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Subject: International Relations

  • ‘Has no legal basis’: India rejects Pakistan-China ‘boundary commission’

    Why in the News

    The Ministry of External Affairs has rejected the boundary joint commission constituted by Pakistan and China. Its stated ground is that the body has no legal basis to decide on arrangements related to Indian territory under illegal occupation. The rejection followed the first meeting of the Pakistan-China Boundary Joint Commission in Islamabad. India holds that it has never recognised the China-Pakistan Boundary Agreement of 1963, under which Pakistan handed over the Shaksgam Valley to China, and treats that agreement as illegal and invalid. The Ministry restated that the Union Territories of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh are integral and inalienable parts of India, and called on Pakistan to vacate the areas under its illegal occupation. The tension is that a standing commission gives institutional form to a transfer India treats as void, while India’s non-recognition changes nothing about who administers the ground.

    What is the 1963 China-Pakistan Boundary Agreement?

    1. What it did: The agreement demarcated a boundary between China and the part of Kashmir under Pakistan’s control. Pakistan ceded about 5,180 sq km of the Shaksgam Valley, north of the Siachen region, to China.
    2. India’s legal objection: India holds that Pakistan has no sovereignty over the territory and therefore no capacity to transfer any part of it. On that reasoning there is no boundary between Pakistan and China at all.
    3. The agreement’s own provisional clause: The 1963 text itself records that the boundary is provisional, and provides for renegotiation with the sovereign authority once the Kashmir dispute is settled. Both signatories therefore acknowledged on the face of the document that the question of title was open.

    What exactly did India object to?

    1. Denial of a boundary: India’s position is that no boundary exists between Pakistan and China, so no commission can be constituted to administer one. The objection goes to the existence of the subject matter, not to the commission’s composition or procedure.
    2. Rejection of legitimisation attempts: India stated that it resolutely opposes attempts to alter the status of the occupied territories or to legitimise illegal occupation. Any so-called boundary cooperation between China and Pakistan concerning Indian territories would have no bearing whatsoever on India’s sovereignty.
    3. Demand for vacation: India called on Pakistan to immediately vacate the areas under its illegal and forcible occupation, rather than engage in such proceedings. The demand converts the rejection from a protest into a stated precondition.
    4. Consistency as the argument: India framed its position as clear and consistent rather than as a new response. Consistency is itself the legal point, since acquiescence over time is what would weaken a non-recognition claim.

    Why does the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor feature in this objection?

    1. Route through occupied territory: India has opposed the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the flagship connectivity and energy project linking Xinjiang to Gwadar port, because part of it passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK). The objection is territorial rather than commercial.
    2. Infrastructure as evidence of control: Roads, power projects and administrative arrangements built along a disputed alignment create facts on the ground and a record of undisturbed use. A boundary commission performs the same function in legal form that the corridor performs in physical form.
    3. Link to the wider connectivity initiative: CPEC is the leading component of China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which India has declined to join on sovereignty grounds. India stayed away from the Belt and Road Forum held in Beijing in May 2017 for that reason.

    Challenges to India’s non-recognition position

    1. Non-recognition does not alter control: China has administered the Shaksgam Valley since 1963 and India’s objection has produced no change in possession. Eg. India’s sustained objection to CPEC since 2017 has not slowed construction along the corridor.
      The Fix: Pair the legal position with continued infrastructure and force posture development on the Indian side of the Siachen and Karakoram sector, so the claim is backed by presence.
    2. Institutional practice accumulates over time: A commission that meets periodically builds a documented record of bilateral practice that third parties may treat as settled. Eg. The 1963 agreement itself has been treated as operative for over six decades despite its own provisional clause.
      The Fix: Record a formal protest after each meeting of the commission, so the record shows continuous objection rather than a single statement.
    3. No forum adjudicates the claim: No international court or tribunal has jurisdiction over the question without the consent of all parties, and neither China nor Pakistan will give it. Eg. India has consistently treated Jammu and Kashmir as a bilateral matter and declined third party adjudication.
      The Fix: Build the position into bilateral and plurilateral documents India signs, so partners record the Indian claim rather than staying silent on it.
    4. Two front linkage in the same sector: The valley sits adjacent to the Siachen region, so Chinese presence there connects the Pakistan front and the China front in one theatre. Eg. The Siachen Glacier has been held by Indian forces since Operation Meghdoot in April 1984, at high cost in men and logistics.
      The Fix: Treat the northern Ladakh sector as a single operational theatre in planning, rather than as two separate bilateral borders.

    Conclusion

    India’s rejection restates a position of long standing, and it is the institutional form of the Pakistan-China arrangement that is new. A commission that sits, meets and records outcomes is an attempt to convert a contested transfer into ordinary bilateral administration. The next marker is whether the commission acquires a schedule of meetings and published outcomes, since a body that meets once is a statement and a body that meets regularly is a practice.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is viewed as a cardinal subset of China’s larger ‘One Belt One Road’ initiative. Give a brief description of CPEC and enumerate the reasons why India has distanced itself from the same.”

  • The 1991 treaty violated by Pak ship that collided with Indian vessel

    Why in the News

    A Pakistani ship closed on an Indian Navy vessel and collided with it in international waters. India has summoned Pakistan’s Charge d’Affaires over the conduct and placed it in direct contravention of Article 10 of the 1991 Agreement between India and Pakistan on Advance Notice on Military Exercises, Manoeuvres and Troop Movements. Article 10 bars naval ships and submarines of the two countries from closing within three nautical miles of each other while operating in international waters. The last comparable episode was in 2011, when the Pakistan Navy ship PNS Babur brushed past the Indian Navy frigate INS Godavari in the Gulf of Aden and damaged the frigate’s helicopter safety net. The contested point is whether a set of confidence building measures written in the late 1980s and early 1990s still restrains conduct at sea, when the only consequence of a breach is a diplomatic protest.

    What is the 1991 Agreement on Advance Notice on Military Exercises, Manoeuvres and Troop Movements?

    1. Purpose: The agreement establishes a standing mechanism for the two countries to inform each other about military exercises and troop movements. Its stated object is to prevent a crisis arising from a misreading of the other side’s intentions.
    2. Scope: It lays down rules for the land, naval and air forces of both countries. Major exercises close to the other’s territory are to be avoided, and where they take place the other party is to be informed.
    3. Naval threshold: A major naval exercise is defined as one involving six or more ships of destroyer or frigate size and above, exercising in company and crossing into the other country’s Exclusive Economic Zone (the maritime belt extending up to 200 nautical miles from the baseline, over which a coastal State holds resource rights).
    4. Article 10: Naval ships and submarines of the two countries are not to close less than three nautical miles from each other in international waters, so as to avoid an accident. One nautical mile is about 1.85 km.

    Why did the two countries build this agreement when they did?

    1. Nuclear weapons programmes: Accelerating weapons work on both sides through the 1980s raised the cost of any war to a level neither government could absorb. That escalation is what made a standing notification mechanism attractive to both.
    2. Soviet invasion of Afghanistan: The December 1979 invasion made Pakistan and the United States keen to avoid disturbance on Pakistan’s eastern border with India. Pakistan’s western commitment created the space for an eastern arrangement.
    3. Exercise Brass Tacks IV: India carried out a massive military exercise in Punjab and Rajasthan along the India-Pakistan border in January 1987, mobilising some 150,000 troops. The scale of the exercise alarmed Pakistan and produced the specific demand for advance notice that the 1991 treaty answers.
    4. Clarification rights: The agreement allows either side to seek clarification on the assembly of forces, and on the direction, extent and duration of an exercise. That right is the operative response to the uncertainty Brass Tacks IV created.

    What else does the confidence building architecture of this period contain?

    1. Joint commission, 1983: The Agreement for the establishment of a joint commission between India and Pakistan was signed on 10 March 1983. It was the first of the structured bilateral mechanisms of this phase.
    2. Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities, 1988: Finalised on 31 December 1988, it bars each country from attacking the other’s nuclear installations. The two sides exchange lists of their nuclear installations every 1 January, and that exchange has continued without a break since 1992.
    3. Cultural Cooperation Agreement, 1988: Signed on the same day as the nuclear installations agreement. It shows the period’s approach of pairing a military restraint measure with a civilian one.
    4. Agreement on Prevention of Air Space Violations, 1991: Signed on 6 April 1991, the same day as the advance notice agreement, it also permits over flights and landings by military aircraft. Air and land restraint were therefore settled together, and the naval rule sits inside the same package.

    What does the recurrence of naval incidents show about the agreement’s reach?

    1. Long gap between incidents: The previous close quarters episode was in 2011 in the Gulf of Aden, far from either country’s coast. The rule has held for long stretches, which is why each breach is treated as a signal rather than as routine.
    2. Distance from the exercise framework: Both incidents occurred during ordinary deployments, not during a notified major exercise. The agreement’s notification machinery is built for planned exercises and does not reach the day to day operations where contact actually happens.
    3. Response limited to protest: India’s recorded response in both cases was a diplomatic communication. No joint inquiry, shared navigational record or agreed finding of fault follows a breach.

    Challenges to the 1991 Agreement

    1. No verification or monitoring machinery: The agreement provides for notification and for clarification on request, and creates no inspection body or joint verification procedure. Eg. Neither side produced an agreed account of the 2011 PNS Babur and INS Godavari incident, which closed without a finding.
      The Fix: Attach a standing naval point of contact on each side with a fixed timeline for exchanging navigational data after a close quarters incident.
    2. No incidents at sea instrument: Article 10 fixes a separation distance and prescribes nothing about signalling, manoeuvring or harassment at close range. Eg. The United States and the Soviet Union addressed exactly these behaviours through the Incidents at Sea Agreement of 1972, which India and Pakistan have no equivalent of.
      The Fix: Negotiate a dedicated incidents at sea agreement covering signalling procedure and prohibited manoeuvres, separate from the exercise notification framework.
    3. Dependence on the political climate: Each measure in this architecture survives only while the wider relationship permits it, and none carries a self executing renewal. Eg. The composite dialogue that carried most bilateral confidence building work has been suspended for extended periods after terror attacks.
      The Fix: Insulate the technical measures from the political dialogue by giving the military to military channels their own standing mandate.
    4. Silence on non-state and hybrid activity: The instruments of this period address regular forces and declared exercises, and say nothing about maritime infiltration, unattributed vessels or fishing fleet incidents. Eg. The 26 November 2008 Mumbai attackers reached the city by sea after hijacking a fishing trawler.
      The Fix: Extend the notification framework to a maritime incident register covering non-naval vessels operating in the other country’s declared zones.
    5. Asymmetry in the dispute settlement route: A breach produces a summons, and the agreement names no arbiter, no penalty and no suspension clause. Eg. India’s protest in the present case ends with the summons, whatever the outcome of the collision.
      The Fix: Provide for a joint review at the level of the two naval headquarters within a fixed period of any reported breach of Article 10.

    Conclusion

    The 1991 Agreement remains in force, and both navies continue to operate in the same international waters. India’s response has stopped at a summons, which is the whole of what the instrument provides. The gap the collision exposes is procedural rather than political: the two countries have a rule on separation at sea and no shared means of establishing what happened when it is broken. What to watch is whether the exchange of nuclear installation lists due on the next 1 January proceeds as usual, since that is the one measure of this architecture that has run unbroken and is the readiest indicator of whether the rest still holds.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Terrorist activities and mutual distrust have clouded India-Pakistan relations. To what extent the use of soft power like sports and cultural exchanges could help generate goodwill between the two countries? Discuss with suitable examples.”

  • China’s open AI advantage may not last forever

    China’s open AI advantage may not last forever

    Why in the News

    Indian startups are rebuilding their products on Chinese open weight foundation models, with Qwen, DeepSeek and Kimi delivering large cost savings and lagging the American frontier by about six months. Reporting from July 2026 records Indian companies increasingly switching to Chinese large language models (LLMs) to contain Artificial Intelligence (AI) costs, with startups cutting costs by an order of magnitude. This open weight release is neither charity nor a workaround for chip export controls, and rests on five reinforcing logics that make the strategy durable. The tension is that durable is not permanent, and the assessment set out here is that China will begin graduating access to its frontier open weight models around late 2028.

    What is an open weight model?

    1. What is released: The trained parameters of the model are published, so anyone can download the model and run it on their own hardware.
    2. How it differs from an interface: A proprietary model is reached through an interface the provider controls, and the provider can price it, restrict it or withdraw it. A downloaded model keeps working whatever the provider later decides.
    3. What it enables: The holder can fine tune the model on its own data and modify its behaviour, which a provider controlled interface does not permit.
    4. Why the distinction is strategic: The choice between the two forms decides whether capability sits with the user or with the supplier.

    How far have Indian firms moved onto Chinese models?

    1. Products rebuilt on Chinese foundations: Indian startups are constructing their products on Qwen, DeepSeek and Kimi rather than on American frontier models.
    2. Performance is close enough: These models run almost as well as the American frontier and trail it by roughly six months, which is within tolerance for most commercial applications.
    3. The cost difference is not marginal: One venture investor cited startups cutting costs by an order of magnitude, which changes what is affordable rather than trimming a bill.
    4. The switch is deliberate: The stated reason for the move is cost containment rather than any assessment of capability.

    What are the five logics behind China’s open weight strategy?

    1. Cost: DeepSeek trained its R1 model for $294,000, a fraction of what American frontier laboratories incur, with distillation from American models and architectural efficiency breakthroughs compressing research spending.
    2. Prestige: DeepSeek’s January 2025 release wiped roughly a trillion dollars off American technology stocks, and open weighting has since been converted into diplomacy through the 29 country World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization (WAICO) bloc and 5,000 training slots offered to developing countries.
    3. Commoditisation: American laboratories monetise proprietary weights, so free models good enough for most commercial work attack their pricing power. Chinese firms need not beat the competing product, only destroy the ability to charge for it.
    4. Capital: Financial repression traps household savings in state banks that lend cheaply to strategic sectors, producing the same subsidisation and overcapacity that flattened the global solar and electric vehicle markets. In AI it produced 820 LLMs registered with China’s cyberspace authority by early 2026.
    5. Infrastructure: Free models drive adoption, which drives demand for the complementary products China dominates in energy, cloud and physical infrastructure. Alibaba’s cloud revenue grew 34 percent year on year while it gave Qwen away.

    What conditions would make Beijing close the gates?

    1. The consultation is already under way: Chinese regulators led by the Ministry of Commerce have been consulting Alibaba, Bytedance and Zhipu on limiting the transfer of training data abroad and on whether foreign users should continue to freely download model weights.
    2. Consolidation: Beijing can coordinate five firms and cannot coordinate 800, and the state news agency has announced the shift from the “Hundred Model War” to the “Top Five Basic Models”. American export controls, by raising costs for Chinese laboratories, are accelerating the very consolidation that makes restriction feasible.
    3. Lock in: Restricting access before global developers are deeply embedded in the Chinese cloud stack would send them elsewhere and break the flywheel. That threshold is currently far from being reached.
    4. Saturation: Once the pricing power of frontier American laboratories is sufficiently commoditised, and open weight releases from Meta, Mistral, Nvidia and others sustain the pressure independently, further Chinese releases buy nothing. The gap here is narrowing and still exists.

    What would graduated restriction actually look like?

    1. Not a switch: The likely outcome is a set of graduated pathways rather than a single closure, appearing from around late 2028.
    2. Embargoed weights: Frontier models served through an interface first, with the weights released only after a six month embargo.
    3. Licensing above a capability threshold: Commercial licensing required beyond a stated capability level, with smaller distilled models left free as the entry route.
    4. Scaffolding withheld: Model weights released openly while tool use and agentic scaffolding, which is what turns a model into a working system, are held back.
    5. Preferential access: Members of the WAICO bloc receiving access on better terms than non members, which converts model access into a membership benefit.

    What should India do with the open window?

    1. Price in the switching costs: The open ecosystem should be used on the assumption that access terms will change, so the cost of moving between stacks is budgeted now rather than discovered later.
    2. Model agnostic architecture in the public sector: Government departments and regulated sectors should be built on abstraction layers and harnesses that work across stacks, so a change of supplier becomes a configuration change.
    3. A routing layer instead of hardware subsidies: The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY) should consider running a public sector routing service across models, in place of offering compute subsidies on slices of graphics processing units.
    4. Atmashakti rather than self sufficiency: Effort should concentrate where India can actually win, in applications, industrial and language data, edge inference silicon design and domain specific fine tuning. This is self strength built in a few selected segments, in place of full self sufficiency that India cannot afford and does not need.
    5. Use the window diplomatically: India should shape open weight norms in multilateral forums while the commons is still open and Beijing still needs legitimacy for it.

    Challenges to India’s reliance on open weight models

    1. Dependence is being built into production systems: Cost driven adoption embeds a foreign model in products that cannot be rewritten quickly when terms change. Eg. Startups rebuilding their core products on a single model family carry the switching cost inside their architecture.
      The Fix: Require an abstraction layer in any publicly funded AI deployment, so the model can be swapped without rebuilding the application.
    2. Diffusion is mistaken for capability: Rapid adoption of adequate models raises productivity and builds no domestic ability to produce the next model. Eg. Most Indian AI activity sits in applications rather than at the frontier.
      The Fix: Tie public procurement preference to firms that contribute datasets, evaluations or fine tuned models back into a shared national repository.
    3. Language and data coverage is thin: A model trained elsewhere performs worse on Indian languages and on Indian administrative data, which is where public sector value lies. Eg. Low resource Indian languages remain weakly represented in the training corpora of major open models.
      The Fix: Treat curated Indian language and sectoral datasets as the national asset to fund, since a data advantage survives a change of model supplier.
    4. Compute access is governed elsewhere: The hardware needed to fine tune or serve a large model at scale is subject to export controls set by other governments. Eg. Advanced processor supply to India and to China is determined by controls neither country sets.
      The Fix: Prioritise edge inference silicon design, where India can build a position that does not depend on access to frontier training hardware.
    5. Security review of downloaded models is weak: An openly released model can carry behaviour that surfaces only under specific conditions, and there is no standing capability to test for it. Eg. Backdoor behaviour triggered by particular inputs has been demonstrated in publicly released models.
      The Fix: Mandate evaluation of any model used in a regulated sector against a published test suite before deployment.

    Conclusion

    The open models now cutting Indian costs are being given away because a strategic competition is currently being fought that way, and that is the fact to plan against rather than the saving to celebrate. India can take the cost advantage and still owe itself an architecture that survives the moment the giving stops. The marker to watch is the Chinese consultation on foreign downloads of model weights, since a decision there arrives well before any formal restriction does.

    Government Initiatives for Artificial Intelligence in India

    1. IndiaAI Mission: Approved in 2024 with an outlay of Rs 10,371 crore and implemented by IndiaAI under MeitY, it builds compute, datasets, skills and startup financing as a single ecosystem programme.
    2. IndiaAI Compute: A national AI compute grid of over 38,000 graphics processing units, offering eligible users up to 40 percent lower compute costs.
    3. AIKosh: A national repository of non personal datasets and models, carrying thousands of datasets across sectors including agriculture, health, climate and governance.
    4. IndiaAI Safety Institute: The national trust framework within the mission, covering bias mitigation, privacy, explainability and AI governance.
    5. India AI Impact Summit 2026: Hosted by India under the mission, it repositions the global discussion from AI safety towards AI for development and convenes Global South participation.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    [2023] “Introduce the concept of Artificial Intelligence (AI). How does AI help clinical diagnosis? Do you perceive any threat to privacy of the individual in the use of AI in healthcare?”

  • Saudi Arabia is facing a two-strait dilemma

    Why in the News

    Houthi forces have taken the Red Sea coast of Yemen and the Bab el-Mandeb strait, and their occupation of Perim Island gives them an unobstructed line of sight over commercial traffic through a channel carrying roughly 12 percent of global trade. The capture follows a Houthi declaration of a naval blockade of Saudi Arabia, itself a response to Saudi fighter jets damaging the runway at Sana’a airport to stop an Iranian aircraft landing without clearance. With the Strait of Hormuz already disrupted, Saudi Arabia had shifted its loading to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. A second closed strait therefore leaves the kingdom without an unobstructed sea route to its Asian buyers, and it has cut crude production in response.

    What is the Bab el-Mandeb strait?

    1. Bab el-Mandeb: It is the sole channel connecting the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden, so it is the only sea route between the Arabian Sea and the Suez Canal.
    2. Perim Island: It sits inside the strait and divides it into two channels, so whoever holds the island observes and can engage traffic passing on either side.
    3. Closure reroutes rather than delays: A ship denied the strait cannot reach the Suez Canal at all and has to sail around the Cape of Good Hope instead.
    4. The two strait exposure: Saudi Arabia’s eastern terminals load through the Strait of Hormuz and its western terminal at Yanbu loads through Bab el-Mandeb, so its seaborne exports depend on two separate chokepoints.

    How did the Houthis take the strait?

    1. The war’s origin: Yemen’s civil war began in the aftermath of the Arab Spring and has flared up with renewed intensity.
    2. From threat to control: The Houthis had threatened the waterway with long range weapons for years, and now hold the coastline itself.
    3. The forces that failed to hold it: Saudi backed forces did not support the United Arab Emirates aligned factions deployed along the coast.
    4. Infighting compounded the gap: Internal infighting among those factions aggravated the failure, so the strait was seized with minimal resistance.
    5. What the blockade brought with it: Regular attacks on Saudi tankers in the Red Sea and on the kingdom’s oil related facilities have accompanied it.

    What has the blockade done to Saudi oil exports?

    1. The pipeline behind Yanbu: The port is supplied by the 1,200 km East West pipeline running from the eastern oilfields across the peninsula.
    2. Where that oil went: Nearly 70 percent of it moved to Asia through Bab el-Mandeb before the naval blockade began in July.
    3. The rerouting: Flows through the strait have dwindled sharply, and shipments have been redirected through the Suez Canal and around the African continent.
    4. The production cut: Crude output fell to 6.2 million barrels per day in August, the lowest level this year, against over 10 million in January.

    Why has external help not arrived?

    1. The American refusal: The United States promised intelligence and declined a Saudi request for direct involvement.
    2. The stated calculation: Washington does not wish to open another front, and any direct American or Western intervention would lead the Houthis to broaden their strikes.
    3. The electoral consideration: The resulting spike in global oil markets is what the US administration is keen to avoid ahead of the midterm elections in November.
    4. The Mecca Alliance partners: Pakistan and Turkey are reluctant to commit militarily except in the event of an invasion of Saudi Arabia, and are concerned about provoking the Houthis further.
    5. The precedent: Pakistan refused a Saudi request to join the Yemen war in 2015, notwithstanding the bilateral security agreement the two signed in 1982.

    What leverage have the Houthis and Iran gained?

    1. Demonstrated capability: When the United States targeted them in 2025, they were reported to have shot down several American drones and nearly hit a number of fighter jets.
    2. The next objective: They have begun moving to capture Marib, east of Sana’a, the centre of Yemen’s oil and gas industry.
    3. Why Marib matters: Taking it would strengthen their bargaining position in any negotiated settlement.
    4. Iran’s gain: Iran has added ending the blockade of Yemen to its conditions for a lasting settlement with the United States.
    5. The position this creates: Riyadh faces a reluctant United States, hesitant alliance partners and two contested maritime chokepoints at the same time.

    Challenges to Saudi Arabia’s seaborne export security

    1. Pipeline capacity sits below export volume: The East West pipeline moves only a part of the kingdom’s exports to the Red Sea, so shifting west cannot substitute for the eastern terminals. Eg. Ras Tanura on the Gulf coast remains the largest loading terminal and lies inside the Hormuz route.
      The Fix: Expand the interconnection between the eastern fields and the Red Sea terminals, and hold standing chartered tonnage for the longer route.
    2. Rerouting costs fall on the seller: A voyage around the Cape of Good Hope raises freight, crew and insurance on every cargo, and buyers on term contracts do not absorb it. Eg. War risk premiums on Red Sea transits rose steeply once shipping there came under attack from 2023.
      The Fix: Hold pre positioned floating storage and product stocks near Asian buyers, so a longer voyage does not interrupt contracted deliveries.
    3. A production cut is not quickly reversed: Shutting in wells to match reduced export capacity carries reservoir and restart costs, so output does not simply resume when the route reopens. Eg. Idle spare capacity has historically taken months to bring back to full rates after a deep cut.
      The Fix: Balance through storage rather than through shut ins, using domestic and leased overseas tank capacity to keep wells producing while shipments are constrained.
    4. Air defence cannot cover terminals and tankers together: Defending fixed oil facilities and moving tankers spread across a wide sea area needs different systems and far more of them. Eg. The 2019 strikes on the Abqaiq processing facility removed about half of Saudi crude output at a stroke.
      The Fix: Pair fixed site defence with escorted convoying on the Red Sea leg, so the tanker leg is not left to individual operators.
    5. The security guarantee is an expectation, not an obligation: The kingdom’s protection has rested on an American commitment that carries no treaty duty to act. Eg. The United States did not respond militarily to the 2019 strikes on Saudi oil facilities either.
      The Fix: Convert the arrangement into a written commitment with defined triggers, or build the indigenous capability the expectation currently substitutes for.

    Conclusion

    An oil exporter’s power rests on the certainty that its cargoes will sail, and that certainty now depends on a stretch of water held by a non state armed movement. Riyadh’s options have narrowed to conceding demands it has refused for years, or sustaining counterattacks long enough to reopen the route, with no external force willing to do either on its behalf. The unresolved tension is between a security posture built on an external guarantee and a guarantor that has declined to act. The marker to watch is Marib, since control of Yemen’s oil and gas centre would largely settle the balance in any negotiated outcome.

    Maritime chokepoints in global trade

    1. Chokepoint: It is a narrow channel on a major shipping route with no practical alternative nearby, so traffic concentrates there and a disruption at that one point affects the entire route.
    2. Strait of Hormuz: It connects the Persian Gulf to the Gulf of Oman and carries the seaborne exports of Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar and Iran, the largest volume of oil and liquefied natural gas passing any single point in the world.
    3. Strait of Malacca: It links the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea and carries the bulk of the crude moving to China, Japan and South Korea, which is why energy planners in those countries treat it as a standing vulnerability.
    4. Suez Canal and its only alternative: The canal shortens the Asia to Europe route by thousands of nautical miles, and the sole alternative, the Cape of Good Hope, adds roughly two weeks to a voyage.

    Back2Basics: the Houthis

    1. Name: The movement calls itself Ansar Allah, and Houthi is the family name of its founding leadership.
    2. Origin: It emerged in the 1990s as a Zaidi revivalist movement in Saada province in northern Yemen.
    3. Control: It captured the capital Sana’a in 2014 and holds much of the country’s northwest, where a large share of Yemen’s population lives.
    4. External backing: Iran supplies weapons and technical support, which is what converts Houthi control of the strait into leverage for Tehran.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “Ships from which of the following countries have to cross the Strait of Hormuz to reach out to the Indian Ocean? 1. Bahrain 2. Syria 3. Qatar 4. Egypt”

  • After BRICS, it’s time to navigate the realities of great power rivalries

    Why in the News

    China now accounts for roughly three fifths of the combined Gross Domestic Product of the eleven member BRICS grouping, against less than half of the four member BRIC forum’s output when it was formed in 2006. The United States has moved the same way inside the G7, from less than two fifths of that group’s nominal output three decades ago to close to three fifths now. The BRICS summit in New Delhi closed with multipolarity as its stated theme, and the Chinese President travels to Washington next week for a second meeting with the US President this year. The tension is between a declared multipolar order and a measured concentration of economic weight in two states.

    What do a G2 and a G3 order describe?

    1. G2: It describes a world order managed in effect by the United States and China, on the ground that they are the only two states with the scale to shape economic order, technology standards and supply chains.
    2. G3: It describes the same arrangement with Russia admitted as a third manager, on the strength of its military power and its reach across Eurasia rather than its economic size.
    3. Neither is an institution: Both are descriptions of where decisions are actually taken. Neither has a charter, a secretariat or a membership list.
    4. Agreement is not implied: A G2 does not mean the two agree. It means their disagreements set the terms everyone else operates under.

    Why has economic weight concentrated inside BRICS and the G7?

    1. Enlargement did not dilute: BRICS grew from four members to eleven, and China’s share of the group’s output rose across the same period rather than falling.
    2. Beijing outgrows its own grouping: China continues to gain in economic size and geopolitical influence faster than the forum it sits in.
    3. What widened the G7 gap: Japan’s stagnation, Europe’s weaker growth and its demographic pressures, together with American advantages in energy, capital markets and artificial intelligence, account for the shift.
    4. Preponderance underwrites alliance behaviour: American willingness to turn harshly on its closest partners rests in part on that expanding economic weight. Eg. Pressure applied to Canada and Britain, and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU).

    Why must Washington and Beijing manage the rivalry, and where does Russia fit?

    1. Mutual dependence: Each seeks to reduce its vulnerability to the other, and neither can readily escape the other’s market, technology, capital or industrial capacity.
    2. No condominium: The disputes over trade, technology and Taiwan are too deep for the two to divide the world between them.
    3. Management rather than settlement: The meetings rest on a recognition that the rivalry has to be handled through sustained high level contact.
    4. The calendar of contact: A Washington meeting next week is expected to be followed by another on the margins of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Shenzhen, and the United States hosts the annual G20 summit in Miami in December.
    5. Russia’s residual weight: Russia is economically diminished and still holds enough military power, geographical reach and diplomatic weight to influence the balance between the two across Eurasia.
    6. Moscow’s alignment: Moscow has drawn Beijing closer than ever before, while Washington has made an overture to Russia.
    7. What would produce a G3: Progress in the American peace initiative on Ukraine could open a rapprochement with Moscow, a trilateral summit and a Russian presence at the G20. The conflict between Moscow and Europe over Ukraine is what complicates it.

    What does the concentration do to the G20?

    1. Its distinguishing membership: Unlike the G7 it includes China, Russia, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and South Africa. Unlike BRICS it includes the United States, Europe and Japan.
    2. Why that composition mattered: That mix is what made the G20 the one forum plausibly capable of collective action on the global economy.
    3. The failure this month: Differences between the United States and China at the G20 finance ministers’ meeting in Washington prevented the forum from issuing a joint statement.
    4. The point of objection: China objected to the language on trade surpluses and export led growth.
    5. The second way it loses: Bilateral deal making between Washington and Beijing can come at the expense of the other members, so the forum is diminished whether the two disagree or agree.

    What does this mean for India’s multipolarity claim?

    1. The stated preference: A multipolar order is Delhi’s declared objective, and the Delhi summit was organised around that theme.
    2. The measured position: Multipolarity has not arrived, and the distribution of power is arguably moving away from it rather than towards it.
    3. What the forums actually do: APEC, BRICS, the EU, the G7 and NATO do not shape world order. They operate within parameters set by great power politics.
    4. Where a summit still earns its cost: Collective progress at these annual gatherings is rare, and their value lies in the bilateral meetings held on their margins. Eg. The attempted reset of India China relations by the Indian Prime Minister and the Chinese President at the Delhi summit.
    5. The task that follows: Indian foreign policy has to work the rivalry between Washington, Beijing and Moscow as it stands, rather than the order it would prefer.

    Challenges to BRICS as a vehicle for multipolarity

    1. One member carries most of the group’s weight: A grouping in which a single economy supplies the bulk of the output cannot easily adopt positions that constrain that economy. Eg. The New Development Bank still raises and lends predominantly in United States dollars, which limits how far it reduces members’ dependence on the dollar system.
      The Fix: Cap any single member’s share of the capital of BRICS institutions, so financial weight does not convert directly into agenda control.
    2. No mechanism for the members’ own disputes: The grouping holds members with live bilateral disputes and has no standing machinery to address them. Eg. The India China boundary question was taken up on the margins of the Delhi summit rather than by the grouping itself.
      The Fix: Keep the collective agenda to functional cooperation where members already converge, and route bilateral disputes to dedicated bilateral channels.
    3. Enlargement thins the common interest: Each addition widens the range of national interests the text must accommodate, which makes the agreed language weaker. Eg. The grouping now holds states closely aligned with Washington on security alongside states in open confrontation with it.
      The Fix: Adopt a concentric design, with a core membership taking binding commitments and partner states joining specific projects.
    4. Declarations carry no implementation machinery: The grouping issues an annual declaration and has no permanent secretariat to carry it forward or to report on it. Eg. Its commitment on pathways for plurilateral initiatives at the WTO binds no member to any act.
      The Fix: Create a standing secretariat that publishes, before each summit, what the previous declaration’s commitments actually produced.
    5. Payment ambitions outrun financial capacity: Reducing dependence on the dollar requires deep local currency bond markets and open capital accounts, which most members do not have. Eg. Russian exporters accumulated rupee balances they could not readily deploy once bilateral trade was settled in national currencies.
      The Fix: Build settlement capacity around a payment messaging link and local currency clearing for trade pairs that are already close to balanced, rather than around a common currency.

    Conclusion

    The question is no longer whether the world is multipolar, but whether the forums India invests in can act at all when the two largest economies disagree. On present evidence they cannot, and the decisions that matter are taken in bilateral rooms India does not sit in. That leaves an unresolved gap between the order Delhi argues for and the order it has to operate inside. The thing to watch is whether a trilateral meeting convenes on the margins of the APEC summit, since that format would confirm that the management of world order has moved outside the multilateral bodies.

    Back2Basics: G7

    1. Nature: It is an informal grouping of advanced economies that coordinates on economic and security policy, with no treaty basis and no permanent secretariat.
    2. Membership: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States, with the European Union taking part in its meetings.
    3. Origin: It began as a finance ministers’ grouping in the 1970s and became an annual leaders’ summit, with the presidency rotating each year.
    4. Russia’s place: Russia joined to make it the G8 in 1997 and was suspended in 2014 after the annexation of Crimea.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    ““BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South.” Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.”

  • Why India’s stance on WTO plurilateral deals may be shifting

    Why in the News

    The BRICS Delhi Declaration 2026 has asked members to identify appropriate pathways for plurilateral initiatives into the World Trade Organization (WTO) legal framework, including on development oriented issues. India opposed exactly that route at the WTO’s 14th Ministerial Conference (MC14) in Cameroon in March, where it alone blocked incorporation of the China backed Investment Facilitation for Development (IFD) agreement. India pressed there for guardrails, meaning agreed legal safeguards applying to plurilateral pacts as a class before any single one is brought into the rule book. That term does not appear in the Delhi text, which India chaired. The contested point is whether a member that treats plurilateral deals as a systemic threat to the WTO can simultaneously help design their entry into it.

    What is a plurilateral agreement in the WTO?

    1. Plurilateral agreement: It is negotiated and implemented by an exclusive group of members rather than by the full membership.
    2. Binding on signatories only: Its obligations apply to the members that sign it, and the rest of the membership takes on nothing.
    3. Consensus is the gate: A plurilateral agreement enters the WTO family of agreements exclusively by consensus, so a single member can keep it out indefinitely.
    4. Why they are in demand now: Plurilaterals feature prominently in proposals for WTO reform, as a route around the difficulty of agreeing anything among the full membership.

    What is the Investment Facilitation for Development agreement?

    1. Investment Facilitation for Development: It is a plurilateral initiative launched at the WTO in 2017 with the stated aim of increasing foreign direct investment flows.
    2. What it covers: It addresses the administrative side of investment, such as transparency of rules and the speed of approvals, rather than market access or investor protection.
    3. Its legal status: It is not a WTO agreement. It enters the WTO system only if the full membership agrees to incorporate it.

    What did India argue against the pact at MC14?

    1. The systemic objection: India’s stated position was that incorporating the IFD risks eroding the foundational principles and the functional limits of the WTO.
    2. Investment is not a trade issue: India argued that investment does not belong in an organisation built to negotiate trade rules.
    3. India stood alone: It was the only member opposing incorporation.
    4. What it refused specifically: India did not agree to incorporation of the IFD as an Annex 4 agreement, Annex 4 being the schedule of the agreement establishing the WTO that lists plurilateral agreements binding on their signatories alone.
    5. What it offered instead: The Union Ministry of Commerce and Industry recorded in March an openness to comprehensive good faith discussion under the WTO Reform Agenda first.
    6. The general demand behind the specific refusal: India sought safeguards for plurilaterals as a class before any specific plurilateral outcome was integrated, which is a rule about method rather than an objection to one pact.

    What has changed in the BRICS Delhi Declaration 2026?

    1. The operative sentence: The declaration records that it is important to identify appropriate pathways for plurilateral initiatives into the WTO legal framework, including on development oriented issues.
    2. The wider commitment: It also commits members to implement the MC14 outcomes and to engage in WTO reform to enhance the organisation’s authority, effectiveness, inclusiveness and relevance.
    3. The missing word: The guardrails formulation India pressed in March does not appear anywhere in the text, and India held the chair at the summit that adopted it.
    4. Forward looking rules: The text additionally asks members to explore the formulation of forward looking rules in the WTO.
    5. The direct implication: Identifying pathways for plurilaterals points towards India lifting its reservation on the IFD, which would be a significant change in a position it has held alone.

    Why is the plurilateral route contested for development issues?

    1. The carve out is the problem: The declaration applies the plurilateral route to development oriented issues, which are precisely the issues on which developing members need the developed membership to be bound.
    2. Food security: A permanent solution on public stockholding delivers nothing if it is negotiated among members who were never the ones objecting to it.
    3. Farm subsidies: A reduction in developed country farm support cannot be obtained inside a group those countries decline to join.
    4. The structural point: An agreement binding only its signatories cannot change the conduct of a member that stays outside it, so development demands run through the multilateral route or they do not run at all.

    Challenges to bringing plurilateral agreements into the WTO

    1. Consensus is absolute and cuts both ways: A single objecting member keeps a plurilateral out however many support it, and the same veto blocks the reform of the system itself. Eg. The WTO’s Appellate Body has been unable to hear appeals since 2019 because one member has blocked appointments to it.
      The Fix: Agree a standing procedure for admitting plurilaterals, with published criteria, so each proposal is judged against a rule instead of renegotiated from scratch.
    2. Free riding on most favoured nation treatment: Benefits conceded inside a plurilateral often have to be extended to the whole membership, so signatories carry obligations that non signatories enjoy without cost. Eg. Tariff concessions under the Information Technology Agreement are made by its participants and extended to all members.
      The Fix: Require every plurilateral to state at the outset whether its benefits extend on a most favoured nation basis, so the question is settled before signature rather than after.
    3. Erosion of the single undertaking: The WTO’s founding bargain was that members accepted the agreements as one package, and a shift to opt in deals lets the strongest members choose what they take on. Eg. The Doha Round stalled precisely because members would not accept its package as a whole.
      The Fix: Tie any plurilateral admission to a parallel deliverable on an outstanding multilateral issue, so the package logic survives in practice.
    4. Negotiating capacity decides participation: Small delegations cannot staff several simultaneous negotiations, so the members with the largest missions in Geneva shape the text. Eg. A number of least developed country members maintain no permanent mission in Geneva at all.
      The Fix: Fund shared negotiating support for members without a Geneva mission, so a seat at a plurilateral does not depend on delegation size.
    5. Scope creep into subjects outside the mandate: Admitting investment facilitation brings a subject the membership once removed from the negotiating agenda back in, and with it the organisation’s dispute settlement machinery. Eg. Investment was among the Singapore issues dropped from the Doha agenda in 2004 after developing members objected.
      The Fix: Settle the scope question inside the WTO Reform Agenda first, so the mandate is defined before any specific pact is admitted under it.

    Conclusion

    India’s objection was never confined to one investment pact. It was to a method of making rules that lets willing members legislate around unwilling ones, inside an organisation whose authority rests on the full membership carrying the same obligations. That objection is unresolved, and the declaration India chaired now records an interest in finding a route for exactly that method. The marker to watch is whether India moves its reservation when incorporation next comes before the WTO General Council, or holds out for safeguards that apply to plurilaterals as a class.

    Back2Basics: WTO Ministerial Conference

    1. Nature: It is the highest decision making body of the World Trade Organization.
    2. Composition and frequency: It brings together all members and is required to meet at least once every two years.
    3. Powers: It can take decisions on all matters arising under any of the multilateral trade agreements.
    4. Recent editions: MC12 was held in Geneva in 2022, MC13 in Abu Dhabi in 2024, and MC14 in Cameroon in 2026.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “What are the key areas of reform if the WTO has to survive in the present context of ‘Trade War’, especially keeping in mind the interest of India?”

  • [MENTION] Indian Naval Ship Kulish arrives at Ream Naval Base, Cambodia

    [MENTION] Indian Naval Ship Kulish arrives at Ream Naval Base, Cambodia

    Why in News

    A Ministry of Defence release recorded that Indian Naval Ship (INS) Kulish arrived at Ream Naval Base, Cambodia on 13 September 2026.

    Static Context (the exam value sits here)

    1. Ream Naval Base: It lies near Sihanoukville on Cambodia’s coast, on the Gulf of Thailand. It sits close to the southern approaches to the Strait of Malacca.
    2. Strategic weight: The base’s expansion drew attention over a possible expanded external military presence in the region. It bears on maritime access to the South China Sea.
    3. INS Kulish: It is an indigenous Kora class missile corvette of the Indian Navy.
    4. Diplomatic function: Naval port calls project presence and build maritime partnerships across the region India frames as the Indo Pacific.

    Prelims angle

    The location of Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Thailand, its proximity to the Strait of Malacca, and the identity of India’s coastal states and maritime neighbours are map based hooks.

    Mains angle

    General Studies Paper II (GS2), India and its neighbourhood and maritime strategy. A question can use the port call as an example of India’s maritime outreach near key sea lanes.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026] Ships from which of the following countries have to cross the Strait of Hormuz to reach out to the Indian Ocean?
    1. Bahrain
    2. Syria
    3. Qatar
    4. Egypt
    (a) 1 and 2
    (b) 1 and 3
    (c) 2 and 3
    (d) 3 and 4
    Answer: (b)”

    “[2010] Which one of the following can one come across if one travels through the Strait of Malacca ?
    (a) Bali
    (b) Brunei
    (c) Java
    (d) Singapore
    Answer: (d)”

  • How India should view China’s ‘open’ AI pitch

    How India should view China’s ‘open’ AI pitch

    Why in the News

    China has offered to lead the creation of a BRICS open source artificial intelligence (AI) community, along with a BRICS digital ecosystem cloud platform, support for cooperation on large language models and a programme of AI training. The offer was made by the Chinese President at the BRICS Summit in New Delhi. The New Delhi Declaration issued after the summit mentions neither the community nor the cloud platform, and commits members instead to broader cooperation on improving access to AI resources. The pitch positions Chinese AI technology as an alternative to proprietary systems controlled largely by companies in the United States. For India the question is whether a grouping wide platform led by Beijing widens access to AI for developing countries or routes that access through a single supplier.

    What is the proposed BRICS AI open source community?

    1. China in the lead: China would take the lead in setting up the community.
    2. Model cooperation: It would support cooperation among members on developing and deploying large language models (LLMs), systems trained on very large text collections to generate and interpret language.
    3. Training and seminars: It would run specialised AI seminars and training courses, described as building an open AI ecosystem.
    4. Cloud platform and adjacent areas: A BRICS digital ecosystem cloud platform was proposed alongside it, with expanded cooperation on digital skills, technology exchanges and intelligent manufacturing.

    Why is China making this pitch to developing countries now?

    1. An alternative to proprietary systems: The initiative widens Beijing’s effort to position its AI technology against systems controlled largely by companies in the United States.
    2. Commitments already made: At the World Artificial Intelligence Conference in Shanghai in July, 5,000 AI training and seminar opportunities for developing countries over five years were announced.
    3. Cooperation centres: AI application cooperation centres were proposed with groupings including BRICS, ASEAN and the African Union.
    4. A contest for the Global South: Both India and China aspire to be the leading voice of the Global South, and Beijing holds a clear edge in AI capabilities.

    What is open source artificial intelligence?

    1. Open weights and code: A model released under a licence that lets others run, modify and redistribute it.
    2. Contrast with a proprietary system: A proprietary model’s weights stay with the vendor and are reached only through an interface the vendor controls and prices.
    3. Why it bears on access: A released model can be run on a user’s own hardware, which removes the need to buy access from the developer for every use.
    4. Limits of the label: Openness of weights does not always extend to the training data or to the terms on which the model may be used commercially.

    Why was the proposal not adopted by the grouping?

    1. The declaration is silent: The New Delhi Declaration does not mention the proposed open source community or the cloud platform.
    2. What it commits to instead: Members are committed more broadly to cooperation on improving access to AI resources, with a focus on safety, security, reliability and inclusiveness.
    3. Existing text carried forward: The declaration refers to an earlier BRICS statement on global AI governance and records that members will continue cooperation in the area.
    4. The proposal can return: China takes over the BRICS chairship in 2027 and could place the proposals before the grouping again.

    What is India’s own position on access to AI?

    1. The access demand: At the AI Impact Summit earlier this year India pushed for broader access to compute, datasets, models and other AI infrastructure, particularly for developing countries.
    2. Domestic capacity: The IndiaAI Mission funds subsidised compute infrastructure and supports Indian foundation models and datasets.
    3. The two run alongside each other: Any eventual BRICS programme on models or cloud infrastructure would sit next to India’s own effort to expand access without relying entirely on foreign providers.

    Challenges to a BRICS platform for open source AI

    1. Compute is the binding constraint, not model access: Releasing model weights does not give a developing country the accelerators or the electricity to train or serve them at scale. Eg. Advanced AI accelerators are subject to United States export controls that reach third countries.
      The Fix: Pair any model sharing commitment with pooled access to compute capacity physically located in member countries.
    2. Dependence on one member’s technology stack: A cloud platform built and operated by a single member leaves participants dependent on that member’s chips, software and terms of service. Eg. Huawei’s Ascend accelerators and their accompanying software stack underpin much of China’s domestic AI infrastructure.
      The Fix: Require any BRICS platform to expose hardware neutral interfaces, so a workload can be moved to another member’s infrastructure.
    3. Divergent data governance among members: Members differ on cross border data transfer and on state access to data, which blocks a shared dataset pool. Eg. India’s Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 sets its own regime for transfers outside the country.
      The Fix: Begin with model and training cooperation and leave datasets to bilateral arrangements until a common transfer standard exists.
    4. Language and content coverage: A model released by any one member carries that member’s language priorities, so coverage of other members’ languages stays thin. Eg. Indian language performance in globally released models lags their performance in English.
      The Fix: Make a language corpus contribution from each member a condition of participation in the community.
    5. Safety obligations left unattached to release: An open release removes the developer’s ability to withdraw a model later found unsafe, because copies already exist. Eg. Once weights are downloaded and mirrored, a subsequent restriction cannot reach the copies in circulation.
      The Fix: Attach an evaluation and disclosure requirement at the point of release rather than relying on a recall mechanism afterwards.

    Conclusion

    Access to AI is being contested as a question of who supplies it, not of whether it should be shared. An offer to open the models while owning the platform beneath them widens use without widening capability, and that is the distinction India has to hold on to. What to watch is whether the grouping’s next chair converts the access language already agreed into a commitment on compute, or leaves it as a statement of intent.

    Back2Basics: IndiaAI Mission

    1. A national mission under the Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology, approved in 2024.
    2. Built around seven pillars, including IndiaAI Compute Capacity, the IndiaAI Innovation Centre and the IndiaAI Datasets Platform.
    3. Its compute pillar subsidises access to graphics processing units for startups, researchers and public institutions.
    4. Its remaining pillars cover application development, skilling, startup financing and safe and trusted AI.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2026, GS2, 10 marks] “BRICS acts as a powerful counterweight in global governance, actively amplifying the voice and influence of the Global South.” Explain the role of BRICS in projecting itself as an alternative to other groupings.”

  • India, Vietnam agree to deepen defence ties, co-produce military equipment

    India, Vietnam agree to deepen defence ties, co-produce military equipment

    Why in the News

    India and Vietnam have agreed to deepen defence and security cooperation, including through joint production of Indian defence items. The agreement came out of the 19th India Vietnam Joint Commission Meeting on trade, economic, scientific and technological cooperation, chaired jointly by the two foreign ministers in New Delhi. The Joint Commission met for the first time in three years, and it met after the relationship had been raised to an Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership during the State Visit from Vietnam in May 2026. India’s defence supply to Vietnam has so far run through gifted platforms and lines of credit. Joint production changes what the relationship is, from the transfer of equipment to a stake in Vietnam’s own defence industry, in a region where China’s assertive behaviour in the Indo Pacific is the shared concern.

    What is the India Vietnam Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership?

    1. The tier: The highest level at which India holds bilateral ties with Vietnam, reached during the State Visit of Vietnam’s General Secretary and President in May 2026.
    2. A regional first: Vietnam is the first country in the region with which India has bilateral ties at that level.
    3. Defence as a central pillar: Defence and security cooperation sits among the central pillars of the partnership.
    4. The review mechanism: The Joint Commission Meeting on trade, economic, scientific and technological cooperation is where the full spectrum of the partnership is reviewed by the two foreign ministers.

    How has India’s defence supply to Vietnam been built so far?

    1. A gifted platform: India gifted the indigenously built missile corvette INS Kirpan to Vietnam in July 2023.
    2. Credit financed boats: Twelve high speed guard boats built by Larsen & Toubro were handed over in June 2022, under a bilateral line of credit of USD 100 million.
    3. Further lines of credit: Two more lines of credit, of USD 120 million and USD 180 million, were signed between the Exim Bank of India and Vietnam’s Finance Ministry in July 2024 and are being executed now.
    4. Beyond equipment: Engagement has diversified into wider military to military dialogue, capacity building and training across all arms of the forces.

    What did the two sides identify beyond defence?

    1. Trade and supply chains: Expanding trade, investments and mutually beneficial supply chains.
    2. Market access: Access for Indian marine and agricultural products and pharmaceuticals.
    3. Connectivity: Financial, port and air connectivity between the two countries.
    4. New sectors: Opportunities in nuclear energy and the space sector.
    5. Standards and heritage: Cooperation on standards for seafarers, and on heritage conservation.
    6. People to people ties: Capacity building and people to people ties, with the growing popularity of yoga in Vietnam noted. Next year will be observed as the Year of India Vietnam Friendship, marking 55 years of diplomatic ties.

    Where does Vietnam sit in India’s regional frameworks?

    1. Act East Policy: Vietnam is a key pillar of India’s Act East Policy, a relationship rooted in deep civilisational linkages.
    2. Vision MAHASAGAR: Vietnam is a key partner in Vision MAHASAGAR, meaning Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions, which is India’s stated outlook for the Indo Pacific.
    3. The ASEAN track: Vietnam is an important partner within India’s Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
    4. Maritime cooperation: Vietnam’s engagement under India’s Indo Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) was welcomed at the meeting.
    5. The strategic backdrop: The deepening of defence ties was framed against China’s assertive behaviour in the Indo Pacific region.

    Challenges to India Vietnam defence joint production

    1. A Russian origin inventory: Vietnam’s forces run largely on Russian platforms, which limits what Indian systems can be integrated into without redesign. Eg. Vietnam’s Kilo class submarines and Su 30 combat aircraft are of Russian origin.
      The Fix: Concentrate joint production on segments where Indian industry already services Russian origin fleets, such as spares, sensors and patrol craft.
    2. Vietnam’s balancing with China: Vietnam manages an economic relationship with China that constrains how visible its defence alignment can be. Eg. China remains Vietnam’s largest trading partner.
      The Fix: Keep the programme industrial and commercial in framing, delivered through shipyards and licensed production rather than through basing or joint patrols.
    3. Slow conversion of credit into deliveries: Indian lines of credit take years to become contracted orders, because procurement approvals and yard capacity lag the signing. Eg. The defence line of credit of USD 500 million extended to Vietnam in 2016 took years to translate into orders.
      The Fix: Attach dated milestones and a named executing yard to each tranche of an existing line of credit.
    4. Competition on terms, not goodwill: Vietnam has diversified its arms procurement toward suppliers offering technology transfer, so India bids against others on commercial terms. Eg. Israeli suppliers have provided Vietnam with air defence systems and small arms production lines.
      The Fix: Build transfer of technology and local content commitments into the joint production package instead of offering finished units.

    Conclusion

    The relationship has moved past the stage at which India’s contribution can be counted in platforms handed over. Joint production asks India to be a supplier that stays, through spares, training and yard capacity inside Vietnam. The marker to watch is whether the two sides name a first item and a manufacturer, rather than announcing a further round of credit.

    Back2Basics: Indo Pacific Oceans Initiative

    1. Announced by India at the East Asia Summit in Bangkok in November 2019.
    2. An open, non treaty based arrangement for cooperation on maritime security and the sustainable use of ocean resources.
    3. Organised around seven pillars, including maritime security, maritime ecology, maritime resources, disaster risk reduction and management, and trade connectivity and maritime transport.
    4. Individual pillars are led by partner countries rather than directed by a central secretariat.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2020, GS2, 15 marks] What is the significance of Indo-US defence deals over Indo-Russian defence deals? Discuss with reference to stability in the Indo-Pacific region.”

  • Xi, Modi agreed both nations should be partners: Wang Yi

    Why in the News

    China and India should be partners. China’s Foreign Minister has described that as the most important consensus reached by the Chinese President and the Prime Minister when they met on the sidelines of the 18th BRICS Summit in New Delhi. The meeting closed the Chinese President’s first visit to India in seven years, and it was the third leaders’ meeting since the border agreement of October 2024. The two sides agreed to jointly maintain peace and tranquility in border areas and to support each other as rotating chair of BRICS. What is unsettled is whether a relationship rebuilt through air links, pilgrimage routes and summit language holds while the boundary question itself stays where it is.

    What did the two leaders agree on?

    1. Border areas: The two leaders agreed to jointly maintain peace and tranquility in border areas.
    2. BRICS chairmanships: Each country will support the other as rotating chair of the grouping. China takes over as BRICS chair for 2027.
    3. Multilateral coordination: The two sides agreed to strengthen coordination within the United Nations, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the G20.
    4. A multipolar order: They agreed to advance cooperation across the Global South, promote a more multipolar world order, and act as a stabilising force in a period of global uncertainty.
    5. Mutual development: The Chinese President said the two countries can draw on each other’s strengths, support one another and pursue common development.
    6. Scale of the constituency: The improvement in relations has been welcomed by over 2.8 billion people of both nations, and is cast as an essential pillar of stronger cooperation across the Global South.

    What terms has India set for the reset?

    1. Independent foreign policy: India has an independent foreign policy and will not allow any force to engage in anti China activities on its territory. China’s Foreign Ministry cited that statement approvingly.
    2. The three mutuals: Future ties are to be guided by mutual respect, mutual sensitivity and mutual interest.
    3. Differences and disputes: Differences should not be allowed to become disputes.
    4. A new chapter: The Prime Minister described the talks as the beginning of a new chapter in bilateral relations.

    Where does the boundary question sit in this framing?

    1. Subordinated to the wider relationship: China’s Foreign Minister, who is also a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee, said the border issue should be viewed in proper perspective within the broader context of the bilateral relationship.
    2. India’s stated approach: India has always approached relations with China from a strategic standpoint.
    3. The sequence of meetings: The two leaders met at Kazan in Russia in 2024 and again in September 2025, and the New Delhi meeting was their third since the breakthrough in ties.
    4. What the language covers: The agreed formulation extends to peace and tranquility in border areas, and carries no statement on the boundary itself.

    How is connectivity between the two countries being restored?

    1. Direct flights: China Southern Airlines announced the resumption of passenger services on the Guangzhou to New Delhi route from 21 September, after a six year break.
    2. Why they had stopped: Direct air service was suspended after the Covid pandemic and after tensions following the Doklam and Galwan standoffs.
    3. Pilgrimage route: The Kailash Mansarovar Yatra resumed in 2024, following the border understanding.

    Challenges to the India China normalisation

    1. Trade imbalance: India’s merchandise deficit with China is its largest with any trading partner, and it widens as electronics and machinery imports grow. Eg. Solar modules, electronic components and active pharmaceutical ingredients are sourced overwhelmingly from Chinese suppliers.
      The Fix: Tie any market access concession in the reset to measurable movement on the non tariff barriers facing Indian pharmaceutical and agricultural exports.
    2. Border infrastructure asymmetry: Road, rail and airfield construction on the Chinese side of the Line of Actual Control outpaces India’s build out in the same sectors. Eg. The Sichuan Tibet railway and forward airfield upgrades opposite Ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh.
      The Fix: Hold the Border Roads Organisation’s project list to dated completion milestones reported annually.
    3. Third country military supply: China’s defence supply relationship with Pakistan runs irrespective of the state of its relations with India. Eg. JF 17 combat aircraft and naval frigates supplied to Pakistan.
      The Fix: Raise third country military supply as a standing item in the Special Representatives dialogue rather than leaving it to summit level language.
    4. Dependence on leader level understanding: The reset rests on understandings between two leaders rather than on an institutional mechanism that survives a crisis. Eg. The border agreements of 1993 and 1996 did not prevent the 2020 standoff in eastern Ladakh.
      The Fix: Require the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India China Border Affairs to report publicly after each round.

    Conclusion

    The relationship has been restored at the level of contact rather than at the level of the dispute. Flights, pilgrimages and chairmanship courtesies are reversible instruments, and each of them was withdrawn once already. The thing to watch is whether the standing border mechanisms meet and produce a recorded outcome before the next leaders’ meeting, because that is the only part of this reset that cannot be undone by a single incident.

    Back2Basics: The border agreement of October 2024

    1. An understanding between India and China on patrolling arrangements along the Line of Actual Control in eastern Ladakh.
    2. It addressed the friction points at Depsang and Demchok, where patrolling had been blocked since 2020.
    3. It led to disengagement of troops at those points and the resumption of coordinated patrolling.
    4. It reopened the space for leader level meetings and for the phased restoration of pilgrimage and travel links.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2014, GS2, 12.5 marks] With respect to the South China sea, maritime territorial disputes and rising tension affirm the need for safeguarding maritime security to ensure freedom of navigation and over flight throughout the region. In this context, discuss the bilateral issues between India and China.”