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Subject: International Relations

  • India, Kuwait hold inaugural key dialogue in Delhi to bolster defence ties

    Why in the News

    India and Kuwait held the inaugural meeting of the India-Kuwait Joint Defence Committee in New Delhi on August 28. Both sides agreed to expand bilateral defence cooperation across training, military exercises, industry, and research and development. The meeting operationalises the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on Defence Cooperation signed during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Kuwait in December 2024.

    Why does an institutionalised defence dialogue with Kuwait matter for India?

    1. A first standing forum with a Gulf monarchy on defence: The Joint Defence Committee gives India and Kuwait a recurring institutional channel, rather than one-off visits, to advance training, joint exercises, defence industry links and research and development.
    2. Extends India’s Gulf defence footprint beyond energy ties: India’s engagement with the Gulf has historically centred on energy imports and the diaspora; a dedicated defence committee with Kuwait signals a broadening of the relationship into security cooperation, alongside similar frameworks India already runs with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
    3. Kuwait sits at a sensitive maritime chokepoint: Kuwait’s location near the head of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz gives India a stake in the security of a route through which a large share of its crude oil imports transit.

    Challenges to the India-Kuwait defence relationship

    1. Limited defence-industrial base on the Kuwaiti side: Kuwait’s domestic defence manufacturing capacity is minimal, so cooperation is likely to stay import and training-oriented rather than co-production, unlike some of India’s other defence partnerships. Eg. India’s co-production discussions with the United States on the Javelin missile system have no current parallel in the Kuwait relationship. Fix. Use the Joint Defence Committee’s industry track to identify smaller co-development areas, such as maintenance, repair and overhaul services, where Kuwait’s capacity constraints are less binding.
    2. Competing suppliers already entrenched in the Gulf: Gulf states, including Kuwait, have longstanding defence procurement relationships with the United States, the United Kingdom and France, which limits the near-term scope for India to secure large equipment sales. Eg. Kuwait’s air defence and fighter fleets are built around US and European platforms, leaving India’s defence exports pitch centred on niche systems and services rather than big-ticket sales.

    Conclusion

    The inaugural Joint Defence Committee meeting converts the 2024 MoU into a standing institutional mechanism, marking a modest but concrete step in India’s effort to deepen security ties with the Gulf beyond energy and trade. The substantive test will be whether the committee produces actual joint exercises, training exchanges or industry tie-ups before its next meeting.

    What is the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)?

    1. A regional grouping, not Kuwait’s own body: The Gulf Cooperation Council is a political and economic union of six Gulf Arab states, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman, formed in 1981 to coordinate economic, security and foreign policy matters among them.
    2. India engages the GCC bilaterally, not as a bloc: India does not have a defence framework with the GCC as a single entity; agreements such as the Joint Defence Committee are negotiated bilaterally with individual member states like Kuwait.
  • India seals deal to purchase Javelin anti-tank missile system from US

    India seals deal to purchase Javelin anti-tank missile system from US

    Why in the News

    India has finalised a deal to buy the Javelin anti-tank guided missile system from the United States, with the Indian Army signing a Letter of Offer and Acceptance through the US Foreign Military Sales process. The US Embassy called the signing a “milestone” that strengthens the US-India Major Defence Partnership and opens discussions on co-production, extending a series of recent India-US defence deals that followed Operation Sindoor.

    What is the Javelin system, and how was the deal concluded?

    1. A man-portable, fire-and-forget missile: The Javelin is a single, man-portable, fire-and-forget, medium-range anti-tank guided missile designed for use against armoured vehicles and fortified positions. “Fire-and-forget” means soldiers do not need to remain exposed after launch, and “man-portable” means it can be carried by soldiers, a combination that makes it particularly effective.
    2. Produced by a joint venture, used by Ukraine: The Javelin is manufactured by the Javelin Joint Venture, a partnership between RTX and Lockheed Martin, and is used by the US Army and Marine Corps as well as several international customers, including Ukraine in its war with Russia.
    3. A prior clearance preceded the final signing: In November last year, the US had approved a possible foreign military sale of 100 FGM-148 Javelin rounds, one Javelin missile and 25 Javelin Lightweight Command Launch Units and related equipment, estimated at $45.7 million, ahead of Friday’s signed agreement.

    What does the deal signal for US-India defence ties?

    1. Co-production is now under discussion: US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth said in May that Washington had committed to pursuing co-production of Javelin munitions with India, calling it a real, tangible step to improve the collective readiness of both forces.
    2. Part of a broader run of recent procurements: The Javelin purchase follows India’s acquisition of 216 M982A1 Excalibur tactical projectiles, a planned purchase of six additional Boeing P-8I maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare aircraft, US approval of support services and equipment for Apache helicopters worth $198.2 million, a five-year, Rs 7,995 crore support agreement for the MH-60R helicopter fleet, and an October 2024 deal for 31 MQ-9B High Altitude Long Endurance drones.
    3. Built on the 2024 defence partnership framework: India and the US signed the framework for the US-India Major Defence Partnership last October, a framework the current wave of procurements, including the Javelin deal, sits within.

    What is the Foreign Military Sales process?

    A government-to-government US arms transfer route: Foreign Military Sales is the US government’s mechanism for selling defence equipment and services to foreign governments, under which the US government, rather than the manufacturer directly, administers the sale.

  • To Zohran Mamdani: The RSS chief you may not know

    Why in the News

    A senior advocate who served as one of three mediators in the Ayodhya-Babri Masjid-Ram Janmabhoomi dispute has written an open letter responding to New York Mayor Zohran Mamdani’s criticism of Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) chief Mohan Bhagwat, recounting Bhagwat’s role in restraining celebration after the 2019 Ayodhya settlement and in the later Gyanvapi mosque controversy in Varanasi. The piece sets Bhagwat’s public restraint against a moment when the judiciary itself, rather than the RSS, departed from the settled position on the Places of Worship Act, 1991.

    What role did Bhagwat play around the Ayodhya settlement?

    1. Restraint after the 2019 verdict: Bhagwat insisted there should be no celebration or jubilation over the Ayodhya outcome, since this would be provocative to the other side, and the moment passed largely without triggering wider unrest.
    2. A stated limit on the RSS’s claims: Bhagwat said the RSS’s interest was confined to the Ram Mandir and that it was not seeking to reclaim any other place of worship, a statement the writer says helped temper the Vishva Hindu Parishad’s publicly stated list of other disputed mosques.

    What happened in the Gyanvapi case, and how did Bhagwat respond?

    1. A departure from precedent in the Gyanvapi ruling: Justice D.Y. Chandrachud, then a puisne judge who had earlier delivered part of the Ayodhya judgment, remarked in the Gyanvapi case that it remained open to the court to examine whether the site was a mosque or a temple, a position the writer characterises as a departure from the Ayodhya judgment’s own reasoning on the Places of Worship Act.
    2. Bhagwat’s public intervention: Bhagwat responded the following day by saying “one cannot go looking for shivlings in every mosque,” a statement the writer frames as running counter to the direction the Court’s own remark had opened up.

    Conclusion

    The writer argues that Bhagwat’s recorded public positions, restraint after Ayodhya and the remark against searching for shivlings in every mosque, reflect a stated commitment to inter-community harmony that Mamdani’s criticism of the RSS chief does not account for, and proposes that the two meet and talk during Bhagwat’s visit to the United States.

    What is the Places of Worship Act, 1991?

    1. Statutory freeze on religious character: The Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act, 1991 mandates that the religious character of every place of worship, as it existed on 15 August 1947, be maintained and prohibits its conversion, with the Ayodhya dispute exempted as a case already in litigation when the law was enacted.
    2. Held to embody a Basic Structure value: In the Ayodhya judgment, the Supreme Court held that the Act embodies the constitutional values of secularism and is part of the Basic Structure of the Constitution.
  • FM: Closer India-Canada economic ties important amid global uncertainty

    FM: Closer India-Canada economic ties important amid global uncertainty

    Why in the News

    The Union Finance Minister has said closer economic cooperation between India and Canada carries greater significance amid a rapidly changing global landscape marked by geopolitical uncertainty, and called for stronger partnerships to build resilient, sustainable and inclusive economies. The remarks came after the inaugural India Canada Economic and Financial Dialogue, the first such dialogue between the two countries. The Finance Minister said the dialogue reflects a shared ambition to move beyond traditional trade in goods and services toward a deeper partnership covering investment, finance, capital markets and regulatory cooperation.

    What is the India Canada Economic and Financial Dialogue?

    1. About: It is a bilateral mechanism between the Indian and Canadian finance ministries to coordinate on macroeconomic policy, financial sector cooperation and multilateral economic issues, launched with its inaugural round.
    2. Scope of discussions: The inaugural round covered three areas, macroeconomic developments and domestic policy priorities in both countries, avenues for financial sector cooperation, and broader international and multilateral cooperation on shared interests.
    3. Anchored in a wider strategic goal: The Prime Minister and his Canadian counterpart have set an ambitious goal for strengthening bilateral ties, and the dialogue is meant to give that goal fresh momentum and direction.

    What case did the Finance Minister make for closer India Canada cooperation?

    1. Global uncertainty is the backdrop: The Finance Minister described the world as going through a profound transformation with constantly evolving geopolitical and economic realities, making resilient partnerships more important.
    2. India’s economy was presented as a stable partner: The Finance Minister highlighted India’s “remarkable macroeconomic resilience” and pointed to complementarities between the two economies as grounds for expanding investment and economic cooperation.

    What specific areas of financial cooperation did the two sides identify?

    1. Cross border payments and financial stability: The two sides explored cooperation on cross border payment systems and measures to safeguard financial stability.
    2. Fintech and capital markets: Discussions also covered cooperation in financial technology and capital markets, part of the plan to move beyond goods and services trade into deeper financial integration.

    Conclusion

    The inaugural dialogue has set out macroeconomic policy coordination, financial sector cooperation and multilateral engagement as its three working areas. No date has been set for the next round, but the framework is intended to carry forward the broader bilateral goal the Prime Minister and his Canadian counterpart have set for the relationship.

  • India’s return to its Central Asian neighbourhood

    India’s return to its Central Asian neighbourhood

    Why in the News

    The Prime Minister is set to travel to Central Asia, beginning with a state visit to Uzbekistan and followed by participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit of Heads of State in Bishkek, the Kyrgyz capital once called Frunze in Soviet times. The visit follows a decade long build up in India’s outreach to the region, a landmark 2015 tour of all five Central Asian states, India’s entry into the SCO as a full member in 2017, and the invitation extended to all five Central Asian leaders as chief guests for Republic Day in 2022. Central Asia sits between Russia and China, both of which still shape its politics and economy, while Pakistan seeks to claim the region’s historical and religious lineage as its own. The visit tests how far India can convert a civilisational and diplomatic relationship into a substantive one without a shared land border.

    Why does India treat Central Asia as its neighbourhood despite the absence of a land border?

    1. A civilisational link substitutes for geography: Central Asia shares deep ties with India in culture, religion, language and architecture, and India is separated from Tajikistan only by the narrow Wakhan corridor inside Afghanistan.
    2. Pakistan contests this claim: Pakistan seeks to use religious affinity to claim the region’s historical lineage for itself and to cut India off from these connections, an approach that has not succeeded so far.
    3. The region is turning outward: Central Asian states are increasingly looking beyond Russia and China for development partners, and view India’s plural, moderate and democratic experience with admiration rather than suspicion.

    How has India built its Central Asia engagement over the past decade?

    1. The 2015 visit ended a policy of deference: The Prime Minister’s 2015 tour of all five Central Asian states marked the end of India’s earlier practice of deferring to Russia in what it treated as Moscow’s periphery.
    2. SCO membership followed in 2017: India was admitted to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as a full member in 2017, the same year Pakistan was admitted, sponsored respectively by Russia and China.
    3. A dialogue mechanism followed the pandemic: An unprecedented invitation to all five Central Asian leaders as Republic Day chief guests in 2022 was forced online by the COVID 19 pandemic, but still produced the India Central Asia Dialogue as a standing mechanism for cooperation.

    Why does the visit begin with Uzbekistan?

    1. Uzbekistan has been the region’s most dynamic reformer: Ties with Uzbekistan have improved steadily under its president since 2016, and the country is regarded as the most forward looking in the region on diversifying its foreign policy.
    2. Its counter terrorism record matters to India: Uzbekistan has taken an uncompromising line against terrorism and extremism, and its close knowledge of and pragmatic approach to Afghanistan and the Taliban is of direct value to India.
    3. It anchors India’s alternative connectivity plans: India has held detailed talks with Uzbekistan on alternative rail and road routes through Iran and Afghanistan, links that need to be revisited given recent developments in both countries.

    What other powers is India competing with in the region?

    1. Russia and China remain the dominant powers: Central Asia is landlocked between the two, and both continue to shape the region’s politics and economy even as their relative influence shifts, Russia’s weakening and China’s growing.
    2. Turkiye and Iran hold cultural and economic sway: Both countries are described as dominant influences in the region alongside Russia and China.
    3. The United States and European Union are entering the space: Both are working their way into Central Asia as Russia’s grip loosens.
    4. Radicalisation spillover from Afghanistan is a shared anxiety: China fears the spread of radicalisation into its border regions from Afghanistan, an anxiety the region shares along with memories of attacks such as the 2024 Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow.

    What is India’s position inside the SCO?

    1. The SCO has grown well beyond its founding core: What began as the “Shanghai Five” grouping in 1996 has grown, in its 25th year, to 10 members, 15 dialogue partners and two observers.
    2. India engages the SCO on geography, not ideology: India has been a regular participant at SCO Head of State meetings except in 2024, and has pushed ideas on economic, technological and civilisational cooperation, including a vision of security, connectivity and opportunity put forward at last year’s Tianjin summit.
    3. India offers a counterweight within the SCO’s China Pakistan dyad: Negotiating inside the SCO against a China Pakistan axis is demanding, and for a country as dependent on China as Kyrgyzstan, India’s presence in the SCO offers a genuine alternative.

    Challenges to India’s Central Asia outreach

    1. Weak physical connectivity limits how far ties can grow: India has no direct land or transit route into Central Asia, so trade and people movement rely on routes through third countries. Eg. Talks on alternative rail and road links through Iran and Afghanistan remain unfinished even after years of discussion. Fix. Operationalise the Chabahar port route and conclude a transit framework with Uzbekistan and other Central Asian states independent of Afghan transit uncertainty.
    2. China’s economic footprint outpaces India’s: China’s connectivity and trade financing in the region dwarf India’s presence in infrastructure and investment. Eg. China has built rail links and pipeline corridors connecting Central Asia directly to its own territory, a scale of investment India has not matched. Fix. Use lines of credit and the India Central Asia Dialogue to fund discrete, deliverable projects in energy, health and digital infrastructure rather than compete on scale.
    3. Russia’s traditional primacy still shapes the region’s security choices: Most Central Asian states retain security arrangements with Russia through the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, limiting how far they can diversify. Eg. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan continue to host Russian military bases. Fix. Build India’s security cooperation around counter terrorism training and disaster response, areas that do not compete with existing Russian linked security arrangements.

    Conclusion

    The visit signals a deliberate, structured attempt to convert a civilisational relationship into a strategic one, anchored first in Uzbekistan and then in the SCO platform. Connectivity gaps and the entrenched primacy of Russia and China in the region mean this return builds incrementally rather than displacing existing power structures. How far India can embed itself economically and strategically in Central Asia will depend on sustained follow through on the India Central Asia Dialogue rather than on the visit itself.

    Back2Basics

    What is the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation?

    1. Origin: It began in 1996 as the “Shanghai Five”, grouping China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and was renamed the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in 2001 when Uzbekistan joined.
    2. Mandate: It focuses on regional security, counter terrorism, economic cooperation and connectivity among its Eurasian member states.
    3. Headquarters: Its secretariat is based in Beijing.

    [2024] “Critically analyse India’s evolving diplomatic, economic and strategic relations with the Central Asian Republics (CARs) highlighting their increasing significance in regional and global geopolitics.”

  • India-China boundary talks: Some progress, but a long road ahead

    India-China boundary talks: Some progress, but a long road ahead

    Why in the News

    An eight point consensus has emerged from the 25th round of talks between the Special Representatives of India and China, the National Security Advisor and the Chinese Foreign Minister, held in Beijing. The talks come ahead of the expected visit of the President of China to India for the BRICS Summit. The outcomes include agreement to advance a framework for settling the boundary question through an Expert Group and a Working Group, and to establish two new hotlines in the Eastern and Middle Sectors. Whether this procedural progress marks the start of genuine boundary delimitation, or repeats a decades long pattern of confidence building measures that stall before they mature, remains contested.

    What is the Special Representatives mechanism on the India China boundary?

    1. A political level channel: The Special Representatives mechanism is the designated political level channel, held at the level of the National Security Advisor and the Foreign Minister, tasked with negotiating a framework for settlement of the boundary question.
    2. The current round: The 25th round of talks was held in Beijing between the National Security Advisor and the Chinese Foreign Minister.
    3. Its relationship to implementation bodies: It operates alongside implementation level mechanisms such as the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India China Border Affairs (WMCC), which handles border management and now houses the Expert Group and Working Group tasked with delimitation and management.

    What did the 25th round of talks agree to?

    1. Reaffirming peace along the border: The outcomes concern maintenance of peace and tranquillity in the border areas, and advancing negotiations on a framework for settlement of the boundary question in accordance with previous agreements.
    2. New task for the Expert Group and Working Group: There is a specific reference to advancing discussions through an Expert Group and a Working Group respectively, to explore an early harvest of boundary delimitation in appropriate sectors, and effective border management.
    3. Implementing an earlier understanding: The two sides agreed to implement last year’s understanding on additional General Level Mechanism or Senior Highest Military Commander meetings, along with establishing two hotlines in the Eastern and Middle Sectors.

    How has the border personnel meeting mechanism evolved since 1992?

    1. Origins in the Joint Working Group: In 1992, the Joint Working Group on the Boundary Question decided on confidence building measures such as Border Personnel Meetings, complementing forward movement on border trade.
    2. A subgroup that grew into an institutional mechanism: A subgroup of the Joint Working Group was created following the 1993 border peace and tranquillity agreement, the India China Expert Group of Diplomatic and Military Officials, which became the precursor to the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India China Border Affairs, set up in 2012.
    3. New meeting points identified after 1995: After the success achieved in 1995 on disengagement at Sumdorong Chu, Lipulekh in the Middle Sector and Dichu in the Eastern Sector were identified as additional military meeting points.
    4. Not every point could be operationalised: The plan for meetings at Lipulekh was abandoned for want of infrastructure and because of adverse weather conditions. A trial meeting at Dichu, in the Kibithu sector of Arunachal Pradesh’s Anjaw district and the site of a notable 1962 battle in which the Kumaon Regiment fought, was finalised, but the chosen site on Madan Ridge proved contentious and no further meetings took place there.
    5. The proposal was revived only in 2014: It was then decided to hold regular meetings at Wacha, opposite Damai on the Chinese side, in the same Kibithu sector, in addition to existing venues across Bum La in Arunachal Pradesh and Nathu La in Sikkim.

    What do the new hotlines add to existing India China contact channels?

    1. The understanding they build on: Last year, the two sides had reached agreement in principle on working towards additional General Level or Senior Highest Military Commander meetings in the Eastern and Middle Sectors, similar to the existing mechanism in the Western Sector at Chushul and Moldo.
    2. Existing channels already in place: Hotlines already exist at Daulat Beg Oldie and Chushul, with informal communication at Demchok in the Western Sector, and similar hotlines at Nathu La in Sikkim and at Bum La and Kibithu in the Eastern Sector.
    3. What the new hotlines could achieve: The two additional hotline channels agreed for the Eastern and Middle Sectors could strengthen this existing capacity and help defuse local tensions.

    What broader thaw in ties has this round of talks followed?

    1. Political level consensus behind the process: The Special Representatives are working to realise the consensus reached between the Prime Minister and the President of China at Kazan in October 2024, and at Tianjin in August 2025, on improving ties.
    2. Other signs of normalisation: The resumption of the Kailash Mansarovar Yatra, the restoration of direct flights, and the resumption of border trade are meaningful steps in the same direction.

    What tensions temper optimism about this round of talks?

    1. It would be premature to call this delimitation: It would be premature to suggest that substantive boundary delimitation has already begun in earnest, since the Expert Group and the Working Group under the Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination are only now explicitly tasked with finalising their respective terms of reference, meaning the framework is being created and the process is being activated only incrementally.
    2. The road ahead is long: The task of achieving an early and substantial harvest of boundary delimitation and border management may be long and arduous, requiring patient negotiations.
    3. Piecemeal progress against an unsettled whole: There is also the question of piecemeal progress against a more holistic settlement of differences along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), since neither the Sikkim subsector nor the Middle Sector are free from their own unresolved differences.
    4. Negotiators need to be equal to a vexed history: The negotiators must be empowered to engage in meaningful discussions and must have sufficient experience in handling a matter that has proved difficult for previous generations.

    Conclusion

    This round of Special Representative talks has advanced the procedural architecture for the India China boundary question, through new hotlines and a formal mandate for the Expert Group and Working Group, ahead of the expected visit of the President of China for the BRICS Summit. Genuine boundary delimitation has not yet begun, and the decades long history of the border personnel meeting mechanism shows that such confidence building steps can stall for years before they mature. Whether the newly mandated Expert Group and Working Group convert this round’s procedural momentum into an actual settlement remains to be seen.

    Back2Basics: Line of Actual Control (LAC)

    1. Definition: The LAC separates Indian controlled territory from Chinese controlled territory along the unsettled boundary between the two countries.
    2. Three sectors: It is divided into three sectors, the Eastern Sector covering Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim, the Middle Sector covering Uttarakhand and Himachal Pradesh, and the Western Sector covering Ladakh.

    “[2024, GS3, 15 marks] India has a long and troubled border with China and Pakistan fraught with contentious issues. Examine the conflicting issues and security challenges along the border. Also give out the development being undertaken in these areas under the Border Area Development Programme (BADP) and Border Infrastructure and Management (BIM) Scheme.”

  • Insurers can invest in NDB’s onshore rupee bonds, says IRDAI

    Insurers can invest in NDB’s onshore rupee bonds, says IRDAI

    Why in the News

    The Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDAI) has permitted insurers to invest in Maharajah INR Bonds, the onshore rupee bonds of the New Development Bank (NDB). The approval follows a representation from the NDB seeking clearance for the bonds, under which the bank proposes to raise Rs 25,000 crore over a five year period. The move assumes significance ahead of next month’s BRICS Summit in New Delhi.

    What is a Maharajah INR Bond?

    1. Definition: It is an onshore rupee bond issued in the Indian market by the New Development Bank.
    2. Purpose: Proceeds are intended to be raised over a five year period, totalling Rs 25,000 crore, for general corporate purposes and for financing or onward lending to sustainable development, sustainable infrastructure, and green and social projects in India.
    3. Legal classification: IRDAI has clarified that the proposed onshore rupee bond issuances by the NDB fall under the definition of securities under the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956.

    What has IRDAI approved and why does it matter now?

    1. The approval itself: IRDAI communicated its approval to insurers through a circular, permitting them to invest in the NDB’s Maharajah INR Bonds.
    2. What triggered it: The approval follows a representation from the NDB seeking clearance for the bond programme.
    3. Its timing: The approval assumes significance ahead of next month’s BRICS Summit in New Delhi, where the New Development Bank’s fundraising plans are likely to draw attention.

    Under what conditions can insurers invest, and what is the intent behind the approval?

    1. Widening the investment universe: IRDAI is permitting the investment to give insurers more scope for investments.
    2. Regulatory treatment: The investment will be treated as part of insurers’ approved investments and remains subject to norms laid down by the Government of India and to SEBI (Securities and Exchange Board of India) approval, among other conditions.
    3. Who stands behind the bonds: The New Development Bank is a multilateral development bank established by Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, the BRICS grouping.

    Conclusion

    IRDAI’s approval is a procedural but enabling step that widens the pool of domestic capital available to the New Development Bank ahead of the BRICS Summit in New Delhi. How much of the proposed Rs 25,000 crore is actually raised will depend on the bond issuance itself and on insurer appetite once it opens.

    Back2Basics: New Development Bank

    1. Formation: The New Development Bank was established in 2014 under the founding agreement of the BRICS grouping and became operational the following year.
    2. Headquarters: It is headquartered in Shanghai, China.
    3. Mandate: It mobilises resources for infrastructure and sustainable development projects in BRICS and other emerging and developing economies.
    4. Membership: It has since expanded its membership beyond its five founding countries to include other developing nations.

    [2014] “India has recently signed to become founding a New Development Bank (NDB) and also the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). How will the role of the two Banks be different? Discuss the significance of these two Banks for India.”

  • Can India build a strategic fuel system?

    Why in the News

    Disruptions related to West Asia have exposed a vulnerability in India’s energy security system. India imports large quantities of crude oil, liquefied natural gas (LNG) and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), but its ability to store, move and release these fuels during a prolonged disruption differs sharply by fuel. Against this, the government is considering a decade long strategic fuel programme that would add about 28 MT (million tonnes) of crude oil storage, 9 MT of LNG storage and 4 MT of LPG storage. The programme remains under consideration and should be treated as a proposed target rather than committed capacity.

    What is India’s proposed strategic fuel storage programme?

    1. Scale of the proposal: The decade long programme would add about 28 MT of crude oil storage, 9 MT of LNG storage and 4 MT of LPG storage, roughly 41 MT of combined new capacity.
    2. Purpose: The reserves are intended to provide nearly two months of crude oil and LNG demand cover and about six weeks of LPG demand cover during a prolonged supply disruption.
    3. Status: The programme remains under consideration and is a proposed target, not committed capacity.

    How much strategic fuel storage does India already have?

    1. Crude storage is the most developed: Phase I of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve provides 5.33 MT of underground capacity, with actual storage of about 3.37 MT, or roughly 63 to 64 percent utilisation, across Visakhapatnam, Mangaluru and Padur. A further 6.5 MT has been approved under Phase II at Chandikhol and Padur.
    2. Execution has lagged on Chandikhol: Work on the Chandikhol project remains slow amid ongoing land acquisition requirements and the finalisation of commercial public private partnership frameworks.
    3. LPG storage is a fraction of the proposed target: The Visakhapatnam and Mangaluru caverns together provide about 0.14 MT of capacity, so a proposed 4 MT reserve would represent roughly a thirty fold increase in underground LPG capacity.
    4. Natural gas has no underground storage at all: India currently has no operational underground gas storage facility, and its gas security instead depends on domestic production, LNG imports, import terminals, commercial inventories and pipelines.
    5. Capacity is not the same as usable inventory: A facility has a physical capacity, but the fuel it actually holds can vary, and not all inventory is immediately accessible. During a crisis, the critical measure is how much fuel is available and at what withdrawal rate it can reach consumers.

    What does the proposed 9 MT of LNG storage actually mean?

    1. Regasification capacity is not the same as strategic inventory: India already has substantial LNG import and regasification infrastructure, but a regasification terminal’s capacity to convert LNG into natural gas does not itself constitute strategic inventory.
    2. LNG storage and underground gas storage work differently: LNG is stored as a cryogenic liquid at around 162 degrees Celsius below zero, requiring specialised insulated tanks and management of boil off gas. Underground gas storage instead regasifies the LNG first and injects the resulting natural gas into a depleted reservoir or cavern.
    3. A narrower stress test already exists: A study by the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board (PNGRB) and the International Copper and Fertiliser (ICF) group examined how much additional LNG infrastructure would be needed to supply priority consumers for a stress period of 20 days by 2030, estimating a requirement of about 0.56 to 0.6 MT of LNG equivalent, achievable with roughly eight additional LNG tanks at a combined cost of about 1 billion dollars.
    4. The proposed reserve is an order of magnitude larger: Against the same study’s projection of roughly 58 MT of annual LNG imports, the proposed 9 MT works out to about 56 days of import cover, which is the basis for describing it as nearly two months of LNG import cover, not two months of India’s total gas consumption.

    Does all of India’s gas storage have to take the form of LNG tanks?

    1. A portfolio approach is possible: India could eventually use a combination of surface LNG tanks and underground natural gas storage rather than LNG tanks alone.
    2. A parallel proposal targets import terminals directly: A separate proposal from the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas would require LNG import terminals to maintain storage capacity 10 percent above their normal operating requirement, with the additional capacity available to the government during supply or price disruptions.
    3. Depleted reservoirs offer the largest potential volumes: Depleted oil and gas reservoirs, which account for 74 percent of global working gas volume, could provide much larger volumes of underground gas storage, while salt caverns allow faster injection and withdrawal, making them more suited to shorter duration balancing.
    4. India has candidate geology but not yet usable storage: India’s sedimentary basins, including Krishna, Godavari, Cambay, Mumbai Offshore and Rajasthan, offer potential locations, but moving from geological potential to usable storage requires subsurface investigation, site selection, engineering, construction, testing, filling and pipeline integration. Rajasthan’s salt bearing formations have similarly been investigated for solution mined caverns, with suitability depending on depth, thickness, purity, geometry, groundwater and mechanical properties.

    What does the United States Strategic Petroleum Reserve show about storage as a system?

    1. Scale achieved through salt caverns: The United States Strategic Petroleum Reserve holds an authorised capacity of 714 million barrels across 60 salt caverns.
    2. Storage works only as part of an infrastructure system: The American reserve functions as an integrated network of caverns, pipelines, marine terminals and refineries, showing that strategic storage is fundamentally an infrastructure system and not simply an underground space.

    How mature are India’s crude and LPG storage systems?

    1. Crude is the most mature component: India already operates underground crude caverns and has developed the associated engineering capabilities.
    2. LPG presents a much larger scaling challenge: LPG storage is technically proven in India, but a proposed 4 MT reserve would require a substantial network of new caverns or other storage facilities, together with import terminals, pipelines, pumping systems and bottling infrastructure.
    3. The Mangaluru cavern illustrates the complexity involved: Underground construction requires geological and hydrogeological investigation, rock mechanics analysis and groundwater management, particularly where work takes place alongside operating surface facilities.

    How is India strengthening the logistics that move fuel once it is stored?

    1. India is investing to reduce reliance on foreign shipping: State run oil refiners and the Shipping Corporation of India plan to invest 1.5 to 2 billion dollars in a joint venture to acquire 59 ships.
    2. Sourcing is being diversified too: Indian Oil is expanding sourcing through new 2027 agreements with Algeria and increased purchases from the United States, while exploring direct stakes in Very Large Gas Carriers to secure greater control over its supply chain.
    3. New pipelines are expanding delivery, not storage: The PNGRB has authorised approximately 1,800 km of new LPG pipelines across six States, involving investment of around 0.7 billion dollars. These pipelines improve connections between supply sources and inland markets and reduce dependence on road movement, but they do not themselves add strategic storage.
    4. Every storage form depends on connectivity to be useful: Underground gas storage is useful only if it can inject into and withdraw from the gas grid at the required rate. LNG tanks are useful only when regasification and downstream pipelines can move the gas onward, and LPG caverns require connections to bottling and distribution systems.

    Who pays for building and running the strategic reserves?

    1. The reported cost remains unconfirmed: A reported 42 billion dollar programme, which the government has yet to confirm, combines infrastructure capital expenditure with the cost of purchasing and maintaining strategic fuel inventories, with more than half expected to go towards storage infrastructure and the balance towards purchasing and filling the reserves.
    2. A cess has been ruled out: Financing is a genuine challenge, and the government has rejected reports that a cess would be charged to pay for the reserves.
    3. Replenishment carries its own cost and risk: Stocks released during a crisis would need to be replenished, potentially when commodity and freight prices are higher, so the policy needs to settle who owns and finances the inventory, minimum stock obligations, emergency release authority, and who bears replenishment and price risk.
    4. A mixed commercial and strategic model could ease the burden: A model that combines commercial and strategic use of the same capacity could reduce the public financing burden, provided the commercially used capacity remains available during emergencies.

    Is storage capacity alone enough for India’s energy security?

    1. Building capacity is only part of the equation: A strategic reserve is effective only if India can access the fuel, transport it inland, and replenish stocks after a release.
    2. Energy security depends on an integrated framework: Reserves buy time, shipping brings the next cargo, pipelines deliver fuel inland, and governance decides how emergency releases are executed, so the real test of the programme is its ability to coordinate all these elements at once when a crisis hits.

    Conclusion

    India’s existing storage differs sharply by fuel, with crude the most developed, LPG a limited underground footprint, and natural gas without any operational underground facility. The proposed 28 MT of crude, 9 MT of LNG and 4 MT of LPG storage would mark a major expansion, but the programme remains under consideration, and its value will depend as much on shipping, pipelines and financing arrangements as on the storage capacity itself.

    Back2Basics: Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board (PNGRB)

    1. Governing law: PNGRB was set up under the Petroleum and Natural Gas Regulatory Board Act, 2006.
    2. Jurisdiction: It regulates the downstream petroleum and natural gas sector, including refining, processing, storage, transport, distribution, marketing and sale of petroleum products and natural gas, excluding production and exploration.
    3. Mandate: It authorises and lays down technical and safety standards for gas and LPG pipelines and city gas distribution networks, and protects consumer interests while promoting competitive markets.
    4. Relevance here: It is the regulator behind the LPG pipeline authorisations and the LNG stress test study referenced in this item.

    [2025] “Energy security constitutes the dominant kingpin of India’s foreign policy, and is linked with India’s overarching influence in Middle Eastern countries.” How would you integrate energy security with India’s foreign policy trajectories in the coming years?”

  • Russia turns to India to meet petrol demand after oil infra takes a hit in Ukraine strikes

    Russia turns to India to meet petrol demand after oil infra takes a hit in Ukraine strikes

    Why in the News

    Repeated Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil refineries, combined with routine maintenance, strong summer demand and logistical bottlenecks, have cut Russia’s domestic petrol supply. Russia imported over one million barrels of petrol from India, mainly from Nayara Energy’s Vadinar refinery, over June and July 2026, according to ship tracking data.

    What does the trade data show?

    1. Rising volumes over two months: Gasoline exports from India to Russia rose from about 12,000 barrels per day in June 2026 to about 21,000 barrels per day in July 2026, together close to a million barrels, with the trend reported to have continued into August.
    2. Vadinar as the main Indian source: Three cargoes of around 320,000 to 350,000 barrels each were shipped to Russia from the Vadinar refinery, which has significant Russian shareholding. Additional volumes may have reached Russia through ship-to-ship transfers and vessels with undeclared destinations.
    3. Belarus and Kazakhstan remain the largest suppliers: Most of Russia’s imported gasoline still comes from Belarus, where one of two refineries is 42% owned by a Russian consortium and processes only Russian crude. Kazakhstan is a net petrol importer itself and cannot supply large volumes.
    4. Russia has restricted its own exports to protect domestic supply: Moscow has curbed diesel exports ahead of winter and placed volume limits on petrol sold per vehicle at fuel stations in several regions, since its refining system produces a comfortable diesel surplus but only a thin petrol buffer over domestic demand.

    Why does this mark a reversal in the India-Russia energy relationship?

    1. India’s established role has been as buyer, not supplier: Russian crude, discounted after Western sanctions cut off Moscow’s traditional European buyers following its invasion of Ukraine, now makes up the largest share of India’s crude import basket.
    2. The new flow runs in the opposite direction: India is now supplying a refined product back to Russia, derived in part from the same Russian crude it imports, a flow that did not exist before June 2026.

    Petrol vs Diesel Situation

    Petrol

    • More vulnerable to supply disruptions.
    • Domestic refinery output normally only slightly exceeds demand.
    • Russia has:
      • Restricted exports.
      • Limited petrol supplies at some fuel stations.
      • Adjusted product specifications to protect domestic availability.

    Diesel

    • Russia is relatively better supplied.
    • Its refining system produces more diesel than domestic consumption requires.
    • Nevertheless, Russia has also restricted diesel exports to build a cushion before winter.

    Why is India Important?

    • India has substantial refining capacity and exportable petroleum products.
    • Indian refineries continue to receive large quantities of Russian crude oil.
    • Some petrol exported to Russia may therefore be produced from Russian crude refined in India.
    • This creates an increasingly complex two-way India-Russia energy relationship.

    Conclusion

    The shift shows India’s refining capacity, especially at plants processing discounted Russian crude, has become a swing supplier for Russia’s own domestic fuel shortfall. Whether the flow continues depends on how quickly Russia can repair refining capacity damaged by continuing strikes.

    “[2024] Consider the following statements:
    Statement-I: Recently, Venezuela has achieved a rapid recovery from its economic crisis and succeeded in preventing its people from fleeing/emigrating to other countries.
    Statement-II: Venezuela has the world’s largest oil reserves.
    Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements?
    (a) Both Statement-I and Statement-II are correct and Statement-II explains Statement-I
    (b) Both Statement-I and Statement-II are correct, but Statement-II does not explain Statement-I
    (c) Statement-I is correct, but Statement-II is incorrect
    (d) Statement-I is incorrect, but Statement-II is correct

  • $100,000 fee for H-1B: The new legal route Trump is pursuing

    $100,000 fee for H-1B: The new legal route Trump is pursuing

    Why in the News

    The US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has proposed a new $103,265 fee on H-1B visa petitions, using a rulemaking route after a court struck down an earlier attempt to impose the same fee. The earlier fee had relied on a presidential proclamation, which a US court found exceeded executive authority. The administration is now pursuing the same outcome through a formal DHS rulemaking process instead. The move directly affects Indian workers, who receive the largest single-country share of H-1B visas, and sets up a tension between the United States’ stated intent to restrict low-cost skilled immigration and its technology sector’s dependence on Indian software professionals.

    What is the new legal route, and why does it matter?

    1. Rulemaking instead of proclamation: DHS is now proposing the fee through the standard federal rulemaking process, which carries stronger legal footing than a presidential proclamation but takes longer and includes a public comment period.
    2. Same fee, different vulnerability: A fee approved through rulemaking is harder to strike down in court than one imposed by proclamation, since it follows the procedure Congress has authorised for agency rule changes.

    What is the impact on Indian workers?

    1. Concentration of exposure: Indian nationals receive the largest single-country share of H-1B visas each year, so a steep new fee disproportionately raises the cost of hiring or transferring Indian technology professionals to the United States.
    2. Employer cost shift: US employers typically bear the H-1B fee, not visa applicants. The increase is likely to reduce new H-1B filings for Indian applicants rather than being absorbed by individual workers directly.

    Conclusion

    The Department of Homeland Security’s shift to a rulemaking process to reimpose the $100,000-plus H-1B fee is a more durable attempt to restrict skilled immigration than the earlier proclamation. The outcome for Indian workers now depends on the rulemaking’s public comment period and eventual finalisation, not merely a court challenge.

    Back2Basics: H-1B visa

    1. The H-1B is a US non-immigrant visa category for foreign workers in speciality occupations, typically requiring at least a bachelor’s degree in a related field.
    2. It is issued under an annual numerical cap, allocated through a lottery when applications exceed the cap.
    3. Indian nationals have consistently received the largest single-country share of H-1B approvals, concentrated in information technology roles.

    “[2023, GS2, 10 marks] Indian diaspora has scaled new heights in the West. Describe its economic and political benefits for India.”