💥Join UPSC 2027,2028 Mentorship (July Batch) + XFactor Notes & Microthemes PDF

GS Paper: GS2

  • The shifting trajectory of India’s foreign policy

    The article analyses the impact of India’s growing engagement with the U.S. on relations on India’s foreign policy.

    What signing of  BECA mean

    • The centrepiece of the third 2+2 dialogue was the signing of the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) for Geo-Spatial Cooperation.
    • With the signing of BECA, India is now a signatory to all U.S.-related foundational military agreements.
    • Built into the agreements are provisions for a two-way exchange of information.
    • India had signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), in 2016, and the Communications, Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA), in 2018.
    • By appending its signature to BECA, India is in a position to specifically receive sensitive geo-spatial intelligence.
    • The foundational military pacts effectively tie India to the wider U.S. strategic architecture in the region.

    Issues with signing BECA

    • With the signing of these agreements, India’s claims of maintaining strategic autonomy will be doubtful.
    • By signing BECA, India has signed on to becoming part of the wider anti-China ‘coalition of the willing’ led by the U.S.
    • By signing on to BECA at this juncture, India has effectively jettisoned its previous policy of neutrality, and of maintaining its equi-distance from power blocs.

    Impact on relations with China

    • China-India relations have never been easy.
    • Since 1988, India has pursued, despite occasional problems, a policy which put a premium on an avoidance of conflicts with China.
    • This will now become increasingly problematic as India gravitates towards the U.S. sphere of influence.
    • India’s willingness to sign foundational military agreements with the U.S. would suggest that India has made its choice, which can only exacerbate already deteriorating China-India relations.

    Impact on the relations in the region

    • India needs to pay greater attention at this time to offset its loss of influence in its immediate neighbourhood (in South Asia), and in its extended neighbourhood (in West Asia).
    • Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh, normally perceived to be within India’s sphere of influence, currently seem to be out of step with India’s approach on many issues.
    • At the same time, both China and the U.S. separately, seem to be making inroads and enlarging their influence here.
    • The Maldives, for instance, has chosen to enter into a military pact with the U.S. to counter Chinese expansionism in the Indian Ocean region.
    • India needs to ensure that the latest UAE-Israel linkage does not adversely impact India’s interests in the region.
    • India must also not rest content with the kind of relations it has with Israel, as Tel Aviv has its own distinct agenda in West Asia.
    • Furthermore, India needs to devote greater attention to try and restore India-Iran ties which have definitely frayed in recent years.

    India’s role in Afghanistan

    • India must decide on how best to try and play a role in Afghanistan without getting stuck.
    • India had subscribed to an anti-Taliban policy and was supportive of the Northern Alliance (prior to 2001).
    • The new policy that dictates India’s imperatives today, finds India not unwilling to meet the Taliban.
    • India must decide how a shift in policy at this time would serve India’s objectives in Afghanistan, considering the tremendous investment it has made in recent decades to shore up democracy in that country.

    India’s role in SCO and NAM

    • SCO, which has China and Russia as its main protagonists — and was conceived as an anti-NATO entity — will test India’s diplomatic skills.
    • Even though India currently has a detached outlook, vis-à-vis the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and has increasingly distanced itself from the African and Latin American group in terms of policy prescriptions, matters could get aggravated, following India’s new alliance patterns.
    • It would be a rude awakening for India, if it is seen as no longer a stellar member of NAM.

    Impact on relations with Russia

    • The impact of India signing on to U.S.-related foundational military agreements, cannot but impact India-Russia relations.
    • India-Russia relations in recent years have not been as robust as in the pre-2014 period, but many of the edifices that sustained the relationship at optimum levels, including annual meetings between the Russian President and the Indian Prime Minister have remained.
    • It is difficult to see how this can be sustained, if India is seen increasingly going into the U.S. embrace.
    • Almost certainly in the circumstances, India can hardly hope to count on Russia as a strategic ally.
    • This is one relationship which India will need to handle with skill and dexterity, as it would be a tragedy if India-Russia relations were to deteriorate at a time when the world is in a state of disorder.

    Consider the question “What are the implications of India’s signing of foundational military agreements with the U.S. for India’s relations with the other countries”

    Conclusion

    While India moves towards more robust engagement with the U.S., it must also consider impact of such move on the relations with the other countries.

     

  • Nyay Kaushal E-resource Centre

    CJI has inaugurated the first-ever e-resource centre and virtual court for traffic and transport to enable speedy justice for litigants, called ‘Nyay Kaushal’, at Nagpur.

    Must read edition:

    [Burning Issue] Judiciary in Times of COVID-19 Outbreak

    Nyay Kaushal Centre

    • It is a first of its kind e-resource centre in India that will facilitate electronic filing of cases in the Supreme Court, High Courts and district courts across the country.
    • It is meant to be a step at mitigating various inequalities, being connected to the Supreme Court, the High Courts and the Taluka Courts.
    • It will provide the easiest way of filing court matters by utilising technology. It will provide benefits in saving time, avoidance of exertion, travelling long distances, and a saving in costs.
    • The virtual court will be working from Katol in Nagpur district.

    It’s working

    • The virtual court can deal with all traffic challan cases from every corner of Maharashtra online.
    • It will be possible for the litigants to pay the fine and get the traffic challan case disposed of with the click of a button on a smartphone or a computer.

    Why need such a mechanism?

    • The biggest problem that came with the pandemic was that access to justice became conditional on access to technology.
    • This has ended up creating a divide between the ones who can afford technology and ones who cannot.
    • With the aid of virtual courts, our system of justice does not suffer and the rule of law continues to be maintained.
  • Street Vendors in India

    Recently PM distributed loans to nearly 300,000 street vendors under the PM SVANidhi scheme.

    Q. Discuss how Street-vending accounts for significant non-agricultural urban informal employment in India. Also, discuss how the PM SVANidhi scheme will help street vendors.

    SVANidhi scheme

    • The SVANidhi ensures a working capital loan up to Rs 10,000 for vendors and rewards digital transactions.
    • All street vendors who have been in the business on or before March 24, 2020, are eligible to avail the benefits.
    • For this scheme launched in the wake of the novel coronavirus pandemic, the Centre has earmarked a stimulus package of Rs 5,000 crore for nearly 50 lakh vendors.

    Street vendors in India

    • There are estimated 50-60 lakh street vendors in India, with the largest concentrations in the cities of Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, and Ahmedabad.
    • Most of them are migrants who typically work for 10–12 hours every day on average. Anyone who doesn’t have a permanent shop is considered a street vendor.
    • According to government estimates, street-vending accounts for 14 per cent of the total (non-agricultural) urban informal employment in the country.
    • The sector is riddled with problems. Licence caps are unrealistic in most cities — Mumbai, for example, has a ceiling of around 15,000 licences as against an estimated 2.5 lakh vendors.
    • This means most vendors hawk their goods illegally, which makes them vulnerable to exploitation and extortion by local police and municipal authorities.

     

    Identifying street vendors

    • The Street Vendors (Protection of Livelihood and Regulation of Street Vending) Act, 2014 was enacted to regulate street vendors in public areas and protect their rights.
    • The Act defines a “street vendor” as a person engaged in vending of articles… of everyday use or offering services to the general public, in…any public place or private area, from a temporary built-up structure or by moving from place to place”.
    • The Act envisages the formation of Town Vending Committees in various districts to ensure that all street vendors identified by the government are accommodated in the vending zones subject to norms.
  • Who is a Star Campaigner?

    The Election Commission (EC) has revoked the status of a veteran leader and former Madhya Pradesh CM as a star campaigner for the party.

    Try answering this question:

    Q.Ceiling on election expenses ends up being counterproductive and encourages candidates to under-report their expenditure. Critically analyse.

    Who is a Star Campaigner?

    • A star campaigner can be described as persons who are nominated by parties to campaign in a given set of constituencies.
    • These persons are, in almost all cases, prominent and popular faces within the party.
    • There is no specific definition according to law or the Election Commission of India.
    • Star campaigners for a party will not exceed 40 where it is a recognised political party.
    • For parties that are deemed unrecognized, the number of star campaigners will not be more than 20.

    Their purpose

    • Actors, celebrities and senior political party members are the ones who are nominated to be star campaigners.
    • This is based on the premise that a popular face, someone that the common voter can immediately identify and side with, can rake in more votes for that political party.

    How much does a star campaigner cost?

    • Section 77 (b) of The Representation of People’s Act, 1951 says that most of the expenses incurred by the campaigner “shall not be deemed to be an expenditure in connection with the election”.
    • In other words, all expenses will be borne by the respective political party.
    • For example, expenses borne by star campaigners on account of travel by air or by any other means of transport shall not be deemed as expenditure in connection with the election.
    • The manual to the Model Code of Conduct states that for the benefit of availing Section 77 (1) of The RP Act, a permit for the mode of transport for every star campaigner will be issued centrally and against their name.
    • It is also mandatory for this permit to be stuck on a prominent and visible place on the vehicle.

    A case for PMs

    • The MCC states that if the star campaigner is a PM or a former PM, then expenses incurred for bullet-proof vehicles required by centrally appointed security personnel will be borne by the government.
    • If another political dignitary accompanies this candidate, then 50 per cent of expenses incurred for security arrangements will be borne by the candidate.

  • Fifteenth Finance Commission

    Three years after it was constituted, the Fifteenth Finance Commission has finalised its report for fund devolution from the Centre to States for the five years from 2021-22 to 2025-26.

    Fifteenth Finance Commission

    • The Fifteenth Finance Commission (XV FC) was constituted on November 27, 2017.
    • It was constituted against the backdrop of the abolition of the Planning Commission and the distinction between Plan and non-Plan expenditure, and introduction of the Goods and Services Tax (GST).

     What is the Finance Commission?

    • The FC was established by the President of India in 1951 under Article 280 of the Indian Constitution.
    • It was formed to define the financial relations between the central government of India and the individual state governments.
    • The Finance Commission (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1951 additionally defines the terms of qualification, appointment and disqualification, the term, eligibility and powers of the Finance Commission.
    • As per the Constitution, the FC is appointed every five years and consists of a chairman and four other members.
    • Since the institution of the First FC, stark changes in the macroeconomic situation of the Indian economy have led to major changes in the FC’s recommendations over the years.

    Why in news now?

    • That report of the XV FC had pared the States’ share of the divisible tax pool from 42%, as recommended by the Fourteenth Finance Commission, to 41%, citing the creation of the UT of Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh.
    • The Commission had then said that some of the key recommendations it was required to make would feature in its final report, including the viability of creating a separate defence and national security fund.
    • The panel is also expected to factor in unpaid GST compensation dues to States for this year while working out States’ revenue flow calculations for the years beyond 2022.

    Must read:

    [Burning Issue] 15th Finance Commission and its recommendations (Part I)

  • [pib] National Productivity Council (NPC)

    National Productivity Council (NPC) has been granted accreditation conforming to ISO 17020:2012 by National Accreditation Board for Certification Body (NABCB).

    National Productivity Council (NPC)

    • NPC is a national level organization to promote productivity culture in India.
    • The NPC comes under the Department for Promotion of Industry and Internal Trade (DPIIT), Ministry of Commerce & Industry.
    • Established in 1958, it is an autonomous, multipartite, non-profit organization and has been registered as a Society under the Societies Registration Act XXI of 1860.
    • NPC is a constituent of the Tokyo-based Asian Productivity Organisation (APO), an Inter-Governmental Body, of which the Government of India is a founder member.

    Why ISO status?

    • It has been granted accreditation for undertaking inspection and audit work in the area of Food Safety Audit and Scientific Storage of Agricultural Products.
    • NPC has been conducting inspections/audit for different statutory bodies such as Warehousing Development and Regulatory Authority (WDRA) and FSSAI and is already having high credentials in the area of inspections and audits.
  • The challenges of walking the Indo-Pacific talk

    The article analyses the similarity, differences and limitations of the Quad and the Indo-Pacific construct and delineate the challenges India as it seeks to deal with China.

    Expectations from India in countering China

    • During the mid-2000s the world expected India to be an economic powerhouse, a decade later, those expectations remain modest, at best.
    • The international community has once again decided to court New Delhi to play a decisive role in shaping the region’s strategic future.
    • The expectation this time is more strategic and military, to lead the charge against China from within the region.

    Role of India in the Quad and similarity with Indo-Pacific construct

    • Quad is a forum for strategic and military consultations among India, the U.S., Australia and Japan.
    • Quad members are also major States in the Indo-Pacific region.
    • Both the Quad and the Indo-Pacific constructs are focused on China.
    • More so, they are also in some ways centred around India’s geographic location and its policies.
    • Put differently, if you take China out of the equation, they would have little rationale for existence.
    • If you take India out of the picture, their ability to sustain as geopolitical constructs would drastically diminish.

    Differences between  Indo-Pacific Construct and Quad

    • The Indo-Pacific is a politico-economic vision and the Quad is a military-strategic vision which does not form the military or strategic nucleus of the first.
    • While the Indo-Pacific provides a complex political and economic picture with a hesitant, but growing, articulation of China as a strategic challenge.
    • The Quad is inherently more anti-China in character and intent.
    • The Indo-Pacific,will find it impossible to avoid engaging China, the Quad is mostly focused on diplomatic signalling and with little common intent let alone joint action.
    • Quad’s ability to succeed would entirely depend on China — the more aggressive China gets, the more resolute the Quad countries would be in strengthening it.

    Comparing Indio-Pacific with BRI

    • The BRI is far more advanced, much more thought-out, and enjoyes the support of Chinese state.
    • Several Indo-Pacific countries are already members of the BRI.
    • On the flip side, the BRI is already under immense stress from its inherent weaknesses, such as China’s unilateral pursuit of the BRI and the associated economic burdens on the States that sign up to it.

    Challenges India face

    1) On economic front

    • There must be strong economic partnerships and linkages among its members, merely focusing on strategic talk and possible military cooperation will not work.
    • India’s recent decision not to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), could potentially complicate the country’s future engagements in the region.
    • Also worryinng is the already huge gap between India and China on trade with almost every Indo-Pacific country.
    • This growing trade gap will be a major determining factor in shaping the region’s strategic realities.
    • Institutional engagement: India does not have FTAs with Australia, New Zealand, the U.S., Bangladesh and the Maldives. It has FTAs with South Korea, the Association of South East Asian Nations, or ASEAN, Japan and Sri Lanka.
    • In the case of China, it has FTAs with all these countries barring the U.S.

    2) On strategic and military front

    • India strategic and military engagements in the region also fall short.
    • Beijing is a major defence supplier to several of the region’s States including Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.
    • This dwarfs India’s minimal sales, defence dialogues and occasional joint military exercises in the region.

    Way forward

    • India’s role in the Indo-Pacific will remain limited if it does not prove to be a major economic partner to these States.
    • But given the economic slowdown in India today in the wake of COVID-19 and the lack of political consensus about RCEP, India’s ability to economically engage with the region remains limited.
    • On the military-strategic side too, India’s performance in the region is less than desirable.
    • The only choice, it appears then, is for some sort of a loosely structured regional strategic alliance with the U.S. and its allies in the broader Indo-Pacific region.

    Consider the question ” What are the similarities and differences in the Quad and the Indo-Pacific construct? What are the challenges India faces as it increases its engagement in the both.” 

    Conclusion

    India remains caught between a deeply constrained, but unavoidable, need to rethink its strategic posture, and the recognition of its material inability to do so, at least for now.

  • Excessive optimism over a pact with election-bound US is premature

    The growing pace of India-US bilateral engagement has raised hopes in several quarters. However, there are several issues that must be considered and need to avoid excessive optimism. 

    Timing of 2+2 dialogue

    • The India-US 2+2 third meeting was held in Delhi only a week before the US presidential elections.
    • The government felt that it was important to seal the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) without delay.
    • Other reason could be government’s assessment that there is bipartisan support in the US for higher and positive bilateral ties.

    Need for caution in India’s approach

    • In India-US ties, the leading outside consideration is China.
    • A Biden presidency, should that be the choice of the American people, would seek to ensure that China’s rise is not at the cost of the US’s global pre-eminence.
    • However, the strategy and methods it employs would be different from that of its predecessor.
    • Further, even a Trump 2 administration, with the election done, may change course in its China approach.
    • Hence, caution and prudence are good diplomatic watchwords.
    • It is good that the agreements for a full defence engagement with the US are in place.
    • But it is one matter to have them done and an entirely different one insofar as the nature and intensity of cooperation.
    • So, India’s tradition of relying on its own strengths in matters of national security should not be eroded in the hope that an outside power would provide useful inputs.

    Alliance Vs. Partnership

    • India-US ties are in the framework of a partnership, not an alliance.
    • The partnership may not be based on opposition to an outside element, the alliance almost always is.
    • Alliances also demand a much higher price than partnerships, through loss of autonomy if the ally is a bigger power.

    Excessive enthusiasm on Quad may be premature

    • The 2+2 joint statement does not name China but its thrust is clear.
    • The Quad is based on a commonality of concerns on account of China’s actions.
    • India’s decision to go along with a more purposive group, including through its maritime exercises, is in keeping with its interests.
    • The real direction that the Quad will take has to await the US’s overall China strategy over the next few years.
    • Excessive enthusiasm on the Quad front may, therefore, be premature.

    Way forward

    • India has to change the nature of its economic and commercial ties with China.
    • Thus, the joint statement’s reference on the need to “enhance supply chain resilience and to seek alternatives to the current paradigm” was timely, though here, again, the future US approach is not entirely certain.
    • The areas where the bilateral partnership has the potential of evolving most positively for India relate to health, education and science and technology.
    • There should not be any reluctance in developing ties in defence industries, too, but it cannot be forgotten that no country will part with any of its critical technologies.
    • But there cannot be a substitute for developing indigenous capacity for India’s needs for weapon systems.

    Conclusion

    India-US ties will move positively forward but there will be imponderables ahead, principally arising out of US strategies towards China. But, a close embrace of another country is always problematic.

  • Annual State of Education Report (ASER) Wave 1, 2020

    The ASER Wave 1 Survey was recently released since the COVID-19 crisis interrupted this years’ trajectory.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q.Discuss the efficacy of the One-Nation- One-Board System and its limitations.

    About ASER Survey

    • This is an annual survey (published by education non-profit Pratham ) that aims to provide reliable estimates of children’s enrolment and basic learning levels for each district and state in India.
    • ASER has been conducted every year since 2005 in all rural districts of India. It is the largest citizen-led survey in India.
    • It is also the only annual source of information on children’s learning outcomes available in India.

    How is the survey conducted?

    • ASER tools and procedures are designed by ASER Centre, the research and assessment arm of Pratham.
    • The survey itself is coordinated by ASER Centre and facilitated by the Pratham network. It is conducted by close to 30,000 volunteers from partner organisations in each district.
    • All kinds of institutions partner with ASER: colleges, universities, NGOs, youth groups, women’s organisations, self-help groups and others.
    • The ASER model has been adapted for use in several countries around the world: Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Pakistan, Mali and Senegal.

    Assessment parameters

    • Unlike most other large-scale learning assessments, ASER is a household-based rather than school-based survey.
    • This design enables all children to be included – those who have never been to school or have dropped out, as well as those who are in government schools, private schools, religious schools or anywhere else.
    • In each rural district, 30 villages are sampled. In each village, 20 randomly selected households are surveyed.
    • Information on schooling status is collected for all children living in sampled households who are in the age group 3-16.
    • Children in the age group 5-16 are tested in basic reading and basic arithmetic. The same test is administered to all children.
    • The highest level of reading tested corresponds to what is expected in Std 2; in 2012 this test was administered in 16 regional languages.
    • In recent years, this has included household size, parental education, and some information on household assets.

    Key Findings

    1.Enrollments:

    • 5.5% of rural children are not currently enrolled for the 2020school year, up from 4% in 2018.
    • This difference is the sharpest among the youngest children (6 to 10) where 5.3% of rural children had not yet enrolled in school in 2020, in comparison to just 1.8% in 2018.
    • Due to the disruptions caused by the pandemic, families are waiting for the physical opening of schools to enrol their youngest children, with about 10% of six-year-olds not in school.
    • Among 15-16 year-olds, however, enrollment levels are slightly higher than in 2018.
    • The proportion of boys enrolled in government schools has risen from 62.8% in 2018 to 66.4% in 2020, while for girls, that number has gone up from 70% to 73% in the corresponding period.
    • Patterns show a slight shift toward government schools, with private schools seeing a drop in enrolment in all age groups.
    • The Centre has now permitted States to start reopening schools if they can follow Covid-19 safety protocols but the majority of the country’s 25 crore students are still at home.

    2.Availability of Smartphones:

    • Among enrolled children, 61.8% live in families that own at least one smartphone which was merely 36.5% in 2018.
    • About 11% of families bought a new phone after the lockdown, of which 80% were smartphones.
    • WhatsApp is by far the most popular mode of transmitting learning materialsto students, with 75% of students receiving input via this app.

    3.Availability of Learning Material:

    • Overall more than 80% of children said they had textbooks for their current grade.
    • This proportion was higher among students enrolled in government schools (84.1%) than in private ones (72.2%).
    • In Bihar, less than 8% got such materials from their schools, along with 20% in West Bengal, Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh.
    • More than 80% of rural children in Himachal Pradesh, Punjab, Kerala and Gujarat received such input.

    4.Learning Activities:

    • Most children (70.2%) did some form of a learning activity through material shared by tutors or family members themselves, with or without regular input.
    • 11% had access to live online classes, and 21% had videos or recorded classes, with much higher levels in private schools.
    • About 60% studied from their textbooks and 20% watched classes broadcast on TV.

    Suggestions

    • Fluid Situation: When schools reopen, it will be important to continue to monitor who goes back to school as well as to understand whether there is learning lossas compared to previous years.
    • Building on and Strengthening Family Support: Parents’ increasing levels of education can be integrated into planning for learning improvement, as advocated by National Education Policy, 2020. Reaching parents at the right level is essential to understand how they can help their children and older siblings also play an important role.
    • Hybrid Learning: As children do a variety of different activities at home, effective ways of hybrid learning need to be developed which combine traditional teaching-learning with newer ways of “reaching-learning”.
    • Assessment of Digital Modes and Content: In order to improve digital content and delivery for the future, an in-depth assessment of what works, how well it works, who it reaches, and who it excludes is needed.
    • Mediating the Digital Divide: Children from families who had low education and also did not have resources like smartphones had less access to learning opportunities. However, even among such households, there is evidence of effort with family members trying to help and schools trying to reach them. These children will need even more help than others when schools reopen.

    Way Forward

    • Covid-19 has left the nation with deep economic distress and uncertainty over school-reopenings and thrown open new challenges in every sector.
    • The nationally representative sample highlighted the role played by the families where everyone in the family supported children regardless of their education levels.
    • This strength needs to be leveraged by reaching out to more students and reducing the distance between schools and homes.
  •  Explained: Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA) VS COMCASA VS LEMOA

    India and the United States have signed the Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement (BECA), which, along with the two agreements signed earlier — the LEMOA and the COMCASA.

    Try this question for mains:

    Q. What is the troika of “foundational pacts” of India with the US? Discuss each of them. (150W)

    Completing the troika

    • The two agreements signed earlier are— the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) and the Communications Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA).
    • This completes a troika of “foundational pacts” for deep military cooperation between the two countries.

    What is BECA?

    • BECA will help India get real-time access to American geospatial intelligence that will enhance the accuracy of automated systems and weapons like missiles and armed drones.
    • Through the sharing of information on maps and satellite images, it will help India access topographical and aeronautical data, and advanced products that will aid in navigation and targeting.

    Benefits of BECA

    • This could be a key to Air Force-to-Air Force cooperation between India and the US.
    • BECA will provide Indian military systems with a high-quality GPS to navigate missiles with real-time intelligence to precisely target the adversary.
    • Besides the sailing of ships, flying off aircraft, fighting of wars, and location of targets, geospatial intelligence is also critical to the response to natural disasters.

    What was the LEMOA about?

    • LEMOA was the first of the three pacts to be signed in August 2016.
    • LEMOA allows the militaries of the US and India to replenish from each other’s bases, and access supplies, spare parts and services from each other’s land facilities, air bases, and ports, which can then be reimbursed.
    • LEMOA is extremely useful for India-US Navy-to-Navy cooperation since the two countries are cooperating closely in the Indo-Pacific.

    Concretizing the mutual trust

    • The critical element that underpins LEMOA is mutual trust.
    • Without trust, no country will be willing to expose its military and strategic assets such as warships to the facilities of another country.
    • The signing of LEMOA was in itself an affirmation of the mutual trust between the two militaries, and its application will enhance the trust.
    • It took almost a decade to negotiate LEMOA, and the exercise in a sense bridged the trust deficit between India and the US and paved the way for the other two foundational pacts.

    What about the COMCASA?

    • COMCASA was signed in September 2018, after the first 2+2 dialogue during Mrs. Swarajs’ term as EAM.
    • The pact allows the US to provide India with its encrypted communications equipment and systems so that Indian and US military commanders, and the aircraft and ships of the two countries, can communicate through secure networks during times of both peace and war.
    • The signing of COMCASA paved the way for the transfer of communication security equipment from the US to India to facilitate “interoperability” between their forces.

    Specific context and practical benefit for India

    • The strengthening of the mechanisms of cooperation between the two militaries must be seen in the context of an increasingly aggressive China.
    • Amid the ongoing standoff on the LAC in Ladakh — the longest and most serious in three decades — India and the US intensified under-the-radar intelligence and military cooperation at an unprecedented level.
    • These conversations facilitated information-sharing between the two countries, including the sharing of high-end satellite images, telephone intercepts, and data on Chinese troops and weapons deployment along the LAC.

    Conclusion

    • Such agreements mark the enhancement of mutual trust and a commitment to the long-term strategic relationship.
    • The US wants India to move away from Russian equipment and platforms, as it feels this may expose its technology and information to Moscow.
    • So far, India is going ahead with the purchase of the S-400 air defence missile system from Russia, and this has been a sticking point for American interlocutors.
    • For its part, India is wary of Pakistan’s deep-rooted ties with the Pentagon, and Washington’s dependence on Rawalpindi for access to Afghanistan as well as its exit strategy.
    • But, because of the clear and present danger from China, New Delhi’s strategic embrace of Washington is the obvious outcome.