💥Mains Ready By December. Smash Mains & Smash PYQ Admissions Open
Talk to Mentor

Civilsdaily

Login

Subject: International Relations

  • BRICS: evolution, cooperation and India’s leadership ahead of the 18th Summit

    BRICS: evolution, cooperation and India’s leadership ahead of the 18th Summit

    Why in News

    India hosts the 18th BRICS Summit on 12 to 13 September 2026 at Bharat Mandapam, New Delhi. BRICS is a grouping of major emerging economies.

    Current stage and next milestone

    India chairs BRICS for the fourth time in 2026. The leaders’ sessions run on 12 to 13 September 2026. The chairship has already run over 350 ministerial meetings across 25 cities.

    Core facts

    1. Origin: The acronym BRIC was coined in 2001 by Goldman Sachs. It projected Brazil, Russia, India and China as future major economies.
    2. Formation: South Africa joined in 2010, forming BRICS.
    3. Membership now: The grouping has 11 full members: Brazil, China, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa and the United Arab Emirates. A Partner Country framework adds ten more nations.
    4. Weight: Members hold 49.5% of global population, 40% of global Gross Domestic Product and 26% of global trade.
    5. India’s chairships: They occurred in 2012, 2016, 2021 and 2026.
    6. Theme 2026: Building for Resilience, Innovation, Cooperation and Sustainability.
    7. Three pillars: Political and security cooperation, economic and financial cooperation, and cultural exchanges.
    8. 2026 agenda: Agriculture, health, urban infrastructure, Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises, supply chains and climate resilience.

    Static Context

    1. The New Development Bank (NDB) is the BRICS development bank. It was set up at the 6th Summit via the Fortaleza Declaration of 2014. Its headquarters is in Shanghai.
    2. The Contingent Reserve Arrangement is the BRICS currency swap framework for balance of payments support.
    3. The 16th Summit was held at Kazan, Russia, in 2024. The latest expansion admitted Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

    Prelims angle

    NDB headquarters at Shanghai and its Fortaleza Declaration origin; BRICS membership list and the 11 member count; India’s chairship years; the NDB is a BRICS body, not an Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation body.

    Mains angle

    GS Paper 2, global groupings affecting India’s interests. BRICS suits a question on its role as a counterweight in global governance and a platform for the Global South.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025] Consider the following statements with regard to BRICS:
    I. The 16th BRICS Summit was held under the Chairship of Russia in Kazan.
    II. Indonesia has become a full member of BRICS.
    III. The theme of the 16th BRICS Summit was Strengthening Multiculturalism for Just Global Development and Security.
    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
    (a) I and II
    (b) II and III
    (c) I and III
    (d) I only
    Answer: (a)”

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] “BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South.” Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.”

  • The BRICS Summit allows India to advance its global ambitions

    Why in the News

    India hosts the BRICS Summit at the Bharat Mandapam in New Delhi, with leaders and representatives of 11 BRICS countries opening deliberations on the future of global governance. Forging a joint statement is never easy at a multilateral conference whose members are themselves parties to ongoing conflicts. The grouping was a five member body at India’s earlier hostings, where managing consensus was easier, and enlargement since 2024 has changed that. The largest share of the host’s difficulty comes from the United States, which has accused the bloc of working against the dollar and has threatened tariffs on every member over its payments agenda. India is at the same time seeking to restore ties with that administration on trade and on its Indo-Pacific strategy, so hosting the bloc risks the relationship the hosting is partly meant to balance.

    Why is consensus harder than at India’s earlier hostings?

    1. The scale of the responsibility: Hosting BRICS is the second time in recent years, after the G-20 Summit in 2023, that India has had to shoulder a major multilateral conference.
    2. The earlier hostings were smaller: India hosted the coalition of emerging economies in 2012, 2016 and virtually in 2021, when it was a grouping of just five major powers.
    3. Who joined: The expansion in 2024 added Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and Indonesia was inducted in 2025.
    4. What the enlargement did and did not do: BRICS’ identity has evolved with the new membership. A common focus remains elusive.

    Which conflicts among members block a common text?

    1. Conflicts involving members have multiplied: Global conflicts involving BRICS members have grown alongside the enlargement.
    2. The war involving Iran is the sharpest case: Iran is a victim of the United States and Israeli strikes, and the UAE was attacked by Iran in retaliation. Both are members of the grouping.
    3. Neither will accept a shared account: Iran and the UAE have been unwilling to agree to a common narrative on the problem, which is precisely what a joint statement requires.
    4. India’s own position has divided the grouping: India’s position on Israel came into conflict with other members earlier this year, since the grouping has traditionally taken a much more critical line on Israel’s actions.

    Why does the United States pose the largest problem for the host?

    1. The accusation is about the dollar: The United States President has accused the grouping of plotting to overthrow the United States dollar’s domination of the global economy.
    2. The threatened instrument: He has been threatening tariffs on all members for planning to increase intra-BRICS payments and trade.
    3. What India is attempting in parallel: The government is seeking to restore ties with the United States administration on trade and on its Indo-Pacific strategy.
    4. The risk is not proportionate to the conduct: Hosting BRICS risks invoking American displeasure however irrational that displeasure is, so the host cannot manage the risk simply by adjusting the agenda.

    Why is a grouping that refuses the anti-western label still a counter to the G-7?

    1. The label the bloc rejects: The grouping prefers not to be called anti-western.
    2. What it functions as: It is a powerful counter to the G-7 and to western-led thinking.
    3. The scale behind the counter: BRICS accounts for half the world’s population, two fifths of the global economy and a fourth of global trade.
    4. Its energy position: It includes many of the world’s top energy producers and its biggest consumers, which gives it weight in energy markets that requires no declaration to exercise.
    5. The rise that produced this: BRICS was first conceptualised 25 years ago and convened a summit in 2009, and its countries have risen in global stature and economic heft since, with intra-BRICS trade benefitting.

    What does the presidency deliver for India?

    1. Heft on the global high table: Being part of BRICS gives India more weight in advancing its ambitions in global forums.
    2. Visibility from the chair: The presidency has ensured India prominence on the world stage.
    3. What a successful summit would signal: A presidency that reconciles the grouping’s competing strands would demonstrate the bloc’s capacity to act, and would count as a significant achievement for Indian diplomacy.
    4. The cost side of the same presidency: The prominence comes with exposure, since the host is read abroad as the author of whatever the bloc’s declaration says.

    Challenges to India’s BRICS presidency

    1. Consensus gives every member a veto over the text: A declaration requires all eleven members to agree, so the member with the narrowest interest sets the ceiling on what the document can say. Eg. The bloc’s Rio declaration of 2025 ran to 126 points, which is what accommodating every member’s preferred language produces.
      The Fix: Move contested political language into a chair’s statement issued alongside the declaration, so a single dispute does not shrink the agreed economic text.
    2. Enlargement raised the number of bilateral disputes inside the room: Every admission adds that member’s quarrels to the set the chair must accommodate in one document. Eg. The grouping now contains both Iran and Saudi Arabia, whose diplomatic relations were restored only in 2023.
      The Fix: Publish admission criteria requiring a candidate to hold working diplomatic relations with every existing member, so enlargement does not import an active rupture.
    3. The forum has no secretariat to carry work between summits: BRICS has no treaty and no permanent staff, so each chair rebuilds the agenda and the follow up machinery for a single year. Eg. Ministerial and working group outcomes are recorded in a declaration with no standing body tracking their implementation.
      The Fix: Create a small permanent secretariat funded by member contributions, mandated only to track commitments made in past declarations.
    4. The dollar question is a liability the bloc cannot settle: Members disagree on currency arrangements and the disagreement is read abroad as a shared plan, so the bloc absorbs the cost of a policy it has not adopted. Eg. Tariff threats have been aimed at every member over intra-BRICS payments, including at members that oppose a common currency.
      The Fix: State in the declaration that payment interoperability is a transaction cost measure and that no common currency is under consideration, so the agenda and the accusation are separated on the record.
    5. A chair’s agenda outlives the chairship only if the successor adopts it: A one year presidency sets themes that lapse where the next chair’s priorities differ. Eg. The sustainability agenda India is building on was the centrepiece of Brazil’s chairship the previous year.
      The Fix: Record a three year rolling work programme in the declaration, so an incoming chair inherits commitments rather than restating themes.

    Conclusion

    The presidency’s difficulty is not the agenda but the arithmetic. A grouping of eleven operating by consensus produces the text its least flexible member will accept. India’s gain from the chair is visibility, and visibility is also what attaches the bloc’s positions to the host. The two objectives this summit is being judged against, a document every member can sign and a relationship with Washington that survives it, pull in opposite directions and neither has been given up. What to watch is how the declaration handles the payments question, since that single paragraph is where the summit’s diplomatic cost will be set.

    Back2Basics: how BRICS takes decisions

    1. It is an informal grouping: BRICS has no founding treaty, no charter and no permanent secretariat, so it operates as a coordination forum rather than as an international organisation.
    2. The chair rotates annually: One member holds the chairship for a calendar year, hosts the leaders’ summit and sets the year’s agenda and meeting calendar.
    3. Decisions are taken by consensus: Every outcome document is adopted by agreement among all members, so no member can be outvoted and any member can withhold language.
    4. Outputs are political, not binding: A summit declaration records agreed positions and commitments with no enforcement mechanism, and implementation rests with each member’s own government.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS2, 10 marks] With the waning of globalization, post-Cold War world is becoming a site of sovereign nationalism. Elucidate.”

  • Brazil to Iran: Why you can’t put all of BRICS in the anti-West box

    Why in the News

    India presides over the BRICS summit in Delhi with a two fold task: to convey the forum’s shared objective of democratising the international system, and to dispel the widespread impression that it seeks to overthrow the United States led order. Both the forum’s champions and its detractors read it through an anti-Western lens. Supporters celebrate BRICS as a vehicle for resisting Western dominance, and critics warn that it is becoming a counter-bloc led by China and Russia. Neither reading survives contact with the membership, which is divided over whether its national aim is accommodation with the West, autonomy from it, parity within it, or direct confrontation. Delhi’s burden at this summit is to keep the forum from conflating autonomy from America with antagonism towards it.

    Why does one anti-Western label not fit eleven members?

    1. Four national aims, not one: Members differ over whether their national aim is accommodation with the West, autonomy from it, parity within it, or direct confrontation, so the forum’s political orientation is a spectrum rather than a position.
    2. The confrontational pole: Iran sits closest to an anti-Western pole, since resistance to United States power is central to its state ideology and its recent history.
    3. The other end of the spectrum: At the opposite end sit members with deep economic, security and institutional ties to the West, which they maintain while pursuing greater autonomy.
    4. Where the two largest powers sit: Russia and China lie between the extremes. Both are in strategic competition with the West, and neither can be understood apart from its desire for status, influence and a seat at the Western high table.

    Why does Brazil break the West versus Global South opposition?

    1. Its standing in the grouping: Brazil is Latin America’s largest power and a strong advocate for reforming global institutions.
    2. Its institutions are Western in origin: Its geography, language, religion, legal tradition, political institutions and elite reference points are rooted in the Iberian and Euro-Atlantic worlds.
    3. Its diplomatic tradition reinforces this: Brazil is a constitutional democracy whose diplomatic tradition privileges international law and multilateralism.
    4. What it is actually dissatisfied with: Brazil is not seeking to overthrow the West from outside. It is a Western power dissatisfied with how authority is distributed within the order it inhabits.
    5. What that produces in practice: Brasilia rejects automatic alignment with Washington, and is equally uncomfortable with systematic anti-Western mobilisation.
    6. Distance from Eurasia shapes the position: Brazil sits far from Eurasia and, unlike Delhi, is not emotionally invested in Moscow.
    7. China is an economic partner rather than a security problem: Brazil has no direct conflict with Russia or China, and does not share India’s security challenges with Beijing. Beijing is a leading economic partner of Brazil.

    What is Brazil’s position on de-dollarisation and a common currency?

    1. What it supports: Brazil supports cheaper and faster bilateral settlement mechanisms, including trade in national currencies where that is useful.
    2. What it rejects: Brazil has rejected the notion that BRICS must promote de-dollarisation or develop a common currency to displace the dollar.
    3. The stated reason: A shared currency would require political trust, economic convergence and institutional integration that BRICS does not have.
    4. What the position reveals: Brazil’s engagement with the great powers rests on national interest rather than on ideology, and its payments position is the clearest instance of that.

    How is India’s non-Western position different from an anti-Western one?

    1. The identity claim: The External Affairs Minister has consistently underlined India’s non-Western identity, which rests on India being a post-colonial state and a developing country.
    2. Where the distinction lies: India shares political values with the West. It does not want to become a geopolitical appendage to the United States and Europe.
    3. The record of Western partnership: India’s partnerships with the United States, Europe, Japan and Australia have deepened across trade, technology, defence and diaspora.
    4. Two memberships held at once: Delhi’s participation in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) sits alongside its membership of BRICS.
    5. What makes the forum useful, and what would end that: BRICS is useful to India precisely because of its diversity. It ceases to serve Indian interests if it becomes a China-led alliance against the West.
    6. Why the anti-Western framing is also poor analysis: Delhi knows that Moscow and Beijing, despite their confrontations with Washington, remain interested in negotiating a new balance with it.

    Why are Russia and China not seeking an exit from the Western order?

    1. Russia’s break is structural: Russia’s contradiction with the West is now deep and structural, shaped by the Ukraine war, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) role in European security, and sanctions.
    2. Yet Moscow wants recognition inside it: Russia is also eager for Western recognition as a great power, and for a say in managing European and global security.
    3. What China challenges: China challenges American primacy in Asia, reduces its exposure to Western technology restrictions, and presents BRICS as part of a more representative order.
    4. Why it cannot exit: China’s rise was inseparable from access to Western markets, capital and technology, and it retains strong economic interdependence with the United States.
    5. What Beijing is actually seeking: China is not seeking an exit from the United States led world. It wants to be America’s co-equal in shaping it.

    Where do the newer members and Iran sit on the spectrum?

    1. Egypt: Egypt remains tied to Washington on security.
    2. The United Arab Emirates: The UAE has extensive commercial and strategic links with the United States and Europe.
    3. Indonesia: Indonesia’s “free and active” diplomacy is designed to retain manoeuvring room among the major powers.
    4. What the three have in common: They seek autonomy, closer ties with China and a stronger voice for the Global South. None seeks membership of a unified anti-Western camp.
    5. Iran is the nearest exception: Resistance to the United States and Israel is central to the Islamic Republic’s political identity, and BRICS offers Tehran legitimacy and a means to counter the American effort to isolate it.
    6. Even Iran is not settled internally: Iran’s domestic debate continues to pit advocates of resistance against those favouring diplomacy and reconciliation with the United States.

    Challenges to India’s position that BRICS is non-Western rather than anti-Western

    1. A consensus text is attributed to every signatory: Language agreed with members at the confrontational end of the spectrum is read abroad as the position of all eleven, including the host. Eg. Tariff threats were aimed at every BRICS member over an alleged collective plan against the dollar, not only at the members proposing one.
      The Fix: Insist that any payments or currency language in a declaration name the specific mechanism and its purpose, so a settlement arrangement cannot be read as currency displacement.
    2. The forum has no charter to bound what it commits members to: BRICS has no treaty and no defined competence, so nothing limits the subjects a declaration may cover. Eg. The grouping’s declarations have expanded from development finance into positions on conflicts in West Asia and in Europe.
      The Fix: Adopt a standing framework document defining the forum’s subject areas, so an item outside them needs an explicit decision rather than a paragraph.
    3. Expansion imports the members’ own quarrels: Each admission adds a set of bilateral disputes the forum must now accommodate inside a single text. Eg. Iran and the United Arab Emirates are both members, and the UAE was attacked by Iran during the current war in West Asia.
      The Fix: Handle conflict language through a separate chair’s statement rather than the consensus declaration, so one dispute cannot hold the economic agenda hostage.
    4. Hedging is cheap only while both sides decline to price it: Simultaneous membership of the Quad and of BRICS is sustainable while neither partner charges for it, and a partner that does charge converts India’s balance into a cost. Eg. The tariff round on India last year followed disagreements in trade talks alongside its Russian oil purchases.
      The Fix: Separate India’s BRICS agenda from its security alignments in public terms, so each partner judges a defined economic programme rather than an alignment.

    Conclusion

    The anti-Western reading of BRICS is wrong as description and useful as politics, which is why it survives. It lets a critic in Washington treat eleven different national calculations as one bloc, and it lets a member at the confrontational end claim the weight of the other ten. India’s difficulty is that the second use invites the first, and the forum has no rule that stops either. What to watch is whether the Delhi declaration describes the reform of institutions its members intend to remain inside, or the displacement of an order most of them depend on.

    About BRICS

    1. How it began: The acronym BRIC was coined in 2001 by a Goldman Sachs economist to identify four high growth emerging economies. The first meeting of their foreign ministers took place on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly in 2006.
    2. How it became a summit body: The first formal leaders’ summit was held at Yekaterinburg in Russia in 2009, and South Africa joined in 2011, which gave the grouping its present acronym.
    3. How it expanded: The 2023 Johannesburg summit decided on enlargement. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates joined in 2024 and Indonesia in 2025, with Saudi Arabia’s formal status remaining nuanced.
    4. The partner tier: A “Partner Country” category was introduced in 2024 to engage states such as Malaysia, Thailand and Nigeria without granting full membership.

    Initiatives and Institutions under BRICS

    1. New Development Bank: Established in 2015 and headquartered in Shanghai, it lends for infrastructure and sustainable development in emerging economies, and had approved over $35 billion in infrastructure loans by 2025.
    2. Contingent Reserve Arrangement: A $100 billion fund created in 2015 to provide short term liquidity support to a member under balance of payments pressure.
    3. BRICS Pay: A cross-border payment system in pilot stage, intended to let members settle trade without routing instructions through SWIFT.
    4. Research and technology bodies: The grouping has set up a Vaccine Research and Development Centre for technology transfer, a Partnership on New Industrial Revolution covering artificial intelligence and green technology, and a Space Council created in 2025 to coordinate deep space and lunar research.

    Key Facts about BRICS

    1. Membership: Eleven full members: Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa, Egypt, Ethiopia, Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
    2. Share of population and output: The grouping represents over 45% of the world’s population and accounts for roughly 37% of global GDP measured at purchasing power parity, which is above the G7’s share.
    3. Energy weight: Members together control roughly 42% of global oil production and exports.
    4. How it is organised: BRICS works through an annually rotating chairship, with the chair hosting the leaders’ summit and setting the year’s agenda. Decisions are taken by consensus among all members.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] “BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South.” Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.”

  • India’s BRICS balancing act

    Why in the News

    India is hosting the two day BRICS summit in New Delhi on 12 and 13 September 2026, and treats the grouping as a hedge against the Western economic order rather than a replacement for it. The United States and the European Union remain India’s largest export market and its largest source of investment. The same dependence has become a source of exposure. The United States imposed steep tariffs on India last year amid disagreements in trade deal negotiations, and India’s sovereign decision to purchase Russian oil during the Ukraine war turned it into a target. Tariffs are only the most visible instrument. Patent rules blocked a developing country waiver on vaccines at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, a widening American sanctions regime has repeatedly halted an Indian port project in Iran, and European environment linked trade measures now act as a barrier to Indian exports. India therefore has to reduce reliance on an order it cannot yet do without.

    Why does India treat BRICS as a hedge and not a replacement?

    1. The bloc’s weight has grown: The BRICS share of global gross domestic product (GDP) grew from 17% to 35% between 1995 and 2024, surpassing the G7’s share.
    2. The West still supplies the markets and the capital: The United States and the European Union continue to be India’s largest export market and its largest source of investments.
    3. Western integration built the services sector: Integration with Western economies aided the growth of India’s service sector, which is where most of the new, well paid jobs have been created.
    4. What the hedge could deliver, and when: Expansion of south-south trade, the geographic concentration of critical minerals in the BRICS region and growth in alternative development finance such as the BRICS bank could support India’s growth. None of this is a counter-balance to the Western economic order today, and it could reduce India’s reliance a decade on.
    5. The stated rationale for the hedge: A former Reserve Bank of India (RBI) governor argues that India should treat the emerging international financial architecture around BRICS and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as a “risk mitigant” and a rational response to an ever-expanding sanctions regime.

    What did the TRIPS waiver refusal reveal about patent control?

    1. What was asked for: In October 2020, at the height of the Covid-19 pandemic, India and South Africa sought a waiver of certain provisions of the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement to help developing nations obtain vaccines and other life saving medicines.
    2. What TRIPS is: TRIPS is an international agreement administered by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) that sets minimum standards for protecting intellectual property (IP) in every member country.
    3. Who backed the request: India, South Africa and sixty other developing countries pressed for the waiver.
    4. What happened to it: The developed countries turned the request down.
    5. How the episode is read: A former trade negotiator holds that the failure exposed the danger in an existing patent regime which accords “primacy to patents over patients”.

    How large has the Western sanctions regime become?

    1. The total and the single largest source: A working paper titled ‘Asphyxiation by Sanctions: Harm, Fear and Smog’, written by a former Reserve Bank of India governor, counts 1,325 sanctions imposed globally since 1949, of which 486 were imposed by the United States.
    2. The programmes currently running: The United States currently administers over 30 sanctions programmes, making it responsible for three times as many sanctions as any other country or international body.
    3. When the expansion happened: United States led sanctions jumped in recent decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union.
    4. The second largest sanctioner: The European Union is the second largest sanctioner after the United States.
    5. Trade and financial sanctions grew most: The paper’s decade wise count records financial sanctions rising from 4 in the 1950s to 327 between 2010 and 2022, and trade sanctions from 21 to 209 across the same span.
    6. Travel, military and arms restrictions followed: Travel sanctions rose from 8 to 205 over the same period, military aid sanctions from 1 to 62, and arms sanctions from 7 to 67, so the spectrum has widened from trade measures to military ones.
    7. The reach now includes the messaging layer: Iran and Russia have been removed from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT), the secure global messaging network financial institutions use to transmit payment instructions.
    8. The label the paper applies: The paper calls the United States the “hegemonic sanctioner”.

    What does Chabahar show about sanctions risk to an Indian project?

    1. When it started: India’s plan to develop Chabahar Port in Iran began in 2003.
    2. The first halt: United States sanctions targeting Iran imposed a “hard break” on progress.
    3. The window that opened: The project was revived between 2015 and 2017 after the United States eased sanctions.
    4. The window that closed again: India signed a ten year agreement with Iran to operate and develop the port in 2024, and shortly afterwards the United States again warned of sanctions.
    5. What the sequence shows: The project’s viability tracked United States policy toward a third country rather than the project’s own economics or India’s own decisions.

    Why do BRICS members reject the European Union’s environment linked trade measures?

    1. The measures at issue: The European Union has implemented a range of environment linked trade regimes which act as a barrier to India’s export growth.
    2. The bloc’s stated position: BRICS nations have “condemned and rejected” the European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and similar trade curbs, on the ground that they undermine their transition to a cleaner economy.
    3. The reading Indian trade experts give it: Indian trade experts hold that a trade and climate linkage through regulations such as CBAM is less about protecting the environment and more about promoting the interests of the developed world.
    4. The contrast with the tariff instrument: The United States has been explicit in using tariffs to cut imports from developing nations. The European measure arrives instead as an environmental regulation.

    Challenges to India’s BRICS hedge

    1. The grouping grants no market access: BRICS is not a free trade area and issues no tariff preference, so membership cannot substitute for the export markets the hedge is meant to make India less dependent on. Eg. India’s tariff reductions have come through bilateral agreements such as the one being concluded with the European Union, not through the bloc.
      The Fix: Negotiate a BRICS tariff preference on a narrow list of goods members already trade heavily in, so the grouping delivers a measurable trade gain rather than a declaration.
    2. Alternative development finance is too small to displace anything yet: The financing available through BRICS institutions is a fraction of what India raises from Western markets and from the older multilateral banks. Eg. India’s annual external commercial borrowing exceeds its entire cumulative borrowing from the BRICS bank.
      The Fix: Set a share target for BRICS sourced project finance inside the public capital expenditure plan, so the alternative is used rather than only cited.
    3. Mineral concentration is not the same as mineral access: The critical minerals sit inside the BRICS region and their processing capacity sits largely with one member, so geography does not convert into supply security for India. Eg. China accounts for the majority of global rare earth separation and processing capacity.
      The Fix: Tie offtake agreements with Brazil, South Africa and the Gulf members to refining capacity built in India, so the supply arrives in a processable form.
    4. A hedge invites the retaliation it is meant to insure against: Visible participation in the bloc has itself drawn tariff threats, so the insurance carries a premium paid in the very relationship being hedged. Eg. Tariff threats were directed at BRICS members over the grouping’s “un-American” policies.
      The Fix: Keep India’s BRICS agenda on development finance, payments efficiency and supply chains, and off currency displacement, so the hedge is defensible as economic policy rather than as alignment.

    Conclusion

    India’s position is not a choice between two economic orders. It is a dependence on one while building an option on the other. That option is not yet large enough to price, so every instrument the hedge rests on remains smaller than the exposure it is meant to offset. The cost of the hedge is already being paid in the relationship it insures against. What to watch is whether the Delhi declaration commits to anything carrying a number and a date, since a hedge that produces only text leaves the exposure where it was.

    Back2Basics: Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism

    1. What it is: CBAM is a European Union measure that charges an importer for the greenhouse gas emissions embedded in certain imported goods, set against the carbon price a European producer of the same good already pays.
    2. The goods it covers: It applies to cement, iron and steel, aluminium, fertilisers, electricity and hydrogen, the emission intensive sectors most exposed to import competition.
    3. How it is phased: A transitional phase requiring importers only to report embedded emissions ran from October 2023, and the definitive phase charging for those emissions began in 2026.
    4. India’s stated objection: India treats it as a unilateral trade barrier inconsistent with the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities, since it charges a developing country producer at a developed country’s carbon price.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2019, GS2, 15 marks] “The long-sustained image of India as a leader of the oppressed and marginalised Nations has disappeared on account of its new found role in the emerging global order”. Elaborate.”

  • BRICS Finance Ministers, bank heads flag ‘unilateral imposition’ of tariffs

    Why in the News

    The Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors (FMCBG) of the BRICS countries have issued a joint statement recording “serious concerns with the unilateral imposition” of tariffs and non-tariff measures, on the ground that they distort trade and are inconsistent with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. The statement holds that these pressures weigh most heavily on Emerging Markets and Developing Economies (EMDEs), meaning economies outside the advanced group that depend on external capital and on open export markets. It names no country, and the United States is the only country currently levying extraordinary tariffs on its trade partners. The statement also calls for practical solutions on cross-border payments in local currencies, while recording that national priorities come first and that there is no “one-size-fits-all approach”. The bloc’s diagnosis is therefore collective and its remedy is left to each member to adopt at its own pace.

    What is the FMCBG track within BRICS?

    1. Who it brings together: The FMCBG is the channel through which BRICS members’ finance ministries and central banks meet, separately from the leaders’ summit and from the foreign ministers’ track.
    2. When it met this year: The first FMCBG meeting under India’s chairmanship of BRICS was held on 12 August in Jaipur. The second was held on 9 and 10 September in Mumbai.
    3. What it produces: Its output is a joint statement agreed by every member, issued ahead of the leaders’ summit.

    What did the statement say on tariffs and the trading system?

    1. Two grounds are given, not one: The measures are objected to because they distort trade, and separately because they are inconsistent with WTO rules. The second is a legal claim rather than an economic one.
    2. Non-tariff measures carry equal weight: The objection covers non-tariff measures alongside tariffs, meaning licensing requirements, standards and quotas that restrict imports without a duty being levied.
    3. The remedy sought is the existing system: The ministers reiterated their support for an “open, transparent, inclusive, non-discriminatory, and rules-based” multilateral trading system with the WTO at its core.
    4. The unnamed target limits what the statement can do: A finding that a measure breaks WTO rules carries no consequence until a member brings a dispute against a named respondent.

    What was agreed on cross-border payments and local currencies?

    1. The task force behind it: The statement acknowledges the work of the BRICS Payment Task Force (BPTF) in exploring “pragmatic solutions” for efficient cross-border payment mechanisms.
    2. The specific work acknowledged: The task force has studied the cross-border interoperability of payment and messaging channels, meaning whether one member’s payment system can instruct and settle against another’s.
    3. What local currency settlement covers: The discussions extend to promoting trade settlements and investments using BRICS local currencies, not only retail payments.
    4. The standard the ministers set for it: The task force was encouraged to continue work toward cross-border payments that are “fast, low-cost, more accessible, efficient, transparent, and safe”.

    What else did the ministers take up?

    1. A new task force under India’s chairship: India used its chairship to establish a BRICS Task Force on Growth and Development, as a dedicated platform for the growth and development challenges shared by BRICS and other emerging market and developing economies.
    2. How it is organised: The task force is structured into two workstreams. One covers the Resilience, Innovation and Cooperation pillars, and the other the Sustainability pillar.
    3. What it is meant to do: The ministers recognised it as a space to discuss growth models suited to members’ own national contexts and development priorities, aligned with the workstreams of finance ministries and central banks.
    4. Reform of the lending institutions: The statement also covered the reform of multilateral lending institutions, naming the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

    Challenges to BRICS local currency settlement

    1. Trade imbalances leave one side holding a currency it cannot spend: Settlement in national currencies works where trade between two members is roughly balanced, and a surplus partner otherwise accumulates a currency with no use. Eg. The special rupee vostro accounts opened for Russian oil payments built up rupee balances Russian sellers had limited use for.
      The Fix: Pair each local currency arrangement with an agreed list of goods and assets the surplus balance may be invested in, so the balance has a stated exit.
    2. Convertibility limits sit outside the payment system: A currency that is not fully convertible on the capital account cannot be held freely by a foreign exporter, whatever messaging channel carries the instruction. Eg. The rupee remains subject to capital account restrictions, so a non resident holder needs a specific permitted route for each use of its balance.
      The Fix: Convert the bilateral vostro approvals into a standing settlement facility with defined investment windows, rather than clearing arrangements bank by bank.
    3. Interoperability is a legal problem before it is a technical one: Linking two fast payment systems requires each regulator to accept the other’s customer identification and sanctions screening, which no task force can decide for them. Eg. Each link of the Unified Payments Interface (UPI) with a foreign system has needed its own bilateral arrangement, as with Singapore’s PayNow.
      The Fix: Agree one BRICS standard for customer identification and transaction messaging, so each bilateral link implements a common rulebook instead of negotiating a new one.
    4. Secondary sanctions reach the members’ own banks: A bank settling a transaction for a sanctioned counterparty risks its own dollar clearing access, which is a larger loss than the trade being settled. Eg. Indian banks and refiners curtailed dealings with sanctioned Russian entities even where a rupee route was available.
      The Fix: Route sanctioned trade through designated institutions carrying no dollar clearing exposure, so the risk sits with an entity that has nothing to lose in dollars.
    5. A payment rail does not remove exchange rate risk: Interoperable payments cut transaction cost and leave the currency risk with the trading parties, which is the problem a single unit of account would address. Eg. The task force’s own mandate covers settlement and messaging, and stops short of any common unit of account.
      The Fix: Publish reference rates for the major BRICS currency pairs through a shared platform, so a smaller exporter can price and hedge without routing through the dollar.

    Conclusion

    The bloc has agreed a common description of the problem and has not agreed a common instrument to answer it. On tariffs it asks for the WTO to work as designed, which depends on members it has declined to name. On payments it has commissioned study rather than commitment, and the qualifier protecting national priorities leaves each member to decide how far to go. The leaders meet at the Bharat Mandapam over Saturday and Sunday, and the test of this statement is whether their declaration converts the task force’s study of interoperability into a dated commitment or carries it forward again.

    Back2Basics: the WTO’s Most Favoured Nation rule

    1. What Most Favoured Nation means: Article I of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) requires a member to extend any trade advantage it gives one member to every other member, so it cannot charge different tariffs to different WTO members on the same product.
    2. Bound rates are the second constraint: Article II binds each member’s tariffs to a ceiling recorded in its schedule of concessions, so a duty raised above that ceiling breaches the commitment whether or not it discriminates.
    3. The permitted exceptions: Article XXIV allows a free trade area or a customs union to give its own parties better terms than Most Favoured Nation, and the Enabling Clause allows preferences in favour of developing countries.
    4. Why the rule is hard to enforce now: A breach is established through the WTO’s dispute settlement system, whose Appellate Body has been unable to hear appeals since 2019 because appointments to it have been blocked.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2018, GS2, 15 marks] What are the key areas of reform if the WTO has to survive in the present context of ‘Trade War’, especially keeping in mind the interest of India?”

  • What the recent trajectory of India-China ties means for the summit

    Why in the News

    The Chinese President arrives in India for the BRICS leaders’ summit, his third visit since assuming the presidency and the first after a gap of seven years. The summit is the stated reason for the trip, and its bilateral weight comes from what the visit interrupts, the border standoff that began in eastern Ladakh in 2020 and marked the low point of the relationship, now in its seventh year. Years of diplomatic and military-level talks produced a disengagement of troops in 2024, and a sequence of normalisation steps has followed, from direct flights to eased visas. The structural disputes behind the standoff are untouched by those steps, and the trade deficit and market access questions sit exactly where they did. That fault line, alongside a turbulent global environment, will shape what the summit can agree.

    What is the record of India-China border standoffs?

    1. The two early conflicts: The 1962 war was followed by border clashes in Sikkim in 1967.
    2. The Ladakh standoffs of the last decade: Major standoffs occurred at Depsang in Ladakh in 2013 and at Chumar in Ladakh in 2014.
    3. Doklam: A standoff at Doklam followed in 2017, in a sector away from Ladakh.
    4. Eastern Ladakh since 2020: The standoff that began in eastern Ladakh in 2020 is still ongoing, with about 50,000 Indian troops deployed along the Line of Actual Control, meaning the undelineated line separating the two sides’ positions.
    5. The casualties of June 2020: The clashes of June 2020 killed 20 Indian defence personnel, including an officer of Colonel rank, and at least four Chinese defence personnel.

    What has changed since the 2024 disengagement?

    1. The talks produced a withdrawal: Years of diplomatic and military-level talks led to a disengagement of troops in 2024, and incremental steps have since been taken to stabilise the relationship.
    2. Connectivity restored: Direct flights between the two countries resumed and visa restrictions were eased.
    3. Pilgrimage resumed: The Kailash Mansarovar Yatra was restarted.
    4. Investment rules relaxed: Restrictions on Chinese investments in India were relaxed.
    5. The visit itself is the signal: Travel to India after a seven year gap is read as a positive signal, and only to a degree.

    What has not changed?

    1. The trade imbalance: A massive trade deficit remains the defining feature of the economic relationship.
    2. Market access runs one way: The lack of market access for Indian businesses in China is frequently flagged as an issue.
    3. Enforcement action continues: India is acting against Chinese firms for tax evasion.
    4. Trust is the deeper casualty: Strategic and political trust has been diminished by a border standoff now in its seventh year.
    5. The Pakistan factor deepened it: Collusion between China and Pakistan during Operation Sindoor further worsened the crisis of trust and credibility.

    How far have the founding economies diverged since BRIC was named?

    1. The origin of the label: Goldman Sachs analysts described India, China, Brazil and Russia as the world’s emerging economies in 2001, and BRIC was born as a grouping in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks.
    2. China: It has become the second-largest economy in the world after the United States.
    3. India: It has grown at a modest rate and been outpaced by Beijing.
    4. Russia and Brazil: Russia has faced challenges from wars of its own making, and Brazil has floundered amid frequent regime changes and scandals.
    5. South Africa: A later entrant to the grouping, it has not lived up to expectations.
    6. The 2009 turning point: The first BRICS leaders’ summit was held in the shadow of the global financial crisis, and China emerged from that crisis stronger than many Western nations.

    How does China’s assertiveness show up beyond the border?

    1. Military growth follows economic growth: China has grown militarily, with big-power ambitions to dethrone the United States.
    2. Where the posture is visible: Its increasingly aggressive and assertive stance shows in its neighbourhood, in its actions in the South China Sea, in the Indo-Pacific, and on the borders it shares with India.
    3. India absorbs a disproportionate share: India has faced the brunt of border standoffs frequently, and the belligerence of the Chinese state under the current President has been greater than at any time in the recent past.

    Is BRICS an anti-West grouping or a non-Western one?

    1. The two framings are not the same: China and Russia have attempted to frame BRICS as an “anti-West” grouping, and India sees it as a “non-Western” grouping.
    2. India’s position rules out the first: India has built robust ties with the United States over the last 25 years and is courting Europe, Australia, Canada and other Western nations, so it is decidedly not anti-West.
    3. The dependence is stated plainly: India needs the West for access to capital and technology, and as a destination for its people, more than China or Russia do.
    4. Beijing’s self-placement within the bloc: China has viewed itself as the “first among equals” in the grouping, and long supported enlarging it beyond the original five, which produced the 2023 expansion to the present strength of 11 members.
    5. Western action against members complicates the divide: US tariffs on Brazil and political disagreements with South Africa cut across the distinction the members are arguing over.

    What does the convergence against US tariffs actually buy?

    1. The shared exposure: The US President’s arbitrary tariff moves have cornered countries around the world, including China and India, and the two now find themselves on the same side in attempting to counter the effects.
    2. China’s own position has weakened: After years of high economic growth, China has revised its expectations for the near future.
    3. India’s use of the summit: India is hosting the summit partly to signal to the United States that it has other partners in fields ranging from technology to fuel security.
    4. What those partners supply: The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have been investing in the Indian economy, Russia has stepped in as an energy supplier amid the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and Brazil is ready to partner on critical minerals.

    How has the West Asia war split the grouping?

    1. The sovereignty question it raises: The US war on Iran has raised questions about powerful nations violating the territorial integrity and sovereignty of others, and both China and Russia are guilty of the same in their own neighbourhoods.
    2. The economic cost is common: Energy prices and inflation have risen, and BRICS countries, as part of the Global South, are bearing the brunt.
    3. Members sit on opposite sides of the same war: Iran is attacking US military bases in West Asia, and the United Arab Emirates hosts several US military bases and personnel.
    4. Why this needs China: Moving those two members towards cooperation and presenting a more unified flank requires Chinese weight alongside India’s hosting role.
    5. The scale of attendance raises the stakes: Leaders of over 30 countries and groupings are attending, so a failure to reconcile positions is visible well beyond the membership.

    Challenges to stabilising India-China ties

    1. The trade deficit is structural, not tariff driven: India’s imports are concentrated in the intermediate and capital goods its own manufacturing runs on, so restricting imports raises domestic costs rather than closing the gap. Eg. Active pharmaceutical ingredients, the chemical inputs a finished medicine is made from, are sourced largely from China even as India exports the finished formulations.
      The Fix: Tie the production incentive schemes for bulk drugs and electronic components to measured reductions in import dependence, with the baseline published.
    2. Disengagement is not de-escalation: Withdrawal from friction points leaves the roads, airfields and habitat built up behind the line in place, so force can return faster than it left. Eg. Both sides have retained the forward infrastructure constructed after 2020.
      The Fix: Negotiate a verifiable de-induction of forces and a written restoration of patrolling norms, rather than treating troop separation as settlement.
    3. There is no agreed line to defend: The Line of Actual Control is not delineated on a map both sides accept, so the same patrol is routine to one side and an incursion to the other. Eg. Each side maintains its own claim line across the Depsang plains.
      The Fix: Task the Special Representatives mechanism with a sector-by-sector exchange of maps, beginning with the sectors where no standoff has occurred.
    4. A third country sets the floor under India’s threat assessment: The military supply and intelligence relationship between China and Pakistan means a bilateral understanding does not reduce the threat India plans against. Eg. Chinese-origin platforms form the bulk of Pakistan’s recent fighter and naval inductions.
      The Fix: Keep the normalisation track and the security track formally separate and say so publicly, so trade and travel measures are not treated as concessions on security.
    5. Economic opening is being restored without reciprocity: Relaxing investment rules restores Chinese capital’s access to India without restoring Indian firms’ access to the Chinese market. Eg. Press Note 3 of 2020 required government approval for investment from countries sharing a land border with India, and its relaxation is not matched by a Chinese commitment.
      The Fix: Make each relaxation sector specific and conditional on a named market access commitment of comparable value.

    Conclusion

    The visit restores high level contact without touching what caused its absence. India and China now share an exposure to US trade measures, and shared exposure produces a common grievance more readily than a common position, since each retains the option of settling separately with Washington. The unresolved tension is that India needs Chinese weight to hold the grouping together on trade and energy, and needs the grouping not to be read as anti-Western, which is the framing Beijing prefers. What to watch is whether the summit declaration carries a joint position on unilateral trade measures, and whether the normalisation sequence extends from travel and pilgrimage to market access, which is the test of whether anything structural has moved.

    Back2Basics: Operation Sindoor

    1. What it was: Indian military strikes in May 2025 on terrorist infrastructure located in Pakistan and in Pakistan-occupied Jammu and Kashmir.
    2. What prompted it: It followed the April 2025 attack on tourists at Pahalgam in Jammu and Kashmir.
    3. How it ended: Several days of exchanges across the border were followed by an understanding between the two militaries to stop military action.
    4. Why it appears in an India-China item: Chinese support to Pakistan during those exchanges is cited as having deepened India’s trust deficit with China, separately from the border dispute.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2017, GS2, 10 marks] ‘China is using its economic relations and positive trade surplus as tools to develop potential military power status in Asia’, In the light of this statement, discuss its impact on India as her neighbor.”

  • India and EU close to sealing trade deal, await nod from top Council in Brussels

    Why in the News

    The European Commission has forwarded its proposal for the conclusion of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between the European Union (EU) and India to the European Council, the step that immediately precedes signature. The Commission is the EU’s main executive body and proposes the trade legislation. The European Council, comprising the heads of state or government of the 27 member states along with its own President and the President of the Commission, takes the final decision on authorising signature. On authorisation this becomes the largest trade agreement either side has concluded, eliminating or reducing tariffs on 96 per cent of EU goods exports to India and securing market access for more than 99 per cent of India’s exports to the EU by trade value. Signature is not conclusion, since the European Parliament’s consent and India’s own internal ratification both remain. The agreement also answers a problem neither side names in its text, which is that both import most of their industrial inputs from China.

    How does an EU trade agreement get approved?

    1. The Commission negotiates and proposes: The European Commission conducts the negotiation and then proposes the legislation for concluding the agreement.
    2. The Council authorises signature: The European Council defines the general political direction and priorities of the EU, and its members take the final decision on whether the agreement is signed.
    3. Parliament’s consent follows signature: The agreement then requires the consent of the European Parliament before conclusion and entry into force.
    4. India ratifies in parallel: Indian authorities are going through their own internal ratification procedures at the same time.

    What is the existing size of the relationship?

    1. Current trade: The EU and India already trade over Euro 180 billion worth of goods and services a year, with one Euro equal to about US $1.16.
    2. Employment on the EU side: That trade supports close to 800,000 EU jobs.
    3. What the agreement would be: On authorisation it would be the largest trade agreement ever concluded by either the EU or India.

    What does the agreement give the EU?

    1. Tariff elimination on almost all its goods: Tariffs on 96 per cent of EU goods exports to India would be eliminated or reduced.
    2. The value of the duty relief: The reductions would save around Euro 4 billion a year in duties on European products.
    3. Competitive position in the Indian market: European companies would find it easier to access the Indian market and to compete on a more level playing field.
    4. The consumer side: Indian consumers would gain increased choice and more competitive prices.

    What does the agreement give India?

    1. Near total market access for goods: It would secure market access for more than 99 per cent of India’s exports to the EU by trade value.
    2. Services and the movement of professionals: It unlocks high-value commitments in services, complemented by a comprehensive mobility framework enabling the movement of skilled Indian professionals.
    3. The labour-intensive sectors it targets: Textiles, apparel, leather, footwear, marine products, gems and jewellery, handicrafts, engineering goods and automobiles are named as the gainers.
    4. The immediate tariff effect: Tariffs of up to 10 per cent on almost $33 billion of Indian exports fall to zero on the agreement’s entry into force.

    Why did the two sides restart negotiations in 2022?

    1. China’s trade surplus was the trigger: A key reason for reopening talks in 2022 was China’s growing trade surplus with both partners.
    2. Both import their industrial inputs from the same source: The EU and India each import most of their industrial requirements from China, and Beijing’s tightening grip on manufacturing supply chains is reflected in its record trade surplus, which trade friction with the United States has not reduced.
    3. Both are restricting Chinese goods in strategic sectors: Brussels imposed tariffs of up to 35 per cent on Chinese electric vehicles in 2024, and India continues to levy over 100 per cent duty on automobiles imported from China, and is opening the sector to developed countries through trade agreements.
    4. The dependence has been assessed and not removed: A 2025 report by the Delhi Policy Group found both India and the EU still significantly dependent on China.
    5. The pandemic changed the calculation: The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 exposed the vulnerability of China-centric supply chains, prompting both to reassess dependencies and to pursue diversification and de-risking.

    What pressure is the United States applying to both sides?

    1. The stated objective: India and the EU are both under US pressure to reduce dependence on Chinese products and to avoid being used as transhipment hubs.
    2. Indian manufacturing clusters named: A US report last month described several global manufacturing city clusters as “ugly sister” cities, including the Pune-Gujarat-Chennai industrial corridor, and stated that the United States loses when these hubs win.
    3. The argument it makes: The report held that the longer the system operates unchecked, the harder it becomes to restore lost industrial capacity, and that illegal transhipment hubs will continue to siphon off American manufacturing one product line at a time.

    Challenges to the India-EU free trade agreement

    1. A carbon levy sits outside the tariff schedule: The EU’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, a charge on the embedded carbon of an imported good, applies irrespective of the tariff concessions granted. Eg. It covers iron and steel, aluminium, cement, fertilisers, electricity and hydrogen, with the definitive charge beginning in 2026.
      The Fix: Agree mutual recognition of India’s carbon pricing under its Carbon Credit Trading Scheme, so a charge paid in India is set off at the EU border.
    2. Deforestation rules add a traceability duty to a tariff cut: The EU Deforestation Regulation requires geolocation of the plot of production for listed commodities, which a smallholder supply chain cannot document. Eg. Coffee, cocoa, rubber, soy, palm oil, cattle and wood are covered by it.
      The Fix: Fund plot-level geolocation through the commodity boards, so the compliance cost does not fall on the individual grower.
    3. Rules of origin decide who actually uses a zero duty: A concession is usable only where the product clears the value addition test, and an export assembled from imported inputs may not. Eg. Electronics assembled in India from imported components can fail a threshold that garments made from Indian fabric clear comfortably.
      The Fix: Agree cumulation, so inputs sourced from the partner count as originating and the concession reaches assembled goods.
    4. Ratification is a sequence, not a decision: Council authorisation and Parliament consent are separate steps, and an agreement classed as mixed can additionally require ratification by each member state. Eg. The EU’s agreement with Mercosur concluded negotiations in 2019 and remained outside force for years afterwards.
      The Fix: Split the text so the trade chapters enter into force on Parliament’s consent, with investment protection carried in a separate instrument.
    5. Non-tariff measures bind harder than tariffs in food trade: Sanitary and phytosanitary limits decide whether a consignment enters at all, and a zero tariff does nothing for a rejected shipment. Eg. Indian marine and food consignments face EU rejections on antibiotic residue and aflatoxin limits.
      The Fix: Agree recognition of testing by notified Indian laboratories, so a consignment is certified once at origin rather than retested at the border.

    Conclusion

    The text is settled and the decision has moved from negotiators to governments. Three gates remain in sequence: authorisation by the Council, consent of the European Parliament, and India’s internal ratification, and the concessions take effect only at entry into force. Those concessions are also the part of the agreement least likely to decide its value, since the measures that actually restrict Indian exports operate through carbon, deforestation and food safety rules that no tariff schedule touches. What to watch is the Council’s authorisation decision, and whether the agreement is classed as a mixed agreement, which would add ratification by every member state to the path.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2010] In the context of bilateral trade negotiations between India and European Union, what is the difference between European commission and European Council? 1. European Commission represents the EU in trade negotiations whereas European Council participated in the legislation of matters pertaining to economic policies of the European Union 2. European Commission comprises the heads of State of govt. of member countries whereas the European Council comprises of the persons nominated by European Parliament Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) Both 1 and 2 (d) Neither 1 nor 2 ANSWER: (d)”

  • 9th ASEAN India Ministerial Meeting reaffirms commitment to food security and resilient value chains [Dossier]

    PIB class: Press Release. Ministry: Ministry of Agriculture and Farmers Welfare.

    Why in News

    The 9th ASEAN India Ministerial Meeting on agriculture reaffirmed commitment to food security, sustainable agriculture and resilient value chains.

    Core facts

    1. The forum: ASEAN is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, a ten member regional grouping. India is a dialogue partner and a strategic partner of ASEAN.
    2. Stated themes: Food security, sustainable agriculture and resilient agricultural value chains formed the agenda of the ministerial meeting.
    3. Figures and specific deliverables: Not verifiable this run and therefore omitted.

    Static Context

    1. ASEAN was established in 1967 through the Bangkok Declaration. Its members are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
    2. India ASEAN relations run through a structured framework. India joined as a sectoral dialogue partner in 1992 and a full dialogue partner in 1996. The relationship became a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2022.
    3. The ASEAN India Trade in Goods Agreement is under review. Agriculture cooperation runs through a rolling plan of action agreed by the two sides.
    4. Food security cooperation links to India’s Act East Policy. It ties agriculture trade to India’s wider Indo Pacific engagement.

    Prelims angle

    ASEAN founding year 1967 and the Bangkok Declaration. The ten members. India’s status as a Comprehensive Strategic Partner since 2022. India ASEAN connectivity projects such as the Kaladan Multi Modal Transit Transport Project and the India Myanmar Thailand Trilateral Highway.

    Mains angle

    GS2, regional groupings affecting India’s interests. Agriculture and food security cooperation as a pillar of the Act East Policy and of India’s Indo Pacific strategy.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] Which of the following connectivity projects is/are a part of cooperation between India and the ASEAN member countries? 1. Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project 2. IMT Trilateral Highway 3. Agartala-Akhaura Rail Line (a) 1 and 2 (b) 2 and 3 (c) 1 and 3 (d) 2 only. Answer: (a)”

  • BRICS [PIB Backgrounder]

    PIB class: PIB Backgrounder. Unit: PIB feature unit.

    Why in News

    PIB published a thematic Backgrounder on BRICS, the intergovernmental grouping.

    Core facts (static, definitional)

    1. BRICS is an intergovernmental grouping. The founding members are Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
    2. Origin: The term BRIC began as an economic grouping in 2006. South Africa joined in 2010, making it BRICS.
    3. Expansion: The grouping admitted new members from January 2024. Indonesia became a full member in January 2025 and is the first Southeast Asian state in the bloc.
    4. Institutions: The New Development Bank (NDB) finances infrastructure and sustainable development projects. The Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) is a currency swap framework for balance of payments support.

    Static Context

    1. The New Development Bank (NDB) was established in 2015 and is headquartered in Shanghai. Founding members subscribed equal capital, so no single member dominates its voting.
    2. The Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) is a treaty based safety net. It lets members access foreign currency during short term liquidity pressure.
    3. BRICS positions itself as a voice of the Global South. It presses for reform of the United Nations Security Council and of the Bretton Woods institutions.
    4. The 16th BRICS Summit was held at Kazan, Russia in 2024 under the Russian chairship. Its theme concerned strengthening multilateralism for just global development and security.

    Prelims angle

    Founding versus new members. The NDB headquarters at Shanghai and its equal capital structure. The CRA as a swap arrangement. Latest summit host and chair. Indonesia as the first Southeast Asian member.

    Mains angle

    GS2, global groupings affecting India’s interests. BRICS as a counterweight in global governance and a platform for the Global South, weighed against internal divergence among members.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025] Consider the following statements with regard to BRICS: I. The 16th BRICS Summit was held under the Chairship of Russia in Kazan. II. Indonesia has become a full member of BRICS. III. The theme of the 16th BRICS Summit was Strengthening Multiculturalism for Just Global Development and Security. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) I and II (b) II and III (c) I and III (d) I only. Answer: (a)”

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South. Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.”

  • The challenges for BRICS

    Why in the News

    India hosts the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi on 12 and 13 September, twenty years after the grouping was formalised in 2006. The grouping now accounts for a larger share of world output than the G7 and has grown from four members to eleven. Expansion has made agreement harder rather than easier. The foreign ministers’ meeting earlier in 2026 closed without a joint declaration after two members on opposite sides of an active conflict clashed. The economic project shows the same gap, with the idea of a single BRICS currency shelved in favour of settling bilateral trade in national currencies.

    How did BRICS grow from a four country dialogue into an eleven member bloc?

    1. Origin in a growth forecast: BRIC began in 2006 with Brazil, Russia, India and China, following a Goldman Sachs projection identifying these economies as future engines of global growth.
    2. From ministers to leaders: The format moved from a foreign ministers’ dialogue to a leaders’ forum, and the first summit was held at Yekaterinburg in Russia in 2009.
    3. First enlargement: South Africa joined in 2010, and the grouping took its present name.
    4. Second enlargement: Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were added in 2024, and Indonesia became the eleventh full member in January 2025.

    How does BRICS now compare with the G7 in economic weight?

    1. The position in 2000: The four original members together accounted for roughly 23% of global GDP on a purchasing power parity (PPP) basis, which compares economies using what a currency actually buys at home rather than at market exchange rates. The G7 held nearly 52%.
    2. The position in 2024: The eleven member grouping accounted for approximately 36.8% of global GDP (PPP), and the G7 share fell below 29%.
    3. Growth differential: BRICS economies are projected to grow by an average 3.8% in 2025 and 3.7% in 2026, more than three times the G7 average.
    4. Prosperity tells a different story: Per capita GDP averages around $53,000 in the G7 against roughly $8,200 in BRICS.
    5. What drives the aggregate: The bloc’s weight comes from population and resource scale rather than from individual prosperity.

    Why has the grouping’s original grievance survived twenty years?

    1. The founding complaint: Global institutions have not kept pace with the redistribution of economic and political power.
    2. What the first summit asked for: Reform of the international financial institutions and of the United Nations, greater energy security, and a more democratic multipolar world order.
    3. Still unmet: Those demands remain the grouping’s central agenda two decades later, which is why an economic forum has turned into a geopolitical one presenting itself as a voice of the Global South.

    What does BRICS do for India’s strategy of multi alignment?

    1. Membership without alliance: India participates simultaneously in BRICS, the G20, the Quad and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) without accepting alliance commitments.
    2. The purpose of that spread: Multi alignment rests on strategic autonomy and is about creating room for manoeuvre rather than choosing between competing power centres.
    3. The grouping is not anti Western by origin: BRICS emerged during an early phase of convergence between India and the United States on strategic questions.
    4. India’s institutional contribution: India proposed a development bank at the 2012 New Delhi summit, and that proposal became the New Development Bank (NDB).
    5. What the bank has done: By mid 2026 the NDB had approved approximately $44 billion across 141 projects.

    What divides the members over what BRICS is for?

    1. The Chinese and Russian reading: Both increasingly position the grouping as a counterweight to Western dominance and a platform to challenge United States led institutions and the dollar’s hegemony.
    2. Beijing’s stake in size: China drove the enlargement, treating a larger grouping as a vehicle to project leadership of the Global South.
    3. Moscow’s stake in survival: Excluded from the SWIFT messaging network that banks use to send cross border payment instructions, and facing sweeping sanctions, Russia treats BRICS as an economic lifeline.
    4. The Indian and Brazilian reading: Both view BRICS primarily as an economic and reform oriented grouping.
    5. Where the divergence became explicit: Russia demanded in 2023 that India pay for oil in yuan, and India refused, insisting on dollars or rupees only.

    Why has expansion made consensus harder to reach?

    1. The visible fault line: The BRICS Foreign Ministers’ meeting in New Delhi in May 2026 failed to agree on a joint declaration.
    2. What caused the breakdown: Two member states on opposite sides of an active conflict, Iran and the UAE, confronted each other directly.
    3. What the chair issued instead: India recorded a chair’s statement acknowledging “differing views among some members regarding the situation in West Asia”.
    4. The structural point: BRICS operates on consensus, and every added member adds another veto on any text touching a geopolitical crisis.

    What has replaced the idea of a single BRICS currency?

    1. The currency idea is shelved: The United States President has threatened 100% tariffs on BRICS nations if they created a new currency or backed another currency to replace the dollar, and a single BRICS currency has largely been dropped.
    2. Bilateral settlement instead: Members have moved to settling trade in national currencies, a decentralised route that needs no common institution. Russia and China now settle over 90% of their bilateral trade in ruble and yuan.
    3. The India cases: Roughly 90% of direct payments between Russia and India have moved to national currencies through Special Rupee Vostro Accounts, which are rupee accounts that a foreign bank holds with an Indian bank, authorised by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). India has run a rupee and dirham settlement system with the UAE since July 2023 and a rupee and rupiah framework with Indonesia since July 2026.
    4. A payments layer, not a currency: BRICS Pay, to be unveiled at the 2026 summit, links national payment rails including Russia’s SPFS, China’s CIPS, India’s UPI and Brazil’s Pix, so members can settle trade without routing through dollar correspondent banks.
    5. India’s own preference: India pushes interoperable central bank digital currencies (CBDCs), meaning sovereign digital money that can move across systems, rather than a supranational currency.

    How far has the dollar’s position actually weakened?

    1. Reserve holdings barely moved: The dollar still accounted for 57.13% of global central bank reserves in the first quarter of 2026.
    2. No member is building an alternative reserve: No BRICS member is accumulating rupee, yuan or rand reserves at meaningful scale.
    3. The Western assessment: Western countries treat the grouping not as an immediate replacement for the existing international order, but as a platform capable of gradually reshaping the distribution of geopolitical power.

    Challenges to BRICS

    1. No permanent secretariat or charter: The grouping has no treaty, no standing staff and no institutional memory, so follow up on a summit commitment depends on whichever member holds the rotating chair. Eg. Implementation is tracked through each chair’s own sherpa arrangements rather than by a standing body.
      The Fix: Create a small permanent secretariat with a published implementation review against each summit declaration.
    2. Unsettled disputes between members cap cooperation: India and China remain in an unresolved boundary dispute, which limits how far either will accept the other’s leadership of the bloc. Eg. The Galwan Valley clash of 2020 froze wider cooperation between the two for years.
      The Fix: Ring fence bilateral disputes into a separate channel so bloc business is not suspended whenever a member pair falls out.
    3. The bank depends on the market it wants to bypass: The NDB raises much of its capital in dollar markets, so lending to a sanctioned member threatens its own credit standing and funding cost. Eg. The bank suspended new transactions in Russia in 2022 to protect its market access.
      The Fix: Expand local currency lending and local currency bond issuance so project finance does not rest on dollar funding.
    4. Enlargement without an entry standard: Membership now spans oil exporters, sanctioned economies and aid recipients with little shared trade interest, which weakens any common negotiating position. Eg. Argentina abandoned its accession after being invited to join in 2023.
      The Fix: Publish objective accession criteria covering intra bloc trade share and acceptance of the reform agenda before any further enlargement.

    Conclusion

    BRICS has accumulated weight faster than it has accumulated agreement. Its economic case is largely settled and its political case is not. The marker to watch at the New Delhi summit is whether the chair closes with a text every member has signed or with a statement of its own. A second marker is whether the payments platform moves from launch to measurable settlement volume, since that is where the grouping’s stated ambition meets the actual behaviour of its members.

    Back2Basics: New Development Bank

    1. Founding instrument: The bank was established by an agreement signed at the 2014 BRICS summit in Fortaleza, Brazil, and began operations in 2015.
    2. Headquarters: It is based in Shanghai, with its first regional office in Johannesburg.
    3. Voting design: The five founding members hold equal shareholding, unlike the weighted voting used in the Bretton Woods institutions.
    4. Membership beyond the founders: Bangladesh, the UAE, Egypt and Algeria have been admitted as members, so the bank’s membership is wider than the grouping itself.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] “BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South.” Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.”