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Subject: Polity

  • What is a Money Bill?

    In a pre-emptive move, the opposition has written to Lok Sabha Speaker, urging him not to bypass the Rajya Sabha by declaring key Bills as “money bills”.

    What is a Money Bill?

    • A money bill is defined by Article 110 of the Constitution, as a draft law that contains only provisions that deal with all or any of the matters listed therein.
    • These comprise a set of seven features, broadly including items such as-
    1. Imposition, abolition, remission, alteration or regulation of any tax
    2. Regulation of the borrowing of money by the GOI
    3. Custody of the Consolidated Fund of India (CFI) or the Contingency Fund of India, the payment of money into or the withdrawal of money from any such fund
    4. Appropriation of money out of the CFI
    5. Declaration of any expenditure charged on the CFI or increasing the amount of any such expenditure
    6. Receipt of money on account of the CFI or the public account of India or the custody or issue of such money, or the audit of the accounts of the Union or of a state
    7. Any matter incidental to any of the matters specified above.

    Who controls such bills?

    • In the event proposed legislation contains other features, ones that are not merely incidental to the items specifically outlined, such a draft law cannot be classified as a money bill.
    • Article 110 further clarifies that in cases where a dispute arises over whether a bill is a money bill or not, the Lok Sabha Speaker’s decision on the issue shall be considered final.

    What surrounds the ‘Money Bill’ controversy?

    • While all Money Bills are Financial Bills, all Financial Bills are not Money Bills.
    • For example, the Finance Bill which only contains provisions related to tax proposals would be a Money Bill.
    • However, a Bill that contains some provisions related to taxation or expenditure, but also covers other matters would be considered a Financial Bill.
    • Again, the procedure for the passage of the two bills varies significantly. The Rajya Sabha (where the ruling party might not have the majority) has no power to reject or amend a Money Bill.
    • However, a Financial Bill must be passed by both Houses of Parliament.
    • The Speaker (nonetheless, a member of the ruling party) certifies a Bill as a Money Bill, and the Speaker’s decision is final.
    • Also, the Constitution states that parliamentary proceedings, as well as officers responsible for the conduct of business (such as the Speaker), may not be questioned by any Court.

    Back2Basics:

    What is Finance Bill?

  • In difficult times, Fifteenth Finance Commission rose to the challenge

    The article analyses the various recommendations of the Fifteenth Finance Commission and their impact.

    Unique challenges

    • Many new and unique demands were placed on the 15th Finance Commission.
    • The major challenge being addressing the issue of the 2011 population census evoking a sharp response from the southern states.
    • Other issues include the non-lapsable defence fund and the use of certain parameters for performance incentives.
    • The Commission was also required to perform the task of assessing and projecting the fiscal roadmap for the Union and state amid an uncertain domestic environment due to shortfall in the GST collection, further accentuated in the year 2020 by the global pandemic.

    Key recommendations

    The Commission, in its final report, recommended vertical devolution at 41 per cent, adjusting 1 per cent for the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir.

    1) Horizontal distribution

    • For horizontal distribution, the commission has tried to harmonise the principles of expenditure needs, equity and performance.
    • This is achieved by the introduction of efficiency criteria of tax and fiscal efforts and by assigning 12.5 per cent weight to demographic performance.
    • Consideration of demographic performance will help in resolving the demographic debate and incentivising states in moving towards the replacement rate of population growth.

    2) Principles governing grant-in-aid

    • Grants are important as they are more directly targeted and equalise the standards of basic social services to some extent.
    • The Commission has recommended a total grant of Rs 10,33,062 crore during 2021-26.
    • Grant is broadly characterised into: (a) revenue deficit grants (b) grants for local governments (c) grants for disaster management (d) sector-specific grants and (e) state-specific grants.
    • Many of these grants are linked with performance-based criteria, thereby promoting principles of transparency, accountability, and leading to better monitoring of expenditures.
    • However, the Commission was asked to examine whether revenue deficit grants should be provided at all to the states.
    • Some states stressed that revenue deficit grants have serious disincentives for tax efforts and prudence in expenditure and, hence, these should be discontinued.
    • Fiscally stressed states of Kerala, West Bengal and Punjab are regular recipients of these grants due to high debt legacy.

    3) Conditional grants to local bodies

    • This Commission’s grant for local government is different from that of its predecessors for the set of entry-level conditions:
    • (a) Constitution of State Finance Commissions.
    • (b) Timely auditing and online availability of accounts for rural local bodies coupled with
    • (c) Notifying consistent growth rate for property tax revenue for urban local bodies.
    • Secondly, the recommendations are in alignment with the national programmes of Swachch Bharat Mission and Jal Jeewan Mission.

    4) Incubation of new cities and urban grants

    • It is for the first time that a Finance Commission has recommended Rs 8,000 crore to states for incubation of new cities, granting Rs 1,000 crore each for eight new cities.
    • The focus of urban grants for million-plus cities is improvement in air quality and meeting the service level benchmark of solid waste management and sanitation.

    5) Grants for health and setting up of disaster mitigation fund

    • The commission recommended channelising the health grant of Rs 70,051 crore through local bodies, addressing the gaps in primary health infrastructure.
    • The Commission’s recommendation for setting up the state and national level Disaster Risk Mitigation Fund (SDRMF), in line with the provisions of the Disaster Management Act, is both well-timed and necessary.
    • For the first time, the Finance Commission has introduced a 10-25 per cent graded cost-sharing basis by the states for the NDRF and NDMF which has not been appreciated by the states.

    6) Non-lapsable fund for defence

    • The Commission has recommended setting up of a dedicated non-lapsable fund, the Modernisation Fund for Defence and Internal Security (MFDIS).
    • Objective of the fund is to bridge the gap between projected budgetary requirements and budget allocation for defence and internal security and to provide greater predictability for enabling critical defence capital expenditure.
    • The fund will have four specific sources: (a) Transfers from the Consolidated Fund of India, (b) disinvestment proceeds of DPSEs, (c) proceeds from the monetisation of surplus defence land and (d) proceeds of receipts from defence land likely to be transferred to state governments and for public projects in the future.
    • The total indicative size of the proposed MFDIS over the period 2021-26 is Rs 2,38,354 crore.
    • The Union government has accepted this recommendation in principle.

    Consider the question “Examine the various principles on which the Fifteenth Finance Commission based the horizontal distribution of states share.”

    Conclusion

    The report starts with the famous quote of Mahatma Gandhi: “The future depends on what we do in the present”. It would be interesting to see the impact of these overarching and revolutionary recommendations in the times ahead.

  • Finance Commission dips into states’ share for Centre’s expenditure

    The article analyses the recommendations of fifteenth Finance Commission and their implications for the federalism in India.

    Major recommendations accepted by the government

    • Report of the fifteenth Finance Commission (XVFC) was laid before the Parliament.
    • The finance minister announced the acceptance of its recommendation of retaining the share of states in central taxes at 42 per cent.
    • She also stated that on its recommendation revenue deficit grants of Rs 1.18 lakh crore to the states have been provided for in the budget.
    • Some of the recommendations, however, have far-reaching implications on government finances, both of the Centre and the states.
    • Keeping in view the extant strategic requirements for national defence in a global context, XVFC has, in its approach, recalibrated the relative shares of the Union and the states in gross revenues receipts.

    Issues with the recalibration for national defence

    • Recalibration enables the Union to set aside resources for special funding on defence.
    • The states have been made to pay Rs 7,000 crore to bridge [the] Centre’s gap between projected budgetary requirements and budget allocation for defence and internal security defence.
    • But this is an expenditure that the Centre is obliged to fund.
    • For the first time, a finance commission has carved out resources meant for distributable statutory grants and dipped into the states’ revenue share, as against the tax share, in order to finance the Centre’s exclusive expenditure obligation.
    • What has been done is not in line with the system envisaged in the Constitution.
    • This move will eventually put the fiscal federal system under systemic strain.
    • In operational terms, too, this move is a significant departure.
    • So far, the Centre has been used to pre-empting resources from the kitty to be distributed among the states but only to finance expenditures in areas earmarked for states.
    • This was done through the centrally-sponsored schemes, but at least the states’ money was being used in the states, even if on a discretionary rather than a criteria basis.
    • Now, with this move of earmarking and financing of funds for sectors, it is the states’ money that is being used to finance the Centre’s expenditure.
    • This is certainly not cooperative federalism.

    Changes in horizontal distribution: More weightage to efficiency and performance

    • In horizontal distribution, the criteria used by successive finance commissions for devolving taxes across states have always been linked to need — based on equity, tempered by efficiency.
    • From 92.5 per cent of funds to a state being devolved based on need and equity, the XVFC has reduced these two components to 75 per cent.
    • The remaining 25 per cent are to be devolved on considerations of efficiency and performance.
    • This is the lowest weightage for equity, making the XVFC transfers potentially the least progressive ever.

    Structural changes not taken into account

    • The Finance Commission has not even made any serious effort to review the existing scheme of transfers in light of the changed federal landscape.
    • The existing criteria for the devolution have evolved in, and for, a production-based tax system.
    • The XVFC should have reformulated the distributional criteria for a consumption-based tax system [GST].
    • The structural change from production to consumption will make a significant difference to distribution as well as the need, nature and distribution of equalising grants.
    • This is the same manner in which the revenue deficit grants have been carried forward.
    • Ideally, the “gap-filling” approach should have been redesigned in light of the compensation law providing a minimum-guaranteed revenue of 14 per cent to every state.

    Consider the question “For the first time, a finance commission has carved out resources meant for distributable statutory grants and dipped into the states’ revenue share, as against the tax share, in order to finance the Centre’s exclusive expenditure obligation. What are the issues with this move?”

    Conclusion

    The Fifteenth Finance Commission report is not aligned with the new landscape of federalism and does not address the key issues.

  • Andhra-Odisha Boundary Dispute

    Andhra Pradesh recently held panchayat elections in three villages in the Kotia cluster, which is at the centre of a dispute between Andhra Pradesh and Odisha.

    Do you know?

    Sukma district of Chhattisgarh borders with Odisha (Malkangiri district), Telangana (Bhadradri Kothagudem district) and Andhra Pradesh (East Godavari district).

    You got it right. Thers’ a junction. AP and Telangana , both borders with Chhattisgarh.

    Andhra-Odisha Boundary Dispute

    • Prior to April 1, 1936, villages under Kotia panchayat were part of Jeypore Estate.
    • In the Constitution of Orrisa Order, 1936, published in the Gazette of India on March 19 that year, the GoI demarcated Odisha from the erstwhile Madras Presidency.
    • In 1942, the Madras government contested the boundary and ordered re-demarcation of the two states.
    • When the state of Andhra Pradesh was created in 1955, the villages were not surveyed by the state government either.

    Details of the villages

    • These villages, with a population of nearly 5,000, are located on a remote hilltop on the inter-state border and are inhabited by Kondh tribals.
    • The region, once a Maoist hotbed which still reports sporadic incidents of violence, is also rich in mineral resources like gold, platinum, manganese, bauxite, graphite and limestone.

    What is the judicial reaction?

    • In the early 1980s, Odisha filed a case in the Supreme Court demanding right and possession of jurisdiction over the 21 villages.
    • In 2006 the court ruled that disputes belonging to the state boundaries are not within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
    • The matter can only be resolved by Parliament and passed a permanent injunction on the disputed area.

  • [pib] Child Beggars and their protection

    The Union Minister of Women and Child Development has given important information regarding the protection of child beggars in India under various acts and ministries.

    Q.What are the various legislatures aimed at protecting Child Beggars in India? Discuss their efficacy in the prevention of child begging as well as abuse.

    Protection of Child Beggars

    (A) JJ Act, 2015

    • The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (JJ Act) is the primary law for children in the country.
    • The Section 2 (14) (ii) of the Act, 2015, considers a child being in force or is found begging, or living on the street as a “child in need of care and protection”.
    • As per Section 76 of JJ Act, whoever employs or uses any child for the purpose of begging or causes any child to beg shall be punishable with imprisonment.
    • The Act provides a security net of service delivery structures along with measures for institutional and non-institutional care, to ensure the comprehensive well being of children in distress situations.
    • The primary responsibility of execution of the Act rests with the States/UTs.

    (B) Child Protection Services (CPS)

    • The Ministry implements a centrally sponsored scheme CPS under the umbrella Integrated Child Development Services scheme.
    • It supports the children in difficult circumstances including child beggars and destitute children.
    • Under the scheme, institutional care is provided through Child Care Institutions (CCIs), as a rehabilitative measure.
    • The programmes and activities in CCIs inter-alia include age-appropriate education, access to vocational training, recreation, health care, counselling etc.
    • The scheme supports 24×7 emergency outreach/ helpline service for children in distress conditions.
    • The service is accessible through a dedicated toll-free number, 1098 from anywhere in India.

    (C) Rehabilitation measures

    • The Ministry of Social Justice and Empowerment, has undertaken a pilot project for Comprehensive Rehabilitation of Persons engaged in the act of begging.
    • It is currently held in ten (10) cities; namely Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai, Ahmadabad, Hyderabad, Bangalore, Lucknow, Patna, Nagpur and Indore.
    • The initiative aims for identification, rehabilitation, counselling, skill development of beggars.
    • It includes education of children engaged in begging/children of persons engaged in the begging.

    The children of today are assets of tomorrow. Yet education, which is a fundamental right to every child in our country, is still a dream for many children in India, especially the ones who are poor, downtrodden and in dire need.

  • MTP amendment Bill

    The article discusses the provision of the medical board in the MTP (Amendment) Act and issues with it.

    Proposal of medical board

    • The Medical Termination of Pregnancy (Amendment) Bill (‘MTP Bill’) passed in the Lok Sabha is scheduled to be tabled for consideration in Rajya Sabha.
    • The Act prescribes the setting up of medical boards in every state and Union territory (UT), consisting of a gynaecologist, paediatrician, radiologist or sonologist and any other members as proposed by that state or UT.
    • Each board will be responsible for diagnosing substantial foetal abnormalities that necessitate termination of pregnancy after a 24-week gestation period.
    • Medical boards are a form of third-party authorisation and were not envisaged in the MTP Act, 1971.

    Issues with the proposal

    • In the context of the current healthcare budgetary challenges, this proposal to set up infrastructure across the country to regulate medical termination of pregnancies is both financially unsound and practically impossible.
    • India’s healthcare system has neither the financial investment nor the infrastructure to sustain the operation and functioning of medical boards in every state and UT.
    • Due to the weak healthcare infrastructure in the country, it would be practically impossible to constitute these boards with the requisite specialists.
    • Even where they are set up, the accessibility of such boards for pregnant persons, especially those living in rural areas, remains a major challenge.
    • More importantly, subjecting people to multiple invasive examinations is a grave violation of their rights to privacy and dignity.
    • Requiring pregnant persons to navigate a bureaucratic web of authorisation will inevitably lead to delays and thereby impede access to safe and legal abortion services.

    Poor public financing and privatisation of healthcare

    • At 1.6 per cent of GDP in 2019-20 India’s current level of public financing of health is one of the lowest in the world
    • This has meant that most health expenditure in the country is out of pocket (OOP) — borne by patients themselves.
    • OOP expenditure on healthcare is recorded at 58.7 per cent as per the National Health Accounts in 2016-17.
    • The central government has preferred to incentivise private players to set up or offer services, instead of building infrastructural and professional capacity.
    • Privatisation drives up costs of care and the handing over of public facilities to the private sector can have catastrophic consequences.
    • They additionally remain non-accountable to state authorities in terms of affordability or transparency for instance, through Right to Information enquiries, or to uphold fundamental rights like non-discrimination in treatment or employment, or even the fundamental right to health.
    • The National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO)’s 75th report shows that less than 20 per cent of the population is covered by health insurance in India.
    • According to the National Health Profile 2017, India has only one doctor for roughly 10,200 people in the public sector.

    Consider the question “Discsss the changes made by the Medical Termination of Pregnancy (Amendment) Bill and the challenges its provision could face.”

    Conclusion

    Poor public health infrastructure and absence of specialists across the country have meant that most abortions do not happen in the public sector, but at private centres or at home. With overwhelming shortfalls in specialist availability, especially in rural and scheduled areas, it would be impossible to constitute boards with requisite specialist representation as contemplated under the MTP Bill.

  • What is Division Voting?

    Parliament saw the first instance of division voting in times of the pandemic, with Major Ports Authorities Bill 2020 passed in Rajya Sabha as members voted through slips in view of social distancing norms in place.

    What is the news?

    • The Bill provides for the regulation of major ports and will replace the Major Port Trusts Act of 1963, and a board of Major Port Authority for each major port will replace the current port trusts.
    • The Opposition has charged that the Bill is aimed at privatization of ports.
    • Opposition members said the legislation would adversely affect states’ rights.

    What is Division Voting?

    • A motion is a binary question raised in Parliament for a decision to be taken by MPs.
    • A division is a type of voting which records how each MP voted on a motion.
    • There are three methods of holding a Division i.e.
    1. By operating  the  Automatic  Vote  Recorder
    2. By distributing ‘Ayes’  and  ‘Noes’  slips  in  the  House  and
    3. By members going into  the  Lobbies
    • However, the method of recording of votes in Lobbies has become obsolete ever since the installation of  Automatic  Vote Recording machine.
    • This procedure has not been used for the last two decades

    Not a usual practice

    In spite of the advantages offered by division, it is not the default method of voting in Parliament.

    • The division is only mandated for a set of motions which require a special majority of the house to be passed.
    • For example, constitutional amendment bills have to be passed by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of the House “present and voting”.
    • To ensure that this condition is fulfilled, a division is called for. On other occasions, individual MPs have to ask for a division.
    • During the term of the last Lok Sabha (2014-19), voting by division was held only on 108 occasions. Only half of these were asked for by MPs, the other half related to constitutional amendment bills.

    What is the preferred method?

    • The preferred method for making decisions in Parliament is through a voice vote.
    • In this method, MPs orally convey their agreement or disagreement to a motion.
    • It clubs the individual decisions of MPs in one loud chorus of “Ayes” or “Noes”.
    • Being an oral vote, it does not put on parliamentary record the stand of political parties and individual MPs on contentious political issues.

  • What is Breach of Privilege?

    An MP has issued a breach of privilege notice against an MP from Bengal in the Lok Sabha.

    Try this PYQ:

    Q.With reference to the Parliament of India, which of the following Parliamentary Committees scrutinizes and reports to the House whether the powers to make regulations, rules, sub-rules, by-laws etc. conferred by the constitution of delegated by the Parliament are being properly exercised by the Executive within the scope of such delegation?

    (a) Committee on Government Assurances

    (b) Committee on Subordinate Legislation

    (c) Rules Committee

    (d) Business Advisory Committee

    What is the news?

    • The accused MP has cast some aspersions with respect to the conduct of a judge.
    • The question is whether the conduct of a judge can be discussed on the floor of the House or not.
    • Article 121 of the Constitution does not allow allegations to be levelled against a sitting or a former judge.

    Breach of Privilege

    • The powers, privileges and immunities of either House of the Indian Parliament and of its Members and committees are laid down in Article 105 of the Constitution.
    • Article 194 deals with the powers, privileges and immunities of the State Legislatures, their Members and their committees.
    • Parliamentary privilege refers to the right and immunity enjoyed by legislatures, in which legislators are granted protection against civil or criminal liability for actions done or statements made in the course of their legislative duties.

    What constitutes a breach of this privilege?

    • While the Constitution has accorded special privileges and powers to parliamentarians and legislators to maintain the dignity and authority of the Houses, these powers and privileges are not codified.
    • Thus, there are no clear, notified rules to decide what constitutes a breach of privilege, and the punishment it attracts.
    • Any act that obstructs or impedes either House of the state legislature in performing its functions, or which obstructs or impedes any Member or Officer of such House in the discharge of his duty, or has a tendency, directly or indirectly, to produce such results is treated as a breach of privilege.
    • It is a breach of privilege and contempt to print or publish libel reflecting on the character or proceedings of the House or its Committees or on any member of the House for or relating to his character or conduct as a legislator.

    Procedure followed in cases of an alleged breach

    • The Legislative Assembly Speaker or Legislative Council Chairman constitutes a Privileges Committee consisting of 15 members in the Assembly and 11 members in the Council.
    • The members to the committee which has quasi-judicial powers are nominated based on the party strength in the Houses.
    • The Speaker or Chairman first decides on the motions.
    • If the privilege and contempt are found prima facie, then the Speaker or Chairman will forward it to the Privileges Committee by following the due procedure.
    • At present, there is no Privileges Committee in either House of the state legislature.
    • The Committee will seek an explanation from all the concerned, will conduct an inquiry and will make a recommendation based on the findings to the state legislature for its consideration.

  • POCSO doesn’t brook dilution

    The recent Bombay High Court judgement has raised controversy for its interpretation of certain Section of the POCSO Act. The article deals with this issue.

    Object of the POCSO Act

    • The Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act was enacted in 2012 especially to protect children (aged less than 18) from sexual assault.
    • The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Act admitted that a number of sexual offences against children were neither specifically provided for in extant laws nor adequately penalised.
    • The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified by India in 1992, also requires sexual exploitation and sexual abuse to be addressed as heinous crimes.

    Issues with Bombay High Court’s Judgement

    • The Bench acquitted a man under the POCSO Act found guilty of assault on the grounds that he groped his victim over her clothes and there was no skin-to-skin contact between them.
    • As this judgment was likely to set a dangerous precedent, the apex court stayed the acquittal.
    • Section 7 of the POCSO Act, along with other things, says that whoever with sexual intent touches the breast of the child is said to commit sexual assault.
    • Whereas Section 8 of the Act provides minimum imprisonment of three years for sexual assault.
    • Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) lays down a minimum of one year imprisonment for outraging the modesty of a woman.

    Difference between IPC and POCSO

    • The difference between POCSO and IPC, as far as the offence of sexual assault is concerned, is two-fold.
    • One, the definition of ‘assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty’ given in the IPC is generic.
    • Whereas in POCSO, the acts of sexual assault are explicitly mentioned such as touching various private parts.
    • ‘Sexual assault’ in POCSO specifically excludes rape which requires penetration; otherwise the scope of ‘sexual assault’ under POCSO and ‘outraging modesty of a woman’ under the IPC is the same.
    • Two, whereas the IPC provides punishment for the offence irrespective of any age of the victim, POCSO is specific for the protection of children.
    • Higher punishment is provided under POCSO not because more serious allegations of sexual assault are required but because the legislature wanted punishment to be more deterrent if the victims are children.

    Conclusion

    In the absence of any specific provision in the POCSO Act which requires skin-to-skin touch as a mandatory element of an offence, any interpretation which dilutes protection to children must be declared ultra vires.

  • Need for rigorous scrutiny of constitutionality of the bills

    Farmers’  protests against the farm laws and staying of  implementation of these laws by the judiciary have once again brought into focus the process followed in the passage of laws by the parliament. This article highlights the importance of parliamentary committees.

    Need for introspection on the role of parliament

    • The Supreme Court’s order on the farm laws staying their implementation crossed the line of separation between the legislature and judiciary.
    • The order should trigger introspection in Parliament.
    • Since 2019, the constitutionality of statutes passed by it, like the abrogation of Article 370, the Citizenship Amendment Act and recently the farm laws, has been challenged before the SC.
    • The highest lawmaking body should be asking itself whether it rigorously scrutinises the constitutionality of bills.

    Three mechanisms to examine the constitutionality

    • Parliament has three mechanisms for examining whether a government bill adheres to constitutional principles.
    • First, any member of the Parliament can oppose the introduction of a bill by stating that it initiates legislation outside the legislative competence of the Parliament.
    • Second, MPs also get an opportunity to discuss a bill’s constitutionality while debating it in the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha.
    • But on both these occasions, the strength of the argument does not determine the legislative outcome.
    • The Parliament’s decision depends on the numbers that the treasury and opposition benches command on the house floor.
    • Third, the opportunity for probing a bill’s constitutionality arises when a parliamentary committee is examining it.

    Advantages of scrutiny of the bill by  parliamentary committee

    • The most important opportunity of the above mentioned three opportunities is scrutiny by the parliamentary committee.
    • In the past too, the parliamentary committees have subjected the bills to strict scrutiny on the issue of constitutionality.
    • For example, the committee examining the land acquisition bill 2011 was concerned about the bill infringing upon the state governments’ power.
    • Similarly, during the deliberations on the Citizenship Amendment Bill 2016, the joint committee explicitly asked the government whether the bill would violate the spirit of Articles 14 and 25 of the Constitution.
    • The committee process also has the advantage of drawing on constitutional expertise outside of the law ministry.
    • The government has also fielded the attorney general to appear before parliamentary committees.

    Weakness of parliamentary committee process

    • Our parliamentary committee process has a fatal flaw.
    • Government bills do not automatically go to committees for examination.
    • Ministers get an option to refer their bill to a select committee, they often don’t exercise this option.
    • While countries like Sweden and Finland pass their bills through two parliamentary committees.
    • One committee looks at the technical aspects of a proposed law, and a specialised committee focuses on a bill’s constitutional validity.

    Consider the question “Several laws passed by the government have been challenged before the judiciary on the ground of unconstitutionality. This highlights the importance of strict scrutiny of the bills by the Parliament. In light of this, examine the role played by the parliamentary committees in the scrutiny of the bills.” 

    Conclusion

    Lack of robust scrutiny processes weakens Parliament’s image as the highest legislative institution and encourages judicial encroachment on its powers. After all, lawmaking should not be a mechanical stamping of the government’s legislative proposals but their careful examination by the Parliament.