Subject: Bilateral Relations

While the idea of inviting Australia to join Malabar is being explored, we must not forget the concerns with it. This article examines such concerns.

Context

• India’s Ministry of Defence discussed the issue of adding Australia to the trilateral Malabar naval exercise.
• If materialised, it will be the first time since 2007 that all members of Quad-India, U.S., Japan and Australia will participate in a joint military drill.

Possible consequences of the move

• The Chinese leadership sees the maritime Quadrilateral as an Asian-NATO that seeks only to contain China’s rise.
•  India’s intention to involve Australia in the Malabar drill could only be construed as a move directed against Beijing.

India’s perspective

• Following the stand-off in Ladakh, many Indian analysts believe the time is right for India to shed its traditional defensiveness in the maritime domain.
• The realists advocate an alliance with the U.S., Japan and Australia to counter Chinese moves in the Indian Ocean.

Concerns

1) Contrary message to China

• While India and China are negotiating a truce, Australia’s participation in the Malabar exercise sends contrary signals to Beijing.
• If China responded aggressively in the Eastern Indian Ocean, it could needlessly open up a new front in the India-China conflict.

2) Only modest gains for India

• U.S. and its Pacific partners want to form a maritime coalition to implement a ‘rules-based order’ in the Indo-Pacific littorals.
• India’s priority is to acquire strategic capabilities to counter a Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean.
•  Indian Navy is yet to develop the undersea capability to deter Chinese submarines in the eastern Indian Ocean.
• With U.S. defence companies hesitant to share proprietary technology the gains for India, in exchange for signing up the ‘military-quad’, are modest.
• Without strategic technology transfers, Indian Navy’s deterrence potential in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) will not improve much.

3) Operational issue: India will be drawn into power dynamics of the Asia-Pacific

• With the strategic contest between the U.S. and China, there is every possibility that the military-Quad will be used to draw India into the security dynamics of the Asia-Pacific.
• The U.S. would expect its Indo-Pacific partners, including India, to assist the U.S. Navy in its South China Sea endeavour.
•  The U.S. and Japanese navies have little spare capacity for sustained surveillance and deterrence operations in the IOR.
• Australia is an exception and is ready and able to partner India in securing the Eastern Indian Ocean.

4) Timing

• A balancing coalition must come together at a time when the nature and magnitude of the threat are wholly manifest.
• But, despite a growing presence in the Indian Ocean, the Chines Navy is yet to physically threaten Indian interests at sea.
• So, the onus of the first move to precipitate a crisis in the Eastern Indian Ocean lies with the Indian Navy.

Conclusion

Upgrading the trilateral Malabar to a quadrilateral, without acquiring the requisite combat and deterrence capability, could yield gains for India in the short term, but would prove ineffective in the long run.

The focus of this article is on the U.S. policy in the Indo-Pacific and its relations with its allies there in countering China.

Instances of China’s aggression

• Galwan Valley is not an exception in Beijing’s recent behaviour in Asia.
• China has also engaged in a tense geopolitical confrontation with its other neighbours.
• Stand-offs with Vietnam and Malaysia in the South China Sea and threatening Australia with boycotts are a few examples.

Response to China

• Beijing’s aggressiveness is fueling debates about the underlying costs of reliance on China.
• China’s aggression is also increasing support for closer coordination between other Indo-Pacific partners.
• Indian, Japan, Malaysia, and Australia have all taken concrete steps to reduce their economic exposure to Beijing.
•  India and Australia recently inked a new military logistics agreement in the “virtual summit”.
• A similar agreement between Delhi and Tokyo may follow.
• The Quadrilateral Dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the United States is growing stronger and even expanding.
• And recently Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) issued one of their strongest statements to date on the South China Sea.
• The ASEAN statement insisted that maritime disputes must be resolved in accordance with the UN Law of the Sea treaty.

Asian multilateralism: Born out of crises

• Recently the “Milk Tea Alliance”, reaction of people, born to forge solidarity between Taiwanese, Hong Kongers, and Southeast Asians online to deal with Chinese cyberbullying.
• The Chiang Mai Initiative — a financial swap mechanism between China, Japan, South Korea, and Southeast Asia — emerged in the aftermath of the late 1990s financial crisis.
• ASEAN, created in 1967, did not convene its first heads of state meeting until fall of Saigon in 1976 in the Vietnam War.

Role of the U.S.

• The COVID-19 crisis is remaking the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific.
• The ongoing crisis has made countries aware of seriousness of Chinese dominance.
• This situation has given the U.S. opportunity it has long sought: 1) More credible multilateral coordination among allies, 2) Pushback against online disinformation. 3) The desire to better integrate like-minded economies and supply chains.
• But the crisis is also raising renewed questions about the American leadership.
• The question now facing the U.S. is whether or not it can harness this new regional momentum.

Alienating allies

• U.S. continues to make unforced errors that create distance with U.S. allies and partners.
• For example, its focus on cutting support for the WHO and asserting that COVID-19 originated in a Wuhan lab alienated Canberra.
• Similarly, the administration’s suspension of various worker visas will almost certainly have serious repercussions in India.

What should be the U.S. approach to Asia?

• The U.S. needs to make two major shifts.
• First, U.S. policy needs to start supporting, rather than attempting to commandeer, regional efforts to build a less China-centric future for the Indo-Pacific.
• While Chinese aggression provides powerful motivation for coordination, U.S. partners are seeking an agenda that is framed in broader terms than simply rallying to counter Beijing.
• If the U.S. wants to reduce reliance on Beijing and “re-couple” investments and supply chains among allied nations, it is going to have to make compromises.
• U.S. should work with Indo-Pacific partners on the issues that they prioritise and provided them with space for independent action.
• Second, Washington should avoid repeating Beijing’s mistakes of bullying.
• U.S. should offer a clear alternative in word and deed to China’s “Wolf Warrior” diplomacy.
• Moves such as demanding that a G-7 communiqué refer to COVID-19 as the “Wuhan virus” and blocking mask shipments to close allies are the kind of counterproductive bullying.

Options for Asian countries

• Beijing’s recent aggression is not an aberration but part of a growing pattern.
• As Beijing’s confidence in its growing material and military power solidifies, its neighbours will need to think carefully about the long-term decisions necessary to preserve an open regional order.
• Facing the unprecedented health and economic crises spawned by COVID-19, the U.S. and Asian partners will need to coordinate more closely.
• Asian countries should strengthen their own regional networks.
• This Asian network will challenge the views of those in both Washington and Beijing who would see the region only as a sparring ground.

Conclusion

For American and Asian leaders, the choice is stark: encourage and foster this trend, recognising that stronger regional coordination will require more compromises as well as tougher choices, or resist it and risk being left behind.