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GS Paper: GS3-19.Disaster and Disaster Management.

  • Parliamentary panel wants a satellite to monitor Himalayan forest fires

    Why in the News

    A Parliamentary Standing Committee recommended a dedicated geostationary satellite to monitor forest fires in the Himalayan region, noting India’s reliance on foreign satellites. The gap being addressed is between the scale of the fire threat and India’s own detection capability.

    What did the committee recommend?

    1. Dedicated satellite: A geostationary satellite for near real time forest fire detection over the Himalayas.
    2. Institutional build out: National Disaster Response Force (NDRF) regional centres for faster response.
    3. Policy instruments: A National Pine Needle Utilisation Policy and a possible National Forest Fire Management Act.

    Why is current detection inadequate?

    1. Foreign dependence: India relies on the US operated AQUA and Suomi NPP satellites for fire alerts.
    2. Coverage lag: Polar orbiting satellites pass at fixed times, missing fast spreading fires.

    Why is the Himalayan region especially vulnerable?

    1. Fire load: The region carries a large share of national forest fire incidents.
    2. Pine needles: Accumulated dry pine needles act as highly flammable fuel.

    What are the challenges to the proposal?

    1. Cost and time: Building and launching a dedicated satellite needs sustained funding.
    2. Ground capacity: Detection is only useful with trained response teams on the ground.
    3. Policy status: The recommendations are not yet enacted measures.

    “[2019] For the measurement/estimation of which of the following are satellite images/remote sensing data used?
    1. Chlorophyll content in the vegetation of a specific location
    2. Greenhouse gas emissions from rice paddies of a specific location
    3. Land surface temperatures of a specific location
    Select the correct answer using the code given below.
    (a) 1 only
    (b) 2 and 3 only
    (c) 3 only
    (d) 1, 2 and 3

  • Why floods in Kerala are becoming more severe

    Why in the News

    Recurrent severe flooding in Kerala is traced to how the land and rivers have been altered, not rainfall alone. The tension is between treating floods as a natural disaster and recognising them as a man made outcome.

    What is driving the flood intensity?

    1. River siltation: Sediment build up reduces the carrying capacity of rivers.
    2. Dam storage loss: The extremely heavy rains have increased the water level in all dams, run by both the state electricity board and the irrigation department. A Comptroller and Auditor General (CAG) audit found major storage loss at reservoirs due to sedimentation, including 47% at Kallarkutty.
    3. Wetland shrinkage: Paddy and wetland area fell from 7.93 lakh hectares in 1979 to 1980 to 1.80 lakh in 2023 to 2024.
    4. Concretisation: Hard surfaces from urbanisation alter natural drainage. During heavy rains, these impervious surfaces channel stormwater rapidly into nearby rivers and streams, causing water levels to rise within hours.

    Why do these factors worsen floods?

    1. Reduced buffer: Lost wetlands and paddy no longer absorb excess water. Paddy fields, marshlands and wetlands, are known for absorbing a huge volume of rainfall
    2. Faster runoff: Concrete surfaces speed runoff into swollen rivers.
    3. Lower channel capacity: Silted rivers overflow at lower volumes.

    What is the state’s response?

    1. Desilting: The government plans desilting of rivers and reservoirs.
    2. Asset register: An asset register will be prepared for rivers, streams and lakes and land auditing is proposed to prevent encroachment of rivers
    3. Land use: Restoration of paddy and wetland is under consideration.

    Conclusion

    Kerala’s floods are the product of altered hydrology as much as heavy rain. The unresolved task is reversing decades of wetland loss and unplanned construction.

    Back2Basics

    Manufactured sand

    Manufactured sand, or M-sand, is an artificial fine aggregate made by crushing hard rocks like granite, basalt, or gneiss into small, sharp grains. It serves as a strong, eco-friendly replacement for natural river sand in modern construction.

    How It Is Made

    1. Quarrying and Blasting: Hard rock is pulled out from quarries.
    2. Primary and Secondary Crushing: Large rocks go through jaw or cone crushers to break down into smaller pieces.
    3. Shaping and Sizing: Vertical Shaft Impact (VSI) crushers smash and shape the particles into angular, cubical forms.
    4. Screening and Washing: Sieves sort the grain sizes, and water washes away excess rock dust and micro-fines.

    Benefits of Manufactured Sand

    1. No Impurities: Free of clay, silt, and organic trash found in riverbeds.
    2. High Strength: Sharp, angular edges interlock tightly, giving concrete better bonding and compression strength.
    3. Eco-Friendly: Stops harmful river dredging that ruins water life and river banks.
    4. Consistent Quality: Made in factories with strict size controls instead of relying on nature.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2024] Flooding in urban areas is an emerging climate-induced disaster. Discuss the causes of this disaster. Mention the features of two such major floods in the last two decades in India. Describe the policies and frameworks in India that aim at tackling such floods.

    Linkage: The PYQ examines the causes of urban flooding and India’s policy response to flood disasters. Kerala shows how wetland loss, river siltation, concretisation and altered land use intensify floods despite heavy rainfall, highlighting the need for ecosystem-based flood management.

  • Cloudbursts in India

    Why in News?

    Recent flash floods in Himalayan States have brought cloudbursts into focus. The IMD has clarified that many reported “cloudbursts” do not meet its scientific definition, highlighting the need for accurate terminology and better disaster planning.

    What is a Cloudburst?

    • According to the India Meteorological Department (IMD), a cloudburst is 100 mm (10 cm) or more rainfall in one hour over a 20 to 30 sq. km area.
    • Key Features
      • Highly localized and short-duration event.
      • Causes sudden flash floods and landslides due to rapid runoff.
      • Much rarer than normal heavy monsoon rainfall.
      • Mini-cloudburst (proposed): Some scientists suggest a category of 50 mm rainfall in one hour over the same area, as it can also cause severe damage.

    How Common are Cloudbursts in India?

    • Cloudbursts are rare, but their frequency is increasing due to global warming, as warmer air can hold more moisture.
    • IMD recorded around 30 cloudbursts between 1970 and 2016, though experts believe many events went unrecorded.
    • Most occur in remote Himalayan regions, where monitoring stations are sparse.
    • Frequently reported in Uttarakhand, Himachal Pradesh, Jammu & Kashmir, Assam, and the Northeast, especially during July-August.

    How Do Cloudbursts Form?

    Why are Cloudbursts Difficult to Forecast?

    • Highly localized, smaller than weather model grid sizes.
    • Develop rapidly, leaving very little lead time.
    • Mountains block Doppler Weather Radar signals, creating blind spots.
    • Limited Automatic Weather Stations (AWS) in high-altitude areas reduce real-time observations.
    • Hyperlocal prediction requires high-resolution models and massive computing power.

    What is India Doing?

    • IMD Nowcasting for short-term weather alerts.
    • Mission Mausam to strengthen hyperlocal forecasting.
    • Expansion of the Doppler Weather Radar (DWR) network.
    • Installation of more Automatic Weather Stations (AWS).
    • Use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) for improved weather prediction and early warnings.

    Challenges

    • Sparse observation network in mountainous terrain.
    • Radar blind spots due to topography.
    • Limited computing capacity for hyperlocal models.
    • Growing climate change-induced extreme rainfall.
    • Weak enforcement of land-use regulations.

    [2026] Which of the following statements with regard to India’s indigenous new high resolution weather model, the ‘Bharat Forecast System,’ is/are correct?
    1. Its objective is to generate forecasts at the Panchayats cluster level.
    2. It was developed by IIT Delhi.
    Select the answer using the code given below:

    [A] 1 only

    [B] 2 only

    [C] Both 1 and 2

    [D] Neither 1 nor 2

  • In Assam, floods shift course. State response is static.

    Why in the News

    Flooding is a chronic feature of Assam’s monsoon, but this year, Upper Assam districts far from the Brahmaputra’s main channel and without a history of severe floods, Sivasagar, Charaideo, Jorhat and Golaghat, have borne the brunt. More than 20 people died within 24 hours on Monday after a wall of water from Nagaland’s Mon district spilled into Assam over open terrain, and the State Government called the devastation unforeseeable.

    What made this year’s floods different from Assam’s usual monsoon pattern?

    1. Districts without flood history hit hardest: The state government has called the scale of devastation in Sivasagar, Charaideo, Jorhat and Golaghatunprecedented.
    2. Casualty toll: More than 20 people died within 24 hours on Monday after a wall of water from Nagaland’s Mon district spilled into Assam and surged over embankments.
    3. An unusual drainage path: The floodwater is draining into the Brahmaputra over open terrain rather than through the tributaries as usual.
    4. The government’s stated position: The Assam government told the state assembly that “no one could have been prepared” for the calamity.

    Why is the “unforeseeable calamity” explanation unconvincing?

    1. A known river behaviour: The floods’ trajectory is a fallout of Assam’s topography and the Brahmaputra’s well-documented tendency to shift course.
    2. Sediment deposition raises the riverbed: After entering the Assam valley near Pasighat in Arunachal Pradesh’s East Siang district, the sharp reduction in gradient slows the river and causes it to deposit sediment, raising the riverbed and reducing the channel’s flood capacity.
    3. Channel abandonment: The Brahmaputra periodically abandons old channels and carves new ones, making it impossible to confine the river within embankments permanently.
    4. A static strategy for a shifting river: Assam’s flood management strategy continues to rely primarily on embankments despite this known channel-shifting behaviour.

    What triggered the immediate disaster in Nagaland and Assam?

    1. Extreme localised rainfall: Mon district received more than one-third of its average July rainfall in about eight hours on Sunday.
    2. Saturated slopes: Hills in the region were already saturated from heavy rain earlier in the month.
    3. Landslides in Nagaland: The saturated slopes collapsed, triggering landslides that killed nine people in Nagaland.
    4. Resulting surge into Assam: The destruction that followed in Assam was a direct consequence of this upstream rainfall and landslide event.

    What institutional response does this demand?

    1. A shared-system approach needed: The situation underscores the need for an institutional mechanism that treats rivers as shared ecological systems across states, with timely warning and coordinated action.
    2. The Brahmaputra Board’s capacity gap: The Brahmaputra Board has long been hampered by staff shortages and inadequate technical capacity. (Brahmaputra Board is a statutory body set up under the Brahmaputra Board Act, 1980 under the Ministry of Jal Shakti, Department of Water Resources, River Development & Ganga Rejuvenation. The jurisdiction of the Brahmaputra Board includes both the Brahmaputra and Barak Valley and covers all the States of the North Eastern Region, including Sikkim and part of West Bengal, which fall under the Brahmaputra basin.)
    3. A call to reinvigorate the agency: With extreme weather becoming more frequent, the Centre and State Governments need to reinvigorate the Brahmaputra Board.

    Conclusion

    The Brahmaputra’s documented tendency to deposit sediment, raise its bed and shift channels, not an unforeseeable event, pushed this year’s floods into Upper Assam districts with no history of severe flooding. Assam’s embankment-only strategy cannot contain a river that periodically abandons its channels, and the underlying institutional gap, an understaffed, under-resourced Brahmaputra Board, must be addressed before climate change intensifies these ruptures further.

    PYQ Relevance

    [UPSC 2020] Account for the huge flooding of million cities in India including the smart ones like Hyderabad and Pune. Suggest lasting remedial measures.

    Linkage: The PYQ tests the geographical and anthropogenic causes of floods and the need for long-term flood management strategies. The Brahmaputra floods article extends this theme to riverine flooding. It shows that how geomorphological processes such as sediment deposition and channel migration, combined with extreme rainfall, demand basin-wide management rather than an embankment-centric approach.

  • [23rd July 2026] The Hindu OpED: Buried questions: On the Sikkim tunnel accident

    PYQ Relevance[UPSC 2016] The Himalayas are highly prone to landslides. Discuss the causes and suggest suitable measures of mitigation.
    Linkage: The PYQ examines the geological fragility of the Himalayas and the need for mitigation measures while undertaking developmental activities. The Teesta-VI blast highlights that infrastructure projects in the young and unstable Himalayan geology require rigorous geological investigations, continuous hazard monitoring, and strict compliance with environmental clearance conditions.

    Mentor’s Comment

    An explosion triggered by trapped methane in an NHPC (formerly National Hydroelectric Power Corporation) Limited tunnel at the Teesta Stage-VI hydroelectric project in Sikkim has killed at least 15 workers. What remains unresolved is not whether the hazard existed, but whether the environmental clearance conditions meant to guard against it were ever verified in practice.

    Why was gas in the Teesta-VI tunnel foreseeable rather than a surprise?

    1. Geological setting: The Teesta basin sits in a seismically active zone with young, heavily fractured rock capable of trapping compressed gas pockets laid down long ago.
    2. Known hazard type: Methane is a well-recognised hazard in underground excavation generally, not specific to this project.
    3. The real open question: What is unresolved is not whether gas could exist, but whether its risk was assessed and modelled during project planning, and whether detection and ventilation safeguards were functioning.

    What does the region’s recent history of underground disasters show?

    1. Meghalaya, February 2026: An explosion at an illegal coal mine killed about 30 workers.
    2. Uttarakhand, 2023: A road tunnel under construction collapsed, trapping 41 workers for 17 days before rescue.
    3. South Lhonak lake, October 2023: A glacial lake outburst flood destroyed the Teesta-III dam and killed more than 100 people downstream.
    4. Pattern, not exception: Together, these episodes show underground and Himalayan infrastructure work carries recurring risk, not isolated misfortune.

    What complicates accountability for Teesta-VI specifically?

    1. Change of developer: Teesta-VI was absorbed by the public-sector NHPC Limited after its original private developer, unable to afford escalating costs, went into insolvency.
    2. Carried-over clearance conditions: A change in developer partway through a project raises the question of whether environmental-clearance conditions were re-verified under the new operator.
    3. Internal inquiry is not an oversight: NHPC has announced its own investigation, but an internal inquiry by the project operator is not a substitute for independent verification of clearance compliance.

    What must happen once the emergency response ends?

    1. Immediate priority: Relief and rescue for workers still trapped must remain the first priority.
    2. No isolated-incident framing: The government must not treat the disaster as an isolated misfortune once the emergency passes.
    3. Independent review required: An independent review is needed to verify whether the environmental clearance conditions attached to Teesta-VI were strictly met in practice, not merely granted on paper.

    Conclusion

    The Teesta-VI blast is the latest in a pattern of underground and Himalayan project disasters recurring because environmental clearance compliance is not independently verified after approval. Once relief operations conclude, the government must order an independent review of whether the clearance conditions attached to Teesta-VI, and comparable Himalayan hydropower projects, were actually met in practice.