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GS Paper: GS2

  • India-Myanmar relations

    The Foreign Secretary and Chief of the Army Staff have recently visited Myanmar reflected India’s multidimensional interests in the country.

    Try this question:

    Q.Myanmar is the key in linking South Asia to Southeast Asia and the eastern periphery becomes the focal point for New Delhi’s regional outreach. Analyse.

    India-Myanmar relations

    • There are two lines of thinking that drive India’s Myanmar policy: engagement with key political actors and balancing neighbours.
    • For Myanmar, the visit would be viewed as India’s support for its efforts in strengthening democratization amidst criticisms by rights groups over the credibility of its upcoming election.

    Non-interference in internal politics

    • The political logic that has shaped India’s Myanmar policy since the 1990s has been to support democratization driven from within the country.
    • This has allowed Delhi to engage with the military that played a key role in Myanmar’s political transition and is still an important political actor.
    • A key factor behind the military regime’s decision to open the country when it initiated reforms was, in part, to reduce dependence on China.

    India as an alternative

    • By engaging Myanmar, Delhi provides alternative options to Naypyidaw.
    • This driver in India’s Myanmar policy has perhaps gained greater salience in the rapidly changing regional geopolitics.

    Recent initiatives

    • Like in other neighbouring countries, India suffers from an image of being unable to get its act together in making its presence felt on the ground.
    • The inauguration of the liaison office of the Embassy of India in Naypyidaw (the capital) may seem a routine diplomatic activity.
    • However, establishing a permanent presence in the capital where only a few countries have set up such offices does matter.
    • Interestingly, China was the first country to establish a liaison office in Naypyidaw in 2017.
    • India has also proposed to build a petroleum refinery in Myanmar that would involve an investment of $6 billion.

    Strategic calculus

    • This is an indication of Myanmar’s growing significance in India’s strategic calculus.
    • It also shows India’s evolving competitive dynamic with China in the sector at a time when tensions between the two have intensified.
    • Another area of cooperation that has expanded involves the border areas.
    • Furthermore, the recent announcement that India was transferring a Kilo-class submarine to Myanmar demonstrates the depth of their cooperation in the maritime domain.

    The balancing act

    • For Delhi, the balancing act between Bangladesh and Myanmar remains one of the keys to its overall approach to the Rohingya issue.
    • Delhi has reiterated its support for “ensuring the safe, sustainable and speedy return of displaced persons” to Myanmar.
    • By positioning as playing an active role in facilitating the return of Rohingya refugees, India has made it clear that it supports Myanmar’s efforts and also understands Bangladesh’s burden.
    • For Delhi, engaging rather than criticizing is the most practical approach to finding a solution.

    Conclusion

    • For India, Myanmar is key in linking South Asia to Southeast Asia and the eastern periphery becomes the focal point for New Delhi’s regional outreach.
    • Delhi’s political engagement and diplomatic balancing seem to have worked so far in its ties with Myanmar.
    • Whether it has leveraged these advantages on the ground to the full is open to debate.
    • The aforementioned initiatives could be the beginning of change on the ground by establishing India’s presence in sectors where it ought to be more pronounced.

  • Outsiders can now buy land in Jammu and Kashmir

    People, as well as investors outside Jammu and Kashmir, can now purchase land in the Union Territory (UT) as the Centre has notified new land laws for the region.

    What is the new criterion?

    • Under the newly introduced J&K Development Act, the term “permanent resident of the State” as a criterion has been “omitted”, paving the way for investors outside J&K to invest in the UT.
    • Under the ‘transfer of land for the purpose of promotion of healthcare or education’, the government may now allow the transfer of land.
    • According to amendments made to “The Jammu & Kashmir Land Revenue Act, Samvat, 1996”, only agriculturists of J&K can purchase agricultural land.
    • No sale, gift, exchange, or mortgage of the land shall be valid in favour of a person who is not an agriculturist.
    • No land used for agriculture purposes shall be used for any non-agricultural purposes except with the permission of the district collector.
    • Under a new provision, an Army officer not below the rank of Corps Commander can declare an area as “Strategic Area” within a local area, only for direct operational and training requirements.

    Note: These laws do not apply to the UT of Ladakh. The Centre is likely to notify separate land laws for the UT of Ladakh soon.

    Criticisms of the move

    • Political parties have opposed the move citing the sale of the state.
    • With these new laws in place, tokenism of the domicile certificate has been done away with, as purchasing non-agricultural land has been made easier.

  • New dimension to the bilateral engegement

    The article draws parallels in the past in India and China’s engagement with West Asia and contrasts it with the present approach adopted by China in dealing with the region.

    Strategic autonomy

    • According to a former Foreign Secretary of India, Vijay Gokhale, the ideation of ‘strategic autonomy’ is much different from the Nehruvian era thinking of ‘non-alignment’.
    • Speaking in January 2019, Mr. Gokhale said: “The alignment is issue based, and not ideological.”

    India’s engagement with West Asia

    • Pre-dating 2020, India’s outreach to West Asia sharpened since 2014.
    •  Oil-rich Gulf states looked at India as investment alternative away from the West to deepen their own strategic depth.
    • India also doubled down on its relations with the likes of Abu Dhabi and Riyadh, giving open economic and political preference to the larger Gulf region.
    • While engagements with Israel moved steadily forward, Iran lagged behind, constrained by U.S. sanctions, which in turn significantly slowed the pace of India-Iran engagements.

    China’s engagement with West Asia

    • China’s overtures have been steadily more adventurous as it realises two major shifts that have taken place in West Asia.
    • First, the thinking in the Gulf that the American security safety net is not absolute.
    • Second, the Gulf economies such as Saudi Arabia, even though trying to shift away from petro dollar, will still need growing markets to sell oil to in the coming decade as they reform their economic systems.
    • The obvious two markets here are China and India.

    Similarity in India and China’s approach to West Asia

    • Both India and China employed similar versions of ‘non-alignment’ thinking is in West Asia based on equitable engagement with the three poles of power in Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel.
    • Both countries did it without getting involved into the region’s multi-layered conflicts and political fissures.
    • However, deteriorating U.S.-China ties, the COVID-19 pandemic that started in China, followed by the Ladakh crisis, is forcing a drastic change in the geopolitical playbooks of the two Asian giants, and, by association, global security architectures as well.

    Changing approach of China

    •  A report in September shone a light on a $400 billion, 25-year understanding between Iran and China, with Beijing taking advantage of abandonment of the Iran nuclear deal.
    • China is no longer happy with a passive role in West Asia, and through concepts such as “negative peace” and “peace through development”.
    • In concert with tools such as the Belt and Road Initiative, Beijing is now ready to offer an alternative model for “investment and influence”.
    •  It remains to be seen, however, how China balances itself between the poles of power while backing one so aggressively.

    Stability of the region and opportunity for India

    • From India’s perspective, the overt outreach to the Gulf and the ensuing announcements of multi-billion-dollar investments on Indian shores by entities from Saudi Arabia and the UAE is only New Delhi recognising the economic realities of the region. 
    • Despite entanglements in the Yemen war and general tensions between the Gulf states and Iran, the likes of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and so on have maintained relatively strong and stable economic progression.
    • Israel’s recent peace accords with the UAE and Bahrain add much further weight towards a more stable Gulf region — the caveats withstanding that the operationalisation of the accords is smooth and long-lasting.

    Consider the question “Despite turbulence in the region, India’s engagement with West Asia has always been characterised by non-alignment and ethos of equitable engagement. In light of this, elaborate on India’s approach to the region and region’s importance for India.”

    Conclusion

    While in the recent past, the Indo-Pacific, with the development of the Quad, has taken centre stage, other geographies such as West Asia have also started to showcase bolder examples of New Delhi and Beijing’s metamorphosing approaches towards the international arena.

  • Incentives for furthering the India-US partnership are stronger than ever

    Changing geopolitical factors have accelerated further the deepening of India-US ties. The article analyses the current circumstances and evolution of the bilateral relations.

    Background against which 2+2 dialogue taking place

    • The 2+2 dialogue between India and the United States in Delhi this week marks an important moment in bilateral relations.
    • The 2+2 dialogue comes just three weeks after the foreign ministers of the Quad — or the Quadrilateral Security Framework — met in Tokyo.
    • It also takes place amidst a profound structural shift in great power politics as well as turbulence in the international economic order intensified by the coronavirus pandemic.
    • The dialogue follows India’s first-ever participation in a meeting of the exclusive Five Eyes grouping that facilitates intelligence-sharing among the US, Canada, UK, Australia and New Zealand.
    • A few days ago, Delhi announced the much-awaited expansion of the annual Malabar exercises to include Australia.

    Background of the past engagements

    • Signing the historic civil nuclear initiative ended India’s prolonged atomic isolation in the world laid the outline of a broader framework for security cooperation.
    • Due to the deep divisions within the national security establishment, the leadership and some political constraints faced by the government, the coalition broke up.
    •  The focus was on keeping visible distance from the US in the name of non-alignment, strategic autonomy, and the quest for a multipolar world.
    • The relationship survived those years, thanks to the US’s perseverance.

    3 Factors responsible for rapid progress in the US-India ties

    1) Chines aggression on northern border

    • The huge military crisis on the northern borders with China that is well into the sixth month is the first factor.
    • In the past, India avoided closer security ties with the US in deference to Beijing’s sensitivities.
    • In contrast, the government now has refused to pay heed to Chinese sensitivities over its policy on security cooperation with the US.

    2) Disruption caused by the corona pandemic

    • The coronavirus has sharpened the US debate on the dangers of excessive economic interdependence on China.
    • Meanwhile, India has begun to reduce its commercial ties to Beijing in response to the PLA’s Ladakh aggression.
    • This has created the conditions for a new conversation between India and the US on rearranging global supply chains away from China.
    • So, the Quad Plus conversations have drawn in Brazil, Israel, New Zealand, South Korea and Vietnam with a view to rearrange the global supply chain.

    3) Focus on critical technologies

    • Third factor is critical technologies like artificial intelligence that promise to transform most aspects of modern life — including security, political economy and social order.
    • Delhi and Washington are now focused on finding ways to collaborate on the critical technologies of the 21st century and work with their partners in setting new global rules for managing them.

    Conclusion

    As the regional and global order faces multiple transitions, the incentives for Delhi and Washington to sustain and advance India-US partnership are stronger than ever before and will continue into the next administration.

  • Live-streaming of Courts

    Attorney General of India has pushed for live-streaming court proceedings to make hearings accessible to all. But CJI sounded a cautionary note, saying it was susceptible to “abuses.”

    Why such demands?

    • In a first in India, the Gujarat High Court has begun live streaming of Court Proceedings on YouTube.
    • The issue of live-streaming came up as a Special Bench led by the CJI was taking stock of the virtual court system initiated soon after the pandemic lockdown.

    Live-streaming of Court

    • Justice Chandrachud was one of the three judges on the Bench that gave the verdict on live-streaming in September 2018.
    • In fact, he had noted in his separate opinion that live-streaming of proceedings would be the true realization of the “open court system.”
    • His suggestions were later adopted as guidelines in the September 2018 judgment.

    Why there should be live-streaming?

    • Improved accountability: Live-streaming of court proceedings would serve as an instrument for greater accountability and formed part of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.
    • Living up the expectation of Constitution: Live Streaming of Court proceedings is manifested in public interest. Public interest has always been preserved through the Constitution article 19 and 21
    • Empowering the masses: It will enable the legal system to deliver on its promise of empowering the masses.
    • More transparency: It will encourage the principle of open court and reduce dependence on second-hand views. It will effectuate the public’s right to know. 
    • This would inspire confidence in the functioning of the judiciary as an institution and help maintain the respect that it deserved as a co-equal organ of the state.
    • Academic help: Live streaming may also be a help for academic purposes.

    Issues with live-courts

    The Parliamentary Standing Committee (PSC) of the Department of Personnel, Public Grievances and Law and Justice have tabled its report on the functioning of Virtual Courts and Digitization of Justice Delivery in Parliament.

    Following are the four key considerations and recommendations of the committee as far as mainstreaming of virtual courts is concerned:

    (1) The question of access:

    • A large number of litigants and advocates lack internet connectivity and requisite infrastructure and means to participate in virtual hearings and the process. This has serious implications.
    • The obvious one being that a large chunk of our citizenry is vulnerable to being excluded from the process of justice delivery owing to factors beyond their control.
    • The committee also opined that the judiciary considers solutions such as mobile video conferencing facilities to allow for meaningful participation from those living in remote geographies.

    (2) The degree of comfort:

    • A highly underrated but equally consequential factor is whether everyone, even if access to reliable internet connectivity is universal, is comfortable and well versed with the new tools and mediums of justice delivery.
    • Big, well-to-do law firms and advocates in urban areas would face no issues as compared to those participants in rural areas given the digital divide.

    (3) The idea of open courts itself:

    • Virtual courts allegedly threaten the constitutionality of Court proceedings and undermine the importance of Rule of law which forms a part of the basic structure of the Constitution.
    • Expressing concern over the opaqueness of such hearings, critics state that virtual courts are antithetical to the open court system given the limited access that they allow for.

    (4) The question of Privacy and Data Security:

    • This is where the report makes some interesting and innovative suggestions vital to the performance of any digital justice delivery mechanism.
    • It also took note of the fact that most virtual court proceedings in India currently take place using third-party software or platforms and a few of them have already been rejected earlier on grounds of being unsafe to use.
    • The committee noted how courts across the world have had instances of intrusion and data privacy or security concerns while adapting to an entirely virtual mode of conducting hearings.

    Still, digital records are necessary

    • Litigants depend on the information provided by lawyers about what has transpired during the course of hearings.
    • When the description of cases is accurate and comprehensive; it serves the course of open justice.
    • Again, if a report on a judicial hearing is inaccurate, it impedes the public’s right to know.

    Best examples

    • Internationally, constitutional court proceedings are recorded in some form or the other.
    • In Australia, proceedings are recorded and posted on the high court’s website.
    • Proceedings of the Supreme Courts of Brazil, Canada, England and Germany are broadcast live.
    • The Supreme Court of the US does not permit video recording, but oral arguments are recorded, transcribed, and available publicly.
    • And democracies aside, in China, court proceedings are live-streamed from trial courts up to the Supreme People’s Court of China.

    Significance of open-courts

    • India stands alone amongst leading constitutional democracies in not maintaining audio or video recordings or even a transcript of court proceedings.
    • Court hearings can be turning points in the life of a nation: ADM Jabalpur comes readily to mind. More recently, there is any number of cases where the Supreme Court’s judgments have changed citizens’ lives.
    • Ayodhya, Aadhaar, Section 377, Sabarimala, NRC and the triple talaq judgments are among them.

    Various moves for accessibility

    • Over the last few years, the Supreme Court has taken steps to make justice more accessible. The Court started providing vernacular translations of its judgments.
    • Non-accredited journalists were permitted to live-tweet court proceedings. During the lockdown, journalists have been permitted to view virtual court proceedings in real-time.

    Way forward

    • There should be live-streaming cases of constitutional and national importance as a pilot project, including Constitution Bench cases.
    • Matrimonial cases and those involving national security could be excluded.
    • There must be a reasonable time-delay (say 10 minutes) between the live court proceedings and the broadcast to ensure any information which ought not to be shown, as directed by the court, can be edited from being broadcast.
    • The judiciary must also employ a press officer to liaise with the media, and issue simultaneously one or two page summaries of its judgments to facilitate greater public understanding.
    • There has to be a greater reliance on written briefs and the significance accorded to them, time limits for oral arguments, and a greater emphasis on preparation in advance.

  • Why India should consider the next US administration’s approach to China

    Though it is the election held in the US for the election of the US President, it is closely followed throughout the world given the dominant position of that country in the world and impact of the US Presidents decision on the world. This article analyses the implications for India in both the scenarios re-election of Trump or Joe Biden winning the election.

    Implications for India

    • Broader foreign policy decisions will have significant implications for India.
    • Particularly consequential will be how a second Trump administration or a Biden administration perceive and approach China and, relatedly, the question of America’s role in the world.
    • The outcome will depend on the choices that the next American president makes on key personnel and policies.

    Analysing Trump administration’s approach to China from India’s perspective

    • The Trump administration’s more hawkish view of China broadly converges with Indian concerns about a rising China’s actions and intentions.
    • And it has facilitated the Trump administration to assign India an important role in its strategic framework, including through the Free and Open Indo-Pacific concept.
    • This has laid the basis for defence and security cooperation, helped to manage differences with Delhi on trade, Russia, Iran, and human rights, and vocal American support for India in the ongoing crisis with China.
    • Unlike India’s subtler approach to highlighting Beijing’s malign behaviour, the administration’s more explicit one has put a global spotlight on Chinese assertiveness.
    • However, there are aspects of President Trump’s China approach that have caused concerns in Delhi.
    • There has been concern about Trump striking a deal with Chinese leader Xi Jinping since summit in April 2017.
    • The administration subsequently pivoted to competition with China that summer.
    • Concerns have also been raised due to neglect in the Trump administration of developments related to Hong Kong, Xinjiang and Huawei/ZTE.
    • The other aspects of Trump’s China approach that have given Delhi pause are its ideological dimensions, as well as responses like tariffs that have hurt India too.
    • On the similar lines American withdrawal from international institutions and agreements that has served to benefit Beijing.
    • The China prism has had its limits — it has not, for instance, resulted in concessions to India on trade and immigration.

    What would be Joe Biden’s to approach towards China and implications for India

    • And there is recognition among most Democrats that the US-China relationship today is different from what it was in 2009, 2012 or 2016.
    • An Obama administration China hand noted that opinion in the US on approach to China has “moved from balancing co-operation and competition, to competition and confrontation”.
    • But what a Biden administration sees as the terms of strategic competition with China and how it might choose to blend in cooperation will have implications for India.
    • Its outcome will depend in part on the president’s views, who holds key foreign and economic policy positions, as well as Beijing’s approach.
    • India will closely watch how Biden might respond to any overtures from Beijing.
    • It will particularly worry about any signs that Washington would be willing to limit competition or criticism in return for Chinese cooperation on certain administration priorities.
    • More broadly, it will look at whether Biden administration’s Asia policy derives from its China policy or vice versa.
    • Other aspects of Biden’s preferred approach might suit India, for instance:
    • 1) acting collectively with allies and partners rather than unilaterally,
    • 2) Not imposing tariffs that hit allies and partners along with China,
    • 3) Recommitting to international organisations in ways that could blunt Chinese influence.
    • India might also broadly approve of — and could benefit from — the 3Ds of a Biden foreign policy: Domestic (renewal), deterrence, and democracy.
    •  If a Biden administration sees engagement with China on climate change, global health security and non-proliferation as a priority that will complicate the Indian government’s options and require adjustments.
    • Moreover, with either Trump or Biden, foreign economic policy choices and budgetary ones for example, spending at home versus abroad will have crucial implications for India.

    Conclusion

    India will need to consider what America’s choice on November 3 will mean for American power and purpose — because assessments of that could determine how Beijing decides to act in the region and globally.

  • Importance of maritime domain for India and role of Quad in it

    While highlighting the importance of navy for India, the article examines the need to define the role and relation between the Quad and Malabar.

    The salience of navy for India

    • It took confrontation in the Himalayas to bring focus on India’s maritime domain clearly indicates that the salience of maritime power is not yet understood in India.
    • On its northern and western fronts, India faces a formidable challenge and can at best hope for stalemate due to two factors :
    • 1) Economic, military and technological asymmetry between China and India.
    • 2) Active China-Pakistan nexus.
    • Attention has, therefore, been focused on the maritime domain, where it is believed that India may have some cards to play.
    •  While preparing to fight its own battles with determination, it is time for India to seek external balancing (read Quad) — best done via the maritime domain.

    Evolution of Malabar Exercise

    • Above is the backdrop against which one must see the progressive evolution of Exercise “Malabar”,
    • At beginning, it was a bilateral event involving just the Indian and US navies.
    • It became tri-lateral with the inclusion of Japan in 2015.
    • And now it has transformed into a four-cornered naval drill that will also include Australia.
    • Apart from its geo-political significance for the Indo-Pacific, this development poses two conundrums.
    • Firstly, given the same composition, what is the distinction, now, between “Malabar” and the “Quad”?
    • Secondly, does Malabar 2020 mark the release of Australia from China’s thralldom?

    Defining the roles and relation betwee Malabar and Quad

    • The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or Quad has its roots in the Core Group of four senior diplomats representing the US, India, Japan and Australia.
    • The group was formed to coordinate relief efforts after the Great Asian Tsunami of December 26, 2004.
    • The present Quad has obviously retained this tradition and its members have neither created a charter nor invested it with any substance.
    • The Quad is 16 years old now, and Malabar 28.
    • Both have served a useful purpose, and a reappraisal of the roles and relationship of the Quad-Malabar concepts is, therefore, overdue.
    • Since it is India which faces a “clear and present danger”, it should boldly take the initiative to do so.

    Need for the Indo-Pacific Concord

    •  In order to rein in China’s hegemonic urges, there is need for affected nations to come together to show their solidarity and determination in a common cause.
    • In this context, there is need to create a broad-based “Indo-Pacific Concord”, of like-minded regional democracies.
    • This should be an organisation with a maritime security charter, which has no offensive or provocative connotations.
    • Using the Quad and Malabar templates, a shore-based secretariat can be established in a central location like Port Blair, in the Andaman Islands, which would schedule and conduct periodic multinational naval exercises.
    • The exercises could be structured to hone the skills of participating navies in specialisations like humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, countering non-traditional threats, undertaking search-and-rescue operations and establishing networked maritime domain awareness.
    • The Concord could also designate forces to uphold maritime security or “good order at sea”.

    What Australia joining Quad means

    •  The prospect of Australia belatedly joining the Quad is expected to reinforce the Quad and enhance its credibility.
    • But there are reasons for India to be circumspect it.
    • Memories are still alive of its past political ambivalence towards India, its criticism of our naval expansion and its vociferous condemnation of the 1998 nuclear tests.
    • Nor should one overlook Beijing’s recent influence on Australia’s foreign policy.
    • This influence on Australia’s foreing policy caused it to flip-flop over the sale of uranium to India as well as its peremptory withdrawal from the Quad in 2008.

    Implications of singing of BECA with the U.S.

    • India signing the BECA (Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement) with the US last of the four “foundational agreements” would enhance interoperability between the respective militaries.
    • However, there is need to pay heed to two valid concerns:
    • 1) Regarding the possible compromise of information impinging on India’s security.
    • 2) Whether these agreements will barter away the last vestiges of India’s strategic autonomy.

    Consider the question “The changing geopolitical equations has necessitated the formation of Indo-Pacific Concord by the democracies of the region.” In light of this, elaborate on India’s role in Quad and its implications for the region”

    Conclusion

    Indians, given our history, should never lose sight of the truism in international relations, that it is the unerring pursuit of national interests that guides the actions and policies of every nation.

  • Looking back at India’s journey at the UN

    The article examines India’s journey at the UN as it enters it 75year. It also analyses the challenges India faced at the UN and tracks India’s transformation from being an outlier to the high table.

    Three phases of India’s presence at the UN

    • Seven and a half decades of India at the UN may be viewed with reference to roughly three distinct phases.

    First phase: From independence to 1989

    • The first phase lasted until the end of Cold War in 1989.
    • During this phase, India had learnt to explore and enhance its diplomatic influence in easing armed conflicts in Asia and Africa by disentangling them from the superpower rivalry.
    • India also leaned that the UN could not be relied upon to impartially resolve vital security disputes such as Jammu and Kashmir.
    • India strove to utilise the UN only to focus on common causes such as anti-colonialism, anti-racism, nuclear disarmament, environment conservation and equitable economic development.
    • India seemed to claim the moral high ground by proposing, in 1988 three-phase plan to eliminate nuclear weapons from the surface of earth.
    • But it resisted attempts by neighbouring countries to raise bilateral problems.
    • Defeat in 1962 war against China meant a definitive redesign of the country’s diplomatic style to privilege bilateral contacts over the third party role by the UN.

    Second phase: 1990s

    • The 1990s were the most difficult decade for India in the UN.
    • The 1990s were marked by the sudden end of the Cold War, the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the United States as the unrivalled power.
    • Besides, the uncertain political climate along with the balance of payments crisis constrained the country’s capability to be active in various bodies, especially in the Security Council (UNSC) and the General Assembly.
    • There was a change in India’s foreign policy: At the UN as India showed pragmatism in enabling the toughest terms on Iraq even after Gulf War or in reversing position on Zionism as racism.
    • At the same time, growing militancy in Kashmir in the early 1990s helped Pakistan to internationalise the dispute with accusations about gross human rights violations by India.
    • India to seek favours from Iran and China in the Human Rights Commission to checkmate Pakistan.
    • The violation of the sovereignty principle by NATO intervention against Yugoslavia in 1999 without the authorisation of the UNSC deeply disturbed India.
    • At the same time call for an end to aerial attacks on Yugoslavia did not garner much support in the UNSC.
    • India’s diplomatic difficulties was exposed when it suffered a defeat in the hands of Japan in the 1996 contest for a non-permanent seat in the UNSC.
    • India resolutely stood against indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1995.
    • India strongly rejected the backdoor introduction for adoption of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996.
    • It is against this background that India surprised the world in 1998 with its Pokhran nuclear weapon tests, ignoring the likely adverse reaction from the nuclear club.

    Third phase: Rise in influence in 21st century

    • The impressive economic performance in the first decade of the 21st century due to economic liberalisation and globalisation policies, helped a great deal in strengthening profile.
    • This is only aided by its reliable and substantial troop contributions to several peacekeeping operations in African conflict theatres.
    • India has emerged as a responsible stakeholder in non-traditional security issue areas such as the spread of small and light weapons, the threat of non-state actors acquiring weapons of mass destruction, and the impact of climate change.
    • India has scaled up its contributions to development and humanitarian agencies, while India’s share to the UN assessed budget has registered a hike from 0.34% to 0.83%.
    • India’s successful electoral contests for various prestigious slots in the UNSC, the Human Rights Council, the World Court, and functional commissions of the Economic and Social Council indicates its growing popularity

    Major unsuccessful initiatives by India

    • Two major initiatives India has heavily invested in are stuck:
    • 1) The draft Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism it drafted and revised with the hope of helping consensus.
    • It encountered reservations on provisions regarding definition of terrorist and the convention’s application to state armed forces.
    • 2) Second is the question of equitable expansion of the UNSC to enable India to attain permanent membership along with other claimants from Asia, Africa and Latin America.
    • The move has been stuck for more than 25 years because of a lack of unity among the regional formations.
    • It also includes opposition from some 30 middle powers such as Italy and Pakistan which fear losing out to regional rivals in the event of an addition of permanent seats.
    •  The only realistic possibility seems to settle for a compromise, i.e. a new category of members elected for a longer duration than the present non-permanent members without veto power.

    Priorities at the UNSC as a non-permanent member

    • India’s future role will depend on its ability to deal  economic slowdown and a troubled relationship with China.
    • This is pertinent as India will soon begin its two-year term as a non-permanent UNSC member (January 1, 2021).
    • Its areas of priority will continue to be the upholding of Charter principles, act against those who support, finance and sponsor terrorists, besides striving for securing due say to the troop contributing countries in the management of peace operations.
    • It is reasonable to assume (based on earlier patterns) that India will work for and join in consensus on key questions wherever possible.
    • But it may opt to abstain along with other members including one or two permanent members.

    Consider the question “Elaborate on the transformation in India’s role at UN. What are the challenges India may face as a non-permanent member of the UNSC” 

    Conclusion

    As a non-permanent UNSC member now, India needs to uphold the Charter principles in the backdrop of a turbulent world.

  • In news: International Labour Organization

    After 35 years, India has assumed the Chairmanship of the Governing Body of International Labour Organization (ILO).

    Try this PYQ:

    Q.The Partnership for Action on Green Economy (PAGE), a UN mechanism to assist countries transition towards a greener and more inclusive economies, emerged at:

    (a) The Earth Summit on Sustainable Development 2002, Johannesburg

    (b) The United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development 2012, Rio de Janeiro

    (c) The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 2015, Paris

    (d) The World Sustainable Development Summit 2016, New Delhi

    About the International Labour Organization

    • The ILO is a UN agency whose mandate is to advance social and economic justice through setting international labour standards.
    • Founded in 1919 under the League of Nations, it is the first and oldest specialised agency of the UN.
    • The ILO has 187 member states: 186 out of 193 UN member states plus the Cook Islands.
    • The ILO’s international labour standards are broadly aimed at ensuring accessible, productive, and sustainable work worldwide in conditions of freedom, equity, security and dignity.

    About its Governing Body

    • The Governing body is the apex executive body of the ILO which decides policies, programmes, agenda, budget and elects the Director-General.
    • It meets three times a year, in March, June and November.

    Significance for India

    • India will be presiding over the upcoming meeting of the Governing Body to be held in November 2020.
    • India would have the opportunity to interact with the senior officials and social partners of the member states.
    • It will also provide a platform to apprise participants of the transformational initiatives taken by the Government in removing the rigidities of the labour market.

  • US Secretary of state Visit to India

    Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo makes his way to India next week, exactly a week before the election. This article discusses the various aspects that could form the part of the discussion.

    Difference in U.S’s and India’s position on Quad

    • He has stated that meeting in India “would include discussions about how free nations can work together to thwart threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party”.
    • Just a few weeks ago, at the Quad Foreign Ministers meeting, U.S. Secretary of State had called for collaboration to protect people and partners from the Chinese Communist Party’s exploitation, corruption, and coercion.
    •  In contrast, India has maintained that its membership of the Quad is aligned to its Indo-Pacific policy, and by no means directed against any country.
    • While Chines aggression is changing India’s priorities, any shift in India’s position on the Quad at the U.S.’s prompting must also benefit India.

    What should be the part of U.S.-India collaboration

    • It is critical to study just how India hopes to collaborate with the U.S. on the challenge that Beijing poses on each of India’s three fronts: at the LAC, in the maritime sphere, and in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) region surrounding India.
    • On the maritime sphere, discussions will include strengthening ties in the Indo-Pacific, enhancing joint military exercises like the ‘Malabar’ and completing the last of the “foundational agreements” with the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement for Geospatial Cooperation (BECA).
    • In Male, the U.S. has announced a defence agreement that will pave the way for a strategic dialogue.
    • And unlike in the past, India has not objected this agreement with Male for entering in its area of influence in the Indian Ocean Region, as it will allow the U.S. to counter Chinese influence there.
    • With Sri Lanka the U.S. is in discussions on infrastructure projects, and progress on its “Millenium Challenge Corporation” (MCC) offer of a five-year aid grant of about $480 million.
    • At a time when India is delaying Sri Lanka’s requests for debt relief, given its own economic constraints, the U.S. aid offer will be seen as one way of staving off China’s inroads into Sri Lanka.
    • Most important will be how the U.S. and India can collaborate on dealing with India’s most immediate, continental challenge from China: at the LAC.
    • Apart from enhancing and expediting U.S. defence sales to India, there is must the U.S. could promise to India.
    • The U.S. must also commit to keeping the pressure on Pakistan on terrorism, despite the U.S. need for Pakistan’s assistance in Afghan-Taliban talks.
    • A firm U.S. statement in this regard may also disperse the pressure the Indian military faces in planning for a “two-front” conflict with China.

    Resolving other key issues with the U.S.

    • Resolution of Trade issues, an area the Trump administration has been particularly tough, and restoration of India’s Generalised System of Preferences status for exporters should also be priority.
    • The government could press for more cooperation on 5G technology sharing, or an assurance that its S-400 missile system purchase from Russia will receive an exemption from CAATSA sanctions.

    Conclusion

    By inviting Secretary of State this close to the U.S. elections, New Delhi has taken a calculated and bold gamble, however, our leaders must drive a harder bargain to consolidate the pay-offs from the visit.

    Back2Basics: What is CAATSA?

    • The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) is a U.S. federal law that imposes economic sanctions on Iran, Russia and North Korea.
    • The bill came into effect on August 2, 2017, with the intention of countering perceived aggressions against the U.S. government by foreign powers.
    • It accomplishes this goal by preventing U.S. companies from doing business with sanctioned entities.