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Subject: International Relations

  • Pay attention to their objectives in dealing with China and Pakistan

    While their interests overlap, Pakistan and China diverge when it comes to their objective in Kashmir. Both want to keep the pressure on India to avoid it from changing the status quo. Extending this line of argument, the author in this article suggest that India should separate the policy response to China from Pakistan, as they differ in their objectives.

    Coordinated efforts to corner India?

    • Latest news on the Ladakh front suggests that Chinese and Indian forces have begun to disengage in select areas.
    • But this does not detract from the reality that in the past few weeks Beijing and Islamabad are making coordinated efforts to challenge India’s presence in the Kashmir-Ladakh region.
    • There is stepped-up activity on Pakistan’s part to infiltrate terrorists into the Valley.
    • China has undertaken provocative measures on the Ladakh front to assert control over disputed areas around the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

    Let’s see how Pakistan and China’s interests overlap

    • In Pakistan’s case the intensification in its terrorist activities is related in part to the dilution of Article 370. 
    • Dilution of Article 370 helps India de-link Ladakh from the Kashmir problem.
    • For China, the division of Ladakh from Jammu and Kashmir allows India a freer hand in contesting China’s claims in the region.
    • Increasing road-building activity on India’s part close to the LAC augments this perception.
    • In addition, Ladakh borders China’s most restive provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet.
    • Ladakh is also contiguous to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), Gilgit and Baltistan, where the Chinese have invested hugely under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project.
    • External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s remark last year that India expects to have “physical jurisdiction over (POK) one day” has alarmed Beijing which sees any such Indian move as threatening the CPEC project.
    • These factors demonstrate the overlapping interests that Beijing and Islamabad have regarding India in this region.

    The above factors explain why Pakistan and China would want India to be so preoccupied with taking defensive measures in Kashmir and Ladakh as to have little time and energy left to attempt to alter the status quo in POK or in Aksai Chin.

    But there are major differences in Pakistani and Chinese objectives regarding India

    • These differences are related to their divergent perceptions of their disputes and their different force equations with India.
    • For China, Ladakh is primarily a territorial dispute with strategic ramifications.
    • China also believes it is superior to the Indian militarily and, therefore, can afford to push India around within limits as it has been attempting to do in the recent confrontation.
    • For Pakistan, its territorial claim on Kashmir is based on an immutable ideological conviction that it is the unfinished business of partition and as a Muslim-majority state is destined to become a part of Pakistan.
    • Islamabad also realises that it is the weaker power in conventional terms and therefore has to use unconventional means, primarily terrorist infiltration, to achieve its objective of changing the status quo in Kashmir.
    • China is a satiated power in Ladakh having occupied Aksai Chin and wants to keep up the pressure on New Delhi to prevent the latter from trying to change the situation on the ground.

    Way forward-Pay attention to objectives while negotiating

    • China’s primary concern with regard to Kashmir is to prevent any Indian move from threatening the CPEC project.
    • It does not challenge the status quo in Kashmir.
    • Pakistan, on the other hand, is committed to changing the status quo in Kashmir at all cost.
    • It has been trying to do so since Partition not only through clandestine infiltration but also by engaging in conventional warfare.
    • Therefore, while it is possible to negotiate the territorial dispute with China on a give-and-take basis.
    • Doing the same is not possible in the case of Pakistan which considers Kashmir a zero-sum game.
    • India should, therefore, distinguish the different objectives on the part of Beijing and Islamabad and tailor its responses accordingly without conflating the two threats to its security.

    Consider the question “Policy response of India in dealing with Pakistan and China should consider differences in their objectives in relation to Kashmir. And clubbing them together just because of their tactical overlap should be avoided. Elaborate.”

    Conclusion

    Lumping the twin threats posed by Pakistan and China together because of a tactical overlap between them makes it difficult to choose policy options rationally. So, the policy response must understand the difference in their objectives and avoid clubbing them together.

  • India-China border crisis: It is not about the U.S.

    India’s growing closeness to the U.S. could be the reason for China’s aggression along India’s border. This is the explanation we often come across. But is it really the case?. This article probes the same question. Example of China’s dispute with Indonesia and Philippine help us analyse the U.S. angle to Indo-China border dispute. So, what is the conclusion?

    An easy explanation to India-China border crisis

    • Why has China precipitated a fresh military crisis with India in eastern Ladakh?
    • Among the many explanations making the rounds in Delhi, there is always the easy and attractive one — it’s all about America.
    • Delhi has incurred Beijing’s wrath by moving closer to Washington, goes the argument.
    • India’s renewed enthusiasm for the US-led Quad, it is said, is encouraging China to teach a lesson to Delhi.

    But does this explanation applies to the other countries as well? Look at Indonesia

    • No!
    • This theory does not hold up in relation to other countries having problems with China.
    • Let us turn to the South China Sea, where China is on a bold and ambitious drive to expand its control over the disputed waters.
    • Let us start with gathering tensions over the territorial dispute between Beijing and Jakarta.
    • Over the last year and more, Jakarta is coping with a Chinese challenge in its waters off its Natuna Islands.
    • The Natuna are nearly 1,500 km from the Chinese mainland.
    • The Natuna themselves lie outside Beijing’s nine-dash line that claims nearly 80 per cent of the South China Sea.
    • The dispute is over the exclusive economic zone that the islands confer on Indonesia.
    • China says it has historic rights to these waters and has been dispatching its fishing fleet into these waters.

    Maybe China sees a problem with Jakarta-Washington relations: Let’s analyse

    • Jakarta did not support the US approach to the Indo-Pacific.
    • and went to great lengths to develop a concept of its own and get it endorsed by the ASEAN.
    • Indonesia is not a member of the much-maligned Quad.
    • Its foreign policy is wedded to non-alignment.
    • And as the host of the historic Bandung Conference in 1955, Indonesia is a founding member and champion of Non-aligned Movement.

    Now, let’s consider second example: Philippines

    • The story of the Philippines — one of the oldest military allies of the US in Asia — nicely complements the non-aligned Indonesia’s troubles with China.
    • When he came to power in 2016, President Rodrigo Duterte decided to distance the Philippines from the US and embraced China.
    • He had a hope of finding a reasonable settlement to the substantive maritime territorial dispute with Beijing.
    • In February this year, Manila announced the decision to terminate the agreement that lets American troops operate in the Philippines.
    • But last week, the Philippines “suspended” the decision to terminate military cooperation with the US.
    • The reason: The PLA’s relentless military pressure on the South China Sea islands claimed by Manila and including them in a new Chinese administrative district.

    So, what the two examples suggest?

    • Neither Jakarta that is scrupulously non-aligned nor Manila that was ready to break its alliance with the US has been spared from Beijing’s current muscular approach to China’s territorial disputes.
    • China has long-standing claims, right or wrong, on the territories of its neighbours.
    • The other is the dramatic shift in the regional power balance in favour of China.
    • Unlike in the past, China now has the military power to make good its claims and alter the territorial status quo, if only in bits and pieces.
    • This is what China is doing in the South China Sea.
    • And the situation may not be any different in Ladakh.

    Consider the question “The shift in the regional power balance and not the growing Indo-U.S. relations explains the assertive nature of China in India-China border issues. Elaborate.”

    Conclusion

    The real challenge for Delhi in managing its expansive territorial dispute with Beijing, then, is to redress the growing power imbalance with China. The rest is detail.

  • Cooperative security in Persian Gulf littoral and Implications for India

    This article analyses the security environment in the Gulf countries. Their common characteristic as being the oil producers and similarity in their social and security problems are also explained in detail in this article. And all this has implications for India. So, what are the implications? Read to know…

    Let’s look at the importance of countries surrounding Persian Gulf

    • The United Nations defines this body of water as the Persian Gulf.
    • The lands around it are shared by eight countries: Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
    • All are the members of the UN.
    • There is a commonality of interest among them in being major producers of crude oil and natural gas.
    • And thereby contribute critically to the global economy and to their own prosperity.
    • This has added to their geopolitical significance.
    • At the same time, turbulence has often characterised their inter se political relations.
    Arab Countries surrounding Persian Gulf

    Power play and security of the region

    • For eight decades prior to 1970, this body of water was a closely guarded British lake, administered in good measure by imperial civil servants from India.
    • When that era ended, regional players sought to assert themselves.
    • Imperatives of rivalry and cooperation became evident and, as a United States State Department report put it in 1973, ‘The upshot of all these cross currents is that the logic of Saudi-Iranian cooperation is being undercut by psychological, nationalistic, and prestige factors, which are likely to persist for a long time.’
    • The Nixon and the Carter Doctrines were the logical outcomes to ensure American hegemony.
    • An early effort for collective security, attempted in a conference in Muscat in 1975, was thwarted by Baathist Iraq.
    • The Iranian Revolution put an end to the Twin Pillar approach and disturbed the strategic balance.
    • The Iraq-Iran War enhanced U.S. interests and role.
    • Many moons and much bloodshed later, it was left to the Security Council through Resolution 598 (1987) to explore ‘measures to enhance the security and stability in the region’.

    Gulf regional security framework: Some questions

    • Any framework for stability and security thus needs to answer a set of questions:
    • Security for whom, by whom, against whom, for what purpose?
    • Is the requirement in local, regional or global terms?
    • Does it require an extra-regional agency?
    • Given the historical context, one recalls a Saudi scholar’s remark in the 1990s that ‘Gulf regional security was an external issue long before it was an issue among the Gulf States themselves.’

    What should be the ingredients of a  regional security framework?

    • The essential ingredients of such a framework would thus be to ensure: 1) conditions of peace and stability in individual littoral states; 2) freedom to all states of the Gulf littoral to exploit their hydrocarbon and other natural resources and export them; 3) freedom of commercial shipping in international waters of the Persian Gulf 4)freedom of access to, and outlet from, Gulf waters through the Strait of Hormuz; 5) prevention of conflict that may impinge on the freedom of trade and shipping and 6)prevention of emergence of conditions that may impinge on any of these considerations.
    • Could such a framework be self-sustaining or require external guarantees for its operational success?
    • If the latter, what should its parameters be?

    Misunderstanding the role great powers can play

    • Statesmen often confuse great power with total power and great responsibility with total responsibility.
    • The war in Iraq and its aftermath testify to it.
    • The U.S. effort to ‘contain’ the Iranian revolutionary forces, supplemented by the effort of the Arab states of the littoral (except Iraq)  GCC initially met with success in some functional fields and a lack of it in its wider objectives.

    The turbulent nature of US-Iran relations

    • In the meantime, geopolitical factors and conflicts elsewhere in the West Asian region — Yemen, Syria, Libya — aggravated global and regional relationships.
    • And it hampered a modus vivendi in U.S.-Iran relations that was to be premised on the multilateral agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme agreed to by western powers and the Obama Administration.
    • But it was disowned by U.S. President Donald Trump whose strident policies have taken the region to the brink of armed conflict.

    Perception of declining U.S. commitment to sub-regional security

    • Perceptions of declining U.S. commitment to sub-regional security have been articulated in recent months amid hints of changing priorities.
    • This is reported to have caused disquiet in some, perhaps all, members of the GCC, the hub of whose security concern remains pivoted on an Iranian threat (political and ideological rather than territorial).
    • And American insurance to deter it based on a convergence of interests in which oil, trade, arms purchases, etc have a role along with wider U.S. regional and global determinants.
    • It is evident that a common GCC threat perception has not evolved over time.
    • It has been hampered by the emergence of conflicting tactical and strategic interests and subjective considerations.
    • The current divisions within the organisation are therefore here to stay.
    • These have been aggravated by 1)the global economic crisis, 2) the immediate and longer term impact of COVID-19 on regional economies, 3) the problems in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 4) and the decline in oil prices.

    Let’s look at the emerging trends in the region

    • One credible assessment suggests that in the emerging shape of the region.
    • 1) Saudi Arabia is a fading power.
    • 2) UAE, Qatar and Iran are emerging as the new regional leaders.
    • 3) Oman and Iraq will have to struggle to retain their sovereign identities.
    • 4)The GCC is effectively ended, and OPEC is becoming irrelevant as oil policy moves to a tripartite global condominium.
    • None of this will necessarily happen overnight and external intervention could interfere in unexpected ways.
    • But it is fair to say that the Persian Gulf as we have known for at least three generations is in the midst of a fundamental transformation.

    Improvement relations between Arab states and Iran

    • With the Arab League entombed and the GCC on life-support system, the Arab states of this sub-region are left to individual devices to explore working arrangements with Iraq and Iran.
    • The imperatives for these are different but movement on both is discernible.
    • With Iran in particular and notwithstanding the animosities of the past, pragmatic approaches of recent months seem to bear fruit.
    • Oman has always kept its lines of communication with Iran open.
    • Kuwait and Qatar had done likewise but in a quieter vein.
    • And now the UAE has initiated pragmatic arrangements.
    • These could set the stage for a wider dialogue.
    • Both Iran and the GCC states would benefit from a formal commitment to an arrangement incorporating the six points listed above.
    • So would every outside nation that has trading and economic interests in the Gulf. This could be sanctified by a global convention.
    • Record shows that the alternative of exclusive security arrangements promotes armament drives, enhances insecurity and aggravates regional tensions.
    • It unavoidably opens the door for Great Power interference.

    Ties with India and impact on its strategic interests

    • Locating the Persian Gulf littoral with reference to India is an exercise in geography and history.
    • The distance from Mumbai to Basra is 1,526 nautical miles and Bander Abbas and Dubai are in a radius of 1,000 nautical miles.
    • The bilateral relationship, economic and political, with the GCC has blossomed in recent years.
    • The governments are India-friendly and Indian-friendly and appreciate the benefits of a wide-ranging relationship.
    • This is well reflected in the bilateral trade of around $121 billion and remittances of $49 billion from a workforce of over nine million.
    • GCC suppliers account for around 34% of our crude imports and national oil companies in Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi are partners in a $44 billion investment in the giant Ratnagiri oil refinery.
    • In addition, Saudi Aramco is reported to take a 20% stake in Reliance oil-to-chemicals business.
    • The current adverse impact of the pandemic on our economic relations with the GCC countries has now become a matter of concern.

    India’s relationship with Iran

    • The relationship with Iran, the complex at all times and more so recently on account of overt American pressure, has economic potential and geopolitical relevance on account of its actual or alleged role in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
    • Iran also neighbours Turkey and some countries of Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea region.
    • Its size, politico-technological potential and economic resources, cannot be wished away, regionally and globally, but can be harnessed for wider good.

    Consider the question “Stability and security of the Persian Gulf region has wider consequences for Indians strategic concerns. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    Indian interests would be best served if this stability is ensured through cooperative security since the alternative — of competitive security options — cannot ensure durable peace.

  • Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC)

    Senior lawmakers from eight democracies including the US have united to counter Communist China. They have launched the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC).

    Points to ponder:

    The world is growing conscious against China after its coronavirus adventure. IPAC is the first step towards the institutionalization of the Anti-China consciousness!

    What should be India’s stance here?

    IPAC

    • IPAC is a new cross-parliamentary alliance to help counter what the threat posed by China’s growing influence on global trade, security and human rights.
    • The participating nations include the US, Germany, UK, Japan, Australia, Canada, Sweden, Norway, as well as members of the European parliament.
    • It is an international cross-party group of legislators working towards reform on how democratic countries approach China.
    • Comprised of legislators from eight democracies it will be led by a group of co-chairs who are senior politicians drawn from a representative cross-section of the world’s major political parties.
    • The group aims to “construct appropriate and coordinated responses, and to help craft a proactive and strategic approach on issues related to China.”

  • Mission SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region)

    As part of Mission SAGAR, INS Kesari has entered Port Victoria, Seychelles to providing assistance in dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic.

    Try this question from CSP 2017:

    Q. Which of the following is geographically closest to Great Nicobar?

    (a) Sumatra

    (b) Borneo

    (c) Java

    (d) Sri Lanka

    Mission SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region)

    • SAGAR is a term coined by PM Modi in 2015 during his Mauritius visit with a focus on the blue economy.
    • It is a maritime initiative which gives priority to the Indian Ocean region for ensuring peace, stability and prosperity of India in the Indian Ocean region.
    • The goal is to seek a climate of trust and transparency; respect for international maritime rules and norms by all countries; sensitivity to each other`s interests; peaceful resolution of maritime issues; and increase in maritime cooperation.
    • It is in line with the principles of the Indian Ocean Rim Association.

    Back2Basics: IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association)

    • Established in 1997 in Ebene Cyber City, Mauritius.
    • First established as Indian Ocean Rim Initiative in Mauritius on March 1995 and formally launched in 1997 by the conclusion of a multilateral treaty known as the Charter of the IORA for Regional Cooperation.
    • It is based on the principles of Open Regionalism for strengthening Economic Cooperation particularly on Trade Facilitation and Investment, Promotion as well as Social Development of the region.

  • India launches campaign brochure for UNSC seat

    India has launched its campaign brochure ahead of elections for five non-permanent members of UNSC.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. By any calculus, India will qualify for UNSC permanent seat. Analyse.

    India’s agenda for UNSC

    The normal process of international governance has been under increasing strain as frictions have increased. Traditional and non-traditional security challenges continue to grow unchecked. India will highlight:

    • International terrorism
    • UN reforms and Security Council expansion, and
    • Streamlining the world body’s peacekeeping operations
    • Various technological initiatives

    India and UNSC

    • India is guaranteed a place in the UNSC as it is the sole candidate for Asia-Pacific but needs two-thirds of the 193-member General Assembly to vote in its favour in a secret ballot scheduled this month in New York.
    • While India is expected to sail through with the 129 votes required for the seat, the government is setting its sights on much higher numbers than that ahead of the election.
    • In 2010, when India stood for the UNSC seat of 2011-2012, it won 187 of the 190 votes polled.

    Streamlining new NORMS

    • This will be the eighth time India will occupy a non-permanent UNSC seat, with its last stint in 2011-2012.
    • India’s overall objective during this tenure in the UN Security Council will be the achievement of N.O.R.M.S: a New Orientation for a Reformed Multilateral System.

    Non-permanent membership  isn’t a cup of tea

    • The government launched its plan for the UNSC seat as far back as 2013, officials said, with a keen eye on 2021, and the year that will mark its 75th year of Independence.
    • To our good fortune, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan agreed, in a gesture to our friendship, to step aside for the 2021-22 seats.
    • The next big challenge was to pursue the Asia-Pacific grouping nomination without any last-minute contenders being propped up against India.
    • While diplomacy between capitals certainly helps, the vote had to be tied down by negotiations on the ground.
    • India was able to win a unanimous endorsement from the 55-nation grouping that included both China and Pakistan, in June 2019.

    Back2Basics: United Nations Security Council

    • The UNSC is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations and is charged with the maintenance of international peace and security.
    • Its powers include the establishment of peacekeeping operations, the establishment of international sanctions, and the authorization of military action through Security Council resolutions.
    • It is the only UN body with the authority to issue binding resolutions to member states.
    • The Security Council consists of fifteen members. Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, and the United States—serve as the body’s five permanent members.
    • These permanent members can veto any substantive Security Council resolution, including those on the admission of new member states or candidates for Secretary-General.
    • The Security Council also has 10 non-permanent members, elected on a regional basis to serve two-year terms. The body’s presidency rotates monthly among its members.

    Also read:

    India’s Bid to United Nations Permanent Seat

  • The China conundrum

    India-China border issue and the latest standoff in Ladakh has forced India to consider the lasting solution to the problem. This article explains China’s anti-India strategy. And options available with India in the face of aggression are also considered.

    LAC: the reason for frequent face-offs

    • The debate has persisted whether it was China’s National Highway 219 cutting across Aksai Chin or Nehru’s “forward policy” which constituted the actual reason for the Sino-Indian border-conflict of 1962.
    • After declaring a unilateral ceasefire on November 20, troops of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) withdrew 20 kms behind what China described as the “line of actual control” (LAC).
    • The LAC generally conformed to the British-negotiated McMahon Line.
    • In the west, the Chinese stuck to their 1959 claim-line in Ladakh, retaining physical control of the 14,700 sq km Aksai Chin.
    • The 1962 ceasefire line became the de facto Sino-Indian border.
    • But in a bizarre reality, both sides visualised their own version of the LAC, but neither marked it on the ground; nor were maps exchanged.
    • This has inevitably led to frequent face-offs.

    So, what were the steps taken the resolve the border issue after 1962?

    • Post-conflict, it is customary for belligerents to undertake early negotiations, in order to establish stable peace and eliminate the casus belli.
    • Strangely, in the Sino-Indian context, it took 25 years and a serious military confrontation in 1987 to trigger a dialogue.
    • The dialogue led the two countries to sign the first-ever Sino-Indian Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA) in 1993.
    • Indian diplomats claim that this has helped maintain “mutual and equal security”, while the bilateral relationship has progressed in other spheres.
    • And yet, the failure to negotiate a boundary settlement after 22 meetings of special representatives of the two countries cannot be seen as anything but a failure of statesmanship and diplomacy.

    Now, let’s analyse China’s anti-India strategy and how LAC and Pakistan problem fits into it

    • China’s post-civil war leadership had conceived an early vision of the country’s future.
    • Ambitious and realist in scope, this strategy visualised China attaining, in the fullness of time, great-power status and acquiring a nuclear-arsenal.
    • Since the vision saw no room for an Asian rival, neutralising India became a priority.
    • It was for this specific purpose, that Pakistan was enlisted in 1963 as a partner.
    • In China’s anti-India strategy, Pakistan has played an invaluable role by sustaining a “hot” border and holding out the threat of a two-front war.
    • In China’s grand-strategy, an undefined LAC has become a vital instrumentality to embarrass and keep India off-balance through periodic transgressions.
    • These pre-meditated “land-grabs”, blunt messages of intimidation and dominance, also constitute a political “pressure-point” for New Delhi.

    Possibility of escalation into shooting war

    • While Indian troops have, so far, shown courage and restraint in these ridiculous brawls with the PLA.
    • But there is no guarantee that in a future melee, a punch on the nose will not invite a bullet in response.
    • In such circumstances, rapid escalation into a “shooting-war” cannot be ruled out.
    • Thereafter, should either side face a major military set-back, resort to nuclear “first-use” would pose a serious temptation.

    What are the options available with India?

    • For reasons of national security as well as self-respect, India cannot continue to remain in a “reactive mode” to Chinese provocations and it is time to respond in kind.
    • Since India’s choices vis-à-vis China are circumscribed by the asymmetry in comprehensive national power, resort must be sought in realpolitik.
    • According to theorist Kenneth Waltz, just as nature abhors a vacuum, international politics abhors an imbalance of power, and when faced with hegemonic threats, states must seek security in one of three options: 1) Increase their own strength, 2) ally with others to restore power-balance, 3) as a last resort, jump on the hegemon’s bandwagon.

    India’s decision-makers can start by posing this question to the military: “For how long do you have the wherewithal to sustain a combat against two adversaries simultaneously?” Depending on the response, they can consider the following 2 options.

    1. Alliance with the USA

    • Nehru, when faced with an aggressive China in 1962, asked support from the USA.
    •  Indira Gandhi in the run-up to the 1971 war with Pakistan asked support from the USSR.
    • Both had no qualms of jettisoning the shibboleth of “non-alignment” and seeking support from the USA and USSR respectively.
    • Today, India has greater freedom of action and many options to restore the balance of power vis-à-vis China.
    • Xi Jinping has opened multiple fronts — apart from the COVID-19 controversy — across the South China Sea, South East Asia, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Asia.
    • Donald Trump is burning his bridges with China.
    • In the world of realpolitik, self-interest trumps all and India must find friends where it can.
    • Given China’s vulnerabilities in the Indian Ocean and the real possibility of America losing its strategic foothold in Diego Garcia, India has a great deal to offer as a friend, partner or even an ally; with or without the Quad.

    2. Accommodation with China

    •  If ideological or other reasons preclude the building of a power-balancing alliance, coming to an honourable accommodation with China remains a pragmatic option.
    • Zhou Enlai’s proposal of 1960 — repeated by Deng Xiaoping in 1982 — is worth re-examining in the harsh light of reality.
    • The price of finding a modus vivendi [an arrangement or agreement allowing conflicting parties to coexist peacefully]for the Sino-Indian border dispute may be worth paying if it neutralises two adversaries at one stroke and buys lasting peace.

    Consider the question “In the harsh light of reality and faced with aggression from its neighbour, India has to ally with other powers to restore the balance of power. Examine.”

    Conclusion

    Neither option will be easy to “sell”. However, India cannot afford to continue with the current situation for long and must choose one of the options to end the to find the solution.

  • A chill in US-China relations and India as a collateral damage

    Even before the covid pandemic we could sense the rising tension between the U.S. and China. However, pandemic proved to be the tipping point. This article explains the role the U.S. played in China’s rise. And its recent acceptance under Donald Trump of not so peaceful rise of China.

    Let’s look into recent announcements on China by the US President

    •  On May 29, the Trump administration said it would revoke Hong Kong’s special trade status under U.S. law.
    • It passed an order limiting the entry of certain Chinese graduate students and researchers who may have ties to the People’s Liberation Army.
    • The U.S. President has also ordered financial regulators to closely examine Chinese firms listed in U.S. stock markets.
    • And warned those that do not comply with U.S. laws could be delisted.

    So, what all these measures indicate?

    • These announcements are a clear indication that the competition between the U.S. and China is likely to sharpen in the post-COVID world.

    U.S. is complicit in China’s rise, but how?

    •  After the Chinese communists seized power, the Americans hoped to cohabit with Mao Zedong in a world under U.S. hegemony.
    • The Chinese allowed them to believe this and extracted their price.
    • U.S. President Richard Nixon gave China the international acceptability it craved in return for being admitted to Mao’s presence in 1972.
    • President Jimmy Carter terminated diplomatic relations with Taiwan in order to normalise relations with China in 1978.
    • President George H.W. Bush washed away the sins of Tiananmen in 1989 for ephemeral geopolitical gain.
    • And Bill Clinton, who as a presidential candidate had criticised Bush for indulging the Chinese, proceeded as President to usher the country into the World Trade Organization at the expense of American business.
    • All American administrations since the 1960s have been complicit in China’s rise in the unrealised hope that it will become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ under Pax Americana.

    China is creating its own universe

    • The collapse of the Soviet Union reinforced the view that the U.S. wants to keep its order and change China’s system.
    • This strengthened China’s resolve to resist by creating its own parallel universe.
    • China is building an alternate trading system: the Belt and Road Initiative.
    • A multilateral banking system under its control-Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, New Development Bank.
    • Its own global positioning system BeiDou.
    • Digital payment platforms like WeChat Pay and Alipay.
    • A world-class digital network-Huawei 5G.
    • Cutting-edge technological processes in sunrise industries.
    • And a modern military force.
    • It is doing this under the noses of the Americans and some of it with the financial and technological resources of the West.

    U.S. accepting the uneasy fact that China’s rise has not been peaceful

    • It is only under Mr. Trump that the Americans are finally acknowledging the uneasy fact that the Chinese are not graven in their image.
    • He has called China out on trade practices.
    • He has called China out on 5G.
    • It was Mr. Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy document that, perhaps for the first time, clubbed China along with Russia as a challenge to American power, influence and interests.
    • His recent China-specific restrictions on trade and legal migration are, possibly, only the beginning of a serious re-adjustment.

    Decoupling of the economies and new cold war

    • A full-spectrum debate on China is now raging across the U.S.
    • Former White House Chief of Staff Steve Bannon declared that the U.S. is already at war with China.
    • Others like diplomat Richard Haass and former president of the World Bank, Robert Zoellick, warn that a new Cold War will be a mistake.
    • Scholar Julian Gewirtz, in his brilliant essay, ‘The Chinese Reassessment of Interdependence’, talks about a similar process underway in Beijing.
    • Both sides are acutely aware how closely their economies are tied together: from farm to factory, the U.S. is heavily dependent on supply chains in China and the Chinese have been unable to break free of the dollar.
    • If Mr. Trump’s wish is to disentangle China’s supply chains, Mr. Xi is equally determined to escape from the U.S. ‘chokehold’ on technology.
    • To what extent the de-coupling is possible is yet to be determined.
    • But one thing is inevitable, India will become part of the collateral damage.

    Hong Kong: Sign of U.S. China rivalry entering in ideological domain

    • Will Hong Kong become a game-changer in the post-COVID world?
    • China’s decision to enact the new national security law for Hong Kong has been condemned in unison by the U.S. and its Western allies as an assault on human freedoms.

    Why is this significant?

    • The points of divergence, even dispute, between them have so far been in the material realm.
    • With Hong Kong, the U.S.-China rivalry may, possibly, be entering the ideological domain.
    • For some time now there are reports about Chinese interference in the internal affairs of democracies.
    • Countries in the West have tackled this individually, always mindful of not jeopardising their trade with China.
    • Hong Kong may be different.
    • It is not only a bastion for Western capitalism in the East, but more importantly the torch-bearer of Western democratic ideals.
    • Think of it as a sort of Statue of Liberty; it holds aloft the torch of freedom and democracy for all those who pass through Hong Kong en route to China.
    • This is an assault on beliefs, so to speak.

    Issue of China’s role in Covid-19 pandemic

    • These is growing demands that China should come clean on its errors of omission in the early days of COVID-19.
    • In the months ahead, more information may become public, from sources inside China itself, about the shortcomings of the regime.
    • That will further fuel a debate on the superiority of the Chinese Model as an alternative to democracy.

    Will this form the ideological underpinning for the birth of a new Cold War?

    • That will depend on who wins in Washington in November.
    • It will also depend on whether profit will again trump politics in Europe.
    • Moreover, how skilfully the Wolf Warriors of China can manipulate global public opinion will also make the be an important factor.

    Consider the question-“Various recent measures by the U.S. on China and the debate on the role of China in Covid-19 makes it clear that the next Cold War is all but imminent. And India has to be careful to avoid being collateral damage in that war. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    The lines are beginning to be drawn between the Americans on the one side and China on the other. A binary choice is likely to test to the limit India’s capacity to maintain strategic and decisional autonomy.

  • Setting agenda for G-12

    Recently, there was a call for expansion of the membership of the G-7 by the U.S. President. But the expanded group should not be seen as an anti-China gang-up. Disciplining and not isolating China is what most of the members of the group would want. And to do so, this new group needs to have new agenda. This article discusses the items that must form the part of the new agenda.

    Evolution of the G-7

    • When it started in 1975—with six members, Canada joining a year later—it represented about 70% of the world economy.
    • And it was a cosy club for tackling issues such as the response to oil shocks.
    • Now it accounts for about 40% of global gdp.
    • Since the global financial crisis of 2007-09 it has sometimes been overshadowed by the broader g20.
    • The G-7 became the G-8 in 1997 when Russia was invited to join.
    • In 2014, Russia was debarred after it took over Crimea.

    Call for expansion of the membership

    • It was the French who first flew the kite of membership expansion.
    • France had invited heads of government of several “emerging economies” for a meeting of the group at Évian-les-Bains, France, in June 2003. 
    • After 2003, G-8 host countries began organising a meeting on the sidelines of their summits with a select group of five or six developing countries.
    • India and China were invited to all those summits.
    • Now, President Trump has, however, gone a step further.
    • Rather than invite “guests” to a G-7 summit, he has suggested expanding the G-7 to a G-10 or G-11.
    • Trump has come up with an interesting list of new members — Australia, India, South Korea and, possibly, Russia.
    • Inclusion of Russia: Trump’s pragmatism in including Russia should be welcomed.
    • The advantage of getting Russia in is that the group would not be viewed merely as an anti-China gang-up but, in fact, as a club of “free market democracies”.
    • The group could easily be made the G-12 with the inclusion of Indonesia — one of the few democratic nations in the Islamic world.

    Discipline China, not isolate it

    • Trump’s motivation in expanding the G-7 to include India and Russia while keeping China out is transparent.
    • If keeping China out was not the intention, the G-7 could easily have dissolved themselves and revitalised the presently inert G-20.
    • There are, of course, good reasons why Xi Jinping’s China requires to be put on notice for its various acts of omission and commission and disrespect for international law.
    • However, disciplining China is one thing, isolating it quite another.
    • If the new group is viewed as yet another arrow in the China containment quiver it would place India and most other members of the group in a spot.
    • Everyone wants China disciplined, few would like to be seen seeking its isolation.
    • Asia needs a law-abiding China, not a sullen China.
    • Japan and Australia, have serious concerns about China’s behaviour.
    • But they may not like the new group to be viewed purely as an anti-China gang-up.
    • That may well be the case with South Korea too.
    • Indeed, even India should tread cautiously.
    • India has more issues with China than most others in the group, spanning across economic and national security issues and yet it should seek a disciplined China, not an isolated one.

    So, what should be on the agenda of the new group?

    • The proposed new group should define its agenda in terms that would encourage China to return to the pre-Xi era of global good behaviour.
    • The G-7 came into being in the mid-1970s against the background of shocks to the global financial and energy markets.
    • The G-12 would come into being against the background of a global economic crisis and the disruption to global trade caused both by protectionism and a pandemic.
    • The two items on the next summit agenda would have to be the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the rising tide of protectionism and mercantilism and the global economic slowdown.
    • The summit will have to come forward with some international dos and don’ts to deal with the challenge posed by these disruptions.

    New rules should apply to both the US and China

    • These new rules of international conduct would have to apply to both China and the US.
    • The G-12— have a shared interest in ensuring that both China and the US respect international law and desist from unilateralism in dealing with neighbours and global challenges.

    Widening the agenda

    • To be able to alter China’s behaviour without isolating it, the G-12 will have to widen their agenda.
    • Widening involves going beyond the purely economic issues that the G-7 originally focused on, and include climate change, health care and human rights.

    What should the “free market democracies” mean

    • In identifying themselves as “free market democracies” the G-12 must issue a new charter of respect for human rights, adherence to international law and multilateralism in trade and security.
    • This is easier said than done.
    • President Trump will have to re-assure the group’s members that he has their combined interests at heart in proposing a new group.
    • And he also has to show that he has an imagination beyond just an “America First” policy.
    • Even as the world is increasingly wary of an assertive China and of Xi Jinping’s China Dream and his version of a “China First” policy, it is also wary of Trump’s unilateralism on many fronts.

    What should the invitee nations consider before joining the group?

    • Many countries share Trump’s displeasure with China for its manipulation of the World Health Organisation.
    • But many of them are equally unhappy with the manner in which the Trump administration has treated the World Trade Organisation.
    • A G-12 cannot ignore such partisan behaviour by either the US or China.
    • If Trump does issue an invitation to the three or four new members to join the new group, they should seek clarity on the terms of membership.
    • Russia’s experience, of being invited and then disinvited and now being considered for being re-invited should be a salutary message to all others invitees.

    Consider the question- “The expanded new G-12 with India as its member, should also needs new agenda with its focus beyond China. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    As the world’s largest free market democracy India deserves to be a member of not just a G-12 but of even a new G-7. India’s political and economic credentials are certainly stronger than those of Canada, Britain and Italy.

  • What is the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)?

    Security issue in the disputed South China Sea has helped convince the Philippines to delay quitting a key U.S. military pact called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. What’s behind diplomatic tensions in the South China Sea? How it is set to become another flashpoint between the US and China?

    The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)

    • A VFA is a version of a status of forces agreement that only applies to troops temporarily in a country.
    • The US military operates around the world thanks to Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) in 100 or so countries.
    • Similarly, the VFA spells out the rules, guidelines and legal status of the US military when operating in the Philippines.
    • The VFA also affirms the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty as well as the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement — agreements that enable the U.S. military to conduct joint exercises and operations in the Philippines.
    • It came into force on May 27, 1999, upon ratification by the Senate of the Philippines.
    • It also exempts U.S. military personnel from visa and passport regulations in the Philippines.

    Significance of VFA

    • Both the US and Philippines remain wary of Beijing’s actions in the South China Sea (SCS). The VFA, therefore, act as an insurance policy against Chinese threats.
    • Terminating the VFA would leave the U.S. military without any legal or operational standing in the Philippines — and that’s a problem for the alliance.
    • Without a VFA, the U.S. military would not be able to support either of these defence agreements.

    Philippines-China spat on SCS

    • The Philippines has had diplomatic spats with China over the Scarborough Shoal and Spratlys in particular.
    • It says China’s “nine-dash line”, which China uses to demarcate its territorial claims, is unlawful under the UNCLOS convention.
    • The SCS is also a major shipping route and home to fishing grounds that supply the livelihoods of people across the region.

    Back2Basics: South China Sea Row

    • It is a dispute over territory and sovereignty over ocean areas, and the Paracels and the Spratlys – two island chains claimed in whole or in part by a number of countries.
    • China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei all have competing claims.
    • Alongside the fully-fledged islands, there are dozens of rocky outcrops, atolls, sandbanks and reefs, such as the Scarborough Shoal.
    • China claims by far the largest portion of territory – an area defined by the “nine-dash line” which stretches hundreds of miles south and east from its most southerly province of Hainan.
    • Beijing says its right to the area goes back centuries to when the Paracel and Spratly island chains were regarded as integral parts of the Chinese nation, and in 1947 it issued a map detailing its claims.
    • It showed the two island groups falling entirely within its territory. Those claims are mirrored by Taiwan.

    Spat over Chinese claims

    • China has backed its expansive claims with island-building and naval patrols.
    • The US says it does not take sides in territorial disputes but has sent military ships and planes near disputed islands, calling them “freedom of navigation” operations to ensure access to key shipping and air routes.
    • Both sides have accused each other of “militarizing” the South China Sea.
    • There are fears that the area is becoming a flashpoint, with potentially serious global consequences.

    With inputs from Washington Post