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Subject: International Relations

  • What is the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)?

    Non-alignment is an old concept today, and India has adopted an approach of “issue-based alignment”, according to External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar.

    Try this question for mains:

    Q.“The gradual exit of the US from institutional geopolitics has created an ocean of opportunity for small nations”. Discuss.

    What is the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM)?

    • The NAM is a forum of 120 developing world states that are not formally aligned with or against any major power bloc.
    • The group was started in Belgrade, Yugoslavia in 1961.
    • After the UN, it is the largest grouping of states worldwide.

    Its formation

    • NAM emerged in the context of the wave of decolonization that followed World War II.
    • It was created by Yugoslavia’s President, Josip Broz Tito, India’s first PM, Jawaharlal Nehru, Egypt’s second President Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ghana’s first president Kwame Nkrumah, and Indonesia’s first President, Sukarno.
    • All five leaders believed that developing countries should not help either the Western or Eastern blocs in the Cold War.
    • As a condition for membership, the states of the NAM cannot be part of a multilateral military alliance (such as the NATO) or have signed a bilateral military agreement with one of the “big powers” involved in Great Power conflicts.
    • However, its idea does not signify that a state ought to remain passive or even neutral in international politics.

    Its relevance today

    • One of the challenges of the NAM in the 21st century has been to reassess its identity and purpose in the post-Cold War era.
    • The movement has continued to advocate for international cooperation, multilateralism, and national self-determination, but it has also been increasingly vocal against the inequities of the world economic order.
    • On the contrary, from the founding of the NAM, its stated aim has been to give a voice to developing countries and to encourage their concerted action in world affairs.

    The geopolitics of opportunity

    • Non-alignment was a term of a particular era and geopolitical landscape. One aspect was independence, which remains a factor of continuity for India.
    • The consequences of global shifts, including the US and the assertiveness of China, are opening spaces for middle powers like India, Japan, the EU and others.

    US repositioning has impacted everyone

    • The consequence of repositioning of the US, that the big umbrella is now smaller than it used to be, has allowed many other countries to play more autonomous roles.
    • India needs to take more “risks”, as the world expected it to take a more proactive stance on various issues including connectivity, maritime security, terrorism, climate change and terrorism.

  • Changing dynamics in China-Pakistan collusion against India

    India has always been aware of the China-Pak collusion and their mutual support to each others’ actions. But the underlying basis has been changing now. It is no longer Pakistan seeking Chinese support in J&K as much as it is the other way around.

    Preparedness for a two-front war

    • The debate regarding India’s capability to fight a war in which there is full collusion between China and Pakistan has generally remained inconclusive.
    • Most detractors of the belief regarding China’s military-operational support to Pakistan, have leaned on the argument that China will adopt a policy to suit its interests.
    • Both in 1965 and 1971, China made some promises to Pakistan but chose to stay away.
    • Of course, that was during the Cold War — a completely different international strategic environment.

    China-Pakistan collection action in Kashmir

    • Pakistan increased its proxy campaign in J&K almost in sync with two China-related trends.
    • First, enhanced PLA assertiveness in Eastern Ladakh.
    • Second, the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
    • A progressively altering Chinese attitude towards the Kashmir issue started to take shape as early as 2008-09, with issuing stapled visas to Indians residing in J&K and denial of a visa to the Northern Army Commander were signs of it.
    • This support was also witnessed on issues like the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Pakistan’s involvement in global terrorism and the abrogation of Article 370.

    Pincer approach in Ladakh

    • It is no longer Pakistan seeking Chinese support for its adventurism as much as it is the other way around.
    • The mutuality of interests has increased and military coordination has become a larger part of the overall strategy.
    • China may force further escalation this season depending upon how the world responds to its expansionism.
    • China could also adopt a posture which prepares it, along with Pakistan, towards a future “pincer approach” in Ladakh.
    • Along with Ladakh — Arunachal, Sikkim and the Central Sector are very part of the expanded collusive strategy.
    • But it is Ladakh where the effect is intended most and it is there that the pincer approach may prove more challenging for India.

    Suggestions for India

    • Assuming that confrontation with the Sino-Pak combine is inevitable now or later, one of the ways for India to offset this is to project sufficient capability.
    • The diplomatic and military domains have to play this out effectively.
    • India cannot be seen to be alone or militarily weak.
    • It has tremendous support internationally which must translate into a higher level of strategic support.
    • Militarily, Pakistan should never be able to perceive that it will be allowed to fight as per choice and conceived strategy.
    • China’s success or failure in such adventurism will set the course of its future strategy against its multiple adversaries.
    • That is the psyche which India must exploit to prevent escalation and win this and impending standoffs without fighting.
    • This needs a rapid and all-out national effort with the highest priority accorded to it, including budgeting.

    Conclusion

    India cannot afford to focus only on the northern borders. A firm and full strategy to deal with Pakistan in all contingencies has now become imperative.

  • Concerns over Australia in the Malabar Exercise

    While the idea of inviting Australia to join Malabar is being explored, we must not forget the concerns with it. This article examines such concerns.

    Context

    • India’s Ministry of Defence discussed the issue of adding Australia to the trilateral Malabar naval exercise.
    • If materialised, it will be the first time since 2007 that all members of Quad-India, U.S., Japan and Australia will participate in a joint military drill.

    Possible consequences of the move

    • The Chinese leadership sees the maritime Quadrilateral as an Asian-NATO that seeks only to contain China’s rise.
    •  India’s intention to involve Australia in the Malabar drill could only be construed as a move directed against Beijing.

    India’s perspective

    • Following the stand-off in Ladakh, many Indian analysts believe the time is right for India to shed its traditional defensiveness in the maritime domain.
    • The realists advocate an alliance with the U.S., Japan and Australia to counter Chinese moves in the Indian Ocean.

    Concerns

    1) Contrary message to China

    • While India and China are negotiating a truce, Australia’s participation in the Malabar exercise sends contrary signals to Beijing.
    • If China responded aggressively in the Eastern Indian Ocean, it could needlessly open up a new front in the India-China conflict.

    2) Only modest gains for India

    • U.S. and its Pacific partners want to form a maritime coalition to implement a ‘rules-based order’ in the Indo-Pacific littorals.
    • India’s priority is to acquire strategic capabilities to counter a Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
    •  Indian Navy is yet to develop the undersea capability to deter Chinese submarines in the eastern Indian Ocean.
    • With U.S. defence companies hesitant to share proprietary technology the gains for India, in exchange for signing up the ‘military-quad’, are modest.
    • Without strategic technology transfers, Indian Navy’s deterrence potential in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) will not improve much.

    3) Operational issue: India will be drawn into power dynamics of the Asia-Pacific

    • With the strategic contest between the U.S. and China, there is every possibility that the military-Quad will be used to draw India into the security dynamics of the Asia-Pacific.
    • The U.S. would expect its Indo-Pacific partners, including India, to assist the U.S. Navy in its South China Sea endeavour.
    •  The U.S. and Japanese navies have little spare capacity for sustained surveillance and deterrence operations in the IOR.
    • Australia is an exception and is ready and able to partner India in securing the Eastern Indian Ocean.

    4) Timing

    • A balancing coalition must come together at a time when the nature and magnitude of the threat are wholly manifest.
    • But, despite a growing presence in the Indian Ocean, the Chines Navy is yet to physically threaten Indian interests at sea.
    • So, the onus of the first move to precipitate a crisis in the Eastern Indian Ocean lies with the Indian Navy.

    Conclusion

    Upgrading the trilateral Malabar to a quadrilateral, without acquiring the requisite combat and deterrence capability, could yield gains for India in the short term, but would prove ineffective in the long run.

  • Iran ties need quiet diplomacy

    India ties with Iran are significant for more than one reasons. Two countries share cultural bonds, Iran holds a special place when it comes to India’s energy security. Yet, India often finds itself in a difficult position as it tries to walk the tightrope between the U.S. sanction and maintaining the relations with Iran. 

    Context

    • Concerns were raised in India over its exclusion by Iran from the 628 km long rail link between Chabahar and Zahidan.
    • Iran has since clarified that it is not the case and India could join the project at a later stage.
    • It happened just as China and Iran were close to signing a deal on an economic and security partnership.

    Importance of Chabahar and the rail link

    • Chabahar could provide connectivity for Afghanistan through Iran in order to lessen its dependence on Karachi port.
    • This plan has enjoyed support in Delhi, Kabul and Tehran since 2003.
    •  Road and rail links from Chabahar to Zahidan and then 200 km further on to Zaranj in Afghanistan, need to be built.

    Progress on the project

    • Iran was under sanctions during 2005-13, so there was little progress.
    •  Meanwhile, India concentrated on the 220 km road to connect Zaranj to Delaram on the Herat highway, and completed it in 2008.
    • After the sanctions on Iran eased in 2015,  A memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed with Iran in 2016.
    • This MoU aimed to equip and operate two terminals at the Shahid Beheshti port as part of Phase I of the project.
    • The Trilateral Agreement on Establishment of International Transport and Transit Corridor between Afghanistan, Iran and India was signed.
    • In addition to $85 million of capital investment, India also committed to providing a line of credit of $150 million for port container tracks.
    • Phase I was declared operational in 2018 and India’s wheat shipments to Afghanistan have been using this route.
    • A special economic zone (SEZ) at Chabahar was planned but re-imposition of U.S. sanctions has slowed investments into the SEZ.
    • India was given a waiver from U.S. sanctions to continue cooperation on Chabahar.
    •  Despite the waiver, the project has suffered delays.

    Growing Iran-China relations

    • In 2016, just as sanctions were eased, Chinese President Xi Jinping visited Tehran and proposed a long-term comprehensive, strategic partnership.
    • Iran kept the negotiations going for years because of reluctance to grow too close to China.
    • Meanwhile, tensions in the region have been growing since last year with missile strikes in Saudi Arabia and a U.S. drone strike killing Gen. Qassim Soleimani.
    • As a veto-wielding member, China can help Iran at the UNSC.
    • Even so, the Iran- China comprehensive, strategic partnership road map has run into opposition in the Majlis[Iranian Parliament].

    India’s concerns over Iran-China deal

    • What is alarming for New Delhi is that Beijing is also concluding a security and military partnership with Tehran.
    • Initial reports in Iran have suggested China will deploy 5,000 security personnel to protect its projects in Iran.
    • Some reports suggest Kish Island in the Persian Gulf, located at the mouth of the Strait of Hormuz, maybe “sold” to China.
    • With a growing Chinese presence, India is also concerned about its strategic stakes around the Chabahar port project.

    Way forward for India

    • Though China has a greater capacity to resist U.S. sanctions, Iran realises the advantage of working with India as it enjoys a sanctions waiver from the U.S. for Chabahar.
    • Iran and India also share an antipathy to a Taliban takeover in Afghanistan.
    • This is why Iran would like to keep the door open.
    • Nevertheless, India needs to improve its implementation record of infrastructure projects in its neighbourhood.
    • There are numerous tales of Indian cooperation projects in Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, etc suffering delays and cost overruns that only make it easier for China to expand its footprint in India’s neighbourhood.

    Consider the question “India-Iran ties circumscribed by each other’s compulsion and geopolitical constraints. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    India should continue to remain politically engaged with Iran so that there is a better appreciation of each other’s sensitivities and compulsions.

    With inputs from:

    https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-in-china-iran-indias-concerns-6511177/

  • U.S.-Asia coordination to preserve global order

    The focus of this article is on the U.S. policy in the Indo-Pacific and its relations with its allies there in countering China.

    Instances of China’s aggression

    • Galwan Valley is not an exception in Beijing’s recent behaviour in Asia.
    • China has also engaged in a tense geopolitical confrontation with its other neighbours.
    • Stand-offs with Vietnam and Malaysia in the South China Sea and threatening Australia with boycotts are a few examples.

    Response to China

    • Beijing’s aggressiveness is fueling debates about the underlying costs of reliance on China.
    • China’s aggression is also increasing support for closer coordination between other Indo-Pacific partners.
    • Indian, Japan, Malaysia, and Australia have all taken concrete steps to reduce their economic exposure to Beijing.
    •  India and Australia recently inked a new military logistics agreement in the “virtual summit”.
    • A similar agreement between Delhi and Tokyo may follow.
    • The Quadrilateral Dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States is growing stronger and even expanding.
    • And recently Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) issued one of their strongest statements to date on the South China Sea.
    • The ASEAN statement insisted that maritime disputes must be resolved in accordance with the UN Law of the Sea treaty.

    Asian multilateralism: Born out of crises

    • Recently the “Milk Tea Alliance”, reaction of people, born to forge solidarity between Taiwanese, Hong Kongers, and Southeast Asians online to deal with Chinese cyberbullying.
    • The Chiang Mai Initiative — a financial swap mechanism between China, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia — emerged in the aftermath of the late 1990s financial crisis.
    • ASEAN, created in 1967, did not convene its first heads of state meeting until fall of Saigon in 1976 in the Vietnam War.

    Role of the U.S.

    • The COVID-19 crisis is remaking the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific.
    • The ongoing crisis has made countries aware of seriousness of Chinese dominance.
    • This situation has given the U.S. opportunity it has long sought: 1) More credible multilateral coordination among allies, 2) Pushback against online disinformation. 3) The desire to better integrate like-minded economies and supply chains.
    • But the crisis is also raising renewed questions about the American leadership.
    • The question now facing the U.S. is whether or not it can harness this new regional momentum.

    Alienating allies

    • U.S. continues to make unforced errors that create distance with U.S. allies and partners.
    • For example, its focus on cutting support for the WHO and asserting that COVID-19 originated in a Wuhan lab alienated Canberra.
    • Similarly, the administration’s suspension of various worker visas will almost certainly have serious repercussions in India.

    What should be the U.S. approach to Asia?

    • The U.S. needs to make two major shifts.
    • First, U.S. policy needs to start supporting, rather than attempting to commandeer, regional efforts to build a less China-centric future for the Indo-Pacific.
    • While Chinese aggression provides powerful motivation for coordination, U.S. partners are seeking an agenda that is framed in broader terms than simply rallying to counter Beijing.
    • If the U.S. wants to reduce reliance on Beijing and “re-couple” investments and supply chains among allied nations, it is going to have to make compromises.
    • U.S. should work with Indo-Pacific partners on the issues that they prioritise and provided them with space for independent action.
    • Second, Washington should avoid repeating Beijing’s mistakes of bullying.
    • U.S. should offer a clear alternative in word and deed to China’s “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy.
    • Moves such as demanding that a G-7 communiqué refer to COVID-19 as the “Wuhan virus” and blocking mask shipments to close allies are the kind of counterproductive bullying.

    Options for Asian countries

    • Beijing’s recent aggression is not an aberration but part of a growing pattern.
    • As Beijing’s confidence in its growing material and military power solidifies, its neighbours will need to think carefully about the long-term decisions necessary to preserve an open regional order.
    • Facing the unprecedented health and economic crises spawned by COVID-19, the U.S. and Asian partners will need to coordinate more closely.
    • Asian countries should strengthen their own regional networks.
    • This Asian network will challenge the views of those in both Washington and Beijing who would see the region only as a sparring ground.

    Conclusion

    For American and Asian leaders, the choice is stark: encourage and foster this trend, recognising that stronger regional coordination will require more compromises as well as tougher choices, or resist it and risk being left behind.

  • India should believe in the EU

    India and the EU have many things in common. And there are many areas in which both can expand the cooperation. This article explores commonalities and the areas which offer the scope for enhancing the cooperation. 

    Common interests

    • Both aim to enhance strategic autonomy and their global standing.
    • Diversifying strategic value chains is also a common interest.
    • Both seek to address the issue of climate change on an urgent basis.

    Economic ties with the EU

    • The EU is India’s largest trading partner accounting for €80 billion worth of trade in goods in 2019.
    • This is equal to 11.1% of total Indian trade.
    • The EU is also the biggest foreign investor, with €67.7 billion worth of investments made in 2018.
    • Which is equal to 22% of total FDI inflows.

    Scope for improving the economic ties

    • The EU’s investments in China amounted to €175.3 billion (2018).
    • So, India could succeed in attracting EU investment that might be moving out of China.
    • To attract this outflowing investment, India must address the mutual trust deficit.
    • Enhanced business cooperation can help both the EU and India diversify their strategic value chains.
    • Increasing people’s mobility and connectivity is another area that can create opportunities for innovation and growth.

    Talks on FTA

    • Both sides need to move further on the Free Trade Agreement.
    • A new study from the European Parliament estimates the impact of an EU-India trade agreement between €8 billion and €8.5 billion.
    • The study also mentions additional potential gains from enhanced coordination on the provision of global public goods, such as environmental standards.

    Cooperation on climate change

    • Under the new industrial strategy, the Green Deal, the EU has set an ambitious target to be carbon-emission neutral by 2050.
    • If the EU and India succeed in transforming into carbon-neutral economies by 2050, we all would gain from the investment.

    Strategic partnership with EU

    • The Indo-Pacific region is becoming contentious, so India should capitalise on its geopolitical leverage there.
    • Cooperation with like-minded, democratic powers can support this effort, especially towards assertive competitors like China.
    • The EU as a whole offers more to India than the strongest bilateral relations with individual EU member state.
    • New Delhi must learn how to maximise benefits from this strategic partnership.
    • The disruption caused by COVID-19 has been the occasion for the EU to prove its worth.
    • “Next-generation EU proposal” submitted by the European Commission has economic as well as geopolitical implications.
    • The proposal shows that the ties that bind the EU extend well beyond treaties and individual members’ self-interest.
    • The EU champions the rules-based international order, so the EU and India must act to promote sustainable reform of multilateral institutions starting from the WTO.

    Consider the question “India-EU ties with many common interests assume significance as rule-based order is being challenged by the rise of exceptionalism. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    A strong partnership would help both the EU and India become global decision-makers and tackle the challenges caused by the disruption of global order collectively.

  • Azad Pattan Hydel Project

    Pakistan and China have signed an agreement for the 700 MW Azad Pattan hydel power project on the Jhelum River in Sudhoti district of PoK.

    Try this question from CSP 2019:

    Q.What is common to the places known as Aliyar, Isapur and Kangsabati?

    (a) Recently discovered uranium deposits

    (b) Tropical rain forests

    (c) Underground cave systems

    (d) Water reservoirs

    Azad Pattan hydel project

    • The project is a run-of-the-river scheme with a reservoir located near Muslimabad village, 7 km upstream from the Azad Pattan bridge, in district Sudhnoti, one of the eight districts of PoK.
    • It is one of five hydropower schemes on the Jhelum.
    • Upstream from Azad Pattan are the Mahl, Kohala, and Chakothi Hattian projects; Karot is downstream. Like Kohala and Azad Pattan, Karot too is being developed under the CPEC framework.
    • The project will comprise a 90-metre-high dam, with a 3.8 sq km reservoir.
    • The $ 1.5-billion project is the second power project under the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

    Other projects in PoK

    • Kohala project is a 1,124 MW hydel project that will come upon the Jhelum near Muzaffarabad. This project is one of the biggest investments by China in PoK.
    • The Karot Hydropower station, the third project being executed by China on the Jhelum is on the boundaries of Kotli district in PoK and Rawalpindi district in Pakistan’s Punjab province.
    • Two hydel projects are planned in Gilgit Baltistan – Phandar Hydro Power, and Gilgit KIU.
    • Most recent in the news was Diamer-Bhasha dam in the PoK.

  • India’s Military Ties with Nepal

    Soldiers from Nepal form a significant part of the Indian Army’s legendary Gurkha regiment. Here is a brief explainer on the origin and evolution of these ties.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q.“India has special and time-tested military ties with Nepal”. Analyse.

    India’s military ties with Nepal: The origin

    • India’s military connection with the Himalayan country goes back to the reign of Maharaja Ranjit Singh whose army in Lahore enlisted Nepalese soldiers called Lahure or soldiers of fortune.
    • British India raised the first battalion of the Gurkha Regiment as the Nasiri regiment on April 24, 1815.
    • By the time the First World War started, there were 10 Gurkha regiments in the British Indian Army.
    • When India got freedom, these regiments were divided between the British and Indian armies as per the Britain–India–Nepal Tripartite Agreement signed in November 1947.
    • Six Gurkha regiments with a lakh-odd soldier came to India, which went on to raise another regiment called 11 Gurkha Rifles who chose not to transfer to the British Army.

    Can Nepali citizens join the Indian Army?

    • Yes, any Nepali can join the Indian Army, both as a jawan and as an officer.
    • A citizen of Nepal can take the NDA or CDS exams and join the Indian Army as an officer.
    • Col Lalit Rai, who received a Vir Chakra for the bravery of his battalion, the 1/11 Gurkha Rifles, during the Kargil war, is one such officer of Nepalese descent.
    • The Nepalese army also sends its officers for training to India’s military academies and combat colleges.

    Do the soldiers from Nepal enjoy the same rights as the Indian troops?

    • Yes, they enjoy the same benefits as the India troops both during service and after retirement.
    • They get the same medical facilities as the Indian soldiers, and often medical teams from the Indian Army tour Nepal.
    • Unlike the British, who started giving the Nepalese soldiers pension only a few years ago, the Indian Army has never discriminated against the Nepalese soldiers, who can avail of healthcare facilities in India as well.
    • The Indian Army also runs welfare projects in Nepal villages, including small water and power projects.

    The honorary chief of the Nepalese army

    • Yes, this convention dates back to 1972 when then Field Marshal Sam Manekshaw, a Gurkha regiment officer, fondly called Sam Bahadur by his troops, was made the honorary chief of the Nepalese army.
    • Ever since the Army chief of India is the honorary chief of the Nepalese army and vice-versa.

    Joint exercises

    • Joint military exercise ‘SURYA KIRAN is an annual event which is conducted alternatively in Nepal and India.
    • It is an important exercise in terms of the security challenges faced by both nations in the realm of changing facets of global terrorism.

  • Afghanistan–Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA)

    Pakistan has allowed Afghanistan to send goods to India using the Wagah border. The decision is a part of Islamabad’s commitment under the Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement (APTTA).

    A statement based question can be asked upon the agreement on terms like:

    1. Reciprocal trade with India

    2. Railways/Road/Air transit whether allowed

    About the agreement

    • The APTTA is a bilateral trade agreement signed in 2010 by Pakistan and Afghanistan.
    • It calls for greater facilitation in the movement of goods amongst the two countries.
    • The 2010 agreement supersedes the 1965 Afghanistan Transit Trade Agreement, which granted Afghanistan the right to import duty-free goods through Pakistani seaports, mostly notably from Karachi.

    Features of the agreement

    • Trade-in goods smuggled into Pakistan once constituted a major source of revenue for Afghanistan.
    • The 2010 APTTA allows for both countries to use each other’s airports, railways, roads, and ports for transit trade along designated transit corridors.
    • The agreement does not cover road transport vehicles from any third country, be it from India or any Central Asia country.
    • However, the signed Agreement permits Afghanistan trucks access to the Wagah border with India, where Afghan goods will be offloaded onto Indian trucks.
    • This agreement does not permit Indian goods to be loaded onto trucks for transit back to Afghanistan.
    • Instead, Afghan trucks offloaded at Wagah may return to Afghanistan loaded only with Pakistani, rather than Indian goods in an attempt to prevent the formation of a black market for Indian goods in Pakistan.

  • Chabahar Rail Project

    The Iranian government has decided to proceed with the construction of Chabahar Rail Project on its own, citing delays from the Indian side in funding and starting the project.

    What is the issue?

    • Four years ago, India and Iran signed an agreement to construct a rail line from Chabahar port to Zahedan, along the border with Afghanistan.
    • The Iranian Railways will proceed without India’s assistance, using approximately $400 million from the Iranian National Development Fund.
    • The development comes as China finalizes a massive 25-year, $400 billion strategic partnership deal with Iran, which could cloud India’s plans.

    The Chabahar Rail Project

    • It is a 628 km Chabahar-Zahedan line, which will be extended to Zaranj across the border in Afghanistan.
    • The entire project would be completed by March 2022.
    • It was meant to be part of India’s commitment to the trilateral agreement between India, Iran and Afghanistan to build an alternate trade route to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

    Why did Iran omit India from the project?

    • Despite several site visits by engineers, and preparations by Iranian railways, India never began the work, ostensibly due to worries that these could attract U.S. sanctions.
    • The U.S. had provided a sanctions waiver for the Chabahar port and the rail line to Zahedan, but it has been difficult to find equipment suppliers and partners due to worries they could be targeted by the U.S.
    • India has already “zeroed out” its oil imports from Iran due to U.S. sanctions.

    The contentious partnership with China

    • Iran and China are close to finalising a 25-year Strategic Partnership which will include Chinese involvement in Chabahar’s duty-free zone, an oil refinery nearby, and possibly a larger role in Chabahar port as well.
    • The cooperation will extend from investments in infrastructure, manufacturing and upgrading energy and transport facilities, to refurbishing ports, refineries and other installations.
    • It is also rumoured that the Chabahar port will be leased to China surpassing India.
    • Iran had proposed a tie-up between the port at Gwadar and Chabahar last year and has offered interests to China in the Bandar-e-Jask port 350km away from Chabahar, as well as in the Chabahar duty-free zone.

    Back2Basics: India-Iran Partnership over Chabahar Port

    • In 2016, India signed a deal with Iran entailing $8 billion investment in Chabahar port and industries in Chabahar Special Economic Zone.
    • The port is being developed as a transit route to Afghanistan and Central Asia.
    • India has already built a 240-km road connecting Afghanistan with Iran.
    • All this were expected to bring cargo to Bandar Abbas port and Chabahar port, and free Kabul from its dependence on Pakistan to reach the outer world.
    • Completion of this project would give India access to Afghanistan and beyond to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Europe via 7,200-km-long multi-modal North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).