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Subject: International Relations

  • Iran war pushes India’s oil & gas import bill up 43%

    Why in the News

    India’s net oil and gas imports rose 43.4 percent in value in April to July of the current financial year, to $57.8 billion from $40.3 billion a year earlier. Import volumes barely moved, so the increase is almost entirely a price effect created by supply tightness and stifled energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz. With 88.3 percent of crude requirement met by imports, India has prioritised supply security over price, and the cost of that choice lands on the trade balance.

    What are net oil and gas imports?

    1. How the figure is built: Net oil and gas imports are arrived at by deducting petroleum product exports from oil, natural gas and petroleum product imports.
    2. Why the deduction matters: India is a net exporter of petroleum products because of its refining capacity, so gross import figures overstate the true external drain.
    3. What it still includes: India also imports some petroleum products, notably liquefied petroleum gas, so the netting does not remove product imports entirely.
    4. Why it is the tracked number: It measures the actual foreign exchange outgo on energy, which is what feeds into the trade balance and the current account.

    What is the Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell?

    1. What it is: The Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell (PPAC) is the data and analysis body under the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas. It compiles India’s official import, consumption, production and pricing statistics for petroleum and natural gas.

    What is liquefied natural gas?

    1. What it is: Liquefied natural gas (LNG) is natural gas, primarily methane, cooled to minus 162 degrees C so that it becomes liquid and can be shipped in cryogenic carriers. It must be regasified at a terminal in the importing country before use.
    2. How it is priced: Spot LNG in Asia is priced against the Japan Korea Marker, with Henry Hub and the Title Transfer Facility serving the American and European markets.

    What is liquefied petroleum gas?

    1. What it is: Liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) is propane and butane, produced as a byproduct of oil refining or natural gas processing, and used for domestic cooking, industrial heating and autogas.
    2. How it is priced: It is priced against the Saudi Aramco Contract Price, which is loosely linked to Brent crude.

    Why did the import bill rise 43 percent when volumes barely moved?

    1. Volumes were nearly flat: Oil and LNG imports were only marginally higher in volume terms across April to July.
    2. Crude price did the work: The average landed price of imported crude was about $106 per barrel in April to July, sharply higher than about $68 per barrel in the corresponding period of last year.
    3. Value rose without volume: The crude oil import bill surged by over 56 percent year on year to $63.4 billion even as volumes rose only slightly, to 81.9 million tonnes or about 600 million barrels, from 81.5 million tonnes.
    4. The stated priority: India has been prioritising supply security over price considerations, so it imported at extremely high rates rather than curtail volumes.
    5. Product trade moved the same way: Petroleum product export volumes fell while export value rose, and product import volumes fell faster than product import value, both reflecting high international prices.

    How did each component of the energy trade basket move?

    1. Crude oil imports, volume: 81.9 million tonnes against 81.5 million tonnes a year earlier, a rise of 0.5 percent.
    2. Crude oil imports, value: $63.4 billion against $40.5 billion, a rise of 56.5 percent.
    3. Petroleum product imports, volume: 9.0 million tonnes against 16.4 million tonnes, a fall of 45.1 percent.
    4. Petroleum product imports, value: $5.6 billion against $7.6 billion, a fall of 26.3 percent.
    5. LNG imports, volume: 11,867 million standard cubic metres against 11,269 million standard cubic metres, a rise of 5.3 percent.
    6. LNG imports, value: $5.6 billion against $4.5 billion, a rise of 24.4 percent.
    7. Petroleum product exports, volume: 16.5 million tonnes against 20.1 million tonnes, a fall of 17.9 percent.
    8. Petroleum product exports, value: $16.7 billion against $12.4 billion, a rise of 34.7 percent.
    9. Net oil and gas imports: $57.8 billion against $40.3 billion, a rise of 43.4 percent.

    How exposed is India’s energy basket to the Strait of Hormuz?

    1. Crude dependence: India depends on imports to meet over 88 percent of its crude oil requirement, and its dependence on imported oil for the four months ended July was 88.3 percent, almost flat year on year.
    2. Gas dependence: About half of India’s natural gas consumption is met by imports, brought in as LNG.
    3. Share routed through the strait: Around 40 percent of India’s crude oil imports, 60 percent of its LNG imports and 90 percent of its LPG imports came from West Asia through the strait.
    4. Where the disruption showed: Petroleum product imports declined 45.1 percent in volume to 9.0 million tonnes because supply of major products India imports, such as LPG, was hit by the West Asia conflict.
    5. Why exports fell: India’s petroleum product export volumes fell almost 18 percent year on year to 16.5 million tonnes as domestic fuel supplies were prioritised amid the global supply crunch.

    Why does an oil price shock transmit into the wider economy?

    1. The volume multiplier: India annually imports 1.8 to 2 billion barrels of oil, so every $1 per barrel increase raises the oil import bill by up to $2 billion on an annualised basis.
    2. Share of total imports: Energy imports are a major component of India’s overall imports, so any meaningful increase moves the aggregate import number.
    3. Trade balance and current account: A higher energy bill widens the merchandise trade deficit and feeds directly into the current account deficit.
    4. Inflation channel: Higher landed crude costs pass into transport and freight costs and into the prices of petroleum linked goods.
    5. Exchange rate channel: A larger dollar outgo on energy adds to demand for foreign exchange and weighs on the rupee’s exchange rate.

    Challenges to managing India’s oil and gas import bill

    1. Demand is price inelastic in the short run: Refiners cannot cut crude intake without cutting fuel supply, so a price shock passes straight into the bill. Eg. Crude import volumes rose 0.5 percent even as the crude bill rose 56.5 percent in April to July.
    2. Concentration of LPG sourcing: A single region supplies almost the entire LPG import basket, leaving no substitute route in a disruption. Eg. The West Asian share of India’s LPG imports moves entirely through the Strait of Hormuz, with no second corridor available if the strait closes.
    3. Fixed rupee excise blocks pass through of relief: Central excise duty is levied as a fixed amount per litre rather than as a percentage, so falling crude prices accrue to revenue rather than to consumers. Eg. When Brent fell from $80 to $60 per barrel in early 2025, Delhi petrol fell by only about Rs 2 to 3 per litre.
    4. Strategic reserve cover below international norms: The buffer available to ride out a supply interruption is short of the accepted benchmark. Eg. India’s total crude cover of 74 days sits below the International Energy Agency norm of 90 days of net import cover.
    5. No strategic reserve for gas at all: The gas basket has an operational buffer but no strategic cushion. Eg. India’s LNG storage tanks at regasification terminals give roughly 10 days of operational buffer, with no strategic LNG reserve in existence.
    6. Spot LNG volatility deters utilisation: When spot prices spike, importers switch to coal or fuel oil, stranding regasification capacity. Eg. India’s roughly 42.5 million tonnes per annum of LNG regasification capacity runs at 60 to 65 percent utilisation because switching becomes rational above $15 per MMBtu.
    7. Refinery configuration ties India to sour crude sources: Indian refineries have invested in desulphurisation capacity built around Middle Eastern grades, which limits how fast the basket can be re-sourced. Eg. Most Middle Eastern crude India buys is priced against Dubai and Oman, and Saudi, Iraqi and UAE grades track that benchmark.

    Conclusion

    India’s net oil and gas import bill rose to $57.8 billion in April to July from $40.3 billion a year earlier, a 43.4 percent increase driven almost wholly by price rather than volume. At 88.3 percent crude import dependence and with the West Asian shares of crude, LNG and LPG all routed through the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint disruption converts directly into a macroeconomic shock. The figures are provisional data from the Petroleum Planning and Analysis Cell, and the next reading will show whether the price effect persists once Hormuz flows normalise.

    About India’s Crude Oil Procurement and Pricing

    1. Who buys: State owned refiners account for 73 percent of India’s procurement through Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited, with private refiners Reliance Industries and Nayara Energy accounting for 27 percent.
    2. How buying works: Each refiner independently forecasts demand two to three months ahead and negotiates bilaterally with suppliers such as Rosneft, Saudi Aramco and Iraq’s State Organisation for Marketing of Oil.
    3. How it is priced: All contracts are priced as Brent plus or minus a negotiated discount, and Middle Eastern grades track the Dubai and Oman benchmark.
    4. Where crude lands: Crude is received by tanker at Paradip, Mumbai, Kochi and Vadinar.
    5. Quality determines price: Sulphur content and American Petroleum Institute (API) gravity, the measure of a crude’s density, together determine refining cost and product yield, with sweet crude defined as sulphur content below 0.5 percent and sour crude requiring additional processing.

    Regulatory Framework Governing India’s Petroleum and Natural Gas Sector

    1. Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas: The apex policy body, which sets the framework for exploration, refining, marketing, pricing and strategic reserves, awards production sharing contracts, and exercises ownership over the public sector oil companies.
    2. Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board: Regulates refining, processing, storage, transportation, distribution, marketing and sale of petroleum products and natural gas, authorises City Gas Distribution networks, and determines pipeline tariffs on a common carrier basis.
    3. Directorate General of Hydrocarbons: The technical regulator for upstream exploration and production, which manages block allocations, monitors production sharing contracts, verifies reserves, approves field development plans and maintains the National Data Repository.
    4. Oil Industry Development Board: Funded by a statutory cess on domestic crude production, it finances oil industry development and wholly owns Indian Strategic Petroleum Reserves Limited, which operates the underground reserve caverns.
    5. Deregulated retail pricing: Petrol was deregulated in 2010 and diesel in 2014, so the Ministry does not directly set retail pump prices.

    Government Initiatives in the Petroleum and Gas Sector

    1. Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Phase I comprises 5.33 million tonnes of crude across three underground rock caverns at Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru and Padur, with a Phase II commercial cum strategic expansion under public private partnership models.
    2. Hydrocarbon Exploration and Licensing Policy, 2016: Replaced the earlier New Exploration Licensing Policy with a uniform licence covering all hydrocarbons, open acreage licensing and revenue sharing in place of production sharing.
    3. Administered Price Mechanism for domestic gas: The Ministry sets the administered price for domestic natural gas indexed monthly at 10 percent of the Indian Crude Basket price, following the Kirit Parikh Committee recommendations, subject to a floor and ceiling for legacy fields.
    4. Direct Benefit Transfer for LPG: LPG is subsidised through direct transfer, with Rs 300 per cylinder for Ujjwala beneficiaries.
    5. City Gas Distribution expansion: India’s city gas distribution network now covers 98 cities, supplying compressed natural gas for vehicles and piped natural gas for households from a mix of domestic gas and regasified LNG.

    Key Facts about Global Oil Benchmarks and India’s Reserves

    1. Brent crude: North Sea origin, 38 API and 0.37 percent sulphur, traded on the Intercontinental Exchange in London, accounting for 75 to 80 percent of global oil trade and serving as the reference against which all other grades are a premium or discount.
    2. West Texas Intermediate: Cushing, Oklahoma origin, 39.6 API and 0.24 percent sulphur, traded on the New York Mercantile Exchange, accounting for 15 to 20 percent of global trade and typically Brent minus $0 to $5 per barrel.
    3. Dubai and Oman: Persian Gulf origin, 31 to 33 API and 1.0 to 2.0 percent sulphur, traded on the Dubai Mercantile Exchange, accounting for 5 to 10 percent of global trade and typically Brent minus $5 to $15 per barrel.
    4. Why OPEC does not set the price: OPEC controls 40 percent of production but Brent sets 75 to 80 percent of global prices, since markets price oil hundreds of thousands of times a day while OPEC announces targets once and has no enforcement mechanism against quota cheating.
    5. Reserve position: India’s total crude cover is 74 days, made up of 9.5 days from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and 64.5 days of oil marketing company commercial stocks, against the International Energy Agency norm of 90 days.
    6. LPG and LNG cover: LPG cavern capacity of about 140,000 tonnes gives roughly 22 days of cover against consumption of about 3 million tonnes a month, while LNG has about 10 days of operational buffer and no strategic reserve.
    7. Volatility of spot gas: The Japan Korea Marker swung from $3 per MMBtu in mid 2020 to $70 per MMBtu in August 2022.
    8. Committee recommendation on storage: The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Petroleum in December 2023 recommended equipping refineries with two to three days of smaller strategic storage at five to six additional locations, which could add 15 to 20 days of capacity.

    Back2Basics: Strait of Hormuz

    1. Location: A narrow sea passage connecting the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and onward to the Arabian Sea.
    2. Control: Iran controls the northern shore and seven of the eight islands in the strait, Oman controls the southern entrance, and the United States Fifth Fleet acts as the external guarantor of transit.
    3. Oil traffic: About 20 million barrels a day pass through it, amounting to 20 percent of global oil movement.
    4. Gas traffic: It carries 20 percent of global LNG trade, which makes closure hit gas hardest given Qatar’s dominance in LNG supply.
    5. Strategic character: It carries the highest concentration of energy flow of any maritime chokepoint in the world.

    Challenges in India’s Energy Security

    1. Stagnant domestic crude production: Falling domestic output pushes import dependence upward regardless of demand. Eg. Cess collections of the Oil Industry Development Board have declined in real terms because domestic crude production has stagnated.
    2. Regulatory conflict of interest: The same ministry sets the pricing environment and owns the companies whose losses that environment creates. Eg. The Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas simultaneously regulates the sector and holds ownership rights over Indian Oil Corporation Limited, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited.
    3. Gaps in the regulatory perimeter: No single regulator covers the full chain from wellhead to pump. Eg. The Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board has no jurisdiction over upstream exploration, wellhead gas pricing or LPG retail pricing.
    4. Upstream reservoir disputes slow output: Technical disputes between operators delay field development and carry royalty implications. Eg. The gas migration dispute between ONGC and Reliance Industries in the Krishna Godavari basin required adjudication by the Directorate General of Hydrocarbons.
    5. Chokepoint concentration across all three fuels: Crude, LPG and LNG share the same maritime chokepoint, so diversification of supplier does not diversify route. Eg. LPG moves with crude tankers or on dedicated carriers through the same Strait of Hormuz.
    6. Tax structure blunts price signals: Taxes form roughly 60 percent of the retail pump price, weakening the link between global prices and consumer behaviour. Eg. Delhi petrol at Rs 96 to 97 per litre carried Rs 13 of central excise and Rs 15 to 18 of State value added tax before the crisis.
    7. Storage build out lags the exposure: Reserve expansion depends on capital and cavern geology, both of which take years. Eg. Phase II of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve is being pursued through public private partnership because budgetary funding alone has not delivered the capacity.

    Way Forward

    1. Complete Phase II of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve: Bring the commercial cum strategic caverns on stream to move total cover towards the 90 day International Energy Agency norm.
    2. Adopt the refinery level storage recommendation: Implement the Parliamentary Standing Committee’s December 2023 proposal on refinery level storage, which remains a recommendation rather than sanctioned capacity.
    3. Create a strategic gas reserve: Extend the reserve architecture to LNG, which today has only an operational buffer at regasification terminals.
    4. Shift excise from a fixed levy to an ad valorem levy: This would let consumers receive part of the benefit when crude prices fall, restoring the price signal.
    5. Diversify sourcing away from a single chokepoint: Expand term contracts with Atlantic basin, West African and North American suppliers so that a Hormuz disruption does not strike crude, LNG and LPG supply simultaneously.
    6. Raise domestic production through open acreage: Accelerate block awards under the Hydrocarbon Exploration and Licensing Policy to arrest the decline in domestic output.
    7. Separate ownership from regulation: Move ownership of the public sector oil companies out of the administering ministry so that pricing policy is not set by their shareholder.

    “[2025, GS2, 15] “Energy security constitutes the dominant kingpin of India’s foreign policy, and is linked with India’s overarching influence in Middle Eastern countries.” How would you integrate energy security with India’s foreign policy trajectories in the coming years?”

  • India, Japan sign maritime security pact to deepen defence cooperation

    Why in the News

    India and Japan signed a Memorandum of Arrangement on Maritime Security Cooperation on 20 August 2026, after bilateral talks between the two Defence Ministers in New Delhi. The arrangement converts a relationship built on periodic exercises into a standing operational framework covering maritime domain awareness, logistics access and ship repair. It also opens naval shipbuilding and design to joint development, moving the partnership from equipment transfer towards co-production.

    What is the Memorandum of Arrangement on Maritime Security Cooperation?

    1. Nature of the instrument: A Memorandum of Arrangement is a signed framework document recording the agreed areas of cooperation between two defence establishments. It creates a standing basis for activity without the binding force of a treaty.
    2. Parties it links: The arrangement connects the Indian Navy with the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force.

    What is Maritime Domain Awareness?

    1. Definition: Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is the effective understanding of everything in the maritime space that affects security, safety, economy or the environment. It rests on tracking, identifying and sharing information on vessel movements.
    2. Why it is built with partners: No single navy can watch an entire ocean, so MDA depends on pooling radar, satellite and automatic identification system feeds across countries.

    What are Sea Lines of Communication?

    1. Definition: Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) are the primary maritime routes along which trade, energy and naval forces move between ports. Disruption of a SLOC affects supply rather than territory.
    2. Why they are defended jointly: A SLOC crosses several jurisdictions and the high seas, so its protection depends on coordinated patrolling and port access rather than any one state’s territorial control.

    What is the UNICORN antenna system?

    1. What it is: UNICORN is a Japanese shipborne integrated communications antenna system that houses multiple antennas inside a single composite mast. It lowers a warship’s radar cross section by removing external antenna clutter.

    What is ATLA?

    1. Full form and role: The Acquisition, Technology and Logistics Agency (ATLA) is Japan’s defence procurement and technology development body under its Ministry of Defense. It is the counterpart to India’s Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) for joint technology work.

    What is the Japan India Special Strategic and Global Partnership?

    1. The label: It is the highest tier of India’s bilateral relationships, adopted in 2014, under which defence, economic and technology cooperation between the two countries is organised.

    What does the arrangement operationally commit the two navies to?

    1. Information sharing: The two sides agreed to deepen operational cooperation through information sharing, naval exercises, ship repair and logistics support.
    2. Maritime domain awareness and rescue: The framework covers maritime domain awareness, search and rescue, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief between the Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force and the Indian Navy.
    3. Protection of sea lanes: The Ministers agreed to strengthen coordination for the protection of Sea Lines of Communications through reciprocal naval visits, joint exercises, and personnel and subject matter expert exchanges.
    4. Logistics and port access: Logistical support was extended to include access to ports and maintenance and repair facilities.
    5. Mine countermeasures: The two countries will move towards greater cooperation in mine countermeasures.

    How does the partnership move beyond equipment transfer into co-development?

    1. Naval shipbuilding and design: The two sides will explore joint development in naval shipbuilding and design, leveraging Japan’s technological expertise and India’s production capabilities.
    2. Make in India framework: They will discuss greater use of India’s shipbuilding capabilities under the Make in India framework.
    3. Reciprocal ship repair: Both countries will work towards reciprocal provision of ship repair facilities.
    4. First equipment marker: The shipborne UNICORN integrated communications antenna system was identified as the symbol of the growing defence equipment partnership, with a commitment to its early realisation.
    5. Research and industry channels: DRDO and ATLA will deepen cooperation in advanced defence technologies, and a Defence Industry Forum will be convened.

    What does the expansion of joint exercises signal about interoperability?

    1. Existing exercise set: The Ministers welcomed the expansion of bilateral military exercises, including Dharma Guardian and the Japan India Maritime Exercise (JIMEX), the two navies’ bilateral maritime exercise.
    2. Veer Guardian 26: The planned Veer Guardian 26 air exercise will see Japanese fighter aircraft participate in an exercise in India for the first time.
    3. Greater complexity: The two sides agreed to enhance the complexity of bilateral exercises rather than repeat existing formats.
    4. Unmanned systems and short notice drills: They agreed to integrate unmanned systems and to explore short notice joint exercises, which test readiness rather than choreography.
    5. Special forces and theatre commands: The two countries will promote exchanges between their Special Operations Forces and pursue cooperation with India’s integrated theatre commands after their establishment.

    What institutional machinery will carry the cooperation forward?

    1. A standing Working Group: The two sides agreed to establish a Working Group headed at the Director General and Joint Secretary level.
    2. Domains it coordinates: The Working Group spans operational, intelligence, equipment, technology and industrial domains.
    3. Industry channel: A Defence Industry Forum will be convened alongside the research level cooperation.
    4. Ministerial channel: The two sides agreed to accelerate discussions for the fourth India Japan 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Dialogue, to be held in Tokyo this year.
    5. Political framing: Both reaffirmed their commitment to deepen defence cooperation under the Japan India Special Strategic and Global Partnership and to work towards a free and open Indo Pacific amid heightened global tensions.

    Challenges to the India Japan maritime security arrangement

    1. Japan’s own legal constraints on transfers: Article 9 of Japan’s 1947 Constitution and the Three Principles on Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology limit what Tokyo can sell or co-develop abroad. Eg. The US 2 amphibious aircraft deal, negotiated with India for over a decade, lapsed without an order.
    2. Cost and schedule risk in Japanese technology tie ups: High specification Japanese systems carry costs that Indian procurement budgets absorb poorly. Eg. The Mumbai Ahmedabad High Speed Rail Project, built on Japanese technology and a Japanese loan, slipped from its 2022 target to 2027 or later.
    3. Thin use of the existing logistics pact: Reciprocal access agreements deliver value only when used outside exercise windows. Eg. The Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement signed in September 2020 has been used largely around scheduled exercises rather than for continuous deployments.
    4. Naval balance shifting faster than the partnership: The regional force ratio is moving against both partners while the arrangement is still being institutionalised. Eg. The People’s Liberation Army Navy crossed 340 battle force ships by 2021, overtaking the United States fleet in numbers.
    5. Indian yard capacity limits co-production: Joint naval shipbuilding assumes yard capacity India has not yet built. Eg. India’s share of global shipbuilding is under 1 percent, in a sector dominated by China, South Korea and Japan.
    6. Incomplete theatre command reform: Cooperation with India’s integrated theatre commands is conditional on those commands existing. Eg. The Inter Services Organisation (Command, Control and Discipline) Act, 2023 created the legal basis for joint commands, but no theatre command had been stood up when the arrangement was signed.
    7. Chokepoint risks a bilateral pact cannot fix: Sea lane disruption often originates from non state actors outside either navy’s operating area. Eg. Houthi attacks in the Red Sea forced shipping to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, adding weeks to voyages.

    Conclusion

    India and Japan have moved from periodic exercises to a signed operational framework covering maritime domain awareness, logistics access and ship repair, with naval shipbuilding and design opened to joint development. The arrangement’s institutional carrier is a Working Group at Director General and Joint Secretary level spanning operational, intelligence, equipment, technology and industrial domains. The next milestone is the fourth India Japan 2+2 Foreign and Defence Ministerial Dialogue, to be held in Tokyo this year, with the Veer Guardian 26 air exercise bringing Japanese fighter aircraft to India for the first time.

    “[2019, GS2, 10] ‘The time has come for India and Japan to build a strong contemporary relationship, one involving global and strategic partnership that will have a great significance for Asia and the world as a whole.’ Comment.”

  • BNP’s Alamgir elected new President of Bangladesh

    Why in the News

    Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir, long time secretary general of the ruling Bangladesh Nationalist Party, was elected President of Bangladesh on 20 August 2026 in the first contested poll for the office in 35 years. He secured 255 of the 343 votes cast in Parliament against 88 for the nominee of the Jamaat-e-Islami led opposition alliance. The contest itself is the significant fact, since the office has been filled by consensus and uncontested polls for decades.

    How is the President of Bangladesh elected?

    1. Who votes: The President is elected indirectly by the members of Parliament, so the outcome reflects the composition of the House rather than a popular vote.
    2. Who conducts it: The Chief Election Commissioner acts as the Election Returning Officer and declares the result after counting.
    3. The vacancy rule: Under the Constitution, a new President is required to be elected within 90 days of the office falling vacant.
    4. What the office holds: The presidency is largely ceremonial, with executive authority resting with the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.

    What is the Jatiya Sangsad?

    1. What it is: The Jatiya Sangsad is Bangladesh’s unicameral Parliament, which both elects the President and provides the Prime Minister and Cabinet. Its composition therefore determines the presidential outcome in advance of the vote.

    What is Bangabhaban?

    1. What it is: Bangabhaban in Dhaka is the official residence and workplace of the President of Bangladesh. Its Darbar Hall is the venue at which the President takes the oath of office.

    What did the vote actually show about the balance in Parliament?

    1. The electorate: Of the total 349 registered voters, 343 voted in the election, and six lawmakers did not vote.
    2. The result: Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir secured 255 votes and Oli Ahmed secured 88 votes.
    3. The losing candidate: Oli Ahmed, aged 84, is a retired Colonel and chairman of the Liberal Democratic Party, and was the nominee of the Jamaat-e-Islami led eleven party opposition alliance.
    4. The winning candidate’s standing: Alamgir, aged 78, is a long time secretary general of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and a close ally of former Prime Minister Khaleda Zia.
    5. What the margin reflects: The ruling party and its allies hold a two thirds majority in Parliament following the general election that returned them to power.
    6. The break with recent practice: It was the first contested presidential election in Bangladesh since 1991, the office having largely been filled through consensus and uncontested polls in recent decades.

    Why did the presidency fall vacant?

    1. The resignation: Mohammed Shahabuddin resigned last month on health grounds before completing his five year tenure.
    2. His political association: He was a close aide of the deposed Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, whose government fell in 2024.
    3. The constitutional consequence: The vacancy triggered the 90 day requirement for electing a successor.
    4. Why it became contested: With a changed parliamentary composition following the transition, the consensus mechanism that had filled the office in recent decades no longer held.

    What does a ceremonial presidency mean in Bangladesh’s system?

    1. Head of state, not head of government: The President is the head of state, while executive authority is exercised by the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.
    2. The formal military role: The President is designated supreme commander of the defence services, a title exercised on the advice of the government.
    3. Where discretion survives: The President’s independent discretion is confined to the appointment of the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice, and otherwise the office acts on advice.
    4. The order of succession: The Speaker of Parliament acts as President when the office falls vacant, until a successor is elected.
    5. The oath: The President elect will take the oath as Bangladesh’s 23rd President on Friday evening at the Darbar Hall of Bangabhaban.

    Why does the return of contested presidential politics matter?

    1. What consensus polls concealed: Uncontested elections meant the office was allocated by the ruling party rather than won, which removed any parliamentary test of the nominee.
    2. What a contest introduces: A recorded vote of 255 to 88 registers the size and composition of the opposition bloc inside Parliament.
    3. The opposition’s new configuration: The Jamaat-e-Islami led eleven party alliance fielded a joint candidate, which formalises an opposition grouping that had previously been fragmented.
    4. The signal of the abstentions: Six lawmakers declined to vote, which records dissent that a consensus procedure would have absorbed silently.
    5. The continuity of the office: The presidency remains ceremonial, so the contest changes the politics of the office without changing its powers.

    What does the change in Dhaka alter for India’s neighbourhood policy?

    1. A new majority to work with: The Bangladesh Nationalist Party and its allies hold a two thirds majority, which gives India a single interlocutor with the parliamentary strength to conclude agreements.
    2. A pending water file: The India Bangladesh Ganga Water Treaty of 1996 expires on 31 December, and its renewal must be negotiated with the new dispensation.
    3. The unresolved Teesta question: The Teesta water sharing agreement drafted in 2011 remains unsigned and has been Dhaka’s standing demand across governments.
    4. Connectivity projects in progress: Rail, road and port links built over the previous decade, including the Akhaura Agartala rail link and the Maitri Setu bridge, require continuity of commitment on both sides.
    5. The security file: Border management, insurgent sanctuaries in the northeast and the safety of minority communities are the standing items on which India seeks assurances from any government in Dhaka.

    Challenges to Bangladesh’s political transition

    1. A ceremonial head of state elected on party lines: A partisan presidency strains the office’s role as a neutral arbiter in disputes over government formation. Eg. The outgoing President was a close aide of the deposed Prime Minister and resigned before completing his tenure.
    2. Consolidation of power under a two thirds majority: A supermajority removes the parliamentary check on constitutional amendment. Eg. The ruling party and its allies hold a two thirds majority in the Jatiya Sangsad after the general election.
    3. An opposition organised around a religious party alliance: The main opposition bloc is led by a party with a contested constitutional history. Eg. The eleven party opposition alliance that fielded the losing presidential candidate is led by Jamaat-e-Islami.
    4. Institutional damage from the previous transition: Administrative and judicial appointments made under the earlier government remain politically contested. Eg. The presidency itself fell vacant through the resignation of an appointee of the deposed government.
    5. Economic pressure on a garment dependent economy: External demand shocks translate directly into employment and foreign exchange stress. Eg. Bangladesh’s export earnings are concentrated in ready made garments, which leaves the current account exposed to a single sector.
    6. Security of minority communities: Political transitions in Bangladesh have historically been followed by attacks on minorities. Eg. The period following the fall of the previous government in 2024 saw reported attacks on Hindu households and temples.
    7. Restoring routine electoral practice: A single contested election does not by itself re-establish competitive norms. Eg. It took 35 years for a contested presidential poll to recur after 1991.

    Conclusion

    Bangladesh has elected a new head of state through its first contested presidential poll in 35 years, with the ruling party’s nominee securing 255 votes against 88 for the opposition alliance’s candidate, from 343 of 349 registered voters. The office remains ceremonial, so the outcome registers the parliamentary balance after the political transition rather than shifting executive power. The next milestone is the oath of office as Bangladesh’s 23rd President on Friday evening at the Darbar Hall of Bangabhaban.

    About India Bangladesh Relations

    1. The border: India and Bangladesh share a land boundary of 4,096.7 km, India’s longest with any neighbour, running along West Bengal, Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram.
    2. The rivers: The two countries share 54 common rivers, and water sharing is the most persistent item on the bilateral agenda.
    3. Trade: Bangladesh is India’s largest trade partner in South Asia, and India is among the largest sources of Bangladesh’s imports.
    4. Connectivity: Rail links, inland waterway protocol routes, bus services and port access arrangements have been progressively restored since 2015 after decades of disuse.
    5. Energy: India supplies electricity to Bangladesh across the interconnection at Bheramara and through cross border transmission links, and the two countries operate a diesel pipeline between them.
    6. Development partnership: India has extended three Lines of Credit to Bangladesh totalling about $7.862 billion, its largest such commitment to any single country.

    Constitutional Framework Governing the Presidency in Bangladesh

    1. Article 48: Provides for a President elected by the members of Parliament, and requires the President to act on the advice of the Prime Minister except in appointing the Prime Minister and the Chief Justice.
    2. Article 50: Fixes the President’s term at five years from the date of entering office, and bars any person from holding the office for more than two terms.
    3. Article 54: Provides that the Speaker of Parliament shall act as President when the office is vacant or the President is unable to discharge functions.
    4. Article 55: Vests the executive power of the Republic in the Prime Minister and the Cabinet, which is the provision that makes the presidency ceremonial.
    5. Article 123: Governs the timing of elections to the office, including the requirement that a vacancy be filled within a fixed period of its occurrence.
    6. Presidential Election Act, 1991: Provides the procedure for nomination, polling and declaration of the result, with the Chief Election Commissioner acting as Returning Officer.

    India Bangladesh Cooperation Initiatives

    1. Maitri Setu: A bridge over the Feni river connecting Sabroom in Tripura with Ramgarh in Bangladesh, inaugurated in March 2021, giving the northeast access to Chattogram port.
    2. Akhaura Agartala rail link: A cross border rail connection commissioned in November 2023 that shortens the route between Agartala and Kolkata through Bangladeshi territory.
    3. Port access agreement: An arrangement permitting the use of Chattogram and Mongla ports for the movement of Indian goods to and from the northeastern States.
    4. India Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline: A cross border diesel pipeline from Siliguri to Parbatipur, inaugurated in March 2023, supplying high speed diesel to northern Bangladesh.
    5. Maitree Super Thermal Power Project: A joint venture coal fired power project at Rampal in Bangladesh, developed by an Indian and Bangladeshi partnership.
    6. Border Haats: Designated markets along the boundary allowing residents of nearby villages on both sides to trade specified local goods without formal customs procedures.

    Key Facts about Bangladesh and its Relations with India

    1. Independence: Bangladesh became independent in 1971, and India was among the first countries to recognise it.
    2. Land Boundary Agreement: The 1974 agreement was operationalised through the 100th Constitutional Amendment Act, 2015, under which India transferred 111 enclaves to Bangladesh and received 51.
    3. Maritime boundary: A Permanent Court of Arbitration tribunal delivered its award on the maritime boundary between the two countries in July 2014, which both accepted.
    4. Kushiyara agreement: The withdrawal of water from the Kushiyara river was agreed in September 2022, the second water sharing instrument after the Ganga treaty.
    5. Population: Bangladesh has a population of about 173 million people.
    6. Presidential history: The office being filled on 21 August 2026 is that of Bangladesh’s 23rd President.
    7. Joint river institution: The Joint Rivers Commission has functioned since 1972 as the standing bilateral mechanism on shared rivers.

    Back2Basics: Bangladesh Nationalist Party

    1. Founded: The party was founded in 1978 by Ziaur Rahman, then the country’s military ruler and later President.
    2. Ideology: It is built around Bangladeshi nationalism, which defines national identity by territory and religion rather than by the language based Bengali nationalism of its principal rival.
    3. Leadership: It has been led since 1984 by Khaleda Zia, widow of the founder, who served as Prime Minister on three occasions.
    4. Principal rival: Its long standing opponent is the Awami League, and the two parties have alternated in power for most of the country’s competitive electoral history.
    5. Electoral boycotts: The party boycotted the general elections of 2014 and 2024, which kept it out of Parliament for extended periods.
    6. Current position: It returned to power in the general election held in February 2026, and holds a two thirds majority in Parliament with its allies.

    Challenges in India Bangladesh Relations

    1. The unresolved Teesta agreement: The most contested river sharing file has remained unsigned for over a decade. Eg. The Teesta draft agreed in 2011 was not signed after West Bengal withheld support.
    2. Border killings: Fatalities along the boundary remain the most publicly damaging irritant in the relationship. Eg. Incidents involving the Border Security Force and Bangladeshi nationals along the fenced boundary recur and draw formal protests from Dhaka.
    3. Illegal migration and its domestic politics: Migration questions feed into Indian State level politics and produce friction with Dhaka. Eg. The National Register of Citizens exercise in Assam produced sustained diplomatic concern in Bangladesh.
    4. Trade imbalance: Bangladesh runs a large deficit with India, which sustains a domestic constituency against closer economic integration. Eg. Indian exports to Bangladesh far exceed Bangladeshi exports to India despite duty free access under the South Asian Free Trade Area.
    5. Competition from external partners: Infrastructure and defence offers from other powers reduce India’s relative weight. Eg. Chinese financing has funded major Bangladeshi infrastructure including bridges, power plants and port projects.
    6. The Rohingya caseload: More than a million refugees in Cox’s Bazar constrain Bangladesh’s policy space and create a shared security concern. Eg. Repatriation attempts to Myanmar have repeatedly failed since the influx of 2017.
    7. Security of minority communities: Attacks on minorities during political transitions generate pressure on Indian policy. Eg. The 2024 transition was followed by reported attacks on Hindu households and places of worship.
    8. Insurgent sanctuaries and connectivity security: Northeast Indian connectivity through Bangladesh depends on continued cooperation against insurgent groups. Eg. Transit corridors through Bangladeshi territory to the northeast require sustained security cooperation to remain viable.

    Way Forward

    1. Open the Ganga treaty renewal early: Begin the final round of renewal talks well before the 31 December expiry so that the instrument does not lapse during a political transition.
    2. Separate the Teesta from the Ganga negotiation: Handle the two rivers on independent tracks so that a stalled file does not hold a functioning one hostage.
    3. Institutionalise engagement beyond the ruling party: Maintain contact across the political spectrum in Dhaka so that the relationship does not have to be rebuilt at each change of government.
    4. Correct the trade asymmetry: Expand duty free access, remove non tariff barriers and complete the proposed comprehensive economic partnership so that the deficit ceases to be a political argument.
    5. Complete connectivity projects on schedule: Deliver the remaining rail, road and inland waterway links so that the economic case for cooperation is visible to the Bangladeshi public.
    6. Reduce border fatalities to zero: Shift to non lethal means and joint patrolling protocols along the boundary, since this single issue does the most reputational damage.
    7. Coordinate on the Rohingya question: Support repatriation diplomacy with Myanmar and continue humanitarian assistance to Cox’s Bazar, which addresses a Bangladeshi priority at limited cost.

  • Why Sergio Gor’s words in Srinagar are noteworthy

    Why in the News

    The United States Ambassador to India visited Srinagar on 19 August 2026 and described Jammu and Kashmir as an important part of India, on his first visit to the Valley and immediately after meeting the elected Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir. Seventy three years earlier American emissaries had come to the same Valley to raise the possibility of independence with Sheikh Abdullah, whose grandson now stood beside the ambassador. The distance between those two moments is the measure of how far the American position on Jammu and Kashmir has travelled since 1947.

    What is the Instrument of Accession?

    1. What it was: The legal document by which the ruler of a princely state acceded to either India or Pakistan at the end of British paramountcy in 1947, ceding defence, external affairs and communications to the acceding dominion.
    2. Its statutory basis: It was executed under the Government of India Act, 1935 as adapted by the Indian Independence Act, 1947, which gave rulers the choice of accession.
    3. In the case of Jammu and Kashmir: The Maharaja signed it on 26 October 1947 following the tribal invasion, which brought Indian forces into the state.
    4. Why it is contested in this story: American assessments questioned whether the Instrument by itself finally settled the state’s future, which is the legal proposition the ambassador’s statement now cuts against.

    What is Sadr-i-Riyasat?

    1. What it was: The title of the constitutional head of Jammu and Kashmir between 1952 and 1965, elected by the state legislature in place of a hereditary ruler. The office was replaced by a Governor appointed by the President through the Constitution (Sixth Amendment) to the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution in 1965.

    What is a demarche?

    1. What it is: A formal diplomatic representation made by one government to another, delivered in writing or in a scheduled meeting, recording a position or a protest. It ranks above an ordinary statement of protest because it is placed on the record between foreign ministries.

    What was the Kashmir Conspiracy Case?

    1. What it was: The prosecution launched against Sheikh Abdullah and his associates after his dismissal in 1953, alleging a conspiracy against the state and dealings aimed at detaching Jammu and Kashmir from India. It ran for years before being withdrawn, and it framed the political atmosphere around his contacts with foreign interlocutors.

    What exactly did the United States envoy say, and why does the venue matter?

    1. The statement: Visiting Srinagar, the ambassador declared that this is an important part of India.
    2. The setting: It was his first visit to the Valley, and he had just finished meeting the Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, who is Sheikh Abdullah’s grandson.
    3. The follow up: He suggested that the United States travel advisory could be reviewed by Washington because of improvements in the security situation.
    4. The date: The statement was made on 19 August 2026.
    5. Why the location carries weight: The venue mattered as much as the words, since the same Valley was where American interlocutors had once raised the prospect of independence.
    6. The reaction: Pakistan did not merely protest, but lodged a formal demarche.

    Why is an ambassador’s sentence not the same as a change in policy?

    1. What it is not: A statement by an ambassador is not a treaty, a presidential proclamation, or a formal repudiation by the State Department of every position Washington has espoused since 1947.
    2. Why it still counts: Diplomacy operates through vocabulary, and a shift in the words a mission uses in public registers a shift in position even without a formal instrument.
    3. The measure applied: No objective student of Kashmir can fail to notice how far America has come between the language of the early 1950s and the language used in Srinagar.
    4. What remains open: Nothing in the statement withdraws or replaces the underlying documentary record of American legal assessments.

    How did American diplomacy engage the idea of an independent Kashmir in the early 1950s?

    1. The 1950 meetings: Loy Henderson, the American ambassador to India, secretly met Sheikh Abdullah in Kashmir twice in 1950.
    2. What the record shows: Henderson’s secret telegram records the Sheikh making a strong case for Kashmiri independence from both India and Pakistan.
    3. The condition Abdullah attached: He told Henderson that an independent Kashmir could survive only if it had the friendship of both India and Pakistan and economic assistance from the United States, directly or through the United Nations.
    4. How it entered Indian politics: American interest in Kashmir took on such political overtones that even Henderson’s wife entered Indian political mythology, and Indian leaders suspected that Americans were holding out the prospect of independence to Abdullah.
    5. The Stevenson visit: Adlai Stevenson, twice the Democratic Party’s candidate for the presidency and one of the most influential American internationalists of his era, visited Kashmir in May 1953 and talked to Abdullah.
    6. The effect in New Delhi: Those meetings sent shockwaves of suspicion through New Delhi, and American diplomatic records show that the then Prime Minister believed Stevenson’s conversations had encouraged Abdullah’s growing intransigence.
    7. What the episode establishes: An independent Kashmir was then conceivable enough in American diplomatic parlance for the Indian Prime Minister to worry that Washington might act to encourage it.

    What did those contacts cost Sheikh Abdullah inside Jammu and Kashmir?

    1. The dismissal: On 9 August 1953, Sheikh Abdullah was dismissed as prime minister of Jammu and Kashmir by the Sadr-i-Riyasat.
    2. The stated grounds: The dismissal came amid mounting suspicions in New Delhi about his commitment to the accession and his growing interest in an independent Kashmir.
    3. The role of the American contacts: His contacts with prominent Americans fed those suspicions directly.
    4. The legal aftermath: Those contacts later became part of the political atmosphere surrounding what came to be known as the Kashmir Conspiracy Case.
    5. The symmetry with 2026: Almost exactly seventy three years separate that dismissal from the ambassador’s statement in Srinagar.

    How did United Nations Security Council Resolution 47 shape the international framing of the dispute?

    1. American support: The United States supported Resolution 47 in 1948, which was adopted on 21 April that year.
    2. What it did: It placed the dispute in an international context and anticipated a plebiscite after a process of demilitarisation.
    3. The prescribed sequence: The sequence required Pakistan first to secure the withdrawal of the tribal invaders from the territory under its occupation.
    4. What happened to it: That prescribed sequence was never implemented.
    5. What it gave Pakistan: For years afterwards the resolution provided Pakistan with the diplomatic scaffolding it wanted, namely that Jammu and Kashmir was not an Indian question alone but an international dispute to be settled.
    6. America’s place in it: America was at the centre of that scaffolding.

    How far did the American legal position on the accession go?

    1. The document: A State Department memorandum of February 1950 set out the American legal assessment of the accession.
    2. Its characterisation: The memorandum described Jammu and Kashmir’s accession to India as contested.
    3. Its conclusion: It concluded that in the American legal assessment at the time, the Maharaja’s Instrument of Accession could not by itself have finally settled the state’s future.
    4. Why this matters: The position was not confined to the plebiscite procedure but went to the legal sufficiency of the accession instrument itself.

    Why did the position persist after the Cold War?

    1. The 1993 statement: In October 1993, Robin Raphel, freshly appointed assistant secretary of state for South Asian affairs in the Clinton administration, called Kashmir a disputed territory.
    2. The legal claim made: She said Washington did not recognise the legal validity of the Instrument of Accession as meaning that Kashmir was forever part of India.
    3. India’s reaction: India was aghast, and the then Prime Minister described such efforts at diplomatic suasion as pinpricks and minor mischief.
    4. The larger fact it revealed: Nearly five decades after 1947, the United States remained unwilling to couch its discussion of Jammu and Kashmir in terms that accepted India’s political description of the state without qualification.
    5. Why 2026 stands out against it: Measured against that record, the ambassador’s description in Srinagar marks the closing of an ambiguity that had survived the end of the Cold War.

    Why should a favourable American statement not produce triumphalism in New Delhi?

    1. Where the case was actually made: India’s case in Kashmir has ultimately been made most strongly by the people of Jammu and Kashmir themselves, not by shifts in foreign vocabulary.
    2. The standing test: The test has always been India’s ability to deepen constitutionalism, expand democracy and political reconciliation, deliver development, and ensure civil liberties for all citizens.
    3. Why the elected government matters: Srinagar’s elected government is what gives the Indian position its domestic foundation, which is why the ambassador’s meeting with the Chief Minister carried weight.
    4. What remains outstanding: A return to normal democratic politics and the restoration of statehood is essential, and no external statement substitutes for it.
    5. What has genuinely changed: The historical arc reflects India’s own transformation and the gradual exhaustion of the idea that Jammu and Kashmir is best handled through international mechanisms conceived in the bloodshed of Partition.
    6. The precise nature of the shift: America has not overwritten history but has accepted reality, having for decades dealt with Kashmir as a problem in search of a permanent political resting place, and having now implicitly acknowledged that history had already made a choice.

    Challenges to India’s position on Jammu and Kashmir

    1. Statehood has not been restored: The state’s downgrade to Union Territory status remains unreversed, which weakens the constitutionalism argument India rests on. Eg. Jammu and Kashmir became a Union Territory on 31 October 2019 under the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act, 2019.
    2. Diplomatic language can reverse with an administration: Positions expressed by an envoy carry no continuity guarantee across governments. Eg. The assistant secretary of state’s 1993 characterisation of Kashmir as disputed territory came four decades after the 1950 State Department memorandum and repeated its underlying reasoning.
    3. The plebiscite framing survives in the record: Resolutions never formally rescinded remain available for citation. Eg. Resolution 47 of 1948 remains on the Security Council record even though its prescribed sequence was never implemented.
    4. Pakistan retains a formal diplomatic channel: Every Indian gain in framing is met with a counter representation. Eg. Pakistan lodged a formal demarche after the ambassador’s statement in Srinagar.
    5. Security perception governs external normalisation: Third country advisories track incidents rather than political statements. Eg. The ambassador tied any review of the United States travel advisory to improvements in the security situation, not to political developments.
    6. Political reconciliation remains incomplete: Electoral revival does not by itself settle questions of autonomy and representation. Eg. The elected Chief Minister heads a government whose legislative competence is that of a Union Territory rather than a State.
    7. Third country hyphenation persists in crises: External powers revert to treating India and Pakistan as a pair during military escalation. Eg. External calls for restraint are directed at both countries simultaneously during every India Pakistan military exchange.

    Conclusion

    The American position on Jammu and Kashmir has moved from a February 1950 State Department memorandum calling the accession contested, through the plebiscite framing of Resolution 47 and the 1993 refusal to accept the Instrument of Accession as final, to an ambassador standing in Srinagar in August 2026 and calling it an important part of India. That arc closes an ambiguity but settles nothing that India itself must settle, since the case in Kashmir has been carried by the people of the region and by the quality of Indian constitutional practice there. The unfinished work is the return to normal democratic politics and the restoration of statehood, which no shift in foreign vocabulary can supply.

    “[2019, GS2, 15] “What introduces friction into the ties between India and the United States is that Washington is still unable to find for India a position in its global strategy, which would satisfy India’s National self-esteem and ambitions” Explain with suitable examples.”

  • Five years after Taliban takeover, life in Afghanistan marred by many struggles

    Why in the News

    Five years have passed since the Taliban entered Kabul on 15 August 2021, ending the United States led military presence and the Islamic Republic that had governed Afghanistan for two decades. The Taliban have converted military victory into durable control of institutions, borders and revenue, without converting it into recognition, economic recovery or rights for women. That gap defines the position every state now has to work around, including India.

    What is a de facto government?

    1. Definition: A de facto government is an authority that exercises effective control over a territory and its population without being formally recognised as its lawful government by other states. Control is a question of fact, recognition a question of law.
    2. What recognition does: Recognising a government endorses its authority to represent the state internationally, while withholding recognition does not deny that the state itself exists.
    3. Why states still transact: Border management, humanitarian delivery and consular work require dealing with whoever controls territory, which produces engagement without recognition.
    4. What non recognition costs the authority: It blocks the state’s seat at international organisations, access to central bank reserves held abroad and formal sovereign borrowing.

    What is the Islamic State-Khorasan Province?

    1. What it is: The Islamic State-Khorasan Province (ISKP) is the regional branch of the Islamic State operating in Afghanistan, Pakistan and parts of Central Asia, formed in 2015.
    2. Its relationship with the Taliban: It rejects the Taliban’s authority as insufficiently doctrinaire and is an armed rival rather than an ally, which is why the Taliban conduct operations against it.

    What has actually changed in Afghanistan’s security situation since 2021?

    1. The war ended: The most immediate change was the end of the war between the Taliban and the then Afghan government.
    2. The withdrawal and the collapse: The United States and NATO completed their military withdrawal in August 2021, and Afghan security forces collapsed soon afterwards.
    3. Consolidation of control: The Taliban control Afghanistan’s major government institutions, security forces and borders, and armed opposition groups have not been able to mount a significant nationwide challenge.
    4. No comparable conflict: There is now no nationwide armed conflict comparable to the fighting that took place before 2021.
    5. What it means on the ground: Roads previously affected by battles and checkpoints are generally more accessible, and the risk of being caught in clashes between the Taliban and government forces has fallen.

    Why has the end of the war not meant the end of violence?

    1. A surviving armed rival: The Islamic State-Khorasan Province remains active and has carried out attacks against civilians, Taliban officials and foreign nationals.
    2. Counter operations: The Taliban have carried out operations against the group, which makes the conflict internal rather than against a foreign force.
    3. Deteriorating relations with Pakistan: The two countries have repeatedly accused each other of allowing militant groups to operate from their territory.
    4. Frequency of border clashes: Clashes along the border have become more frequent since 2021.
    5. A reversal of the earlier relationship: Pakistan had been an important supporter of the Taliban for years, but since 2021 Islamabad’s concerns over militant attacks and border security have increasingly complicated relations with Kabul.

    How far have restrictions on women gone, and what do they cost in the long run?

    1. The initial assurance: When the Taliban took control in 2021 they said they would respect women’s rights under their interpretation of Islamic law.
    2. What followed: Restrictions on women have steadily increased rather than stabilised at the level announced.
    3. Education: Girls remain barred from secondary education and higher education.
    4. Employment and movement: Women have been excluded from many areas of employment and face restrictions on movement and on access to public spaces, affecting almost every aspect of participation in public life.
    5. The pipeline effect: Girls unable to complete school cannot move on to university or professional training, which means fewer women will enter professions such as medicine, teaching, journalism and public administration.

    Why is economic stability not the same as economic recovery?

    1. The pre 2021 base: International aid accounted for a significant part of government spending and economic activity before the takeover.
    2. The shock: The withdrawal of foreign troops and the sudden reduction in aid created a major economic shock, and there were fears that the Afghan economy could collapse.
    3. What the Taliban did instead: The administration increased domestic revenue collection, tried to expand trade with neighbouring countries, invested in infrastructure and attempted to raise economic activity within the country.
    4. The result: Afghanistan has achieved a degree of economic stability since the severe crisis that followed the takeover, but stability is not recovery.
    5. What stability leaves untouched: Poverty remains widespread, unemployment remains a major problem, and humanitarian assistance continues to be important for millions of Afghans.
    6. A new pressure: The country is dealing with the return of large numbers of Afghans from Pakistan and Iran, whose arrival has created additional pressure on housing, employment and public services.

    What do other countries’ positions show about the limits of non-recognition?

    1. The general position: The Taliban regime has not received widespread international recognition, and most countries continue to avoid formally recognising it as Afghanistan’s legitimate government.
    2. The stated grounds: The main concerns are restrictions on women, the absence of an inclusive political system, and questions about terrorism and human rights.
    3. Russia: Russia has formally recognised the Taliban regime, making it the outlier among major powers.
    4. China and the United Arab Emirates: Both have accepted Taliban appointed ambassadors, which is operational acceptance short of formal recognition.
    5. Western governments: Several Western governments have maintained contact with Taliban officials without extending recognition.
    6. The common driver: Countries have increasingly had to deal with the Taliban because they control Afghanistan, which shows that control eventually compels engagement even where it does not compel recognition.

    What explains India’s shift from distance to pragmatic engagement?

    1. The posture: India has followed a cautious but increasingly pragmatic approach towards the Taliban since they returned to power in August 2021.
    2. The line held: New Delhi did not recognise the Taliban regime, and has expanded diplomatic engagement without altering that position.
    3. Return of presence: India reopened its diplomatic mission in Kabul in 2022.
    4. Continuing assistance: India continued providing humanitarian assistance, including food, medicines and other supplies.
    5. The turning point: The engagement became more significant in 2025 with the visit of the Taliban Foreign Minister.
    6. Why Afghanistan matters: Security is one of India’s biggest concerns in relation to Afghanistan, and Pakistan is the other factor shaping the calculation.

    Challenges to India’s Afghanistan policy

    1. Engagement without recognition has no legal footing: Agreements reached with an unrecognised authority cannot be enforced or registered internationally. Eg. India’s diplomatic mission in Kabul, reopened in 2022, operates as a technical mission rather than a full embassy.
    2. Overland access runs through a hostile neighbour: India has no land route to Afghanistan that does not cross Pakistan. Eg. India’s wheat consignments to Afghanistan required specific Pakistani transit permission in 2022 for movement through the Wagah crossing.
    3. Dependence on a sanctioned transit route: The alternative sea and land corridor runs through Iran, which carries its own sanctions exposure. Eg. India’s ten year contract of May 2024 to operate the Shahid Beheshti terminal at Chabahar depends on a project specific sanctions exemption.
    4. Stranded development assets: India built infrastructure whose upkeep now depends on an authority it does not recognise. Eg. The Afghan Parliament building inaugurated in 2015 and the Afghan India Friendship Dam at Salma completed in 2016 both sit under Taliban administration.
    5. Reputational cost of engaging a rights violating authority: Expanded contact runs against India’s own stated positions on women’s rights. Eg. Girls in Afghanistan remain barred from secondary and higher education while diplomatic engagement expands.
    6. Competition from states willing to recognise: Recognition buys influence that engagement alone does not. Eg. Russia formally recognised the Taliban regime, and China and the United Arab Emirates accepted Taliban appointed ambassadors.
    7. Terrorism risk that engagement cannot eliminate: Groups hostile to India retain sanctuary regardless of the state of India Kabul relations. Eg. The Islamic State-Khorasan Province has attacked foreign nationals in Afghanistan, including a Sikh gurdwara in Kabul in June 2022.

    Conclusion

    Five years after the takeover, the Taliban hold Afghanistan’s institutions, borders and security forces, have arrested the economic collapse that was predicted, and face no nationwide armed challenge. They have not obtained recognition, have not converted stability into recovery, and have deepened rather than relaxed the restrictions that keep recognition out of reach. The unresolved question is whether states that must deal with a de facto authority can extract any change in its conduct through engagement alone, since Russia’s recognition and India’s non recognition have so far produced the same behaviour from Kabul.

    “[2013, GS2, 10] The proposed withdrawal of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from Afghanistan in 2014 is fraught with major security implications for the countries of the region. Examine in light of the fact that India is faced with a plethora of challenges and needs to safeguard its own strategic interests.”

  • Ganga treaty not in Bihar’s interests, says JD(U) leader

    Why in the News

    The national working president of the Janata Dal (United), who was Bihar’s Minister for Water Resources between 2021 and 2024, has advocated against renewal of the 1996 India Bangladesh Ganga Water Treaty on the ground that renewal would hurt Bihar’s interests. The treaty expires on 31 December and the two sides are yet to hold the last round of talks on its renewal. A federal objection has therefore entered a bilateral negotiation that the Union alone has the power to conclude.

    What is the India Bangladesh Ganga Water Treaty, 1996?

    1. What it is: A bilateral treaty signed on 12 December 1996 for a term of 30 years, governing the sharing of Ganga waters between India and Bangladesh at the Farakka Barrage.
    2. What it covers: It applies only to the dry season, from 1 January to 31 May, when flow at Farakka is lowest and competition between the two uses is sharpest.
    3. How sharing is measured: Availability is measured in ten day periods at Farakka, and shares are calculated separately for each period rather than as an annual total.
    4. How disputes are handled: A Joint Committee observes and records flows at Farakka and at the Hardinge Bridge in Bangladesh, and the treaty provides for review of the arrangement at five yearly intervals or earlier by mutual agreement.

    What is a cusec?

    1. What it means: A cusec is one cubic foot of water flowing per second, the standard unit in which river discharge and canal capacity are stated in South Asia. All the sharing thresholds in the Ganga treaty are expressed in this unit.

    What does the sharing formula actually do at Farakka?

    1. When availability is 70,000 cusecs or less: The flow is divided equally, with India and Bangladesh receiving 50 percent each.
    2. When availability is between 70,000 and 75,000 cusecs: Bangladesh receives 35,000 cusecs and the balance of the flow goes to India.
    3. When availability is 75,000 cusecs or more: India receives 40,000 cusecs and the balance of the flow goes to Bangladesh.
    4. The guarantee clause: Between 1 March and 10 May, India and Bangladesh each receive a guaranteed 35,000 cusecs in alternate blocks of three ten day periods.
    5. The fallback provision: Where the two sides cannot agree at review, India is to release not less than 90 percent of Bangladesh’s share until an understanding is reached.

    Why does Bihar say the treaty has hurt its interests?

    1. The claim made: Thirty years of data under the treaty show that the interests of Bihar have been negatively impacted.
    2. The separation of interests asserted: Diplomatic issues between the two countries must be sorted out, but Bihar’s interests too must be kept in mind while doing so.
    3. The trade off named: The treaty may have checked a few boxes in terms of international messaging, but it has hurt the State’s interests.
    4. The physical mechanism behind the grievance: Maintaining pond level at Farakka raises the water surface upstream, which slows the river and deposits silt in the Ganga bed across Bihar, reducing channel capacity.
    5. The flood consequence: Reduced channel capacity aggravates flooding and drainage congestion in the Bihar districts along the Ganga, including Bhagalpur, Katihar and Munger.
    6. The State’s standing demand: Bihar has for years sought large scale desilting of the Ganga, a national silt management policy, and at one point the decommissioning of the Farakka Barrage.

    Why does the renewal decision sit with the Union alone?

    1. Treaty making power: Article 253 empowers Parliament to make any law for implementing an international treaty or agreement, and the executive power to conclude treaties rests with the Union.
    2. Water as a State subject: Water, including water supplies, irrigation and canals, drainage and embankments, is Entry 17 of the State List, which is why States claim a stake in any water sharing arrangement.
    3. The Union’s own entry: Entry 56 of the Union List gives Parliament power over the regulation and development of inter State rivers and river valleys where declared expedient in the public interest.
    4. Consultation is practice, not obligation: Riparian States are consulted as a matter of convention in transboundary water negotiations, but the Constitution does not require their concurrence.
    5. The precedent of exclusion: West Bengal objected in 2024 to being left out of the committee constituted for the Ganga treaty renewal and the Teesta discussions, which shows the grievance is not confined to Bihar.

    Why is the renewal a test of the wider India Bangladesh relationship?

    1. The deadline: The treaty expires on 31 December, which fixes the outer limit of the negotiation.
    2. The pending step: The two sides are yet to hold the last round of talks on renewal.
    3. The linked file: The Teesta water sharing arrangement has remained unconcluded since 2011, and the Ganga renewal is the only functioning template the two sides have.
    4. The upstream downstream asymmetry: India is the upper riparian on the Ganga, so the treaty is the principal instrument through which Bangladesh secures a predictable dry season flow.
    5. The domestic politics on both sides: A renewal that satisfies Dhaka must also survive objections from Bihar and West Bengal, which makes the negotiation a two level one.

    Challenges to the renewal of the Ganga Water Treaty

    1. No mechanism to compensate an affected upstream State: The treaty allocates water between countries and is silent on internal distribution of costs. Eg. Bihar’s siltation and flood costs from Farakka pondage have no route to redress inside the treaty text.
    2. Declining lean season flow: The volume the formula divides has itself been shrinking, which sharpens the distributional fight. Eg. The guaranteed 35,000 cusecs blocks between 1 March and 10 May become harder to honour when total availability falls below 70,000 cusecs.
    3. Absence of a State role in the negotiating machinery: Riparian States have no formal seat, which produces objection after the fact rather than input before it. Eg. West Bengal objected in 2024 to exclusion from the renewal committee.
    4. Silt management remains unfunded and unassigned: No agency has both the mandate and the budget for basin scale desilting. Eg. Bihar’s demand for a national silt management policy has been pending across successive Union budgets.
    5. Political transition in Dhaka: A renewal negotiated with one government may be reopened by its successor. Eg. Bangladesh has undergone a change of government since the fall of the Awami League administration in 2024, with the Bangladesh Nationalist Party returning to power in February 2026.
    6. Linkage risk with other rivers: Dhaka has consistently sought to tie the Ganga arrangement to progress on the Teesta. Eg. The Teesta sharing draft agreed in 2011 was not signed because of West Bengal’s objection, and remains unresolved.
    7. No basin wide framework with upper riparians: The Ganga basin extends beyond the two signatories, so a bilateral treaty cannot govern total flow. Eg. Nepal controls the headwaters of the Kosi, Gandak and Ghaghara, which contribute a large share of the Ganga’s dry season flow.

    Conclusion

    The India Bangladesh Ganga Water Treaty, 1996 expires on 31 December, the last round of renewal talks has not yet been held, and a party in Bihar’s ruling coalition has now publicly opposed renewal on the ground that thirty years of the arrangement have damaged the State’s interests. The dispute is not about the sharing ratio alone but about whether an upstream State’s siltation and flood costs can be recognised inside an instrument the Union alone concludes. The next milestone is the final round of renewal talks between the two sides before the treaty lapses.

  • Palestine backs India’s bid for non-permanent Security Council seat

    Why in the News

    Palestine has backed India’s bid for a non-permanent UN Security Council seat for 2028-29. The support came during India’s renewed diplomatic engagement with Palestine, including plans for a new India-funded hospital in the West Bank and medical assistance for Gaza.

    Non-Permanent Seat of the UNSC

    • Composition: UNSC has 15 members: 5 permanent members with veto power and 10 non-permanent members.
    • Election: Elected by the UN General Assembly for a 2-year term with a two-thirds majority.
    • Distribution: Seats follow equitable geographical representation; India contests from the Asia-Pacific Group.
    • Rotation: 5 non-permanent seats are elected every year. A retiring member cannot be immediately re-elected.

    Significance of Palestine’s Support for India

    • Palestine supports India’s 2028-29 candidature and has also expressed support for India having a permanent UNSC seat.
    • It views India’s economic and political weight as important for advancing Palestinian interests.
    • Palestine expects India to use its relations with Israel to facilitate the peace process.
    • The endorsement strengthens India’s image as a country capable of engaging both sides of the Israel-Palestine conflict.

    India’s Development Assistance to Palestine

    • West Bank: India is finalising an India-funded hospital.
    • Vocational training: Support for a vocational training centre.
    • Gaza: Discussions on artificial limbs for amputees.
    • Medical equipment: Talks on supplying dialysis machines and other equipment, potentially through Jordan.

    India’s Position on Palestine

    • India has consistently supported:
      • A negotiated two-state solution.
      • An independent Palestine coexisting peacefully with Israel.
      • Development and humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people.
    • The recent visit to Ramallah marked India’s first high-level visit to the affected region since the October 2023 conflict.

    India’s De-hyphenated Israel-Palestine Policy

    India follows a de-hyphenated approach, treating relations with Israel and Palestine independently.

    • Full diplomatic relations with Israel were established in 1992.
    • India has deepened strategic cooperation with Israel while continuing to support Palestinian statehood.
    • India has continued supporting Palestinian-related resolutions at the UN.
    • This balancing gives India diplomatic credibility and leverage with both sides.

    “[2009] The Security Council of UN consists of 5 permanent members, and the remaining 10 members are elected by the General Assembly for a term of

    (a) 1 year

    (b) 2 years

    (c) 3 years

    (d) 5 years

  • From scientific research to geopolitics: Why India needs a clear ‘Arctic narrative’

    Why in the News

    A report of the Parliamentary Standing Committee on External Affairs, titled “India’s Role and Presence in the Arctic and Antarctic Regions”, asks what India’s narrative on the Arctic actually is. The tension it exposes is that India holds a 1920 treaty entitlement, a permanent research station and a national Arctic Policy, yet funds Arctic activity at a level that contradicts every one of those claims.

    What is the Svalbard Treaty of 1920 and what does it give India?

    1. The instrument: The Svalbard Treaty of 1920 recognises Norwegian sovereignty over the Svalbard archipelago while granting all signatory states equal rights of access and economic activity there.
    2. India’s standing: India, then part of the British Dominion, was among the original 14 signatories of the Treaty.
    3. The practical entitlement: The Treaty entitles an Indian to visit Svalbard, an archipelago located between mainland Norway and the North Pole, without a visa and to engage in commercial ventures.
    4. What India built on it: India remains one of only two developing countries with a permanent scientific presence in the region, through the Himadri research station at Ny-Alesund in Svalbard.

    What is India’s Arctic Policy of 2022?

    1. The framework: India notified an Arctic Policy in 2022, setting out its objectives across science, climate and environmental protection, economic and human development, transportation and connectivity, governance and international cooperation, and capacity building.
    2. The gap it left: The Policy provided the framework but India still lacks a dedicated senior official responsible for Arctic affairs.

    What is the Arctic and Indian monsoon teleconnection?

    1. The mechanism: Rapid Arctic warming and declining sea ice alter atmospheric circulation patterns, and those altered patterns influence monsoon behaviour across South Asia.
    2. What it affects: The chain runs from Arctic ice loss to rainfall patterns, agricultural productivity, food security and economic growth in India.

    Why does the Arctic matter to India’s climate security?

    1. Monsoon dependence is structural: India’s dependence on the monsoon remains profound, with nearly 70 percent of India’s annual rainfall coming from the southwest monsoon.
    2. The economic base at risk: Agriculture still accounts for roughly 18 percent of India’s gross domestic product and supports more than half of its population.
    3. The scientific link is now established: Scientific studies increasingly point to an Arctic and Indian monsoon teleconnection, so Arctic ice loss is a direct input into Indian rainfall variability.
    4. Sea-level rise is the second pillar: The Arctic is a major contributor to global sea-level rise, and on current trends entire low-lying island states such as the Maldives face existential threats.
    5. The regional exposure: Large parts of Bangladesh and significant stretches of India’s coastline could experience recurrent flooding and displacement, with more than 250 million people in vulnerable coastal regions of South Asia affected by mid-century.
    6. The security consequence: Large-scale climate-induced migration from neighbouring regions would create humanitarian, social and security challenges of an unprecedented order, which moves the Arctic out of the environmental file and into the security file.

    Why has the Arctic become a geopolitical arena rather than only a scientific one?

    1. India’s partners are Arctic states: Two of India’s closest strategic partners, the United States and Russia, are Arctic nations, so Arctic policy is inseparable from India’s core bilateral relationships.
    2. The adversary is already inside: China, described as India’s principal long-term adversary, has invested heavily in Arctic infrastructure, research and shipping despite being an extra-regional state.
    3. The convergence of stakes: The Arctic is emerging as a battleground for major powers, with maritime access, energy security and critical mineral supply chains intersecting in the same space.
    4. India’s existing goodwill: India maintains friendly relations with other Arctic nations, evident in the recent India-Nordic Summit.
    5. The unanswered question: The open issue is whether India is prepared to engage at a scale commensurate with the interests it has declared.

    What does China’s polar build-up show about the scale India is not matching?

    1. China, acquisition then indigenisation: China acquired a second-hand icebreaker from Ukraine and then developed indigenous icebreaker building capability from it.
    2. China, current fleet: China today operates several polar-capable vessels, giving it access to the wider Arctic Ocean that India lacks.
    3. China, the next tier: China is the second country after Russia to be building a nuclear icebreaker, which is the class of asset that permits sustained independent high-latitude operations.
    4. China, non-vessel presence: China has invested heavily in Arctic infrastructure, research and shipping despite having no Arctic coastline of its own.
    5. Russia and the United States, incumbency: Both are Arctic littoral states and therefore hold rights in the region by geography rather than by treaty accession, which is the position India can never occupy.

    What structural gaps does the Committee identify in India’s Arctic engagement?

    1. Fragmented ownership: Responsibility for Arctic affairs is fragmented across multiple divisions of the Ministry of External Affairs, with Arctic states and Arctic Council matters handled by four different territorial and functional divisions.
    2. No single point of accountability: The fragmentation makes a coherent whole-of-government Arctic engagement difficult, and India still lacks a dedicated senior official responsible for Arctic affairs despite having had an Arctic Policy since 2022.
    3. No ice-class vessel: Without an ice-class research vessel, India’s scientific footprint in the Arctic remains largely confined to Svalbard.
    4. Dependence on others for access: Access to the wider Arctic Ocean depends on collaboration with foreign partners and on the availability of chartered vessels.
    5. The vessel that never arrived: An indigenous Polar Research Vessel (PRV), a dedicated ice-capable ship required for meaningful pan-Arctic research, was sanctioned in 2014 and is expected to be delivered only towards the end of this decade.

    Why does the funding figure undercut the stated policy?

    1. The headline number: India spent just Rs 17.53 crore on Arctic activities in 2024-25.
    2. The internal comparison: That is less than one-tenth of India’s expenditure on Antarctica, despite the Arctic carrying the monsoon and sea-level linkages.
    3. The external comparison: It is less than the cost of building a single kilometre of a flyover.
    4. The exposure it is set against: The same region affects sea-level rise along India’s 11,098 km coastline and is simultaneously a climate and a geopolitical hotspot.
    5. The contradiction stated: If the Arctic warrants a national policy, a dedicated parliamentary study and repeated diplomatic engagement with Arctic states, the budgetary commitment suggests the opposite conclusion.

    Conclusion

    India’s Arctic problem is not an absence of standing but an absence of capability matched to that standing. A 1920 treaty entitlement, a permanent station at Ny-Alesund and a 2022 Arctic Policy establish the claim, while four scattered ministry divisions, no dedicated official, no ice-class vessel and Rs 17.53 crore a year establish the limit. The Parliamentary panel has identified the gaps, and the outstanding task is the conversion of policy into capability.

    “[2018, GS1, 10 marks] Why is India taking keen interest in resources of Arctic Region?”

  • [20th August 2026] The Hindu OpED: A Palestinian state is the foundation for regional peace

    Question (2018, GS2): “India’s relations with Israel have, of late, acquired a depth and diversity, which cannot be rolled back. Discuss.”
    Linkage: This question directly evaluates India’s strategic partnership with Israel. Historically, India’s West Asia policy was heavily anchored in support for the Palestinian cause and the two-state solution. This question asks candidates to analyze how India’s relations with Israel have de-hyphenated from its stance on Palestine, expanding into robust defense, agricultural, and technological cooperation.

    Mentor Comment:

    United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803, adopted in November 2025, established a Board of Peace for Gaza, and its annex acknowledges a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood once Gaza redevelopment advances and Palestinian Authority reform is carried out. The tension this exposes is that every subsidiary conflict in West Asia turns on a Palestinian state that the war since October 2023 has pushed further out of reach.

    What is the two-state solution, and what does it actually require?

    1. Core formula: The two-state solution proposes two sovereign states, Israel and Palestine, living side by side in defined borders with mutual recognition.
    2. The asymmetry inside the phrase: One of the two states already exists, so the operative task is not maintaining a balance but creating a second state that does not yet exist.
    3. The three qualifying tests: A Palestinian state must be sovereign, independent and viable, meaning it must control its own territory, conduct its own external relations and possess an economic base capable of sustaining a state.
    4. The claimed consequence: Peace and stability in the region are treated as unattainable until this second state comes into being.

    What is Resolution 2803 and the Board of Peace?

    1. Instrument: United Nations Security Council Resolution 2803, adopted in November 2025, set up a Board of Peace (BoP) as the transitional oversight mechanism for the Gaza Strip.
    2. The statehood clause: Its annex states that while Gaza redevelopment advances and the Palestinian Authority (PA) reform programme is faithfully carried out, conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood.

    Why are the region’s separate conflicts treated as one unresolved question?

    1. Gaza: Israel’s war on Gaza is framed not as a discrete security operation but as the most violent expression of an unsettled sovereignty question.
    2. Hezbollah: Hezbollah began launching rockets and missiles at Israel immediately after Israel’s Gaza campaign opened following 7 October 2023, tying the northern front directly to the Palestinian question.
    3. Iran: The Iran war, Iranian arms supply to Hezbollah and Iranian hostility to Israel are held to rest on the denial of Palestinian self-determination rather than on theological difference.
    4. The Houthi factor: The Houthi phenomenon in the Red Sea is treated as a further derivative of the same unresolved dispute.
    5. Arab normalisation: Israel’s relations with its Arab neighbours will remain strained until it accepts the reality of a Palestinian state, in the same way Arab states have reconciled to the reality of Israel.
    6. The secondary issues: Once an irreversible road map to Palestinian statehood is accepted by all parties, disputes such as freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz become far easier to resolve.

    What are the historical roots of regional hostility towards Israel?

    1. The Balfour Declaration, 1917: British support for a Jewish homeland in Palestine expressly limited the indigenous Arab population to civil and religious rights, converting a holy land claim into a homeland project.
    2. The founding grievance: Hostility rests on the fact that Israel was created and imposed on the region at the expense of the indigenous Arab population.
    3. The 1947 partition offer: Palestinians were offered a state under the United Nations resolution of 1947 and on later occasions and rejected each offer, a record an Israeli Foreign Minister summarised as the Arabs never missing an opportunity to miss an opportunity.
    4. The counter-reading of that rejection: Rejection of a partial offer by a party that holds the underlying title is treated as a defensible refusal rather than as proof of intransigence, since the Zionist slogan itself described the territory as land without people for a people without land.
    5. The Holocaust and western guilt: Israel’s creation is attributed substantially to the Holocaust and to the sense of guilt felt by western countries, most of which, including the United States, had barred the entry of Jews fleeing Nazi Germany.
    6. No inherited religious enmity: Islam and Judaism carry no record of perpetual enmity, since the Koran names prophets and patriarchs from the Hebrew bible including Moses and Abraham, the Crusades were fought between Muslims and Christians with Jews not party to them, Jews were persecuted in countries professing Christianity, and the Arabs bore no responsibility for the Holocaust carried out by Nazi Germany and its collaborators.

    Why does a Shia axis support a Sunni movement?

    1. The alignment: Hezbollah, a Shia movement, and Iran, a Shia-majority country, both support Hamas, a Sunni movement.
    2. The explanation: The alignment rests on a shared commitment to the right of self-determination for the Palestinian people rather than on sectarian affinity.
    3. Where Israel sits in that logic: Israel attracts hostility as the only power standing in the way of an independent Palestine, not as a religious adversary.
    4. Iran was not always hostile: Under the Shah, Iran’s relations with Israel were cordial and a sizeable Jewish community lived in Iran.
    5. The residual community: About 15,000 Jews remain in Iran, and Iran’s Constitution reserves a seat for the Jewish community in Parliament.
    6. The conditional off-ramp: If Israel accepts a Palestinian state, Hezbollah loses its stated reason to disrupt life in northern Israel and Iran loses its reason to supply Hezbollah with weapons.

    Why has the war since October 2023 pushed statehood further away rather than closer?

    1. Collapse of domestic support: Whatever limited support existed within Israel for the concept of a Palestinian state has evaporated since the Hamas terrorist attack on Israeli civilians in October 2023.
    2. The cost of the response: Israel’s disproportionate and ruthless strikes on Gaza after 7 October have almost isolated Israel internationally.
    3. The physical precondition destroyed: The Gaza Strip has been devastated, and with it the territorial and administrative base on which a Palestinian state would have to be built.
    4. The time horizon pushed out: The possibility of Palestine emerging has receded by many years and possibly decades.
    5. The resulting deadlock: Peace and stability in the region have become an illusion precisely because the instrument that was to deliver security has removed the conditions for a settlement.
    6. The development cost: Without peace and stability, the region’s people cannot realise the development potential that new technologies offer.

    Why is external mediation, not bilateral negotiation, the only viable route?

    1. The bargaining asymmetry: The stronger side normally insists on a bilateral approach and the weaker side prefers an outside agency, which is why Israel has insisted on bilateral talks while simultaneously saying there is no one on the other side to negotiate with.
    2. The only power with leverage: The United States is the only external power with the required influence and residual goodwill with both sides.
    3. The honest broker objection answered: No broker is genuinely honest, but even a non-honest broker can sell a transaction to the satisfaction, or the equal dissatisfaction, of both parties.
    4. The single precedent that worked: The only period of real progress came with the Oslo Accord of 1993, negotiated through the mediation and good offices of Norway.
    5. What Oslo produced: Under Oslo the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) formally recognised Israel and the Palestinian Authority was created, and it is a reformed version of that Authority that is now proposed as a caretaker government of Palestine.
    6. Oslo’s downstream effects: The Accords paved the way for Jordan’s recognition of Israel and eventually for the Abraham Accords.
    7. The second broker: The United Nations remains the other viable mediator, and although Israel has declared the United Nations Secretary-General persona non grata, Israel owes its existence to the United Nations, and positions in international relations evolve with situations.
    8. The leadership obstacle: The current Israeli Prime Minister voted against the Oslo Accords and remains opposed to the idea of a Palestinian state.

    Conclusion

    The West Asian conflict system is not a set of separate wars but one unresolved sovereignty question, and every subsidiary conflict persists because a sovereign, independent and viable Palestinian state has not been created. Resolution 2803 has restored a conditional pathway to statehood in Security Council language, but the material base for that state in Gaza has been destroyed. What remains unaddressed is the absence of leadership on any side willing to accept mediation and convert a conditional pathway into an irreversible road map.

    What is the Right of Self-Determination in International Law?

    1. About: Self-determination is the right of a people to freely determine their political status and pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
    2. Rationale: It exists to convert the political fact of a distinct people under external or alien rule into a legal claim, so that statehood does not depend solely on the consent of the controlling power.
    3. Charter basis: It is recorded in Article 1(2) and Article 55 of the United Nations Charter and in Common Article 1 of the two 1966 International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
    4. External self-determination: The right of a people to determine its international status, including independence, association or integration with another state.
    5. Internal self-determination: The right of a people to choose its own government and to pursue development within an existing state, without a claim to secession.
    6. Uti possidetis juris: The principle that new states inherit the administrative boundaries existing at the moment of independence, which limits the redrawing of borders by force.

    Key Concerns Regarding the Right of Self-Determination

    1. Conflict with territorial integrity: The right runs directly against the principle of territorial integrity of existing states, and international law provides no settled test for which prevails.
    2. No agreed definition of a people: There is no accepted legal test for what constitutes a people entitled to the right, which allows both over-claiming and denial.
    3. Selective recognition: Recognition of statehood is a political act by individual states, so identical factual situations attract different outcomes depending on great power alignment.
    4. Enforcement gap: A recognised right of self-determination carries no enforcement mechanism where the controlling power is protected by a Security Council veto.
    5. Viability threshold: A territory may satisfy the legal criteria for statehood yet lack contiguous territory, revenue base or control over borders, leaving nominal sovereignty without effective sovereignty.

    Key Milestones in the Palestine Question

    1. 1917: The Balfour Declaration records British support for a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine.
    2. 1947: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 181 proposes partition of Mandate Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state with Jerusalem under international administration.
    3. 1948: The State of Israel is declared, followed by the first Arab-Israeli war.
    4. 1967: The Six Day War brings the West Bank, Gaza, East Jerusalem, the Golan Heights and Sinai under Israeli control, and Security Council Resolution 242 sets out the land for peace principle.
    5. 1993: The Oslo Accord, mediated by Norway, brings mutual recognition between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization and creates the Palestinian Authority.
    6. 1994: Jordan recognises Israel, following Egypt’s earlier recognition under the 1979 peace treaty.
    7. 2012: The United Nations General Assembly upgrades Palestine to a non-member observer State.
    8. 2020: The Abraham Accords normalise Israel’s relations with the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain, later extended to further states.
    9. 2025: Security Council Resolution 2803 creates the Board of Peace for Gaza and records a conditional pathway to Palestinian statehood.

    India’s Position on Palestine and the Two-State Solution

    Source: Backgrounder, India-Israel Relations Backgrounder.docx

    1. Long-standing principled support: India maintains a long-standing principled support for the Palestinian cause and for a negotiated two-state solution.
    2. De-hyphenation: India separates its Israel policy from its Palestine policy, engaging each on its own terms rather than treating support for one as opposition to the other.
    3. Recognition timeline: India recognised the State of Israel in 1950 but withheld full diplomatic relations for four decades, shaped by its support for the Palestinian cause, its ties with Arab states and its energy dependence on West Asia.
    4. Normalisation in 1992: Full diplomatic relations were established in January 1992, in the post-Cold War context and alongside India’s economic liberalisation.
    5. The 2017 signal: The first visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Israel, in July 2017, elevated the relationship to a Strategic Partnership and notably did not include Ramallah, which signalled de-hyphenation.
    6. Voting record: India has continued to vote for Palestinian causes at the United Nations even while deepening its ties with Israel.
    7. The Gulf balance: India’s energy imports, remittance inflows and a large diaspora in Gulf states require its Israel ties to be balanced against Arab partners.
    8. Strategic autonomy: India frames the Israel relationship as issue-based cooperation and not as alignment against any third party.

    Back2Basics: The Palestinian Authority

    1. Origin: The Palestinian Authority was created under the 1993 Oslo Accord as an interim self-governing body for parts of the West Bank and Gaza.
    2. Parent body: It was established by the Palestine Liberation Organization, which formally recognised Israel under the same Accord.
    3. Mandate: It exercises civil and, in designated areas, security administration, with the Oslo framework dividing the West Bank into Areas A, B and C by degree of Palestinian and Israeli control.
    4. Interim design: It was designed as a transitional arrangement pending a final status agreement covering borders, Jerusalem, refugees and settlements, which was never concluded.
    5. Current relevance: A reformed Palestinian Authority is the body named in Resolution 2803 as the vehicle through which a pathway to statehood would run.
    6. Territorial split: Its writ has not extended to Gaza since the 2007 split with Hamas, which is itself a constraint on any single Palestinian government.

    Challenges to a Two-State Settlement

    1. Absence of contiguous territory: A viable Palestinian state requires territorial contiguity that settlement expansion has progressively removed, e.g. the West Bank’s division into Areas A, B and C leaves Palestinian-administered zones as separated enclaves.
    2. Physical destruction of the state base: Reconstruction must precede governance, since the administrative and economic base has been destroyed, e.g. the devastation of the Gaza Strip after the campaign that followed 7 October 2023.
    3. Divided Palestinian leadership: No single Palestinian authority commands both territories, e.g. the Palestinian Authority governs parts of the West Bank while Gaza has been under Hamas control since 2007.
    4. Collapse of political constituencies: Domestic support for a Palestinian state has evaporated inside Israel, e.g. the shift in Israeli opinion after the Hamas attack on Israeli civilians in October 2023.
    5. Leadership opposition at the top: The settlement requires assent from leaders personally committed against it, e.g. the current Israeli Prime Minister voted against the Oslo Accords and remains opposed to Palestinian statehood.
    6. Veto-protected deadlock: Security Council action is constrained by permanent member vetoes, e.g. repeated vetoes of ceasefire and membership resolutions have prevented enforceable outcomes.
    7. Spoiler incentives on both flanks: Armed actors gain standing from continued conflict and lose it from a settlement, e.g. Hezbollah’s rocket campaign against northern Israel began only after the Gaza war opened.
    8. Refugee and Jerusalem questions unresolved: Final status issues deferred at Oslo remain untouched, e.g. the right of return and the status of East Jerusalem were left to a final agreement that was never negotiated.

    Way Forward

    1. Convert the conditional clause into a road map: Translate the Resolution 2803 annex language on a credible pathway into a sequenced, dated and irreversible road map accepted by all parties.
    2. Restore a single Palestinian administration: Complete the Palestinian Authority reform programme so that one reformed administration can serve as a caretaker government across both territories.
    3. Anchor mediation in an external broker: Retain United States mediation, supplemented by United Nations involvement, rather than allowing a return to bilateral talks that the bargaining asymmetry makes unproductive.
    4. Sequence reconstruction with governance: Tie Gaza reconstruction financing to the standing up of civil administration, policing and revenue functions, so that physical rebuilding creates state capacity rather than only shelter.
    5. Use regional normalisation as leverage: Make further Arab normalisation with Israel conditional on measurable progress on the statehood pathway, so the Abraham Accords framework reinforces rather than bypasses the Palestinian question.
    6. Sustain India’s dual-track engagement: Maintain principled support for a negotiated two-state solution alongside development assistance to Palestine and cooperation with Israel, which protects India’s standing across West Asia.

    “[2018] The term “two-state solution” is sometimes mentioned in the news in the context of the affairs of (a) China (b) Israel (c) Iraq (d) Yemen Answer: (b)”

  • India to build hospital in West Bank, seeks to deploy field hospital in Gaza

    Why in the News

    India and Palestine broke ground on 19 August for a 200 seat super speciality hospital in Arrabeh city in the Jenin Governorate of the northern West Bank, during the first high level Indian visit to the affected region since the conflict broke out in October 2023. India simultaneously sought the deployment of an Indian field hospital in the Gaza Strip and reiterated its support for a negotiated two state solution. Palestine used the visit to back India's bid for a non permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council for 2028 to 2029.

    What does India's development package for Palestine cover?

    1. The hospital: A 200 seat super speciality hospital funded by India, to be built in Arrabeh city in the Jenin Governorate of the northern West Bank, with construction work launched jointly on 19 August.
    2. The field hospital: India has sought the deployment of an Indian field hospital in the Gaza Strip, discussed with Palestinian officials during the visit.
    3. Health sector support: Essential medicines and anti cancer drugs, an Artificial Limb Fitment Camp, and a consignment of medicines handed over to the Palestinian Ministry of Health during the visit.
    4. Beyond health: A vocational training centre, the provision of artificial limbs for amputees in Gaza, and talks on medical equipment including dialysis machines, some of which are expected to be moved into Palestine through Jordan.

    What is the two state solution?

    1. The proposition: It is the framework under which an independent State of Palestine would exist alongside the State of Israel, with agreed borders, security arrangements and a settlement on Jerusalem and refugees.
    2. India's position on it: India supports a negotiated two state solution, and has restated that position through every phase of the current conflict.

    What did the Ramallah visit deliver?

    1. The rank of the visit: The Secretary in charge of Consular, Passport, Visa and Overseas Indian Affairs in the Ministry of External Affairs is the highest ranking Indian diplomat to visit the West Bank since the attack of 7 October 2023.
    2. Where it took place: Ramallah, the administrative headquarters of the Palestinian Authority, with a meeting held there with the Palestinian Foreign Minister.
    3. The officials met: The Minister of Health and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the State of Palestine, and a call on the Prime Minister of Palestine on 19 August.
    4. The positions restated: India's consistent support for the Palestinian people, its support for a negotiated two state solution, and a pitch for addressing the humanitarian situation in Gaza.
    5. The deliverable launched: The groundbreaking ceremony for the super speciality hospital in Jenin, carried out jointly by the Indian and Palestinian teams.
    6. What Palestine asked for: The Palestinian Ambassador to India said Palestine welcomes New Delhi's help towards key infrastructure projects in the region.

    Why does Palestine's backing of India's UNSC bid matter?

    1. The specific endorsement: The Palestinian Ambassador to India said Palestine backs India's bid for a non permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council for the 2028 to 2029 term.
    2. The wider position stated: Palestine has appealed, as a country of the global South, for India to be among the countries holding a permanent seat on a reformed Council.
    3. The reasoning offered: The endorsement was tied to India's global standing as a major economy and a political power.
    4. What Palestine seeks in return: Palestinians hope India will use its influence, including its ties with Israel, to push forward the peace process.
    5. Why it counts in a Council election: A non permanent seat requires a two thirds majority in the General Assembly, so endorsements from within the Asia Pacific group and the wider global South build the coalition a candidacy needs.

    How does India balance its Palestine policy with its Israel ties?

    Source: Backgrounder, India-Israel Relations Backgrounder.docx, supplemented

    1. The stated policy: India maintains long standing principled support for the Palestinian cause and a two state solution, balanced against deepening ties with Israel, a policy described as the de hyphenation of Israel from Palestine.
    2. When de hyphenation was signalled: The first ever visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Israel in July 2017 elevated the relationship to a Strategic Partnership, and notably did not include Ramallah.
    3. What the Israel relationship carries: Israel is among India's top defence suppliers alongside Russia, France and the United States, with merchandise trade anchored in diamonds, chemicals, defence equipment, high technology and agriculture, and a Free Trade Agreement under negotiation.
    4. Where the friction sits: Reports of Indian military shipments to Israel during the Gaza conflict draw domestic and diaspora criticism, and India's energy imports, remittances and large diaspora in the Gulf require careful balancing of Israel ties with Arab partners.
    5. How India frames it: India describes the relationship as issue based cooperation rather than alignment against any third party, which is its strategic autonomy formulation.
    6. What the present visit adds, supplemented: Restoring a high level Indian presence in Ramallah after nearly three years, and pairing it with a physical asset in the West Bank, gives the Palestine half of the balance a visible deliverable rather than a stated position alone.

    Challenges to India's engagement in Palestine

    1. Physical access to Gaza: A field hospital cannot be deployed without a functioning crossing and security guarantees from the parties in control of it. e.g. medical equipment including dialysis machines is expected to reach Palestine only through Jordan.
    2. Construction in a contested territory: Building in the northern West Bank exposes a project to demolition orders, permit refusals and military operations. e.g. the Jenin Governorate, where the Arrabeh hospital is sited, has been the site of repeated large scale Israeli operations.
    3. Balancing against defence ties with Israel: Visible development assistance to Palestine sits beside a defence relationship with Israel that domestic critics read as inconsistent. e.g. reports of Indian military shipments to Israel during the Gaza conflict drawing domestic and diaspora criticism.
    4. Fiscal and delivery capacity of the Palestinian Authority: A completed hospital requires recurrent staffing and operating budgets from an authority under fiscal stress. e.g. the vocational training centre and artificial limb programmes also depend on Palestinian institutions for continuity after handover.
    5. Gulf balance: India's energy imports, remittances and a large diaspora in Gulf states constrain how far it can lean toward either party. e.g. India's calibrated positions at the United Nations through successive phases of the Gaza conflict.
    6. Dependence on a stalled peace process: Development assistance cannot substitute for a political settlement, so the same infrastructure is at risk in the next round of hostilities. e.g. the India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor, announced at the 2023 G20 New Delhi Summit, whose progress regional conflict has slowed.
    7. Competing donor crowding: Reconstruction finance in Gaza and the West Bank is dominated by much larger Gulf and Western donors, which limits the visibility of Indian contributions. e.g. India's assistance is delivered through discrete projects rather than through a large reconstruction fund.

    Conclusion

    India's Palestine policy has for two decades rested on a stated position on the two state solution, and this visit converts part of that position into physical assets in health and vocational training. Palestine's endorsement of India's non permanent Security Council candidature for 2028 to 2029, coupled with its request that India use its ties with Israel to advance the peace process, prices that assistance in diplomatic terms. The next milestones are the finalisation of modalities for the Gaza field hospital deployment and the completion of the Jenin hospital construction.

    India-Israel Relations

    Source: Backgrounder, India-Israel Relations Backgrounder.docx

    1. Recognition and normalisation: India recognised the State of Israel in 1950 but withheld full diplomatic relations for four decades, and full ties were established in January 1992, when India opened its embassy in Tel Aviv and Israel opened its mission in New Delhi.
    2. Elevation to Strategic Partnership: The relationship was elevated to a Strategic Partnership during the first ever visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Israel in July 2017, followed by a reciprocal visit by the Israeli Prime Minister in 2018.
    3. Defence as the anchor: Israel is among India's top defence suppliers, with cooperation covering the Barak-8 medium range surface to air missile jointly developed with the Defence Research and Development Organisation, Heron and Searcher unmanned aerial vehicles, Harop and Harpy loitering munitions, radars, electronic warfare systems and precision guided munitions.
    4. The Kargil precedent: Cooperation proved decisive during the 1999 Kargil conflict, when Israel supplied laser guided munitions and reconnaissance support at short notice.
    5. Trade profile: Bilateral trade grew from about 200 million United States dollars in 1992, largely diamonds, to several billion dollars diversified across refined petroleum, chemicals, textiles and machinery from India, and defence equipment, high technology, potash and fertilizers from Israel.
    6. Agriculture and water: The India Israel Agricultural Action Plan operates Centres of Excellence across Indian States transferring drip irrigation, precision farming and protected cultivation, alongside Israeli expertise in desalination and wastewater recycling.
    7. Minilateral and connectivity architecture: The I2U2 grouping of India, Israel, the United Arab Emirates and the United States, launched in 2021 to 2022 for food security and clean energy, and the India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor announced at the 2023 G20 New Delhi Summit, with Israel as a key transit node.
    8. The Abraham Accords effect: The normalisation of Israel's ties with several Gulf states in 2020 eased India's balancing act between Israel and the Arab world.

    Key Facts about India and Palestine

    1. Early recognition of the PLO: India was the first non Arab state to recognise the Palestine Liberation Organisation as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, in 1974.
    2. Recognition of the State of Palestine: India recognised the State of Palestine in 1988.
    3. Representative Office: India opened its Representative Office to Palestine in Gaza in 1996, and shifted it to Ramallah in 2003.
    4. First Prime Ministerial visit: The first visit by an Indian Prime Minister to Palestine took place in February 2018, to Ramallah.
    5. Institutional gifts: Indian assistance has built the Palestine India Techno Park and a centre of excellence in information and communications technology at Al Quds University, along with a school in Abu Dis and support to the Palestine Institute of Diplomacy.
    6. Multilateral contributions: India contributes annually to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, and extends training slots under the Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation programme to Palestinian officials.
    7. Voting record: India has consistently supported resolutions on Palestinian self determination at the United Nations General Assembly while abstaining on several resolutions that name parties for condemnation.

    Back2Basics: Non Permanent Membership of the UN Security Council

    1. What it is: The United Nations Security Council has fifteen members, five permanent with the veto and ten non permanent without it.
    2. Term: Non permanent members serve a term of two years and are not eligible for immediate re election.
    3. Who elects them: The United Nations General Assembly, by a two thirds majority of members present and voting.
    4. Regional distribution: The ten seats are allocated across the African group, the Asia Pacific group, the Latin American and Caribbean group, the Western European and Others group, and the Eastern European group, with five seats filled each year.
    5. India's record: India has served eight terms as a non permanent member, the most recent being 2021 to 2022, and is contesting the 2028 to 2029 term.
    6. What the seat carries: A non permanent member may preside over the Council in rotation, chair subsidiary bodies and sanctions committees, and vote on all resolutions, but holds no veto.
    7. The reform demand: India, along with Brazil, Germany and Japan in the G4 grouping, seeks permanent membership with expanded representation for Africa, Asia and Latin America.

    Way Forward

    1. Secure access guarantees for the Gaza field hospital: Modalities settled with all parties controlling the crossings are the precondition for deployment, without which the offer stays on paper.
    2. Build operating capacity alongside infrastructure: Pairing the Jenin hospital with training for Palestinian medical staff and a recurrent equipment supply line prevents a completed building without the workforce to run it.
    3. Route assistance through predictable channels: Formalising the Jordan transit route for medical equipment reduces the dependence on ad hoc clearances for each consignment.
    4. Sustain principled support for a two state solution: A consistent public position protects India's standing across West Asia irrespective of how the Israel relationship develops.
    5. Convert the Palestinian endorsement into a Council coalition: Following the endorsement with sustained outreach to the Asia Pacific group and the wider global South is what turns a statement of support into the two thirds majority the 2028 to 2029 election requires.
    6. Insulate long term cooperation from conflict cycles: Multi year funding commitments for health and vocational training projects prevent each round of hostilities resetting the assistance programme.
    7. Broaden beyond health: Extending assistance into water, agriculture and information technology training, where India already has delivery experience in Palestine, diversifies the partnership beyond a single sector.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2018] The term "two-state solution" is sometimes mentioned in the news in the context of the affairs of (a) China (b) Israel (c) Iraq (d) Yemen Answer: (b)”

    # Compiled Articles, 20 August 2026 (Part 5, Items 25 to 30)