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Subject: International Relations

  • A crisis-hit Iran at the crossroads

    Context

    The coronavirus pandemic creates fresh possibilities for cooperation between the West Asian nation and its neighbours.

    Challenges faced by Iran

    • Hardest hit by COVID-19 among the West Asian countries: Iran, the hardest-hit among the West Asian countries in the global pandemic, is on the front line of the battle against the coronavirus that causes the causes coronavirus disease, COVID-19.
    • Healthcare reeling under combined load: With nearly 900 deaths and over 14,000 cases of infection, its health-care system is reeling under the combined effect of the pandemic and American sanctions.
    • Possibility of social unrest resurfacing: The masses thronging the streets some weeks ago may have receded out of fear of both the coronavirus and the wrath of the regime, but there is a possibility of social unrest resurfacing if the government’s response to the spread of the virus is ineffective and shortages are exacerbated.
    • Emergency funding from IMF: Iran has already approached the International Monetary Fund for $5-billion in emergency funding to combat the pandemic.
    • Easing of some sanctions by the US: The U.S. Treasury had announced in end-February that it was lifting some sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran to facilitate humanitarian trade such as the import of testing kits for COVID-19. Clearly, Iran thinks this is inadequate.

    Iran’s nuclear policy

    • Iran to resumed nuclear activities: Following the U.S.’s decision to jettison the deal, Iran had announced that it would resume its nuclear activities but had agreed to respect the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections and enhanced monitoring as part of its obligations under the additional protocol.
    • What were the conditions of JCPOA? The JCPOA limited Iran to enrich uranium only up to a 3.67% concentration and its stockpile to 300 kg of UF6 (corresponding to 202.8 kg of U-235), and further capped its centrifuges to no more than 5,060, besides a complete cessation of enrichment at the underground Fordow facility.
      • It also limited Iran’s heavy water stockpile to 130 tonnes.
    • Restriction on enrichment lifted by Iran: Since July 2019, Iran has lifted all restrictions on its stockpiles of enriched uranium and heavy water.
      • It has been enriching uranium to 4.5%, beyond the limit of 3.67%.
      • Moreover, it has removed all caps on centrifuges and recommenced enrichment at the Fordow facility.
      • An increased stockpile of Uranium: As of February 19, Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile totalled 1,020.9 kg, compared to 372.3 kg noted in the IAEA’s report of November 3.
      • IAEA’s second report: In a second report issued on March 3, the IAEA has identified three sites in Iran where the country possibly stored undeclared nuclear material or was conducting nuclear-related activities.
      • The IAEA has sought access to the suspect sites and has also sent questionnaires to Iran but has received no response.
    • Possibility of being on the collision course with the UNSC: The United Kingdom, France and Germany had invoked the JCPOA Dispute Resolution Mechanism (DRM) as early as in January this year.
    • The threat to abandon the NPT: With the next Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) set to take place in New York from April 27 to May 22, 2020, Iran’s threat to abandon the NPT if the European Union takes the matter to the UN Security Council (UNSC) may yet only be bluster, but the failure of the DRM process would certainly put Iran on a collision course with the UNSC.
    • Support from China at UNSC: A sympathetic China, which holds the rotational presidency of the UNSC for March, should diminish that prospect, albeit only temporarily.
    • Possibility of reversing the sanctions: As things stand, the terms of UNSC Resolution 2231, which had removed UN sanctions against Iran in the wake of the JCPOA, are reversible and the sanctions can be easily restored.
      • That eventuality would prove disastrous, compounding Iran’s current woes.
    • Possibility of Iran continuing its nuclear program: While recognising that cocking a snook at the NPT in the run-up to the NPT RevCon and the U.S. presidential elections will invite retribution, Iran may use the global preoccupation with the pandemic to seek a whittling down of sanctions and to continue its nuclear programme.
      • More breathing time amid due to pandemic: In the event that the NPT RevCon is postponed due to the prevailing uncertainty, Iran may yet secure some more breathing time.

    Iran’s ties with China and implications for India

    • China- only major country to defy the US sanctions: Meanwhile, the U.S. continues to implement its “maximum pressure policy”. China remains the only major country that continues to defy U.S. sanctions and buy oil from Iran, apart from a small quantum that goes to Syria.
      • The sale of oil to China, however, does little to replenish Iran’s coffers. China is eschewing payments in order to avoid triggering more sanctions against Chinese entities.
    • Trilateral naval exercise: When seen in the context of the trilateral naval exercise between China, Iran and Russia in the Strait of Hormuz in the end of December 2019 codenamed “Marine Security Belt”, these developments suggest a further consolidation of Sino-Iran ties in a region of great importance to India.
      • Inclusion of Pakistan in the exercise: Over time, this could expand into a “Quad” involving China’s “all-weather friend” Pakistan in the Indian Ocean and the northern Arabian Sea, with broader implications for India as well as the “Free and Open” Indo-Pacific.

    Conclusion

    • Iran’s foreign policy to remain unchanged: The first round of Iran’s parliamentary elections in February showed that the hardliners are firmly ensconced. The fundamental underpinnings of Iran’s foreign policy are likely to remain unchanged.
    • Possibility of cooperation among neighbours: Yet, the rapid spread of the coronavirus in the region creates fresh possibilities for cooperation between Iran and its neighbours, if regional tensions are relegated to the back-burner.
    • Laudable example by India: Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s initiative to develop a coordinated response to the pandemic in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation framework, indeed, sets a laudable example.
    • Much depends on Iran’s willingness: Much though will depend on Iran’s willingness to rein in its regional ambitions and desist from interference in the domestic affairs of others.

  • From virtual conferencing to real leadership

    Context

    SAARC has become the ‘virtual’ platform through which leaders of the eight countries of our troubled region agreed to work together to combat unarguably the greatest immediate threat to the people: the COVID-19 health pandemic.

    Success depends on India

    • The success of the Modi-SAARC initiative will largely depend on India—the dominant power of the region, in every sense.
    • Pakistan’s position may become marginal: Once New Delhi demonstrates that it has the capacity, the political willingness to institutionalise and to lead a mutually beneficial cooperative regime in the region, Pakistan’s “churlish” behaviour will become marginal to SAARC.
      • Various international relations theorists view this as a function of “hegemonic stability”.
    • Much needs to be done: Much more will need to be done by New Delhi to establish that the video conference was not a mere event, but the assertive expression of its new willingness to stabilise the region through cooperative mechanisms, for our common future.
    • Rare opportunity: This is a moment thus of a rare opportunity for India to establish its firm imprimatur over the region, and to secure an abiding partnership for our shared destiny.

    The genesis of SAARC

    • SAARC was born at a moment of hope in the 1980s.
    • An initiative by Zia Ur Rehman: The idea was initiated by one of the most inscrutable leaders of the region, General Zia Ur Rehman of Bangladesh, who, met many of the other leaders personally and dispatched special envoys to the capitals of the countries of the region.
      • Dhaka’s persistence resulted in the first summit of the seven leaders of the region in 1985.
      • Afghanistan joined in 2007.
    • Not lived up to expectation: In the nearly 35 years of its existence, even its champions will concede however that SAARC has, to put it euphemistically, not lived up to the promise of its founder.

    How the SAARC has performed?

    • The dismal performance in the trade: South Asia is the world’s least integrated region; less than 5% of the trade of SAARC countries is within. A South Asian Free Trade Zone agreed on, in 2006, remains, in reality, a chimera.
    • Moribund state: The last SAARC summit, scheduled to be held in Islamabad in November 2016, was postponed after the terrorist attacks in Uri; none has been held since then, and until Mr. Modi’s initiative, no major meeting had been planned.
    • Marginal in our collective consciousness: A quick look at some of the questions posed in the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha on SAARC, in the last years, suggest that Indian MPs seek answers on why India is still a member of SAARC and on the strength of other organisations such as the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) that India is engaged with.
      • Thus SAARC had become almost marginal to our collective consciousness.

    The fadeout and revival of SAARC

    • India-Pakistan tension: Clearly, most of the smaller states and external players believe that the India-Pakistan conflict has undermined SAARC.
    • How Pakistan derails the initiatives? Bilateral issues cannot be discussed in SAARC but since the organisation relies on the principle of unanimity for all major decisions, Pakistan has often undermined even the most laudable initiative lest it gives India an advantage.
      • Relative gains by India are more important for Pakistan than the absolute gains it secures for itself.
    • Pakistan’s use of terror: For India, Pakistan’s use of terror as an instrument of foreign policy has made normal business impossible.
    • Need of the revival to deal with the COVID-19: There is no doubt that the impact of COVID-19 will be unprecedented, in terms of those it targets and the way we live. It is too early to judge the consequences , but it will take years for the world to return to the old and familiar.
      • Strategies to cope with this new insidious, scheming and diabolic strain of the coronavirus have to be dynamic and ad hoc.
      • Two principles to deal with the epidemic: Containment and the possible prevention of community transmission are the only two principles that are firmly tested.
      • If community transmission occurs and cannot be contained, the consequences will be calamitous.
    • Time to act together: This is indeed a time for SAARC and the experts of the region to think and act together and India can lead this effort.

    Conclusion

    It is evident that Mr Modi is an out-of-the-box lateral thinker, especially on foreign policy. More importantly, the tragedy of COVID-19 may provide an opportunity for India to demonstrate its compassionate face to secure a region at peace with itself. India cannot afford to not to harvest this opportunity, after having sowed the seeds of a New South Asia.

  • The ambit and the limits of ‘diaspora diplomacy’

    Context

    It is necessary for New India to look at the political choices of Indian migrants abroad through a more realistic lens.

    Indian diaspora

    • Largest diaspora and highest remittances: India has the world’s largest diaspora, about 17.5 million and receives the highest remittance of $78.6 billion from Indians living abroad (Global Migration Report 2020).
    • Impact of the diaspora back home: Members of the diaspora, often seen as more “successful” and therefore more influential, can have a big impact on their relatives back home.

    Certain wrong premises: The promise of the diaspora’s dual power is based on certain faulty premises.

    1. Transferability of vote: To start with, the transferability of votes has not yet been proven conclusively.

      • It is necessary and timely that the government re-analyses the benefits accrued from the diaspora’s political presence through a more realistic lens.
      • One obvious reason is that the Indian community isn’t large enough to make a difference in the voting patterns in any of these countries.
      • The second is that the population that comes out for the rallies doesn’t represent the entire diaspora.

    2. Not necessarily support the government: The second issue is that politically active members of the Indian diaspora don’t necessarily support the Indian government’s actions, and often because they are of Indian origin, hold the government in New Delhi to higher standards than they do others.

    • Concern over CAA and Kashmir Issue: The U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairperson for Asia, Ami Bera, voiced his concerns quite plainly about Kashmir and Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA) during a visit to India last month.
    • Criticism of the government actions: The sponsor of the U.S. House resolution on Kashmir (HR745) Pramila Jayapal; co-chair of U.S. Presidential candidate Bernie Sanders’s campaign Ro Khanna; and former presidential contender Kamala Harris, have all been openly critical of the government’s actions.

    What should the government do? The conclusion for the government is that it cannot own only that part of the diaspora that supports its decisions, and must celebrate the fact that members of the Indian diaspora, from both sides of the political divide, are successful and influential.

    3. Diaspora as a factor in bilateral relation: The government must ensure that its focus on the diaspora doesn’t become a factor in its bilateral relations.

    • While it is perfectly legitimate and laudable to ensure the safety and well-being of Indian citizens in different parts of the world, it must tread more lightly on issues that concern foreign citizens of Indian origin.

    4.Introduction of India’s internal politics:

    • The introduction of India’s internal politics into this equation is another new angle, one that led the British Foreign Office to remonstrate with India about interference last December.
    • Politically affiliated Indian diaspora chapters are now also playing old India-Pakistan fault-lines amongst immigrants, which in the past were fuelled by Pakistani agencies.
    • In California primaries this month, local “Hindu-American” groups protested against Democratic candidates like Ro Khanna for joining the Congressional Pakistan caucus and for criticising New Delhi’s actions.

    5. Impact on diaspora:

    • Conflating POI with citizens of India: The government must consider the impact that policies conflating the PIOs with Indian citizens could have on the diaspora itself.
    • Ability to assimilate: Most immigrant Indian communities have been marked by their ability to assimilate into the countries they now live in.
    • Much of that comes from a desire to be treated as equal citizens, not as immigrants, while a few also have bad memories of anti-immigrant sentiments in the 1960s and 1970s in Europe and the U.S. when they were targeted and accused of “divided loyalties”.

    Conclusion

    Laying claim to diasporas kinship and culture and taking pride in their success is one thing. It would be a mistake to lay claim to their politics, however.

     

  • Fighting COVID-19 together for a shared future

    Context

    The Chinese government has mobilised the whole nation with confidence, unity, a science-based approach and targeted response.

    Aspects that were focused by China to deal with COVID-19

    • Formulated timely strategies for epidemic prevention and control.
    • Strengthened a unified command and response in Wuhan and Hubei.
    • Coordinated the prevention and control work in other regions.
    • Strengthened scientific research, emergency medical and daily necessity supplies.
    • Effectively maintained social stability.
    • Strengthened public education.
    • Actively engaged in international cooperation.

    Mutual support between India and China

    • China and India have maintained close communication and cooperation on epidemic prevention and control. In a letter to President Xi, India’s Prime Minister has expressed support for China.
    • China appreciates the medical supplies provided by India and have helped facilitate the safe return of Indian nationals in Hubei.
    • The global footprint of COVID-19: China has been closely following the global footprint of COVID-19.

    Cooperation on a global level for disease control:

    • Chines govt. will stay in close communication with WHO.
    • Share its epidemic control experience with other countries.
    • Seek closer international cooperation on medicine and vaccine development.
    • Provide assistance to the best of its capabilities to countries and regions that are affected by the spread of the virus in keeping with its role as a responsible major
    • The Chinese reach-out: China has provided various kinds of assistance including testing reagents, remote assistance and medical supplies to countries with a severe outbreak.
    • Sharing of experience and protocol for treatment: China have shared diagnosis and treatment experience and protocols with many countries including India.
      • China is ready to maintain communication with India, share experience in a timely manner, render assistance and make joint efforts to overcome the epidemic.

    Impact and recovery of China

    • Robust economy: The impact on the Chinese economy will be short-lived and generally manageable. China has a resilient economy with robust domestic demand and a strong industrial base. We will definitely sustain the good momentum of economic and social development and meet the goal of achieving moderate prosperity in our society and eradicating extreme poverty in China.
    • Strengthen coordination and communication: China will also strengthen coordination and communication with economic and trading partners and give priority to the resumption of production and supply of leading enterprises and key sectors that have a major impact on the stability of global supply chains.
      • The fundamentals of China’s economy will remain strong in the long run, and China will remain an important engine for global economic growth.

    Conclusion

    The history of civilisation is also one of a history of fighting diseases and a great journey of ceaseless global integration. To prevail over a disease that threatens all, unity and cooperation is the most powerful weapon.

     

     

     

  • Fail-safe exit for America, but a worry for India

    Context

    The recently negotiated peace deal between the United States and the Taliban is unlikely to bring peace to Afghanistan, is geopolitically disadvantageous for India, and has serious implications for our national security.

    Power dynamics of the US-Taliban deal

    • An honourable exit for India: The terms of the deal, the manner in which it was negotiated as well as the geopolitical context in which it was stitched up indicate that it was more about providing an honourable exit route for the U.S.
    • Violence after concluding the deal: Within 24 hours of the much-publicised deal, violence and major disagreements about the deal began erupting in Afghanistan.
    • Why there are the prospects of instability in Afghanistan: Given that the Taliban negotiated from a position of strength, the Trump administration from weakness and little political will, and that the Ashraf Ghani administration in Afghanistan was by and large a clueless bystander in all of this, means that the country is perhaps on the verge of yet another long-drawn-out and internecine battle.

    The changed Taliban

    • Taliban of the 1990s: When the Taliban came to power in the mid-1990s in Kabul, it had few backers in the world.
      • Nor was it seen as a useful commodity by the great powers or the states in the region, except for Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
    • United pushback from the rest of the world: The international community was almost united in offering a normative pushback against the violent outfit.
      • As a result, the Taliban was at best reluctantly tolerated until it messed up towards the end of its regime in Kabul.
    • The pressure of Northern Alliance: The Northern Alliance, supported by countries such as Russia and India, kept up its military pressure against the Taliban while it was in power.
    • How today’s Taliban is different from the past: The situation today, at least for the moment, is perhaps the exact opposite of what was the case then.
      • Lessons learned to deal with the international system: The Taliban today is also more worldly-wise and might have learned, during its exile, to deal with the international system and play the game of balance of power.
      • Not necessarily the puppet: More so, it may not necessarily be a puppet of the Pakistani deep state once it returns to power.

    International acceptance of the Taliban

    • Lending the legitimacy to Taliban: Given the war fatigue and the geopolitical stakes in Afghanistan, most of the key players in the region and otherwise have been in negotiations with the Taliban one way or another, and for one reason or another, lending the terror group certain legitimacy in the process.
    • Why countries want good relations with the Taliban: Anyone desirous of a stake in Afghanistan or does not want its domestic turmoil to spill over into their country would want to keep the Taliban in good humour.
      • Suitable withdrawal of the US: There is another reason why the Taliban has many suitors — because of the U.S. withdrawal by and large suits everyone, be it China, Pakistan, Iran, or Russia.
      • The US bigger challenge: Suddenly, the Taliban appears to have been forgiven for its sordid past and unforgivable sins because for most of these countries, the U.S. is the bigger challenge than the Taliban.

    Why India’s strategy is diplomatically flawed?

    • Only state at losing end: The only state that seems to be on the losing end, unfortunately, of this unfolding game of chess and patience in Afghanistan is India.
      • Why the earlier Taliban was anti-India? The earlier Taliban regime was anti-India, it was also because India had militarily supported the Northern Alliance that kept up the military pressure against the Taliban.
      • Today’s Taliban does not share the same animus for India.
    • Need for Change in India’s approach: India, could have rejigged its approach to the Taliban this time around. However, it put all its eggs in the Ashraf Ghani basket, even on the eve of the signing of the peace deal in Doha.
    • Not a diplomatic strategy by India: India also, for most intents and objectives, adopted a puritanical approach to the Taliban.
      • There are 2 reason India is neither reaching out to the Taliban nor exploiting the fissures within it-
      • Because it did not want to irk the elected government in Kabul and-
      • It adopts a moralistic approach to dealing with extremist groups in general — not a smart diplomatic strategy.
    • Self-defeating position: This moralistic attitude, also a diplomatically lazy one, I would say, that be it Pakistan or Afghanistan, India would only talk to the legitimate government in that country, is a self-defeating position.
      • The world is not that perfect, nor state all that uniform, created in the shape and image of the Westphalian forefather.
      • Smart statecraft, therefore, is dealing with what you have and making the best of it.

    What would be the result of India’s strategy?

    • Impact on relations with Afghanistan: India’s relations with Afghanistan will take a hit in the immediate aftermath of the deal.
      • Limited ability to influence the outcomes: With China, India’s strategic adversary, deeply involved in the geopolitics and geo-economics of the region, including in Afghanistan, India’s traditional ability to influence the region’s political and security outcomes will be severely limited.
      • This will be further exacerbated by the withdrawal of the U.S., India’s closest friend, from the region.
      • India’s relation with the other players in the region: Other regional actors in Afghanistan are also less friendly towards India than ever before: Iran feels let down by India given how the latter has behaved towards it at the behest of the Americans.
      • Relation with Russia: For Russia, India is only one of the many friends in the region — the exclusivity of Russia-India relations is a thing of the past — and Pakistan would consider targeting India a fair game.
    • Counter Strategy: Unless New Delhi carefully envisages a counter-strategy, these factors will increasingly push India into a geopolitical tough spot in the region.
      • Need to focus on the region: India should worry us that our political class is focused on domestic politics while the region is becoming ever more uncertain and evidently unfavourable to us.

    Taliban and Kashmir Angle of the deal

    • Negligible physical impact but the possibility of psychological impact: While the direct physical impact of the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan on Kashmir will be negligible, this will not be without serious implications for the unfolding situation in Kashmir’s restive regions.
      • Psychological impact: The most important impact is going to be psychological.
      • Interpretation of the event: Disenchanted Kashmiri youngsters, and there are a lot of them, will interpret the events in Afghanistan as follows: “If the mighty superpower USA could be defeated by the Taliban in Afghanistan with help from the Pakistan army, defeating Indian forces in Kashmir won’t be impossible after all.”
      • This enthusiasm is completely misplaced, but that is not the point.
      • That the Kashmiri youth might pick up guns drawing inspiration from the situation in Afghanistan is indeed the point.
    • Increase in Pakistan’s utility: The U.S.-Taliban deal cannot survive without Pakistan’s assistance towards ensuring its success, and the U.S. and its allies recognise that. Such recognition of Pakistan’s utility provides the country with ability, as and when it wishes to, to up the ante in Kashmir.
    • The geopolitical significance of Pok and Aksai Chin claim: India’s official statement which describes Afghanistan as a “contiguous neighbour” — meaning that India considers Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) a part of its sovereign territory — will make Pakistan and China sit up and take notice.
      • Claim making reconciliation more difficult: India also made a similar claim about Aksai Chin in the wake of its August decision on Kashmir. Erstwhile rhetorical claims on PoK and Aksai Chin have suddenly assumed a lot more geopolitical significance today making conciliatory approaches to conflict resolution ever more difficult.

    Conclusion

    Given that a new Taliban-led dispensation in Afghanistan will be far more accepted by the international community than the last time around also means increased acceptability for such regimes in general, either out of necessity or as a function of geopolitical calculations. That the Taliban mass-murdered its opponents into statehood in the 21st century and that this might provide potential inspiration to other outfits in the region and outside should indeed worry us.

     

     

     

  • Explained: Sir Creek Dispute

     

     

    Former Pakistan Minister recalls plan for Sir Creek pact.

    Sir Creek

    • Sir Creek is a 96-km strip of water disputed between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch marshlands. Originally named Ban Ganga, Sir Creek is named after a British representative.
    • The Creek opens up in the Arabian Sea and roughly divides the Kutch region of Gujarat from the Sindh Province of Pakistan.

    What’s the dispute?

    • The dispute lies in the interpretation of the maritime boundary line between Kutch and Sindh. Before India’s independence, the provincial region was a part of the Bombay Presidency of British India.
    • But after India’s independence in 1947, Sindh became a part of Pakistan while Kutch remained a part of India.
    • Pakistan claims the entire creek as per paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Bombay Government Resolution of 1914 signed between then the Government of Sindh and Rao Maharaj of Kutch.
    • The resolution, which demarcated the boundaries between the two territories, included the creek as part of Sindh, thus setting the boundary as the eastern flank of the creek popularly known as Green Line.
    • But India claims that the boundary lies mid-channel as depicted in another map drawn in 1925, and implemented by the installation of mid-channel pillars back in 1924.

    The Genesis 

    • The marshland of Sir Creek first became disputed in the early 20th century when the Rao of Kutch and the Chief Commissioner of Sindh Province of British India, due to different perceptions of the boundaries, laid claims over the creek.
    • The case was taken up by then Government of Bombay, which conducted a survey and mandated its verdict in 1914.
    • This verdict has two contradictory paragraphs, which make the India and Pakistan contenders on the same issue.
    • Paragraph 9 of this verdict states that the boundary between Kutch and Sindh lies ‘to the east of the Creek,’ (Green Line) which effectively implied that the creek belonged to Sindh and, therefore, to Pakistan.
    • On the other hand, Paragraph 10 states that since Sir Creek is navigable most of the year.
    • According to international law and the Thalweg principle, a boundary can only be fixed in the middle of the navigable channel, which meant that it has be divided between Sindh and Kutch, and thereby India and Pakistan.
    • India has used this para to consistently argue that the boundary needs to be fixed in the middle of the creek.
    • Pakistan, however, claims that Sir Creek isn’t navigable but India claims that since it’s navigable in high tide, the boundary should be drawn from the mid channel.

    What’s the importance of Sir Creek?

    • Apart from the strategic location, Sir Creek’s core importance is fishing resources. Sir Creek is considered to be among the largest fishing grounds in Asia.
    • Another vital reason for two countries locking horns over this creek is the possible presence of great oil and gas concentration under the sea, which are currently unexploited thanks to the impending deadlock on the issue.

    UNCLOS supports India’s stand

    • If Thalweg principle is to be upheld, Pakistan would lose a considerable portion of the territory that was historically part of the province of Sindh.
    • Acceding to India’s stance would mean shifting of the land/sea terminus point several kilometres to the detriment of Pakistan, leading in turn to a loss of several thousand square kilometres of its Exclusive Economic Zone under the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

    War in 1965 and tribunal

    • After the 1965 war, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson successfully persuaded both countries to end hostilities and set up a tribunal to resolve the dispute.
    • The verdict of the tribunal came in 1968 which saw Pakistan getting 10% of its claim of 9,000 km (3,500 sq. miles).
    • Since 1969, 12 rounds of talks have been held over the issue of Sir Creek, but both sides have denied reaching any solution.
    • The region fell amid tensions in 1999 after the Pakistan Navy shot down a MiG-21 fighter plane, but the last rounds of talks were held in 2012. Since then it’s been status quo.

  • Indian Ocean Commission

    India was accepted as an observer in the Indian Ocean Commission getting a seat at the table of the organization that handles maritime governance in the western Indian Ocean.

    Indian Ocean Commission

    • The Indian Ocean Commission is an intergovernmental organization that was created in 1982 at Port Louis, Mauritius and institutionalized in 1984 by the Victoria Agreement in Seychelles.
    • The COI is composed of five African Indian Ocean nations: Comoros, Madagascar, Mauritius, Réunion (an overseas region of France), and Seychelles.
    • These five islands share geographic proximity, historical and demographic relationships, natural resources and common development issues.

    Aims and Objectives of IOC

    • COI’s principal mission is to strengthen the ties of friendship between the countries and to be a platform of solidarity for the entire population of the African Indian Ocean region.
    • COI’s mission also includes development, through projects related to sustainability for the region, aimed at protecting the region, improving the living conditions of the populations and preserving the various natural resources that the countries depend on.
    • Being an organisation regrouping only island states, the COI has usually championed the cause of small island states in regional and international fora.

    India and IOC

    • India’s entry is a consequence of its deepening strategic partnership with France as well as its expanding ties with the Vanilla Islands.
    • India had made the application to be an observer. The IOC has four observers — China, EU, Malta and International Organisation of La Francophonie (OIF).

    Significance

    • For India, the importance of joining this organization lies in several things.
    • First, India will get an official foothold in a premier regional institution in the western Indian Ocean, boosting engagement with islands in this part of the Indian Ocean.
    • These island nations are increasingly important for India’s strategic outreach as part of its Indo-Pacific policy.
    • This move would enhance ties with France which is the strong global power in the western Indian Ocean.
    • It lends depth to India’s SAGAR (security and growth for all in the region) policy unveiled by PM Modi in 2015.
    • The move, India hopes, would lead to greater security cooperation with countries in East Africa.

  • The diplomatic cost

    Context

    The CAA and violence in Delhi have started to take its toll on India’s secular foreign policy.

    The US and other’s reaction to the situation in India

    • Trump visit to India: President Trump referred to India as a democracy which was peaceful and tolerant. He lauded freedom, rule of law, liberty and protection of human dignity, adding graphically that where India had the holy Ganges, it also had the Golden Temple and Jama Masjid.
      • Assurance to the critics at home: He thereby cleverly reassured critics at home, especially in the US Congress, that he was not ignoring the values the two great democracies shared.
      • However, as the situation in Delhi spun into violence the next day, in an untutored media interaction at the US ambassador’s residence, he ducked questions about the CAA or Delhi riots, nonchalantly remarking it was “up to India” to deal with it.
      • This may have brought comfort to the Indian government but the world at large differed.
    • Response from the other countries: Delhi had already exchanged angry words with Malaysia, Turkey and even Indonesia over their varied critique of India’s handling of its Muslim minority when Iran joined the issue.

    Iran’s response to violence in India

    • Condemnation by foreign ministers: Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif condemned the “wave of organised violence against Indian Muslims”, adding that “Iran has been a friend of India”.
      • India’s foreign ministry summoned the Iranian ambassador to protest the inappropriateness of the minister’s remark.
    • The reaction by the Iranian Supreme Leader: Soon after, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei found the time, in the middle of the COVID-19 outbreak, to excoriate the Indian government.
      • Adding insult to injury, he appended #IndianMuslimsInDanger.
    • No reaction on China problems: A facile response, can be that Iran is being hypocritical as it has not expressed remorse over the Chinese repression of Uyghurs.
    • The difference in India’s importance to China: China is a veto-wielding member of the UN Security Council, which also sustains the Iranian economy despite US sanctions. On the other hand, India has a Shia population second only to that of Iran.

    Relations with Iran

    • Two consulates in India: There are two Iranian consulates in India in Hyderabad and Mumbai. Iran seeks the third one in Lucknow.
      • Qom also hosts many Shia students, particularly from the Kargil region.
    • Historic links between the two countries: After Humanyun’s exile in Iran (1530-40) before recovering the Indian throne, the Persian language and culture fired the cultural renaissance at the Mughal court.
      • Religio-cultural heritage importance: India is important for Iran for its religio-cultural heritage, unlike China, which is needed for transactional and strategic reasons.
    • Two interrelated questions flow from this reasoning:
      • 1. What is Iran’s importance for India and the trajectory of India-Iran relations over the last two decades?
      • 2. And why is Iran adopting this sharp tone over what the Indian government argues is an internal matter?
    • Convergence in the relations: The closest India-Iran strategic convergence began in the 1990s, particularly after Kabul fell to the Taliban in 1996. These ties blossomed under reformist Iranian President Mohammad Khatami and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.
    • Tehran Declaration: In 2001, the two signed the Teheran Declaration. Khatami in his opening remarks said that Iran always admired India’s secular credentials and Vajpayee had maintained that tradition.
      • In 2003, Khatami was the chief guest at India’s Republic Day and a New Delhi Declaration was issued.
    • Deterioration in relations and impact of India-US relation: The relationship began to slip as Iran’s clandestine nuclear programme and assistance from Pakistan’s rogue scientist A Q Khan was uncovered in mid-2003.
      • Impact of India-US closeness: Concomitantly, India was drawing closer to the US and negotiating a nuclear cooperation agreement.
      • The US used the nuclear issue to cause a cleavage as Indian and Iranian interests began seriously diverging.
      • Taliban factor: In any case, the Taliban had been ejected from Afghanistan and US troops literally surrounded Iran, having in 2003 overthrown Saddam Hussein. Geo-strategy trumped diplomacy.

    The US-Iran relation cycle

    • The nuclear deal with Iran: Iran-US relations also went through a cycle, with President Barack Obama recalibrating US policy towards the Gulf and West Asia.
      • Countering ISIS: Calculating that without Iran, ISIS could not be countered, the US in 2015 endorsed the nuclear deal that P-5 and Germany negotiated to end the nuclear stand-off.
    • Missing warmth of the 1990s: Although India-Iran relations after that returned to near normal as most US sanctions were lifted, the warmth of the 1990s was missing.
      • Iran was now beginning to extend its influence and role across Iraq and West Asia.
    • Maximum Pressure strategy of the US: President Donald Trump in 2016 reversed US policy and since then “maximum pressure” has been applied on Iran via tightened sanctions.
    • India’s engagement with Saudi Arabia and UAE: PM Modi also moved more forthrightly to engage Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
    • The fallout of the US strategy reversal: A fallout of the US policy reversal has been an exacerbation of not only the Shia-Sunni split but a Sunni-Sunni split as Qatar and Turkey are with Iran.

    Changing polity and increasing influence in the neighbourhood

    • Conservatives elected to power: In Iran’s parliamentary election on February 28, extremely conservative members have been elected, the moderates having been vetoed by the Guardians Council earlier.
      • Turnout was a low 43 per cent, due partly to fear of the coronavirus.
    • Increasing influence in the neighbourhood: Iran is even more isolated, though determined to resist US demands, due to communications being curtailed due to the virus.
      • Relations with the Taliban: It has good working relations with the Taliban and converging interests to see that US troops exit the region.
      • The friendly government in Baghdad: Iran is battling to ensure a friendly government in Baghdad, despite the killing of Major General Qasem Soleimani, by keeping militias aligned to it in play.

    Conclusion

    • Perception of India: Khamenei’s tweet reflects the perception that India is in the US-Saudi-Emirati corner and of little use as long as Trump is president.
      • Growing closeness Abu Dhabi, Riyadh and Ahmedabad would have led Iran to this conclusion.
    • Leveraging India’s dependence: In the Islamic world, Iran by publicly defending Indian Muslims embarrasses the silent Saudis.
      • It also calculates that India needs access to Afghanistan through Chabahar to assist the Ghani government or influence developments there.

     

  • After the Trump visit

    Context

    President Trump’s visit had the right optics. Attention must now turn to India-US priority areas.

    What were the mutual gains and highlights of the visit?

    • Security: Homeland Security is an American expression. For us to own it shows our concerns on cross-border sponsored terrorism.
    • Nuclear technology: Our nuclear VVER power plant technologies are state of the art and of Russian and French design.
      • Fast breeder: Good, but one more is better. We are well on the way to the fast breeder on the thorium route and these nuclear turbines are an essential step.
      • Unlimited thorium: We don’t have much uranium but unlimited thorium, so in the long run, apart from solar, this is the energy future.
      • Insurance obstacle resolved: Obviously, the insurance obstacle, as to who will bear the cost of insurance against disaster damage, which the Americans were raising earlier, has been resolved.
      • We have to build nuclear power to provide the initial feedstock for the thorium-based reactors.
    • No progress on trade pact: There are obviously differences between the two nations on the trade pact.
      • There is “progress”, but otherwise, we don’t know the way forward. Since the event was Ahmedabad-based, Amul is invading America and dairying is real politics.
    • US concerns over Kashmir issue: The US concern on Kashmir and minority rights is real.
      • If the largest foreign office establishment in the world is raising issues through their chief, let’s not bury our head in the sand.
      • Our defence minister expressing sadness at former chief ministers of Jammu and Kashmir being in detention was a gesture to the US President’s stand on pursuing solutions.
    • The bipartisan foreign policy of India shifting: The Americans generally rally behind the President on foreign policy.
      • We are more advanced now and have kicked a bipartisan approach to foreign affairs.
      • Seven decades of a bipartisan policy are thrown away without a word in explanation.

    Challenges to the rights in India

    • Every right is tampered with. Your religion, your identity in a country that never questioned it, you name it, it’s in question.
    • Multiple identity cards not accepted: The Aadhaar card, passport, ration card, election card are not enough. One office doesn’t accept another’s card, even if they carry the same information.
    • A study on a ration card and election cards: A study funded by the Canadian IDRC showed the poor only keep under lock and key the ration and election cards. One saves them from starvation, the other gives them dignity. At least once every five years, the mightiest knock at their door. We must not destroy, we must build.

    Conclusion

    There are obviously differences between the two nations on the trade pact. But apart from trade, there are many areas the cooperation on which can benefit both the countries.

     

     

  • Freedom in the World 2020

     

    India has become one of the world’s least free democracies, according to a global survey.

    Freedom in the World Report

    • It is a yearly survey and report by the U.S. based non-governmental organization Freedom House.
    • It measures the degree of civil liberties and political rights in every nation and significant related and disputed territories around the world.
    • The report derives its methodology from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1948.
    • It covers 195 countries, awarding scores based on political rights indicators such as the electoral process, political pluralism and participation and government functioning, as well as civil liberties indicators related to freedom of expression and belief associational and organisational rights, the rule of law and personal autonomy and individual rights.

    Highlights of the report

     

     

    Deteriorating freedom in India

    • The report ranks India at the 83rd position, along with Timor-Leste and Senegal.
    • This is near the bottom of the pile among the countries categorised as “Free”.
    • India’s score fell by four points to 71, the worst decline among the world’s 25 largest democracies this year.
    • India scored 34 out of 40 points in the political rights category, but only 37 out of 60 in the civil liberties category, for a total score of 71, a drop from last year’s score of 75.
    • The report treats “Indian Kashmir” as a separate territory, which saw its total score drop precipitously from 49 to 28 this year, moving it from a status of “Partly Free” to “Not Free”.

    Reason for the downfall

    • The annulment of autonomy and the subsequent shutdown of Kashmir, the NRC and the CAA, as well as the crackdown on mass protests, have been listed as the main signs of declining freedom in the report.
    • These three actions have shaken the rule of law in India and threatened the secular and inclusive nature of its political system said the report.
    • The report slammed the internet blackout in Kashmir terming it the longest shutdown ever imposed by democracy.
    • It said freedom of expression was under threat in India, with journalists, academics and others facing harassment and intimidation when addressing politically sensitive topics.
    • It warned that the Indian government’s alarming departures from democratic norms under present govt. could blur the values-based distinction between Beijing and New Delhi.