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Subject: International Relations

  • The 5G Club ‘D10’

    Britain said that it was pushing the U.S. to form a club of 10 nations that could develop its own 5G technology and reduce dependence on Huawei.

    We can expect prelims question asking the purpose of the D10 group like-

    Q. The D10 Club recently seen in news is a- Environment NGO/ Group of Democracies/ etc.

    The D10 Club

    • The Britain is proposing a ‘D10’ club of democratic partners that groups the G7 nations with Australia and the Asian technology leaders South Korea and India.
    • It would include G7 countries – UK, US, Italy, Germany, France, Japan and Canada – plus Australia, South Korea and India.
    • It is aimed for channelling investments into existing telecommunication companies within the 10 member states.
    • The group aim to create alternative suppliers of 5G equipment and other technologies to avoid relying on China.

    Ruling out Huawei

    • Britain has allowed the Chinese global leader in 5G technology to build up to 35% of the infrastructure necessary to roll out its new speedy data network.
    • But their PM Boris Johnson was reported to have instructed officials to draw up plans to cut Huawei out of the network by 2023 as relations with China sour.

  • Anchoring the ties with Australia the virtual way

    India-Australia relations have been growing in depth and diversity. Though two countries have been collaborating in various areas there is still potential to be realised in many areas. This article discusses the India-Australia ties. The area in which the two countries are collaborating and scope to further it.

    Relations with much potential

    • Mr. Modi convened a virtual multilateral summit to bring South Asia together to face the pandemic, and he also spoke online with G-20 leaders on similar issues.
    • On June 4, India will have its first virtual bilateral summit with Australia.
    • The convergence of interests and values has been patently obvious.
    • But the time has also come to translate that potential into reality.

    So, let’s see how India and Australia are expanding the scope of cooperation

    • 1) The two countries have sought to reconstruct their increasingly turbulent regional geography in the Indo-Pacific and see the Quad (with Japan and the United States) as the most potent instrument to promote cooperation.
    • The Quad, not surprisingly has been causing apprehensions in Beijing.
    • 2) It is expected that the ‘Mutual Logistics Support Agreement’ will be signed during the summit.
    • That should enhance defence cooperation and ease the conduct of large-scale joint military exercises.
    • 3) Last April, Australia and India conducted AUSINDEX, their largest bilateral naval exercise.
    • And there are further developments on the anvil, including Australia’s permanent inclusion in the Malabar exercise with Japan.
    • 4) It may be prudent too for New Delhi and Canberra to elevate the ‘two plus two’ format for talks from the Secretary level to the level of Foreign and Defence Ministers.

    Now, let’s look at the cooperation in areas that matter to the lives of the people of the countries-

    1) Pandemic control through controlled adaptation:  Lesson from Australia

    • Australia is one of the few countries that has managed to combat COVID-19 so far through “controlled adaptation” by which the coronavirus has been suppressed to very low levels.
    • Two of the leaders of this great Australia-wide effort are Indian-born scientists.
    • There is much that the two Prime Ministers can share on this front.

    2) Collaboration in  health, safe food and supply chains

    • In terms of health and safe food as well the supply chains that facilitate their delivery, there are important lessons to be learnt.
    • One of Australia’s richest businessman and first patron of the Australia-India Leadership Dialogue recently described the promise of DTC-CPG (direct to consumer; consumer packaged goods) which could transform global supply chains.
    • Here too there is much room for collaboration and new thinking.

    3) Higher education

    • The recovery of Australia’s universities, most of which are publicly funded and many rank among the top in the world, is still in question.
    • But they are proving to be resilient and pioneers in distance and online learning.
    • Australian universities could well open earlier than most and emerge as a safer destination for quality education than their European or Ivy league counterparts.

    Consider the question “India’s relations with Australia have of late acquired a dept and diversity which is visible in their cooperation in diverse areas. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    As India and Australia with shared values try to bring about fresh order in a turbulent world, the virtual summit, in this sense, could not have been better timed.

  • China and the Rhineland moment in Hong Kong

    While the world is busy battling pandemic, China has embarked upon completing its pet project: stripping Hong Kong off its special status. This article explains the significance of China’s actions. And the options the U.S. could explore as a response to China’s move.

    Tipping points in History

    • In 1911 Germany sparked an international crisis when it sent a gunboat into the Moroccan port of Agadir.
    • Winston Churchill wrote in his history of the First World War, “all the alarm bells throughout Europe began immediately to quiver.”
    • In 1936 Germany provoked another crisis when it marched troops into the Rhineland, in flagrant breach of its treaty obligations.
    • In 1946, the Soviet Union made it obvious it had no intention of honoring democratic principles in Central Europe, and Churchill was left to warn that “an iron curtain has descended across the Continent.”

    Analogies: Not perfect, but not inapt, either.

    • Analogies between these past episodes and China’s decision this week to draft a new national security law on Hong Kong aren’t perfect.
    • First, Hong Kong is a Chinese port, not a faraway foreign one.
    • Second, Hong Kong’s people have ferociously resisted Beijing’s efforts to impose control, unlike the Rhineland Germans who welcomed Berlin’s.
    • And lastly, the curtailment of freedom that awaits Hong Kong is nothing like the totalitarian tyranny that Joseph Stalin imposed on Warsaw, Budapest and other cities.
    • But the analogies aren’t inapt, either.
    • Beijing has spent the better part of 20 years subverting its promises to preserve Hong Kong’s democratic institutions.
    • Now it is moving to quash what remains of the city’s civic freedoms through a forthcoming law that allows the government to punish speech as subversion and protest as sedition.
    • The concept of “one country, two systems,” was supposed to last at least until 2047 under the terms of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration.
    • Now China’s rulers have been openly violating that treaty, much as Germany openly violated the treaties of Locarno and Versailles.

    Rethink of the U.S. strategic approach to China

    • US administration has undertaken a sober rethink of it’s strategic approach to China.
    • The outlines of which are described in a new inter-agency document quietly released by the White House last week.
    • Gone from this new vision are the platitudes about encouraging China’s “peaceful rise” as a “responsible stakeholder” in a “rules-based order.”
    • Instead, Beijing is described, accurately, as a habitual and aggressive violator of that order.
    • It also describes China as a domestic tyrant, international bully and economic bandit that systematically robs companies of their intellectual property, countries of their sovereign authorities, and its own people of their natural rights.
    • A critic might note that this description of China’s behavior sounds a lot like Trump’s.
    • Sort of, except that the comparison trivializes the scale of China’s abuses and neglects the breadth and longevity of its challenge.

    Why Now and what is the US response?

    • Beijing almost certainly chose this moment to strike because it calculated that a world straining under the weight of a pandemic and a depression lacked the will and attention to react.
    • On Friday, Trump said he would strip Hong Kong of its privileged commercial and legal ties to the U.S.
    • Issue with the move: That punishes the people of Hong Kong at least as much as it does their rulers in Beijing.

    What’s a better course for the U.S.? A few ideas:

    • Sanction Chinese officials engaged in human-rights abuses in Hong Kong under the Global Magnitsky Act.
    • Upgrade relations with Taiwan and increase arms sales, including top-shelf weapons’ systems such as the F-35 and the Navy’s future frigate.
    • Re-enter the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)agreement as a counter to China’s economic influence.
    • Publicly press all G-7 countries to stop doing business with telecom-giant Huawei as a meaningful response to the Hong Kong law.
    • Give every Hong Kong person an opportunity to easily obtain a U.S. residency card, even a passport.

    Conclusion

    If all this and more were announced now, it might persuade Beijing to pull back from the brink. In the meantime, think of this as  Rhineland moment with China — and remember what happened the last time the free world looked aggression in the eye, and blinked

  • For a reset in India-Nepal relations

    Over the past few years, we have been  witness to the deteriorating India-Nepal relations. Reserves of goodwill which India had accumulated is fast depleting in Nepal. The latest issue over the map is a new addition to the decline in relations. This article stresses the need for political maturity to find the solution to the complex issue of the underlying problem.

    Need for the fundamental reset in relations between Indian and Nepal

    • The immediate provocation for the contention is the long-standing territorial issue surrounding Kalapani.
    • It is a patch of land near the India-Nepal border, close to the Lipulekh Pass on the India-China border.
    • However, the underlying reasons are far more complex.
    • Yet, Nepali Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli’s exploitation of the matter, by raising the banner of Nepali nationalism and painting India as a hegemon, is part of a frequent pattern.
    • Which indicates that relations between the two countries need a fundamental reset.

    Let’s look at the historical background of the India-Nepal border

    • India inherited the boundary with Nepal, established between Nepal and the East India Company in the Treaty of Sugauli in 1816.
    • Kali river constituted the boundary, and the territory to its east was Nepal.
    • The dispute relates to the origin of Kali.
    • Near Garbyang village in Dharchula Tehsil of the Pithoragarh district of Uttarakhand, there is a confluence of different streams coming from north-east from Kalapani and north-west from Limpiyadhura.
    • The early British survey maps identified the north-west stream, Kuti Yangti, from Limpiyadhura as the origin.
    • But after 1857 changed the alignment to Lipu Gad, and in 1879 to Pankha Gad, the north-east streams, thus defining the origin as just below Kalapani.
    • Nepal accepted the change and India inherited this boundary in 1947.

    More past events dealing with the LIpulech pass

    • The Maoist revolution in China in 1949, followed by the takeover of Tibet, created deep misgivings in Nepal.
    • So, India was ‘invited’ by Nepal to set up 18 border posts along the Nepal-Tibet border.
    • The westernmost post was at Tinkar Pass, about 6 km further east of Lipulekh.
    • In 1953, India and China identified Lipulekh Pass for both pilgrims and border trade. After the 1962 war, pilgrimage through Lipulekh resumed in 1981, and border trade, in 1991.
    • In 1961, King Mahendra visited Beijing to sign the China-Nepal Boundary Treaty that defines the zero point in the west, just north of Tinkar Pass.
    • By 1969, India had withdrawn its border posts from Nepali territory.
    • The base camp for Lipulekh remained at Kalapani, less than 10 km west of Lipulekh.
    • In their respective maps, both countries showed Kalapani as the origin of Kali river and as part of their territory.
    • After 1979, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police has manned the Lipulekh Pass.

    So, when was the issue of the origin of Kali river raised?

    • After the 1996 Treaty of Mahakali -Kali river is also called Mahakali/Sarada further downstream-the issue of the origin of Kali river was first raised in 1997.
    • The matter was referred to the Joint Technical Level Boundary Committee that had been set up in 1981 to re-identify and replace the old and damaged boundary pillars along the India-Nepal border.
    • The Committee clarified 98% of the boundary, leaving behind the unresolved issues of Kalapani and Susta when it was dissolved in 2008.
    • It was subsequently agreed that the matter would be discussed at the Foreign Secretary level.
    • Meanwhile, the project to convert the 80-km track from Ghatibagar to Lipulekh into a hardtop road began in 2009 without any objections from Nepal.

    Objections raised by Nepal to the new map released by India

    • The Survey of India issued a new political map (eighth edition) on November 2, 2019, to reflect the change in the status of Jammu and Kashmir as two Union Territories.
    • Nepal registered a protest though the map in no way had changed the boundary between India and Nepal.
    • However, on November 8, the ninth edition was issued.
    • The delineation remained identical but the name Kali river had been deleted.
    • Predictably, this led to stronger protests, with Nepal invoking Foreign Secretary-level talks to resolve issues.

    New map released by Nepal and issues with it

    • A new map of Nepal based on the older British survey reflecting Kali river originating from Limpiyadhura in the north-west of Garbyang was adopted by parliament and notified on May 20.
    • On May 22, a constitutional amendment proposal was tabled to include it in a relevant Schedule.
    • The new alignment adds 335 sq km to Nepali territory, territory that has never been reflected in a Nepali map for nearly 170 years.

    Following issue explains why there is need for rewriting the fundamental of India-Nepal relations

    1. Nepali nationalism is being equated to anti-Indianism

    • Prime Minister Narendra Modi has often spoken of the “neighbourhood first” policy.
    • But the relationship took a nosedive in 2015 when India first got blamed for interfering in the Constitution-drafting in Nepal.
    • And then for an “unofficial blockade” that generated widespread resentment against the country.
    • It reinforced the notion that Nepali nationalism and anti-Indianism were two sides of the same coin.

    2. China factor

    • In Nepali thinking, the China card has provided them the leverage to practise their version of non-alignment.
    • In the past, China maintained a link with the Palace and its concerns were primarily related to keeping tabs on the Tibetan refugee community.
    • With the abolition of the monarchy, China has shifted attention to the political parties as also to institutions like the Army and Armed Police Force.
    • Also, today’s China is pursuing a more assertive foreign policy and considers Nepal an important element in its growing South Asian footprint.

    3. India has ignored the changing political narrative for long

    • The reality is that India has ignored the changing political narrative in Nepal for far too long.
    • India remained content that its interests were safeguarded by quiet diplomacy even when Nepali leaders publicly adopted anti-Indian postures.
    • Long ignored by India, it has spawned distortions in Nepali history textbooks and led to long-term negative consequences.
    • For too long India has invoked a “special relationship”, based on shared culture, language and religion, to anchor its ties with Nepal.
    • Today, this term carries a negative connotation — that of a paternalistic India that is often insensitive and, worse still, a bully.
    • The 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship which was sought by the Nepali authorities in 1949  is viewed as a sign of an unequal relationship, and an Indian imposition.
    • The purpose of the treaty was to continue the special links Nepal had with British India and it  provides for an open border and right to work for Nepali nationals
    • Yet, Nepali authorities have studiously avoided taking it up bilaterally even though Nepali leaders thunder against it in their domestic rhetoric.

    Consider the question, “Examine the issues that have been testing the old ties between India and Nepal.”

    Conclusion

    The urgent need today is to pause the rhetoric on territorial nationalism and lay the groundwork for a quiet dialogue where both sides need to display sensitivity as they explore the terms of a reset of the “special relationship”. A normal relationship where India can be a generous partner will be a better foundation for “neighbourhood first” in the 21st century.

  • Deepening India’s engagement with Africa amid pandemic

    Long thought to be the backwater of the world, Africa has been successful in shading its past image and emerge on the global stage as region hard to ignore. And countries across the world are vying to increase their engagement with the region. This article examines the scope for increasing the ties with the region amid the pandemic.

    India’s association with African Union

    • Africa Day is observed every year on May 25 to commemorate the founding of the Organisation of African Unity, now known as the African Union.
    • India has been closely associated with it on account of its shared colonial past and rich contemporary ties.
    • The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses has hosted an Africa Day Round Table annually for the last four years in order to commemorate this epochal event.

    Economy and pandemic

    • The World Bank in its April report, assessed that the COVID-19 outbreak has sparked off the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region’s first recession in 25 years.
    • Growth is expected to plummet to between -2.1 and -5.1 per cent in 2020, from a modest 2.4 per cent in 2019.
    • With high rates of HIV, malaria, diabetes, hypertension and malnourishment prevalent, a large number of Africans were already faced with a health and economic crisis.
    • The steep decline in commodity prices has spelt disaster for the economies of Nigeria, Zambia and Angola.

    Need for financial support

    • Precarious fiscal positions have ruled out any major governmental stimulus.
    • Public debt has mounted.
    • According to the World Bank, the SSA region paid $35.8 billion in total debt service in 2018.
    • Which is 2.1 per cent of regional gross domestic product (GDP).
    • Together, African countries have sought a $100 billion rescue package.
    • This rescue package includes a $44 billion waiver of interest payment by the world’s 20 largest economies.
    • The IMF’s debt service relief of $500 million is meant for 25 countries of which 19 are in Africa, but that is a drop in the bucket.
    • It is clear that without outside support, Africa will find it very difficult to meet the challenge.

    Why the increased interest in engagement with Africa?

    • Africa’s rich natural resources, long-term economic potential, youthful demography and influence as a bloc of 54 countries in multi-lateral organisations is apparent.
    • Many have an eye for economic opportunities, including in energy, mining, infrastructure and connectivity. 
    • Japan hosted the 7th Tokyo International Conference for African Development (TICAD) in August 2019.
    • Russia hosted the first-ever Russia-Africa Summit last year.
    • Brazil, home to the largest population of people of African descent outside of Africa, has also sought to develop closer ties.
    • Cuba has sent medical teams to help Africa.

    Chinese Bonhomie with the region

    • China’s engagement of Africa, as elsewhere, is huge but increasingly regarded as predatory and exploitative.
    • Its annual trade with Africa in 2019 stood at $208 billion, in addition to investments and loans worth $200 billion.
    • Traditionally, China’s participation in infrastructure projects has been astonishing.
    • Having famously built the 1,860 km Tanzania-Zambia railway line in 1975, and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti and Mombasa-Nairobi lines more recently, China is now eyeing to develop the vast East Africa Master Railway Plan.
    • It is also developing the Trans-Maghreb Highway, the Mambilla Hydropower Plant in Nigeria, the Walvis Bay Container Terminal in Windhoek and the Caculo Cabaca Hydropower project in Angola.
    • At the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (COCAC) in 2018, China set aside $60 billion in developmental assistance.
    • And it was followed by a whopping $1 billion Belt and Road (BRI) Infrastructure Fund for Africa.
    • China has followed up with robust health sector diplomacy in the wake of the pandemic.
    • But its image has been tarnished by defective supplies of PPE gear and discriminatory behaviour against Africans in Guangzhou.
    • This also led to an embarrassing diplomatic row.

    India’s relations with Africa

    • In the last few years, India’s relations with Africa saw a revival.
    • India-Africa trade reached $62 billion in 2018 compared to $39 billion during 2009-10.
    • After South Asia, Africa is the second-largest recipient of Indian overseas assistance with Lines of Credit (LOC) worth nearly $10 billion (42 per cent of the total) spread over 100 projects in 41 countries.
    • Ties were boosted at the India Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) in 2015.
    • 40 per cent of all training and capacity building slots under the ITEC programme have traditionally been reserved for Africa.
    • Approximately 6,000 Indian soldiers are deployed in UN peace-keeping missions in five conflict zones in Africa.
    • Bilateral cooperation includes solar energy development, information technology, cyber security, maritime security, disaster relief, counter-terrorism and military training.
    • India has also launched several initiatives to develop closer relations, including the first-ever India Africa Defence Ministers conclave in February this year on the margins of the Defence Expo 2020.
    • India provides about 50,000 scholarships to African students each year.
    • The huge Indian diaspora is a major asset.
    • India had planned to host the Fourth India Africa Forum Summit in September this year.
    • However, the COVID-19 pandemic may cause it to be delayed.

    India’s support amid covid pandemic

    • India has already despatched medical assistance to 25 African countries.
    • PM Modi has had a telephonic talk with President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa who is the current chairperson of the African Union, and separately others such as the presidents of Uganda and Ethiopia.
    • India could consider structuring a series of virtual summits in zonal groups with African leaders across the continent over the next few months.
    • That could both provide a platform for a cooperative response to the pandemic and also serve as a precursor to the actual summit in the future.
    • The Ministry of External Affairs has already extended the e-ITEC course on “COVID-19 Pandemic: Prevention and Management Guidelines for Healthcare Professionals” to healthcare workers in Africa.
    • The Aarogya Setu App and the E-Gram Swaraj App for rural areas for mapping COVID-19 are technological achievements that could be shared with Africa.
    • Since the movement of African students to India for higher education has been disrupted, India may expand the e-VidyaBharti (tele education) project to establish an India-Africa Virtual University. Agriculture and food security can also be a fulcrum for deepening ties.
    • With the locust scourge devastating the Horn of Africa and the pandemic worsening the food crisis, India could ramp up its collaboration in this sector.
    • India could also create a new fund for Africa and adapt its grant-in-aid assistance to reflect the current priorities.
    • This could include support for new investment projects by Indian entrepreneurs especially in the pharmaceutical and healthcare sectors in Africa.

    Time for Quad Plus to propose cooperation with African countries

    • Both India and Japan share a common interest in forging a partnership for Africa’s development.
    • It is time for the Quad Plus, in which the US, India, Japan and Australia have recently engaged other countries such as the ROK, Vietnam, New Zealand, Israel and Brazil, to exchange views and propose cooperation with select African countries abutting the Indian Ocean.
    • After all, the Indo-Pacific straddles the entire maritime space of the Indian Ocean.

    Consider the 2015 question asked by the UPSC “Increasing interest of India in Africa has its pros and cons. Critically examine”

    Conclusion

    The pandemic is a colossal challenge but it may create fresh opportunities to bring India and Africa closer together.

  • India-China confrontation: Not a standalone event

    The recent India-China standoff in Ladakh points to a larger picture of the Chinese agenda of regional dominance. The US-China tension has proved to be the backdrop against which the Ladakh standoff is playing out. This article suggests that this standoff is not a standalone event. It could well be a trigger for domino effect.

    What the intensification of tension between India-China suggests?

    1) China is feeling threatened

    • An authoritarian regime whose legitimacy rests primarily on its economic performance is faced with a situation where growth is expected to plummet.
    • It is a sign that Beijing is increasingly feeling beleaguered.
    • In response, it has embarked on a strategy of brinkmanship with several goals in mind.
    • External adventurism, when cloaked in the garb of ultra-nationalism, can shore up a regime’s legitimacy at home.

    2) It could be a move to divert the attention of the world

    • Simultaneously, it can act as a diversionary measure to escape international criticism for Beijing’s attempt to cover up the spread of the coronavirus.
    • Many countries hold China responsible for the huge cost in human lives and suffering as well as the unprecedented economic distress.
    • In the face of such criticism, the Chinese regime is increasingly using jingoistic jargon to build up domestic support.
    • President Xi Jinping’s recent speech to the PLA is an outstanding example of this strategy.
    • He exhorted the Chinese armed forces to “prepare for war” in order to “resolutely safeguard national sovereignty” and “the overall strategic stability of the country”.
    • This is a sign that the Communist Party of China (CPC) feels increasingly threatened both domestically and externally.

    Let’s look at the deterioration of the US-China relations

    • China’s relations with the U.S. have been going downhill almost since the beginning of the Donald Trump presidency.
    • Washington has periodically imposed economic sanctions on China and Beijing has retaliated in kind.
    • Trade talks have faltered because of growing protectionist sentiments in the U.S. and Chinese inability to adequately respond to them.
    • The chipping away at Hong Kong’s autonomous status by Beijing and the suppression of the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong has led to severe criticism by the U.S. administration and in the Congress.
    • Differences over the issue of Taiwan have added to tensions, with China viewing the U.S. as the primary impediment preventing Taiwan’s integration.
    • The Trump administration has significantly increased support to Taiwan with arms sales that have added to China’s concern.

    U.S.-China rivalry in South-China Sea

    • Above all, the U.S.-China rivalry in the South China Sea acts as the potential flashpoint that may well lead to a shooting war.
    • So far, it has been careful that these moves do not trigger a serious confrontation with the U.S.
    • Washington has a strong interest in preventing China from asserting control over the South China Sea as maintaining free access to this waterway is important to it for economic reasons.
    • It also has defence treaty obligations to the Philippines, which has vigorously contested Chinese territorial claims.
    • Further, China’s control of the South China Sea would be a major step toward replacing the U.S. as the foremost power in the Indo-Pacific region.

    India-China relation questions have been the leitmotif in the UPSC papers. Just the theme of the question changes. Consider 2017 question “China is using its economic relations and positive trade surplus as a tool to develop potential military power status in Asia. In light of this statement, discuss its impact on India as her neighbour.”

    Conclusion

    Increased Chinese adventurism could result in an escalation of U.S.-China confrontation in the South China Sea. If that happens, the India-China face-off in Ladakh could become part of a much larger “great game”, with the U.S. trying to preserve the status quo and China attempting to change it to further its objective of regional dominance at the U.S.’s expense. The current India-China crisis should, therefore, be seen in its proper context and not as an isolated event.

  • India-Pak cooperation against Locusts Attack

    As another locust swarm comes from Pakistan, the spotlight is again on the India-Pakistan dynamic that has come into play.

    Do you know?

    The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) believes locusts have decimated close to 70,000 hectares of crops in Kenya, 30,000 hectares in Ethiopia and 42,000 hectares of crops in the state of Rajasthan.
    Just so you can perhaps assess the kind of damage we are talking about here. A large swarm can eat as much as about 35,000 people in one day 😀 !

    What are Locusts?

    • The desert locust (Schistocerca gregaria) is a short-horned grasshopper that is innocuous while it is in a “solitary phase” and moving about independently.
    • These winged insects differ from normal hoppers and become dangerous only when their populations build up rapidly and the close physical contact in crowded conditions triggers behavioural changes.
    • They, then, enter the “gregarious phase”, by grouping into bands and forming swarms that can travel great distances (up to 150 km daily), while eating up every bit of vegetation on the way.
    • If not controlled at the right time, these insect swarms can threaten the food security of countries.

    India reaches out to Pak

    • The Ministry of External Affairs said that it has reached out to Pakistan for cooperation, and is awaiting their response.
    • Despite the ups and downs in the bilateral relationship, cooperation on the locust warning system has survived the wars, terrorist attacks, and political turmoil.

    History of outbreaks in India

    • Records suggest that since the beginning of the 19th century, there have been at least eight “outbreaks” in India from 1812 to 1889, and a ninth in 1896-1897.
    • According to the history of the Locust Warning Office published by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), there were “serious invasions” of locusts in India every few years during the 1900s.
    • A “five-year invasion” from 1926 to 1931 is estimated to have damaged crops worth Rs 2 crore (about $100 million at today’s prices).
    • The princely states and provinces had their own structures to deal with this, but there was no coordination.

    The Locust Warning Organization (LWO)

    • After the 1926-32 “invasion”, the British Indian government-sponsored a research scheme, starting in 1931, which led to the permanent Locust Warning Organization (LWO) in 1939.
    • It had its headquarters in New Delhi and a substation in Karachi.
    • In 1941, a conference of princely states in desert areas and provinces affected by locusts was held.
    • Its role was expanded in 1942, and in 1946 a bureaucratic structure was put in place.

    Beginning of cooperation

    • Iran too suffered locust attacks, in 1876, and in 1926-1932.
    • Apparently the first case of collaboration between countries in the region occurred in 1942 when a delegation from India helped with locust control work in southwest Persia.
    • Over the next two years, Indian help was also provided to Oman and Persia.
    • This was followed by the first conference within the region on Desert Locust, which was held in Tehran in 1945 and involved Iran, India, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
    • A second conference took place in 1950 also in Tehran with Pakistan participating.

    Bringing in Pakistan

    • In the 1950s, India and Iran cooperated and Pakistan provided two aircraft for locust surveys in Saudi Arabia.
    • Following another attack during 1958-61, a decision was taken to group Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India together and the FAO Desert Locust commission was formed in 1964.
    • The commission held annual sessions skipped in 1965 and 1999 but held in 1971.
    • Even in the last six years when the relationship between India and Pakistan has deteriorated, it has been held in 2014, 2016 and 2018.
    • The meetings are attended by locust control experts, with no diplomats.

    India and Pakistan

    • In 1977, the two countries began to meet on the border.
    • From 1991 to 2003, special border surveys took place during the summer, undertaken by locust control officers in their respective countries.
    • Joint border meetings have taken place every year since 2005 till 2019, except in 2011. This has been despite every diplomatic strain; including the 26/11 Mumbai attacks.
    • Arrangements are made in advance and protocols are followed for crossing the border.
    • While politics and diplomacy is kept out of the technical discussions, locust control authorities feel that one of the more difficult challenges faced by the commission is that of “insecurity and sensitivities” in the region.

    Also read:

    Risk of Early Locusts Attacks: A new concern

    Try this:

    Q. Time and again normal ocean cycles got more pronounced or disrupted, resulting in all kinds of unintended consequences, like an ever-increasing domino effect of locust attacks in Asia and the Indian Sub Continent. We need to understand these links if we are to plan effectively for climate change mitigation and adaptation. Discuss. (250W)

  • What is the Korean Armistice Agreement?

    A United Nations investigation into a recent exchange of gunfire between North Korea and South Korea inside the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) has determined that both countries violated the armistice that ended the 1950-53 Korean War.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. What is the Korean Armstice Agreement? Discuss the concept of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)?

    The Korean Armstice Agreement

    • The Korean Armstice Agreement signed on 27 July 1953 is the armistice that brought about a complete cessation of hostilities of the Korean War.
    • It was not the end of a war, but only a cessation of hostilities in an attempt to negotiate a lasting peace.
    • Military commanders from China and North Korea signed the agreement on one side, with the US-led United Nations Command signing on behalf of the international community.

    What is the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)?

    • The DMZ marks where the 1950-53 Korean War — when China and North Korea battled UN forces led by the United States — ended with an armistice, not a treaty.
    • It is a 2 km-wide buffer, stretching coast to coast across the peninsula, lined by both sides with razor wire, heavy armaments and tank traps.
    • It is 60 km from Seoul and 210 km from the North Korean capital of Pyongyang. Inside the DMZ is a Joint Security Area (JSA).
    • The so-called ‘peace village’ of Panmunjom, where the armistice that halted the Korean War was signed in 1953, is located in the 800-metre-wide and 400-metre-long JSA zone.
    • A Military Demarcation Line (MDL) marks the boundary between the two Koreas.

    Why it is significant?

    • Vast stretches of the DMZ have been no man’s land for more than 60 years, where wildlife has flourished undisturbed.
    • Last year, US President Donald Trump met with North Korean leader Kim Jong Un at the demilitarized zone separating the two Koreas, in Panmunjom.

  • Analysing three-pronged strategy of China in Ladakh

    The article gives an in-depth analysis of the current border dispute between India and China in Ladakh. But the present dispute follows the pattern. China has been encroaching and gaining control over the disputed territory since the 1980s. And this dispute also fits into that pattern.

    China acting strategically in Ladakh

    • While India has pursued its core national interests in J&K, China’s response was strategic — a shift that may have a lasting imprint on geopolitics.
    • We have been harping on the “differing perception” theory of the LAC for decades.
    • But in reality China has been gaining control over a massive “disputed territory” in Eastern Ladakh since the 1980s.

    Major Chinese encroachment events

    • The Chinese first made encroachments into the 45-km long Skakjung pastureland in Demchok-Kuyul sector.
    • This resulted in local Changpas of Chushul, Tsaga, Nidar, Nyoma, Mud, Dungti, Kuyul, Loma villages gradually losing their winter grazing.
    • Ladakh’s earlier border lay at Kegu Naro — a day-long march from Dumchele.
    • Starting from the loss of Nagtsang in 1984, followed by Nakung (1991) and Lungma-Serding (1992), the last bit of Skakjung was lost in 2008.
    • The PLA followed the nomadic Rebo routes for patrolling in contrast to Indian authorities restricting Rebo movements that led to the massive shrinking of pastureland and border defence.
    • By the 2000s, the PLA’s focus shifted to desolate, inhospitable Chip Chap which remains inaccessible until end-March.
    • After mid-May, water streams impede vehicles moving across Shyok, Galwan, and Chang-Chenmo rivers leaving only a month and a half for effective patrolling by the Indian side.
    • No human beings inhabit here, a 1962 war site, an entry point into Ladakh for the Uyghurs and Tibetans.
    • Local Ladakhi personnel manned the posts here, but patrolling in the 972 sq km Trig Height area has been lax.
    • Easier accessibility allowed the PLA to intrude into Chip Chap with impunity during July-August — its regulars usually spent a few hours before crossing back.
    • But, during the 21-day Depsang stand-off in 2013, when Burtse became a flashpoint, the PLA set up remote camps 18-19 km inside Indian territory.
    • Chinese soldiers virtually prevented Indian troops from getting access to Rakinala near Daulat Beg-Olde (DBO) where the IAF reactivated the world’s highest landing strips in 2008.
    2008 Daulat Beg Oldi Stand-off
    • This plus the reopening of Fukche and Nyoma airbases perhaps provoked the PLA’s intrusion in Depsang.

    So, what is the current stand-off about?

    • Despite topographical challenges, the BRO has lately fast-tracked the 260 km long Shayok-DBO road construction.
    • That road construction probably triggered the PLA intrusion in early May sparking the current Galwan stand-off.
    • Towards the south at Pangong Tso, forces had physical scuffles over area-denial for patrolling at Sirijap on May 5-6 and on May 11.
    • The situation remains tense at Sirijap’s cliff spurs and also at the Tso, where troops are chasing each other in high-speed patrol boats.
    • Clearly, intrusions are part of China’s never-ending effort to push Indian troops westward of the Indus and Shyok rivers and reach the 1960 claimed line.

    Details of the disputed border in Ladakh

    • Out of the 857 sq km long border in Ladakh only 368 sq km is the International Border, and the rest of the 489 sq km is the LAC.
    • The two traditional disputed points included Trig Heights and Demchok.
    • At eight points, the two sides have differing perceptions.
    • But lately, China has raised two fresh dispute points at Pangong Tso 83 sq km and at Chumur where it claims 80 sq km.
    • The old dispute sites were at the end point of Pangong Tso and at Chushul — the 1962 battle-site.

    Three-pronged strategy

    • 1) The Sirijap range on the northern bank of the lake remains most contested, from which several cliff spurs jut out — the “finger series” 1 to 8.
    • India’s LAC claim line is at Finger-8, but the actual position is only up to Finger-4.
    • The Chinese are asserting further west to claim 83 sq km here.
    • The PLA has built a 4.5 km long road to prevent patrolling by Indian troops.
    • The PLA’s road network from here extends to Huangyangtan base located near National Highway G219.
    • 2) Further south in Demchok, China claims some 150 sq km.
    • The PLA has built massive infrastructure on its side, moved armoured troops into Charding Nalla since 2009.
    • Tibetan nomads pitch tents on Hemis Monastery’s land throughout 2018-2019.
    • 3)In Chumur, China claims 80 sq km and probably wants a straight border from PT-4925 to PT-5318 to bring Tible Mane (stupa) area under its control.
    • For India, holding of Chumur is critical for the safety of the Manali-Leh route.
    • PLA demanded removal of India’s fortified positions in Burtse (2013) and Demchok and Chumur (2014) for its retreat.

    What could be the implications for India?

    • Overall, the pattern shows the PLA’s desperate design to snatch the lake at Lukung through a three-pronged strategy of attacking from Sirijap in the north, Chuchul in the south and through the lake water from middle.
    • This is the key chokepoint from where the Chinese can cut off Indian access to the entire flank of Chip Chap plains, Aksai Chin in the east and Shayok Valley to the north.
    •  Which means that Indian control is pushed to the west of the Shyok river and south of the Indus river, forcing India to accept both rivers as natural boundaries.
    • And once China gets control of the southern side of the Karakoram it can easily approach Siachen Glacier from the Depsang corridor.
    • And meet at Tashkurgan junction from where the CPEC crosses into Gilgit-Baltistan.
    • That would be disastrous for Indian defence, leaving the strategic Nubra vulnerable, possibly impacting even India’s hold over Siachen.
    • China’s access to Changla-pass through Lukung and Tangtse would threaten the entire Indus Valley.
    • It is quite possible that China is eyeing the waters of the Shyok, Galwan and Chang-Chenmo rivers, to divert them to the arid Aksai Chin and its Ali region.

    Consider the question “What could be the strategic and security implications of China’s claim in Pangong Tso region for India?”

    Conclusion

    India should resist the Chinese design which could have disastrous consequences for India’s defence and strategic interests. This should involve diplomatic channels rather than skirmishes on the borders.

  • Looking beyond Taliban: Focus on the Pashtun Question

    The US-Taliban peace deal signals growing heft of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Pashtuns constitute nearly 42 per cent population of Afghanistan and the Taliban is essentially a Pashtun formation. Also,  remember Pakistan: just like the kid who is always up to something. The ethnic fragmentation and Pakistan’s meddling is a recipe for perpetual conflict zone in the region.

    The question of India’s engagement with Taliban

    • Taliban’s effective control of territory in Afghanistan expanded in recent years.
    • This led to the question of India’s direct dialogue with the Taliban gain some relevance.
    • It has acquired some immediacy after the US announced plans for a significant draw down of its forces from Afghanistan and signed a peace deal with the Taliban earlier this year.
    • Also, recently the US Special Envoy for Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, called on India to open a political conversation with the Taliban.
    • The interest was further amplified by a signal from the Taliban that it is eager for a productive relationship with India.

    So, what should India do?

    • Those calling for direct engagement with the Taliban say that Delhi can’t ignore such an important force in Afghan politics.
    • Opponents say there is no reason for Delhi to join the international stampede to embrace the Taliban.
    • If and when the Taliban becomes a peaceful entity and joins the quest for a political settlement with Kabul, they argue, Delhi should have no objection to direct talks.
    • So, opening a dialogue with the Taliban is a tactical issue focused on when, how and on what terms.

    Pashtun question and India’s enduring interest in Afghanistan

    • The Taliban remains an important sub-set of the larger and more strategic Pashtun question.
    • The Pashtun question holds the key to India’s enduring interest in Afghanistan: Promoting a peaceful, independent and a sovereign Afghanistan that is not a subaltern to the Pakistan army.

    2 Basic issues that will define the Pashtun question

    1. Forming unity among multiple ethnic groups

    • First is the problem of reconciling the interests of multiple ethnic groups in Afghanistan.
    • The Pashtuns constitute nearly 42 per cent of the population.
    • The sizeable Afghan minorities include 27 per cent Tajiks, 9 per cent each of Hazaras and Uzbeks.
    • Irrespective of the nature of the regimes in Kabul over the last four decades— constructing a stable internal balance has been hard.
    • That problem will acquire a new intensity as the Taliban stakes claim for a dominant role in Kabul.

    But has the Taliban learnt to live in peace with the minorities?

    • The Taliban, an essentially Pashtun formation, had brutally crushed the minorities during its brief rule in the late 1990s.
    • There are some indications that the Taliban is now reaching out to the minorities but it is some distance away from winning their trust.

    2. Pakistan’s meddling in Afghanistan

    • The problem of constructing internal balance in Afghanistan has been complicated by Pakistan’s meddling.
    • Pakistan would like to have the kind of hegemony that the British Raj exercised over Afghanistan.
    • Neither can Pakistan replicate that dominance nor are the Afghans willing concede it to the Pakistan army.

    What about the Pashtun minority in Pakistan?

    • There are more than twice as many Pashtuns living in Pakistan than in Afghanistan.
    • The Pashtun population is estimated to be around 15 million in Afghanistan and 35 million in Pakistan.
    • And as mentioned above, the Taliban is essentially Pashtun formation.
    • Although Pashtun separatism has long ceased to be a force in Pakistan, Islamabad finds the Pashtun question re-emerge in a different form.
    • Pakistan can’t really bet that the Taliban will not put Pashtun nationalism above the interests of the Pakistani state.
    • The Taliban, for example, has never endorsed the Durand Line as the legitimate border with Pakistan.
    • It is by no means clear if Pakistan’s construction of the Taliban as a conservative religious force has obliterated the group’s ethnic character.
    • Sufferings of Pakistani Pashtun People: Islamabad’s quest for control over Afghanistan over the last four decades has heaped extraordinary suffering on the Pashtun people on Pakistan’s side of the Durand Line.
    • As the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement seeks a peaceful redressal of its demands for basic human rights, Pakistan has unleashed massive repression.

    India’s importance in Afghanistan

    • That the Taliban wants to talk to India and Pakistan brands Pashtun leaders as Indian agents only underlines Delhi’s enduring salience in Afghanistan.

    Consider the question “After the US-Taliban peace deal, India is forced with a difficult prospect of opening the dialogue with the Taliban. Examine the implications of the return of Taliban in Afghanistan for India. What is your opinion on India starting the dialogue with Afghanistan?”

    Conclusion

    Pakistan’s expansive military and political investments in Afghanistan have not really resolved Islamabad’s security challenges on its western frontier. If an Afghan triumph eludes Pakistan, Delhi can’t escape the complex geopolitics of the Pashtun lands.