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Subject: International Relations

  • Explained: Why UN Human Rights Commission intends to intervene in a SC case against CAA?

    The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights “intends to file” an Intervention Application in the Supreme Court of India seeking to intervene in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1474 of 2019 and praying that it be allowed to make submissions.

    On what grounds is a UN body seeking to intervene in a case regarding a domestic Indian law?

    • The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN Human Rights) is the leading UN entity on human rights.
    • The UN General Assembly entrusted both the High Commissioner and her Office with a unique mandate to promote and protect all human rights for all people.
    • As the principal United Nations office mandated to promote and protect human rights for all, OHCHR leads global human rights efforts speaks out objectively in the face of human rights violations worldwide.
    • This resolution, adopted by the UNGA in 1994, created the post of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights.

    Its jurisdiction

    • The application says that successive High Commissioners have filed amicus curiae briefs on issues of particular public importance within proceedings before a diverse range of international and national jurisdictions.
    • It includes the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, the International Criminal Court, and at the national level, the United States Supreme Court and final appeal courts of States in Asia and Latin America.

    What exactly does the intervention application say?

    • The OHCHR has welcomed as “commendable” the CAA’s stated purpose, “namely the protection of some persons from persecution on religious grounds.
    • It also “acknowledges the history of openness and welcome that India has exhibited to persons seeking to find a safer, more dignified life within its borders”.
    • However the examination of the CAA raises important issues with respect to international human rights law and its application to migrants, including refugees, says the OHCHR.
    • The CAA, it says, raises “important human rights issues, including its compatibility in relation to the right to equality before the law and nondiscrimination on nationality grounds under India’s human rights obligations”.
    • The application acknowledges that “the issue of nondiscrimination on nationality grounds falls outside the scope of this intervention”, but insists that “this in no way implies that there are not human rights concerns in this respect”.

    Why intervene?

    • The application questions the reasonableness and objectivity of the criterion of extending the benefits of the CAA to Buddhists, Sikhs, Hindus, Jains, Parsis and Christians from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan alone.
    • It points out that while the Indian government has suggested that persons of Muslim faith, regardless of denomination or ethnicity, are protected there.
    • However recent reports by UN human rights show that Ahmadi, Hazara and Shia Muslims in these countries warrant protection on the same basis as that provided in the preferential treatment proposed by the CAA.

    Is there a specific basis on which the OHCHR has faulted the CAA?

    The application flags some central principles of international human rights law:

    1. the impact of the CAA on some migrants
    2. the enjoyment of human rights by all migrants and the rights of all migrants (non-citizens) to equality before the law and
    3. the principle of non-refoulment, which prohibits the forcible return of refugees and asylum seekers to a country where they are likely to be persecuted
    • The application mentions that all migrants “regardless of their race, ethnicity, religion, nationality and/or immigration status enjoy human rights and are entitled to protection”.
    • It cites international human rights instruments to urge the inclusion of non-discrimination, equality before the law, and equal protection before the law into the foundation of a rule of law.
    • International human rights law, the application says, does not distinguish between citizens and non-citizens or different groups of non-citizens for the purposes of providing them protection from discrimination, “including in respect of their migration status”.

    India’s stance

    • The Citizenship Amendment Act is an internal matter of India and concerns the sovereign right of the Indian Parliament to make laws.
    • MEA spokesperson insisted that no foreign party has any locus standi on issues pertaining to India’s sovereignty.
    • The CAA was “constitutionally valid and complies with all requirements of (India’s) constitutional values”, and “is reflective of our long-standing national commitment in respect of human rights issues arising from the tragedy of the Partition of India”.

  • Pieces of peace

    Context

    “Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan” between the US and Taliban signed on February 29 in Doha, is just another piece in the overall strategy of the US for Afghanistan.

    Pakistan’s support to the Taliban and unchanged Afghan policy of the US

    • Continuation of the same hard-nosed policy: While rolling out the Afghan policy in August 2017, it was emphasised by the current US dispensation that it was making amends to the Afghan strategy of the previous dispensation.
      • In reality, it has been a continuation of the same hard-nosed line.
    • How Pakistan supported the Taliban? The US and allies had got a rude shock when it dawned on them that between 2001 and 2008, the Taliban had used training and recuperation centres in Pakistan to regain domination over most parts of Afghanistan.
      • Benefiting from the Coalition Support Fund: Pakistan had actively aided the Taliban and al Qaeda (AQ), while continuing to benefit from handsome Coalition Support Funds and a seat at the “high table”.
      • Support of the Pakistan Army: All failures were blamed on inadequate numbers of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), which were ill-equipped to challenge the Taliban, backed by a professional Pakistan Army.
      • Misdiagnosed cause: The Obama administration diagnosed that lack of governance, corruption and fragmented polity were other key factors.

    What was the comprehensive Afghanistan Strategy?

    • COIN doctrine and “troop surge”: A comprehensive Afghanistan strategy review led to replicating its “troop surge” strategy, which was believed to have succeeded in Iraq, leading to total withdrawal of US troops (December 2011).
      • At the heart of the troop surge was the Counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine of the US Field Manual.
    • COIN plus CT: The military strategy in Afghanistan was split into COIN plus CT (Counter Terrorism) objectives.
      • The Taliban movement was treated as an insurgency.
      • What was involved in COIN: The COIN efforts entailed protecting population centres and highways, building numbers and capability of the ANSF to take on insurgents, with emphasis on good governance and support for reconstruction.
      • It also included reconciliation and reintegration of lower to mid-level willing Taliban.
      • The UN designations of Taliban and AQ were separated to pave the way for “peace talks” with Taliban commanders who were tired of fighting.
    • What this strategy achieved? The US-led ISAF troop surge helped create time and space to build and strengthen the ANSF over three times and succeeded in pushing the Taliban back to outlying areas.
      • Even today these territorial gains have not been reversed, except in some areas.
      • As the ANSF gained strength and depth, the US led-ISAF mission became a NATO led-Resolute Support mission.
    • How changing geopolitical circumstances increased challenges? The CT effort yielded rich dividends for the US and allies, in the Af-Pak region and even beyond.
      • The rise of ISIS: From the build-up of ISIS in 2014 to the loss of its Caliphate in 2019 and recently to the killing of General Solemani, the CT challenges of the US and allies in the Af-Pak region and periphery have become graver than ever.
      • These elements had a bearing on the Afghan strategy rolled out in August 2017.
      • Good progress was made in building up the ANSF, with a strong focus on three key elements — Special Forces, Air Force, and Afghan Intelligence (NDS).

    The US withdrawal

    • Objectives of the withdrawal: Emphasising that “consequences of a rapid exit were predictable and unacceptable”, it outlined two key objectives —
      • Preventing a resurgence of safe havens that threatened the security of Afghanistan and the US interests in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
      • Preventing terrorists from getting nukes or nuclear material which could be used against the US or elsewhere.
    • What is the recalibrated strategy: The “recalibrated” strategy envisaged following-
      • Time-bound but condition-based withdrawal.
      • Support for the Ghani government.
      • ANSF to take on the Taliban.
      • Talks with the Taliban and for Pakistan to demonstrate commitment on dismantling safe havens that threatened US objectives.
      • Overall, the strategy remained the same, except for the withdrawal of the US from a role in nation-building.
    • What are the results of the strategy? There has been a greater emphasis on the strengthening of ANSF.
      • The regular assessments by the US show an increasing role and success of the Afghan Special Forces.
      • The Air Force and the NDS in playing the lead in keeping the Taliban from running over capitals.
      • By and large, the ANSF have been successful in maintaining the balance and the Taliban-control has not slipped to 2009 levels.
      • In the meantime, US forces have dropped to 10 per cent of the peak (in 2011).
      • With the re-election of President Ghani, it is assured that the US line of thinking will prevail over the Afghan government.
      • Role of Pakistan in the process: On its part, Pakistan has demonstrated its intent by delivering top-rung Taliban, including Mullah Baradar in its custody since 2010, and Anas Haqqani released as part of the process, for the talks.
      • Even if there is no comprehensive ceasefire or full withdrawal ever, Pakistan is unlikely to be blamed.

    What Pakistan achieved from the peace process?

    • Return of Afghan refugee: Pakistan has been rewarded in more ways than one. It managed to return lakhs of Afghans.
    • Fencing on the eastern border of Afghanistan: It builds a fence along the eastern parts of Afghanistan to prevent cross-border attacks.
    • Targeting the key TTP leaders: Pakistan got the US and Afghan forces to target key TTP leaders, starting with TTP chief Mullah Fazlullah in June 2018.
      • Since January this year, three top TTP leaders have been killed in Kabul and Kunar.
      • This has also helped build the Pakistan narrative that Afghan soil is being used to target Pakistan.
    • Changing the international narrative in its favour: Even though it is facing “calibrated” heat on FATF sanctions, Pakistan has managed to change the international narrative in its favour.
      • The 24th report (July 2019) of the UNSC monitoring committee has stated, “Al Qaeda continues to cooperate closely with LeT and the Haqqani Network”, but there is no reference to LeT or Haqqani in the 25th report (January 2020).
      • This report has also asserted that ISIL-K has established informal contact with other terrorist groups, including Jamaat-ul-Ahrar, TTP and Lashkar e-Islam.
      • Meanwhile, these groups regularly attack Pakistani posts along the Afghan border.
      • All key anti-Pakistan groups are now being categorised as ISIL-K supporters, even though Pakistan has run the so-called Daesh networks in eastern Afghanistan for years.
      • The UNSC reports also highlight the positive role of Taliban in targeting ISIL-K.

    Conclusion

    • The election in the US has bearing on the process: In an election year, the US needs to show that it is not fighting someone else’s battles and is making “sincere efforts” at peace-making.
      • The “Agreement” demonstrates sincerity.
      • At the same time, the US has to continue steering the Afghan strategy to keep terror networks in check.
      • The peace process has already created a comfort-loving, globe-trotting leadership in the top echelons of the Taliban, who would continue to talk, even if the current Agreement falters.
    • Pakistan is again sitting on the high table: As the LeT and Haqqani networks go missing from UN reports and JeM chief Masood Azhar and pro-Pak TTP leader Ehasanullah Ehsan go conveniently “missing” from Pakistan soil, the pressure on Pakistan has eased.
      • The new non-state entities backed by Pakistan, such as the AQIS and ISKP/IS-Kashmir/IS-Hind will become more visible.
      • The rank and file of LeT, JeM, HUJI etc can easily be transferred to these new entities, while many more can be recruited under new banners.
      • Online propaganda of these entities, including in Indian languages, is already visible and likely to escalate.

     

  • Explained: US-Taliban Pact

     

     

    • The US and Taliban signed an agreement for “Bringing Peace to Afghanistan”, which will enable the US and NATO to withdraw troops in the next 14 months.
    • The pact is between the “Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan which is not recognized by the United States as a state and is known as the Taliban” and the US.
    • The four-page pact was signed between Zalmay Khalilzad, US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, and Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, political head of the Taliban.

    Key elements of the deal

    Troops Withdrawal

    • The US will draw down to 8,600 troops in 135 days and the NATO or coalition troop numbers will also be brought down, proportionately and simultaneously.
    • And all troops will be out within 14 months — “all” would include “non-diplomatic civilian personnel” (could be interpreted to mean “intelligence” personnel).

    Taliban Commitment

    • The main counter-terrorism commitment by the Taliban is that “It will not allow any of its members, other individuals or groups, including al-Qaeda, to use the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the US and its allies”.
    • While Miller said the reference to al-Qaeda is important, the pact is silent on other terrorist groups — such as anti-India groups Lashkar-e-Toiba or Jaish-e-Mohammed.
    • Again, India, not being an US ally, is not covered under this pact.

    Sanctions Removal

    • UN sanctions on Taliban leaders to be removed by three months (by May 29) and US sanctions by August 27.
    • The sanctions will be out before much progress is expected in the intra-Afghan dialogue.

    Prisoner’s release

    • This is a possible trouble spot because the US-Taliban agreement and the joint declaration differ, and it is not clear whether the Ashraf Ghani-led government is on board with this big up-front concession to Taliban.
    • The joint declaration says the US will facilitate discussion with Taliban representatives on confidence building measures, to include determining the feasibility of releasing significant numbers of prisoners on both sides.
    • While there are no numbers or deadlines in the joint declaration, the US-Taliban pact says up to 5,000 imprisoned Taliban and up to 1,000 prisoners from “the other side” held by Taliban “will be released” by March.
    • The intra-Afghan negotiations are supposed to start in Oslo.

    Ceasefire

    • This is identified as another potential “trouble spot”.
    • The agreement states ceasefire will be simply “an item on the agenda” when intra-Afghan talks start, and indicate actual ceasefire will come with the “completion” of an Afghan political agreement.

    Implications of the Deal

    An adieu to democracy in Afghanistan

    • The Taliban have got what they wanted: troops withdrawal, removal of sanctions, release of prisoners.
    • This has also strengthened Pakistan, Taliban’s benefactor, and the Pakistan Army and the ISI’s influence appears to be on the rise.
    • It has made it unambiguous that it wants an Islamic regime.
    • The Afghan government has been completely sidelined during the talks between the US and Taliban.
    • The future for the people of Afghanistan is uncertain and will depend on how Taliban honours its commitments and whether it goes back to the mediaeval practices of its 1996-2001 regimes.

    Implications for India

    • India has been backing the Ghani-led government and was among very few countries to congratulate Ghani on his victory.
    • India’s proximity to Ghani also drew from their shared view of cross-border terrorism emanating from Pakistan.
    • There has not been formal contact with top Taliban leaders, the Indian mission has a fair amount of access to the Pashtun community throughout Afghanistan through community development projects of about $3 billion.
    • Due to So, although Pakistan military and its ally Taliban have become dominant players in Kabul’s power circles, South Block insiders insist that it is not all that grim for New Delhi.
    • these high-impact projects, diplomats feel India has gained goodwill among ordinary Afghans, the majority of whom are Pashtuns and some may be aligned with the Taliban as well.

    Way Forward

    • The joint declaration is a symbolic commitment to the Afghanistan government that the US is not abandoning it.
    • Much will depend on whether the US and the Taliban are able to keep their ends of the bargain, and every step forward will be negotiated, and how the Afghan government and the political spectrum are involved.
    • Like in 1989, 1992, 1996, and in 2001, Pakistan has the opportunity to play a constructive role. It frittered away the opportunities in the past.

    Back2Basics

    India and the Taliban

    • India and the Taliban have had a bitter past.
    • New Delhi nurses bitter memories from the IC-814 hijack in 1999, when it had to release terrorists — including Masood Azhar who founded Jaish-e-Mohammed that went on to carry out terror attacks as such on Parliament, Pathankot and in Pulwama.
    • Quite predictably, Mullah Baradar did not name India among the countries that supported the peace process, but specially thanked Pakistan for the “support, work and assistance” provided.
    • The Taliban perceived India as a hostile country, as India had supported the anti-Taliban force Northern Alliance in the 1990s.
    • India never gave diplomatic and official recognition to the Taliban when it was in power during 1996-2001.
    • But its foreign policy establishment has shied away from engaging with the Taliban directly.

  • Regional bonding: On Ranil Wickremesinghe’s prescription for peace

    Context

    Former Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s push for regional economic integration and for India-Pakistan dialogue should be studied carefully by New Delhi.

    What are the issues with SAARC?

    • Recent moves by India: India has more or less shut down all conversations on the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
      • India also walked away from the ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
    •  Mr Wickremesinghe set out a number of suggestions:
    • The original purpose of SAARC-Regional growth: India-Pakistan tensions have brought economic integration within the SAARC region to a “standstill”.
      • That the original purpose of the South Asian group was to build a platform where bilateral issues could be set aside in the interest of regional growth.
    • Start at the sub-grouping levels: To engender more intra-regional trade, an even smaller sub-grouping of four countries with complementary economies: India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Thailand, can start the process of reducing tariffs and demolishing non-tariff barrier regimes.
      • When it comes to the intra-regional share of total trade, SAARC and BIMSTEC languish behind groupings such as ASEAN, EU and MERCOSUR.
    • Economic Integration Road Map: The Sri Lankan leader also suggested that with India’s leadership, a more integrated South Asian region would be better equipped to negotiate for better terms with RCEP so as not to be cut out of the “productivity network” in Asia, and envisioned an Economic Integration Road Map to speed up the process.

    Governments stand

    • Talks with Pakistan off the table: The government has made it clear that talks with Pakistan are strictly off the table, and that a SAARC summit, which has not been held since 2014, is unlikely to be convened anytime soon.
    • More reliance on bilateral deals: The government, which has taken a protectionist turn on multilateral trade pacts, is relying more on direct bilateral deals with countries rather than overarching ones that might expose Indian markets to flooding by Chinese goods.
    • India’s trade deficit with the neighbours: For any regional sub-grouping in South Asia to flourish, it is India that will have to make the most concessions given the vast trade deficits India’s neighbours have at present, which it may not wish to do.

    Conclusion

    • The overall projection that India’s global reach will be severely constrained unless it is integrated with its neighbours, and tensions with Pakistan are resolved, cannot be refuted. India needs to be more accommodative for the realisation of its ambitions.

     

     

  • Blue Dot Network

     

    With US President Donald Trump on his maiden visit to India, the two countries are expected to have discussed the Blue Dot Network, a proposal that will certify infrastructure and development projects.

    Blue Dot Network

    • Led by the US’s International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), the Blue Dot network was jointly launched by the US, Japan (Japanese Bank for International Cooperation) and Australia (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) in November 2019 on the sidelines of the 35th ASEAN Summit in Thailand.
    • It is meant to be a multi-stakeholder initiative that aims to bring governments, the private sector and civil society together to promote “high quality, trusted standards for global infrastructure development”.
    • The network is like a “Michelin Guide” for infrastructure projects.
    • This means that as part of this initiative, infrastructure projects will be vetted and approved by the network depending on standards, as per which, the projects should meet certain global infrastructure principles.
    • The projects that are approved will get a “Blue Dot”, thereby setting universal standards of excellence, which will attract private capital to projects in developing and emerging economies.

    Countering China’s BRI?

    • Observers have referred to the proposal as a means of countering China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which was launched over six years ago.
    • While Blue Dot may be seen as a counter to BRI, it will need a lot of work for two reasons.

    Fundamental difference between BRI and Blue Dot

    • While the former involves direct financing, giving countries in need immediate short-term relief, the latter is not a direct financing initiative and therefore may not be what some developing countries need.
    • The question is whether Blue Dot offering first-world solutions to third-world countries.
    • Secondly, Blue Dot will require coordination among multiple stakeholders when it comes to grading projects.
    • Given the past experience of Quad, the countries involved in it are still struggling to put a viable bloc. Therefore, it remains to be seen how Blue Dot fares in the long run.

  • A U.S. strategy only meant to isolate China

    Context

    Since 2017, the United States government has released a few reports and fact sheets on its new Indo-Pacific strategy. Buried in these documents is a much deeper agenda of the U.S. government: to use three large Asian states — Australia, India, and Japan — to isolate China. There is nothing else to it.

    The scale of BRI and the US objections

    • Objections to BRI: The U.S. government has made it clear that what it finds most objectionable is China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has signed on more than 70 countries in the world.
    • What BRI aims to achieve? Adopted in 2013, the BRI is intended as a mechanism to-
      • Development of new markets: BRI aims to end China’s reliance upon the markets of the West and to develop new markets in other continents.
      • Building infra: It is also intended to use China’s massive surpluses to build infrastructure in key parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
      • Investment of $ 1.3 trillion: By 2027, according to estimates by Morgan Stanley, China will spend about $1.3 trillion on this ambitious construction project.
      • Involvement of Saudi Arabia: Even Saudi Arabia, a close ally of the U.S., has made the BRI one of the cornerstones of its Saudi Vision 2030 plan.
    • Involvement of Pakistan: While China has invested $68 billion to build the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor from Xinjiang to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port.
      • Saudi Arabia has agreed to invest $10 billion in the port itself.

    Significance of the BRI and comparison with the US spending

    • Staggering scale and participation: The scale of Chinese investment, and the participation of a range of countries with different political identities in the BRI, is staggering.
    • Loss of appetite in the US to spend: At the Indo-Pacific Business Forum in July 2018 the U.S. said that it has spent $2.9 billion through the Department of State and the USAID (United States Agency for International Development).
      • It has lined up hundreds of millions of dollars more through its U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
      • Inadequate US spending: If one adds up all the money that the U.S. intends to spend for economic projects, it is still a fraction of the amount spent by China.
      • ‘America First’ attitude: There is no appetite in Washington, D.C., with its ‘America First’ attitude, to funnel more money towards investments in the region currently being built by the BRI.

    Military Claims of the US and investment

    • US investment with military presence: It appears as if U.S. investments will come only with military claims.
      • The case of Nepal: A few years ago, Nepal discovered a large amount of uranium in Mustang, near the Nepal-China border; this has certainly motivated U.S. interest in Nepal’s economy.
      • If the U.S. money comes with U.S. military presence, this will create a serious flashpoint in the Himalayas.

    Raising human right and transparency issue against China

    • The argument of human rights and transparency
      • Rhetorical argument: Unable to outspend the Chinese, the U.S. government is making a rhetorical argument that it has more respect for “transparency, human rights, and democratic values” than China, which “practices repression at home and abroad”.
    • The argument of transparency and the debt trap
      • Debt trap used by the US: It is hard to imagine the U.S. being “transparent” with its trade deals. It is equally hard to imagine the U.S. being able to argue that it would not put countries into debt.
      • Debt crisis created by the US in the 1980s: The U.S. government enabled a massive Third World debt crisis in the 1980s, which was then used by the U.S.-driven International Monetary Fund’s Structural Adjustment Programs to strangle countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
      • This history is alive, and it makes a mockery of the U.S.’s attempt to say that its own approach is superior to that of China’s.

    US withdrawal from multilateralism

    • Apart from that, the U.S. government has already indicated that it is uninterested in multilateral deals.
    • Withdrawal from TPP: The US withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2017, for instance.
      • Australia and Japan shrugged, and then put their energy into the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which sidelines the U.S.

    The claim of free and open Indo-Pacific

    • Renaming the Pacific Command: In May 2018, the U.S. military’s Pacific Command was renamed the Indo-Pacific Command, a symbolic gesture that provides a military aspect to the Indo-Pacific Strategy.
    • What free and open mean to the US? The U.S. government has made it clear that for all its talk of a “free and open Indo-Pacific”, what it actually wants is an Indo-Pacific with fewer Chinese ships and more U.S. warships.
    • Just before this renaming, the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2017 noted that “China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region”, and so the Indo-Pacific Strategy intends for the S. to fight for its dominance in the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean, and in the Asian rim.
    • This is a very dangerous war that the U.S. seeks to impose on Asia.

    India adopting the US project of Indo-Pacific

    • Australia and Japan moving away: As the military aspect of the Strategy increased, both Australia and Japan edged away from full-scale adoption of the U.S. project.
      • Japan has begun to use the term “Indo-Pacific” without the word “Strategy”.
      • Australia has signed onto a “comprehensive strategic partnership” with China.
    • Only India adopting the project: Only India remains loyal to the agenda set by U.S. President Donald Trump.
      • No US strategy to contain China: In all the documents released by the U.S. government and in all the speeches by officials, there is no discussion of the strategy to contain China.
      • There is only rhetoric that skates into the belligerent territory.

    Conclusion

    India would be advised to study the U.S. project rather than jump into it eagerly. Room for an independent foreign policy for India is already narrowed, and room for independent trade policy is equally suffocated. To remain the subordinate ally of the U.S. suggests that India will miss an opportunity to be part of a reshaped Asia.

     

     

  • Location in news: Idlib Province

     

    The nine-year-old war in Syria is currently raging in the northwestern province of Idlib, with rapidly escalating tensions between government forces of President Bashar al-Assad and the Turkish military.

    Background

    • President’s Assad’s forces are backed by Russia, who are clashing with thousands of Turkish troops south of its border with Syria.
    • Turkey has closed the border and is trying to seal itself from waves of displaced refugees as Assad presses forth with a brutal campaign to take back Idlib.

    Why is Idlib important?

    • Assad has been pushing to recapture Idlib, which, along with parts of neighbouring Hama, Latakia and Aleppo, are the last remaining strongholds of the rebel opposition and other groups that have been attempting to overthrow Assad since 2011.
    • At one point, the opposition held large parts of Syria under its control, but that changed after Assad, with Russian military support, slowly regained control over most of the country.
    • In 2015, Idlib province was overtaken by opposition forces.
    • Now, Syrian government forces are attempting to capture the strategic M4 and M5 national highways that connect Idlib, Aleppo and Damascus, the capital of the country.
    • Idlib skirts the two national highways and lies between Aleppo in the north and Damascus in the south.
    • It’s proximity to the Turkish border makes Idlib strategically important to the Syrian government.

    Who controls Idlib now?

    • Since the province fell to opposition forces, there is no one group that controls Idlib, but rather, several separate factions.
    • International watchdogs say that the dominant faction in Idlib is the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a UN-designated terrorist organization set up in 2017, with links to al-Qaeda.
    • Also operating in Idlib is the Turkey-backed Syrian National Army, an armed opposition group. Included in the mix are the remnants of the Islamic State.
    • Watch groups say that other factions in Idlib strongly oppose the presence of IS fighters in the province.

    Why is Idlib important for Turkey?

    • Idlib’s proximity to the Turkish border makes it not only important for the Syrian government, but also a cause of concern for Turkey.
    • Since the war started in Syria, thousands of displaced Syrians have sought refuge in Turkey over the years.
    • According to the latest known figures, Turkey presently hosts some 3.6 million refugees and is feeling the socio-economic and political strain of their presence in the country.
    • More conflict in Idlib would only serve to displace more people, pushing them towards the Turkish border.
    • Turkey has been witnessing a surge in hostility among its citizens towards refugees and a fresh wave of refugees will only exacerbate the situation.

  • Terms of transaction

    Context

    Trump administration seems supportive of India as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy, while also counting gains for itself.

    No substantive outcomes of the visit stated

    • Neither side has so far publicly touted any major substantive outcomes of the visit.
    • Creation of positive atmosphere: To create some positive atmospherics, the Indian Cabinet Committee on Security just gave final approval to $3 billion worth of pending contracts to purchase military helicopters from US companies Lockheed Martin and Boeing.
      • Missile defence system sale: The US Administration, on its part, informed Congress of its willingness to authorise the sale of another $1.8 billion worth missile defence system.
      • The move is indicative of the US’s growing willingness to allow higher technology defence equipment to India.
    • Placing India at level (STA-1) similar to its closest allies: The Trump Administration has gone farther than its predecessors in the technology levels it is willing to offer.
      • Including Guardian drones in 2017, and placing India at STA-1 level, similar to its closest allies and partners.
    • The expected MoUs: The spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs indicated on February 20 that five MoUs can be expected, inter alia,-
      • On intellectual property.
      • Trade facilitation and
      • Homeland security.
    • Making sense of the US’s actions in the present context: There will also be the regulation joint statement.
      • Analysing in greater details: This time, the statement will be parsed in more than usual detail for indications of future direction and intent for the partnership.
      • It is the time when the US has been talking of “Make America Great Again”, advocating for sovereignty and nationalism.
      • The US is also decrying-Alliance commitments, Readying to sign an agreement with the Taliban by month-end leading to a drawdown of US troop presence.
      • Yet, it is articulating repeatedly about India being a lynchpin of its “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”.

    No development on the limited trade front

    • No progress on limited trade package: The two countries have not been able to finalise even a “limited trade package”, which has been under discussion for two years.
    • Gaps between the expectations: Obviously, there is a gap between what India can accommodate, and what the US negotiators want for their own political reasons.
    • The Trump administration has taken several steps that have negatively impacted India.
      • It has imposed additional tariffs on steel and aluminium imports from India, ostensibly on national security grounds.

    Contradictory impulses

    • The above action flies in the face of citing strategic partnership and convergence in Indo-Pacific strategy.
    • GSP withdrawal: It has withdrawn hitherto available GSP benefits from certain categories of labour-intensive Indian products.
    • Labelling India a ‘Developed’ country: The US has taken India out of its list of “developing” countries, lowering the threshold for countervailing trade action.
    • Against the spirit of the beneficial rise of India: These actions go against the grain of the US articulation that it sees the rise of India to be in US benefit.
      • Treating the trade deficit with China and India on equal footing: It also does not make sense when India is an overall trade deficit country.
      • Even though it has a $20 billion surplus with the US which pales compared to China’s $350 billion surplus.
    • Unprecedented actions against the closest allies: Trump has taken unprecedented action against the closest US allies.
      • He has also repeatedly publicly ridiculed Indian tariffs, claiming recently that India has not treated the US fairly.

    What the future holds for the India-US relationship

    • Is the US “all-weather” partner: Given the contradictory impulses, it would be fair to ask what the future holds for the India-US relationship, and where would the Trump visit and its aftermath take us.
      • Can India consider the US a reliable and “all-weather” partner, or be constantly juggling convergences and divergences?
    • The factors that affected relationship: Historically, four factors have affected the India-US relationship at any point of time:
      • US global posture and priorities.
      • Strength of bilateral relations.
      • The role assigned to Pakistan in its global objectives.
      • The strategy towards China.

    Evolution of India-US relationship

    • Under Democrat Presidents
    • Roosevelt Period: During the Second World War, Roosevelt pushed Britain to grant independence to India, facilitated a separate official Indian representation in Washington through an Agent-General since 1941.
      • But did not go far enough fearing disruption of the necessary wartime alliance. In the post-war period.
    • Truman Period: Truman spoke of partnering with developing countries for their industrial and scientific progress.
      • He welcomed Indian PM Nehru for an acclaimed visit in 1949.
      • But initiated the Cold War containment strategy against the Soviet Union, and the assessment of newly independent countries from that lens.
    • Kennedy Period: He was extremely supportive of democratic India’s economic assistance requirements, and for military assistance during the 1962 China conflict.
    • Carter Period: Carter, wedded to human rights issues, acclaimed India’s post Emergency elections.
      • But was critical on non- proliferation differences.
    • Clinton Period: Clinton stabilised the relationship after the dissonance and sanctions following our 1998 nuclear tests.
      • And gave full support to India’s position during the 1999 Kargil conflict with Pakistan.
    • Obama Period: He came out in support of India’s permanent membership of the UN Security Council, and declared India a Major Defence Partner, enabling higher-level technology authorisations.
    • Under Republican Presidents
    • Eisenhower Period: Eisenhower embraced and armed Pakistan in its CENTO and SEATO military alliances.
      • India as a bulwark against China: He emphasised food and economic assistance to India seeing it as a democratic bulwark against a Communist China.
      • First-ever visit to India by the US president: He made a successful first-ever visit of a serving US President to India, welcomed also by a 5 lakh crowd in Connaught Place.
    • Nixon Period: He visited India for a day in 1959, was upset with Indian criticism of his Vietnam military offensives.
      • Sided completely with Pakistan during the Bangladesh crisis of 1971.
      • He sent the US seventh fleet into the Bay of Bengal to pressurise India and sought to reorder the global balance by outreach to China through a secret Kissinger visit that year.
    • Reagan Period: He explored economic and scientific cooperation with India, but was absorbed with Pakistan’s support in pushing the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan.
    • George W Bush Period: George W Bush transformed the relationship with the civil nuclear cooperation agreement of 2008.
      • Perceiving again the technological, military and political challenge to the US from a rising China.

    Conclusion

    It is clear that India’s interests have been impacted a bit by party orientation on issues, but more by the overall global circumstance. Under the present circumstance, therefore, India will have to deal with a transactional administration, supportive of strengthening India as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy, but also counting the gains for itself.

     

  • An agenda for Modi-Trump

    Context

    With the withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan and other regions, India must think about its new role in the region.

    The US plans for Afghanistan and the Gulf-cause of concerns for India

    • Why it matters? Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be eager to get a first-hand briefing from the US President on his plans for the Af-Pak region and the Gulf.
      • These two regions are vital to India’s economic, political and military security.
    • End of an important era in northwestern frontier: The impending withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan and the downsizing of the American security role in the Gulf region mark the end of an important era in India’s northwestern frontiers — both land and maritime.
    • Can India overcome the past reluctance? The question is whether Modi and Trump can overcome the past reluctance in both capitals to collaborate in the regions west of India.
      • Suitable for both the countries: There is a good fit between-
      • America’s downward adjustment in the region under Trump, and-
      • India’s ambition to play a larger role in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

    Broad understandingIndo-Pacific and extending it to the West

    • Development in the last three years: Over the last three years of the Trump presidency, Delhi and Washington had developed a broad understanding of how to secure the Indo-Pacific that the US had defined.
    • Need to extend the same to Western Indian Ocean: Officials in Delhi frequently complained that these common perspectives did not extend to the Western Indian Ocean.
    • In recent weeks, though, senior US officials have said the Indo-Pacific region extends to the east coast of Africa.
      • Question of strategic cooperation: Extending Indo-Pacific is not a question of defining geography but finding ways to secure common ground through strategic cooperation.

    Elevation of South West Asia to the top of America’s security concerns

    • Filling the vacuum created by the British Empire: As the sun set over the British empire in the east after a century and a half, the US stepped in to fill the breach.
      • What began as a cautious entry into the Indian Ocean became a full-blown military power projection at the end of the 1970s.
    • Other events that played an important role? The dramatic rise in oil prices, the Islamic Revolution in Iran and its threat to export it to the Arab World, and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, saw the elevation of South West Asia to the top of America’s security concerns.
    • Events after Gulf War: The First Gulf War during 1990-91 saw the US intervene to restore the sovereignty of Kuwait that was swallowed by Iraq’s Saddam Hussein.
      • 9/11 attacks: The terror attacks on September 11, 2001, invited a ferocious response from the US that ousted the Taliban from power in Afghanistan.

    The Iraq and Afghanistan war-Endless wars

    • Costly failures: Notwithstanding the initial successes in both Afghanistan and Iraq, there is a growing consensus in the US that these occupations have been costly failures.
      • Trump has been among the first political leaders in the US to call these wars initiated by a Republican predecessor in the White House as “stupid”.
      • The promise of ending the endless wars: During his presidential campaign in 2016 and since Trump has promised to end the “endless wars” in the Greater Middle East and bring the boys back home.
      • It is an idea that has found considerable resonance among Democrats.
    • Focusing on great power competition instead of small wars: While the security establishment is not willing to give up, US is now focusing more on the great power competition with Russia and China than the small wars that had preoccupied it over the last three decades.
    • The Oil factor: The steep decline in US energy dependence on the Gulf, too, has reduced the salience of the region in Washington.

    Three consequence of the change in the US policy

    • Cutting down the military commitments
      • The Middle East and Africa: Trump has been cutting down military commitments in the Middle East and Africa.
      • His officials are about to sign an agreement with the Taliban that provides for American withdrawal from Afghanistan.
      • Maritime front: On the maritime front, Trump has called on all major powers, especially those importing oil from the Gulf, to contribute to the security of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.
    • How it matters for India?
      • Challenges of limiting the consequences: The challenge for Indian policymakers has been to limit the consequences of what seems a definitive turn in US policy.
      • Chance to extend the own role: It should also be about seizing the possibilities for expanding India’s own role in the western marches of the Subcontinent.
    • To expand its role Delhi needs to make a few important shifts in its own thinking.
      • One, it must overcome the still powerful belief in sections of the Indian establishment that the US-Pakistan relationship is unchanging.
      • The US tilt toward India and away from Pakistan: Over the last two decades, there has been a tilt in US policies away from Pakistan and towards India.
      • For instance, the US pressures on Pakistan to vacate the Kargil heights, an exclusive nuclear exemption to India and efforts to rein in Pakistan’s cross-border terrorism during the Obama years.
      • Support in Trump period: Trump went further to acknowledge that Pakistan is part of the problem in Afghanistan and turned up the heat on Pakistan’s support for terrorism.
      • He has supported India’s efforts at the UNSC to bring Masood Azhar to book in the face of Chinese resistance.
      • Helped India isolate Pakistan at the Financial Action Task Force.
      • Prevented the UNSC from discussing Kashmir.
      • But India must also recognise: That there will be a measure of cooperation between the US and Pakistan.
      • Delhi’s focus should, instead, be on expanding its own security cooperation with the US in the troubled lands to the west of India.
    • India needs to prepare for a larger security role in Afghanistan
      • Question of being at the next-door: Trump has been asking a simple question: If India is next door to Afghanistan, should it not be doing more for Afghan security?
      • Need to explore the options: The NDA government has stepped up security assistance to Kabul. As Afghanistan enters a turbulent phase, regional and other powers are bound to fill the vacuum left by the US.
      • There are many options–  between doing nothing and sending the Indian army into Afghanistan- that Delhi and Washington could discuss.
    • Need to increase Naval activity
      • Increased role as regional security provider: Delhi has already stepped up its naval activity within the Gulf and beyond as part of its emergence as a regional security provider.
      • Cooperation with others: Effectiveness of India’s role will rise manifold if it acts in concert with the US and other partners.
      • Modi and Trump could begin by laying the political foundation for such cooperation.

    Conclusion

    At the beginning of Trump’s term, sceptics dismissed the prospects for India-US security cooperation in the eastern Indian Ocean and the Pacific, but progress has been steady. That cooperation can and must be extended now to the Western Indian Ocean.

     

  • Forging a new India-U.S. modus vivendi

    Context

    It is clearer than perhaps ever before in recent times, that New Delhi needs the continued support of the U.S. government on almost everything substantial that matters to India in its quest to be a power of substance in the international system.

    Preparing for Trump 2.0

    • The world may have to deal with Mr Trump for four more years after the end of his present term this year.
    • Where India can benefit from constructive ties with the US?
      • A fairer trade regime.
      • Accessing cutting-edge technology.
      • The fight against terrorism.
      • Stabilising our region.
      • New Delhi stands to benefit from constructive ties on all issues, given a more sensitive United States.
    • India must, therefore, seek greater understanding and engagement should there be a Trump 2.0.
    • Understanding the asymmetrical partnership: Asymmetrical partnerships, as we know from history, are rarely easy.
      • Partnership with the superpowers: Partnerships with superpowers are even more difficult; in international politics, as in life, even the best of unequal relationships results in a loss of some dignity and autonomy. 

    Why the partnership with the US matters for India?

    • The growing influence of China in Indo-Pacific: Without the United States, the region could become willy-nilly part of a new Chinese tributary system.
      • Chance of more organic rule-based order: With a fully engaged United States, the region has at least the chance of creating a more organic rules-based order.
    • Past consequences for India: the history of “estrangement” with the United States, during the Cold War, has had consequences for vital national interests that continue to cast their shadow on the present.
      • Jammu and Kashmir (J&K).
      • Nuclear non-proliferation.
      • Festering of the Pakistan “problem”.
      • The Chinese humiliation of 1962, are just a few examples.
    • Change in the perception over the US: But much of course has changed today.
    • Anti–Americanism is outdate: Anti-Americanism, once the conventional wisdom of the Indian elite, seems outdated.
      • Close alignment with the US: New Delhi has, over the decades, gone on to align itself more closely with Washington.
      • Opinion in favour of the stronger ties: More important, both within India and in the U.S., the consensus across the mainstream of political opinion favours stronger relations between the two countries.

    Pro-US tilt of the Indian Foreign policy

    • A survey suggests support for Trump: According to the latest Pew Surveys of Global Opinion, support for Mr Trump in India is high enough to suggest a great deal of public affection for the American President.
      • That itself is a marker of the way India and Indians now see the world.
    • Reason for the change in geo-strategic change: The reason for the change in New Delhi’s geostrategic outlook can be summarised quickly.
      • If the 1971 Friendship Treaty with the Soviet Union was a response to the continuing U.S. tilt towards Pakistan and the beginnings of a Washington-Beijing entente.
      • China factor: At present, it is the prospect of a potentially hegemonic China in the Indo-Pacific region is helping to cement the relationship.
      • Beijing has managed to alienate nearly all its neighbours and allies, except North Korea and Pakistan.
    • Gains made in bilateral ties in the last 3 years:
      • COMCASA– A foundational military agreement that allows for the sharing of encrypted communications and equipment.
      • Export control law relaxation: A change in U.S. export control laws that places India in a privileged category of NATO and non-NATO U.S. allies;
      • 2+2 dialogue: New ‘2+2’ foreign and defence ministers dialogue.
      • Oil export to India: An exponential increase in U.S. oil exports to India.
      • Tri-lateral military exercise: The inauguration of the first India-U.S. tri-service military exercise and expansion of existing military exercises.
      • The signing of Industrial Security Annex: The signing of an Industrial Security Annex that will allow for greater collaboration among the two countries’ private defence industries.
      • Inclusion of India in a U.S. security Initiative: The inclusion of India and South Asia in a U.S. Maritime Security Initiative.

    Preparing for the President from Democratic Party

    • There is, of course, a chance that we may have a Democratic President next year.
    • Bipartisan support in the US: In those circumstances, we can only hope that the bipartisan consensus on engaging India will prevail.
      • To be sure, however, a new President will seek to put his/her own imprimatur on the relationship.
      • Democrats and the Human Right issue: The Democrats will clearly be more proactive on human rights and on issues of inclusion and diversity, which would make a greater demand on India and test its capacity and creativity.
    • Indian diaspora: India, of course, continue engaging with its strongest source of support in the United States: the Indian diaspora.
      • Fortunately, there is a near consensus on the need to strengthen this constituency.

    Conclusion

    In any case, there is little doubt that whoever is the next occupant of the White House, a retreat from multilateralism (especially on trade-related issues) and concern about China will continue to be the two main pillars of contemporary American foreign policy. If for only those reasons, Mr Trump’s reason has undeniable significance.