💥Mains Ready By December. Smash Mains & Smash PYQ Admissions Open
Talk to Mentor

Civilsdaily

Login

Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • Chabahar Rail Project

    The Iranian government has decided to proceed with the construction of Chabahar Rail Project on its own, citing delays from the Indian side in funding and starting the project.

    What is the issue?

    • Four years ago, India and Iran signed an agreement to construct a rail line from Chabahar port to Zahedan, along the border with Afghanistan.
    • The Iranian Railways will proceed without India’s assistance, using approximately $400 million from the Iranian National Development Fund.
    • The development comes as China finalizes a massive 25-year, $400 billion strategic partnership deal with Iran, which could cloud India’s plans.

    The Chabahar Rail Project

    • It is a 628 km Chabahar-Zahedan line, which will be extended to Zaranj across the border in Afghanistan.
    • The entire project would be completed by March 2022.
    • It was meant to be part of India’s commitment to the trilateral agreement between India, Iran and Afghanistan to build an alternate trade route to Afghanistan and Central Asia.

    Why did Iran omit India from the project?

    • Despite several site visits by engineers, and preparations by Iranian railways, India never began the work, ostensibly due to worries that these could attract U.S. sanctions.
    • The U.S. had provided a sanctions waiver for the Chabahar port and the rail line to Zahedan, but it has been difficult to find equipment suppliers and partners due to worries they could be targeted by the U.S.
    • India has already “zeroed out” its oil imports from Iran due to U.S. sanctions.

    The contentious partnership with China

    • Iran and China are close to finalising a 25-year Strategic Partnership which will include Chinese involvement in Chabahar’s duty-free zone, an oil refinery nearby, and possibly a larger role in Chabahar port as well.
    • The cooperation will extend from investments in infrastructure, manufacturing and upgrading energy and transport facilities, to refurbishing ports, refineries and other installations.
    • It is also rumoured that the Chabahar port will be leased to China surpassing India.
    • Iran had proposed a tie-up between the port at Gwadar and Chabahar last year and has offered interests to China in the Bandar-e-Jask port 350km away from Chabahar, as well as in the Chabahar duty-free zone.

    Back2Basics: India-Iran Partnership over Chabahar Port

    • In 2016, India signed a deal with Iran entailing $8 billion investment in Chabahar port and industries in Chabahar Special Economic Zone.
    • The port is being developed as a transit route to Afghanistan and Central Asia.
    • India has already built a 240-km road connecting Afghanistan with Iran.
    • All this were expected to bring cargo to Bandar Abbas port and Chabahar port, and free Kabul from its dependence on Pakistan to reach the outer world.
    • Completion of this project would give India access to Afghanistan and beyond to Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Russia and Europe via 7,200-km-long multi-modal North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).

  • Broader strategic challenge of dealing with China

    • Identifying the nature of the threat posed by China is important to formulate a response. This article discusses the plan of action on the diplomatic, strategic and economic front to deal with Chinese aggression.

    Economic angle of China’s expansionism

    • The Chinese growth model needed to find subservient emerging markets.
    • In these markets, China can park huge debts and make investments to keep feeding China’s high growth rates.
    • Friendly foreign debt-investment markets were needed to compensate for over-investment at home.
    • The Belt and Road Initiative was rolled out as a meeting point for China’s geo-strategic and geo-economic interests.
    • China has expanded its global footprint by signing on about 100 countries to the BRI.
    • China has made aggressive moves on most of its non-submissive neighbours in the South China Sea.
    • China has also made moves against its traditional rivals like Japan and Taiwan to independent-minded nations like South Korea and Australia.
    • China sees itself as a global power whose time has come.

    India needs to play clearer role

    • Rise of China is shaking up global alignments and shaping new world order.
    • The Trump administration is increasingly being criticised for not providing global leadership.
    • India could afford to be largely non-aligned during the 20th century Cold War.
    • Our size and economic momentum necessitate that we play a clearer role in the Cold War’s 21st-century sequel.
    • India’s foreign policy has lacked a clear vision about China.
    • India has been deepening our strategic relationship with the US but without wanting to alarm China.

    India’s relation with neighbours

    • India’s relations with other neighbouring nations have also become a cause of concern.
    • Pakistan has practically become a minion state for the Chinese – the $62-billion CPEC is a case in the point.
    • Nepal is no longer on our list of all-weather friends.
    • Chinese influence is growing in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh — both signatories to the BRI.
    • And just last week, Beijing, sent another appallingly stern message to our loyal friend, Bhutan, by making ridiculous territorial claims.

    What should be India’s plan of action

    • Dealing with China will require conviction and exercising a range of military, diplomatic and economic options.
    • One forum we need to build on and provide leadership to is the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.
    •  India should now propose the expansion of the Quad’s scope with a possible exploration of a collective defence architecture like NATO.
    • The membership of the Quad should be expanded to include Vietnam, South Korea, New Zealand, and Malaysia.
    • On the economic front, India must welcome the US proposal to expand G7 to include India, Russia, Australia and South Korea without China as a member.
    • Next area of focus should be strengthening ties with our neighbourhood.
    • Effort must be made to regain the relationship with Russia.

    Conclusion

    China must be made to choose: Is it willing to push the equally proud, equally numerous, equally historical and glorious civilisation to the south in this long-term direction for a few square kilometres of territory and a round of chest-thumping?

  • UAE in support of Open Skies Agreement with India

    The UAE is keen to have an open sky agreement with India.

    Open Skies Agreement! Look how confusing does it sound compared to the Open Skies Treaty between the US and Russia.

    What is the Open Skies Agreement?

    • The National Civil Aviation Policy, 2016, allows the government to enter into an ‘open sky’ air services agreement on a reciprocal basis with SAARC nations as well as countries beyond a 5,000-kilometre radius from New Delhi.
    • This implies that nations within this distance need to enter into a bilateral agreement and mutually determine the number of flights that their airlines can operate between the two countries.
    • India has open sky agreements with Japan, Greece, Jamaica, Guyana, Czech Republic, Finland, Spain and Sri Lanka.
    • India also has an open sky agreement with the US, among other countries.

    Why UAE wants such an agreement with India?

    • There are about 1,068 flights a week between India and the UAE operated by the airlines of the two countries under the bilateral Air Service Agreement.
    • India has open skies policy with SAARC countries and those beyond the 5,000-km radius.
    • UAE wants India to revisit this policy.

    Must read:

    U.S. set to exit the ‘Open Skies Treaty’ Copy

  • Patrolling Points along LAC

    The standoffs between Indian and Chinese troops in Ladakh on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), where initial steps towards disengagement have taken place, are around a number of patrolling points or PPs in Galwan, Hot Springs and Gogra areas.

    Do you know?

    The Galwan River flows from the Aksai Chin region occupied by China in the UT of Ladakh.  It originates in the area of Samzungling on the eastern side of the Karakoram Range and flows west to join the Shyok River.  It is one of the upstream tributaries of the Indus River.

    What exactly are Patrolling Points?

    • PPs are patrolling points identified and marked on the LAC, which are patrolled with a stipulated frequency by the security forces.
    • They serve as a guide to the location of the LAC for the soldiers, acting as indicators of the extent of ‘actual control’ exercised on the territory by India.
    • By regularly patrolling up to these PPs, the Indian side is able to establish and assert its physical claim about the LAC.

    Are all the Patrolling Points numbered?

    • Some of the PPs are prominent and identifiable geographical features, such as a pass, or a nala junction where no numerals are given.
    • Only those PPs, where there are no prominent features, are numbered as in the case of PP14 in Galwan Valley.

    Do all Patrolling Points fall on the LAC?

    • Mostly, yes. Except for the Depsang plains in northern Ladakh, where PP10, PP11, PP11A, PP12 and PP13 – from Raki Nala to Jivan Nala – do not fall on the LAC.
    • These are short of the LAC, on the Indian side.

    Are these Patrolling Points not manned?

    • The PPs are not posts and thus not manned. Unlike on the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan, the border with China is not physically held by the Army all along.
    • They are just physical markers on the ground, chosen for their location and have no defensive potential or tactical importance for the Army.

    How is the claim asserted on LAC?

    • The claim is asserted by the Army or joint Army-ITBP patrols as they show more visible presence in these areas.
    • This is done by physically visiting PPs with a higher frequency, as the deployment has moved closer to the LAC and due to improved infrastructure.
    • As the Chinese may not see when the Indian patrols visit these PPs, they will leave come cigarette packets or food tins with Indian markings behind.
    • That lets the Chinese know that Indian soldiers had visited the place, which indicates that India was in control of these areas.

    Who has given these Patrolling Points?

    • These PPs have been identified by the high-powered China Study Group, starting from 1975 when patrolling limits for Indian forces were specified.
    • It is based on the LAC after the government accepted the concept in 1993, which is also marked on the maps with the Army in the border areas.
    • But the frequency of patrolling to PPs is not specified by the CSG – it is finalised by the Army Headquarters in New Delhi, based on the recommendations made by the Army and ITBP.

    PP under dispute

    • PPs 10 to 13 in Depsang sector, PP14 in Galwan, PP15 in Hot Spring, and PP17 and PP17A in Gogra are currently being disputed by both sides, where the standoffs have taken place in the past nine weeks.

  • U.S. stance on CAATSA unchanged

    Recently India had planned for the purchase of Mig-19 fighter aircraft with Russia at an estimated Rs. 18,148 crore. The U.S has reacted to countries, including India, on sanctions for the purchase of Russian arms has not changed.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q.What is CAATSA law? Discuss how it will impact India’s ties with Russia.

    About CAATSA

    • CAATSA stands for Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).
    • It is a US federal law that imposed sanctions on Iran, North Korea, and Russia.
    • The bill provides sanctions for activities concerning:

    (1) cybersecurity, (2) crude oil projects, (3) financial institutions, (4) corruption, (5) human rights abuses, (6) evasion of sanctions, (7) transactions with Russian defence or intelligence sectors, (8) export pipelines, (9) privatization of state-owned assets by government officials, and (10) arms transfers to Syria.

    A cause of worry

    • While the US has become its second-largest defence supplier, mainly of aircraft and artillery, India still relies heavily on Russian equipment, such as submarines and missiles that the US has been unwilling to provide.
    • Seventy per cent of Indian military hardware is Russian in origin.
    • India is set to receive the S-400 Triumf air defence system.

    Is India the only country facing CAATSA sanctions?

    • Notably, Russia is India’s major defence supplier for over 6 decades now, and Iran is India’s second-largest oil supplier.
    • By coincidence, CAATSA has now been invoked by the US twice already, and both times for countries buying the Triumf system from Russia.
    • In September 2018, the US announced sanctions for the procurement of the S-400 Triumf air defence system and Sukhoi S-35 fighter aircraft.
    • Washington expelled Turkey from the F-35 fighter jet programme in July this year after the first delivery of S-400s was received.
    • India is neither like China, which has an inimical relationship with the U.S., and hence not bound by its diktats, nor like Turkey which is a NATO ally of the US.

  • De-escalation begins on LAC

    Three weeks after the worst military clashes in decades, India and China have begun the process of disengagement at contentious locations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

    Must read:

    [Burning Issue] India-China Skirmish in Ladakh

    China is moving back

    • In the Galwan Valley, Chinese troops have shifted 2 kilometres from the site violent clashes while some tents had been removed by the PLA in the Finger 4 area of Pangong Tso.
    • India’s claim is till Finger 8 as per the alignment of the LAC.
    • Some rearward movement of vehicles was seen at the general area of Galwan, Hotsprings and Gogra.
    • Without giving the specific distances moved, the source said the pullback at each location would be confirmed after verification.

    Lessons learnt

    • The lesson for us in Doklam is that disengagement is not enough in order to declare an end to tensions at the LAC.
    • It is necessary that we define endpoints up to where the troops must withdraw to and no understanding should be reached without the restoration of status quo ante.
    • Endpoint variances reflect the potential for future troubles along the LAC.

  • Indo-Pacific region

    As India tries to diffuse the tension along the disputed northern border with China, it must focus on the other potential fronts that China could open. India Ocean could be the next one. This article examines the centrality of the Indian Ocean for China and their approach to the region.

    India’s Indo-Pacific vision

    • This vision is based on our historical associations with this region.
    • This vision also acknowledges the importance of the Indian Ocean in building prosperity in this century.
    • So, the key points of this vision are thus-
    • 1) Inclusiveness, openness and ASEAN centrality and unity.
    • 2) India does not see the Indo-Pacific Region as a strategy or as a club of limited members.
    • 3) It is not directed against any country.

    China should have equal access

    • China is not a littoral state in the Indian Ocean.
    • Historically, Chinese naval activity was limited to the East China Sea, the Bohai Sea, the Yellow Sea, and the South China Sea.
    •  In today’s context, China is the second-largest economy and the world’s largest trading nation.
    • The sea-lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean are vital to her economy and security.
    • Under international law, China should have equal access to the Indian ocean.

    China’s “Malacca Dilemma”

    • China thinks that others would block the Malacca Straits to “contain” the Chinese.
    • So, China has strategized to dominate not just the Malacca Straits, but the ocean beyond it.
    • The PLA Navy (PLAN) made its first operational deployment in the Gulf of Aden in 2008.
    • In 2009 China planned for overseas base or facility.
    • In 2010 a China State Oceanic Administration report alluded to plans to build aircraft carriers.

    BRI: Overcoming the deficiencies China face in India Ocean

    • The US hegemony and India’s regional influence in the Indian Ocean are thought of as a challenge to China.
    • So, China focused on 3 inherent deficiencies that they wanted to overcome.
    • (a) China is not a littoral state.
    • (b) Its passage through key maritime straits could be easily blocked.
    • (c) The possibility of US-India cooperation against China.
    • How to overcome these deficiencies?
    • (1) carefully selecting sites to build ports — Djibouti, Gwadar, Hambantota, Sittwe and Seychelles.
    • (2) By conducting activities in a low-key manner to “reduce the military colour as much as possible”.
    • (3) By not unnerving India and America by cooperating at first, then slowly penetrating into the Indian Ocean, beginning with detailed maritime surveys, ocean mapping, HADR, port construction and so on.

     China acting on the plans

    • The PLA’s new base in Djibouti is the prototype for more “logistics” facilities to come.
    • More port construction projects like Gwadar and Hambantota, are being offered to vulnerable countries.
    • These projects are commercially unviable but have military possibilities,
    • Chinese “civilian” vessels routinely conduct surveys in the EEZ of littoral states.
    • In January 2020 the PLA Navy conducted tripartite naval exercises with Russia and Iran in the Arabian Sea.
    • They have the largest warship building programme in the world.

    Consider the question “What constitutes India’s Indo-Pacific vision? Elaborate on the factors that explain China’s reluctance to subscribe to this vision.”

    Conclusion

    The idea of Indo-Pacific might potentially derail the carefully crafted Chinese plan. So, they now wish to cause alarm by raising fears about Great Power “strategic collision” caused by the so-called American-led “containment” strategy. It is important to look past their propaganda.

  • Italian Marines case judgement could set a dangerous precedent

    The tribunal’s judgement in the Italian marines case was in Italy’s favour. But the basis used in the judgement could set a wrong precedent. India also ensures a fair trial against the marines in Italy. So, what would be the wrong precedent and why would be trial against marines will continue in Italy? Read to know…

    Background

    • On February 15, 2012 two Italian marines were held for killing two Indian fishermen
    • Fishermen were in India’s Contiguous Zone, 20.5 nautical miles off the Kerala coast.
    • And the marines were part of a security contingent on the Enrica Lexie, an Italian commercial oil tanker.

    What is said in the judgement

    • The tribunal was established by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).
    • ITLOS was under the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
    • Only the operative portion of the tribunal’s award is available till now.
    • It held that the marines were entitled to immunity in relation to the acts that they committed.
    • The tribunal also said that India is precluded from exercising its jurisdiction over the Marines.
    • However, the tribunal found that by firing on the fishermen Italy was guilty of “violating India’s freedom and right of navigation”.
    • The tribunal majority agreed with the Italian plea that the marines had immunity for they were state officials.

    The judgement could set the wrong precedent

    • India’s stand was that UNCLOS is not concerned with issues relating to immunity.
    • Immunity of state officials has to be governed by specific multilateral or bilateral treaties or agreements.
    • It should not be invoked to settle issues of jurisdiction.
    • Even if Italian marines are considered as state officials, they were serving on a commercial vessel.
    • Italy did so unilaterally without the cover of any multilateral or bilateral arrangement.
    • There is no convention that such persons as the marines in such cases are immune from local criminal jurisdiction.
    • Only heads of states, heads of governments and foreign ministers customarily enjoy immunity abroad apart from accredited diplomats who are covered by the
    • Countries may now enact specific laws to give immunity to their military and para-military personnel and others by declaring them state official.
    •  This can lead to an increase in tensions generally and especially between inimical states.

    What should be the next course of action for India

    • Indian government should ensure that Italy is made to pay fully for the loss of life and the suffering it has caused in this matter.
    • The government should also ensure that it closely monitors the case proceedings in the Italian court against two marines.
    • This is also a time for the executive and judicial branches of the Indian state to introspect on how they handled the whole affair politically, diplomatically and legally.

    Consider the question “The judgement of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Italian marines case was based on the immunity of state officials. What could be the implication of invoking immunity of state official in this judgement? What should be the next course of action for India?”

    Conclusion

    As a good international citizen, India has accepted the tribunal’s award. Now it must ensure that Italy fully honours it. The matter remains open.

  • Ladakh and its Geo-strategic Importance

    With the long-standing border standoff with China, Ladakh, a rugged, high-altitude region that is generally far removed from the lives and imagination of most Indians, has become part of our daily conversations and worries.

    Let’s have a look at a short primer on the region, its history, and some of the places where Indian soldiers are locked in conflict with the Chinese army. Try remembering its geographical features.

    Ladakh through the History

    • Lying between the Kunlun mountain range in the north and Himalayas to the south, Ladakh was originally inhabited by people of Indo-Aryan and Tibetan descent.
    • Historically the region included the valleys of Baltistan, Indus, and Nubra, besides Zanskar, Lahaul and Spiti, Aksai Chin, Ngari and Rudok.
    • Located at the crossroads of important trade routes since ancient times, Ladakh has always enjoyed great geostrategic importance.
    • At the beginning of the first century AD, Ladakh was part of the Kushan Empire. Till the 15th century, it was part of Tibet and was ruled by dynasties of local Lamas.
    • Later it changed hands multiple times, alternating between the kingdoms of Kashmir and Zhangzhung.
    • In 1834, Gen Zorawar Singh, a general of Raja Gulab Singh who ruled Jammu as part of the Sikh empire, extended the boundaries of Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s kingdom to Ladakh.

    Partition, Pakistan and Chinese occupations

    Immediately after India’s Partition, tribal raiders (the disguised Pakistani Army) attacked Ladakh. They captured Kargil and were heading for Leh when they were confronted by the Indian Army, who got back Kargil.

    • Although India has always considered Aksai Chin to be part of Jammu and Kashmir, in the 1950s the Chinese built a highway, called western highway or NH219, connecting Tibet with Xinjiang through this region.
    • It was always more easily accessible to the Chinese than to the Indians, who were across the Karakoram.
    • India learnt of this road in 1957, and it was one of the causes of the 1962 India-China war, after which China strengthened its control over this region.
    • China today claims Aksai Chin to be part of Hotan County of its Xinjiang province.
    • Pakistan ceded the Shaksgam Valley, which was part of the Baltistan region north of the Karakoram, to China following a Sino-Pakistani agreement signed on March 2, 1963.

    Ladakh through the Chinese eyes

    • China’s forays into the region began after the 1949 Communist Revolution, when Chairman Mao Zedong, a veteran of guerrilla warfare, began consolidating China’s periphery as part of his expansionist designs.
    • The PLA occupied Tibet in 1951 and then began to eye Ladakh.
    • The reason was that the road connecting Kashgar in Xinjiang to Lhasa in Tibet had to pass through Aksai Chin, which was held by Indians but was seldom patrolled by them.

    Galwan Valley in the limelight

    • The Tibetan revolt of 1959 and the Dalai Lama’s flight to India saw China further strengthening its military presence in Ladakh to ensure the security of NH 219.
    • India reacted with its ‘forward policy’ as part of which it began setting up Army posts in the region to prevent Chinese expansion.
    • This resulted in the initial clash between the Indian and Chinese forces in the Kongka Pass area in 1959.
    • Later, Galwan Valley became the scene of action when the Indian Army established a post to cut off the Chinese post in the Samjunjling area, marking the beginning of the 1962 war.

    Pangong Tso: The contested lake

    • In the latest face-off, Indian troops first spied the Chinese on the banks of Pangong Tso.
    • This lake, which is one-third in India and two-thirds in China, is of great tactical significance to the Chinese who have built infrastructure along both its sides to ensure the speedy build-up of troops.
    • Chinese incursions in this region aim at shifting the LAC westward so that they are able to occupy important heights both on the north and the south of the lake, which will enable them to dominate the Chushul Bowl.
    • The narrow Chushul valley, which lies on the road to Leh with Pangong Tso to its north, was an important target for the Chinese even during the 1962 war. It was here that the Battle of Chushul was fought.

    Strategic SSN: To the far north

    • The area spanning Galwan, Depsang plateau, and Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO), is called Sub-Sector North (SSN).
    • This enclave that lies to the east of the Siachen glacier is of immense significance given its proximity to the Karakoram Pass, close to China’s western highway or NH 219 going to Aksai Chin.
    • It’s the SSN that provides land access to Central Asia through the Karakoram Pass.
    • Domination of this area is also crucial for the protection of the Siachen glacier, lying between the Saltoro ridge on the Pakistani side and the Saser ridge close to the Chinese claim line.
    • The Galwan heights overlook the all-weather Durbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DSDBO) Road, which connects Leh to DBO at the base of the Karakoram Pass that separates China’s Xinjiang Region from Ladakh.
    • Domination over these heights allows China to easily interdict this road.

    Why is China stubborn on Galwan?

    • Occupation of Galwan will neutralize the tactical advantage India gained by building the all-weather Durbuk-DBO road over the last two decades.
    • Last year, the Border Road Organisation (BRO) made this rugged terrain even more accessible by completing the 430-metre-long bridge across the Shyok River.
    • With this, the Darbuk route to DBO became available round the year, and the travel time of troops to the SSN was halved.
    • It was this bridge, coupled with the ongoing work on a link road to LAC in this area, prompted the PLA to enter Galwan.

  • Resistance to China is going to be definitive moment for India

    How India overcomes the challenge posed by China would have far-reaching effects. Role of Russia and the U.S. is important for India. This article discusses these factors and the significance of the outcome of the conflict started at Galwan. 

    Two takes on India’s China policy

    • Following Galwan encounter, there are two views about the future of India’s China policy.
    • Some say that structural constraints would limit dramatic changes in policy once the heat of the moment dissipates.
    • While others say that the Galwan clash comes amidst the deepening crisis in bilateral relations over the last decade.
    • Stalled boundary talks, a widening trade deficit, the clash of national interests in the region, and Chinese opposition to India’s global aspirations have together strained Sino-Indian relations.
    • Galwan is the last straw, the argument goes, that broke the camel’s back.

    So, what will be the outcome

    •  The relationship is likely to depend on how the current military confrontation in Ladakh is resolved.
    • If it ends with a quick return to the status quo that prevailed in April, inertia is likely to limit radical policy departures.
    • If the Ladakh crisis ends in a setback for India, the pressure on Delhi to radically reorient its China policy will mount.

    What if the standoff continues?

    • In that case strengthening India’s military and political hand against China is the immediate objective of Delhi’s post-Galwan diplomacy.
    • The long term steps suggested include the construction of a military alliance with the US and other Western partner.
    • As as well as economic decoupling and diversification.
    • Short term steps are about being able to stare down the Chinese in the current military confrontation and hold its ground.

    Role of Russia

    • Three decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, India’s dependence on Russian arms remains substantive.
    • Rajnath Singh’s visit to Moscow amidst the crisis with China underlines the weight of the past in India’s security policy.
    • India is also pressing other major defence suppliers, including France and Israel, to accelerate deliveries on contracted defence equipment.
    • There have been reports from Russia, that China is pressing Moscow not to sell the new fighter aircraft to India.
    • Russia and China are strong strategic partners today.
    • While the past suggests India has a special claim to Russian affections, there is a Sino-Russian strategic cohabitation today in opposition to America
    • How Russia responds to India’s request will have a major bearing on the future evolution of Delhi’s ties with Moscow.

    Role of the U.S.

    • Unlike Russia’s public stance of neutrality between India and China, Washington has come out in favour of Delhi.
    • There was vocal public support of the US defence and foreign policy establishment against Chinese aggression at Galwan.
    •  Media reports from Delhi say the US is already supplying valuable real-time military intelligence of value to the Indian armed forces.
    • Washington is apparently willing to do more but is letting Delhi decide the pace and intensity of that cooperation.

    Challenges in the U.S. cooperation

    • The uncertain political moment in the US amidst the general election scheduled for early November can’t be underestimated.
    • A change of guard in Washington will certainly slow things down as the new administration settles down and reviews its priorities.
    • America’s stakes in China are far higher than Russia’s.
    • Profound economic interdependence of the U.S. and China is a significant political constraint on the US’s options.
    • On deeper military cooperation with Washington, Delhi would want to move with care rather than rush into it as it did in 1962.

    How will outcomes of the crisis matter for India

    • If Delhi comes out of this crisis wounded, its troubles at home and the world will mount significantly.
    • A weakened India will find recasting its China policy even harder.
    • But victorious India will find its international political stock rising and its options on China expanding.
    •  Successful Indian resistance to China’s expansionism would be a definitive moment in the geopolitical evolution of Asia.
    • The stakes for India and the world, then, are far higher today than in 1962.

    Consider the question “Examine the issues that introduce friction in India-China relations. Also, elaborate on the scope of India’s alliance with the U.S to counter the challenges posed by China.”

    Conclusion

    Outcomes of the resistance will have a profound impact on India’s standing and India’s destiny.