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Subject: Polity

  • Political executive control over Delhi Police under Article 239AA comes under fresh scrutiny

    Why in the News

    The Supreme Court is hearing petitions on the police crackdown during the NEET protest. The case has brought attention to the political control over the Delhi Police under Article 239AA and renewed debate on police independence in light of the Ramlila Maidan and Prakash Singh judgments.

    What does Article 239AA provide for policing in Delhi?

    1. Definition: Article 239AA, inserted by the 69th Amendment Act, 1991, gives Delhi a Legislative Assembly and Council of Ministers but excludes police, public order and land from the elected government’s jurisdiction, keeping them with the Union government.
    2. Effect: Delhi Police answers to the Union Ministry of Home Affairs rather than the elected Delhi government, unlike police forces in full states.
    3. Ramlila Maidan precedent: The Supreme Court’s Ramlila Maidan ruling addressed the limits of police force against a peaceful assembly, a precedent invoked whenever Delhi Police’s crowd control conduct is questioned.
    4. Prakash Singh precedent: The Prakash Singh v Union of India ruling laid down police reform directions aimed at insulating police from political direction, directions Delhi Police’s Union government control tests differently than in the states.

    Why does this arrangement resurface during the NEET protest crackdown hearing?

    1. Command versus accountability: Delhi Police’s actions during the NEET protest crackdown are being scrutinised even though the elected Delhi government has no command authority over the force to answer for its conduct.
    2. Union political exposure: Because Delhi Police reports to the Union Home Ministry, its conduct during politically sensitive protests places the central government, not the local elected government, in direct line of accountability.

    Conclusion

    Article 239AA’s exclusion of police from Delhi’s elected government means every controversial policing decision in the capital, including the NEET protest crackdown, becomes a Union government accountability question by constitutional design. The Supreme Court’s hearing will test whether the Ramlila Maidan and Prakash Singh standards can be enforced within this centralised command structure

    Back2Basics

    Article 239AA:

    1. It was inserted by the 69th Constitutional Amendment Act, 1991.
    2. It grants Delhi a special Union Territory status with an elected Assembly, while reserving police, public order and land for the Union Government.

    Prakash Singh v. Union of India:

    It is a landmark 2006 Supreme Court of India public interest litigation judgment that issued seven binding directives to reform police forces, ensure fixed tenures for top officials, and insulate law enforcement from political control.

    Key Directives of the Judgment

    1. State Security Commission: Set up a body to check that state governments do not exercise unwarranted influence over the police.
    2. Fixed Tenure for DGP: Give the Director General of Police a minimum stable tenure of two years regardless of their retirement date.
    3. Fixed Tenure for Officers: Ensure field-level police officers (like SPs and SHOs) have a minimum two-year tenure on their postings.
    4. Separation of Functions: Separate the investigation of crime from day-to-day law and order duties.
    5. Police Establishment Board: Create a board to handle transfers, postings, and promotions for junior officers.
    6. Police Complaints Authority: Establish independent state and district bodies to handle public complaints against police misconduct.
    7. National Security Commission: Form a federal panel to pick and manage top-tier police standards at the national level.

  • The urban nightmare: a fire with no escape 

    Why in the News?

    Repeated urban fire tragedies, in Lucknow and Delhi, are rooted in illegal construction, weak enforcement, and fragmented urban local governance. There is a growing need of empowering local bodies as the structural fix.

    Why do fire tragedies keep recurring despite each one prompting an inquiry?

    1. Illegal construction persists: Buildings that violate fire safety norms continue to be built and occupied because enforcement action rarely follows a violation before a tragedy occurs.
    2. Fragmented authority: Fire safety clearance, building plan approval, and municipal enforcement are split across different agencies, none of which holds end to end accountability for a building’s safety compliance.
    3. Post-tragedy pattern: Each fire triggers an inquiry and short term crackdown, but enforcement lapses again once public attention moves on, indicating the response is reactive rather than preventive.
    4. Weak local body capacity: Urban local bodies, the level of government closest to individual buildings, lack the staffing and financial autonomy to conduct sustained enforcement.

    How does fragmented urban governance weaken accountability?

    1. Multiple agencies: Urban functions are divided among municipal corporations, development authorities, water boards, PWDs and transport agencies.
    2. No single authority: Responsibility is dispersed, making accountability difficult after disasters.
    3. Weak Urban Local Bodies: Municipal corporations have responsibilities but limited administrative and financial powers.
    4. State dominance: Major urban decisions remain under State governments rather than elected city governments.
    5. Governance vacuum: Citizens face one government, but responsibility is split among several agencies.

    Why is empowering Urban Local Bodies more important than launching new schemes?

    1. Constitutional basis: The 74th Constitutional Amendment, 1992 envisages democratic and empowered urban governance.
    2. Authority mismatch: Local bodies have functions but lack adequate powers and resources.
    3. Professional management: Cities require specialised urban planning and enforcement capacity.
    4. Clear accountability: One authority must be responsible for urban safety and regulation.
    5. Fearless enforcement: Building and fire safety laws must be insulated from political influence.

    Conclusion

    Illegal construction and weak enforcement are the proximate causes, but fragmented urban local governance is the structural one, since no single empowered local authority is accountable for preventing violations before they turn fatal. Empowering urban local bodies with real enforcement authority and resources is the fix the piece argues has been avoided.

    Back2Basics

    International fire safety and urban risk management rely on universally recognized frameworks and codes established by global organizations. These function as the benchmark for local building laws worldwide.

    Global Core Frameworks

    1. IFSS-CP (International Fire Safety Standards – Common Principles): Developed by a global coalition and published by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE), this framework provides a benchmark for life safety. It sets 5 Universal Pillars for building design and management:
      1. Prevention: Minimizing ignition risks.
      2. Detection and Communication: Fast warning systems.
      3. Occupant Protection: Safe, unhindered evacuation routes.
      4. Containment: Sectioning buildings with fire-resistant barriers to stop spread.
      5. Extinguishment: Active suppression systems (sprinklers/suppression).
    2. ISO Fire Safety Standards: The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) sets global rules for equipment and risk management. This includes ISO 7240 (fire detection/alarm systems) and ISO 31000 (integrating systemic risk management directly into urban planning).

    Widely Adopted National/Model Codes

    Many countries explicitly adopt or adapt established model codes into their local municipal bylaws:

    1. NFPA Codes (USA): Developed by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA), these are the most globally replicated fire codes.
      • NFPA 1 (Fire Code): Total oversight rules governing building safety, hazardous materials, and structural fire protection.
      • NFPA 101 (Life Safety Code): The absolute blueprint for building design, specifying safe egress, travel distances to exits, and minimum corridor widths based on occupancy types.
    2. International Building Code (IBC): Published by the International Code Council (ICC), the IBC integrates strict structural engineering rules with active fire protection. It mandates specific automatic sprinkler thresholds (NFPA 13 standards) depending on building height and density.
    3. British Standards (UK): BS 9999 is an international code of practice for fire safety in building design and management. It uses a flexible, risk-based approach that balances architectural design with automated safety measures.

    PYQ RELEVANCE

    [UPSC 2020] The strength and sustenance of local institutions in India has shifted from their formative phase of ‘Functions, Functionaries and Funds’ to the contemporary stage of ‘Functionality’. Highlight the critical challenges faced by local institutions in terms of their functionality in recent times.

    Linkage: The PYQ examines whether Urban Local Bodies have the functional capacity and accountability to deliver effective urban governance. The article argues that repeated urban fire disasters stem from fragmented governance, weak Urban Local Bodies, poor inter-agency coordination, and lack of accountability, showing that the real challenge is the functionality of urban institutions rather than the absence of laws.

  • Protecting protest: on mass protests

    Why in the News?

    The Supreme Court is hearing petitions on alleged excessive police force during recent protests, while the CJI’s remarks on protests requiring due permission have sparked debate. The case has also revived the question of whether public inconvenience caused by peaceful protests should be conflated with violence, and the need for a national protocol on crowd-control measures.

    Why does conflating inconvenience with violence weaken the right to protest?

    1. Legal standard blurred: Treating traffic disruption or public inconvenience as equivalent to violence lowers the threshold at which force can be used against a peaceful gathering.
    2. Judicial remark’s weight: A “due permission” framing from the Chief Justice of India carries institutional weight that can shape how lower courts and police read the limits of Article 19(1)(b), the right to assemble peaceably.
    3. Precedent tension: Existing case law distinguishes disruptive but peaceful assembly from violent assembly, and collapsing that distinction narrows the constitutional space for protest.

    What does the absence of a national crowd control protocol expose?

    1. No uniform threshold: Without a national protocol, the force threshold used against protestors varies by state and by individual police commander’s judgment.
    2. Accountability gap: No standard mechanism currently holds police accountable for disproportionate force used to disperse a protest deemed merely inconvenient.
    3. Comparative absence: Other democracies operationalise proportionality standards for crowd control through documented use of force continuums, a structure India’s policing framework lacks in codified form.

    Conclusion

    Peaceful protests that cause public inconvenience should not be treated the same as violent acts. A national crowd-control protocol with clear rules on the use of force and strong accountability can help protect both the right to protest and public order.

    Back2Basics

    The right to protest in India is an implied fundamental right derived from Article 19(1)(a) (freedom of speech and expression) and Article 19(1)(b) (freedom to assemble peaceably and without arms) of the Constitution of India.

    Constitutional Basis and Rules

    1. No Absolute Right: Protests must remain completely peaceful and unarmed.
    2. Reasonable Restrictions: Under Articles 19(2) and 19(3), the state can limit protests to protect the sovereignty and integrity of India, security of the state, and public order.
    3. No Blocking Roads: The Supreme Court has ruled that public ways and spaces cannot be permanently blocked or occupied, balancing protester rights with public movement.

    Legal Obligations and Permissions

    1. Prior Permission: Organizers must generally seek local police or municipal permissions to hold public gatherings or marches.
    2. Designated Spaces: Authorities often restrict demonstrations to specific assigned areas (like designated grounds or parks) to prevent traffic and safety hazards.
    3. Police Action Limits: Courts maintain that mere assembly or peaceful agitation does not justify excessive police force or lathi-charges.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2022] Right of movement and residence throughout the territory of India are freely available to the Indian citizens, but these rights are not absolute. Comment.

    Linkage: The PYQ tests the scope of Fundamental Rights under Article 19 and reasonable restrictions. The editorial examines the limits of the right to peaceful protest under Article 19, and whether restrictions on protests satisfy the test of proportionality.

  • Cauvery Water Regulation Committee directs Karnataka to release 3,500 cusecs a day to Tamil Nadu

    Why in the news?

    The Cauvery Water Regulation Committee (CWRC) has directed Karnataka to release 3,500 cusecs of water per day for 15 days to Tamil Nadu amid drought conditions. Meanwhile, the Tamil Nadu Chief Minister has urged the Prime Minister to review the Centre’s stand on the proposed Mekedatu Dam project, further intensifying the inter-state water dispute.

    Key Highlights

    • CWRC directive: Karnataka has been directed to release 3,500 cusecs per day for 15 days to Tamil Nadu.
    • Reason: The order was issued due to drought conditions and the need to ensure downstream water availability.
    • Parallel dispute: Tamil Nadu has sought a review of the Centre’s position on the Mekedatu Dam project proposed by Karnataka.
    • Possible appeal: Karnataka may challenge the CWRC’s direction before the Cauvery Water Management Authority (CWMA).

    About the Cauvery River

    • Originates at Talakaveri in the Brahmagiri Hills, Karnataka.
    • Flows through Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Puducherry, with a small catchment in Kerala.
    • Empties into the Bay of Bengal.
    • Total length is about 805 km.
    • Left-bank: Harangi, Hemavathi, Shimsha, Arkavathi.
    • Right-bank: Kabini, Bhavani, Noyyal and Amaravathi.

    Cauvery Water Management Mechanism

    Cauvery Water Management Authority (CWMA)

    • Constituted in 2018 under the Ministry of Jal Shakti.
    • Implements the Supreme Court’s 2018 judgment on Cauvery water sharing.
    • Supervises reservoir operations and ensures implementation of water-sharing arrangements.

    Cauvery Water Regulation Committee (CWRC)

    • Functions under the CWMA.
    • Monitors reservoir levels, rainfall and inflows.
    • Recommends monthly water releases among basin States.

    What is the Mekedatu Project?

    • Proposed by Karnataka on the Cauvery River near Mekedatu.
    • Intended to provide drinking water to Bengaluru and generate hydroelectric power.
    • Tamil Nadu opposes the project, arguing that it could affect downstream water availability and violate the Supreme Court’s allocation.

    Constitutional and Legal Provisions

    • Article 262: Empowers Parliament to legislate on inter-State river water disputes.
    • Inter-State River Water Disputes Act, 1956: Provides for adjudication of river water disputes through tribunals.
    • Supreme Court Judgment (2018): Modified the Cauvery Water Disputes Tribunal award and directed the establishment of the CWMA.

    “[2013, GS2, 10 marks] Constitutional mechanisms to resolve the inter-state water disputes have failed to address and solve the problems. Is the failure due to structural or process inadequacy or both? Discuss.”

    [2020] Which of the following Protected Areas are located in Cauvery basin?

    1.Nagarhole National Park
    2.Papikonda National Park
    3.Sathyamangalam Tiger Reserve
    4.Wayanad Wildlife Sanctuary

    Select the correct answer using the code given below:
    a) 1 and 2 only
    b) 3 and 4 only
    c) 1, 3 and 4 only
    d) 1, 2, 3 and 4

  • West Bengal strips panchayat pradhans of registration and cheque signing powers, reopening the devolution debate

    Why in the News

    West Bengal Government has stripped elected panchayat pradhans of birth and death registration powers and cheque signing authority, transferring them to bureaucrats. The state cites the need to curb corruption after the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) exercise, but the move raises questions about devolution of powers to elected local bodies.

    Why does shifting these powers to bureaucrats raise a devolution question?

    1. Constitutional mandate: The 73rd Amendment Act, 1992 envisages panchayats as institutions of local self-government with functional autonomy, not merely implementing agencies for state bureaucrats.
    2. Elected versus appointed authority: Registration and cheque signing powers are everyday functions through which an elected pradhan exercises visible authority over local administration, and removing them shifts real power to an appointed official.
    3. Corruption justification: The stated reason, curbing corruption, does not explain why oversight rather than outright transfer of power was not chosen as the remedy.
    4. Precedent risk: A state government’s ability to strip elected local body powers by executive order, without a corresponding law reform process, sets a precedent other states could follow.

    Conclusion

    The central idea is that a corruption justification is being used to recentralise powers that the 73rd Amendment Act, 1992 assigned to elected local government. Whether West Bengal reverses this transfer, or other states adopt the same approach, will determine if devolution in India remains a one way commitment or a reversible administrative choice.

    Back2Basics

    Devolution of powers under the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992: Functional Devolution (The 3 Fs [Functions, Funds, and Functionaries] and Eleventh Schedule)

    1. 29 Subjects: Article 243-G empowers state legislatures to devolve responsibilities to Panchayats for economic development and social justice across 29 areas listed in the Eleventh Schedule (such as agriculture, drinking water, health and sanitation, and primary education).
    2. The “3 Fs” Challenge: Real devolution relies on transferring Functions (the tasks), Funds (the money), and Functionaries (the administrative staff).
    3. State Discretion: Because local government is a state subject, actual transfer of these powers depends entirely on individual state laws rather than automatic constitutional enforcement.

    Institutional and Financial Framework

    1. Three-Tier System: Established a uniform structure of Panchayats at the village (Gram Panchayat), intermediate (Block/Taluk Panchayat), and district (Zilla Panchayat) levels.
    2. Gram Sabha: Positioned as the foundational base comprising all registered voters in a village area to ensure direct local oversight and social audit.
    3. State Finance Commission (SFC): Mandated the creation of an SFC every five years to recommend tax assignments, tolls, fees, and grants-in-aid to improve local fiscal autonomy.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2023] ‘The states in India seem reluctant to empower urban local bodies both functionally as well as financially.’ Comment.”

    Linkage: The PYQ tests the extent of functional and financial devolution to local bodies. The article highlights the rollback of Panchayat powers, reflecting weak implementation of the 73rd Amendment.

  • Anti-defection law: Supreme Court seeks Centre’s reply on Tenth Schedule merger interpretation

    Why in News

    The Supreme Court has issued notice to the Central Government challenging the prevailing interpretation of the merger exception under the Tenth Schedule (Anti-Defection Law). The plea, linked to the 2022 Goa defection case, argues that the current interpretation undermines the purpose of the Anti-Defection Law by allowing legislators to avoid disqualification without a genuine party merger.

    What is the Merger Exception?

    • Paragraph 4 of the Tenth Schedule provides an exception to disqualification in cases of a merger.
    • A merger is protected when not less than two-thirds of the legislators of a political party agree to merge with another party.
    • The present dispute is whether a legislative party alone can claim a merger, or whether the original political party must also merge.

    About the Tenth Schedule (Anti-Defection Law)

    • Added by the 52nd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1985.
    • Strengthened by the 91st Constitutional Amendment Act, 2003, which removed the earlier exemption for one-third splits.
    • Seeks to curb political defections, ensure government stability, and uphold party discipline.
    • The Presiding Officer (Speaker/Chairman) decides questions relating to disqualification.

    Constitutional Provisions

    • Articles 102(2) and 191(2): Provide for disqualification of MPs and MLAs under the Tenth Schedule.
    • Tenth Schedule: Contains provisions relating to disqualification on grounds of defection.

    Landmark Judgments

    • Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu (1992): Upheld the constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule and held that the Speaker’s decision is subject to judicial review.
    • Keisham Meghachandra Singh v. Speaker, Manipur (2020): Directed Speakers to decide disqualification petitions within a reasonable period, ordinarily three months.

    Issues with the Current Law

    • Delay in deciding disqualification petitions.
    • Allegations of partisan conduct by the Speaker.
    • Ambiguity regarding the merger exception.
    • Weakens representative democracy when mass defections alter electoral mandates.

    [2013, GS2, 10M] The role of individual MPs (Members of Parliament) has diminished over the years and as a result healthy constructive debates on policy issues are not usually witnessed. How far can this be attributed to the anti-defection law, which was legislated but with a different intention?”

    [2022] With reference to anti-defection law in India, consider the following statements:

    1. The law specifies that a nominated legislator cannot join any political party within six months of being appointed to the House.

    2. The law does not provide any time-frame within which the presiding officer has to decide a defection case.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) 1 only

    (b) 2 only

    (c) Both 1 and 2

    (d) Neither 1 nor 2

  • Tracing voters in an ever evolving city

    Why in the News?

    With the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls underway, Bengaluru’s Booth Level Officers (BLOs) and voters are struggling to reconcile 2002 records against a city transformed by two decades of migration and urbanisation. This exposes gaps in the exercise’s design.

    Why is Bengaluru’s SIR harder to execute than the Election Commission’s own justification would suggest?

    1. The Commission’s stated rationale is also the source of the problem: The Election Commission of India (ECI) says SIR is needed because urbanisation and migration have altered the electoral rolls; those very factors make verification difficult.
    2. Scale of the exercise: Bengaluru has over 1.03 crore voters, about one-sixth of Karnataka’s 5.54 crore electorate, verified by 8,972 Booth Level Officers (BLOs) drawn from nearly every government department.
    3. A city transformed since the last revision: Areas such as Whitefield and Mahadevapura were not major urban corridors in 2002, and Assembly constituencies have since been redrawn.

    What specific implementation gaps are voters and BLOs facing?

    1. A language barrier baked into the form: Karnataka’s enumeration forms are printed only in Kannada, unlike Telangana, which provides Telugu, English, and Urdu forms in the Greater Hyderabad Municipal Corporation (GHMC) area.
    2. Documentation breaks for migrants and gig workers: Migrant workers, gig workers, and residents of slum settlements face repeated form rejections, especially when they maintain permanent residence elsewhere or fear losing welfare benefits linked to voter identity documents.
    3. Uneven institutional response: The State Government’s doorstep delivery of Permanent Residence Certificates (PRCs) and caste certificates has not resolved uncertainty because election authorities have not clarified whether a PRC alone is sufficient during the claims and objections stage.
    4. A precedent that narrows, not widens, acceptance: In West Bengal’s SIR, Electoral Registration Officers (EROs) accepted only PRCs issued under the 1999 Rules, not all PRCs.

    Why do the officially reported numbers understate the exercise’s real difficulty?

    1. Distribution numbers can mislead: Additional District Election Officers noted that BLOs sometimes deliver forms to multiple addresses of suspected duplicate voters because they cannot verify the person’s actual residence, inflating the ASDDO (Absent, Shifted, Duplicate, Dead, Other) category.
    2. Digitisation, not distribution, is the real progress marker: As of 22 July, only 31.28% of forms within the Greater Bengaluru Authority had been digitised, compared with 67.23% statewide, despite 25.47 lakh voters already being flagged under the ASDDO category.
    3. BLOs report pressure to inflate completion, not accuracy: Officials stated that BLOs face pressure from Booth Level Agents (BLAs) and Electoral Registration Officers (EROs) to complete digitisation, regardless of whether the underlying data is accurate.

    Conclusion

    Bengaluru’s SIR challenges reflect a design problem, not merely a data entry problem. The same migration, urbanisation, and demographic churn cited by the Election Commission to justify the revision also make it difficult to accurately verify a mobile, multilingual, and undocumented population within a fixed timeline. The central question is whether success should be measured by timely completion or by the accuracy of electoral rolls.

    Back2Basics

    1. Special Intensive Revision (SIR): A comprehensive Election Commission of India (ECI) exercise to re-verify and update electoral rolls from the ground up, distinct from the routine summary revision.
    2. Booth Level Officer (BLO): A government employee assigned to a specific polling booth area, responsible for door to door verification, form distribution, and updating electoral rolls during revision exercises.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2024] Examine the need for electoral reforms as suggested by various committees with particular reference to “One Nation, One Election” principle.

    Linkage: The PYQ examines the need for electoral reforms to strengthen the integrity, inclusiveness, and credibility of India’s electoral process. The article highlights implementation challenges in the Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls, underscoring the need for voter registration and roll management reforms

  • The right to protest and the limits of police power

    Why in the News

    The Cockroach Janta Party’s (CJP) “Chalo Sansad” march at Jantar Mantar on July 20, demanding reforms in the National Testing Agency (NTA) and the Union Education Minister’s resignation, ended in tear gas and lathi charges after protesters attempted to march towards Parliament. The clashes reopened the question of how a democracy polices protest, testing where a constitutionally protected right to assemble ends and lawful police power to disperse begins.

    Is the right to protest absolute?

    1. Constitutional guarantee: Article 19(1)(b) of the Indian Constitution guarantees all citizens the Fundamental Right to assemble peaceably and without arms. This includes the right to hold public meetings, demonstrations, and take out processions, forming the constitutional basis for peaceful protests.
    2. Reasonable restrictions permitted: Article 19(3) allows reasonable restrictions on this right in the interests of public order and the sovereignty and integrity of India.
    3. Restrictions implemented through statute: These restrictions operate through laws governing public order and policing rather than through Article 19 directly.
    4. No single governing law: The legal authority to regulate protests is drawn from a range of statutes, not one dedicated law.

    Was the CJP march unlawful?

    1. Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS) test for unlawful assembly: Under the Section 189 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023, an assembly of five or more persons becomes unlawful only if its common object involves using criminal force, resisting the execution of law, committing an offence, or compelling a person by force or threat.
    2. Lawful assemblies can turn unlawful: A gathering that begins lawfully can become unlawful if its conduct changes during the event.
    3. No permission sought: Delhi Police said the CJP had not sought permission for a procession to Parliament.
    4. Prohibitory order in force: Section 163 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) barred protests, marches and demonstrations in the New Delhi district, except at the designated Jantar Mantar site with prior permission.
    5. Judicial scrutiny followed: The Delhi High Court has sought responses from the Centre and Delhi Police on petitions alleging police brutality and excessive force.

    What standards and limits govern police use of force?

    1. Democratic policing standard: The National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) Manual on Human Rights for Police Officers states that democratic policing treats police as protectors of citizens’ rights and the rule of law, while ensuring safety and security equally for all.
    2. Cost of violations: The manual notes that human rights violations by police erode public confidence, bring institutions into disrepute, and can escalate civil unrest.
    3. Global standard on force: These principles align with the United Nations (UN) Basic Principles on the Use of Force and Firearms, which require force to be lawful, necessary and proportionate.
    4. Statutory dispersal power: Under the BNSS, an Executive Magistrate or an authorised police officer may order an unlawful assembly, or one likely to disturb public peace, to disperse, and may use force if it does not comply.
    5. Minimum force standard: The Code of Conduct for the Police in India requires persuasion, advice and warning first, and only the irreducible minimum force once force becomes inevitable.
    6. Identification gap: The BNSS requires an arresting officer to bear accurate, visible identification but imposes no corresponding requirement on officers engaged in crowd control or dispersal, even as videos from the march showed personnel without name tags or with faces covered.

    How has the judiciary drawn the line, then and now?

    1. Anita Thakur v. State of Jammu & Kashmir (2016): The Supreme Court held that excessive force violates Fundamental Rights and awarded compensation to injured protesters, holding that police action must remain reasonable and accountable.
    2. Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan v. Union of India (2018): The Court held that authorities may regulate demonstrations to maintain public order but cannot extinguish the right to protest altogether.
    3. Amit Sahni v. Commissioner of Police (2020): Arising from the Shaheen Bagh protests, the Court affirmed that dissent is a constitutional right but cannot justify the indefinite occupation of public spaces.
    4. Present reluctance: Chief Justice of India Surya Kant orally declined a plea for suo motu cognisance of the alleged police excesses, saying the Court was “not interested in videos” and should not have its time wasted.

    Conclusion

    The right to assemble under Article 19(1)(b) is not absolute, and police may lawfully disperse an assembly that turns unlawful or defies a prohibitory order, but the force used must remain the minimum necessary and be accountable. The CJP crackdown exposed a specific accountability gap: the BNSS requires arresting officers to display identification but imposes no such requirement on personnel engaged in crowd control, a gap the courts’ existing case law on excessive force does not close, even as the Supreme Court itself declined to examine video evidence of the incident.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2022] Right of movement and residence throughout the territory of India are freely available to the Indian citizens, but these rights are not absolute. Comment.

    Linkage: The PYQ highlights that Fundamental Rights are subject to reasonable restrictions. This is conceptually very close because the article explains that the right to assemble peacefully is also not absolute and may be reasonably restricted under Article 19(3) for public order.

  • How should cities reclaim footpaths?

    Why in the News?

    Following the Supreme Court’s recognition of the right to walk on safe, obstruction-free footpaths as a Fundamental Right, Bengaluru Development Minister directed a 10-day “Safe Footpath” drive across the five corporations under the Greater Bengaluru Authority, removing thousands of street vendors from pavements. The drive enforced the pedestrian right the court recognised but bypassed the process the Street Vendors Act, 2014 requires before vendors can be removed, exposing a gap between enforcing one right and protecting another.

    Why was the Street Vendors Act, 2014 enacted?

    1. Vending recognised as legitimate occupation: The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that street vending is a legitimate occupation protected under Article 19 of the Constitution, regulable in the public interest but not prohibitable outright.
    2. Response to arbitrary evictions: Municipal bodies and police had a recurring pattern of evicting vendors without notice, reducing years of livelihood to rubble overnight, which the Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014 was enacted to end.
    3. Not an anti-encroachment law: The Act does not give vendors an unrestricted right over public space, nor does it function as an anti-encroachment statute.
    4. Balancing two rights: It balances the public’s right to safe, obstruction-free footpaths against a vendor’s right to livelihood, laying down who can vend, where they can vend, and when they can be removed or relocated.

    What process must cities follow before removing vendors?

    1. Town Vending Committee (TVC): Every city must constitute a TVC comprising officials, police, planning authorities, resident representatives and street vendors, who must hold at least 40% of the seats, with representation for women and other marginalised communities.
    2. Survey requirement: Once constituted, the TVC must survey all existing vendors before authorities decide who can continue vending and under what conditions.
    3. Protection during the process: No vendor can be evicted or relocated until the survey is completed and Certificates of Vending are issued.
    4. Certificate of Vending: The certificate gives official permission to vend at a specified location under specified conditions and confers no ownership over public land.
    5. Removal remains conditional, not barred: The Act does not prohibit the removal of vendors; it only requires that removal follow this sequence.

    Why has Bengaluru’s drive come under scrutiny?

    1. No Town Vending Committee in place: Bengaluru’s corporations began removing vendors before constituting a TVC, the body the Act requires to identify vending and no-vending zones.
    2. Relocation promised only after the fact: Karnataka Chief Minister promised relocation only after the drive had already removed vendors.
    3. Sequence reversed: The government acted on the Supreme Court’s recognition of the pedestrian’s right to walk without first completing the survey and certification process the Street Vendors Act requires.
    4. Foundation of the law is balance: The Act’s foundation is the balance between the two rights, not the primacy of one over the other.

    Conclusion

    The Street Vendors Act, 2014, requires cities to constitute a Town Vending Committee, survey existing vendors and issue Certificates of Vending before removal or relocation, precisely to prevent the arbitrary evictions that predate the law. Bengaluru’s drive enforced the Supreme Court’s recognition of the pedestrian’s right to walk without first completing this sequence, showing that reclaiming footpaths lawfully requires following the Act’s process rather than invoking one right to bypass the other.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2023] “The states in India seem reluctant to empower urban local bodies both functionally as well as financially.” Comment.

    Linkage: The PYQ examines the effectiveness of Urban Local Bodies (ULBs) in urban governance, particularly their institutional capacity, devolution of powers, and ability to manage public spaces and civic services. The article highlights that effective implementation of the Street Vendors Act, 2014 depends on empowered municipal institutions such as Town Vending Committees (TVCs). Bengaluru’s failure to constitute a TVC before undertaking evictions reflects the governance and institutional weaknesses of ULBs

  • Fast-track courts: When they can be established, where they lag

    Why in the News

    Indian Prime Minister assured to set up fast-track courts (FTCs) to try exam paper-leak cases, announced after protests by the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) at Jantar Mantar. A draft Bill on paper leaks was taken to Cabinet on Friday, but existing fast-track courts show that speed depends on constitutional limits, infrastructure and investigation quality.

    What are fast-track courts, and what legal basis funds them?

    1. No single governing law: There is no central legislation that governs fast-track courts as a category.
    2. 14th Finance Commission origin: The 14th Finance Commission (2015-2020) recommended FTCs to expedite trials of heinous crimes such as murder, kidnapping and property disputes pending over five years, and for cases involving vulnerable groups such as women and children.
    3. 2019 fast-track special courts (FTSCs) scheme: In 2019, following a Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2018 and a Supreme Court directive, the Union Government launched a centrally sponsored scheme for fast-track special courts (FTSCs), funded partly by the Nirbhaya Fund, exclusively for rape cases and offences under the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012. (Nirbhaya Fund: Following the Nirbhaya case of 16th December, 2012, the Government has set up a dedicated fund , Nirbhaya Fund, which can be utilized for projects specifically designed to improve the safety and security of women. It is a non-lapsable corpus fund, being administered by Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance. The Ministry of Women and Child Development (M/o WCD) is the nodal Ministry to appraise/recommend proposals and Schemes to be funded under Nirbhaya Fund.)

    Can a Special Court be created for a single case?

    1. Article 14: Creation of special courts must satisfy the Right to Equality under Article 14.
    2. Anwar Ali Sarkar precedent: In State of West Bengal vs Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952), the Supreme Court struck down a law letting the government arbitrarily pick cases for special courts for the “object of speedier trial” alone, calling “speed” too vague a criterion.
    3. Reasonable Classification: Cases assigned to special courts must be based on an objective and rational classification, such as the nature of the offence or vulnerability of victims.
    4. A precedent for public-demand cases: The Supreme Court directed the Centre to establish a special court for the 2G case to ensure a day-to-day trial, even amid public demand.
    5. NEET’s uncertain path: It remains to be seen whether the NEET case, being heard in a Delhi court, will be sent to a special court by the government or through a court order.

    How quickly are Fast-Track Courts expected to dispose of cases?

    1. No statutory deadline: There is no fixed legal time limit for completing trials.
    2. Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita (BNSS) recommended timelines: Recommends completing criminal trials within two years and sexual offence trials within two months.
    3. FTSC Performance Target: Each Fast-Track Special Court (FTSC) is expected to dispose of 41-42 cases per quarter or at least 165 cases annually.
    4. No judicially prescribed outer limit: In P. Rama Chandra Rao vs State of Karnataka (2002), a seven-judge Constitution Bench ruled it is “neither advisable or feasible, nor judicially permissible” to prescribe an outer limit for concluding all criminal proceedings.

    What do current Fast-Track Court statistics show?

    1. Current strength: As of January, 862 regular FTCs were functioning across 21 states and Union Territories, alongside 774 FTSCs, including 398 exclusive POCSO courts, across 29 states and UTs.
    2. Disposal rates: The disposal rate for special courts stands around 96%, with an FTSC disposing of about 9.5 cases a month compared with 3.3 cases by a regular trial court of similar jurisdiction.
    3. Persistent pendency: More than 2.4 lakh cases remained pending in FTSCs by the end of 2023.
    4. Government’s own explanation: A 2026 Lok Sabha reply from the Ministry of Law and Justice attributed disposal delays to factors including physical infrastructure availability, quality of investigation, and cooperation of the bar, investigation agencies and forensic support.

    Will Fast-Track Courts solve the paper leak problem?

    1. Poor Conviction Record: Out of 45 major exam paper leaks (2002-2025) involving at least one lakh candidates, only two cases resulted in convictions.
    2. Investigation is the Real Bottleneck: Weak investigations and the absence of stringent bail provisions remain the major challenges.
    3. Limited Impact: Experts argue that FTCs alone cannot solve issues such as judicial vacancies, heavy case pendency, and procedural delays.
    4. Mixed Performance: FTSCs have shown limited success in POCSO and Indian Penal Code (IPC) cases because of heavy caseloads, while performing relatively better in cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

    Conclusion

    Fast-track courts can expedite trials only within the constitutional limits set in Anwar Ali Sarkar case(1952) and cases must rest on a rational classification, not speed or public demand alone. Even then, the FTSC record shows disposal depends on infrastructure and investigative quality that a court’s “fast-track” label does not create. With 2.4 lakh cases still pending in FTSCs and only two convictions among 45 major exam leaks since 2002, the paper-leak Bill will resolve little unless it also addresses investigation quality and bail conditions.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2024] What are the aims and objects of the recently passed and enforced, The Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024? Whether University/State Education Board examinations, too, are covered under the Act?

    Linkage: The PYQ examines the legal and institutional framework for ensuring the integrity of public examinations. The article builds directly on this theme by evaluating whether fast-track courts can effectively enforce accountability under the proposed paper-leak framework.