💥Join UPSC 2027,2028 Mentorship (July Batch) + XFactor Notes & Microthemes PDF
Talk to Mentor

Civilsdaily

Login

Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • Faults in our China policy

    This article tracks the faultline in India’s China policy that makes it an enduring tragedy. China never bought into India’s narratives of Asian unity and untied Asian front against the West. Instead, China cultivated its relations with the West and leveraged that for furthering its interests.

    Enduring tragedy: India’s China policy

    • That tragedy is rooted in persistent political fantasies.
    • Refusal to learn from past mistakes.
    • And the belief that the US and the West are at the source of India’s problems with China.
    • The problem predates independence.
    • Each generation has been reluctant to discard the illusions that India’s China policy has nurtured over the last century.

    Historical background

    •  Tagore went to China in 1924 with the ambition of developing a shared Asian spiritual civilisation.
    • He was accused by Chines of diverting Chins’s attention away from the imperatives of modernisation and, yes, westernisation.
    •  Jawaharlal Nehru approached China as a modernist and nationalist.
    • He met a delegation of Chinese nationalists at Brussels in 1927.
    • There he issued a ringing statement on defeating western imperialism and shaping a new Asian and global order.
    •  But in Second World War, Congress was unwilling to join hands with China in defeating Japanese imperialism.
    • Indian and Chinese nationalists could not come together for they were fighting different imperial powers.

    Relations after independence

    • As India’s first PM, Nehru campaigned against the western attempt to isolate China.
    • Afro-Asian conference in Bandung, Indonesia in 1955 was attended by both.
    • Within five years war broke out in 1962.
    • Atal Bihari Vajpayee travelled to China in February 1979 to re-engage Beijing.
    • Before he could head home, Beijing had launched a war against a fellow communist regime in Vietnam.
    • That was an end of hope for Asian solidarity.
    • Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 sought to normalise relations with China while continuing to negotiate on the boundary dispute.

    Other issues: Trade entanglement

    • Amid border dispute, other issues have taken a life of their own.
    • For example, the massive annual trade deficits.
    • India’s hope that economic cooperation will improve mutual trust will help resolve other issues was also dashed.
    • India’s massive trade deficit with China is now a little over half of its total trade deficit.
    • India is finding it hard to disentangle the deep economic dependence on imports from China.

    Story of political cooperation: From unipolar to bipolar world

    • As the Cold War ended, India began political cooperation with China on global issues.
    • It was hoped that such cooperation will provide the basis for better bilateral relations.
    • It could not have been more wrong.
    • P V Narasimha Rao and his successors joined China and Russia in promoting a “multipolar world” [remember the US dominance].
    • Delhi is now struggling to cope with the emergence of a “unipolar Asia” — with Beijing as its dominant centre.
    • China’s rapid rise has also paved the way for the potential emergence of a “bipolar world” dominated by Washington and Beijing.

    Engagement with West

    • China never worked with Indian on the ideas of building coalitions against the West.
    • While India never stopped arguing with the West, China developed a sustained engagement with the US, Europe and Japan.
    • Mao broke with Communist Russia to join forces with the US in the early 1970s.
    • Deng Xiaoping promoted massive economic cooperation with the US to transform China and lay the foundations for its rise.

    Will staying away from West lead to good relations with China

    • China has leveraged the deep relationship with the West to elevate itself in the international system.
    • Delhi continues to think that staying away from America is the answer for good relations with Beijing.
    • Beijing sees the world through the lens of power.
    • Delhi tends to resist that realist prism.
    • India has consistently misread China’s interests and ambitions.
    • The longer India takes to shed that strategic lassitude, the greater will be its China trouble.

    Facts that India needs to come to terms with

    • India must also recognise that China, like the great powers before it, wants to redeem its territorial claims.
    • China also has the ambition to bend the neighbourhood to its will, reshape the global order to suit its interests.
    • China has not hidden these goals and interests, but India has refused to see what is in plain sight.

    Consider the question “Acknowledging Beijing’s rise, scale of challenge it presents, are first steps in crafting a new China policy” Comment.

    Conclusion

    Acknowledging China’s dramatic rise and recognising the scale of the challenge it presents is essential for Delhi in crafting a new China policy.

  • Explained: In India-China, the Russia role

    Russia has emerged, all of a sudden, as a key diplomatic player amid the tension between India and China. It is set to host the Russia-India-China (RIC) trilateral foreign ministers’ meeting.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. In pursuit of a ‘Special Strategic Partnership’ with the US, India has compromised its ties with Russia. Discuss.

    Raksha Mantri stepping in at RIC

    • Tensions being at the peak, India will discuss supply and purchase of new defence systems — like the S-400 missile defence system — with the Russian top brass in the military and government.
    • India has made this decision to reach out to Russia not just out of choice, but also out of necessity.
    • Moscow has leverage and influence to shape and change Beijing’s hard stance on the border issue.

    Russia: A mediator for both

    • While India and China have been talking at each other — and not to each other — the outreach to Moscow is noteworthy.
    • It is widely known that Russia and China have grown their relationship in the past few years.
    • The Moscow-Beijing axis is crucial, especially since Washington has been at loggerheads with China in recent months and Russia much more calibrated, even in its response on the Covid-19 outbreak.

    Sino-Russian ties: A response to US

    • Russia and China have had a rocky start to their relationship after Mao Zedong founded the People’s Republic of China.
    • When Mao made his first visit to Moscow after winning control of China, in 1949, he was made to wait for weeks for a meeting with the Soviet leader.
    • During the Cold War, China and the USSR were rivals after the Sino-Soviet split in 1961, competing for control of the worldwide Communist movement.
    • There was a serious possibility of a major war in the early 1960s and a brief border war took place in 1969.
    • This enmity began to reduce following Mao’s death in 1976, but relations were not very good until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.

    India and Russia

    • India has a historical relationship with Russia, spanning over seven decades.
    • While the relationship has grown in some areas and atrophied in some others, the strongest pillar of the strategic partnership is of the defence basket.
    • Although New Delhi has consciously diversified its new purchases from other countries, the bulk of its defence equipment is from Russia.
    • Estimates say 60 to 70 per cent of India’s supplies are from Russia, and New Delhi needs a regular and reliable supply of spare parts from the Russian defence industry.
    • In fact, Prime Minister Modi has held informal summits with only two leaders — Xi and Putin.

    Russia position: then & now

    • During the Doklam crisis in 2017, Russian diplomats in Beijing were among the few briefed by the Chinese government.
    • While Russia’s position during the 1962 war was not particularly supportive of India, New Delhi takes comfort in Moscow’s support during the 1971 war.
    • On the events in Galwan, Moscow responded in a much-calibrated manner.
    • Kremlin has expressed its concerns over a clash between the military on the border between China and India but believes that the two countries could resolve this conflict themselves.

  • What is lacking in our China policy

    While formulating our response to China’s aggressive policies in Ladakh, we should first understand their objectives. This article explains these objective and suggests the steps to deal with China’s policies.

    Statements on Aksai Chin and Pakistan

    • Statements over Aksai Chin and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) by India have painted the image of India as a revanchist power in utter disregard of the country’s capabilities.
    • These statements also gave the impression that India precludes any attempt at changing the status quo on either front.
    • Though these statements were justifiable in terms of India’s legal rights to these territories, were ill-timed.

    How these statements were perceived by China

    • They were made when Beijing was feeling alarmed at the Indian government’s decision to separate Ladakh from Jammu and Kashmir.
    • The move augmented its perception that it was a prelude to India’s attempt to change the status quo in Aksai Chin.
    • India’s assertion of its claims on PoK that in China’s perception threatened the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor project.

    China’s 4 strategic objectives

    1. India and China are not equals

    • China wants India to understand that it is not in the same league as China.
    • China resorts to periodic assaults across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) if India tries to assume a position of equality.

    2. Keep India away from interfering in Indo-Pacific

    • China wants India not to actively oppose Chinese designs to dominate the Indo-Pacific region.
    • Also, China wants Indias to refrain from aligning with the U.S. and its allies — Japan and Australia, in particular — in an attempt to contain China.

    3. Keeping India preoccupied with problems

    • China’s strategy also includes keeping India preoccupied with problems in its immediate neighbourhood.
    • So with these problems, India cannot act as an alternative pole of power to China in the broader Asian region.

    4. Supporting Pakistan to neutralise India

    • As part of the last objective, China supports  Pakistan economically and militarily, including the sharing of nuclear weapons designs.
    • China uses Pakistan to neutralise India’s conventional power superiority vis-à-vis that country.

    An understanding of these objectives is essential to fashioning a realistic Indian response to China’s aggressive policies in Ladakh and elsewhere along the LAC.

    But, what about Pakistan?

    • Pakistan is at best an irritant for India. (so, focus on China)
    • Pakistan can be managed with the use of diplomatic tools, international opprobrium, and superior military force.
    • In fact, the Pakistani challenge to India has become magnified because of its nexus with China.

    What India should do?

    • India’s main strategic goal should be the adoption of carefully calculated policies that neutralise China’s diplomatic and military clout in the Asia-Pacific region.
    • While doing so, India should not appear as a surrogate for other powers.
    • And India should also ensure that in making alliances it in not sacrificing the autonomy of decision-making in foreign policy. 

    Consider the question “Understanding of China’s objective is essential to formulate a realistic response to its aggressive policies in Ladakh.” Comment.

    Conclusion

    Understanding the greater threat posed by China vis-a-vis Pakistan should be the basis of India’s policy towards China.

  • Why China trade ban is bad idea

    After the Galwan Valley skirmish, the popular idea resonating in Indian streets is that Indians should boycott Chinese goods and thus “teach China a lesson”.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. India’s quest for self-reliance is still a distant dream. Critically comment in light of the popular sentiment against the Chinese imports in India.

    There are several reasons why the #Boycott_China is an ill-advised move:

    A. Trade deficits are not necessarily bad

    • Trade deficits/surpluses are just accounting exercises and having a trade deficit against a country doesn’t make the domestic economy weaker or worse off.
    • Example: If one looks at the top 25 countries with whom India trades, it has a trade surplus with the US, the UK and the Netherlands. But this does not make Indian economy better than them.

    What does this deficit indicate?

    • Both Indian consumers and Chinese producers are gainer through trading.
    • One gets the market other cheap price. Thus, both are better off than what they would have been without trade.

    So, having a trade deficit is good?

    • Of course, running persistent trade deficits across all countries raises two main issues.
    • One, availability of foreign exchange reserves to “buy” the imports.
    • Today, India has more than $500 billion of forex — good enough to cover imports for 12 months.
    • Two, lack of domestic capacity to produce in the most efficient manner.

    B. Will hurt the Indian poor the most

    • This is because poor are more price-sensitive.
    • For instance, if Chinese TVs were replaced by either costlier Indian TVs or less efficient ones, unlike poor, richer Indians may buy the costlier option.
    • Similarly, the Chinese products that are in India are already paid for. By banning their sale or avoiding them, Indians will be hurting fellow Indian retailers.
    • Again, this would hit poorest retailers more due to inability to cope with the unexpected losses.

    C. Will punish Indian producers and exporters

    • Several businesses in India import intermediate goods and raw materials, which, in turn, are used to create final goods — both for the domestic Indian market as well as the global market (as Indian exports).
    • An overwhelming proportion of Chinese imports are in the form of intermediate goods such as electrical machinery, nuclear reactors, fertilizers, optical and photographic measuring equipment organic chemicals etc.
    • Such imports are used to produce final goods which are then either sold in India or exported.
    • A blanket ban on Chinese imports will hurt all these businesses at a time when they are already struggling to survive, apart from hitting India’s ability to produce finished goods.

    D. Will barely hurt China

    • While China accounts for 5% of India’s exports and 14% of India’s imports — in US$ value terms — India’s imports from China are just 3% of China’s total exports.
    • More importantly, China’s imports from India are less than 1% of its total imports.
    • The point is that if India and China stop trading then — on the face of it — China would lose only 3% of its exports and less than 1% of its imports.
    • However, India will lose 5% of its exports and 14% of its imports.

    Issues

    • On the whole, it is much easier for China to replace India than for India to replace China.
    • Ban can also seize Chinese funding to many Indian businesses (the start-ups with billion-dollar valuations).
    • In short term, replacing Chinese products with Japan or Germany, will only increase our total trade deficit.
    • If on the other hand, we decide to use Indian products, that too would cost us more — albeit just internally.

    E. India will lose policy credibility

    • It has also been suggested that India should renege on existing contracts with China.
    • This can be detrimental for India’s effort to attract foreign investment.
    • As one of the first things an investor — especially foreign — tracks is the policy credibility and certainty.
    • If policies can be changed overnight or if the government itself reneges on contracts, investor will either not invest or demand higher returns for the increased risk.

    F. Raising tariffs is mutually assured destruction

    • Many argue that India should just slap higher import duties on Chinese goods or apply prohibitive tariffs on final goods.
    • By doing this, firstly India would be violating rules of the World Trade Organization.
    • Secondly, it would make China and many others to reciprocate in the same way.

    Equating border dispute with trade is no panacea

    • The first thing to understand is that turning a border dispute into a trade war is unlikely to solve the border dispute.
    • Worse, given India and China’s position in both global trade as well as relative to each other, this trade war will hurt India far more than China.
    • Thirdly, these measures will be most poorly timed since the Indian economy is already at its weakest point ever — facing a sharp GDP contraction.

    Way forward

    • In long term, under the banner of self reliance, India must develop its domestic capabilities and acquire a higher share of global trade by raising its competitiveness.
    • But no country is completely self-sufficient and that is why trade is such a fantastic idea.
    • It allows countries to specialize in what they can do most efficiently and export that good while importing whatever some other country does more efficiently.
    • Need of hour is well thought and balanced approach.

  • Postscript to a tragedy at Galwan

    The article suggests the approach that India should adopt in its policy toward China. Long term view of the situation is crucial. But some short term steps is also necessary.

    Prelude to 1962 War

    • Revolt in Tibet and granting asylum to the Dalai Lama in March 1959 can be seen as start of tensions in relations.
    •  In October 1959, there was a face-off between Indian and Chinese troops at Kongka La.
    • With the conflict in 1962,  there was very little room for a reasoned, negotiated settlement on the boundary question between the two countries.

    2020 is not same as 1959 for both India and China

    • Both nations have grown immensely in strength and stature on the world stage – even military wise.
    • Their relations have substance and a diversity of content in a manner absent in the 1950s – like the economic relations.
    • Hence, there is a need to not blame each other and find solutions instead of descent towards a full-blown conflict with China.

    Weighing the options carefully

    • India at present is struggling at multiple fronts:
    • 1) COVID-19 crisis demands the full attention of the government.
    • 2) Economy is stagnant and needs recovery.
    • 3) Tensions on other fronts – Pakistan persist and Nepal dispute in the Lipulekh/Kalapani area.
    • Thus, the call by warmongers should be evaluated, that too critically.

    Evolving comprehensive China policy

    • Strong political direction, mature deliberation and coherence are keys to handling the situation.
    • Army’s role can involve tactical adjustments and manoeuvres to deter the Chinese.
    • But comprehensive China strategy should be left to those tasked with national security policy.
    • Chinese transgressions in Sikkim and Ladakh can provide learning lessons for our future strategy.
    • A complete strategy would involve military, diplomatic and political levels.

    Future plan of action – Defence

    • India should take the initiative on a timely and early clarification of the LAC.
    • Identify areas of conflict and mark such areas as demilitarized by both sides through joint agreement.
    • At the same time, India must stand resolute and firm in the defence of territory in all four sectors of the border.
    • Contacts between the two militaries — joint exercises and exchanges of visits of senior Commanders — should be scaled down for short term future.
    • Diplomatic channels must continue to be open and should not be restricted in any way as they are essential in the current situation.
    • A border settlement is part of long term strategy.

    Future of business, trade and investment between two countries

    • Indian businesses in China and Chinese business operations in India can expect tougher future.
    • The scenario on trade and investments could encounter similar obstacles.
    • Areas of on national security, as in the cyber field and in telecommunications (5G) should take necessary reduction in import of Chinese items.

     India should strengthen alliances

    • The events in Galwan Valley should be a wake-up call to re invent it’s South and east Asia policy.
    • This is an opportunity for India to align its interests much more strongly with the U.S. as a principal strategic partner.
    • India should also infuse more energy into its relations with Japan, Australia, and the ASEAN.
    • The time has also come for India to reconsider its stand on joining the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.
    • To disengage from economic involvement with China, and build the capacities and capabilities it needs in manufacturing, and in supply chains networks closer home, India has to think in the long terms.

    Consider the question “The context of changing relations with China has forced India to reconsider the depth of its engagement with other countries. In light of this examine the changes India’s foreign policy adopt in dealing with other countries.”

    Conclusion

    Galwan incident is a wake up call for us. In every aspect, engagement with China needs a re look. And that also includes an increased level of engagement in South Asian neighborhood.

  • Why Ladakh matters to India and China?

    This article from IE discusses this cold, dry, high altitude territory with its extremely scarce vegetation that makes it a point of disagreement between India and China.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. India’s boundary disputes with its neighbourhood are the legacy of its colonial past. Analyse.

    Ladakh: The Cold Desert of India

    • Ladakh is the highest plateau in India with much of it being over 3,000 m.
    • It extends from the Himalayan to the Kunlun Ranges and includes the upper Indus River valley.
    • The importance of Ladakh is rooted in complicated historical processes that led to the territory becoming part of the state of J&K, and China’s interest in it post the occupation of Tibet in 1950.

    Beginning of the Chinese claim

    • In July 1958, an official monthly magazine in China published a map of the country that would in the next few months become a bone of contention between India and its East Asian neighbour.
    • The map in question showed large parts of the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) and the Himalayan territory of Ladakh as part of China.
    • Soon after ‘China pictorial’ came out with the new Chinese map, the leaders of both countries began writing to each other frequently regarding Ladakh.
    • The exchange of letters between Jawaharlal Nehru and his Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai was followed by the Sino-Indian war of 1962.
    • The war also led to the formation of the loosely demarcated Line of Actual Control (LAC) running through Ladakh.

    The Integration of Ladakh into India

    • Historically and culturally the state was intrinsically linked to neighbouring Tibet.
    • Language and religion linked Ladakh and Tibet; politically too, they shared a common history.
    • Ladakh was part of the Tibetan empire which broke up after the assassination of King Langdarma in 742 CE.
    • Up until the Dogra invasion of 1834, Ladakh was an independent Himalayan state, much the same way as Bhutan and Sikkim.
    • As the Sikhs acquired Kashmir in 1819, Emperor Ranjit Singh turned his ambition towards Ladakh.
    • But it was Gulab Singh, the Dogra feudatory of the Sikhs in Jammu, who went ahead with the task of integrating Ladakh into Jammu and Kashmir.

    British interests in Ladakh

    • The British East India Company, which was by now steadily establishing itself in India, had lacked interest in Ladakh initially.
    • However, it did show enthusiasm for the Dogra invasion of the area, with the hope that as a consequence, a large portion of Tibetan trade would be diverted to its holdings.
    • The state of J&K was essentially a British creation, formed as a buffer zone where they could meet the Russians.

    The Sino-Sikh War

    • In May 1841, Tibet under the Qing dynasty of China invaded Ladakh with the hope of adding it to the imperial Chinese dominions, leading to the Sino-Sikh war.
    • However, the Sino-Tibetan army was defeated, and the Treaty of Chushul was signed that agreed on no further transgressions or interference in the other country’s frontiers.
    • After the first Anglo-Sikh war of 1845-46, the state of J&K, including Ladakh, was taken out of the Sikh empire and brought under British suzerainty.

    Chinese interest in Ladakh after the occupation of Tibet in 1950

    • The annexation of Tibet by China in 1950 sparked a newfound interest in Ladakh, and particularly so after the 1959 Tibetan uprising that erupted in Lhasa with Dalai Lama’s political asylum in India.
    • In attempting to crush the Tibetan revolt while at the same time denying its existence, the Chinese have used methods which have brought China and India into sharp conflict.
    • To begin with, the road that the Chinese built across Ladakh in 1956-57 was important for the maintenance of their control over Tibet.
    • The building of the road through Ladakh upset Nehru’s government. The diplomatic negotiations failed, and the war of 1962 followed.

    Why conflict has flared up again?

    • There are two layers to this. First, up to 2013, India’s infrastructural development in that area was minimal.
    • From 2013, India started pushing for infrastructure projects there and by 2015; it became a major defence priority.
    • The second layer is the August 5, 2019 decision (to remove the special status of J&K and downgrade the state into two Union Territories).
    • From the Chinese point of view, they would have assumed that if India makes Ladakh a Union Territory, they would be reasserting its control over the entire state.
    • Moreover, it is also important to note that over time, Xinjiang which is part of Aksai Chin, has become very important to China for their internal reasons.

    The dispute

    • The British legacy of the map of the territory continued to remain the ground upon which India laid its claim on the area.
    • India insisted that the border was, for the most part, recognised and assured by treaty and tradition; the Chinese argued it had never really been delimited.
    • The claims of both governments rested in part on the legacy of imperialism; British imperialism (for India), and Chinese imperialism (over Tibet) for China.

  • History, the standoff, and policy worth rereading

    In the changing circumstances, there is a need for recalibration of foreign policy when dealing with China. This article draws on a policy approach adopted by Nehru and suggests 4 areas to focus on while devising the foreign policy.

    India must pay attention to “five fingers”

    • The deadly clashes at Galwan and the ongoing standoff between India and China on the ridges or “fingers” around the Pangong Tso are a metaphor for the wider conflict between the two countries.
    • The metaphor refers to all the areas that Chinese strategy refers to as the “five fingers of the Tibetan palm”.
    • According to the construct, attributed to Mao and cited in the 1950s by Chinese officials, Xizang (Tibet) was China’s right palm, and it was its responsibility to “liberate” the fingers.
    • Fiver fingers are defined as Ladakh, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, and the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA, or Arunachal Pradesh).
    • Sixty years ago, India began to set about ensuring that quite the reverse ensued, and all five fingers were more closely attached to India, not China.
    • As the government of India grapples with its next steps at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), it must cast a similarly grand strategy, to renew its compact with each of those areas today.

    Chines propaganda before 1962 War

    • In the 1950s, even after India and China signed the Panchsheel agreement in 1954.
    • And before the 1962 China-India war, the Nehru government had begun to worry about some of China’s proclamations.
    • Especially after the flight of the Dalai Lama to India in 1959, China began to demand “self-determination in Kashmir”, wrote former Foreign Secretary T.N. Kaul in his memoirs.
    •  More importantly, school textbooks there began to depict the “five fingers” as a part of China.

    India’s three-pronged foreign policy form past

    •  India’s defeat in the 1962 war has been studied in great detail, what is perhaps not so well understood is the three-pronged foreign policy New Delhi set into motion at the time, that provided an effective counter to Mao’s five finger policy over the course of the century.

    Following are the 3 elements that also formed the part of past policy, with the addition of Jammu and Kashmir status change.

    1. Focus on border infrastructure and governance

    • The first was a push for building border infrastructure and governance.
    • In the mid-1950s the government piloted a project to build the Indian Frontier Administrative Services (IFAS) for overseeing NEFA (Arunachal Pradesh) and other areas along the India-China frontier.
    • The Foreign secretary was the Chair of the IFAS selection board.
    • And many who enlisted in the cadre overlapped between the Indian Foreign Service, the Indian Administrative Service and the Indian Police Service, and rotated between postings in the most remote tribal areas and embassies in the region.
    • A special desk was created in the Ministry of External Affairs for officers who would tour all the regions from NEFA to Ladakh in order to make suggestions for the rapid development of these areas.
    • While India’s border infrastructure is only now catching up with the infrastructure China built in the course of the next few decades, its base was made during the brief period the IFAS existed, before it was wound up in 1968.
    • An idea before its time, the IFAS’s role has since been transferred to the Indian Army and the Border Roads Organisation (BRO).

    Idea worth revisiting: IFAS

    • IFAS is an idea worth revisiting, especially as areas along the frontier continue to complain of neglect and a lack of focus from the Centre.
    • In 2019, the Chief Ministers of Arunachal Pradesh and Mizoram called for the resurrection of the IFAS.

    2. Outreach and treaties

    • The second prong were a series of treaties that were signed around that time with neighbours such as Nepal and Bhutan.
    •  And the consolidation of control, militarily and administratively, of other territories that acceded to India, including Ladakh as a part of Jammu and Kashmir (1947), and NEFA (1951).
    • In 1950, India signed a treaty with Sikkim that made it a “protectorate”.
    • By 1975 the Indira Gandhi Government had annexed Sikkim and made it the 22nd State of India.
    • Each of these treaties built unique relationships with New Delhi, tying countries such as Nepal and Bhutan in ways that were seen as a “win-win” for both sides at the time.

    Treaties outliving their utility

    • Over time, the treaties have outlived their utility.
    • And the benefits of unique ties with Nepal and Bhutan, including open borders and ease of movement, jobs and education for their youth as well as India’s influential support on the world stage, have waned in public memory.

    What explains difference in Nepal and Bhutan for India

    • One of the reasons that China has been able to make inroads into Nepal and not with Bhutan, is that the government renegotiated its 1949 Treaty of Perpetual Peace and Friendship with Bhutan.
    • The India-Bhutan 1949 Treaty was replaced with the India-Bhutan Friendship Treaty in 2007.
    • 2007 treaty dropped an article that had committed Bhutan “to beguided” by India on its external affairs policy.
    • This has held India and Bhutan ties in good stead thus far, even during the Doklam stand-off between India and China in 2017 in the face of severe pressure from China.
    • However, despite years of requests from Kathmandu, New Delhi has dragged its feet on reviewing its 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal.
    • and on accepting a report the Eminent Persons’ Group (EPG) on Nepal-India relations has produced that recommends a new treaty.
    • New treaties may not, in themselves reduce India’s security threat from China in its neighbourhood.
    • But they create space for a more mutually responsive diplomacy that is necessary to nurture special relationships.

    3. Tibet strategy: India must chart a more prominent role

    • For the third prong, India’s policy towards the “palm” or Tibet, itself should be looked at more closely as well.
    • While New Delhi’s decision to shelter the Dalai Lama and lakhs of his followers since 1959 is a policy that is lauded.
    • But it does not change the need for New Delhi to look into the future of its relationship, both with the Tibetan refugee community in India, which has lived here in limbo for decades, as well as with its future leadership.
    • At present, the Dalai Lama has the loyalty of Tibetans worldwide, but in the future, the question over who will take up the political leadership of the community looms large.
    • The Karmapa Lama, who lived in India after his flight from China in 2000, and was groomed as a possible political successor, has now taken the citizenship of another country and lives mostly in the United States.
    • Meanwhile, China will, without doubt, try to force its own choice on the community as well.
    • Given that it is home to so many Tibetans, India must chart a more prominent role in this discourse.

    4. Introspection of reorganisation in Jammu and Kashmir

    • Finally, it is necessary to introspect on how India’s own reorganisation of Jammu and Kashmir in August 2019 has changed the security matrix and threat parameters for India, and its neighbours.
    • While Pakistan’s extreme reaction to the move was expected, China’s reaction was perhaps not studied enough.
    • Beijing issued a statement decrying the impact on Jammu and Kashmir, and another one specifically on Ladakh.
    • In the statement, China called it an attempt to “undermine China’s territorial sovereignty by unilaterally changing its domestic law”.
    • And warned that the move was “unacceptable and will not come into force”.

    Consider the question “India’s relations with China has always had to factor in the border dispute. But the incidents in recent necessitated a relook at the foreign policy towards China.” In light of this, examine the factors that must form the basis of foreign policy.

    Conclusion

    The impact of the new map of Jammu and Kashmir on ties with Nepal as well, is no coincidence. There is proof enough that now more than ever, as the government readies its hand on dealing with China, it must not lose sight of every finger in play.

  • India-China Border Dispute: A Conflict that has been in the making for years

    This article chronicles the border dispute between the two countries. It began in 1914 and ever after more than a hundred years it still continues. But the latest clash was the deadliest after 1967. Let’s go through past incidents over the border issue.

    1914: A border China never agreed to

    • The conflict stretches back to at least 1914.
    • In 2014 representatives from Britain, the Republic of China and Tibet gathered in Simla to negotiate a treaty that would determine the status of Tibet and effectively settle the borders between China and British India.
    • The Chinese, unhappy at proposed terms that would have allowed Tibet to be autonomous and remain under Chinese control, refused to sign the deal.
    • But Britain and Tibet signed a treaty establishing what would be called the McMahon Line, named after a British colonial official, Henry McMahon, who proposed the border.
    • India maintains that the McMahon Line, a 550-mile frontier that extends through the Himalayas, is the official legal border between China and India.
    • But China has never accepted it.

    1962: India-China War and origin of LAC

    •  Tensions rose throughout the 1950s.
    • The Chinese insisted that Tibet was never independent and could not have signed a treaty creating an international border.
    • There were several failed attempts at peaceful negotiation.
    • China sought to control critical roadways near its western frontier in Xinjiang.
    • India and its Western allies saw any attempts at Chinese incursion as part of a wider plot to export Maoist-style Communism across the region.
    • By 1962, war had broken out.
    • Chinese troops crossed the McMahon Line and took up positions deep in Indian territory, capturing mountain passes and towns.
    • By November China declared a cease-fire, unofficially redrawing the border near where Chinese troops had conquered territory.
    • It was the so-called Line of Actual Control.

    1967: In Sikkim, India pushes China back

    • Tensions came to a head again in 1967 along two mountain passes, Nathu La and Cho La, that connected Sikkim — then a kingdom and a protectorate of India — and China’s Tibet Autonomous Region.
    • A scuffle broke out when Indian troops began laying barbed wire along what they recognized as the border.
    • The scuffles soon escalated when a Chinese military unit began firing artillery shells at the Indians.
    • In the ensuing conflict, more than 150 Indians and 340 Chinese were killed.
    • The clashes in September and October 1967 in those passes would later be considered the second all-out war between China and India.
    • But India prevailed, destroying Chinese fortifications in Nathu La and pushing them farther back into their territory near Cho La.
    • The change in positions, however, meant that China and India each had different and conflicting ideas about the location of the Line of Actual Control.
    • The fighting was the last time that troops on either side would be killed. — until the skirmishes in the Galwan Valley on Tuesday.

    1987: A crisis averted

    • In 1987, the Indian military was conducting a training operation to see how fast it could move troops to the border.
    • The large number of troops and material arriving next to Chinese outposts surprised Chinese commanders — who responded by advancing toward what they considered the Line of Actual Control.
    • Realizing the potential to inadvertently start a war, both India and China de-escalated, and a crisis was averted.

    2013: Stand-off at Daulat Beg Oldi

    • After decades of patrolling the border, a Chinese platoon pitched a camp near Daulat Beg Oldi in April 2013.
    • The Indians soon followed, setting up their own base fewer than 1,000 feet away.
    • The camps were later fortified by troops and heavy equipment.
    • By May, the sides had agreed to dismantle both encampments, but disputes about the location of the Line of Actual Control persisted.

    2017: Doklam Stand-off

    • In June 2017, the Chinese set to work building a road in the Doklam Plateau, an area of the Himalayas controlled not by India, but by its ally Bhutan.
    • Indian troops carrying weapons and operating bulldozers confronted the Chinese with the intention of destroying the road.
    • A standoff ensued, soldiers threw rocks at each other, and troops from both sides suffered injuries.
    • In August, the countries agreed to withdraw from the area, and China stopped construction on the road.

    2020: Ladakh stand-off

    • In May, melees broke out several times.
    • In one clash at the glacial lake Pangong Tso, Indian troops were badly injured and had to be evacuated by helicopter.
    • China bolstered its forces with dump trucks, excavators, troop carriers, artillery and armored vehicles, Indian experts said.
    • What was clear was that it was the most serious series of clashes between the two sides since 2017 — and a harbinger of the deadly confrontation to come.

    Consider the question “Examine the elements that make the border dispute between India and China difficult to resolve.”

    Conclusion

    Border dispute in two giants could easily escalate into a full-blown war. India has to recalibrate the policy approach after the recent clash and take steps that would prepare it for such an eventuality.

  • Changing Nepal and changing ties with India

    Of late, India’s bilateral relations with Nepal has been going south. The latest trigger has been the changes made by Nepal in the map. This article explores the transformation of Nepal and its impact on India-Nepal relations. Despite the efforts by Nepal to explore the options beyond India, ties are still robust between the two countries and this is reflected in more than one ways.

    Let’s map the changes in  Nepal with one constant factor: nationalism

    1. Democracy

    • The obvious change in Nepal is that it is now a democratic republic after nearly 250 years of being a monarchy.
    • The Nepali Congress and Maoist leader, Prachanda, claim democracy (1990) and the abolition of monarchy (2008) as their legacies.

    2. Societal change due to exposure to globalisation

    • More pervasive is the societal change from Nepal’s exposure to globalisation.
    • Geography, too, stands to change, with the Chinese now having the potential to bore through the Himalayas and exhibiting their presence in Kathmandu in economics and politics.

    3. Nationalism

    • The constant in Nepal is nationalism which is really a mask for anti-India sentiment.
    • Politicians use it for personal gain, and it is deeply ingrained in the bureaucracy, academia and the media.
    • Today, Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli is cementing his legacy as a nationalist by extending Nepal’s map into Indian territory.
    • The cartographic aggression and the embedding of the new map in the country’s national emblem and Constitution are untenable and should have been avoided under all circumstances.
    • In 2015, the Nepali Congress government adopted the new Constitution, ignoring India’s concerns.

    4. Identity politics

    • Identity politics with India is also visible within the country.
    • Nepali citizens from the Terai (Madhesis) feel discriminated as being “Indian”.

    To Nepal, their attitudes reflect the angst of a small state. To India, Nepal appears incorrigible.

    Let’s understand how globalisation changed Nepal

    • After democracy was restored in 1990, passports were more liberally issued, and Nepalis began looking for work opportunities globally, beyond just India.
    • West Asia and South-East Asia specifically became major destinations for labour migration.
    • Security uncertainties with the Maoist insurgency at home also propelled the trend of migration.
    • Students and skilled personnel began moving to Europe, the United States, Australia, Thailand and even to Japan and South Korea.
    • As of 2019, nearly a fifth of Nepal’s population, from all parts of the country, were reportedly overseas.
    • At an estimated $8 billion, global remittances account for nearly 30% of Nepal’s nominal GDP.
    • This makes Nepal one of the most remittance-dependent countries in the world.
    • Leftist ideology and the prominent presence of international non-governmental organisations — ostensibly there to resolve conflict and alleviate poverty — have added to Nepal’s exposure to the world.
    • Nepal’s 2011 Census shows that over 80% of its 28 million-strong population were Hindus, and since 1962, it had formally been a Hindu kingdom.
    • The new Constitution in 2015 makes Nepal a secular country.
    • The proliferation of communication technology has also spread a certain cosmopolitanism but without the accompanying metropolitanism.

    Nepal exploring options beyond India

    • Kathmandu has continued its long-standing efforts to spread Nepal’s options beyond India.
    • Multilateral development banks are by far the biggest lenders and players in the country’s development efforts.
    • And in fact, one of Nepal’s largest aid donors is the European Union.
    • India and China are not the only players for big projects either.
    • A long-delayed project to pipe water into Kathmandu was with an Italian company.
    • Major investments in the telecom sector are coming from Malaysia, and the largest international carrier in Nepal is Qatar Airways.

    Weakening of natural bond and responsible factors

    • The outward movement of students, along with with the growth of institutions of higher learning at home, has meant that most young people in Nepal, including emerging contemporary leaders in politics, business or academics, have not studied in India.
    • This lack of common collegiate roots removes a natural bond of previous generations that had provided for better understanding and even empathy.
    • While most Nepalis understand Hindi, because of the popularity of Bollywood, articulation is quite another matter.

    Robust ties with India, despite diversification

    • Despite Nepal’s efforts to diversify its options globally, its linkages with India remain robust.
    • Nepal’s trade with India has grown in absolute terms and continues to account for more than two-thirds of Nepal’s external trade of around $12 billion annually.
    • This clearly reflects the advantages of geography, both physical and societal.
    • India continues to be the largest aggregate investor in Nepal.
    • The massive under-construction Arun-III 900 MW hydro-electric project is slated to singly produce as much power, when completed in five years, as Nepal produces today.
    • Moreover, the peg with the Indian Rupee provides unique stability to the Nepali Rupee.

    Unique advantage to Nepal

    • Nepal’s per-capita income is just above $1,000.
    • While the huge remittance economy has brought a semblance of well-being, the country has a long way to go in reaching prosperity.
    • The relationship with India, with open borders and Nepalis being allowed to live and work freely, provides Nepal a unique advantage and an economic cushion.
    • The latter is particularly important today with COVID-19-caused global contraction positioned to pop the remittance bubble.
    • Neither the Chinese nor any others are likely to write blank cheques.
    • India for its part should also focus on developing its border areas with Nepal, with better roads and amenities of interest (such as shopping malls) to the burgeoning Nepali middle class.
    • This would have economic plusses for both sides and keep ties strong at the people’s level. It would also be an image makeover.

    Consider the question “Despite intermittent disagreements over certain issues, India-Nepal ties remain robust. In light of this, elaborate on the ties between the two countries and suggest ways to find the solution to the latest border dispute between the two countries.”

    Conclusion

    It is important that we update the prism through which we view our relationship with our Himalayan neighbour. We must not forget the past nor turn away from it but, instead, must be mindful of the realities of a changing India and a changing Nepal.

  • What lies behind China’s assertion in Ladakh

    The latest stand-off in Ladakh triggered a debate over the reasons for Chinese actions. While many attribute it to India’s decision to change the constitutional status of J&K, the author of this article points to the widening power differential. So, what are the implications of it? Read the article to know…

    What is argument from China’s side over growing Chinese assertiveness

    •  India’s decision to change the constitutional status of J&K is cited as the reason for Chinesé growing assertiveness in the Ladakh.
    • The Chinese arguments proffered on various occasions since last August have been summarised by Wang Shida, a Chinese scholar in Beijing.
    • Wang argues that India’s move last August has forced China into the Kashmir dispute.
    • The move stimulated China and Pakistan to take counter-actions on the Kashmir issue, and dramatically increased the difficulty in resolving the border issue between China and India.

    And what is India’s stand over this explanation

    • Official Delhi rejects the argument that India’s action has “posed a challenge to the sovereignty of China and Pakistan”.
    • It points out that the constitutional changes altered the nature of the relationship between Delhi and Kashmir within the Indian Union, and that it has no impact on the current territorial disposition with China and Pakistan.
    • The government’s renewed claim over Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir and China-occupied Aksai Chin is simply a restatement of long-standing Indian positions.

    China: Part of Kashmir dispute or not?

    • It might be baffling to hear the argument that Delhi has “forced” Beijing into the Kashmir dispute with Pakistan.
    • China is very much part of the Kashmir dispute.
    • After all, China occupies large parts of Kashmir, including Aksai Chin and parts of Ladakh and sits on the Shaksgam valley ceded to Beijing by Pakistan in 1963.
    • It is important to note a nuance in China’s articulation.
    • The competing claims of Delhi and Islamabad over Kashmir are rooted in their shared understanding that there was a princely state of Jammu and Kashmir in undivided India.
    • For Beijing, the territories it claims have never been part of J&K but belonged to Tibet and Xinjiang.

    Pakistan agreeing to China’s claim

    • That Pakistan has largely swallowed the Chinese argument is reflected in the 1963 agreement on the boundary between “China’s Sinkiang and the contiguous areas the defence of which is under the actual control of Pakistan”.
    • Not entirely surprising, since Pakistan’s primary focus is on getting the Indian-controlled areas of Kashmir rather than claim all the original lands of J&K.

    China’s changing approach to the Kashmir question

    • While its claim to be outside the dispute has been consistent, China’s approach to the Kashmir question has seen considerable variation over the last seven decades and more.
    • Some recent research has delved into Nationalist China’s active efforts to draw the Hunza region of the Gilgit district into a union with China during 1947-48.
    • The Mir of Hunza, Jamal Khan, opened negotiations with officials of Xinjiang, but in the end, opted to accede to Pakistan.
    • Communist China did not abandon the efforts of the Nationalist government and continued to show Hunza as part of its territory until the early 1960s.
    • In the 1950s, at the height of the “Bhai-Bhai” phase, China avoided taking a position on the Kashmir question.
    • After the 1962 war, China’s position aligned with Pakistan’s as Beijing called for “self-determination” in Kashmir.
    • After the Maoist era came to a close and Deng Xiaoping took charge in the late 1980s, China began to moderate its Kashmir position and find a better balance in its bilateral relations with India and Pakistan.
    • In the mid-1990s, in a significant setback to Islamabad, Beijing urged both India and Pakistan to put aside the Kashmir issue and focus on developmental cooperation.
    • But China’s position on the boundary dispute in general and the Kashmir question in particular tended to harden against India since the late 2000s.
    • That’s when Beijing became more conscious of the widening power differential with all its neighbours, including India.

    So, what explains China’s latest move?

    •  The ground reality has not been altered by India’s constitutional changes.
    • It is being changed by the PLA’s growing military capabilities and the political will to use them.
    • India’s constitutional changes might, in the end, look like a minor defensive move amid China’s continuing gains in Kashmir across the India-Pakistan divide.
    • Although Beijing has let Pakistan keep Hunza for now, it has not really given up its claims on the region under the 1963 agreement.
    • The CPEC, which enters Pakistan through Hunza, has laid the foundation for ever-larger Chinese economic influence in Gilgit-Baltistan.

    What is the implication of this in the future?

    • China’s ability to nibble away at the LAC in Ladakh will only grow as the military balance continues to shift in the PLA’s favour.
    • While India’s significant current military deployment to counter Chinese mobilisation may yet help persuade Beijing to step back, there is no escaping the longer-term trend.
    • If Delhi can’t redress the growing military imbalance and as Islamabad becomes even more dependent on Beijing, China will loom larger than ever on the entire Kashmir region.
    • That is the real message from the new Chinese affirmation that it is now part of the Kashmir question.

    Consider the question “Rather than Indian’s action in its internal matters, it’s China’s widening power differential with India that explains the Chinese assertive actions on the disputed border locations. Comment.

    Conclusion

    In raking up the issue at the UNSC, raising economic presence in the Northern Areas and probing India’s military and political vulnerabilities, China is highlighting its new salience for Kashmir. This is part of China’s growing geopolitical impact all across the Great Himalayas. And India must prepare itself to face this changing reality.