Subject: Internal Security

External dependence for defence equipment could turn out to be the chink in the armour of any country, literally. As one of the major importer of defence equipment, India has been struggling to wean itself away from this vulnerability. This article discusses the recent changes announced by the finance minister in defence procurement and manufacturing policy. So, what are the changes and how will these changes benefit us? Read to know more…

Promoting self-reliance: Addressing strategic and national security concern

• Recently the Finance Minister announced measures to promote self-reliance in defence production.
• This address long-standing strategic and national security concerns about the extent of India’s external dependence for its defence-preparedness.
• For most of the past decade, India had the dubious distinction of being the world’s largest arms importer.
• India accounted for about 12% of global arms imports.
• Saudi Arabia jumped to first place in 2018 and 2019, but India still takes over 9% of global imports.
• This external dependence for weapons, spares and, in some cases, even ammunition creates vulnerabilities during military crises.
• COVID-19 has, once again, focused minds on the impact of supply chain disruptions on both civil and defence sectors.
• With its security environment, its great power ambitions and its technological capacities, India should have a robust defence manufacturing capacity.
• New Defence Procurement Procedures (DPP) 2020 are under formulation.
• We now have a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) tasked with promoting indigenous equipment in the armed forces.

Following are some of the moves declared by the government and their significance for the country

1. Encouraging  private manufacturers

• The decision i) to notify a list of weapons systems for sourcing entirely from Indian manufacturers, ii) the promise to progressively expand this list iii) a separate Budget provision for domestic capital procurement- will encourage our private defence manufacturers.
• The research capacities, technological skills and quality commitment of our private defence manufacturer are often better appreciated by foreign clients for whom they are subcontractors.
• There is a range of platforms and subsystems, developed in India and qualified in trials, some of which face hurdles to their induction by our armed forces because of foreign competition.
• These include missile systems such as Akash and Nag, the Light Combat Aircraft and the Light Combat Helicopter, artillery guns, radars, electronic warfare systems and armoured vehicles.

2. Time-bound procurement

• The government has promised i) a time-bound defence procurement process, ii) overhauling trial and testing procedures iii) establishing a professional project management unit.
• To understand the significance of the above measures consider the fact below-
• Over the past five years, the Indian government has approved over 200 defence acquisition proposals, valued at over ₹4 trillion.
• But most are still in relatively early stages of processing.
• Of course, this delay now provides the opportunity to re-examine them and to prioritise those with indigenous research and development.
• The CDS could also examine them from a tri-service angle, to avoid redundancy of capacities across the services.

3. Corporatisation of Ordnance Factory Board

• Over the decades, our ordnance factories have been the backbone of indigenous supplies to our armed forces.
• Their structure, work culture and product range now need to be responsive to technology and quality demands of modern armed forces.
• Corporatisation, including public listing of some units, ensures a more efficient interface of the manufacturer with the designer and end-user.
• The factories would be better integrated into the larger defence manufacturing ecosystem.

4. Realistic specifications of desired weapon platforms

• Our defence planners will frame “realistic” specifications for their desired weapons platforms.
• These specifications should be based on the requirements of India’s defence strategy, rather than on aspirational considerations which, the Finance Minister said, may lead to a single foreign vendor.
• It is also imperative that when we import weapon systems, we should plan for the ammunitions and spares for them to be eventually manufactured in India.
• This will ensure that we are not driven to seek urgent replenishments from abroad during crises.
• The same goes for repair, maintenance and overhaul facilities and, at the next level, the upgrade of weapons platforms.

5. FDI limit increased to 74% by automatic route

• The liberalisation of foreign direct investment in defence manufacturing, raising the limit under the automatic route to 74%, should open the door to more joint ventures of foreign and Indian companies for defence manufacturing in India.
• It would also sustain domestic industrial activity in the research, design and manufacture of systems and sub-systems.
• Our companies would now get the opportunity to directly contribute to Indian defence manufacturing.

Way forward

• The development of a thriving indigenous defence industry needs an overhaul of existing regulations and practices.
• A long-term integrated perspective plan of the requirements of the armed forces should give industry a clear picture of future requirements.
• DPP 2020 should incorporate guidelines to promote forward-looking strategic partnerships between Indian and foreign companies.
• This partnership should be with a view to achieving indigenisation over a period of time for even sophisticated platforms.
• Cost evaluation has to evolve from mechanical application of the L1 (lowest financial bid) principle to prioritising indigenous content.
• The definition of indigenisation itself needs to privilege technology over value or volume.
• Investment, Indian or foreign, will be viable only if the door to defence exports is opened, with a transparent policy.
• To give private industry a level playing field for developing defence technologies, conflicts of interest, created by the role of our Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) as the government’s sole adviser, developer and evaluator of technologies have to be addressed.

Consider the question, “India has been aspiring to reduce its external dependence for defence equipment but has not succeeded in doing so. Examine the challenges in the way of self-sufficiency in this area. How effective will be the recent policy changes made in meeting the goal?”

Conclusion

The government has rightly clarified that self-reliance would not be taken to overzealous extremes. The thrust for indigenous research and development will coexist with the import of cutting-edge military technologies to obviate near-term defence vulnerabilities. Of the key components of any major reform — money, method and mindset — mindset is the most critical and the most intractable. It takes a crisis to change it.

 

 

 

 

The BSF came into being in the wake of the 1965 India-Pakistan war. So, its ‘innate’ tasks involves both wartime and peacetime roles. This article is written by a retired IPS officer who has been ADG of BSF.  Our aim is to provide you with on-ground experience of issues in this security force. Focus of the article is on the preparedness of the BSF for its wartime role. From the exam perspective, focus on issues and possible solutions.

Role of BSF

• Officially, its role is defined in expansive terms like ‘security of the border of India and matters connected therewith’.
• The tasks of BSF are divided into peacetime and wartime.
• 1) The peacetime tasks include preventing smuggling and any other illegal activity, and unauthorised entry into or exit from the territory of India, etc.
• 2) The wartime tasks of the BSF include holding ground in less threatened sectors, etc.

Unpreparedness in wartime role

• The BSF, in terms of its defences, equipment, weaponry and training, is not at all prepared for its wartime role.
• This means that in the eventuality of any military assault, our ‘first line of defence’ would simply crumble.
• Falling back on army’s mobilizations for a counterattack may take up to several days.
• Retreat and loss of territory in this period is a possible scenario.
• The report titled ‘Border Security: Capacity Building and Institutions’ of the department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, submitted to the Rajya Sabha on April 11, 2017:
• Does not talk about the wartime role of the BSF even once.
• It talks only of its peacetime role including fencing, floodlights and roads along the borders, development of integrated check posts, and construction of strategic roads.

The fallacy of infantry attack

• The founders of the BSF, including the committee of secretaries, had a wrong presumption that the assault on the ‘first line of defence’ will be by the enemy’s ‘exposed’ infantry.
• This assault, they imagined, would be repulsed by BSF soldiers wielding similar arms.
• But that presumption is a folly.
•  Now, as a rule of thumb, infantry assault, whether supported by armour or not, or even a purely armour assault on any position is preceded by as heavy and as accurate artillery bombardment as possible.
• If the attacking nation could afford it, such as the US during the 1991 Gulf War the bombardment could be aerial also.

Unprepared to withstand shelling

• Our ‘first line of defence’ does not have any defensive structures or fortifications that could withstand artillery bombardment even for a minute.
• According to photographs available in the public domain, most BSF observation posts on the international border are ramshackle structures of tin sheets and sandbags erected on small mounds of earth.
• Adding to that, the mounds are in full view of the enemy and their locations are known to them to the last centimetre.

 Uninspiring weaponry

• The photographs of the 105 mm Indian Field Gun and their staple, the 7.62 mm medium machine gun are available in public domain.
• The 105 mm Indian Field Guns have been placed under the operational command of the army, and BSF would not be able to use them when the enemy makes first contact with them.
• That leaves them with their 51 mm and 81 mm mortars.
• The 51mm mortar, with just 109 grams of explosive per shell and a maximum range of  850 m is as good as useless in a war.
• The 81 mm mortar bomb with an explosive charge of 750 grams has a maximum range of 6000 m.
• The enemy artillery would in any case be firing from way beyond that range, thereby making effective retaliation through mortars impossible.
• Even when enemy IFV/APC or armour would come closer and in range, the smooth-bore 81 mm mortar is inherently not accurate enough to hit a moving vehicle. (smoothness of bore reduces accuracy)
• Even the NATO rifled 120 mm mortars have a CEP (circular error probable) of 136 m.
• As for the 7.62 mm medium machinegun, it is an anti-personnel weapon with the armour penetration of the M80 bullet being just 3 mm at 500m.
• That makes it useless against even lightly armoured vehicles.
• This means that the BSF outposts will not be able to deliver any effective fire at all on an enemy assault.

IPS leadership issue

• Since the BSF’s inception, the force’s Indian Police Service (IPS) leadership has not focused on the wartime role of the BSF.
• The IPS officers in top positions in the BSF lack knowledge of military science that could enable them to appreciate and address the wartime role.

Way forward

•  The only defence feasible against artillery bombardment is to go sub-surface—in the form of deep concrete dugouts and fire trenches.
• Then we also need elaborate anti-tank ditches.
• To deliver effective fire on enemy armoured and lightly armoured vehicles, and infantry operating under their protection, the BSF needs weapons which carry enough explosive payloads to tackle armour, both light and heavy.
• Portability, manoeuvrability and accuracy are important considerations in the ‘first line of defence’ attacking armour.
• A veritable battery of ATGMs and cheaper yet accurate options like the 80 mm Breda Folgore RCL are available.
• Using them effectively would require defensive fighting positions interconnected by communication trenches.
• Research needs to be done to mount weapons like the Shipunov 2A42 30 mm autocannon on platforms faster than the BMP-2.
• Similarly, MMGs/GPMGs need mobile platforms like Humvees to increase their survivability as well as effectivity.

Consider the question “The BSF, which is often hailed as India’s ‘first line of defence’ has tasked with wartime and peacetime roles. Though it is quite adept in peacetime role, its wartime preparedness needs an overhaul. Comment.”

Conclusion

These issues with the BSF could result in a  situation where there is every possibility of rout and retreat in the early days of the war. This issue needs to be urgently addressed by the government.

 

The Army’s new concept of agile Integrated Battle Groups (IBG) as part of the overall force transformation will be operationalised very soon, confirmed Army Chief.

Practice question for mains:

The deployment of Integrated Battle Groups (IBG) is necessary for counter-insurgency operations across the terror hit borders of India. Discuss.

What are IBGs?

• IBGs are brigade-sized, agile, self-sufficient combat formations, which can swiftly launch strikes against an adversary in case of hostilities.
• Each IBG would be tailor-made based on Threat, Terrain and Task and resources will be allotted based on the three Ts.
• They need to be light so they will be low on logistics and they will be able to mobilise within 12-48 hrs based on the location.
• An IBG operating in a desert needs to be constituted differently from an IBG operating in the mountains.
• The key corps of the Army is likely to be reorganized into 1-3 IBGs.

Objective of IBG

• Holistic integration to enhance the operational and functional efficiency, optimize budget expenditure, facilitate force modernization and address aspirations

Structure

• While a command is the largest static formation of the Army spread across defined geography, a corps is the largest mobile formation.
• Typically each corps has about three brigades.
• The idea is to reorganise them into IBGs which are brigade-sized units but have all the essential elements like infantry, armoured, artillery and air defence embedded together based on the three Ts.
• The IBGs will also be defensive and offensive. While the offensive IBGs would quickly mobilise and make a thrust into enemy territory for strikes, defensive IBGs would hold ground at vulnerable points or where enemy action is expected.

Why need IBGs?

• After the terrorist attack on the Parliament, the Indian military undertook massive mobilization but the Army’s formations which deep inside took weeks to mobilise losing the element of surprise.
• Following this, the Army formulated a proactive doctrine known as ‘Cold Start’ to launch swift offensive but its existence was consistently denied in the past.
• Its existence was acknowledged for the first time by Gen Rawat in January 2017.