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Subject: International Relations

  • [4th August 2026] The Hindu OpED: Critical minerals, the foundation of strategic power

    Mentor’s Comment

    Critical minerals have moved from the margins of resource policy to the centre of industrial strategy and national security. China’s dominance in refining, sharpened by rare-earth export controls announced in 2025, has exposed how concentrated the global supply chain is and how vulnerable importing economies remain. India holds domestic reserves but lacks the processing and refining capacity that decides who actually controls supply.

    What are critical minerals?

    1. Definition: Critical minerals are metals and elements that are essential to modern technology and defence but face a high risk of supply disruption due to concentrated production. Lithium, cobalt, nickel, graphite, copper and rare earth elements are the core group.
    2. Why they matter now: They are foundational to electric vehicles, battery storage, renewable power, semiconductors, defence systems and advanced manufacturing. As decarbonisation and digitalisation accelerate, mineral security is becoming as strategically important as oil once was.

    Why is the global supply picture a strategic risk, not a commercial one?

    1. Refining is concentrated in a few countries: For copper, lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite and rare earths, the average market share of the top three refining countries rose to 86% in 2024 from around 82% in 2020. Supply now depends on a handful of nodes.
    2. China leads across nearly all strategic minerals: China is the leading refiner in 19 of 20 strategic minerals, with an average market share of about 70%. This concentration turns minerals into geopolitical leverage rather than ordinary traded commodities.
    3. Processing is the true chokepoint: In 2024, China accounted for over 90% of rare earths and graphite processing, nearly 75% of cobalt and 70% of lithium chemicals. Control of the midstream, not the mine, confers power.
    4. Export controls have weaponised supply: China’s rare-earth export controls announced in 2025 raised alarm across energy, automotive, defence, aerospace, Artificial Intelligence and semiconductor sectors. A single supplier’s policy decision can now disrupt entire industries.

    What do foreign responses show about the value of processing capacity?

    1. European Union, mandated benchmarks: The Critical Raw Materials Act sets 2030 targets of 10% domestic extraction, 40% processing and 25% recycling, with no more than 65% of any strategic mineral sourced from a single country. It builds integrated supply chains through binding mandates.
    2. United States, mine-waste refining and defence dependence: Firms such as Phoenix Tailings use electrolysis to extract rare earths from mine tailings, backed by a USD 500 million Pentagon loan to expand separation and metallization, the weakest stage of the mines-to-magnets chain. Weapons such as Tomahawk cruise missiles, THAAD interceptors and F-35 jets fail without these inputs.
    3. United States, samarium bottleneck: The defence sector needs 50 to 100 tonnes of samarium each year, yet domestic capacity is tiny, forcing reliance on revived European sites. Solvay restarted separating rare earths at La Rochelle in France after China choked processed-material outflows in April 2025.
    4. United States, tungsten deadline: The Pentagon has set a January 2027 cut-off for China-sourced tungsten, but China controls roughly 80% of global mine supply and a larger share of downstream processing. Building domestic capacity will take years, forcing reliance on existing inventories.

    How is India positioned, and where is the gap?

    1. Reserves exist but supply security does not: India holds reserves of cobalt, copper, graphite and nickel, plus monazite deposits containing rare-earth oxides. It still imports lithium, cobalt and nickel.
    2. The critical gap is processing and refining: India has bulk-mineral experience but relies on imports for high-purity critical mineral products. Capacity and high-purity production remain constrained.
    3. Structural constraints slow progress: Exploration is shallow, regulatory clearances are time-consuming, private participation is limited and remote-region project economics are weak. Recycling cannot substitute for primary supply in the near term.
    4. Rising demand widens the exposure: Under a net-zero scenario, cumulative demand for critical energy-transition minerals could reach roughly 169 million tonnes by 2070, well above a current-policy pathway.

    What is India’s policy response since 2023?

    1. National Critical Mineral Mission: The government has identified 30 critical minerals and launched the Mission to support the value chain, targeting 1,200 domestic exploration projects by 2030-31, production of at least 15 critical minerals, and acquisition of 50 overseas mining assets.
    2. MMDR Act Amendment (2023): Amended the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act to empower the central government to auction mining leases and composite licenses for 24 critical and strategic minerals (like lithium and cobalt).
    3. Overseas acquisition through KABIL: Khanij Bidesh India Limited (KABIL), a joint venture of state-owned firms for overseas mineral assets, has secured acreage in Argentina’s Catamarca province for lithium exploration.
    4. Domestic rare-earth corridors: The 2026-27 Budget proposed rare-earth corridors in Odisha, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu.
    5. Diplomatic diversification: The India-United States critical minerals and rare earths framework signed in May 2026 provides an additional lever to diversify supply away from a single source.

    What are the challenges to India’s critical mineral security?

    1. Midstream absence: Without high-purity refining, India cannot participate meaningfully in supply-chain realignment even where it mines the raw ore.
    2. Import dependence for battery metals: Continued reliance on imported lithium, cobalt and nickel leaves electric-vehicle and storage ambitions exposed to external disruption. India imports more than 70% of its lithium-ion battery requirements from China and Hong Kong.
    3. Long lead times: Exploration, clearances and processing plants take years, so near-term vulnerability persists regardless of policy intent.
    4. Recycling feedstock is thin: Collection systems, feedstock volumes and technology remain limited, so recycling cannot yet offset primary shortfalls. Only 5% to 10% of digital waste in India is being systematically recycled, the rest is being wasted.
    5. No strategic stockpile in place: India has not yet operationalised buffer stocks for critical minerals, leaving it without a cushion against sudden export controls abroad.

    Conclusion

    Mineral security now defines India’s industrial and strategic trajectory, and the decisive gap is not reserves but processing and refining capacity. Individual measures are necessary but insufficient without a comprehensive strategy that sets mineral-specific risk thresholds, integrates recycling, builds strategic stockpiles and creates a coordinated institutional framework. The priority is to convert domestic potential into refining capability and reduce strategic vulnerability through sustained execution.

    Back2Basics

    National Critical Mineral Mission:

    1. Launched by the Union government to secure the critical mineral value chain, from exploration to recycling.
    2. Nodal ministry: Ministry of Mines.
    3. Minerals identified: 30 critical minerals notified for India.
    4. Key targets: 1,200 domestic exploration projects by 2030-31, production of at least 15 critical minerals, and acquisition of 50 overseas mining assets.
    5. KABIL: Khanij Bidesh India Limited, a joint venture of NALCO, Hindustan Copper and Mineral Exploration Corporation, tasked with acquiring strategic mineral assets abroad.
    6. Legal backing: The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 was amended in 2023 to empower the Central Government to auction leases for specified critical minerals.

    Strategic Critical Minerals Cooperation Framework (India and USA)

    1. India and the United States signed the Strategic Critical Minerals Cooperation Framework on May 26, 2026, in New Delhi.
    2. The agreement was finalized to secure supply chains, boost clean energy manufacturing, and reduce reliance on single-source monopolies like China.

    Key Goals of the Partnership

    1. Supply Chain Security: Protects sensitive mineral and rare earth networks from coercive market practices.
    2. Collaboration Areas: Focuses heavily on joint mining, advanced processing, recycling, and scrap management.
    3. Broader Alignment: Coordinates with plurilateral efforts like the Quad Critical Minerals Initiative and the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement (FORGE).

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2025] Consider the following statements:

    I. India has joined the Minerals Security Partnership as a member. II. India is a resource-rich country in all the 30 critical minerals that it has identified. III. The Parliament in 2023 has amended the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 empowering the Central Government to exclusively auction mining lease and composite license for certain critical minerals.

    Which of the statements given above are correct? (a) I and II only (b) II and III only (c) I and III only (d) I, II and III

    Answer: (c)

  • In Indo-Pacific, a steady projection of power, Quad, Great Nicobar

    Why in the News

    India has agreed to build a trilateral Track 1.5 dialogue mechanism with Japan and the Philippines and continues developing the $10 billion Great Nicobar Island Development Project near the Strait of Malacca. These moves mark a shift from India’s earlier cautious, ambiguity-preserving approach to the Indo-Pacific toward more visible geostrategic positioning, raising the question of whether India is emerging as a third power in the region alongside the United States and China.

    What is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)?

    1. Quad: The Quad is a strategic dialogue between the United States, Japan, Australia and India, first conceived in 2007 and formally revived in 2017, working toward a free, open and inclusive Indo-Pacific without a permanent secretariat or headquarters.

    How has India’s engagement with the Indo-Pacific evolved under the current government?

    1. Summit participation: India’s Prime Minister has attended 12 ASEAN-India Summits, nine East Asia Summits, and all six Quad leader-level summits held since 2021.
    2. Bilateral visits: The Prime Minister has visited Japan eight times, Singapore five times, Indonesia four times and Australia three times over the past decade.
    3. Engagement with China: Despite bilateral differences, the Indian and Chinese leaders have crossed paths over 20 times in the last 12 years, though not all of these constituted serious engagements.

    Why did India historically avoid an assertive framing of its Indo-Pacific role?

    1. Deliberate ambiguity: While the US proposed “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” as the Quad’s motto, India added the word “inclusive,” leaving open the question of which countries the grouping might exclude.
    2. ASEAN Centrality: India proclaimed the concept of “ASEAN Centrality” for the Indo-Pacific at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in 2017, positioning Southeast Asian nations rather than any single power at the centre of the framework.
    3. China and Russia’s rejection: China and Russia refused to adopt the term “Indo-Pacific.” China’s foreign minister in 2018 dismissed it as an effort by Western powers to encircle and contain China.

    What signals a shift toward more assertive geostrategic positioning?

    1. Great Nicobar project: The $10 billion Great Nicobar Island Development Project sits just 40 nautical miles north of the Strait of Malacca, a route that carries around 100,000 ship crossings annually, 60% of them Chinese-flagged, positioning India’s own maritime infrastructure directly along a critical Chinese trade corridor.
    2. New trilateral mechanism: India formally agreed to build a Track 1.5 dialogue with Japan and the Philippines during the Japanese Prime Minister’s visit to Delhi in July, extending Indian engagement into the East and South China Seas, a traditionally tense maritime zone.
    3. Beyond trade and technology: These engagements involve defence deals and strategic maritime collaboration, not only economic cooperation.

    What does the rise in Japanese and South Korean defence spending show about the region’s security environment?

    1. Japan: Japan raised its defence budget to $58 billion last year, moving toward a 2027 target of 2% of GDP.
    2. South Korea: South Korea has increased its defence spending to almost $45 billion, with a target of 3.5% of GDP by 2035.
    3. Shared driver: Both increases reflect a regional assessment that US engagement in the Indo-Pacific is waning even as the challenge posed by China’s rise continues to grow.

    Conclusion

    India’s recent Indo-Pacific moves, from the Great Nicobar project to the new Japan-Philippines trilateral, mark a departure from its earlier gradualist posture built around ASEAN Centrality and deliberate ambiguity. Whether India can sustain this more assertive positioning while preserving its strategic autonomy remains unresolved.

    Back2Basics

    1. Quad: Formed as a concept in 2007, formally revived in 2017.
    2. Headquarters: No formal headquarters; it functions as a strategic dialogue rather than a treaty organisation.
    3. Mandate: Strategic dialogue between the US, Japan, Australia and India on maritime security, counter-terrorism and connectivity in the Indo-Pacific.
    4. Great Nicobar Island Development Project: A roughly $10 billion project on Great Nicobar Island approved in 2022, comprising an international container transshipment terminal, a greenfield international airport, a power plant and a township, and the subject of ongoing environmental and tribal rights concern over its impact on Nicobarese and Shompen communities and coastal biodiversity.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2020] ‘Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)’ is transforming itself into a trade bloc from a military alliance, in present times. Discuss.

    Linkage: The PYQ tests the Quad’s evolving role in the Indo-Pacific strategic architecture and regional security. The article highlights India’s more assertive Indo-Pacific strategy through the Quad, new minilateral partnerships, and maritime initiatives like Great Nicobar.

  • Tariff-free Scottish salmon under UK-India CETA

    Why in the News

    The first tariff free shipment of Scottish salmon reached Bengaluru on July 31 under the UK India Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA), eliminating India’s earlier 33 percent import tariff on the product. A single consignment marks the transition of a trade agreement from signed text into commercial reality, with industry estimating up to £130 million in additional export opportunity for Scotland’s salmon sector over the next decade.

    What is the UK India CETA?

    1. Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA): CETA is the bilateral free trade agreement between the United Kingdom and India that eliminates or reduces tariffs across a wide range of goods and services traded between the two countries, recently operationalised as part of the broader India-UK Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

    Why does the tariff removal matter?

    1. Immediate price effect: Removing the 33 percent import tariff makes Scottish salmon significantly cheaper for Indian importers and retailers, directly affecting shelf pricing for consumers.
    2. Early proof of implementation: A commercial shipment moving within months of the agreement taking effect signals that CETA’s tariff schedules are being implemented on the ground, not just agreed on paper.
    3. Export opportunity for Scotland: Industry estimates suggest the tariff elimination could unlock up to £130 million in additional export opportunities for Scotland’s salmon sector over the next decade.

    What are the challenges to realising CETA’s full trade potential?

    1. Cold chain and logistics: Perishable goods such as fresh salmon require reliable cold chain logistics from the United Kingdom to Indian cities, infrastructure that must scale alongside tariff-driven demand growth.
    2. Domestic industry exposure: Cheaper imported salmon could pressure India’s own aquaculture and seafood sector as volumes scale beyond this early shipment.
    3. Uneven sector by sector implementation: Tariff elimination for individual products such as salmon does not guarantee equally smooth implementation across CETA’s other covered sectors, some of which involve more complex regulatory alignment.
    4. Consumer market development: Realising the full projected export opportunity depends on Indian consumer demand for premium imported seafood growing at the pace industry estimates assume.

    Conclusion

    The Scottish salmon shipment is an early, narrow proof point for CETA’s tariff provisions rather than evidence of the agreement’s full commercial impact. Subsequent months will show whether tariff elimination translates into sustained trade volumes across the agreement’s broader list of covered goods.

  • What Chinese AI model Kimi’s success says about the next phase of US-China AI race

    Why in the News

    Moonshot AI’s Kimi K3, released in July with 2.8 trillion parameters, is being billed as the world’s largest open-weight artificial intelligence (AI) system, prompting Anthropic to accuse the Chinese company of illicitly extracting the capabilities of its Claude model. The episode echoes the shock caused by DeepSeek R1 in January 2025, and exposes a widening split between China’s open-weight AI strategy and the closed, proprietary approach favoured by leading US labs.

    What is Kimi K3?

    1. Kimi K3: Kimi K3 is an advanced AI model released by the Chinese company Moonshot AI, said to rival models from OpenAI and Anthropic, built as an “open-weight” system that can be downloaded and modified by developers.

    What is an open-weight AI model?

    1. Open-weight: An open-weight model allows developers to download its parameters, the numerical values that determine how the system responds to prompts, and run or customise it locally, unlike a closed model whose parameters remain proprietary.

    Open-Weight vs. Closed Models

    1. Open-Weight: Anyone can download the core files, study how it works, and run it offline.
    2. Closed Models: The code and numbers stay hidden on a company’s private servers, and you can only use it through a web page or an API.

    How does the Kimi K3 episode parallel the DeepSeek moment of January 2025?

    1. Prior shock: DeepSeek R1’s January 2025 release triggered global market panic after being compared favourably to leading US models, with OpenAI accusing DeepSeek of copying its technology.
    2. Repeated pattern: Kimi K3’s release in July 2026 has prompted a similar sequence, with Anthropic accusing Moonshot AI of illicitly extracting Claude’s capabilities and a US official describing it as an assault on economies that reward private capital and fair competition.
    3. Chinese countercharge: China’s Commerce Ministry responded by accusing the US of “AI hegemonism.”

    Why is China favouring an open-weight strategy over proprietary models?

    1. Chip supply constraints: Chinese developers face chip supply constraints from Western export restrictions and domestic production bottlenecks, limiting their capacity to support commercial access to a closed model.
    2. Ecosystem building: Chinese labs use open weights to reach developers faster and build an ecosystem around their models, generating demand more quickly than a closed, enterprise-only distribution model would allow.
    3. Custom licensing approach: Kimi K3 uses a hybrid model, open-weight for most users but requiring large companies to strike a commercial agreement with Moonshot, an approach described as unusual among popular open-weight releases.
    4. Diplomatic dimension: China increasingly presents open models as part of international technological cooperation, illustrated by a new Chinese government AI governance body launched this month.

    What does the US industry debate reveal about the open versus closed model split?

    1. Industry open letter: Industry figures have called for the US to shift toward open-weight models, arguing that open-source software already underlies most of the internet and systems used by the US military and federal agencies.
    2. Divergent incentives: Companies behind AI infrastructure, such as chip makers, have generally favoured open-weight models to spread adoption and demand for their hardware, while companies with proprietary models, such as Anthropic, have expressed reservations about this shift.
    3. US investigation: The US government is reportedly investigating whether Moonshot AI illegally accessed advanced chips to train its models.

    Does China’s progress prove that US export controls have failed?

    1. Not proof of failure: Kimi K3’s capability does not prove that export controls have failed. It shows that progress in AI models depends on more than access to the most advanced chips.
    2. Gap still exists: Parity between US and Chinese AI companies remains distant, given the continuing US edge in compute capacity, capital, global distribution and chip access.
    3. Wider influence: The rise of Chinese AI companies could still give other countries more choice and lower-cost options for local deployment, extending China’s influence over global technical standards even without full parity.

    Conclusion

    Kimi K3 has intensified a two-player race for global AI dominance between the US and China, driven partly by a strategic divergence between China’s open-weight approach and the closed models favoured by leading American labs. Export controls have not stopped Chinese progress, but neither have they closed the underlying gap in compute, capital and distribution that still separates the two sides.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2026] Which of the following statements with regard to Large Language Models (LLMs) used in machine learning is/are correct?

    1. LLMs assign probabilities to the next possible words and then pick the one with the highest probability.

    2. LLMs process data through mathematical optimisation to minimise prediction errors.

    3. LLMs produce unbiased outputs.

    (a) 1 only (b) 1 and 2 only (c) 2 and 3 only (d) 1, 2 and 3.

  • Amnesty International report: India’s arms exports to Israel

    Why in the News?

    An Amnesty International report titled “Made in India” alleged that India exported over 2,500 shipments of small arms, ammunition and components to Israel between October 2023 and November 2025, raising concerns over compliance with international humanitarian law.

    Key Findings

    • Over 2,500 shipments of arms and ammunition-related items were exported.
    • At least 788 shipments were identified as having military purposes.
    • Exports reportedly included machine gun components, artillery shells and explosive warheads.
    • The report relies on shipment-level trade data rather than aggregate trade statistics.

    Why is it Significant?

    • Raises concerns regarding India’s defence exports amid the Gaza conflict.
    • Brings attention to issues of international humanitarian law (IHL) and arms transfers.
    • Highlights the growing India-Israel defence partnership.

    Challenges

    • Balancing strategic defence cooperation with international legal obligations.
    • Ensuring transparency and oversight of defence exports.
    • Reputational risks arising from allegations of complicity in conflict-related violations.

    Amnesty International

    • Established in 1961.
    • Headquarters: London, United Kingdom.
    • Global human rights organisation that investigates and campaigns against human rights violations.
    • Publishes the annual State of the World’s Human Rights report.

    International Humanitarian Law (IHL)

    • Also known as the Law of Armed Conflict.
    • Regulates the conduct of armed conflicts.
    • Primarily based on the Geneva Conventions (1949) and their Additional Protocols.
    • Protects civilians, prisoners of war and the wounded during armed conflict.

    India-Israel Defence Cooperation

    • Israel is among India’s major defence suppliers.
    • Cooperation includes: Missiles (Barak-8), UAVs (Heron), Radar systems, Electronic warfare equipment, and Small arms and ammunition

    Geneva Conventions (1949)

    • Four international treaties governing humanitarian protection during war.
    • India is a State Party to all four Geneva Conventions.

    United Nations Commission of Inquiry (COI)

    • Independent fact-finding mechanism established by the UN Human Rights Council.
    • Investigates alleged violations of international human rights and humanitarian law.

    [2015] Amnesty International is

    (a) an agency of the United Nations to help refugees of civil wars

    (b) a global Human Rights Movement

    (c) a non-governmental voluntary organization to help very poor people

    (d) an inter-governmental agency to cater to medical emergencies in war-ravaged regions.

  • Italy suspends Schengen pact with Spain amid Ceuta migrant crisis

    Why in the News?

    Around 60,000 migrants crossed from Morocco into Spain’s Ceuta enclave within 24 hours, prompting Italy to temporarily suspend the Schengen Agreement with Spain for one month by reintroducing border checks.

    What is the Schengen Area?

    • A passport-free travel zone that abolishes internal border checks among participating European countries.
    • Members maintain common external border controls.
    • Internal border checks may be temporarily reintroduced on grounds of national security or public order.

    What Happened in Ceuta?

    • Around 60,000 migrants attempted to enter Ceuta from Morocco.
    • At least 57 migrants died during the crossing.
    • Spain deployed the armed forces and additional police to restore order.
    • Morocco used tear gas to disperse migrants near the border.

    Why is it Significant?

    • Highlights vulnerabilities at the EU’s external borders.
    • Tests the functioning of the Schengen free movement system.
    • Demonstrates that one member state can temporarily restore internal border controls during security emergencies.
    • Raises concerns over irregular migration, border management and humanitarian protection.

    Challenges

    • Rising irregular migration and human smuggling.
    • Balancing border security with humanitarian obligations.
    • Coordination among EU member states.
    • Political tensions between Spain, Morocco and other EU members.

    Ceuta

    • An autonomous Spanish city on the north coast of Africa, bordering Morocco.
    • Together with Melilla, forms the European Union’s only land border with Africa.
    • Frequently used as an entry point for migrants seeking access to Europe.

    Schengen Area

    • Established under the Schengen Agreement (1985).
    • Schengen Convention: 1990.
    • Implemented from 1995.
    • Comprises 29 countries (25 EU members and 4 non-EU countries).
    • Non-EU Schengen Members: Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein

    [2019] Which of the following adopted a law on data protection and privacy for its citizens known as ‘General Data Protection Regulation’ in April 2016 and started implementation of it from 25th May, 2018?

    (a) Australia

    (b) Canada

    (c) The European Union

    (d) The United States of America.

  • [31st July 2026] The Hindu OpED: The Bay of Bengal as India’s SHANTI anchor

    PYQ Relevance
    [UPSC 2022]     What are the maritime security challenges in India? Discuss the organisational, technical and procedural initiatives taken to improve the maritime security.
    Linkage: It examines India’s maritime security challenges and initiatives to strengthen regional maritime governance.The article analyses SHANTI as India’s new framework to enhance maritime cooperation, security, and resilience in the Bay of Bengal through BIMSTEC.

    Mentor’s Comment

    The External Affairs Minister introduced Securing Holistic Advancement through Norms, Trust and Integrity (SHANTI) on 13 July while launching India’s candidature for the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 2028-29 term, naming the Bay of Bengal as the region to operationalise it first. The framework arrives in a region where growing naval and infrastructure capacity has outpaced any shared set of maritime norms among its littoral states.

    What is SHANTI?

    1. Full form and origin: SHANTI stands for Securing Holistic Advancement through Norms, Trust and Integrity, introduced on 13 July alongside India’s UNSC candidature announcement.
    2. Lineage: It builds on Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR), articulated in 2015 around the idea of equity in development, and Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions (MAHASAGAR), announced in 2025 to widen that vision to the interconnectedness of security across the Indo Pacific and the Global South.
    3. Function: SHANTI is presented as a normative framework, offering shared principles for maritime security, disaster response, the blue economy and environmental resilience, rather than a new institution or treaty.
    4. Rollout sequence: The Bay of Bengal is named as the first region where SHANTI is meant to move from principle to practice, before any wider application across the Indo Pacific.

    What is BIMSTEC?

    1. The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) is a regional grouping of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand, connecting South and Southeast Asia around the Bay of Bengal.
    2. At its National Security Advisers’ meeting in New Delhi in July 2026, BIMSTEC members adopted common principles for maritime law enforcement and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. They also agreed to hold their first joint maritime security exercise in the Bay in November 2026.

    Why is the Bay of Bengal treated as SHANTI’s proving ground?

    1. Strategic centrality: The Bay links India’s Act East policy with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), gives access to the Malacca Strait, and connects the eastern Indian Ocean to major global trade and energy routes.
    2. Comparative advantage: The western Indian Ocean is marked by active conflict and fragile economies. The Bay’s littoral states instead face similar, non military challenges such as cyclones, coastal erosion, fisheries management and undersea cable protection, which makes cooperation more feasible than confrontation.
    3. Institutional gap: The region is not short of institutions but suffers from fragmentation among them, and SHANTI is framed as a common framework to align existing mechanisms rather than add another one.
    4. Geopolitical pressure: China’s reliance on the Malacca Strait, often called its Malacca dilemma, has driven an expanding Chinese presence through ports and infrastructure projects in the same littoral states SHANTI seeks to anchor.

    Can SHANTI move beyond being another acronym?

    1. Fragmentation risk: The region’s stated problem is institutional fragmentation, and a new framework risks adding to that fragmentation unless it visibly aligns existing mechanisms.
    2. Stewardship versus dominance: India’s convening role depends on being accepted as a preferred security partner and first responder, a position that rests on restraint rather than the naval and economic weight India commands in the region.
    3. Early stage outputs: Concrete outcomes so far are limited to a declaration of common principles, a first joint maritime exercise scheduled for November 2026, and a white shipping information sharing agreement still under discussion, none of which are yet operational.
    4. Norms without enforcement: SHANTI rests on shared principles rather than a binding treaty, leaving compliance dependent on the willingness of littoral states rather than an enforceable obligation.

    What are the challenges to SHANTI?

    1. Overlap with existing bodies: SHANTI must coordinate with, rather than duplicate, existing mechanisms such as BIMSTEC, the Indian Ocean Rim Association and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, each with its own membership and mandate.
    2. Financing gap: Disaster response, undersea cable protection and blue economy cooperation require capital that several BIMSTEC members cannot supply on their own, raising the risk that shared projects become dependent on Indian or external financing.
    3. Limited replicability: The Bay of Bengal is easier ground precisely because it lacks the active conflict of the western Indian Ocean, so success there does not guarantee the same framework will work in more contested Indo Pacific waters.
    4. Competing infrastructure presence: Continued Chinese port and infrastructure investment in the same littoral states complicates India’s claim to a natural convening role.
    5. Dependence on voluntary compliance: Because SHANTI is a set of norms rather than a binding agreement, its durability depends on continued political will among BIMSTEC members rather than any enforcement mechanism.

    Conclusion

    SHANTI’s substance will not be judged by its acronym but by whether the Bay of Bengal’s BIMSTEC linked initiatives, the first joint maritime exercise due in November 2026 and the pending white shipping information sharing agreement, convert shared principles into functioning practice. Until those steps are completed, SHANTI remains a stated framework rather than a demonstrated one.

    Back2Basics:

    BIMSTEC

    1. The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation was formed in 1997 and renamed after Bhutan and Nepal joined in 2004, expanding it from its original five members to seven.
    2. Its secretariat is based in Dhaka, Bangladesh, and its membership spans Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Thailand.
    3. The 6th BIMSTEC Summit, held in Bangkok in April 2025, adopted the Bangkok Vision 2030 and a Maritime Transport Agreement covering national treatment for vessels, crew and cargo among member states.
    4. BIMSTEC connects South Asia and Southeast Asia and has expanded its cooperation beyond trade into security, disaster management, energy and connectivity.

  • [29th July 2026] The Hindu OpED: Iran’s Afghan balancing act amid regional upheaval

    PYQ Relevance
    [UPSC 2013]     The proposed withdrawal of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from Afghanistan in 2014 is fraught with major security implications for the counters of the region. Examine in light of the fact that India is faced with a plethora of challenges and needs to safeguard its own strategic interests.
    Linkage: The PYQ examines the regional security fallout of a foreign military withdrawal from Afghanistan. The article traces how the 2021 US withdrawal reshaped Iran’s Afghan calculus, a parallel instance of a withdrawal reordering regional strategic behaviour.

    Mentor’s Comment

    Delegations from both the Taliban and the rival Northern Alliance attended the funeral of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran. This dual presence exposed Iran’s continued refusal to fully commit to the Taliban government despite deep economic and diplomatic engagement with Kabul. The visit occurred while Iran was fighting a war in the west, raising the stakes of managing its eastern flank.

    Why does Iran’s history with the Northern Alliance still shape its Taliban policy today?

    1. Pre-2001 alignment: Iran backed the Northern Alliance against the Taliban through the 1990s, alongside India, Russia, and Tajikistan.
    2. Post-9/11 recalibration: Iran’s view of the Taliban shifted after the 9/11 attacks brought sustained Western military deployment to its borders.
    3. Non-recognition persists: Iran has built the strongest external influence in Kabul since 2021 but still withholds formal recognition of the Taliban government.
    4. Dual channel maintained: Iran hosted Taliban Deputy Prime Minister Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar and Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi alongside Northern Alliance leader Ahmed Massoud at the same funeral.

    How did the US withdrawal from Afghanistan reshape Iran’s regional calculus?

    1. Border threat removed: The August 2021 US withdrawal ended a two-decade military presence on Iran’s eastern border.
    2. Competing patronage exposed: Pakistan simultaneously backed the Taliban and the US-led war on terror, producing overlapping and contradictory interests.
    3. Contradiction on record: Osama bin Laden was found in Abbottabad in May 2011, in a house and not a cave, pointing to this dual role.
    4. A quieter front sought: Iran calculated that reducing conflict on its Afghan front would free up resources for other priorities.
    5. Limited patronage offered: Iran could offer the Taliban political legitimacy but only a limited amount of material patronage.

    Why does Iran keep hedging despite the Taliban’s declared wartime support?

    1. Support pledged: A Taliban spokesman close to emir Hibatullah Akhundzada said the group would support Iran if it came under attack. The extent of this support remains undefined.
    2. Access granted: The Taliban gave Iran access to Afghanistan’s civilian airports over the past year.
    3. Durability doubted: Iran treats an insurgency-turned-government as carrying a persistent question mark over its long-term stability.
    4. Internal fissures noted: Ideological and tribal divisions inside the Taliban require constant micromanagement.
    5. Power still consolidating: The Taliban is still solidifying control between Kabul, its political capital, and Kandahar, its ideological one.
    6. Institutional memory at play: Quds Force chief Esmail Qaani’s operational history traces back to the 1990s Taliban-Northern Alliance conflict. This history informs his current caution.

    Why does Iran engage both the Taliban and its opposition at once?

    1. Hedging strategy: Engaging both the recognised Taliban government and the Northern Alliance lets Iran preserve influence regardless of which side gains ground in Afghanistan’s internal balance of power.
    2. Border security concern: Iran shares a long border with Afghanistan, and instability on either side directly affects Iranian security, giving Tehran incentive to maintain channels with all major Afghan actors.
    3. Pakistan factor: Iran’s Afghanistan policy is shaped in part by its complex relationship with Pakistan, which has its own competing interests in Afghan internal politics.
    4. Regional war context: The West Asia war constrains Iran’s bandwidth and resources, making a flexible, multi track Afghan policy more practical than committing exclusively to one Afghan faction.

    What does the Iran-Pakistan wartime “brotherhood” reveal about the limits of regional alliances?

    1. Mediator role assumed: Pakistan positioned itself as a mediator between Tehran and Washington during the war.
    2. Divergent aims surfaced: Pakistan seeks favour with the US and Gulf partners, shown by its troop deployment in Saudi Arabia.
    3. Instrumental use by Iran: Iran uses the relationship as a channel to reach the US through a neighbour it knows, though does not fully trust.
    4. Bilateralism made incidental: The Iran-Pakistan relationship itself is secondary to each country’s separate external objectives.

    Conclusion

    Iran’s simultaneous engagement with the Taliban and the Northern Alliance is a hedging strategy shaped by the West Asia war’s demands on its resources and by its complicated relationship with Pakistan. The approach preserves Iranian influence in Afghanistan without requiring Tehran to bet its regional position on one Afghan faction’s success.

    Back2Basics

      Key Terms

      1. IRGC (Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps): Iran’s ideological military force, separate from its regular armed forces.
      2. Quds Force: IRGC’s branch handling external operations and foreign militant networks.
      3. Northern Alliance: A coalition of anti-Taliban Afghan factions, historically backed by Iran, India, and Russia.

    1. India’s strategic thinking should shift from border “geography” to a “geometry of interests”

      Why in the News

      India’s strategic thinking should shift from a border centric “geography” view to a broader “geometry of interests” spanning the Gulf, Central Asia, the Indo-Pacific and maritime domains.

      Why is a border centric strategic view seen as inadequate?

      1. Narrow threat framing: A geography centric view concentrates strategic attention on land borders with Pakistan and China, underweighting maritime and extended neighbourhood interests.
      2. Expanding interest map: India’s energy security, diaspora, and trade interests in the Gulf, Central Asia and the Indo-Pacific now carry strategic weight comparable to border security concerns.
      3. Maritime domain gap: A geography first framing has historically under-prioritised India’s maritime domain, despite its growing dependence on sea lanes for energy and trade.

      Conclusion

      The central idea is that India’s strategic doctrine has not kept pace with the expansion of its actual interests beyond its land borders. A “geometry of interests” framing would reallocate strategic attention toward the Gulf, Central Asia, the Indo-Pacific and maritime domains in proportion to their real weight in India’s security and economic interests.

    2. India’s “almost great power” status collides with domestic polarisation and stalled reform

      Why in the News

      India’s “almost great power” status is assessed against domestic political polarisation and stalled economic reforms. The piece argues these widen the gap between India’s geopolitical ambition and its material capability.

      Why does the gap between ambition and capability persist?

      1. Reform stall: Structural economic reforms needed to sustain great power level growth rates have slowed, limiting the material base India’s geopolitical ambitions depend on.
      2. Domestic polarisation: Political polarisation at home diverts governance bandwidth and consensus building capacity away from the sustained reform effort great power status requires.
      3. Capability versus signalling: India’s diplomatic signalling of great power ambition has outpaced the material capability, in economic scale and military modernisation, needed to back that signalling consistently.

      Conclusion

      The central idea is that India’s great power ambition is a signalling exercise running ahead of the material capability domestic reform stagnation and polarisation have failed to build. Closing the gap requires resuming the reform effort at home, not further diplomatic signalling abroad.