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Subject: International Relations

  • Trump’s new forced labour tariffs face global pushback and legal questions

    Why in News?

    The United States’ new forced labour tariffs under Section 301, covering more than 60 countries, face legal pushback from Brazil and Australia over WTO compliance.

    Key Highlights

    • Tariffs are imposed under a Section 301 forced labour enforcement investigation, covering over 60 trading partners.
    • Brazil and Australia are contesting the tariffs’ compliance with WTO rules.
    • The dispute remains open, legally and diplomatically.

    Section 301 (U.S. Trade Act, 1974)

    • Empowers the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) to investigate and respond to unfair foreign trade practices.
    • Authorises the U.S. to impose tariffs or other trade restrictions if another country’s actions are found to burden or restrict U.S. commerce.
    • Frequently used in disputes involving intellectual property, market access, subsidies, and labour practices.

    World Trade Organization (WTO)

    • Established in 1995, succeeding the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 1947.
    • Headquarters: Geneva, Switzerland.
    • Objective: Ensure rules-based, predictable, and non-discriminatory international trade.
    • Functions include administering trade agreements, resolving disputes, monitoring trade policies, and providing technical assistance.

    Value Addition

    • Most-Favoured-Nation (MFN) Principle (Article I, GATT): WTO members must treat all trading partners equally unless an exception applies.
    • Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU): Discourages unilateral trade retaliation and requires members to resolve disputes through the WTO mechanism.
    • Relevance for India: Increasing use of unilateral tariffs by major economies can affect export competitiveness and test the credibility of the multilateral trading system.

    [2018, GS2, 15 marks] What are the key areas of reform if the WTO has to survive in the present context of ‘Trade War’, especially keeping in mind the interest of India?”

  • Trump’s Saudi nuclear gambit marks a shift

    Why in the News?

    USA’s decision to sign a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia marks a significant shift in Middle East geopolitics. In this context, many argue that India should accelerate its own nuclear export readiness in response.

    What is the substance of the US-Saudi agreement, and why is it controversial?

    1. The core deal: The agreement would help Saudi Arabia build a civilian nuclear energy programme and reduce dependence on hydrocarbons, with American companies building Saudi reactors to secure a long term position in the kingdom’s nuclear infrastructure.
    2. The enrichment controversy: The main point of contention is the possibility of a uranium enrichment facility in Saudi Arabia, even as Washington seeks to roll back Iran’s nuclear capabilities, creating an apparent contradiction.
    3. The strategic rationale behind the contradiction: The rise of Iran’s regional influence has pushed the UAE towards its own civilian nuclear programme; a Saudi facility built and supervised by American companies is presented as reducing proliferation risk while giving Riyadh strategic parity with Tehran.
    4. Congressional and diplomatic hurdles: The agreement faces scrutiny in the US Congress and opposition from Israel’s supporters and the non-proliferation community.

    How is the nuclear deal linked to the broader regional diplomatic picture?

    1. Tied to Israel normalisation: Washington is linking the nuclear deal to Saudi recognition of Israel, which Riyadh has so far declined under the Abraham Accords framework.
    2. A triangular negotiation: The agreement could become part of a broader negotiation among USA, Saudi Arabia, and Israel covering regional security, Palestinian statehood, and the future of Arab-Israeli relations.

    Where does India stand in this emerging nuclear industrial competition, and what does the editorial recommend?

    1. India is largely absent: This reflects decades of resistance within India’s atomic energy sector to reforms enabling export-oriented industrial participation.
    2. The editorial’s recommendation: The US-Saudi deal should accelerate implementation of India’s SHANTI Act framework to prepare Indian industry for exporting nuclear technology across the Middle East.
    3. A call for political support: India should support the US-Saudi agreement, provided it is backed by strong non-proliferation safeguards, and should offer assistance to Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear programme.

    Conclusion

    The US-Saudi nuclear agreement reflects USA’s use of civil nuclear cooperation as a tool of regional strategic balancing, linking energy security, non-proliferation, and Saudi-Israel normalisation. For India, it is a strategic opportunity to strengthen its civil nuclear industry and emerge as a future nuclear technology exporter.

    Back2Basics

    1. SHANTI Act, 2025: A proposed legislative reform intended to open India’s civil nuclear sector to private and foreign investment in reactor construction and technology exports, reducing the traditional state monopoly in atomic energy.
    2. Abraham Accords: The 2020 diplomatic framework under which several Arab states normalised relations with Israel. Saudi Arabia has not yet joined the framework.

    PYQ RELEVANCE

    [UPSC 2018] In what ways would the ongoing US-Iran Nuclear Pact Controversy affect the national interest of India? How should India respond to this situation?

    Linkage: The PYQ examines the geopolitical implications of nuclear diplomacy in West Asia and its impact on India’s strategic interests. The article analyses the proposed US-Saudi civil nuclear agreement, its implications for regional power balance, nuclear non-proliferation, and India’s strategic and nuclear diplomacy in West Asia.

  • New US tariffs leave India better off than competitors; Trump’s tariff mania is inextricable from his politics

    Why in the News?

    The Trump administration began imposing permanent tariffs under Section 301 of the US Trade Act, 1974 on 60 trading partners after its earlier International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) tariffs were struck down by the US Supreme Court. This places India in a more favorable bracket than China and Vietnam even as such tariffs function as domestic politics rather than sound economics.

    How does the new four tier tariff structure actually work, and where does India sit in it?

    1. Legal foundation shift: The administration is rebuilding the tariff regime under Section 301 of the Trade Act, 1974 (targeting alleged forced labour in imports) after its International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) tariffs were declared illegal by the US Supreme Court in February.
    2. The four tiers: The most favourable group (EU, Taiwan) faces a Section 301 tariff calculated only to bring the total to 10% where the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) rate is below that; the second tier, including India and 16 others such as Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Canada, and Mexico, faces a flat additional 10%; the third tier (Japan, South Korea, Switzerland) faces a flat 12.5%; the least favourable tier of 38 countries, including China and Vietnam, also faces a flat 12.5%.
    3. India’s rate fell during negotiation: India’s tariff dropped from 12.5% first proposed in March to 10%, after India amended its Foreign Trade Policy on 14 June to explicitly ban imports made using forced labour.
    4. India’s export performance defied predictions: Despite tariff measures since early 2025, India’s merchandise exports to the US grew 0.9% (from US$86.5 billion to US$87.3 billion) in 2025-26, according to an ICRIER report, though this was driven entirely by products on the US exclusion list (pharmaceuticals and electronics), while non-excluded exports fell 11.2%.

    What is the real reason the USTR gives for the tariffs, and is that reason coherent?

    1. The stated aim: The US Trade Representative (USTR) says countries that import forced labour goods gain an unfair cost advantage, harming American workers.
    2. The geopolitical tell: All 60 countries under investigation were found “guilty,” with the most favourable grouping being the EU and Taiwan and the least favourable being China and Vietnam, a grouping that tracks geopolitical alignment more than measurable differences in forced labour enforcement.
    3. The stated target is explicit: The tariffs are primarily meant to force countries to reduce dependence on China, with which the US is engaged in a trade war.
    4. New textile quotas complicate India’s advantage: Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQs) granted to Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Malaysia for importing US cotton could divert textile and apparel sourcing away from India, despite its overall favourable tariff position.

    Why do tariffs persist as policy despite weak economic evidence for them?

    1. Tariffs function as a domestic tax, not a foreign penalty: Research by economists Mary Amiti, David Weinstein, and Stephen Redding shows tariff costs are largely borne by American businesses and consumers through higher prices, not by foreign producers.
    2. Global supply chains blunt the intended effect: More than half of global trade consists of intermediate goods; tariffs on inputs such as steel or electronics raise costs for the very domestic manufacturers they are intended to protect.
    3. Trade deficits have not shrunk: The US continues to run a record merchandise trade deficit despite successive tariff rounds, since deficits are driven by savings, investment, and consumption, not tariffs, while global supply chains have rerouted through Vietnam, Mexico, and other intermediary economies.
    4. The political logic that survives the economic failure: Every successful political narrative needs someone to blame, someone to protect, and a visible policy action signalling resolve; tariffs provide all three even when they fail economically, whereas structural reforms require patience and produce fewer immediate political gains.

    Conclusion

    India’s tariff position is more favourable than China’s or Vietnam’s largely due to geopolitical considerations presented through the language of forced labour, rather than a consistent trade policy standard. At the same time, while India may benefit in the short term from trade diversion, new textile sourcing quotas for competing countries could reduce that advantage over the longer term.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2018] What are the key areas of reform if the WTO has to survive in the present context of ‘Trade War’, especially keeping in mind the interest of India?

    Linkage: The PYQ examines the implications of global trade wars, protectionism, WTO reforms, and India’s trade interests in the evolving international trading system. The article analyses the new US tariff regime, its geopolitical and economic motivations, its implications for the multilateral trading order, and the opportunities and challenges it creates for India’s exports and trade strategy.

  • India has ridden out crisis of Iran war but a much bigger challenge is upon it

    Why in the News

    Donald Trump’s foreign policy has exposed a challenge for India as serious as the 1991 Balance of Payments (BoP) crisis, this time centred on commerce, critical minerals, computer chips, and AI infrastructure rather than a single macroeconomic emergency.

    How does 2026 mirror 1991, and how does it differ?

    1. Financial position is stronger, but growth is not: India’s finances in 2026 are far more robust than in 1991, yet GDP growth remains at 6%, consistent with the 30 year average but well below the 8% benchmark, as the rupee depreciated and Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) moved capital out.
    2. A Gulf war shock recurs: Just as the 1990-91 Gulf War pushed up India’s import bill in 1991, the West Asia conflict in 2026 has driven energy shortages and inflation.
    3. The security backstop has changed form, not disappeared entirely: In 1991, the Soviet collapse removed India’s counterweight to China and the US; in 2026, Washington’s retreat from alliances and interest in a “G-2” accommodation with Beijing again leaves India without a reliable security backstop.
    4. China’s lead has widened, not narrowed: China’s GDP was only slightly larger than India’s by 1991; by 2026 it stands at US$20 trillion against India’s US$4 trillion, and at current growth rates the gap will widen from US$16 trillion to US$24 trillion by 2050.

    What makes the “four Cs” challenge harder to fix than the 1991 crisis?

    1. Commerce and manufacturing: Manufacturing has stagnated despite 30 years of policy encouragement, unlike the relatively simple structural reforms that resolved the 1991 crisis.
    2. Critical minerals and rare earths: India has reserves but has not adequately mapped or mined them, and processing capacity is a separate unresolved challenge, with dependence on China ranging from 50% to nearly 100% across minerals and metals.
    3. Computer chips: NITI Aayog estimates that 90% to 95% of India’s semiconductor demand will still be met by imports until 2035.
    4. AI infrastructure: India has strengths in AI adoption and AI talent but little presence in the AI value chain itself.

    What is the deeper tension the piece does not resolve?

    1. Geopolitical alignment is unresolved: The piece poses, without answering, whether India should pursue a “hide-and-bide” strategy with both the US and China, or attempt a more ambitious reset with Beijing modelled on how China itself used American imports, investment, and innovation after 1972.
    2. Pakistan’s positioning has hardened: Pakistan is again “triumphalist,” deeply integrated with China’s military, and was a mediator between the US and Iran in 2026, echoing its 1991 alignment with the winning side of the Cold War.

    Conclusion

    India has absorbed the immediate economic shock of the Iran war, but the underlying four Cs problem (commerce, critical minerals, chips, and AI) is structurally harder than the 1991 crisis and cannot be fixed by macroeconomic reform alone. The piece calls for a coordinated national effort on the scale of a Manhattan Project, while leaving India’s broader geopolitical alignment between the US and China explicitly unresolved.

    Back2Basics

    1. India Semiconductor Mission (ISM): The Union government’s programme to build domestic semiconductor design, fabrication, and packaging capacity, aimed at reducing India’s near total reliance on imported chips.
    2. Critical Minerals Mission: The government’s initiative to secure critical mineral supply chains essential for clean energy, electronics, and defence technologies, given India’s dependence on imports, particularly China, for processing capacity.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2025] India aims to become a semiconductor manufacturing hub. What are the challenges faced by the semiconductor industry in India? Mention the salient features of the India Semiconductor Mission.

    Linkage: The PYQ examines challenges in building India’s semiconductor ecosystem and reducing dependence on strategic technology imports. The article situates semiconductors within the broader “four Cs” challenge, arguing that strengthening domestic chip manufacturing is vital for India’s long-term economic and strategic resilience.

  • Warning signals for India from NATO’s Ankara Summit

    PYQ Relevance
    [UPSC 2023] The expansion and strengthening of NATO and a stronger US-Europe strategic partnership works well in India.” What is your opinion about this statement? Give reasons and examples to support your answer.
    Linkage: Examines the strategic implications of NATO’s evolving role and the US-Europe security partnership for India’s foreign and security policy. The article analyses the Ankara Summit’s defence commitments, Europe’s defence-industrial constraints, and how NATO’s expansion and military spending directly affect India’s defence preparedness and strategic autonomy.

    Mentor’s Comment

    The 32 heads of state or government of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) met at the Ankara Summit on July 7-8, 2026, to review progress since the 2025 Hague Summit and set out a roadmap for implementation. The summit locked in a fivefold rise in the defence-spending pledge and a commitment to build a Europe-wide Defence Industrial Base (DIB), even as Europe’s existing industry struggles to meet current demand.

    What four commitments came out of the Ankara Summit?

    1. Collective defence reaffirmed: All 32 allies affirmed an “ironclad commitment” to collective defence under Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and to the transatlantic bond.
    2. Five per cent spending pledge: Allies unanimously endorsed “The Hague defence commitment,” under which every NATO member undertook to allocate at least five per cent of GDP to defence by 2035, up from the earlier two per cent pledge.
    3. Support for Ukraine: NATO declared “unwavering support” for Ukraine’s freedom, sovereignty and territorial integrity.
    4. European defence industrial base: Members committed to building a high-technology, high-capacity, Europe-wide Defence Industrial Base (DIB), the network of firms, factories, laboratories and skilled workers needed to build and sustain military power.
    5. Focus on implementation: Discussions at Ankara centred on converting these political commitments into military capability through investment, industrial capacity and innovation.

    Can Europe’s defence industry deliver on the pledge?

    1. Pre-existing shortages: European defence giants MBDA and Rheinmetall had warned of ammunition production shortages even before The Hague’s five per cent pledge.
    2. Evidence from the Iran campaign: Operation Epic Fury, the U.S.-Israel bombing campaign against Iran, saw the U.S. fire more than 850 Tomahawk cruise missiles; at the current production rate of 85 a year, replacing them would take a decade.
    3. Coordination gap: Many NATO members have capable Defence Industrial Bases (DIBs) individually, but there is little coordination of alliance-wide priorities.
    4. Concentrated mismatch: The resulting strategic mismatch found during the Ukraine war has clustered in air defence missiles and interceptors, precision-guided munitions, and artillery rockets.
    5. Deepening dependency, not reducing it: The U.S. supplied half of Europe’s defence spending between 2022-2024, up from 28% in 2019-2021, and without a major revitalisation of Europe’s own industry, the five per cent pledge will only deepen dependence on the U.S.
    6. Rising U.S. sales to Europe: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) notifications to the U.S. Congress for European customers have quadrupled since 2008, to $76 billion in 2024.

    How does NATO’s spending surge affect global arms buyers like India?

    1. Buyer’s market turning seller’s market: As NATO spends more, the international arms market is shifting from a buyers’ market to a sellers’ market for the world’s big arms buyers, including India.
    2. First warning sign: U.S. firm General Electric Aerospace has delayed supplying F-404 fighter jet engines, critically needed for the Indian Air Force’s (IAF) Tejas Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) programme.
    3. Competing demand: Asian allies’ rising demand for U.S. weaponry is competing directly with ongoing European needs for the same suppliers.

    What must India do in response?

    1. Growing reliance on new-age technology: India’s defence increasingly depends on drones, artificial intelligence (AI), cyber warfare, electronic warfare, and resilient networks.
    2. Self-reliance as the necessary response: India’s defence industry must achieve self-reliance in these technology areas rather than depend on suppliers who are themselves overstretched fighting their own battles.
    3. Mitigating Supply Chain Vulnerabilities: Avoid over-reliance on single-source western suppliers like General Electric who face competing allied demands. Push local aerospace and defense firms (such as HAL and private sector partners) to prioritize delayed components like fighter jet engines.
    4. Giving a big push to the private sector: Funding and orders should be increased for domestic defense startups working in the fields of drones, artificial intelligence (AI), and cybersecurity.
    5. Further expansion of the ‘Negative Import List’: The scope of the existing ‘Positive Indigenisation List‘ should be further expanded. There should be further expansion of the ‘Negative Import List‘. India’s Positive Indigenisation Lists (PIL) ban military imports, forcing procurement strictly from domestic makers. Managed via the Srijan Portal, key tracks include the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) lists for major platforms and the Department of Defence Production (DDP) lists for components.

    Conclusion

    NATO’s Ankara Summit converted last year’s spending pledge into a five per cent-of-GDP commitment and a mandate to build a European Defence Industrial Base (DIB), but ammunition and missile shortages already visible in the Ukraine war show capacity, not political will, is now the binding constraint. Because higher NATO spending is shifting the global arms market from a buyers’ to a sellers’ market, without a rapid European industrial build-out the pledge will deepen dependence on the U.S. rather than reduce it, and it is squeezing supply for outside buyers like India, making self-reliance in new-age defence technologies the necessary Indian response.

  • US to announce nuclear agreement with Saudi Arabia

    Why in the News?

    The Trump administration is preparing to announce a civil nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia that could include a uranium enrichment facility, drawing bipartisan US Congressional and Israeli non-proliferation concerns.

    Key Highlights

    1. The proposed 30-year agreement could include uranium enrichment capability for Saudi Arabia.
    2. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has stated that Saudi Arabia would pursue nuclear weapons if Iran acquires them.
    3. The agreement requires review by the US Congress before it can be finalised.

    International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

    1. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an autonomous international organization established in 1957.
    2. It promotes the peaceful use of nuclear energy while preventing its use for military purposes through safeguards and inspections.
    3. It is headquartered in Vienna, Austria.
    4. India is one of the 180+ member states of the IAEA.
    5. In 2025, the IAEA Board of Governors declared Iran in breach of its nuclear non-proliferation obligations, the first such finding since 2006.

    New START Treaty

    1. New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) was the last remaining bilateral nuclear arms control treaty between the United States and Russia.
    2. It placed legally binding limits on deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems and provided for mutual inspections.
    3. The treaty officially expired on 5 February 2026, ending more than five decades of legally binding limits on the world’s two largest nuclear arsenals.

    (2018) In the Indian context, what is the implication of ratifying the ‘Additional Protocol’ with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)?

    (a) The civilian nuclear reactors come under IAEA safeguards.
    (b) The military nuclear installations come under the inspection of IAEA.
    (c) The country will have the privilege to buy uranium from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
    (d) The country automatically becomes a member of the NSG.

  • Convergent perils: luminaries against human ethics being outsourced to AI

    Why in the News:

    A group of Nobel laureates, Artificial Intelligence (AI) scientists, and religious leaders signed the “Rome Declaration for an Unarmed and Disarming Peace” on 16 July, calling for a treaty banning autonomous systems from nuclear launch decisions. The Declaration argues that introducing AI into nuclear command structures does not merely speed up decision-making, it removes the human hesitation that has so far prevented nuclear war.

    What has historically prevented nuclear escalation, and why is it fragile?

    1. Human hesitation as the real safeguard: Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD), the doctrine that a first nuclear strike triggers devastating retaliation, relied on human hesitation, diplomatic backchannels, and moral pause, not technical safeguards alone.
    2. Historical near misses: During the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and the 1983 Soviet false alarm incident involving officer Stanislav Petrov, disaster was averted because human operators exercised caution and scepticism.
    3. Compressed decision windows: AI-driven predictive logistics and battle management systems compress decision windows from hours to seconds, removing the time needed for human verification.

    What technical failure modes make AI unsuitable for this role?

    1. Documented failure modes: Large Language Models (LLMs) and neural networks are prone to hallucinations and data poisoning, where training data is maliciously corrupted to manipulate outputs.
    2. Automatic escalation risk: In a crisis, an algorithm misreading a routine signal as an imminent threat could automatically trigger a retaliatory sequence within a compressed decision window.
    3. Unauditable reasoning: Most AI models operate as “black boxes,” making their conclusions impossible to verify at the moment a launch decision would be required.

    What five operational principles does the Declaration propose?

    1. Mandatory meaningful human control: Prohibiting any AI-driven system from making the final decision on the use or deployment of nuclear weapons.
    2. The digital commons model: Expanding data access so experts beyond major powers can better assess AI-related existential risks.
    3. Responsible development: Requiring AI developers to publish the ethical frameworks guiding their models and forbidding fully autonomous, self-improving systems that cannot be monitored or halted by human operators.
    4. Internal arsenal vulnerability audits: Requiring nuclear states to conduct rigorous reviews of their command-and-control systems against AI-driven cyber tampering.
    5. Time-bound, verifiable disarmament: Renewing good faith international negotiations toward completely and verifiably eliminating nuclear weapons.

    Why is the current Iran nuclear crisis treated as a live test of these risks?

    1. Broken arms control architecture: Iran’s breaches of its non-proliferation obligations, followed by joint United States-Israel military strikes, have exposed the existing arms control architecture as broken.
    2. AI in contested monitoring: States increasingly use AI for target characterisation and predictive intelligence tracking of nuclear facilities under contested conditions.
    3. Automated misjudgment risk: An AI system defending an enrichment facility could misinterpret a routine network probe or a physical strike as the start of an attack, triggering a disproportionate automated response before any human decision is made.

    What obstacle remains to acting on the Declaration’s warning?

    1. No treaty consensus: No consensus currently exists among states on what a treaty banning AI in nuclear command should cover, or even on banning autonomous AI in warfare more broadly.
    2. Moral instrument, not binding law: The Declaration functions as a moral and philosophical lexicon rather than a binding legal instrument at this stage.
    3. Dependence on public pressure: Its success depends on generating public awareness that then creates grassroots pressure for states to negotiate a binding treaty.

    Conclusion:

    The Declaration’s central claim is that no technical safeguard can substitute for the human doubt that has twice averted nuclear war, and that compressing decision windows to seconds through AI removes exactly that safeguard. No binding treaty yet exists to prevent this, and the current Iran nuclear crisis shows the danger is not hypothetical. Ethical responsibility for nuclear launch decisions cannot be delegated to a machine.

  • First Sanctions, Now War: India’s Chabahar Plans Up in the Air

    Why in the News:

    The Union Budget 2026 to 2027 made no allocation for the Chabahar Port, against Rs 400 crore in the previous year, while US military strikes damaged Chabahar’s maritime control tower and the US sanctions waiver that had allowed Indian operations expired on April 26, 2026. Together, these developments place India’s decade long connectivity investment in jeopardy just as the strategic importance of the corridor has increased.

    Why is Chabahar strategically indispensable for India, not merely commercially useful?

    1. Operating structure: India Ports Global Ltd (IPGL) operates the Shahid Beheshti Terminal under a 10 year renewable agreement with Iran’s Ports and Maritime Organisation, while Iran operates the Shahid Kalantari Terminal.
    2. Bypassing Pakistan: Chabahar provides India’s only direct route to Afghanistan and Central Asia without depending on Pakistan, which does not permit Indian goods to transit through its territory.
    3. Part of INSTC: Chabahar serves as India’s gateway into this corridor.
      • Term: International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC): A multi modal transport corridor connecting India, Iran, Russia, Europe, and Central Asia, aimed at reducing transport time and cost.
    4. Counterweight to Gwadar: Chabahar acts as a strategic counterbalance to China developed Gwadar Port in Pakistan, located about 140 km away.
    5. Value to Iran: Chabahar is Iran’s only oceanic port with direct access to the Indian Ocean outside the Strait of Hormuz, making it crucial for developing Sistan Baluchistan Province.

    How have US sanctions constrained India’s operational control even before the current war?

    1. Sanctions origin: After withdrawing from the Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA) in 2018, the United States imposed sanctions on Iran but granted a special waiver for Chabahar to facilitate humanitarian assistance and trade with Afghanistan.
    2. Waiver instability: The waiver was withdrawn in September 2025, restored for six months in October 2025, and expired on April 26, 2026, without renewal.
    3. Pre-emptive restructuring: To avoid penalties under the May 2024 agreement, India prepaid its US$120 million investment in the Shahid Beheshti Terminal and transferred its operational stake to local entities.

    Does prepayment and stake transfer protect India’s interests, or concede control precisely when the corridor’s value is rising?

    1. Loss of direct control: India is gradually losing direct operational control over Chabahar following the expiry of the sanctions waiver. The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) has stated only that discussions with relevant stakeholders are continuing.
    2. Defensive rather than assertive posture: The MEA confirmed that the India operated terminal was not damaged during the US strikes near the control tower, but this addresses only physical safety, not operational continuity.
    3. Regional balance shift: The expiry of the waiver strengthens the strategic position of China and Pakistan, the very competitors Chabahar was intended to balance.

    What does the absence of Budget funding signal about India’s near term commitment?

    1. Funding withdrawal: Chabahar received Rs 400 crore in the previous Union Budget, but no allocation was made in the Union Budget 2026 to 2027.
    2. Strategic consequence: Weakening India’s engagement with Chabahar risks undermining its only non Pakistan connectivity corridor to Afghanistan and Central Asia, affecting long term regional connectivity plans.

    Conclusion:

    Chabahar remains a strategic asset for India by providing an alternative route to Afghanistan, Central Asia, and the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) while balancing the influence of Gwadar Port. However, US sanctions, the Iran conflict, the expiry of the sanctions waiver, and the absence of fresh budgetary support have weakened India’s operational position. Although India has safeguarded its financial commitments through restructuring, restoring strategic influence over the project will depend on future geopolitical developments and the sanctions regime.

  • From 1991, Three Foreign Policy Lessons for Managing Disruption of Certainties

    Why in the News:

    The war that began with the killing of Iran’s Supreme Leader on February 28, together with the fifth year of the Russia Ukraine war, is disrupting India’s energy costs, Strait of Hormuz navigation, and diplomatic balancing, echoing the twin 1990 to 1991 shocks of the Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. The parallel is used to argue that India’s current foreign policy debate repeats an old pattern of ideological sympathy overriding interest based assessment of unstable partners.

    What is the current disruption, and how does it parallel 1990 to 1991?

    1. The 1990 to 1991 shocks: Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 sent oil prices soaring, disrupted remittances, and aggravated India’s Balance of Payments (BoP) crisis. Within months, the Soviet Union, India’s principal Cold War partner, collapsed.
    2. The present disruption: The Iran war has raised energy costs and disrupted navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. A June US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding that briefly eased tensions proved premature as the conflict escalated again.
    3. Ukraine’s unresolved war: The Russia Ukraine war has entered its fifth year without settlement. While Russia is not disintegrating as the Soviet Union did, the mounting costs of the war raise questions about its future.
    4. Immediate US pressure: Proposed US sanctions legislation, associated with the late Senator Lindsey Graham, seeks punitive tariffs on China, India, and other importers of Russian oil. President Donald Trump has also called for extending similar measures to Iranian oil, increasing pressure on India’s energy diplomacy.
    5. India’s changed capacity: India is now better positioned than in 1991 due to its larger economy, greater diplomatic influence, and broader strategic partnerships, though it is also more exposed to global shocks.

    How did ideological sympathy distort India’s reading of unstable partners in 1991, and how does the same pattern recur now?

    1. Contradictory 1991 conduct: India evacuated its citizens from the Gulf, sought to preserve ties with Iraq and the Arab world, and simultaneously allowed American aircraft to refuel, while Foreign Minister I. K. Gujral publicly embraced Saddam Hussein.
    2. Establishment sympathy misplacing priorities: Sections of India’s political and foreign policy establishment viewed Saddam Hussein’s confrontation with the United States as more significant than his annexation of Kuwait.
    3. Similar rigidity toward Gorbachev: Some foreign policy voices criticised Mikhail Gorbachev for engaging with the West and even welcomed the August 1991 coup attempt by Soviet hardliners.
    4. Present day repetition: Sympathy for Iran is often rooted in its opposition to the United States rather than an objective assessment of its domestic system. Debate on Russia is frequently personalised around Vladimir Putin and influenced by memories of Soviet era support, limiting analysis of Russia’s evolving relations with China, Europe, and the United States.

    What three lessons does 1991 offer for managing the current disruption?

    1. No balance of power is permanent: International politics is inherently uncertain. India’s foreign policy should prepare for discontinuity as much as continuity.
    2. Debate is a strategic asset: A policy community dominated by consensus may overlook emerging risks. India needs stronger expertise on Russia, Iran, and Central Asia, along with institutions that encourage independent and contrarian analysis.
    3. Domestic reform is the ultimate strength: India’s recovery in 1991 is attributed primarily to economic reforms, with diplomacy playing a supporting role. The same lesson applies today: domestic economic resilience is the foundation of effective foreign policy.

    Conclusion:

    The article argues that India’s foreign policy should be guided by national interest rather than ideological preferences or historical sentiment. Just as delayed recognition of geopolitical change complicated India’s response in 1991, excessive reliance on past assumptions may hinder its response to today’s crises involving Iran and Russia. The central lesson is that economic reform, strategic adaptability, and evidence based policy analysis remain the strongest tools for navigating an increasingly uncertain international order.

  • Protect Seafarers, and the Maritime Order

    Why in the News:

    A Russian missile strike on the merchant vessel MV Golden Leo while departing Ukraine’s Odesa port killed 10 seafarers, including four Indians, marking the first Indian deaths in the Russia Ukraine war after earlier deaths in the Iran war. India summoned Russia’s chargé d’affaires and, for the first time, named Russia in its protest, a step it had avoided for four years of diplomatic balancing with Moscow.

    What happened, and why does it extend the threat to Indian seafarers into a new theatre?

    1. The strike: Russian forces launched three cruise missiles at the MV Golden Leo, a Turkish owned vessel flagged to Guinea Bissau, while it was departing Odesa. The strike killed 10 people, including four Indians, while one more Indian sailor was hospitalised in critical condition.
    2. Prior Hormuz deaths: Indian seafarers, including three aboard the MT Settebello, were killed in and around the Strait of Hormuz amid the Iran war.
    3. Diplomatic response: India summoned Russia’s chargé d’affaires Vladimir Ladanov and explicitly named Russia, calling the targeting of commercial shipping unacceptable.

    On what legal basis is targeting merchant shipping unlawful, and why is that basis under strain?

    1. Governing principle: Merchant vessels engaged in civilian commerce cannot lawfully be attacked unless they are being used for military purposes.
      • Term: International Humanitarian Law (IHL): The body of law that seeks to limit the effects of armed conflict by protecting non combatants.
    2. Cargo detail: The MV Golden Leo was reportedly carrying grain, reinforcing its civilian character.
    3. Stakes for global trade: Ukraine remains a leading global grain exporter to Europe, North Africa, and Asia. Disruptions through the Strait of Hormuz have separately exposed the vulnerability of global energy supplies.

    Why does India’s protest coexist with continued exposure of its seafarers, and what does that expose about its leverage?

    1. India’s outsized stake: More than 10% of the world’s seafarers are Indian, many serving aboard foreign flagged vessels such as the MV Golden Leo and MT Settebello, placing them outside direct Indian jurisdiction.
    2. Risk avoidance, not norm enforcement: Following the deaths of Indian seafarers in West Asia, the Directorate General of Shipping advised against deploying Indian seafarers on voyages through the Strait of Hormuz, reducing risk exposure rather than enforcing the underlying international norm.
    3. Significance of naming Russia: Summoning and explicitly naming Russia is significant because India has generally maintained strategic balance and avoided directly criticising Russia during the conflict.

    Conclusion:

    The deaths of Indian seafarers in two separate conflict zones highlight the growing vulnerability of civilian shipping and the weakening of protections under International Humanitarian Law (IHL). While India’s diplomatic protest demonstrates a willingness to call out violations even by a strategic partner, its immediate response remains focused on risk mitigation rather than norm enforcement. The broader challenge of ensuring compliance with International Humanitarian Law by major military powers remains unresolved.