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Category: Burning Issues

  • [Burning Issue] Strategic Disinvestment of Central Public Sector Enterprises


    Context

    • In the biggest privatization drive, the Union Cabinet has approved sale of the government’s stake to cut shareholding in select public sector firms below 51% to boost revenue collections that have been hit by slowing economy.
    • These CPSE’s include blue-chip oil firm Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited (BPCL), Shipping Corporation of India (SCI) and on-land cargo mover Container Corporation of India (Concor).

    Central Public Sector Enterprises (CPSEs)

    • A state-owned enterprise in India is called a public sector undertaking (PSU) or a public sector enterprise.
    • These companies are owned by the union government of India or one of the many state or territorial governments or both.
    • The company stock needs to be majority-owned by the government to be a PSU.
    • PSUs strictly may be classified as central public sector enterprises (CPSEs) or state level public enterprises (SLPEs).
    • CPSEs are companies in which the direct holding of the Central Government or other CPSEs is 51% or more.
    • They are administered by the Ministry of Heavy Industries and Public Enterprises.

    What is Disinvestment?

    • Privatization involves transforming the ownership of a public sector business to the private sector known as strategic buyer.
    • Disinvestment is also a transformation process that happens while retaining 26% or, in some contexts, 51% percent of share right (i.e. the voting power) with the public sector organization.
    • Strategic disinvestment implies the sale of portion of the Government share holding of a central public sector enterprise (CPSE) of upto 50%, or such higher percentage as the competent authority may determine, along with transfer of management control.

    Objectives of strategic disinvestment

    The following main objectives of disinvestment were outlined:

    • To reduce the financial burden on the Government.
    • To improve public finances.
    • To introduce, competition and market discipline.
    • To fund growth.
    • To encourage wider share of ownership.
    • To depoliticize non-essential services.

    When did the disinvestment process begin in India?

    • The disinvestment process in India began in the year 1991-92, with 31 selected PSUs disinvested for Rs.3,038 crore.
    • In August 1996, the Disinvestment Commission, chaired by G V Ramakrishna was set up to advice, supervise, monitor and publicize gradual disinvestment of Indian PSUs.

    Immediate causes

    • The new economic policy initiated in July 1991 clearly indicated that PSUs had shown a very negative rate of return on capital employed.
    • Inefficient PSUs had become and were continuing to be a drag on the Government’s resources turning to be more of liabilities to the Government than being assets.
    • In relation to the capital employed, the levels of profits were too low. Of the various factors responsible for low profits in the PSUs, the following were identified as particularly important:
    1. Price policy of public sector undertakings
    2. Under–utilization of capacity
    3. Problems related to planning and construction of projects
    4. Problems of labour, personnel and management
    5. Lack of autonomy

    Criterion for disinvestment

    The Union Government has mandated the NITI Aayog to identify the CPSEs that require disinvestment. The NITI Aayog identifies such CPSEs based on the certain criteria laid down by the Central Government itself. The criteria are mentioned below:

    • National Security
    • Sovereign function at arm’s length
    • Market Imperfections and Public Purpose
    • Profitability or loss of the CPSEs is not considered as a relevant criterion.

     Issues with  PSUs through years

    Inherent flaws in PSU’s

    • Public sector undertakings were established in India as a part of mixed economy with the objective of providing necessary infrastructure for the fast growth of economy & to safeguard against monopoly of industrialist community.
    • However, the entire mechanism did not turn out as efficient as it ought to be, all thanks to the prevailing hierarchy and bureaucracy.
    • Inefficient PSU’s were largely responsible for the macro-economic crisis faced by India during 1980’s.

    Lack of autonomy

    • Lack of autonomy, political interference, nepotism & corruption has further deteriorated the situation.
    • For instance, the head of a PSU is appointed by the Government, who in turn appoints all employees who play major roles in the organization.
    • So directly or indirectly the Government itself controls the appointment of all manpower in these organizations.

    Revenue losses

    • Due to the expenditure on items such as interest payments, wages and salaries of PSU employees and subsidies, the Government is left with hardly any surplus for capital expenditure on social and physical infrastructure.
    • Additionally, the continued existence of the PSEs is forcing the Government to commit further resources for the sustenance of many non-viable PSEs.
    • All this makes Disinvestment of the Government stake in the PSEs absolutely imperative.

    Lack of Competitiveness

    • In an era of LPG industrial competitiveness has especially assumed an important role, necessitating privatization or disinvestment of PSUs.
    • Though it is claimed by many that ownership isn’t all that an important indicator of an organization’s functioning as is its management, it has been proven by an ample number of examples that private controls of an organization bring about drastic changes in its effectiveness.
    • This is especially true today when competitiveness is essential not only for leading the industry but for mere survival.

    Poor performance

    • Despite the huge injection of funds in the past decades, the functioning of many public sector units (PSUs) has traditionally been characterized by poor management, slow decision-making procedures, lack of accountability, low productivity, unsatisfactory quality of goods, excessive manpower utilization etc.
    • However, with increasing privatization, disinvestment or change of control into the hands of professional managers, many organizations have seen the tables turn.
    • Some examples are IRCTC and CRIS to facilitate the functioning of Indian Railways etc.

    Importance of Disinvestment

    • Disinvestment also assumes significance due to the prevalence of an increasingly competitive environment, which makes it difficult for many PSUs to operate profitably.
    • This leads to a rapid erosion of the value of the public assets making it critical to disinvest early to realize a high value.
    • Presently, the Government has about Rs. 2 lakh crore locked up in PSUs.
    • Disinvestment of the Government stake is, thus, far too significant. The importance of disinvestment lies in the utilization of funds for:
    1. Financing the increasing fiscal deficit
    2. Financing large-scale infrastructure development
    3. For investing in the economy to encourage spending
    4. For retiring Government debt- Almost 40-45% of the Centre’s revenue receipts go towards repaying public
      debt/interest
    5. For social programs like health and education

    Implications on Economy

    • If India wants a continuous increased growth, it has to scale to the next level of performance. This is not an option but a necessity and disinvestment is a tool to get there.
    • Increased population, unemployment, and poverty levels are the main reasons why India needs to scale.
    • It needs a 10% rate of growth every year in its GDP to continue to be competitive with China and potential emergent nations in South East Asia.

    Successful examples

    • In the context of macroeconomics, time has shown us how countries like Chile, the UK, China, New Zealand, Poland successfully used disinvestment to achieve new economic heights.
    • Many countries used disinvestment as a sure means of restoring budgetary balance & to revive growth on a sustainable basis after facing an economic crisis in the 80s.
    • Analysis of these countries before & after disinvestment shows that market-driven economies are more efficient than the state-planned economies

    Attracting foreign investments

    • Disinvestment shows that govt means business which will attract FDI, FII to finance projects in India.
    • It will allow PSU to raise capital to fund their expansion plans and improve resource allocation in the economy. It will allow the government to stimulate the economy while resorting to less debt market borrowing.
    • Private borrowers won’t be crowded out of the markets by the government and will have to pay less to borrow from the open market.

    Democratization of industries

    • Disinvestment will be extremely positive for the Indian equity markets and the economy.
    • It will also draw a lot of domestic money into the markets.
    • Thus it would encourage citizens’ participation in the management of public enterprises and improve the capitalization of stock markets.

    Concerns over Disinvestment in India:

    • Process of disinvestment is not favoured socially as it is against the interest of socially disadvantageous people.
    • Political pressure from left and opposition.
    • Loss-making units don’t attract investment so easily.
    • Over the years, the policy of divestment has increasingly become a tool to raise resources to cover the fiscal deficit with little focus on market discipline or strategic objective.
    • Sometimes the emergence of private monopolies, consumer welfare will be reduced.
    • It is argued that mere change of ownership, from public to private, does not ensure higher efficiency and productivity.
    • It may lead to retrenchment of workers who will be deprived of the means of their livelihood.
    • Private sector, governed as they are by the profit motive, has a tendency to use capital-intensive techniques which will worsen the unemployment problem in India.
    • Fiscal 2016-17 is the seventh year in a row where the government is not meeting the disinvestment target fixed in the Budget.

    Why criticism over the recent move of disinvestment?

    • BPCL is a profitable refiner and oil marketing company that has consistently paid a healthy dividend.
    • It has also made investments in upstream energy resources and holds interests in overseas hydrocarbon blocks.

    Way Forward

    • With the dismal track record of several PSUs, the Centre cannot be blamed for the decision to divest.
    •  Times have changed and the economy now has other engines of growth. But it should not be hastily inferred that all PSUs have failed us.
    • Let not the ideological blinkers like ‘public sector is bad’ and ‘privatization is the panacea’ unintelligible reality.
    • But when a sterling company like BPCL is also being offered for ‘strategic disinvestment’  the nation naturally expects to know the strategy behind it.

    The Way Ahead: What should be the Objectives of Public Sector Enterprises Disinvestment and Restructuring?

    The means of achieving these objectives involve considerations such as the injection of greater competition into the industrial economy in order to foster a healthier market structure.

    Conclusion

    • Confronted with an unprecedented fiscal deficit and worried by an economy in crisis, the government has to find resources.
    • Disinvestment is a preferred option for ideological and practical reasons.
    • Short-term financial exigencies should not be the Centre’s sole reason for disinvestment in core sectors like petroleum.
    • The government could utilize the money gained by selling off PSUs to improve services in public goods like infrastructure, health and education.

     



    References

    Disinvestment Policy in India.

    http://www.bsepsu.com/importance-disinvestment.asp

    https://www.business-standard.com/article/markets/select-psus-rally-on-in-principle-nod-for-strategic-disinvestment-119112000797_1.html

    https://www.ukessays.com/essays/economics/impact-of-disinvestment-for-indian-economy-economics-essay.php

    https://archive.india.gov.in/spotlight/spotlight_archive.php?id=78

    https://www.newindianexpress.com/opinions/2019/dec/06/why-is-the-govt-privatising-profitable-psus-2072124.html

  • [Burning Issue] Implementation of FASTags


    Context

    From December 1, lanes on NH toll plazas across India has started accepting toll only through FASTag. One hybrid lane will continue to accept cash in addition to being tag-enabled.

    What is ‘FASTag’?

    • FASTags are stickers that are affixed to the windscreen of vehicles and use Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology to enable digital, contactless payment of tolls without having to stop at toll gates.
    • The tags are linked to bank accounts and other payment methods.
    • As a car crosses a toll plaza, the amount is automatically deducted, and a notification is sent to the registered mobile phone number.

    How does it work?

    • The device employs Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) technology for payments directly from the prepaid or savings account linked to it.
    • It is affixed on the windscreen, so the vehicle can drive through plazas without stopping.
    • RFID technology is similar to that used in transport access-control systems, like Metro smart card.
    • If the tag is linked to a prepaid account like a wallet, or a debit/credit card, then owners need to recharge/top up the tag.
    • If it is linked to a savings account, rthen money will get deducted automatically after the balance goes below a pre-defined threshold.
    • Once a vehicle crosses the toll, the owner will get an SMS alert on the deduction. In that it is like a prepaid e-wallet.

    How can one buy it?

    • E-commerce portals like Amazon and PayTM sell these tags issued by various banks.
    • Places, where these counters are set up, include Road Transport Authority offices, transport hubs, bank branches, and selected petrol pumps.
    • A FASTag bought from NHAI comes with a one-time fee of Rs 100 besides a refundable security deposit of Rs 150.
    • Apart from the currently free tags at NHAI booths, there is also a cashback of 2.5 per cent on FASTag transactions as an offer.
    • In the tag taken from NHAI, the Rs 150 security deposit, which the government is bearing as a promotion, comes back to the user as wallet value if the FASTag is linked to the NHAI e-wallet in the “My FASTag app” mobile app.
    • So in this particular scheme, the user gets Rs 150 back without even paying it.

    Penalties

    • A FASTag is valid for five years, and can be recharged as and when required.
    • Vehicles entering FASTag lanes without FASTag will be charged twice the toll amount.

    Will those living close to toll roads did not end up paying more frequently?

    • As per a government notification, users living within 10 km of a toll plaza can avail a concession on toll to be paid via FASTag.
    • They need to submit proof of residence and nearest point-of-sale location to validate.
    • Once the address is verified, the concession is ensured via FASTag affixed on the vehicle.

    Benefits of Fastags

    • FASTag will help to reduce the waiting time at the plaza
    • Accommodating the increasing traffic without additional lanes
    • Eliminating the acceleration and idling, harmful vehicular emissions and air using FASTag
    • Reducing congestion around plazas
    • Pollution reduction
    • To save fuel for the future which will also help to reduce the operating cost of the vehicles
    • To provide customers the flexibility of paying their plaza bill’s with RFID Tag
    • Reduce cash handling which aids in enhanced audit control by centralizing user accounts
    • Enhancing data collection, information such as vehicle count of the day

    Is it working smoothly?

    • The tags sold by banks are not “bank-neutral”.
    • A FASTag bought from one bank can be recharged through that particular bank only and not through other banks.
    • However, tags sold/distributed by NHAI are bank-neutral as one can use any bank account to recharge/top up the value in the tag.

    What about state highways?

    • Under a new “One Nation One FASTag” scheme, the NHAI is trying to get states on board so that one tag can be used seamlessly across highways, irrespective of whether it is the state or the Centre that owns/manages it.
    • Recently as part of a pilot, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Haryana signed MoUs with the Centre to accept FASTags in state highways also.

     



    References

    https://www.civilsdaily.com/news/explained-fastags/

    https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/travel/destinations/fastags-in-india-why-is-it-mandatory-for-your-vehicles-to-have-one-now/as72333185.cms

    https://www.indiatoday.in/information/story/fastag-know-how-works-benefits-details-1622964-2019-11-27

  • [Burning Issue] Labour Code on Industrial Relations


    Context

    • Labour and Employment Ministry has introduced the Labour Code on Industrial Relations bill in the Lok Sabha.
    • As part of labour reform initiatives, the labour ministry has decided to amalgamate 44 labour laws into four codes—on wages, industrial relations, social security and safety, health and working conditions.
    • The industrial relations code is the third of four labour codes that have got approval from the cabinet.

    The Industrial Relations Code Bill, 2019

    • It proposes to amalgamate
    1. The Trade Unions Act, 1926,
    2. The Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946, and
    3. The Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
    • This is the third Code in the government’s proposed codification of central labour laws into four Codes.

    Aims and objectives

    • The bill aims to improve the business environment in the country largely by reducing the labour compliance burden of industries.
    • It proposes to make it easier for an employer to engage and disengage workers based on requirement.
    • This will make the process of hiring and firing smoother depending on elasticity of demand in the shop floor.

    Key propositions of the Bill

    I. Fixed-term employment

    • The most important aspect of the Bill is that it presents the legal framework for ushering in the concept of ‘fixed-term employment’ through contract workers on a pan-India basis.
    • Currently, companies hire contract workers through contractors.
    • With the introduction of fixed-term employment, they will be able to hire workers directly under a fixed-term contract, with the flexibility to tweak the length of the contract based on the seasonality of industry.
    • These workers will be treated on a par with regular workers during the tenure of the contract.
    • The move to include it in a central law will help in wider reach, and states are expected to follow similar applicability.

    II. Recognition of Negotiating Union

    • To help employers check constant unionism, the bill introduces this feature under which a trade union will be recognized as sole ‘negotiating union’ if it has the support of 75% or more of the workers on the rolls of an establishment.
    • As several trade unions are active in companies, it will be tough for any one group to manage 75% support.
    • This, thus, takes away the negotiating rights of unions. In such a case, a negotiating council will be constituted for negotiation, according to the bill.

    IV. Fixed Term Employment Workman

    • Earlier the government had included the category of ‘Fixed Term Employment Workman’ for all sectors in the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946.
    • This was only applicable to ‘central sphere’ establishments, and the states did not follow suit.
    • Finance Minister saif that workers under a fixed-term contract would be taken up depending upon the seasonality of the industry, but would be treated on a par with regular workers.

    Special offerings of the bill

    • The threshold required for government permission for retrenchment has been kept unchanged at 100 employees, as against the proposal for 300 employees in an earlier draft of the Bill, which was opposed by trade unions.
    • Instead, the government has now provided flexibility for changing the threshold through notification.
    • The rigidity of labour laws about laying off labour has often been cited by industry as the main reason limiting scalability and employment generation.
    • At present, any company having 100 workers or more has to seek government approval for retrenchment.
    • The provision of fixed-term employment, which helps in the flow of social security benefits to all workers along with making it easier for companies to hire and fire, in The Industrial Relations Code Bill.
    • Layoffs usually happen due to skill issues or company performance. The bill also has a provision to create a re-skilling fund for the benefit of workers.

    Criticisms

    • Critics question the welfare context in this Code. The bill wants to contractualize the workforce, take their collective bargaining right, curtail their right to strike and even on mass leave.
    • Hiring and firing is what the government seeks to formalize through this, they argue.
    • Any discretion in law leads to uncertainty, lack of clarity, discriminatory implementation, and provides scope for unnecessary usage.
    • Provisions like fixed term employment will also instill fear of failure in startup founders and future entrepreneurs which isn’t encouraging for job creation.

    Conclusion

    • The move aims to build positivity in business environment, but workers unions called it a systemic attack on employee welfare.
    • It showcases the government’s intention to create an eco-system for job creation.

     

     



    References

    https://www.civilsdaily.com/news/the-industrial-relations-code-bill-2019/

    https://www.livemint.com/news/india/labour-code-on-industrial-relations-bill-introduced-in-parliament-11574951810922.html

    https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/industrial-relations-code-non-renewal-of-contract-wont-be-retrenchment/articleshow/72250456.cms

  • [Burning Issue] Presidential Elections in Sri Lanka and India- Sri Lanka relations in recent times


    Context

     

    Recently Gotabaya Rajapaksa was elected as new President of Sri Lanka. This election was based on security issues that emerged after a suicide bombing attack claimed by Islamic State on Easter Sunday this year.

    As Gotabaya settles into office and visits India end of this week, on the 29th, the Indian government would hope that its hands-off approach in the 2019 Sri Lankan elections pays off.

    Brief background of India-SL relations:

     

    • India is the only neighbour of Sri Lanka, separated by the Palk Strait; both nations occupy a strategic position in South Asia and have sought to build a common security umbrella in the Indian Ocean.
    • There are deep racial and cultural links between the two countries. Both share a maritime border.
    • The India- SL relations have been however tested by the Sri Lankan Civil War and by the controversy of Indian intervention during the war.
    • In recent years Sri Lanka has moved closer to China, especially in terms of naval agreements.
    • India has signed a nuclear energy deal to improve relations and made a nuclear energy pact with Sri Lanka in 2015.

     

    India’s role in the Lankan Civil War

     

    • In the 1970s–1980s, the RAW and the state government of Tamil Nadu were believed to be encouraging the funding and training for the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a separatist insurgent force.
    • In 1987, faced with growing anger amongst its own Tamils, and a flood of refugees India intervened directly in the conflict for the first time.
    • This was after the Sri Lankan government attempted to regain control of the northern Jaffna region by means of an economic blockade and military assaults; India supplied food and medicine by air and sea.

    Why did India intervene?

    • Indian intervention in Sri Lankan civil war became inevitable as that civil war threatened India’s unity, national interest and territorial integrity.
    • This threat came in three ways:
    1. On the one hand, external powers could take advantage of the situation to establish their base in Sri Lanka thus posing a threat to India;
    2. On the other, the LTTE’s dream of a sovereign Tamil Eelam comprising all the Tamil inhibited areas (of Sri Lanka and India) posed a threat to India’s territorial integrity.
    3. There was extensive military involvement of Pakistan in the conflict by supplying lethal weaponry and encouraging Sri Lanka to pursue military action rather than peaceful negotiations to end the civil war.

    Outcomes

    • After subsequent negotiations, India and Sri Lanka entered into an agreement.
    • The peace accord assigned a certain degree of regional autonomy in the Tamil areas with a body controlling the regional council and called for the Tamil militant groups to lay down their arms.
    • Further India was to send a peacekeeping force, named the IPKF to Sri Lanka to enforce the disarmament and to watch over the regional council.
    • The accord failed over the issue of representations. The result was that the LTTE now found itself engaged in military conflict with the Indian Army.
    • The ruthlessness of this campaign and the Indian army’s subsequent anti-LTTE operations made it extremely unpopular amongst many Tamils in Sri Lanka.
    • The conflict between the LTTE and the Indian Army left over 1,000 Indian soldiers dead.

    Areas of cooperation

     

    Economic relations

    • India and Sri Lanka are member nations of several regional and multilateral organizations such as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), South Asia Co-operative Environment Programme, South Asian Economic Union and BIMSTEC.
    • Since a bilateral free trade agreement was signed and came into effect in 2000, Indo-Sri Lankan trade rose 128% by 2004 and quadrupled by 2006, reaching US$2.6 billion.
    • Indian exports account for 14% of Sri Lanka’s global imports. India is also the fifth largest export destination for Sri Lankan goods, accounting for 3.6% of its exports.
    • Both nations are also signatories of the South Asia Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA).
    • India’s National Thermal Power Corp (NTPC) is also scheduled to build a 500 MW thermal power plant in Sampoor (Sampur). The NTPC claims that this plan will take the Indo-Sri Lankan relationship to a new level.

    Development co-operation

    • Line of Credit: India is active in a number of areas of development activity in Sri Lanka. About one-sixth of the total development credit granted by India is made available to Sri Lanka.
    • In the recent past, three lines of credit were extended to Sri Lanka: US$100 million for capital goods, consumer durables, consultancy services, and food items, US$31 million for the supply of 300,000 MT of wheat and US$150 million for purchase of petroleum products.
    • Fishing Sector: Projects for providing fishing equipment to the fishermen in the East of Sri Lanka and solar energy aided computer education in 25 rural schools in Eastern Sri Lanka are under consideration.
    • Healthcare: India has supplied medical equipment to hospitals at Hambantota and Point Pedro, supplied 4 state-of-the-art ambulances to the Central Province etc.
    • Tourism: Indian governments have also showed interest in collaborating with their Sri Lankan counterparts on building tourism between the two countries based on shared religious heritage.

    Defense and strategic cooperation

    • India and Sri Lanka conducts one of the largest joint Military exercises called ‘Mitra Shakti’. Both conducts joint Naval exercise called ‘SLINEX’
    • India is the largest provider of defense training program to Sri Lankan soldiers and Defence officials
    • India, Sri Lanka, and Maldives has signed trilateral maritime security cooperation in the Indian Ocean region. The cooperation aims at improving surveillance, anti-piracy operations and reducing maritime pollution

     

    Major outstanding issues

     

    Fishing disputes

    • There have been several alleged incidents of Sri Lankan Navy personnel firing on Indian fishermen fishing in the Palk Strait, where India and Sri Lanka are only separated by 12 nautical miles.
    • The issue started because of Indian fishermen having used mechanized trawlers, which deprived the Sri Lankan fishermen (including Tamils) of their catch and damaged their fishing boats.
    • The Sri Lankan government wants India to ban use of mechanized trawlers in the Palk Strait region, and negotiations on this subject are undergoing.
    • So far, no concrete agreement has been reached since India favors regulating these trawlers instead of banning them altogether.
    • Another cause of anger amongst the Sri Lankan side is the use of mechanized trawlers, which they view as ecologically damaging.

    Alleged political interference

    • A media report from Colombo soon after Rajapaksa’s defeat in the January 8 elections of 2015 had said that an Indian Intelligence official was instrumental in uniting rival political parties — the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and the United National Party (UNP) — against him during the polls.
    • In October 2018, President Sirisena alleged that Indian intelligence agencies were plotting his assassination.
    • He made this comment in the cabinet meeting, after CID of Sri Lanka Police arrested an Indian national in September for the alleged assassination of Sirisena and Gotabaya Rajapaksa.

    China factor

    • SL has a history of taking independent decisions even if they cause misgivings in India.
    • In the period of low profile relationship between the two nations, SL apparently started favoring China over India.
    • India and Sri Lanka in February 2015 signed a nuclear energy deal to improve relationships.
    • China has taken for lease the Hambantota deep sea port and Mattala international airport in Sri Lanka.
    • The earlier government treated our concerns about China’s increasing presence on the island with “strategic autonomy”, pursuing, as usual, a balancing approach.

    Katchatheevu Island

    • It is an uninhabited island that India ceded to Sri Lanka in 1974 based on a conditional agreement called “Kachchativu island pact”.
    • Later on, Sri Lanka declared Katchatheevu, a sacred land given the presence of a Catholic shrine
    • The central government recognizes Sri Lanka’s sovereignty over the island as per the 1974 accord. But Tamil Nadu claimed that Katchatheevu falls under the Indian territory and Tamil fishermen have traditionally believed that it belongs to them and therefore want to preserve the right to fish there.

     

    Why is Sri Lanka important to India?

    • India is Sri Lanka’s closest neighbor. Both sides have built upon a legacy of intellectual, cultural, religious and linguistic interaction.
    • Sri Lanka has always been politically and economically important to India given its strategic geographical position in the Indian Ocean. The relationship has been marked by close contacts at all levels.
    • Sri Lanka sits at the epicenter of the arc connecting the Persian Gulf to the Strait of Malacca. An island nation with an economy that’s mainly reliant on tourism and tea exports, Sri Lanka’s blessed geography puts it at a crucial juncture of the busy shipping lanes of the Indian Ocean.
    • India also has a vital strategic stake in Sri Lanka for its own security interests. An unfriendly Sri Lanka or a Sri Lanka under influence of a power unfriendly to India would strategically discomfit India.
    • For the Indian Navy, Sri Lanka is important as the switching of naval fleets from the Bay of Bengal to the Arabian Sea and vice versa requires the fleets to go around the island nation.
    • Both countries share a common broad understanding on major issues of international interest and experience common social-political problems relating to community divides.

    SL needs India too

    • The humanitarian work by Indian agencies like supplies of medicines, doctors and providing refuge to more than 3 lakhs IDP’s during the decade-old civil war has created a sense of mutual cooperation among the countries natives.
    • SL is one of the leading recipients of India’s Line of Credits.
    • India has always rushed for the relief at the first signs of the rains and floods in SL recently. SL still commends the post-tsunami HADR relief operations carried out by India in the end-2004.
    • India’s military, intelligence and security establishment has maintained its relations with its Sri Lankan counterpart, and both sides have been on the same page at all times.
    • The security environment in the neighborhood will be discussed in light of the 21 April Easter Church bombings, and lessons learned from it.
    • India is also the largest provider of defense training programs for Sri Lankan soldiers and Defence officials.

    The Rajapaksa Factor

     

    • Rajapaksa is a controversial family that is known for its pro-China tilt and also infamously remembered for its brutal acts against Tamil minorities in pursuit of ending the Sri Lankan civil war in 2009.
    • Sri Lanka witnessed an authoritarian family rule under former president Mahinda Rajapaksa between 2005 and 2015.
    • Gotabaya Rajapaksa (brother of Mahinda Rajapaksa), a former defence secretary and intelligence officer, accused of committing human rights violations, hailed by many for ending the civil war.
    • Also, India’s relations with Sri Lanka went through a troubled patch during the Mahinda Rajapaksa presidency due to his proximity with China.

    Unresolved legacy issues

    • Given Gotabaya’s role as defense minister in Mahinda’s government in the LTTE’s elimination and charges of war crimes and human rights violations, this polarization raises questions about the course of domestic politics ahead.
    • The EAM has, during his recent visit, conveyed to President Gotabaya India’s expectation that his government will proceed with national reconciliation, with a solution that meets Tamil aspirations.
    • These are, of course, the right words for the occasion and do not necessarily guarantee what happens next.
    • The Tamils would be concerned at the choice of Anuradhapura as the venue for the President’s inauguration and General Gunaratne, reputedly the scourge of Tamils in the war, as defense minister.

    Greater role for India

     

    Gathering convergence towards SL

    • Delhi needs to invest some political capital in resolving problems such as the long-standing dispute over fisheries.
    • Beyond its objection to China’s BRI projects, Delhi, either alone or in partnership with like-minded countries like Japan, should offer sustainable terms for infrastructure development.
    • Delhi also needs to contribute more to the development of Colombo’s defence and counter-terror capabilities.

    Answering the Tamil Question

    • The second structural factor shaping India’s relations with Sri Lanka is the Tamil question.
    • Delhi has certainly learned the dangers of being drawn too deep into the domestic conflicts of neighboring countries.
    • If the new government in Colombo can advance reconciliation with the Tamil minority, it will be easier for India to strengthen ties with the Gotabaya government.

    No china factor indeed

    • Labeling governments in Sri Lanka as “pro-China” or “pro-India” is irrelevant. It is evident that China’s economic and strategic salience in the subcontinent is not tied to the regime leadership.
    • Previous Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena who considered as pro-India came to power criticizing the Chinese projects in Sri Lanka, but within two years into power, it extended full backing to the Chinese projects.

    Harnessing the  ray of hope

    • Our challenges in Sri Lanka will continue, but we are off to a good start with the new government.
    • The new president has made repeated statements that his government would like Sri Lanka to be a “neutral country” and that “Sri Lanka won’t do anything that will harm India’s interests.”
    • Gotabaya was also critical of the previous government giving Hambantota Port on a 99-year lease to China.
    • He went on to add that giving land as investment for developing a hotel or a commercial property was not a problem but the strategically important, economically important harbor, giving that is not acceptable.
    • The Rajapaksas have acknowledged that India has not interfered in the recent elections.
    • The first visit abroad by Gotabaya Rajapaksa to India has its own symbolic significance, translating into a diplomatic gesture his statement to the EAM that while China is a trade partner, India is a relative.

    Way Forward

     

    • During the last few years, various constitutional amendments have weakened the Sri Lankan president’s powers considerably and it would be interesting to watch the relationship between the president and the parliament, which cannot be dissolved before February 2020 — unless it votes itself to do so.
    • This stability in the Indian government should find synergy with the new Sri Lankan president policy which includes “neutrality” and “non-alignment” between major powers.
    • Rather than focusing on building the case against China, New Delhi must step up its efforts to show what it is for.
    • India can never match Beijing’s economic wherewithal to make a difference to Colombo’s developmental requirements.
    • But it can carve out a niche role in some areas and also partner smartly with likeminded strategic partners like Japan to make an economic and strategic difference in Sri Lanka.

    Conclusion

    • The challenges for India to protect its interests remained even with the friendly Sirisena-Wickremesinghe government in power in Sri Lanka.
    • One of the biggest challenges for Indian diplomacy in the subcontinent is to persuade its neighbor that India is an opportunity and not a threat.
    • Progressive trade and economic ties are key to prosperity in India Sri Lanka relations and the free trade agreement acts as a catalyst to address this solution.
    • Sri Lanka should be allowed for recovering stable polity and growing economic ties with India through various channels.
    • The China question is only part of the recalibration that will be needed to get India-Sri Lanka relations on the right track.

     

     



    References

    https://www.civilsdaily.com/burning-issue-constitutional-crisis-in-sri-lanka/

    https://www.thequint.com/voices/opinion/india-sri-lanka-president-gotabaya-bilateral-relations-security-political-stability

    https://idsa.in/idsacomments/problem-of-fishermen-in-india-sri-lanka-relations_gsen_200516

    https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/why-india-needs-re-calibrate-relations-sri-lanka/

    https://thediplomat.com/2019/11/what-will-rajapaksas-return-mean-for-india-sri-lanka-relations/

    https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/gotabaya-rajapaksa-sri-lanka-elections-colombo-6126280/

  • [Burning Issue] Relevance of BRICS in the changing global order

     


    Context

    • The 11th summit of the BRICS grouping comprising Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa was held in Brasilia last week.
    • Pitted as a counterweight to G7, the combine of developed economies, BRICS represents the world’s top emerging economies and claims to serve as a bridge between the developed and developing world.
    • Questions are also being raised about its efficacy and impact. Its significance for India has also been put to questions several times.

    What is BRICS?

     

    • BRICS is an acronym for the grouping of the world’s leading emerging economies, namely Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
    • The BRICS Leaders’ Summit is convened annually. It does not exist in form of organization, but it is an annual summit between the supreme leaders of five nations.

    inception

    • On November 30, 2001, Jim O’Neill, a British economist who was then chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management, coined the term ‘BRIC’ to describe the four emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India, and China.
    • He made a case for BRIC on the basis of econometric analyses projecting that the four economies would individually and collectively occupy far greater economic space and become among the world’s largest economies in the next 50 years or so.

    Formation

    • The grouping was formalized during the first meeting of BRIC Foreign Ministers on the margins of the UNGA in New York in September 2006.
    • The first BRIC Summit took place in 2009 in the Russian Federation and focused on issues such as reform of the global financial architecture.

    Members

    • South Africa was invited to join BRIC in December 2010, after which the group adopted the acronym BRICS. South Africa subsequently attended the Third BRICS Summit in Sanya, China, in March 2011.
    • The Chairmanship of the forum is rotated annually among the members, in accordance with the acronym B-R-I-C-S.
    • BRICS now brings together five economies accounting for 42% of the world’s population, 23% of the global GDP and an around 17% share of world trade.
    • The five BRICS countries are also members of G-20
    • The group at each summit elects one of the heads of state of the component countries to serve as President Pro Tempore of the BRICS. This year it was Brazil.

    Financial Architecture of BRICS

     

     

    Currently, there are two components that make up the financial architecture of BRICS, namely:

    1. the New Development Bank (NDB) or sometimes referred to as the BRICS Development Bank and
    2. the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA).
    • Both of these components were signed into a treaty in 2014 and became active in 2015.

    New Development Bank

    • The proposed NDB or the BRICS Development Bank is a multilateral development bank operated by the BRICS states.
    • The bank’s primary focus of lending will be infrastructure projects with authorized lending of up to $34 billion annually.
    • South Africa will be the African Headquarters of the Bank named the “New Development Bank Africa Regional Centre”.
    • The bank will have starting capital of $50 billion (members contributing $10 billion each) with capital increased to $100 billion over time.

    BRICS CRA

    • The BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) is a framework for providing protection against global liquidity pressures.
    • This includes currency issues where members’ national currencies are being adversely affected by global financial pressures.
    • It is found that emerging economies that experienced rapid economic liberalization went through increased economic volatility, bringing uncertain macroeconomic environment.
    • The CRA is generally seen as a competitor to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and along with the New Development Bank is viewed as an example of increasing South-South cooperation.
    • It was established in 2015 by the BRICS countries. The legal basis is formed by the Treaty for the Establishment of a BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement, signed at Fortaleza, Brazil on 15 July 2014.

     

    Significant feats of BRICS

     

    I. Johannesburg Declaration, 2018

    • The 2018 summit saw the BRICS leaders come together and discuss various international and regional issues of common concern and adopted the ‘Johannesburg Declaration‘ by consensus.
    • It implies that this important multilateral grouping has a lot to say about the state of the world.
    • The leaders jointly reaffirmed their commitment to the principles of mutual respect, sovereign equality, democracy, inclusiveness and strengthened collaboration.
    • The BRICS leaders have used the summit to reject the growing unilateralism and instead reiterate their commitment to the strengthening of multilateral institutions, calling for stronger intra-trade within member states.

    II. Focus on New Industrial Revolution

    • The other big idea emanating from the summit is to help nations to prepare for the Fourth Industrial Revolution.
    • Participants embraced it, articulating the need for a new strategy on employment, education and skill development as the digital revolution unfolds.
    • The leaders commended the establishment of the BRICS Partnership on New Industrial Revolution (PartNIR).
    • The BRICS Partnership on New Industrial Revolution (PartNIR) aims to deepen BRICS cooperation in digitalisation, industrialisation, innovation, inclusiveness and investment and to maximise the opportunities and address the challenges arising from the 4th Industrial Revolution.

    III. BRICS Plus

    • The BRICS outreach to Africa began at the last summit hosted by South Africa, in 2013.
    • It has picked up momentum now but African leaders want more
    • They need big loans from the New Development Bank (NDB) for their infrastructure projects
    • China introduced the “BRICS Plus” format at the Xiamen summit last year by inviting a few countries from different regions.
    • South Africa emulated it, arranging the attendance of top-level representation of five nations of its choice: Argentina, Jamaica, Turkey, Indonesia and Egypt
    • The precise role of “BRICS Plus” countries will take time to evolve but an immediate benefit is the immense opportunities it provides for networking among leaders.

    IV. Brasilia outcome

    • During Brazil’s chairmanship, the grouping reported 30 new outcomes, initiatives and documents.
    • The latest summit needed a 73 para-long Brasilia Declaration to spell out the leaders’ shared worldview and spectrum of their work.
    • Much to India’s satisfaction, the commitment of BRICS to counterterrorism seems to be getting strengthened.
    • Its working group on countering terrorism has expanded its activities through five thematic subgroups that deal with terrorist financing, use of Internet for terrorist purposes, countering radicalization etc.
    • Where the BRICS shows signs of advancing is in the economic domain. Here, five facets need to be highlighted.

    V. NDB projects

    • The New Development Bank (NDB), the grouping’s flagship achievement, has 44 projects with its lending touching $12.4 billion, in just five years.
    • This is not a small gain, but the bank needs to grow as “a global development finance institution”. A move is now afoot to open its membership selectively.
    • NDB has opened its regional centres in South Africa and Brazil, and will do so in Russia and India in 2020.

    VI. Local currency Bond Fund

    • With a successful Contingent Reserve Arrangement in the bag, BRICS governments are set to establish a local currency Bond Fund.
    • But the earlier proposal to launch a credit rating agency remains shelved due to internal differences.

    VII. Business promotion

    • Business promotion among member-states has been accorded a new salience.
    • The BRICS Business Council held a substantive dialogue to foster cooperation in areas ranging from infrastructure and energy to financial services, regional aviation and digital economy.
    • Its cooperation with the NDB is being encouraged. The national trade promotion agencies signed an MoU on cooperation among themselves.
    • A BRICS Women Business Alliance was also created, both as a women empowerment measure and as a tool to bring “a distinctive perspective on issues of interest for the business community.”

    VIII. Commitment on NIR

    • Following up on the decisions taken at the previous summit, operationalisation of the Partnership on New Industrial Revolution is underway.
    • It is focused on cooperation in digitalisation, industrialisation, innovation, inclusiveness and investment.
    • This partnership will be concretized by establishing industrial and science parks, innovation centres and business incubators.

     

    Relevance of BRICS

    There are three major factors that threaten the relevance of the BRICS grouping and render it just another multilateral grouping in an already bloated set of groupings:

    I. Political

    • These countries are not all on the same page at the same time. While India and Russia share historically close ties, India-China relations experience swing from warm to frosty and back like a pendulum.
    • Russia and China have been united by a common adversary. US-led West-imposed sanctions on Russia and Washington and Beijing’s trade war have pushed the world’s second and third-largest military powers closer together.

    II. Economic

    • There isn’t much convergence. From being four economies to watch out for back in 2001, they (along with South Africa) are all in the middle of some sort of economic doldrums.
    • But the reasons for the states of these economies vary vastly.
    • BRICS can be broken into two groups — those that took advantage of globalization’s march to integrate themselves into global supply chains (primarily China and India).
    • The other faction includes those that took advantage of globalization to sell their abundant natural resources (primarily Brazil, Russia and South Africa).

    III. Strategic

    • A small positive, if that, is that it gives India one more mechanism, occasion and opportunity to hold dialogue with China.
    • There may be little tangible movement in India-China ties, however, if diplomacy is to work, sustained interaction between parties is essential.
    • A counterpoint to this point, however, is that India and China already have several points of contact bilaterally and multilaterally (at the UN, SCO, East Asia Summit etc.) and that one extra platform isn’t going to make a whole lot of difference.
    • Perhaps that is true, but the glorified talk-shop that discusses “futuristic subjects” that is BRICS will continue to exist despite its irrelevance, and any little benefits it affords should be appreciated.

    IV. People-to-People exchange

    • BRICS members have recognised the need for strengthening People-to-People exchanges and to foster closer cooperation in the areas of culture, sport, education, film and youth.
    • People-to-People exchanges seek to forge new friendships; deepen relations and mutual understanding between BRICS peoples in the spirit of openness, inclusiveness, diversity and mutual learning.
    • Such People to people exchanges include the Young Diplomats Forum, Parliamentarian Forum, Trade Union Forum, Civil BRICS as well as the Media Forum.

     

    India’s position amongst BRICS

     

    • Eighteen years later, India finds itself as one of the emerging economies in the grouping and beyond, especially
    • As PM Modi attends the 11th BRICS Summit in Brasilia, his sixth since he assumed office in 2014, it will be the beginning of what New Delhi sees as the “second cycle” of BRICS.
    • From the Indian perspective, BRICS has emerged the voice of developing countries or the global south.
    • As these countries face an aggressive club of developed countries, raising challenges on issues from WTO to climate change, India believes BRICS has to protect the rights of the developing countries.
    • Also, India has to maintain the balancing act between Russia-China on the one side and the US on the other.

    India’s successes

    • The fact that BRICS has put counter-terrorism on top of the agenda has been a success for India.
    • That was evident in the BRICS Summit in Xiamen in September 2017, with China as the chair.
    • The fact that it was achieved, despite the strained ties due to the standoff in Doklam, was a testimony to the value Beijing and New Delhi attach to the outcomes of the grouping.
    • On the question of multilateralism, India has articulated a vision for strengthening and reforming the multilateral system itself.
    • When India calls for multilateralism, it is not a call to reinforce the status quo of multilateralism but to reform it since this is what BRICS had originally set out to do.

    Challenges confronting India at the BRICS

     

    Some of the crucial challenges are:

    I. China’s massive economic weight in the forum

    • Its GDP at nearly $12 trillion is now more than twice that of the other four members put together.
    • This has changed the internal balance in the BRICS in favour of Beijing.

    II. China led Globalization

    • Apprehension about US-led globalization was one of the motivations behind India’s quest for a multipolar world in the past.
    • But India is now struggling with the issue of China-led globalization. The Belt and Road initiative has added to India’s concerns about China’s rise.

    Major disappointments at BRICS

     

    • Despite of the Brasilia Outcome it is difficult to identify new elements in the BRICS’s endeavour to strengthen and reform the multilateral system.
    • The “urgent need” to reform the UN, the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund and other international organisations was stressed once again, even as little progress has occurred on this score.
    • Interest in open and free trade was reiterated, despite growing protectionist tendencies.
    • On the expansion of the UN Security Council, BRICS exposed its disunity yet again by sticking to the formulation that refuses to go beyond China and Russia supporting the “aspiration” of Brazil, India and South Africa.

    A critical evaluation

    • Overall, while the BRICS grouping may have completed a decade, it continues to face the challenges of the lack of a binding ideology, bilateral differences, diversity in terms of socio-cultural and political systems, and China’s overwhelming presence, which reduces the space for other countries in the grouping.
    • It has transformed into an amorphous collective with its fingers in all sorts of pies, but an inability to commit to very many common goals.

    I. Goals yet not clear

    • The contribution of BRICS to project the perspectives of developing economies is laudable.
    • However, by hosting outreach meetings with countries in its neighbouring (or broader) region, each chair (with Brazil’s exception) gave the impression that BRICS would do more for them.
    • But the NDB has been lagging behind on this score. It needs to start extending loans for projects in non-BRICS countries to create a solid constituency of supporters.
    • Also, is such a plethora of meetings really essential? Do the results justify the expenditure? India’s representatives should ask, do they help the poor and vulnerable sections of the BRICS community?
    • Finally, BRICS should ponder if in the short term it needs to focus on fulfilling existing commitments instead of taking on new ones.

    II. Namesake consensus against Terrorism

    • In 2016, it was noted that successive declarations by the BRICS nations tended to echo the same throwaway lines on terrorism, but do little about assuaging one another’s real concerns.
    • The 2019 iteration is no different with its “We condemn terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, which should not be associated with any religion, nationality or civilisation…”.
    • Through it all, China continues to show brazen disregard to India’s concerns about terrorism emanating from Pakistan. This is unlikely to change anytime soon.

    III. Kindleberger Trap

    • As China rises and positions itself as the sole challenger to American hegemony, there is a growing discussion about the possible Kindleberger Trap.
    • This is a situation where China may fail to provide global public goods like a clean environment and financial stability, despite being a superpower.
    • Small countries have little incentive to contribute to global public goods and it is generally the responsibility of great powers to provide global governance.
    • The idea of the Kindleberger Trap is also applicable to rising powers like India, which have global ambitions.

    IV. Climate at peril

    • Climate governance too has been highlighted as an area where BRICS members have a lot of potential to contribute, but so far, that has not happened.
    • Russia has been ambivalent towards climate change and has recently joined the Paris Agreement.
    • India has taken initiatives outside the grouping to project itself as a leader in the fight against climate change, such as the launch of the International Solar Alliance in 2015 with France.
    • Apart from the global agenda, BRICS allows New Delhi to send out messages about its foreign policy priorities, underscoring its desire to be part of issue-based coalitions.

    Way Forward

     

    • A close examination of India’s record in BRICS reveals that New Delhi has used its membership to make a substantial contribution to the global financial architecture, while also making efforts to address glaring gaps in areas such as counter-terrorism, the fight against climate change and UNSC reform.
    • India is not a free-rider in a system of global governance dominated by the West, and continues to provide a vision of global governance.
    • The BRICS needs to expand its agenda for increasing its relevance in the global order. As of now, climate change and development finance, aimed at building infrastructure must dominate its agenda.
    • For BRICS to remain relevant over the next decade, each of its members must make a realistic assessment of the initiative’s opportunities and inherent limitations.

     

     

     

     



    References

     

    https://www.civilsdaily.com/news/op-ed-snap-the-big-five-at-10/

    https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/brics-on-the-ball/article30009282.ece

    https://www.firstpost.com/india/brics-summit-2019-relevance-of-grouping-in-2019-unclear-but-it-does-provide-india-one-major-benefit-7655521.html

    https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-and-its-brics-dilemmas-57891/

  • [Burning Issue] The Ram Janmabhoomi Verdict


    Context

    In a unanimous judgment, a bench headed by CJI Ranjan Gogoi asked the Centre to formulate a scheme within three months and set up a trust to manage the property and construct a temple.

    Centre had acquired the entire 67.73 acres of land including the 2.77 acre of the disputed Ramjanmabhumi-Babri Masjid premises in 1993.

    Background

     

    • The Ayodhya dispute was a political, historical, and socio-religious debate in India, centered on a plot of land in the city of Ayodhya, Uttar Pradesh.
    • The issues revolve around the control of a site traditionally regarded among Hindus to be the birthplace of their deity Rama, the history and location of the Babri Masjid at the site, and whether a previous Hindu temple was demolished or modified to create a mosque.
    • The mosque there, the Babri Masjid, was demolished during a political rally which turned into a riot on 6 December 1992.
    • The first recorded instances of religious violence in Ayodhya occurred in the 1850s over a nearby mosque at Hanuman Garhi. The Babri mosque was attacked in the process.
    • Since then, local groups made occasional demands that they should have the possession of the site and that they should be allowed to build a temple on the site, all of which were denied by the colonial government.

    The Mosque over temple

     

    • Babur was the first Mughal emperor of India and the founder of the Mughal empire.
    • It is believed that one of his generals, Mir Baqi, built the Babri Masjid (“Babur’s Mosque”) in 1528 on his orders.
    • The belief came into currency since 1813–14, when the East India Company’s surveyor Francis Buchanan reported that he found an inscription on the mosque walls which attested to this fact.
    • He also recorded the local tradition, which believed that emperor Aurangzeb (r. 1658–1707) built the mosque after demolishing a temple dedicated to Rama.

    Testimony of excavations

    • In its judgment, the Supreme Court referred to an Archaeological Survey of India (ASI) report to observe that the Babri Masjid, which stood on the disputed site until its demolition in 1992.
    • It reported that Mosque was not built on vacant land and there was evidence of a temple-like structure having existed on the land before the mosque was built.
    • Considering the ASI report valid, the Supreme Court said what was found in the excavation “was not an Islamic structure”.

    Judicial intervention

     

    Allahabad High Court Judgment of 2011

    A suit was filed by the Sunni Wakf Board for declaration and possession of the site. The Allahabad high court bench began hearing the case in 2002, which was completed in 2010.

    After the Supreme Court dismissed a plea to defer the High Court verdict on 30 September 2010, the High Court of Allahabad, the three-member bench ruled that the disputed land be split into three parts.

    The judgment which was pronounced with majority decision of 2:1 held that the 2.77 acres land located in Ayodhya will be divided into a three-way division — one-third for the Sunni Waqf Board, one-third for the Nirmohi Akhara and one-third to the party for ‘Ram Lalla’ or infant Ram represented by the Hindu Maha Sabha.

     

    The Final Verdict

    • The Hindus would get the entire disputed 2.77 acres in Ayodhya where the demolished Babri Masjid once stood.
    • Possession of disputed 2.77-acre land will remain with the Central government receiver.
    • The Muslims will get alternate five acres of land either in the surplus 67 acres acquired in and around the disputed structure by the central government or any other “prominent” place.
    • A trust will be formed in 3 months to build a temple on the disputed land. The court held that the Nirmohi Akhara is not the shebait or devotee of the deity Ram Lalla but will get to be a member of the Trust.

    What the verdict relied upon?

    • In the backdrop of the said dispute then P.V. Narasimha Rao government enacted, in September 1991, a special law to freeze the status of places of worship as they were on August 15, 1947.
    • The law kept the disputed structure at Ayodhya out of its purview, mainly because it was the subject of prolonged litigation.
    • It was also aimed at providing scope for a possible negotiated settlement.

    Places of Worship Act, 1994

    • The Act declares that the religious character of a place of worship shall continue to be the same as it was on August 15, 1947.
    • It says no person shall convert any place of worship of any religious denomination into one of a different denomination or section.
    • It declares that all suits, appeals or any other proceedings regarding converting the character of a place of worship, which are pending before any court or authority on August 15, 1947, will abate as soon as the law comes into force.
    • However, there is an exception to the bar on instituting fresh proceedings with regard to suits that related to the conversion of status that happened after August 15, 1947.
    • This saves legal proceedings, suits, and appeals regarding the chance of status that took place after the cut-off date.
    • These provisions will not apply to ancient and historical monuments and archaeological sites and remains that are covered by the Ancient Monuments and Archaeological Sites and Remains Act, 1958.

    How did SC use the act?

    • In its verdict, the Supreme Court commended the enactment as one that preserved the constitutional value of secularism by not permitting the status of a place of worship to be changed.
    • The state has, by enacting the law, enforced a constitutional commitment and operationalized its constitutional obligations to uphold the equality of all religions and secularism, which is a part of the basic features of the Constitution.
    • It said the Places of Worship Act imposes a non-derogable obligation towards enforcing our commitment to secularism.
    • The court observed that non-retrogression is a foundational feature of the fundamental constitutional principles, of which secularism is a core component.

    Article 142 invoked by SC

    Article 142(1) states that “The Supreme Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction may pass such decree or make such order as is necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter pending before it, and any decree so passed or order so made shall be enforceable throughout the territory of India in such manner as may be prescribed by or under any law made by Parliament and, until provision in that behalf is so made, in such manner as the President may by order prescribe”.

    • The Supreme Court, implicitly referring to the demolition of the Babri Masjid at the disputed site, said that it was invoking Article 142 “to ensure that a wrong committed must be remedied”.
    • This was the first time that the court invoked this power in a case involving a civil dispute over an immovable property, involving private parties.

     

    Significance of the verdict

     

    Communal politics comes to an end

    • Ayodhya in the past was the center stage for communal politics and a tool for polarization before elections.
    • The high-pitched events not only disrupted daily life and business, but also endangered communal harmony in the region.
    • By settling the dispute between communities by the intervention of the Supreme court and other democratic institutions supporting this landmark judgment, a new era of Economic progress in the region is expected.
    • This, in turn, will lead to the exploration of tourism and synergy to business development at the priority of the Govt and all the stakeholders in the region.

    Victory of harmony over hate

    • The date on which the verdict had been delivered, November 9, was particularly significant as it was on that day that the Berlin Wall, dividing East and West Germany, had been brought down and people on opposite sides reconciled PM Modi said.
    • India also saw the opening of the Kartarpur Sahib Corridor. Ayodhya verdict on this day, therefore, is telling us that the message from the date is to be united in harmony and amity.

    Law stands apart over political considerations, religion and beliefs

    • The judges declared that the demolition of the 16th century Babri Masjid on December 6, 1992, was “an egregious violation of the rule of law” and “a calculated act of destroying a place of public worship”.
    • The Muslims have been wrongly deprived of a mosque which had been constructed well over 450 years ago, the Bench said.
    • The Court referred to the Places of Worship (Special Provisions) Act of 1991, which prohibits the conversion of the status any place of worship, to say that all religions are equal.
    • After giving the disputed land to Hindus and a separate five acres for construction of a mosque in Ayodhya, the SC shut the door for fresh litigation to alter the status quo of sites such as those in Kashi and Mathura, which have also seen discord over worship.
    • “The Constitution does not make a distinction between the faith and belief of one religion and another. All forms of belief, worship, and prayer are equal,”
    • The Bench said the Act “speaks to the future by mandating that the character of a place of public worship shall not be altered”.
    • “Places of Worship Act is an affirmation of the solemn duty which was cast upon the State to preserve and protect the equality of all faiths as an essential constitutional value, a norm which has the status of being a basic feature of the Constitution,” the Supreme Court addressed the government.
    • In the times to come and given India’s demographic and cultural complexity, the judgment may prove to be an invaluable legal treatise that upholds “justness” and delivers impartial treatment to a vexed and emotional case.

    Latent implications of the ruling

     

    Ruling is regarded as majoritarian coercion

    • The Supreme Court has averted an immediate crisis, insofar as there has been neither outbreak of violence, nor any reports of bloodshed in the aftermath of the Ayodhya verdict.
    • The point is that majoritarian coercion over time has deepened and legitimized a process where institutional remedies for highly charged communal disputes are sought.
    • What mattered ultimately was comfort, peace and tranquility and the judgment — by its so-called ‘balancing act’, it is argued — holds immense promise.
    • But perhaps the greater crisis that the Court has involuntarily invited is that of minorities losing their faith in the institution of the judiciary.
    • In an environment where the legislature and the executive are turning majoritarianism as accused by some parliamentarians, they are left with no choice but to repose their faith in the courts.

    Worrisome silence

    • The response from Muslim denominational organizations is guarded. It ranges from immediate acceptance to muted disagreement to appeals to “move on”.
    • There are various social media postings that have appealed to the Sunni Waqf Board to decline the compensatory gift of five acres of land.
    • Nevertheless, a state of shock and incredulity runs deep; the silence and stillness is far more worrisome.
    • The demolition of the mosque in 1992 had indeed left its impact on generations to come, as the Nellie (1983), Gujarat (2002) and Bhagalpur (1989) riots did.

    Conclusion

    • The issue inherently has a religious angle, and to appease these sentiments there is a larger need to address the issue of communalism.
    • The verdict attempts to bring an end the festering one-and-a-half centuries-old legal battle over the title to the disputed structure.
    • The judgment did result in a victory for the majority and coincidentally for the mob that demolished the Babri but a reading of the judgment clearly shows disapproval and disavowal of the mob.
    • The legal victory is indeed based upon secular principles and pluralist ethos. This can be projected as the victory of secularism too.


    Let’s have a look at the chronology of the Ayodhya dispute

     

    1528:

    First Mughal Emperor Babar is believed to have constructed Babri Masjid

    1885:

    Mahant Raghbir Das moves Faizabad court seeking permission to construct a temple in the vicinity of the Babri Masjid. The plea is declined.

    December 22-23, 1949:

    Idols of Lord Ram is mysteriously found inside the mosque

    1950:

    Gopal Visharad and Ramachandra Das moves Faizabad court for permission to worship the idols

    1959:

    Nirmohi Akhara files plea seeking possession of the disputed land.

    1961:

    Central Sunni Waqf Board, U.P., moves court for declaration of title of the disputed land and removal of the idols inside the mosque.

    February 1986:

    Faizabad court allows Hindus to worship the idols.

    August 1989:

    Allahabad High Court takes over the title dispute. Orders status quo.

    November 1989:

    The Rajiv Gandhi government allows Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) to perform puja near the disputed site.

    September 1990:

    BJP leader L.K. Advani begins rath yatra

    December 1992:

    Kar sevaks demolish Babri Masjid. Justice Liberhan Commission appointed to probe.

    1993:

    P.V. Narasimha Rao government acquires 67 acres of land adjoining the disputed site. The Supreme Court upholds the acquisition in its Dr. Ismail Faruqui judgment.

    April 2002:

    Allahabad High Court commences hearing the title suits.

    March 2003:

    SC bans religious activity in the acquired lands in Mohd. Aslam @Bhurre case.

    2009:

    Liberhan Committee submits inquiry report.

    September 30, 2010:

    High Court delivers a majority judgment for three-way partition of the disputed property among Hindus, Muslims and Nirmohi Akhara.

    May 2011:

    SC stays the high court judgment on cross-appeals filed by the parties.

    August 2017:

    A three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court led by Justice Dipak Misra begins hearing the appeals. The main title issue is side-tracked. Muslim parties seek a reference of a contentious observation made in the Faruqui judgment that worshipping in mosques are not integral to Islam to a Constitution Bench. A majority judgment is pronounced declining the prayer.

    January 2019:

    A Constitution Bench of five judges led by Chief Justice of India Ranjan Gogoi resumes hearing the title appeals but suggests mediation first.

    August 6, 2019:

    Mediation committee led by former Supreme Court judge, Justice F.M.I. Kalifulla fails to draw a consensus and court hearing commences.

    October 16, 2019:

    After 40 days of hearings, the Constitution Bench reserves judgment

    November 9, 2019:

    Constitution Bench clears the way for constructing Ram Temple at the disputed site. It orders the government to provide five-acre land to Muslims at a prominent place in Ayodhya.

     

     



    References:

    https://thewire.in/law/ayodhya-dispute-public-justice

    https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/a-chronology-of-the-ayodhya-dispute/article29929198.ece

    https://www.bloombergquint.com/opinion/ayodhya-verdict-beliefs-do-matter

    https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-50065277

    https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/some-questions-on-ayodhya-verdict/article29985922.ece

    https://www.indiatoday.in/india-today-insight/story/why-critics-of-majoritarianism-on-the-ayodhya-verdict-are-wrong-1617787-2019-11-11

    https://thewire.in/communalism/ayodhya-verdict-babri-masjid-ram-temple-dn-jha

  • [Burning Issue] WhatsApp Snooping

     



    Context

    • Possibly one of the biggest stories in that broke in cyberspace recently has been WhatsApp’s reports that 1,400 of its users were hacked by Pegasus, a spyware tool from Israeli firm NSO Group.
    • A significant number of these Indian users include journalists, academics, human rights and Dalit activists.
    • Further, the timing of such surveillance — late April to mid-May — rakes up another set of worries about the motive behind the hack.

     

    Pegasus

    • All spyware do what the name suggests — they spy on people through their phones.
    • Pegasus works by sending an exploit link, and if the target user clicks on the link, the malware or the code that allows the surveillance is installed on the user’s phone.
    • A presumably newer version of the malware does not even require a target user to click a link.
    • Once Pegasus is installed, the attacker has complete access to the target user’s phone.
    • The first reports on Pegasus’s spyware operations emerged in 2016, when Ahmed Mansoor, a human rights activist in the UAE, was targeted with an SMS link on his iPhone 6.

    Method of working

    • A Pegasus operator must convince a target to click on a specially crafted ‘exploit link’ which allows the operator to penetrate security features on the phone.
    • This automatically installs Pegasus without the user’s knowledge or permission.
    • Once the phone is exploited and Pegasus installed, it begins contacting the operator’s command and control and send back the target’s private data, including passwords, contact lists, events, text messages, and live voice calls from popular mobile messaging apps.
    • The operator can even turn on the phone’s camera and microphone to capture activity in the phone’s vicinity.

     

    Why is Pegasus dangerous?

    • What makes Pegasus really dangerous is that it spares no aspect of a person’s identity. It makes older techniques of spying seem relatively harmless.
    • What can’t it do would be an easier question to answer. Once on a phone, the spyware has the run of the place.
    • It can intercept every call and SMS, read every email and monitor each messaging app.
    • Pegasus can also control the phone’s camera and microphone and has access to the device’s location data.
    • The app advertises that it can carry out “file retrieval”, which means it could access any document that a target might have stored on their phone.

     

    Concerns over Snooping

    The pertinent questions are, who is behind this surveillance and hacking incident; and has this intrusion of privacy reached a level that has not been fathomed by the legal and technical communities?

    Stretching this further, is this a vulnerability ignored by WhatsApp’s management?

    Perpetrators behind the attack

    • The other angle to this whole episode is the role of the perpetrators behind the hack.
    • With access to technology increasing, networks can be intruded from any part of the world provided the encryption can be broken.
    • The offering of products such as Pegasus and their misuse or proliferation has the same, if not more, ramifications as advanced nuclear technology falling into the wrong hands.
    • The role of non-state actors with support from rogue nations or even criminal syndicates is also not out of question.

    Security and privacy breach

    • Clearly, the potential revelations are worrying a large section of social media users about the confidentiality and integrity of the networks, which is the basis of trust for most users.
    • At the same time, the NSO Group’s claim about only working with specific security agencies across the world brings to the fore questions about the role of such agencies.

    Government under question

    • Some in India have been quick to jump the gun and blame the government and its ‘snooping’ networks.
    • But, that is definitely not proven to be the situation yet, and both the MeitY and Ministry of Home Affairs have clearly said they played no role.

     

    Snooping:  an offence in India

    • Any form of online interception, monitoring and decryption are well defined as per the provisions of the Information Technology Act 2008 (IT Act) and the concomitant rules.
    • These provisions clearly list the 10 agencies that can undertake such actions and the procedures for them, the competent authority who can order such an action being the Union Home Secretary.
    • Even such authorised surveillance actions have to be reviewed by a committee, headed by the Cabinet Secretary, which meets at least once in two months.
    • Likewise for States, the respective Home Secretary is the competent authority and the Chief Secretary heads the review committee.
    • No such authorizations have been given by any of the competent authorities for the monitoring of the affected individuals in India for the period in reference.

     

    Whom to blame, then?

    • This is a clear case of willful hacking whose proportions entail it to be seen as a cyber terrorism attempt; it calls for application of Section 66 (F) of the IT Act to deal with the perpetrators.
    • To date, there have been three denials, by the central government (the ministry of electronics and information technology, the ministry of home affairs, and CERT-IN, a technical body that probes cyber threats).
    • The issue has brought to the fore the fear around the possibility of how emerging network access technology could also beat secured encryption, which remains the fundamental basis of user trust and hitherto privacy.

     

    Clear implications

     

    No national security without individual privacy!

    We must all recognise that national security starts with securing the smartphones of every single Indian by embracing technologies such as encryption rather than deploying spyware. This is a core part of our fundamental right to privacy.

    • This intrusion by the spyware is not merely an infringement of the rights of the citizens of the country but also a worrying development for India’s national security apparatus.
    • The security of a device becomes one of the fundamental bedrocks of maintaining user trust as society becomes more and more digitized.
    • Such an approach belies appreciating the injury and threats to individuals and the country.
    • There is an urgent need to take up this issue seriously by constituting an independent high-level inquiry with credible members and experts that can restore confidence and conduct its proceedings transparently.

    Alleged perpetrator

    • The alleged spying on Opposition leaders and activists in India reminds one of the illegal espionage in the Watergate scandal.
    • Given that NSO claims it only sells to governments and the fact that it is mostly critics of the ruling dispensation who have been targeted, some people have alleged that it is the Indian government that was behind the snooping.
    • In response, the Union minister of IT Minister alleged that the former Indian government had spied on the then chief of the Indian Army as well as the Union Finance Minister.

    A note of caution

    • Social media providers must stop chest-thumping, start investing in attribution solutions and be honest with users about the risks involved in their products.
    • Such software must be strictly controlled and legal provisions must be inked, so that providers of such technologies are deterred.
    • Needless to say, a relook at laws, technology and ethics is needed, preferably sooner than later.
    • In the digital age, companies will emerge and operate in the grey areas of the intersection between technology and security to make a profit.
    • But national security must not be used as a shield by either governments or private players to justify the violation of fundamental rights.

     

    Way Forward

     

    • It is incumbent on Parliament, the judiciary and Facebook, the company that owns WhatsApp, to plug the breach of privacy and nail those responsible for it.
    • Indian government must leverage its relationship with Israel to hold NSO to account.
    • Since this attack involves users from a quite a few countries, there is a greater need for global cooperation to a concerted and coordinated investigation.
    • The government has made it clear that it holds a sovereign right over the data of its citizens. The idea of data sovereignty must include a citizen’s right to privacy.
    • It must punish anyone found guilty of unlawfully violating the privacy of Indian citizens.

     

     



    References:

    https://www.civilsdaily.com/news/spyware-pegasus/

    https://scroll.in/article/942300/explainer-how-whatsapp-was-hacked-to-spy-on-indian-dissidents-and-who-did-it

    https://www.telegraphindia.com/opinion/whatsapp-snooping-is-a-grievous-offence/cid/1719010

    https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/why-there-cannot-be-any-national-security-without-individual-privacy-analysis/story-JvDaOJLW85gXR9cILtwq7M.html

  • [Burning Issue] India’s exit from RCEP


    Context

    • India decided to drop out of the RCEP agreement, citing its negative effects on farmers, MSMEs and dairy sector.

     

    What is RCEP?

     

    Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) is a proposed free trade agreement (FTA) between –

    • The 10 members of ASEAN
    • Additional members of ASEAN +3 = China, Japan, South Korea
    • Members with which ASEAN countries have FTA = India, Australia, New Zealand

    RCEP includes more than 3 billion people, has a combined GDP of about $17 trillion, and accounts for about 40 per cent of world trade. By any means, this is a huge community in making.

     

    How significance was RCEP for India?

    • From India’s point of view, the RCEP presented a decisive platform which could influence its strategic and economic status in the Asia-Pacific region and bring to fruition its “Act East Policy.”
    • It is expected to be an ambitious agreement bringing the 5 biggest economies of the region – Australia, China, India, Japan and South Korea – into a regional trading arrangement.

    There are three immediate benefits that its trade policymakers should note-

    #1. The RCEP agreement would complement India’s existing free trade agreements with the ASEAN and some of its member countries.

    This consolidation can address challenges emanating from implementation concerns vis-à-vis overlapping agreements, which is creating a “noodle bowl” situation obstructing effective utilization of these FTAs.

    It will also help achieve its goal of greater economic integration with countries East and South East of India through better access to a vast regional market ranging from Japan to Australia.

    NOTE:            India is not a party to two important regional economic blocs: the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. The RCEP would enable India to strengthen its trade ties with Australia, China, Japan and South Korea, and should reduce the potential negative impacts of TPP and TTIP on the Indian economy.

    #2. Getting India closer to ASEAN

    • Clubbing with the ASEAN has been a principal policy priority for both China and India.
    • At present, while China has clubbed with the ASEAN+1, ASEAN+3 and ASEAN+6,
    • India is clubbed only under the ASEAN+6 framework

    #3. India can leverage its capabilities in IT, Healthcare, Education and services

    • The RCEP will create opportunities for Indian companies to access new markets
    • India is well placed to contribute to other countries in RCEP through its expertise in services

    #4. Balancing with China

    • India’s allies in Southeast Asia, as well as Australia, want India to join it to balance China.
    • On the other hand, many in India feel that RCEP will aggravate India’s burgeoning trade deficit with China.
    • The Indian industry feels that China does not provide a level playing field for items that they could export, especially in fields like pharma, IT, films, indigenous medicines, wellness and yoga.
    • Some of these are founded on opacity that surrounds the Chinese government’s decision making.

     

    What compelled India to opt-out?

    Chinese imports

    • Key issues that have prevented India from coming on board include “inadequate” protection against surges in imports.
    • This is a major concern for India, as its industry has voiced fears that cheaper products from China would “flood” the market.
    • India had been seeking an auto-trigger mechanism that would allow it to raise tariffs on products in instances where imports cross a certain threshold.
    • India has also not received any credible assurances on its demand for more market access, and its concerns over non-tariff barriers.

    Rules of origin criteria

    • Its concerns on a “possible circumvention” of rules of origin — the criteria used to determine the national source of a product — were also not addressed.
    • Current provisions in the deal reportedly do not prevent countries from routing, through other countries, products on which India would maintain higher tariffs.
    • This is anticipated to allow countries like China to pump in more products.

    Trade deficit

    • Despite India already having separate, bilateral FTAs with most RCEP nations, it has recorded trade deficits with these countries.
    • China India has an over $50 billion trade deficit is one of the major reasons for New Delhi not joining in at this stage.
    • During negotiations, it was also not able to get a favourable outcome on its demands on the base year that would be used to reduce the tariffs on the products that would be traded as part of the pact.

    Protecting domestic industries

    • Throughout the RCEP negotiations, several sections of the Indian industry have raised concerns over India signing the deal.
    • They have argued that some domestic sectors may take a hit due to cheaper alternatives from other participant countries.
    • For instance, the dairy industry was expected to face stiff competition from Australia and New Zealand.
    • Similarly, steel and textiles sectors have also demanded protection.

     

    RCEP minus India

    It comprises half of the world population and accounts for nearly 40% of the global commerce and 35% of the GDP. RCEP would have become the world’s largest FTA after finalisation, with India being the third-biggest economy in it. Without India, the RCEP does not look as attractive as it had seemed during negotiations.

    What it means?

    • Divided ASEAN – ASEAN has been keen on a diversified portfolio so that member states can deal with major powers and maintain their strategic autonomy. ASEAN member states have tried to keep the U.S. engaged in the region.
    • Indo-Pacific – Both geopolitically and geo-economically, China is set to dominate the Indo-Pacific. India’s entire Indo-Pacific strategy might be open to question if steps are not taken to restore India’s profile in the region.
    • Rejected China’s dominance – India signalled that, despite the costs, China’s rise has to be tackled both politically and economically. Japan is now suggesting that it would work towards a deal that includes India.

    Implications for India

     

    Inherent lack of confidence?

    • Our government’s decision to stay out of the RCEP has drawn near-unanimous support from political parties and organisations representing farmers, traders and industries.
    • It is clear recognition that Indian producers will find it difficult to cope with increased import, especially of dairy products from Australia and New Zealand and manufactured goods from China.

    Isolation from the global value chain

    • India’s absence in integrating with global value chains will impact India’s internal and external ambitions.
    • India’s own evidence shows that jobs linked to global value chains earn one-third more than those jobs focused on the domestic market.
    • The inability to accede to the RCEP and ensure India’s integration into these emerging global value chains means India will lose out on a key opportunity to create such high-quality, high-paying jobs.
    • Moreover, India’s absence in both of Asia’s two key economic architectures will take away from India’s goals as a regional and Indo-Pacific power, as well as a prospective global power.

    Unclear on ‘national interest’

    • India’s ambitions to become a global hub for manufacturing means that it is the country’s long-term national interest to be integrated into global value chains.
    • Such growth matters for two reasons: within India, it will create millions of jobs and secure a stable future for India’s young population, and externally, to facilitate India’s rise as one of the poles in a multipolar 21st century.
    • India cannot decide its future by remaining isolated and sitting alone in a corner.

    The Indian protectionism

    • It has been argued that the Indian industry has hidden behind a wall of protectionism for far too long, and must open itself to global competition.
    • There is a tendency in Indian industry to seek protection, whenever any steps towards globalization are taken.
    • However, it is an acknowledged fact that globalization did benefit the Indian economy, it brought in newer technology and made Indian industry far more competitive.
    • RCEP does provide Indian industry a huge market to grow and expand, provided it transforms and the government frees it from bureaucratic controls that have been stifling growth.

    Conclusion

    • It does not seem a good idea for India to be out of the agreement from its inception, only to join it later.
    • Economic isolation is not an option for India. However, there are reports that India will move towards bilateral trade pacts.
    • Given India’s own ambitions to generate growth and jobs within India, and becoming a key player and rule-maker on the world stage, India’s decision to withdraw from the RCEP is not ideal.
    • India must now translate this withdrawal into a commitment for domestic reforms to prepare itself for the next opportunity to integrate itself into the global value chains and unleash Indian manufacturing.
    • However, having no deal is far more prudent than signing up for a bad one.
    • It is easy to succumb to the rapturous sound of global applause, but far tougher to make a tactical retreat in the larger national interest.

     

     



    References

    https://www.civilsdaily.com/what-is-the-significance-of-rcep-for-india/

    https://www.civilsdaily.com/news/explained-rcep-trade-negotiations/

    https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/markets/stocks/news/how-to-craft-an-rcep-to-indias-advantage/articleshow/72016572.cms

  • [Burning Issue] Death of Baghdadi and Its Global Implications

     


    Context

    • The death of ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi last week ended one of the most intense and aggressive manhunts in the world. He blew himself in a dead-end tunnel.
    • As a “leader on the run” for more than five years, Baghdadi was more of a symbol for a Caliphate.
    • It will be an overstatement to claim that his killing put an end to the ISIS network.

     

    ISIS: A quick recap

    • The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) officially known as the Islamic State (IS) is a terrorist group and a formerly unrecognized proto-state that follows a fundamentalist Salafi jihadist doctrine.
    • Within 18 months of the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq in 2011, the AL Qaeda in Iraq captured large territories across Iraq and Syria and morphed itself into ISIS.
    • The group has been designated a terrorist organization by the United Nations as well as by many international organizations and individual countries.

     

    Modus operandi of IS

    • Riding high on extremists and terrorists from across the globe, ISIS announced “decentralized” wilayas and asked their supporters to join them if they could not travel to the Caliphate.
    • The decentralized wilayas in West Africa, the Philippines, Egypt, Yemen, Afghanistan, Indonesia, and Libya have become more active and are showcasing successes on social media daily.
    • IS started systematically encouraging lone actor attacks in the West in 2016.

     

    The most lethal weapon

    • The real threat that the IS, however, poses is that it is able to convince the Muslim extremist fringe that their time has come.
    • Radicalization, in any event, has less to do with numbers than with the intensity of beliefs. The struggle is not against presumed disparities or injustices meted out to Muslim minorities.
    • Rather, it reflects the quest for a new militant Islamist identity.
    • In addition to this, the IS introduced the concept of a new Caliphate — especially al-Baghdadi’s vision of a Caliphate based on Islamic history.
    • This further ignited the imagination of Muslim youth across the globe and became a powerful magnet to attract volunteers to their cause.

     

    Who was Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi?

    • The leader of the IS was often described as the most wanted individual in the world.
    • The US designated him a terrorist some eight years ago and declared a bounty of $10 million (more than Rs 70 crore) on his head.
    • Baghdadi, who was believed to have been born in Iraq perhaps in 1971, proclaimed himself Caliph of the Islamic State in 2013.
    • He made his first known public appearance the following year, delivering a Ramzan sermon at the Great Mosque of al-Nuri in Mosul in northern Iraq.
    • This was the place at which the IS declared itself to be a worldwide Caliphate with al-Baghdadi at its head.

     

    The rise

    • In early 2014, al-Baghdadi’s fighters had taken control over western Iraq, and over the next year and a half, the IS ran a sweeping campaign of terror and brutality across a vast patch of Iraq and Syria.
    • It went on terrifying the world with grisly videos of beheadings and shaking up governments everywhere.
    • By the end of 2015, it had control over an estimated 8-12 million people over which it imposed an unforgiving version of Sharia law, attracting jihadists from across the world, including a few from India.
    • The terrorist organization and empire that Baghdadi headed was estimated at the time to have been the size of Great Britain, with an annual budget of over a billion dollars and an army of more than 30,000 jihadists.

    Downfall

    • The ISIS started to weaken from 2016 onward as the international coalition, backed by regional allies including, most importantly, Syrian Kurdish peshmerga fighters, gained ground in Syria and Iraq.
    • As the formal structure of ISIS crumbled, thousands of its fighters went underground, even though local groups continued to carry out isolated terrorist incidents across the world in the name of ISIS and al-Baghdadi.

     

    Infamous terror activities

    • Among the biggest of ISIS attacks were carried out in Paris in November 2015, and in Sri Lanka in 2019.
    • Al-Baghdadi described the attacks in Sri Lanka on Easter as revenge for the defeat in Al-Baghuz Fawqani in Syria, which was taken from ISIS in late March.

     

    What does Baghdadi’s killing now mean?

    • Should Baghdadi’s elimination be confirmed, it would mark the bringing to justice of one of the biggest terrorist killers of modern times and the successful conclusion of a massive international manhunt.
    • It must be remembered that there have been multiple alerts about his death earlier.
    • In June 2017, Russia claimed he had been killed in an airstrike near Raqqa, Syria; two weeks later, the most reliable Syrian Observatory of Human Rights reported “confirmed information” that al-Baghdadi was dead.

     

    Did this put an end to ISIS?

    • Baghdadi’s death will not necessarily mark the end of ISIS itself, which though fragmented and no longer easily visible, is far from dead.
    • ISIS lives on and today it is much stronger than it was in 2011 before Baghdadi when American troops pulled out of Iraq and the group was considered defeated.
    • Besides its thousands of fighters in Iraq and Syria, ISIS has a Khorasan province and provinces in the Philippines and West Africa and it is strong and growing in Afghanistan.
    • These are groups that are robust on the ground and there is enough evidence to suggest that there is the connective tissue between the affiliates and ISIS’s core group in Iraq and Syria.

    Implications for India

     

    Rising influence in the vicinity

    • ISIS has attracted foreign fighters from South Asia, mainly Pakistanis, Afghans, Maldivians, and Bangladeshis.
    • The Easter attacks showed the potential of violence even by a small group of committed cadres with support of the ISIS network.
    • The NIA during its investigations has since come across links connecting IS units in Kerala and Tamil Nadu as well as in Sri Lanka.
    • In Bangladesh three years ago, ISIS did create a small but effective network with the active support of western nationals of Bangladeshi origin.

    Vulnerability at home

    • Less than 100-200 Indians so far are believed to have traveled to Syria and Iraq and Afghanistan to join ISIS.
    • This creates the potential for more recruitment as well as aiding attacks on Indian soil or interests.
    • A few weeks ago, ISIS propaganda has called for jihad pegged on sentiments around Kashmir and has specifically called for attacks on Indian interests in the Arabian Peninsula.

     

    Global implications

    • ISIS has suffered significant setbacks over the past two years, losing most of its territorial control, and has returned to its roots as an insurgent organization.
    • Given the recent successes in the fight against ISIS, many analysts and government officials are optimistic that Baghdadi’s death will result in substantial weakening and perhaps the demise of ISIS.
    • However, to effectively bring down a terrorist group through targeting its leader, it’s important to consider three factors: organizational structure, ideology, and popular support.
    • Baghdadi’s death will not hinder the operational capacity or bring about the collapse of ISIS. In fact, it could even be counterproductive to weakening ISIS.

    ISIS – An ideology not a personality cult

    • Advocates of this view argue that Baghdadi is irreplaceable, given his claim of lineage to the prophet Muhammad.
    • Despite this belief in Baghdadi’s authority and legitimacy as a leader of the self-proclaimed caliphate, however, ISIS is not a cult of personality.
    • Baghdadi was successful in institutionalizing essential organizational structures.
    • Looking at nearly 1,000 instances of leadership decapitation from 1970 to 2016 revealed that it is often ineffective against religious, separatist, Islamist and large organizations.

    ISIS is more organized

    • Bureaucratized terrorist organizations are diversified with a clear division of responsibilities and functions, standard operations procedures, and other characteristics that create redundancies to support their resilience.
    • In the case of ISIS, Baghdadi created complex bureaucratic structures to govern and manage its finances, social programs, infrastructure and military resources.
    • ISIS has also developed into a hybrid organizational structure.
    • That is, the group is hierarchical at the upper organizational levels, with the emir at the top; deputies who oversee financial, military, legal and social operations; and legislative councils including the Shura Council.
    • At the lower operational levels, the group is more decentralized, with networks including those in Iraq and Syria; affiliated groups in South Asia, the Arabia and Africa; and lone actors who span the globe.
    • Such hybrid structures are especially difficult to weaken through targeting efforts.

    The ideology

    • The leadership of Islamist, religious or separatist groups is not necessary for recruitment, inspiring attacks or ensuring that the group’s message stays relevant.
    • The ideology becomes self-sustaining, and the Islamic State’s use of propaganda and technology has been effective at broadening their base of support transnationally.
    • In August 2018, Baghdadi urged his followers to carry out lone-actor attacks in Western countries.

    New successor in queue

    • ISIS has a wide and deep pool of militants from which to recruit his successor and a bureaucracy that encourages specialization and training.
    • Less than a week after Baghdadi’s death, the organization announced a successor, Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurashi, as the new caliph.

    Popular support

    • It grants the basis for group legitimacy, which can increase an organization’s efficiency and resilience.
    • After an attack on a terrorist group’s leadership, popular support is essential to maintaining organizational strength and capacity.
    • The creation of the self-proclaimed ISIS caliphate broadened this base of support.

    Conclusion

    • The caliphate may be weakened after him, but Baghdadi created a highly resilient bureaucratic organizational structure capable of withstanding the loss of leaders.
    • Attacks on high-profile leaders are visible counterterrorism measures that can make a fearful U.S. audience feel secure in the belief that their government is successfully fighting the war on terrorism.
    • It is an alternative to such costly policies as large-scale military operations.
    • But in the case of ISIS, it’s an alternative that not only disregards critical aspects of the group’s resilience — it could even fuel a strengthened retaliation.

     

     



    References

    https://www.civilsdaily.com/news/op-ed-snap-taking-stock-of-islamic-state-2-0/

    https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/afghan-islamic-state-after-baghdadi/article29865207.ece

    https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/11/05/death-baghdadi-isnt-end-isis/

    https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/after-death-of-al-baghdadi-who-is-the-worlds-most-wanted-criminal-6104708/

    https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-abu-bakr-al-baghdadi-islamic-state-us-raids-syria-6090189/

  • [Burning Issue] Naga Peace Talks


    Context

    • The deadline set by the Centre for wrapping up the Naga peace talks, October 31 has ended up.
    • While the Centre’s interlocutor and now Nagaland’s Governor, R N Ravi, has stressed that some key issues remain unresolved with the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah), or NSCN(I-M).

     

    Rise of Naga nationalism

    • The British had annexed Assam in 1826, in which they subsequently created the Naga Hills district and went on to extend its boundaries.
    • The assertion of Naga nationalism, which began during British rule, has continued after Independence, and even after Nagaland became a state.
    • Along the way, the unresolved issues gave rise to decades of insurgency that claimed thousands of lives, including civilians.

     

    The Naga assertion through History

    • The earliest sign of Naga resistance dates back to 1918, with the formation of the Naga Club.
    • In 1929, the Club famously told the Simon Commission “to leave us alone to determine for ourselves as in ancient times”.
    • In a memorandum to the Simon Commission in 1929, representatives of Naga tribes demanded that Nagas be left free after Independence and not be included in the Indian Union.
    • Ahead of Independence, a nine-point agreement was signed between the Government of India and the Naga National Council.
    • This included an experimental coexistence with India for 10 years to be reviewed at the end of that period.
    • While the Nagas saw this provision as temporary, with a right to self-determination after 10 years, Naga historians say the Indian government has interpreted the “trial period’’ as accession to the Indian Union.
    • In 1946, A Z Phizo formed the Naga National Council (NNC), declared Naga independence on August 14, 1947, and then, in 1951, claimed to have conducted a referendum.
    • The referendum got an overwhelming majority in support of an independent Naga state.
    • By the early 1950s, the NNC had taken up arms and gone underground.
    • The NNC split in 1975, the breakaway group being the NSCN, which split further in later years, most prominently into the NSCN(I-M) and NSCN (Khaplang) in 1988.

     

    What are the Naga peace talks?

    • The talks seek to settle disputes that date back to colonial rule.
    • The Nagas are not a single tribe, but an ethnic community that comprises several tribes who live in the state of Nagaland and its neighborhood
    • One key demand of Naga groups has been a Greater Nagalim that would cover not only the state of Nagaland but parts of neighboring states, and even of Myanmar.

     

    And how have the peace talks played out in recent years?

    Before the ongoing talks, which followed a framework agreement in 2015, there were two other agreements between Naga groups and the Centre. 1975:

    • A peace accord was signed in Shillong in which the NNC leadership agreed to give up arms.
    • Several NNC leaders, including Isak Chishi Swu, Thuingaleng Muivah and S S Khaplang refused to accept the agreement and broke away to form the NSCN.
    • In 1988 came another split, with Khaplang breaking away to form the NSCN(K) while Isak and Muivah headed the NSCN(I-M).

    1997:

    • The NSCN (I-M ) signed a ceasefire agreement with the government in 1997, preceded by rounds of talks since 1995.
    • The key agreement was that there would be no counter-insurgency offensive against the NSCN(I-M), who in turn would not attack Indian forces.
    • The NSCN (I-M) had then announced to “every citizen of Nagalim wherever they may be”, that a ceasefire agreement was entered into between India and the outfit to bring about a lasting political solution.

    2015:

    • In August that year, the Centre signed a framework agreement with the NSCN(I-M).
    • PM Modi described it as a “historic agreement” towards settling the “oldest insurgency” in India. This set the stage for the ongoing peace talks.
    • In 2017, six other Naga armed outfits under the banner of the Naga National Political Groups (NNPGs) joined the talks.
    • Today, Muivah remains the senior-most Naga rebel leader. Isak died in 2016. In the NSCN(-K), its leader Khaplang died in 2018.

     

    What was in the framework agreement?

    • The government has not yet spelled out the details in public.
    • Following the agreement, the government had said in a press statement: “The Government of India recognized the unique history, culture, and position of the Nagas and their sentiments and aspirations.
    • The NSCN understood and appreciated the Indian political system and governance.
    • On the other hand, the NSCN(I-M) issued a statement earlier this year which said that Nagaland State does and will not represent the national decision of the Naga people.
    • The statement was in opposition to the proposal for a Register of Indigenous Inhabitants of Nagaland (RIIN) in the state of Nagaland.

     

    Where does the territorial demand currently stand?

    • The accord being finalized “does not change the boundary of states; it provides autonomous Naga territorial councils for Arunachal and Manipur; a common cultural body for Nagas across states.
    • It provides for specific institutions for the state’s development, integration and rehabilitation of non-state Naga militia and the removal of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act.
    • The map of Greater Nagalim in the NSCN(IM) vision, on the other hand, covers a 1,20,000 sq km sprawl across the Northeast and Myanmar — the area of Nagaland state itself is only 16,527 sq km, a fraction of this vision.
    • Amid the anxiety this has caused among citizens in neighboring states, state governments have assured them that their respective states’ territorial integrity would not be compromised.

     

    What are the other issues?

    • The government and the NSCN(I-M) have failed to agree on issues relating to a separate Naga flag and a constitution.
    • In its latest statement, the NSCN(I-M) has said it will not budge from the demand for the flag and the constitution — and that it is looking for a lasting solution.
    • However, the NSCN(I-M) has adopted a procrastinating attitude to delay the settlement raising the contentious symbolic issues of separate Naga national flag and constitution.

    I. Independence celebration

    • The tallest leader of the Naga struggle, Dr A Z Phizo, met M K Gandhi in Delhi on July 19, 1947.
    • According to Naga historians, Gandhi agreed that the Nagas would celebrate their independence a day ahead of India, on August 14, 1947.
    • To this day, Nagas across Nagaland, Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh celebrate August 14 as Independence Day.

    II. The Naga flag

    • In the Naga narrative, passed down generations by word of mouth, the Naga flag was not designed by a mortal but is of divine origin.
    • As Naga groups battled the Indian armed forces, the legend goes, Phizo and his closest colleagues had a vision — a rainbow, in a startlingly blue sky that had appeared after a storm.
    • A woman of the Rengma tribe, one of the tribes under the Naga umbrella, was commissioned to weave the flag.
    • It was hoisted for the first time in Parashen in Rengma on March 22, 1956.
    • The flag has a blue background, representing the sky. A red, yellow and green rainbow arches across the centre.
    • The Star of Bethlehem adorns the top left corner of the flag; Nagas are predominantly Christian.

     

    Present status

    • The flag remains a symbol of the Nagas’ struggle for over 60 years, of their religious faith, of the aspirations of the Naga people, and their identity.
    • It helps bind all the different Naga tribes together.
    • Outside Nagaland state, in particular, the flag continues to elucidate strong emotions of identity from Nagas.
    • Inside the state, common citizens are today divided on it. Certain sections believe that with secession from the Indian Union no longer possible, the Naga flag has lost some of its relevance.

     

    Status of secessionist tendencies

    • The moderates have supported a complete inclusion in the Indian state, for access to the latter’s development project, infrastructure, and its education and health facilities.
    • But a large section of the Nagas still holds dear the idea of the Naga identity and their tribal roots.

     

    Impacts of disagreement

    • The statement from the Governor’s office has given rise to speculation that the government is ready to sign a final peace agreement with other groups without the NSCN (I-M), the largest group.
    • Civil society groups in Nagaland are divided in their opinion.
    • Some have said the talks should be wrapped up with whatever is offered now and keep other issues open for later negotiations.
    • Others believe all issues should be settled and the NSCN (I-M) should be on board, even if it takes longer than the deadline.

     

    Conclusion

    • The Naga struggle claimed thousands of lives over decades and devastated countless homes, all over the idea of a sovereign Naga nation.
    • If the NSCN (I-M) accedes to economic and political packages alone, without a separate flag and constitution, it remains to be seen whether it will be seen as a solution, or as a defeat.

       



    References https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/explained-history-of-naga-flag-and-why-is-it-important-6098576/ https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/naga-talks-long-road-issues-6090652/