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Subject: Internal Security

  • Towards self-reliance in defence manufacturing

    External dependence for defence equipment could turn out to be the chink in the armour of any country, literally. As one of the major importer of defence equipment, India has been struggling to wean itself away from this vulnerability. This article discusses the recent changes announced by the finance minister in defence procurement and manufacturing policy. So, what are the changes and how will these changes benefit us? Read to know more…

    Promoting self-reliance: Addressing strategic and national security concern

    • Recently the Finance Minister announced measures to promote self-reliance in defence production.
    • This address long-standing strategic and national security concerns about the extent of India’s external dependence for its defence-preparedness.
    • For most of the past decade, India had the dubious distinction of being the world’s largest arms importer.
    • India accounted for about 12% of global arms imports.
    • Saudi Arabia jumped to first place in 2018 and 2019, but India still takes over 9% of global imports.
    • This external dependence for weapons, spares and, in some cases, even ammunition creates vulnerabilities during military crises.
    • COVID-19 has, once again, focused minds on the impact of supply chain disruptions on both civil and defence sectors.
    • With its security environment, its great power ambitions and its technological capacities, India should have a robust defence manufacturing capacity.
    • New Defence Procurement Procedures (DPP) 2020 are under formulation.
    • We now have a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) tasked with promoting indigenous equipment in the armed forces.

    Following are some of the moves declared by the government and their significance for the country

    1. Encouraging  private manufacturers

    • The decision i) to notify a list of weapons systems for sourcing entirely from Indian manufacturers, ii) the promise to progressively expand this list iii) a separate Budget provision for domestic capital procurement- will encourage our private defence manufacturers.
    • The research capacities, technological skills and quality commitment of our private defence manufacturer are often better appreciated by foreign clients for whom they are subcontractors.
    • There is a range of platforms and subsystems, developed in India and qualified in trials, some of which face hurdles to their induction by our armed forces because of foreign competition.
    • These include missile systems such as Akash and Nag, the Light Combat Aircraft and the Light Combat Helicopter, artillery guns, radars, electronic warfare systems and armoured vehicles.

    2. Time-bound procurement

    • The government has promised i) a time-bound defence procurement process, ii) overhauling trial and testing procedures iii) establishing a professional project management unit.
    • To understand the significance of the above measures consider the fact below-
    • Over the past five years, the Indian government has approved over 200 defence acquisition proposals, valued at over ₹4 trillion.
    • But most are still in relatively early stages of processing.
    • Of course, this delay now provides the opportunity to re-examine them and to prioritise those with indigenous research and development.
    • The CDS could also examine them from a tri-service angle, to avoid redundancy of capacities across the services.

    3. Corporatisation of Ordnance Factory Board

    • Over the decades, our ordnance factories have been the backbone of indigenous supplies to our armed forces.
    • Their structure, work culture and product range now need to be responsive to technology and quality demands of modern armed forces.
    • Corporatisation, including public listing of some units, ensures a more efficient interface of the manufacturer with the designer and end-user.
    • The factories would be better integrated into the larger defence manufacturing ecosystem.

    4. Realistic specifications of desired weapon platforms

    • Our defence planners will frame “realistic” specifications for their desired weapons platforms.
    • These specifications should be based on the requirements of India’s defence strategy, rather than on aspirational considerations which, the Finance Minister said, may lead to a single foreign vendor.
    • It is also imperative that when we import weapon systems, we should plan for the ammunitions and spares for them to be eventually manufactured in India.
    • This will ensure that we are not driven to seek urgent replenishments from abroad during crises.
    • The same goes for repair, maintenance and overhaul facilities and, at the next level, the upgrade of weapons platforms.

    5. FDI limit increased to 74% by automatic route

    • The liberalisation of foreign direct investment in defence manufacturing, raising the limit under the automatic route to 74%, should open the door to more joint ventures of foreign and Indian companies for defence manufacturing in India.
    • It would also sustain domestic industrial activity in the research, design and manufacture of systems and sub-systems.
    • Our companies would now get the opportunity to directly contribute to Indian defence manufacturing.

    Way forward

    • The development of a thriving indigenous defence industry needs an overhaul of existing regulations and practices.
    • A long-term integrated perspective plan of the requirements of the armed forces should give industry a clear picture of future requirements.
    • DPP 2020 should incorporate guidelines to promote forward-looking strategic partnerships between Indian and foreign companies.
    • This partnership should be with a view to achieving indigenisation over a period of time for even sophisticated platforms.
    • Cost evaluation has to evolve from mechanical application of the L1 (lowest financial bid) principle to prioritising indigenous content.
    • The definition of indigenisation itself needs to privilege technology over value or volume.
    • Investment, Indian or foreign, will be viable only if the door to defence exports is opened, with a transparent policy.
    • To give private industry a level playing field for developing defence technologies, conflicts of interest, created by the role of our Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) as the government’s sole adviser, developer and evaluator of technologies have to be addressed.

    Consider the question, “India has been aspiring to reduce its external dependence for defence equipment but has not succeeded in doing so. Examine the challenges in the way of self-sufficiency in this area. How effective will be the recent policy changes made in meeting the goal?”

    Conclusion

    The government has rightly clarified that self-reliance would not be taken to overzealous extremes. The thrust for indigenous research and development will coexist with the import of cutting-edge military technologies to obviate near-term defence vulnerabilities. Of the key components of any major reform — money, method and mindset — mindset is the most critical and the most intractable. It takes a crisis to change it.

     

     

     

     

  • Terrorism and its ideologies

    Pakistan is a unique country in the sense that it is both a victim and the perpetrator of terrorism. This article explains the situations which made Pakistan home to the terrorism. So, why some terrorist organisations turned against Pakistan? What are the ideologies followed by various terrorist organisation and how it makes a difference in their functioning? Read to know…

    Terrorism paradox of Pakistan: Both Victim and perpetrator

    • This Terrorism paradox can be traced to the deliberate policy of the Pakistani state to create and foster terrorist groups in order to engage in low-intensity warfare with its neighbours.
    • Pakistan first operationalised this strategy in regard to Afghanistan in 1973.
    • And intensified it with the cooperation of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia after the Marxist coup of 1978 after which USSR entered Afghanistan.

    Soviet withdrawal and rise in insurgency in Kashmir

    • The Soviet withdrawal in 1989 left the Pakistani military with a large surplus of Islamist fighters that it had trained and armed.
    • Islamabad decided to use this “asset” to intensify the insurgency in the Kashmir Valley.

    Radicalisation of Pakistani population

    • The decade-long Afghan “jihad” in Afghanistan had also radicalised a substantial segment of the Pakistani population.
    • Radicalisation was intense in the North-West Frontier Province and Punjab.
    • Sectarian divisions were also on the rise not only between Sunnis and Shias but also among various Sunni sects.
    • The division was intense between two Sunni sects-the puritanical Deobandis and the more syncretic and Sufi-oriented Barelvis.
    • In the process, a number of homegrown terrorist groups emerged that the Pakistan Army co-opted for its use in Kashmir and the rest of India.
    • But, it soon became clear that Pakistan had created a set of Frankenstein’s monsters some of whom turned against their creator.
    • The Musharraf government, under American pressure, decided to collaborate with the latter in the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
    • This resulted in some of the terrorist organisation turning against Pakistan.

    Monsters who don’t spare even its creator

    • The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has ideological affinity with the Afghan Taliban.
    • The TTP and its affiliates have fought pitched battles with the Pakistan Army in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and parts of the NWFP.
    • Also, the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) has not hesitated to launch terrorist attacks on targets within Pakistan as well, especially against the Shias and Sufi shrines.

    Did all terrorist organisation turn against Pakistan?

    • No!
    • Consider the case of ‘loyalist’ LeT.
    • Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), is a classic example of a “loyalist” terrorist organisation that has played by the rules set by the Pakistani military.
    • It only launches attacks on targets outside Pakistan, primarily in India.
    • As the evidence in the case of the Mumbai carnage of 2008 clearly indicates LeT operations are coordinated with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
    • ISI provides it with intelligence and logistical support in addition to identifying specific targets.
    • This is why the LeT and its front organisations have continued to receive the military’s patronage and unstinting support.
    • Consequently, its leader, Hafiz Saeed, was until recently provided protection by the Pakistani state.

    Ideological differences

    • Both the LeT and the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) have been engaged in attacks on Indian targets identified by Pakistan’s ISI.
    • The difference between LeT and JeM lies in the fact that while the LeT is more pragmatic and less ideological.
    • The JeM is highly ideological and sectarian.
    • JeM draws its ideological inspiration from a very extreme form of Deobandi puritanism.
    • That extreme form considers all those who do not believe in its philosophy beyond the pale of Islam.
    • For many JeM diehards, these include not only Shias and Barelvis but also the Pakistani state and the Pakistani military.
    • LeT on the other hand does not consider Muslims of different theological orientations as non-believers and therefore legitimate targets of attack.
    • This relatively “liberal” interpretation is related to the fact that LeT draws its ideological inspiration from the sect called the Ahl-e-Hadis, which composes only a small proportion of Pakistan’s Muslim population and cannot afford to engage in sectarian conflict.
    • Moreover, it draws its membership from different Muslim sects including the Sufi-oriented Barelvis and the puritanical Deobandis.
    • Both these factors drive LeT toward greater tolerance in sectarian terms and to eschew intra-Islamic theological battles.
    • Its primary goals are political; above all, driving India out of Kashmir.
    • This jells well with the objectives of the Pakistani military and makes LeT and Hafiz Saeed, favourites of the Pakistani establishment.

    Consider the question asked by UPSC in 2017-“The scourge of terrorism is a grave challenge to national security. What solution do you suggest to curb this growing menace? What are the major sources of terrorist funding?

    Conclusion

    The fact that using terrorist outfits for state objectives is a highly risky business whose blowback cannot be predicted and can have very negative consequences for the stability of the state itself.

     

  • [pib] Shekatkar Committee recommendations on Border Infrastructure

    Government has accepted and implemented three important recommendations of the Committee of Experts (CoE) under the chairmanship of Lt General D B Shekatkar (Retd.) relating to border Infrastructure.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. India’s unique geo-strategic location needs an all-weather and efficient border infrastructure. Comment.

    About Shekatkar Committee

    • The military reforms committee – under Lt General (retd.) DB Shekatkar – was set up by then Raksha Mantri Manohar Parrikar in 2015.
    • The committee was established with a mandate for Enhancing Combat Capability and Rebalancing Defence Expenditure.
    • Shekatkar Committee had made recommendations on enhancing the combat potential of India’s three armed forces, rationalizing the defence budget etc.
    • The committee submitted its report on December 21, 2016. It had apparently exceeded its brief with some 200 recommendations.
    • A major recommendation is that the defence budget should be 2.5% to 3% of the GDP.

    Recommendations on border infrastructure

    • On the matter related to creating border infrastructure, the Government has implemented the recommendation of CoE to outsource road construction work beyond the optimal capacity of Border Roads Organisation (BRO).
    • These were related to speeding up road construction, leading to socio-economic development in the border areas.
    • The other recommendation relating to the introduction of modern construction plants, equipment and machinery has been implemented.

    Back2Basics: Border Roads Organisation (BRO)

    • The BRO develops and maintains road networks in India’s border areas and friendly neighboring countries and functions under the Ministry of Defence.
    • It is entrusted for construction of Roads, Bridges, Tunnels, Causeways, Helipads and Airfields along the borders.
    • Officers from the Border Roads Engineering Service (BRES) and personnel from the General Reserve Engineer Force (GREF) form the parent cadre of the Border Roads Organisation.
    • It is also staffed by officers and troops drawn from the Indian Army’s Corps of Engineers on extra regimental employment.
    • The BRO operates and maintains over 32,885 kilometers of roads and about 12,200 meters of permanent bridges in the country.

  • War and Peace: Analysis of BSF’s role

    The BSF came into being in the wake of the 1965 India-Pakistan war. So, its ‘innate’ tasks involves both wartime and peacetime roles. This article is written by a retired IPS officer who has been ADG of BSF.  Our aim is to provide you with on-ground experience of issues in this security force. Focus of the article is on the preparedness of the BSF for its wartime role. From the exam perspective, focus on issues and possible solutions.

    Role of BSF

    • Officially, its role is defined in expansive terms like ‘security of the border of India and matters connected therewith’.
    • The tasks of BSF are divided into peacetime and wartime.
    • 1) The peacetime tasks include preventing smuggling and any other illegal activity, and unauthorised entry into or exit from the territory of India, etc.
    • 2) The wartime tasks of the BSF include holding ground in less threatened sectors, etc.

    Unpreparedness in wartime role

    • The BSF, in terms of its defences, equipment, weaponry and training, is not at all prepared for its wartime role.
    • This means that in the eventuality of any military assault, our ‘first line of defence’ would simply crumble.
    • Falling back on army’s mobilizations for a counterattack may take up to several days.
    • Retreat and loss of territory in this period is a possible scenario.
    • The report titled ‘Border Security: Capacity Building and Institutions’ of the department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, submitted to the Rajya Sabha on April 11, 2017:
    • Does not talk about the wartime role of the BSF even once.
    • It talks only of its peacetime role including fencing, floodlights and roads along the borders, development of integrated check posts, and construction of strategic roads.

    The fallacy of infantry attack

    • The founders of the BSF, including the committee of secretaries, had a wrong presumption that the assault on the ‘first line of defence’ will be by the enemy’s ‘exposed’ infantry.
    • This assault, they imagined, would be repulsed by BSF soldiers wielding similar arms.
    • But that presumption is a folly.
    •  Now, as a rule of thumb, infantry assault, whether supported by armour or not, or even a purely armour assault on any position is preceded by as heavy and as accurate artillery bombardment as possible.
    • If the attacking nation could afford it, such as the US during the 1991 Gulf War the bombardment could be aerial also.

    Unprepared to withstand shelling

    • Our ‘first line of defence’ does not have any defensive structures or fortifications that could withstand artillery bombardment even for a minute.
    • According to photographs available in the public domain, most BSF observation posts on the international border are ramshackle structures of tin sheets and sandbags erected on small mounds of earth.
    • Adding to that, the mounds are in full view of the enemy and their locations are known to them to the last centimetre.

     Uninspiring weaponry

    • The photographs of the 105 mm Indian Field Gun and their staple, the 7.62 mm medium machine gun are available in public domain.
    • The 105 mm Indian Field Guns have been placed under the operational command of the army, and BSF would not be able to use them when the enemy makes first contact with them.
    • That leaves them with their 51 mm and 81 mm mortars.
    • The 51mm mortar, with just 109 grams of explosive per shell and a maximum range of  850 m is as good as useless in a war.
    • The 81 mm mortar bomb with an explosive charge of 750 grams has a maximum range of 6000 m.
    • The enemy artillery would in any case be firing from way beyond that range, thereby making effective retaliation through mortars impossible.
    • Even when enemy IFV/APC or armour would come closer and in range, the smooth-bore 81 mm mortar is inherently not accurate enough to hit a moving vehicle. (smoothness of bore reduces accuracy)
    • Even the NATO rifled 120 mm mortars have a CEP (circular error probable) of 136 m.
    • As for the 7.62 mm medium machinegun, it is an anti-personnel weapon with the armour penetration of the M80 bullet being just 3 mm at 500m.
    • That makes it useless against even lightly armoured vehicles.
    • This means that the BSF outposts will not be able to deliver any effective fire at all on an enemy assault.

    IPS leadership issue

    • Since the BSF’s inception, the force’s Indian Police Service (IPS) leadership has not focused on the wartime role of the BSF.
    • The IPS officers in top positions in the BSF lack knowledge of military science that could enable them to appreciate and address the wartime role.

    Way forward

    •  The only defence feasible against artillery bombardment is to go sub-surface—in the form of deep concrete dugouts and fire trenches.
    • Then we also need elaborate anti-tank ditches.
    • To deliver effective fire on enemy armoured and lightly armoured vehicles, and infantry operating under their protection, the BSF needs weapons which carry enough explosive payloads to tackle armour, both light and heavy.
    • Portability, manoeuvrability and accuracy are important considerations in the ‘first line of defence’ attacking armour.
    • A veritable battery of ATGMs and cheaper yet accurate options like the 80 mm Breda Folgore RCL are available.
    • Using them effectively would require defensive fighting positions interconnected by communication trenches.
    • Research needs to be done to mount weapons like the Shipunov 2A42 30 mm autocannon on platforms faster than the BMP-2.
    • Similarly, MMGs/GPMGs need mobile platforms like Humvees to increase their survivability as well as effectivity.

    Consider the question “The BSF, which is often hailed as India’s ‘first line of defence’ has tasked with wartime and peacetime roles. Though it is quite adept in peacetime role, its wartime preparedness needs an overhaul. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    These issues with the BSF could result in a  situation where there is every possibility of rout and retreat in the early days of the war. This issue needs to be urgently addressed by the government.

     

  • [pib] Defence Testing Infrastructure Scheme (DTIS)

    In order to give a boost to domestic defence and aerospace manufacturing, Raksha Mantri has approved the launch of the Defence Testing Infrastructure Scheme (DTIS).

     

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. Self-reliance in defence manufacturing is one of the key objectives of ‘Make in India’. Discuss.

     

    Defence Testing Infrastructure Scheme (DTIS)

    • The DTIS would run for the duration of five years and envisages set up six to eight new test facilities in partnership with private industry.
    • The scheme has been allocated with an outlay of Rs 400 crore for creating a state of the art testing infrastructure for this sector.
    • This will facilitate indigenous defence production, consequently, reduce imports of military equipment and help make the country self-reliant.
    • While the majority of test facilities are expected to come up in the two Defence Industrial Corridors (DICs), the Scheme is not limited to setting up Test Facilities in the DICs only.

    Funding pattern

    • The projects under the Scheme will be provided with up to 75 per cent government funding in the form of ‘Grant-in-Aid’.
    • The remaining 25 per cent of the project cost will have to be borne by the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) whose constituents will be Indian private entities and State Governments.
    • The SPVs under the Scheme will be registered under Companies Act 2013 and shall also operate and maintain all assets under the Scheme, in a self-sustainable manner by collecting user charges.

  • “Tour of Duty (ToD) Scheme” for Short Service in Indian Army

    The Indian Army has planned to take civilians on a three-year “Tour of Duty” (ToD) or short service” on a trial basis to serve as officers and in other ranks initially for a limited number of vacancies which will be expanded later.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. The “Tour of Duty” (ToD) Scheme is a significant move to free up funds for the Army’s modernization. Comment.

    Tour of Duty Scheme

    • Indian Army is thinking to induct youngsters for three-year “Tour of Duty (ToD) tenure as both officers and jawans.
    • The ToD scheme, in case approved, will initially be launched with around 100 vacancies for officers and 1,000 for jawans.
    • As per Army, a ToD officer will earn Rs 80,000-90,000 per month. After ToD tenure, youngsters can find lucrative private and public sector jobs.
    • The Army says it will restructure the cadre and help modernize the force.

    Advantages of ToD Scheme

    • ToD is expected to result in a significant reduction in the expenditure on pay and pensions and free up funds for the Army’s modernization.
    • The overall purpose of the ToD concept is ‘internship/temporary experience’.
    • There will be no requirement of attractive severance packages, resettlement courses, professional encashment training leave, ex-servicemen status, ex-servicemen Contributory Health Scheme for ToD officers and other ranks.
    • Analysing the cost of training incurred on each personnel compared with the limited employment of the manpower for three years, the proposal calculates that it will indeed have a positive benefit.

    The cost factor

    • The approximate cost incurred is nearly ₹5.12 crore and ₹6.83 crores for a Short Service Commission (SSC) officer if he or she is released from service after 10 and 14 years, respectively.
    • The costs for those released after a three-year ToD is just ₹80-85 lakh.
    • Similarly, estimates for a jawan with 17 years of service as compared to a ToD recruit with three years’ service shows that the prospective lifetime savings of just one jawan are ₹11.5 crores.
    • Thus, savings for only 1,000 jawans could be ₹11,000 crores, which could be used for the much-needed modernization of the Army.

    Other benefits

    • This scheme is for those who did not want a full career in the Army but still wanted to put on the uniform.
    • Individuals who opted for ToD would get a much higher salary than their peers in the corporate sector.
    • They would also have an edge after leaving the service and going to the corporate sector.
    • The Army hoped that this would attract individuals from the best colleges, including the Indian Institutes of Technology.

    Back2Basics: Permanent Commission (PC) Vs. Short Service Commission (SSC)

    • SSC means an officer’s career will be of a limited period in the Indian Armed Forces whereas a PC means they shall continue to serve in the Indian Armed Forces, till they retire.
    • The officers inducted through the SSC usually serve for a period of 14 years. At the end of 10 years, the officers have three options.
    • A PC entitles an officer to serve in the Navy till he/she retires unlike SSC, which is currently for 10 years and can be extended by four more years, or a total of 14 years.
    • They can either select for a PC or opt-out or have the option of a 4-years extension. They can resign at any time during this period of 4 years extension.

  • What are Integrated Battle Groups (IBG)?

    The Army’s new concept of agile Integrated Battle Groups (IBG) as part of the overall force transformation will be operationalised very soon, confirmed Army Chief.

    Practice question for mains:

    The deployment of Integrated Battle Groups (IBG) is necessary for counter-insurgency operations across the terror hit borders of India. Discuss.

    What are IBGs?

    • IBGs are brigade-sized, agile, self-sufficient combat formations, which can swiftly launch strikes against an adversary in case of hostilities.
    • Each IBG would be tailor-made based on Threat, Terrain and Task and resources will be allotted based on the three Ts.
    • They need to be light so they will be low on logistics and they will be able to mobilise within 12-48 hrs based on the location.
    • An IBG operating in a desert needs to be constituted differently from an IBG operating in the mountains.
    • The key corps of the Army is likely to be reorganized into 1-3 IBGs.

    Objective of IBG

    • Holistic integration to enhance the operational and functional efficiency, optimize budget expenditure, facilitate force modernization and address aspirations

    Structure

    • While a command is the largest static formation of the Army spread across defined geography, a corps is the largest mobile formation.
    • Typically each corps has about three brigades.
    • The idea is to reorganise them into IBGs which are brigade-sized units but have all the essential elements like infantry, armoured, artillery and air defence embedded together based on the three Ts.
    • The IBGs will also be defensive and offensive. While the offensive IBGs would quickly mobilise and make a thrust into enemy territory for strikes, defensive IBGs would hold ground at vulnerable points or where enemy action is expected.

    Why need IBGs?

    • After the terrorist attack on the Parliament, the Indian military undertook massive mobilization but the Army’s formations which deep inside took weeks to mobilise losing the element of surprise.
    • Following this, the Army formulated a proactive doctrine known as ‘Cold Start’ to launch swift offensive but its existence was consistently denied in the past.
    • Its existence was acknowledged for the first time by Gen Rawat in January 2017.

  • Pokhran-II nuclear tests

    Yesterday, May 11 was celebrated as the National Technology Day. It marks the day on which India successfully test-fired its first nuclear bombs in 1998.

    Practice question for mains

    Q. India’s nuclear policy of ‘No First Use’ needs a revamp. Examine.

    India and nuclear weapons

    • India is currently among eight countries in the world that have a publicly known nuclear weapons program.
    • At the time of our independence, leaders were opposed to fully embracing nuclear weapons.
    • Just two years before in 1945, the world had witnessed the horrific nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
    • Mahatma Gandhi called the use of nuclear weapons morally unacceptable.

    Why India did equip itself with nuclear arms?

    • Then PM Jawaharlal Nehru was sceptical but kept the door open for future consideration.
    • This future beckoned early, as India’s defeat in the 1962 Sino-Indian War gave rise to legitimate fears about national security.
    • Then in 1974, India conducted its first nuclear test, codenamed “Smiling Buddha”, at Pokhran in Rajasthan.
    • Then-Prime Minister Indira Gandhi called the test a peaceful nuclear explosion.
    • India demonstrated to the world that the country could defend itself in an extreme situation and chose not to immediately weaponize the nuclear device it tested at Pokhran.

     The Pokhran II tests

    • India’s fence-sitting finally ended when it detonated another device in 1998, again at Pokhran.
    • Assigned the code name Operation Shakti, the mission was initiated on May 11, 1998.
    • The tests consisted of 5 detonations, the first being a fusion bomb while the remaining four were fission bombs.
    • One fusion and two fission bombs were tested on May 11, and two more fission bombs on May 13.
    • With the tests, India achieved its objective of building fission and thermonuclear weapons with yields up to 200 kilotons.

    Aftermath

    • After Pokhran-II, Vajpayee had declared India a nuclear state — then the sixth country in the world to join this league.
    • Unlike in 1974, India had this time chosen to actively develop its nuclear capabilities, and the tests followed economic sanctions by the United States and Japan. The sanctions were later lifted.

    Back2Basics: India’s nuclear programme

    • India started its own nuclear programme in 1944 when Homi Jehangir Bhabha founded the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research.
    • Physicist Raja Ramanna played an essential role in nuclear weapons technology research; he expanded and supervised scientific research on nuclear weapons and was the first directing officer of the small team of scientists that supervised and carried out the test.
    • After independence, PM Nehru authorised the development of a nuclear programme headed by Homi Bhabha.
    • The Atomic Energy Act of 1948 focused on peaceful development.
    • India was heavily involved in the development of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but ultimately opted not to sign it.
    • In 1954, two important infrastructure projects were commissioned. The first established Trombay Atomic Energy Establishment at Mumbai (Bombay). The other created a governmental secretariat, Department of Atomic Energy (DAE), of which Bhabha was the first secretary.

    Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG)

    • The NSG is a multilateral export control regime and a group of nuclear supplier countries that seek to prevent nuclear proliferation by controlling the export of materials, equipment and technology that can be used to manufacture nuclear weapons.
    • The NSG was founded in response to the Indian nuclear test in May 1974 and first met in November 1975.
    • It was solely aimed to deny advanced technology, and isolate and contain India.

  • The Resistance Front (TRF)

     

    (Image Source: The Economic Times)

     

    A newly floated outfit, the Resistance Front, has come under the scanner of enforcement agencies for its suspected links with the banned Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).

    This is a very significant development with respect to India’s concern against terrorism. Terrorism and the terror outfits are increasingly becoming more institutionalized and ‘the Resistance Front’ is an another move towards it.

    ‘The Resistance Front’

    • TRF, which is owning up terror attacks in Kashmir these days, is an offshoot of the terrorist group Lashkar-e-Taiba and is also associated with other terror outfits such as Hizbul Mujahideen, Jaish-e-Mohammed.
    • Various reports claim that after the abrogation of Article 370 in J&K, Pakistan decided to increase the terror activities in the Valley.
    • However, facing international pressure and to protect itself from being blacklisted by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Pakistan decided to launch a new terror group with a new identity.
    • Various Indian security agencies operating in Kashmir feel that the ‘TRF’ was formed due to the pressure on Pakistan from the FATF to cut down on the funding of the terrorist groups.

    A new strategy justifying terrorism

    • The word ‘resistance’ has been used by Pakistan and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to put in place a new strategy for supporting terrorism against India.
    • Pakistan’s plan is to rebrand the terrorists operating under the umbrella of JeM, LeT and Hizbul as “non-religious” rebellion.
    • Pakistan wants to project Kashmiri terrorism as a resistance movement by Kashmiris. So far Hizbul and LeT have come under TRF’s umbrella.

    Must read:

    https://www.civilsdaily.com/news/explained-amendments-to-the-uapa/

    Back2Basics: What is the FATF?

    • FATF is an intergovernmental organization founded in 1989 on the initiative of the G7 to develop policies to combat money laundering.
    • The FATF Secretariat is housed at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) headquarters in Paris.
    • It holds three Plenary meetings in the course of each of its 12-month rotating presidencies.

  • Transforming the Military

    The COVID blaze caused economic disruption and now even the military is feeling the heat. The military is grappling with multiple issues like freezing of fresh capital acquisition and delay in procurement. But this could also be considered as an opportunity to transform the Indian military. 4 areas where this transformation could start are discussed in this article. Read to know more.

    The difference in approaches to security

    • Pakistan’s approach: Pakistan stagnates in an existential-threat-based and India-centric approach to national security.
    • What is China’s approach? China’s expansive global strategy and unbridled capability-based development surge have overcome the dangers of direct competition with the US.
    • It has closed the gap through an “indirect approach to international security”.
    • This indirect approach looks at building on strengths in areas such as cyberspace, non-contact warfare, economic and diplomatic coercion.

    So, what should be India’s approach to security?

    • Strategic guidelines for India’s must shift from a threat-based methodology to a multi-disciplinary capability.
    • An outcome-based orientation to fit with the nation’s power aspirations.

    4 most critical means to kick-start the transformation:

    1. Creation of indigenous defence capability

    • Doing this without brushing away the short and medium-term requirement of selective imports will be the key to a calibrated march to self-sufficiency.

    2. Leadership

    • India’s military leadership is very hierarchical and sequential in its approach.
    • However, this same leadership has superb operational skills and possesses a quick understanding of technology, tactics, techniques and procedures.
    • Consequently, strategic leaders need to be identified and their transition towards becoming more than mere executors of operational plans and campaigns needs to be enabled.
    • Multi-disciplinary thinking, lateral assimilation and a world-view are among the specific skill-sets that need to be nurtured.

    3. Training and Education

    • Training and education form the next two silos in the process of transformation.
    • The US example: Several military officers at the colonel level — fresh out of war colleges and the university environment where they spend a year of education (not training) — are posted at the Pentagon and NATO HQ.
    • Here, they work alongside civilians, politicians, lawmakers, not forgetting their own joint leadership.
    • In such an environment, it is not difficult to mark, train and recognise talent in ways that go beyond the mere rank structure.
    • It is high time India goes down that road because even though economic globalisation may be on hold for a while post-COVID-19, there is going to be a flattening of the world from a security perspective.
    • There will be common threats that would need to be fought jointly by nations.
    • The three pre-requisites in these silos will be an amalgam of 1)service-centric and joint operations expertise, 2) operational acumen in a global environment, and 3) broad-based education that develops intellectual capital.
    • Training in the Indian military is top-notch and needs a little tweaking to help officers and men understand the rules of engagement in a Volatile, Uncertain, Complex and Ambiguous (VUCA) world.
    • It is diversified education at all levels of leadership that is a weak area.

    4. Jointness and integration

    • Finally, the silo of jointness and integration without losing identities and compromising competencies is an outcome that needs to be chased down with focus and determination.

    Consider the question based on the issues discussed in the article “Strategic guidelines for India’s security managers must shift from a threat-based methodology to a multi-disciplinary capability and outcome-based orientation to fit with the nation’s power aspirations. Based on some expert committee reports, discuss the ways which the Indian military follow to achieve the transformation to satisfy the nation’s power aspirations.”

    Conclusion

    Some difficulties caused to the military due to COVID pandemic should be considered as an opportunity. It should be an opportunity to evolve a transformational culture in the Indian military. This should be based on clear political guidelines driven by existing and futuristic capabilities, expected strategic outcomes and anticipated strategic challenges.