on track to where we should be if we are to reach the Paris agreement goal of limiting warming to 1.5 C.
    • The threat of climate change, although raising its head again, has been constrained.

    2.Digital space and its dark side

    • Cyberspace has been a digital saviour during the corona crisis.
    • Virtual communications enhanced through various services, new apps, expanded coverage has been key to enhanced virtual lives for millions by increase of the avenues for working from home, video chat connectivity and online delivery of goods.
    • Companies that have deftly used cyberspace have prospered the most: Amazons net capital gain has been over $400 billion in 2020.
    • However, a surge in cybercrime and cyber fraud is anticipated, if not there already.
    • The logic being that cyberspace use has expanded without commensurate growth in security features.
    • Thee are dire projections of an impending “cyber Pearl Harbour”.

    3.Geopolitical tensions

    • Accentuation of geopolitical tensions during the corona crisis is well-documented.
    • The US-China relationship was already deteriorating, the blame game over the virus has exacerbated it.
    • The brazen behaviour of China in matters relating to Taiwan, Hong Kong, Australia, South China Sea and the India-China border has added to the inflammable state of geopolitics.
    • Rarely has the world seen such paucity of international cooperation since World War II.
    • The unravelling of the international institutions and partnerships that have been built since World War II is stark.

    4.Trust deficit among states

    • Trust amongst states has plummeted to its worst since World War II.
    • When faced with corona crisis shortages, almost all EU states responded at the national level.
    • Globally, at one time, more than 70 per cent of the world’s ports of entry — air, sea and land — restricted travel.
    • According to a Global Trade Alert study, nearly 90 governments blocked the export of medical supplies while 29 restricted food exports.

    Efficiency to self-sufficiency

    • Lack of trust is also impacting diversified supply chains.
    • The corona crisis is driving a shift from efficiency to self-sufficiency.
    • Japan is paying companies to relocate factories from China.
    • President Emmanuel Macron has pledged “full independence” for France in crucial medical supplies by year-end.
    • Prime Minister Modi has called for self-reliance and being vocal for local in India.
    • In the US, support for “Buy American” benchmarks for government health spending has growing bipartisan support.

    India’s role

    •  Challenges that transcend borders are of cardinal importance to India’s well being.
    • It is, therefore, time to conceptualise, in concrete terms, pathways to address them.
    • This will need to include our envisaging the new order and India’s own role in it as well as who our partners in this venture are to be.
    • Others are already working on their game plans.

    Consider the question “The cracks in the global order were apparent but the pandemic has accentuated the challenges to the global order. In light of this, examine the challenges to global order is facing the role that India should play.”

    Conclusion

    If India wants to be “rule shapers” rather than being “rule takers”, then we need to start working in partnership at blueprints for change. It is never too early to plan for the future

  • West Bank Annexation Plan

    Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu confirmed that the Israeli leader’s plan to annex parts of the occupied West Bank would not start on the original target date as the British PM made an extraordinary appeal to Israel to call off the plan.

    The strategic location of Gaza strip, West Bank, Dead Sea etc. creates a hotspot for a possible map based prelims question. 

    Consider this PYQ from 2015 CSP:

    Q. The area known as ‘Golan Heights’ sometimes appears in the news in the context of the events related to:

    a) Central Asia
    b) Middle East
    c) South-East Asia
    d) Central Africa

    Must read:

    [Burning Issue] West Asia Peace Plan

    Where is West Bank Located?

    • The West Bank is located to the west of the Jordan River.
    • It is a patch of land about one and a half times the size of Goa, was captured by Jordan after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War.
    • Israel snatched it back during the Six-Day War of 1967 and has occupied it ever since.
    • It is a landlocked territory, bordered by Jordan to the east and Israel to the south, west, and north.
    • Following the Oslo Accords between the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) during the 1990s, part of the West Bank came under the control of the Palestinian Authority.
    • With varying levels of autonomy, the Palestinian Authority controls close to 40 per cent of West Bank today, while the rest is controlled by Israel.

  • Reviving SAARC

    To counter a hegemon, showing a united front helps. Drawing on this maxim, India has to work on improving its standing in the region. And reviving SAARC could be a right step in this direction. So, why SAARC is in hibernation in the first place? Where India could start? Read to know…

    China challenging India’s interests in the region

    • China, as part of its global expansionism, is chipping away at India’s interests in South Asia.
    • China’s proximity to Pakistan is well known.
    • Nepal is moving closer to China for ideational and material reasons.
    • China is wooing Bangladesh by offering tariff exemption to 97% of Bangladeshi products.
    • China has intensified its ties with Sri Lanka through massive investments.
    • According to a Brookings India study, most South Asian nations are now largely dependent on China for imports despite geographical proximity to India.

    SAARC-Caught in India-Pakistan rivalry

    •  India’s strategic dealing with China has to begin with South Asia.
    • In this regard, it is important to reinvigorate SAARC, which has been in the doldrums since 2014.
    • In the last few years, due to increasing animosity with Pakistan, India’s political interest in SAARC dipped significantly.
    • India has been trying hard to isolate Pakistan internationally for its role in promoting terrorism in India.

    BIMSTEC cannot be an alternative to SAARC

    • India started investing in other regional instruments, such as BIMSTEC, as an alternative to SAARC.
    • However, BIMSTEC cannot replace SAARC for reasons such as lack of a common identity and history among all BIMSTEC members.
    • BIMSTEC’s focus is on the Bay of Bengal region, thus making it an inappropriate forum to engage all South Asian nations.

    Economic integration-way to revive SAARC

    • One way to infuse life in SAARC is to revive the process of South Asian economic integration.
    • South Asia is one of the least integrated regions in the world.
    • Intra-regional trade is at barely 5% of total South Asian trade
    • Intra-regional trade is 25% of intra-regional trade in the ASEAN region.
    • The lack of political will and trust deficit has prevented any meaningful movement.
    • According to the World Bank, trade in South Asia stands at $23 billion of an estimated value of $67 billion.
    • India should take the lead and work with its neighbours to slash the tariff and non-tariff barriers.
    • There’s a need to resuscitate the negotiations on a SAARC investment treaty, pending since 2007.
    • According to the UNCTAD intra-ASEAN investments constitute around 19% of the total investments in the region.
    • The SAARC region can likewise benefit from higher intra-SAARC investment flows.
    • Deeper regional economic integration will create greater interdependence with India acquiring the central role.
    • Which, in turn, would serve India’s strategic interests too.

    Two domestic challenges

    • 1) There has been an unrelenting top-dressing of anti-Pakistan rhetoric and Islamophobia on the Indian soil.
    • There’s also a recurrent use of the ‘Bangladeshi migrant’ rhetoric.
    • It dents India’s soft power of being a liberal and secular democracy, which gives moral legitimacy to India’s leadership in the region.
    • This divisive domestic politics fuels an anti-India sentiment in India’s neighbourhood.
    • 2) The economic vision of the government remains convoluted.
    • It’s unclear what the slogans of atma nirbharta (self-reliance) and ‘vocal for local’ mean.
    • If this marks sliding back to protectionism, one is unsure if India will be interested in deepening South Asian economic integration.

    Consider the question “Examine the issues that hinder the SAARC from realising its full potential as a regional grouping.”

    Conclusion

    Prime Minister did well by reaching out to SAARC leaders earlier this year, but such flash in the pan moments won’t help without sustained engagement.

  • Resistance to China is going to be definitive moment for India

    How India overcomes the challenge posed by China would have far-reaching effects. Role of Russia and the U.S. is important for India. This article discusses these factors and the significance of the outcome of the conflict started at Galwan. 

    Two takes on India’s China policy

    • Following Galwan encounter, there are two views about the future of India’s China policy.
    • Some say that structural constraints would limit dramatic changes in policy once the heat of the moment dissipates.
    • While others say that the Galwan clash comes amidst the deepening crisis in bilateral relations over the last decade.
    • Stalled boundary talks, a widening trade deficit, the clash of national interests in the region, and Chinese opposition to India’s global aspirations have together strained Sino-Indian relations.
    • Galwan is the last straw, the argument goes, that broke the camel’s back.

    So, what will be the outcome

    •  The relationship is likely to depend on how the current military confrontation in Ladakh is resolved.
    • If it ends with a quick return to the status quo that prevailed in April, inertia is likely to limit radical policy departures.
    • If the Ladakh crisis ends in a setback for India, the pressure on Delhi to radically reorient its China policy will mount.

    What if the standoff continues?

    • In that case strengthening India’s military and political hand against China is the immediate objective of Delhi’s post-Galwan diplomacy.
    • The long term steps suggested include the construction of a military alliance with the US and other Western partner.
    • As as well as economic decoupling and diversification.
    • Short term steps are about being able to stare down the Chinese in the current military confrontation and hold its ground.

    Role of Russia

    • Three decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, India’s dependence on Russian arms remains substantive.
    • Rajnath Singh’s visit to Moscow amidst the crisis with China underlines the weight of the past in India’s security policy.
    • India is also pressing other major defence suppliers, including France and Israel, to accelerate deliveries on contracted defence equipment.
    • There have been reports from Russia, that China is pressing Moscow not to sell the new fighter aircraft to India.
    • Russia and China are strong strategic partners today.
    • While the past suggests India has a special claim to Russian affections, there is a Sino-Russian strategic cohabitation today in opposition to America
    • How Russia responds to India’s request will have a major bearing on the future evolution of Delhi’s ties with Moscow.

    Role of the U.S.

    • Unlike Russia’s public stance of neutrality between India and China, Washington has come out in favour of Delhi.
    • There was vocal public support of the US defence and foreign policy establishment against Chinese aggression at Galwan.
    •  Media reports from Delhi say the US is already supplying valuable real-time military intelligence of value to the Indian armed forces.
    • Washington is apparently willing to do more but is letting Delhi decide the pace and intensity of that cooperation.

    Challenges in the U.S. cooperation

    • The uncertain political moment in the US amidst the general election scheduled for early November can’t be underestimated.
    • A change of guard in Washington will certainly slow things down as the new administration settles down and reviews its priorities.
    • America’s stakes in China are far higher than Russia’s.
    • Profound economic interdependence of the U.S. and China is a significant political constraint on the US’s options.
    • On deeper military cooperation with Washington, Delhi would want to move with care rather than rush into it as it did in 1962.

    How will outcomes of the crisis matter for India

    • If Delhi comes out of this crisis wounded, its troubles at home and the world will mount significantly.
    • A weakened India will find recasting its China policy even harder.
    • But victorious India will find its international political stock rising and its options on China expanding.
    •  Successful Indian resistance to China’s expansionism would be a definitive moment in the geopolitical evolution of Asia.
    • The stakes for India and the world, then, are far higher today than in 1962.

    Consider the question “Examine the issues that introduce friction in India-China relations. Also, elaborate on the scope of India’s alliance with the U.S to counter the challenges posed by China.”

    Conclusion

    Outcomes of the resistance will have a profound impact on India’s standing and India’s destiny.

  • Making sense of moves of China

    The role played by intelligence and emphasis on Summit diplomacy in relation with China are the two issues discussed in this article. So, what went wrong in Galwan incident from the intelligence point of view? And what are the perils of Summit diplomacy? Read to know...

    Galwan-New and fractious phase

    • What occurred in the Galwan heights on June 15, must not be viewed as an aberration.
    • It would be more judicious to view it as signifying a new and fractious phase in China-India relations.
    • Even if the situation reverts to what existed in mid-April India-China relations appear set to witness a “new and different normal”.
    • China’s reaction has been consistent — India must move out of Galwan.
    • This is something that India cannot ignore any longer.
    • Galwan incident cannot be viewed as a mere replay of what took place in Depsang (2013), Chumar (2014) and Doklam (2017).
    • This is a new and different situation and India must not shrink from addressing the core issue that relations between India and China are in a perilous state.

    Close and careful analysis of China’s claim is necessary

    • China’s assertion of its claim to the whole of the Galwan Valley needs close and careful analysis for following reasons-
    • 1) Point 14 gives China a virtual stranglehold over the newly completed, and strategically significant, Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie Road, which leads on to the Karakoram Pass.
    • 2) The strategic implications for India of China’s insistence on keeping the whole of the Galwan Valley are serious as it fundamentally changes the status quo.
    • 3) By laying claim to the Galwan Valley, China has reopened some of the issues left over from the 1962 conflict.
    • And this demonstrates that it is willing to embark on a new confrontation.

    LAC and claim line of China

    • Ambiguity has existed regarding the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in this sector.
    • The Chinese “claim line” is that of November 1959.
    • For India the LAC is that of September 1962.
    • In recent years, both sides had refrained from reopening the issue, but China has never given up its claims.
    • By its unilateral declaration now, China is seeking to settle the matter in its favour. India needs to measure up to this challenge.

    Importance of Aksai Chin

    • The importance of Aksai Chin for China has greatly increased of late, as it provides direct connectivity between two of the most troubled regions of China, viz., Xinjiang and Tibet.
    • This does not seem to have been adequately factored in our calculations.
    • While Indian policymakers saw the reclassification of Ladakh as purely an internal matter.
    • They overlooked the fact that for China’s military planners it posited a threat to China’s peace and tranquillity.

    Intelligence capabilities

    • Admittedly, the timing and nature of China’s actions should have aroused keen interest in intelligence circles about China’s strategic calculations.
    • The Chinese build-up in the Galwan Valley, Pangong Tso and Hotsprings-Gogra did not require any great intelligence effort, since there was little attempt at concealment by the Chinese.
    • India also possesses high-quality imagery intelligence (IMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities.
    • These capabilities are distributed between the National Technical Research Organisation, the Directorate of Signals Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence and other agencies.
    • Which made it possible to track Chinese movement.
    • Where intelligence can be faulted is with regard to inadequate appreciation of what the build-up meant, and what it portended for India.
    • This is indicative of a weakness in interpretation and analysis of the intelligence available.
    • And also of inability to provide a coherent assessment of China’s real intentions.
    • Intelligence assessment of China’s intentions, clearly fell short of what was required.
    • While India’s technological capabilities for intelligence collection have vastly increased in recent years, the capacity for interpretation and analysis has not kept pace with this.
    • Advances in technology, specially Artificial Intelligence have, across the world, greatly augmented efforts at intelligence analysis.

    Who has the responsibility of intelligence assessment and analysis

    • The principal responsibility for intelligence assessment and analysis concerning China, rests with the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) and India’s external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW).
    • To a lesser extent, it remains with the Defence Intelligence Agency.
    • The decision of the NSCS to dismantle the Joint Intelligence Committee has contributed to a weakening of the intelligence assessment system.
    • In the case of the R&AW, lack of domain expertise, and an inadequacy of China specialists might also have been a contributory factor.

    Adverse impact of certain policy measures

    •  The preference given recently to Summit diplomacy over traditional foreign policy making structures proved to be a severe handicap.
    • Summit diplomacy cannot be a substitute for carefully structured foreign office policy making.
    • Currently, India’s Summit diplomacy has tended to marginalise the External Affairs Ministry with regard to policy making, and we are probably paying a price for it.
    • As it is, the Ministry of External Affairs’s (MEA) stock of China experts seems to be dwindling.
    • And MEA’s general tilt towards the U.S. in most matters, has resulted in an imbalance in the way the MEA perceives problems and situations.

    Conclusion

    Along with the other factors, India should also focus on intelligence analysis and interpretation and make sure there are enough China experts in the MEA.

  • Reimagining South Asian boundaries

    State-centric politics is the issue that plagues the regional cooperation in the region. But the consequences for the lives, livelihoods and the well-being of the people located at the edges of nation-states are overlooked. This issue is discussed in this article.

    State plays central role in disputes

    • One of the major problems of South Asian politics is that it has to flow from within a state-centric paradigm.
    • This state-centrism has given the state structure the propriety to be the sole arbiter of disputes.
    • It is the state that articulates, defines, and represents “national” interests in negotiations with other states.
    • States in South Asia places importance on political boundaries as the “natural” shield even in the arbitration of South Asian affairs.
    • This approach happens to be the dominant South Asian pattern.
    • In this approach territorial boundaries are valued more than lives, livelihoods and the well-being of the people located at the edges of nation states.
    • “Patriotism” looms large as and when inter-state relationships are viewed through the statist lens.
    •  Hostility, real or imagined, is used as the governing principle in the arbitration of territorial disputes across South Asia.

    Lack of regional identity

    • Basically, the term “region” seems to be a contested idea in a South Asian context.
    • This is because none of the South Asian states has ever recognised and respected the idea of regional identity or regional politics.
    • They have been wary of such natural division in politics.
    • Given that this is a reality, how could one even think of South Asia as a region to reckon with?

    South Asia as region of regions

    • One must understand that South Asia is perhaps the most natural regional grouping of states around the world.
    • And, at the same time, it is also the most difficult and contested grouping.
    • South Asia needs to be rethought, not as a region of states, but as a region of regions.
    • As such it demonstrates itself more as a borderland that needs to be cultivated out of contact zones.
    • Such contact zone exists beyond the limits of territorial boundaries shared by the member-states.

    So, how this applies to India-Nepal border dispute?

    • There is a need to go beyond the popular debates revolving around such “troubling” questions such as: how much area has been “encroached” upon by which state and on what basis.
    • Such questions appear to be “normal” in the way a “statist paradigm” deals with the issue.
    • To those who are to maintain their lifeworld at those zones these issues are troubling.

    Interconnected (fluid) life

    • South Asian life, essentially at the edges of the nation state, is bound to be fluid.
    • This is because the boundary, which confirms the territorial limits of a nation state, is at the same time the affirmed threshold of another nation state.
    • In a certain sense, the people living at the edges of nation states within South Asia do not actually belong to any of the two nation states.
    • Or in other words, they belong to both the states at the same time.
    • Plurality, differences and inclusivity bring coherence to borderland ontology.
    • They defy the logic of singular, unifying, exclusive identities that the nation states privilege.

    Implications for regional cooperation

    • Unless both India and Nepal agree to see the reality beyond the gaze of the statist paradigm, they would harm regional experiments such as the BIMSTEC or the Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal (BBIN) sub-regional initiative.
    • South Asian states need to realise the difference between “regional cooperation” merely as advocacy and as an issue that demands self-approval and self-promotion.
    • South Asian countries may claim success on regional cooperation while closing all doors of recognising difference and mutual tolerance.
    • Powerful countries operating within and beyond the orbit of South Asia might become successful in establishing their control.
    • To establish control these countries may use the token of “regional cooperation” as an issue of realpolitik.

    Consider the question “South Asia is perhaps the most natural regional grouping of states around the world, yet it is also the most difficult and contested grouping. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    Region and regional identity are not just issues of “realpolitik” in South Asia; rather, the need is to “officially” accommodate this rather naturally drafted way of doing politics, if we are genuinely concerned about South Asian geopolitics.