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Subject: Internal Security

  • [pib] Shekatkar Committee recommendations on Border Infrastructure

    Government has accepted and implemented three important recommendations of the Committee of Experts (CoE) under the chairmanship of Lt General D B Shekatkar (Retd.) relating to border Infrastructure.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. India’s unique geo-strategic location needs an all-weather and efficient border infrastructure. Comment.

    About Shekatkar Committee

    • The military reforms committee – under Lt General (retd.) DB Shekatkar – was set up by then Raksha Mantri Manohar Parrikar in 2015.
    • The committee was established with a mandate for Enhancing Combat Capability and Rebalancing Defence Expenditure.
    • Shekatkar Committee had made recommendations on enhancing the combat potential of India’s three armed forces, rationalizing the defence budget etc.
    • The committee submitted its report on December 21, 2016. It had apparently exceeded its brief with some 200 recommendations.
    • A major recommendation is that the defence budget should be 2.5% to 3% of the GDP.

    Recommendations on border infrastructure

    • On the matter related to creating border infrastructure, the Government has implemented the recommendation of CoE to outsource road construction work beyond the optimal capacity of Border Roads Organisation (BRO).
    • These were related to speeding up road construction, leading to socio-economic development in the border areas.
    • The other recommendation relating to the introduction of modern construction plants, equipment and machinery has been implemented.

    Back2Basics: Border Roads Organisation (BRO)

    • The BRO develops and maintains road networks in India’s border areas and friendly neighboring countries and functions under the Ministry of Defence.
    • It is entrusted for construction of Roads, Bridges, Tunnels, Causeways, Helipads and Airfields along the borders.
    • Officers from the Border Roads Engineering Service (BRES) and personnel from the General Reserve Engineer Force (GREF) form the parent cadre of the Border Roads Organisation.
    • It is also staffed by officers and troops drawn from the Indian Army’s Corps of Engineers on extra regimental employment.
    • The BRO operates and maintains over 32,885 kilometers of roads and about 12,200 meters of permanent bridges in the country.
  • War and Peace: Analysis of BSF’s role

    The BSF came into being in the wake of the 1965 India-Pakistan war. So, its ‘innate’ tasks involves both wartime and peacetime roles. This article is written by a retired IPS officer who has been ADG of BSF.  Our aim is to provide you with on-ground experience of issues in this security force. Focus of the article is on the preparedness of the BSF for its wartime role. From the exam perspective, focus on issues and possible solutions.

    Role of BSF

    • Officially, its role is defined in expansive terms like ‘security of the border of India and matters connected therewith’.
    • The tasks of BSF are divided into peacetime and wartime.
    • 1) The peacetime tasks include preventing smuggling and any other illegal activity, and unauthorised entry into or exit from the territory of India, etc.
    • 2) The wartime tasks of the BSF include holding ground in less threatened sectors, etc.

    Unpreparedness in wartime role

    • The BSF, in terms of its defences, equipment, weaponry and training, is not at all prepared for its wartime role.
    • This means that in the eventuality of any military assault, our ‘first line of defence’ would simply crumble.
    • Falling back on army’s mobilizations for a counterattack may take up to several days.
    • Retreat and loss of territory in this period is a possible scenario.
    • The report titled ‘Border Security: Capacity Building and Institutions’ of the department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, submitted to the Rajya Sabha on April 11, 2017:
    • Does not talk about the wartime role of the BSF even once.
    • It talks only of its peacetime role including fencing, floodlights and roads along the borders, development of integrated check posts, and construction of strategic roads.

    The fallacy of infantry attack

    • The founders of the BSF, including the committee of secretaries, had a wrong presumption that the assault on the ‘first line of defence’ will be by the enemy’s ‘exposed’ infantry.
    • This assault, they imagined, would be repulsed by BSF soldiers wielding similar arms.
    • But that presumption is a folly.
    •  Now, as a rule of thumb, infantry assault, whether supported by armour or not, or even a purely armour assault on any position is preceded by as heavy and as accurate artillery bombardment as possible.
    • If the attacking nation could afford it, such as the US during the 1991 Gulf War the bombardment could be aerial also.

    Unprepared to withstand shelling

    • Our ‘first line of defence’ does not have any defensive structures or fortifications that could withstand artillery bombardment even for a minute.
    • According to photographs available in the public domain, most BSF observation posts on the international border are ramshackle structures of tin sheets and sandbags erected on small mounds of earth.
    • Adding to that, the mounds are in full view of the enemy and their locations are known to them to the last centimetre.

     Uninspiring weaponry

    • The photographs of the 105 mm Indian Field Gun and their staple, the 7.62 mm medium machine gun are available in public domain.
    • The 105 mm Indian Field Guns have been placed under the operational command of the army, and BSF would not be able to use them when the enemy makes first contact with them.
    • That leaves them with their 51 mm and 81 mm mortars.
    • The 51mm mortar, with just 109 grams of explosive per shell and a maximum range of  850 m is as good as useless in a war.
    • The 81 mm mortar bomb with an explosive charge of 750 grams has a maximum range of 6000 m.
    • The enemy artillery would in any case be firing from way beyond that range, thereby making effective retaliation through mortars impossible.
    • Even when enemy IFV/APC or armour would come closer and in range, the smooth-bore 81 mm mortar is inherently not accurate enough to hit a moving vehicle. (smoothness of bore reduces accuracy)
    • Even the NATO rifled 120 mm mortars have a CEP (circular error probable) of 136 m.
    • As for the 7.62 mm medium machinegun, it is an anti-personnel weapon with the armour penetration of the M80 bullet being just 3 mm at 500m.
    • That makes it useless against even lightly armoured vehicles.
    • This means that the BSF outposts will not be able to deliver any effective fire at all on an enemy assault.

    IPS leadership issue

    • Since the BSF’s inception, the force’s Indian Police Service (IPS) leadership has not focused on the wartime role of the BSF.
    • The IPS officers in top positions in the BSF lack knowledge of military science that could enable them to appreciate and address the wartime role.

    Way forward

    •  The only defence feasible against artillery bombardment is to go sub-surface—in the form of deep concrete dugouts and fire trenches.
    • Then we also need elaborate anti-tank ditches.
    • To deliver effective fire on enemy armoured and lightly armoured vehicles, and infantry operating under their protection, the BSF needs weapons which carry enough explosive payloads to tackle armour, both light and heavy.
    • Portability, manoeuvrability and accuracy are important considerations in the ‘first line of defence’ attacking armour.
    • A veritable battery of ATGMs and cheaper yet accurate options like the 80 mm Breda Folgore RCL are available.
    • Using them effectively would require defensive fighting positions interconnected by communication trenches.
    • Research needs to be done to mount weapons like the Shipunov 2A42 30 mm autocannon on platforms faster than the BMP-2.
    • Similarly, MMGs/GPMGs need mobile platforms like Humvees to increase their survivability as well as effectivity.

    Consider the question “The BSF, which is often hailed as India’s ‘first line of defence’ has tasked with wartime and peacetime roles. Though it is quite adept in peacetime role, its wartime preparedness needs an overhaul. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    These issues with the BSF could result in a  situation where there is every possibility of rout and retreat in the early days of the war. This issue needs to be urgently addressed by the government.

     

  • [pib] Defence Testing Infrastructure Scheme (DTIS)

    In order to give a boost to domestic defence and aerospace manufacturing, Raksha Mantri has approved the launch of the Defence Testing Infrastructure Scheme (DTIS).

     

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. Self-reliance in defence manufacturing is one of the key objectives of ‘Make in India’. Discuss.

     

    Defence Testing Infrastructure Scheme (DTIS)

    • The DTIS would run for the duration of five years and envisages set up six to eight new test facilities in partnership with private industry.
    • The scheme has been allocated with an outlay of Rs 400 crore for creating a state of the art testing infrastructure for this sector.
    • This will facilitate indigenous defence production, consequently, reduce imports of military equipment and help make the country self-reliant.
    • While the majority of test facilities are expected to come up in the two Defence Industrial Corridors (DICs), the Scheme is not limited to setting up Test Facilities in the DICs only.

    Funding pattern

    • The projects under the Scheme will be provided with up to 75 per cent government funding in the form of ‘Grant-in-Aid’.
    • The remaining 25 per cent of the project cost will have to be borne by the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) whose constituents will be Indian private entities and State Governments.
    • The SPVs under the Scheme will be registered under Companies Act 2013 and shall also operate and maintain all assets under the Scheme, in a self-sustainable manner by collecting user charges.
  • “Tour of Duty (ToD) Scheme” for Short Service in Indian Army

    The Indian Army has planned to take civilians on a three-year “Tour of Duty” (ToD) or short service” on a trial basis to serve as officers and in other ranks initially for a limited number of vacancies which will be expanded later.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. The “Tour of Duty” (ToD) Scheme is a significant move to free up funds for the Army’s modernization. Comment.

    Tour of Duty Scheme

    • Indian Army is thinking to induct youngsters for three-year “Tour of Duty (ToD) tenure as both officers and jawans.
    • The ToD scheme, in case approved, will initially be launched with around 100 vacancies for officers and 1,000 for jawans.
    • As per Army, a ToD officer will earn Rs 80,000-90,000 per month. After ToD tenure, youngsters can find lucrative private and public sector jobs.
    • The Army says it will restructure the cadre and help modernize the force.

    Advantages of ToD Scheme

    • ToD is expected to result in a significant reduction in the expenditure on pay and pensions and free up funds for the Army’s modernization.
    • The overall purpose of the ToD concept is ‘internship/temporary experience’.
    • There will be no requirement of attractive severance packages, resettlement courses, professional encashment training leave, ex-servicemen status, ex-servicemen Contributory Health Scheme for ToD officers and other ranks.
    • Analysing the cost of training incurred on each personnel compared with the limited employment of the manpower for three years, the proposal calculates that it will indeed have a positive benefit.

    The cost factor

    • The approximate cost incurred is nearly ₹5.12 crore and ₹6.83 crores for a Short Service Commission (SSC) officer if he or she is released from service after 10 and 14 years, respectively.
    • The costs for those released after a three-year ToD is just ₹80-85 lakh.
    • Similarly, estimates for a jawan with 17 years of service as compared to a ToD recruit with three years’ service shows that the prospective lifetime savings of just one jawan are ₹11.5 crores.
    • Thus, savings for only 1,000 jawans could be ₹11,000 crores, which could be used for the much-needed modernization of the Army.

    Other benefits

    • This scheme is for those who did not want a full career in the Army but still wanted to put on the uniform.
    • Individuals who opted for ToD would get a much higher salary than their peers in the corporate sector.
    • They would also have an edge after leaving the service and going to the corporate sector.
    • The Army hoped that this would attract individuals from the best colleges, including the Indian Institutes of Technology.

    Back2Basics: Permanent Commission (PC) Vs. Short Service Commission (SSC)

    • SSC means an officer’s career will be of a limited period in the Indian Armed Forces whereas a PC means they shall continue to serve in the Indian Armed Forces, till they retire.
    • The officers inducted through the SSC usually serve for a period of 14 years. At the end of 10 years, the officers have three options.
    • A PC entitles an officer to serve in the Navy till he/she retires unlike SSC, which is currently for 10 years and can be extended by four more years, or a total of 14 years.
    • They can either select for a PC or opt-out or have the option of a 4-years extension. They can resign at any time during this period of 4 years extension.
  • What are Integrated Battle Groups (IBG)?

    The Army’s new concept of agile Integrated Battle Groups (IBG) as part of the overall force transformation will be operationalised very soon, confirmed Army Chief.

    Practice question for mains:

    The deployment of Integrated Battle Groups (IBG) is necessary for counter-insurgency operations across the terror hit borders of India. Discuss.

    What are IBGs?

    • IBGs are brigade-sized, agile, self-sufficient combat formations, which can swiftly launch strikes against an adversary in case of hostilities.
    • Each IBG would be tailor-made based on Threat, Terrain and Task and resources will be allotted based on the three Ts.
    • They need to be light so they will be low on logistics and they will be able to mobilise within 12-48 hrs based on the location.
    • An IBG operating in a desert needs to be constituted differently from an IBG operating in the mountains.
    • The key corps of the Army is likely to be reorganized into 1-3 IBGs.

    Objective of IBG

    • Holistic integration to enhance the operational and functional efficiency, optimize budget expenditure, facilitate force modernization and address aspirations

    Structure

    • While a command is the largest static formation of the Army spread across defined geography, a corps is the largest mobile formation.
    • Typically each corps has about three brigades.
    • The idea is to reorganise them into IBGs which are brigade-sized units but have all the essential elements like infantry, armoured, artillery and air defence embedded together based on the three Ts.
    • The IBGs will also be defensive and offensive. While the offensive IBGs would quickly mobilise and make a thrust into enemy territory for strikes, defensive IBGs would hold ground at vulnerable points or where enemy action is expected.

    Why need IBGs?

    • After the terrorist attack on the Parliament, the Indian military undertook massive mobilization but the Army’s formations which deep inside took weeks to mobilise losing the element of surprise.
    • Following this, the Army formulated a proactive doctrine known as ‘Cold Start’ to launch swift offensive but its existence was consistently denied in the past.
    • Its existence was acknowledged for the first time by Gen Rawat in January 2017.
  • Pokhran-II nuclear tests

    Yesterday, May 11 was celebrated as the National Technology Day. It marks the day on which India successfully test-fired its first nuclear bombs in 1998.

    Practice question for mains

    Q. India’s nuclear policy of ‘No First Use’ needs a revamp. Examine.

    India and nuclear weapons

    • India is currently among eight countries in the world that have a publicly known nuclear weapons program.
    • At the time of our independence, leaders were opposed to fully embracing nuclear weapons.
    • Just two years before in 1945, the world had witnessed the horrific nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
    • Mahatma Gandhi called the use of nuclear weapons morally unacceptable.

    Why India did equip itself with nuclear arms?

    • Then PM Jawaharlal Nehru was sceptical but kept the door open for future consideration.
    • This future beckoned early, as India’s defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian War gave rise to legitimate fears about national security.
    • Then in 1974, India conducted its first nuclear test, codenamed “Smiling Buddha”, at Pokhran in Rajasthan.
    • Then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi called the test a peaceful nuclear explosion.
    • India demonstrated to the world that the country could defend itself in an extreme situation and chose not to immediately weaponize the nuclear device it tested at Pokhran.

     The Pokhran II tests

    • India’s fence-sitting finally ended when it detonated another device in 1998, again at Pokhran.
    • Assigned the code name Operation Shakti, the mission was initiated on May 11, 1998.
    • The tests consisted of 5 detonations, the first being a fusion bomb while the remaining four were fission bombs.
    • One fusion and two fission bombs were tested on May 11, and two more fission bombs on May 13.
    • With the tests, India achieved its objective of building fission and thermonuclear weapons with yields up to 200 kilotons.

    Aftermath

    • After Pokhran-II, Vajpayee had declared India a nuclear state — then the sixth country in the world to join this league.
    • Unlike in 1974, India had this time chosen to actively develop its nuclear capabilities, and the tests followed economic sanctions by the United States and Japan. The sanctions were later lifted.

    Back2Basics: India’s nuclear programme

    • India started its own nuclear programme in 1944 when Homi Jehangir Bhabha founded the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research.
    • Physicist Raja Ramanna played an essential role in nuclear weapons technology research; he expanded and supervised scientific research on nuclear weapons and was the first directing officer of the small team of scientists that supervised and carried out the test.
    • After independence, PM Nehru authorised the development of a nuclear programme headed by Homi Bhabha.
    • The Atomic Energy Act of 1948 focused on peaceful development.
    • India was heavily involved in the development of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but ultimately opted not to sign it.
    • In 1954, two important infrastructure projects were commissioned. The first established Trombay Atomic Energy Establishment at Mumbai (Bombay). The other created a governmental secretariat, Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), of which Bhabha was the first secretary.

    Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

    • The NSG is a multilateral export control regime and a group of nuclear supplier countries that seek to prevent nuclear proliferation by controlling the export of materials, equipment and technology that can be used to manufacture nuclear weapons.
    • The NSG was founded in response to the Indian nuclear test in May 1974 and first met in November 1975.
    • It was solely aimed to deny advanced technology, and isolate and contain India.
  • The Resistance Front (TRF)

     

    (Image Source: The Economic Times)

     

    A newly floated outfit, the Resistance Front, has come under the scanner of enforcement agencies for its suspected links with the banned Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).

    This is a very significant development with respect to India’s concern against terrorism. Terrorism and the terror outfits are increasingly becoming more institutionalized and ‘the Resistance Front’ is an another move towards it.

    ‘The Resistance Front’

    • TRF, which is owning up terror attacks in Kashmir these days, is an offshoot of the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba and is also associated with other terror outfits such as Hizbul Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammed.
    • Various reports claim that after the abrogation of Article 370 in J&K, Pakistan decided to increase the terror activities in the Valley.
    • However, facing international pressure and to protect itself from being blacklisted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Pakistan decided to launch a new terror group with a new identity.
    • Various Indian security agencies operating in Kashmir feel that the ‘TRF’ was formed due to the pressure on Pakistan from the FATF to cut down on the funding of the terrorist groups.

    A new strategy justifying terrorism

    • The word ‘resistance’ has been used by Pakistan and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to put in place a new strategy for supporting terrorism against India.
    • Pakistan’s plan is to rebrand the terrorists operating under the umbrella of JeM, LeT and Hizbul as “non-religious” rebellion.
    • Pakistan wants to project Kashmiri terrorism as a resistance movement by Kashmiris. So far Hizbul and LeT have come under TRF’s umbrella.

    Must read:

    https://www.civilsdaily.com/news/explained-amendments-to-the-uapa/


    Back2Basics: What is the FATF?

    • FATF is an intergovernmental organization founded in 1989 on the initiative of the G7 to develop policies to combat money laundering.
    • The FATF Secretariat is housed at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) headquarters in Paris.
    • It holds three Plenary meetings in the course of each of its 12-month rotating presidencies.
  • Transforming the Military

    The COVID blaze caused economic disruption and now even the military is feeling the heat. The military is grappling with multiple issues like freezing of fresh capital acquisition and delay in procurement. But this could also be considered as an opportunity to transform the Indian military. 4 areas where this transformation could start are discussed in this article. Read to know more.

    The difference in approaches to security

    • Pakistan’s approach: Pakistan stagnates in an existential-threat-based and India-centric approach to national security.
    • What is China’s approach? China’s expansive global strategy and unbridled capability-based development surge have overcome the dangers of direct competition with the US.
    • It has closed the gap through an “indirect approach to international security”.
    • This indirect approach looks at building on strengths in areas such as cyberspace, non-contact warfare, economic and diplomatic coercion.

    So, what should be India’s approach to security?

    • Strategic guidelines for India’s must shift from a threat-based methodology to a multi-disciplinary capability.
    • An outcome-based orientation to fit with the nation’s power aspirations.

    4 most critical means to kick-start the transformation:

    1. Creation of indigenous defence capability

    • Doing this without brushing away the short and medium-term requirement of selective imports will be the key to a calibrated march to self-sufficiency.

    2. Leadership

    • India’s military leadership is very hierarchical and sequential in its approach.
    • However, this same leadership has superb operational skills and possesses a quick understanding of technology, tactics, techniques and procedures.
    • Consequently, strategic leaders need to be identified and their transition towards becoming more than mere executors of operational plans and campaigns needs to be enabled.
    • Multi-disciplinary thinking, lateral assimilation and a world-view are among the specific skill-sets that need to be nurtured.

    3. Training and Education

    • Training and education form the next two silos in the process of transformation.
    • The US example: Several military officers at the colonel level — fresh out of war colleges and the university environment where they spend a year of education (not training) — are posted at the Pentagon and NATO HQ.
    • Here, they work alongside civilians, politicians, lawmakers, not forgetting their own joint leadership.
    • In such an environment, it is not difficult to mark, train and recognise talent in ways that go beyond the mere rank structure.
    • It is high time India goes down that road because even though economic globalisation may be on hold for a while post-COVID-19, there is going to be a flattening of the world from a security perspective.
    • There will be common threats that would need to be fought jointly by nations.
    • The three pre-requisites in these silos will be an amalgam of 1)service-centric and joint operations expertise, 2) operational acumen in a global environment, and 3) broad-based education that develops intellectual capital.
    • Training in the Indian military is top-notch and needs a little tweaking to help officers and men understand the rules of engagement in a Volatile, Uncertain, Complex and Ambiguous (VUCA) world.
    • It is diversified education at all levels of leadership that is a weak area.

    4. Jointness and integration

    • Finally, the silo of jointness and integration without losing identities and compromising competencies is an outcome that needs to be chased down with focus and determination.

    Consider the question based on the issues discussed in the article “Strategic guidelines for India’s security managers must shift from a threat-based methodology to a multi-disciplinary capability and outcome-based orientation to fit with the nation’s power aspirations. Based on some expert committee reports, discuss the ways which the Indian military follow to achieve the transformation to satisfy the nation’s power aspirations.”

    Conclusion

    Some difficulties caused to the military due to COVID pandemic should be considered as an opportunity. It should be an opportunity to evolve a transformational culture in the Indian military. This should be based on clear political guidelines driven by existing and futuristic capabilities, expected strategic outcomes and anticipated strategic challenges.

     

  • Vande Bharat and Samudra Setu Missions to repatriate Indian nationals

    India is all geared to operate flights and naval vessels to repatriate Indian nationals stranded abroad.

    The name Samudra Setu typically sound like a combatant naval exercise whereas Vande Bharat reminds us of Train-18. Both ideas have opposite context and meaning. One must keep this in mind.

    What is the ‘Vande Bharat Mission’ mission about?

    • ‘Vande Bharat Mission’ will see the operation of 64 flights from May 7 to May 13 to bring back around 15,000 Indian nationals stranded abroad.
    • Once completed, it may turn out to be the largest evacuation operation ever since the 1990 airlift of 1.7 lakh people from Kuwait.
    • Approximately, 2,000 people from abroad will fly back to India daily.

    What is Indian Navy’s ‘Operation Samudra Setu’?

    • The Indian Navy launched ‘Operation Samudra Setu’ (Sea Bridge) as a part of national effort to repatriate Indian citizens from overseas.
    • Indian Naval Ships Jalashwa and Magar are presently enroute to the port of Malè, Republic of Maldives to commence evacuation operations from 08 May 2020 as part of Phase-1.
    • INS Jalashwa is the largest amphibious platform in the Navy and is based at the Eastern Naval Command headquarters in Visakhapatnam.
    • It can normally accommodate 1,000 people but will take about 800.
  • ‘Trends in World Military Expenditure’ Report, 2019

    The annual report ‘Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2019’ was released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), a Swedish think tank.

    Military expenditure across the World

    • The global military expenditure rose to $1917 billion in 2019 with India and China emerging among the top three spenders, according to the report.
    • In 2019, the top five largest spenders — U.S. ($732 bn), China, India, Russia ($65.1 bn) and Saudi Arabia ($61.9 bn) — accounted for 62% of the global expenditure.
    • China’s military expenditure reached $261 billion in 2019, a 5.1% increase compared with 2018, while India’s grew by 6.8% to $71.1 billion.
    • In Asia and Oceania, other than India and China, Japan ($47.6 bn) and South Korea ($43.9 bn) were the largest military spenders.

    What drives India’s military spending?

    • India’s tensions and rivalry with both Pakistan and China are among the major drivers for its increased military spending.
    • While India’s defence spending excluding pensions, which constitute a significant part, has been growing in absolute terms, it has been going down as a percentage of its GDP as noted by the report.

    Significant rise

    • India’s expenditure in 2019 was 6.8% more than that in 2018.
    • It grew by 259% over the 30-year period of 1990–2019, and by 37% over the decade of 2010–19.

    The Defence expenditure in India is increasing every year in absolute terms, implying higher spending while there has been very selective modernisation of the armed forces. Critically analyse.