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Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • Greater Male Connectivity Project (GMCP)

    India will fund the implementation of the Greater Male Connectivity Project (GMCP) in the Maldives with $500 mn packages.

    Try this question from 2014:

    Which one of the following pairs of islands is separated from each other by the ‘Ten Degree Channel’?

    (a) Andaman and Nicobar

    (b) Nicobar and Sumatra

    (c) Maldives and Lakshadweep

    (d) Sumatra and Java

    About Greater Male Connectivity Project

    • The GMCP will consist of a number of bridges and causeways to connect Male to Villingili, Thilafushi and Gulhifahu islands that span 6.7 km.
    • It would ease much of the pressure of the main capital island of Male for commercial and residential purposes.
    • When completed, the project would render the Chinese built Sinamale Friendship bridge connecting Male to two other islands, thus far the most visible infrastructure project in the islands.
    • At present, India-assisted projects in the region include water and sewerage projects on 34 islands, reclamation project for the Addl island, a port on Gulhifalhu, airport redevelopment at Hanimadhoo, and a hospital and a cricket stadium in Hulhumale.
  • Strategic autonomy in foreign policy

    India has been maintaining strategic autonomy in its foreign policy since Independence. But the end of Cold War and growing closeness towards the U.S. raises concerns. This article addresses this issue.

    India’s foreign policy: characterised by autonomy

    • India has historically prided itself as an independent developing country which does not take orders from or succumb to pressure from great powers.
    • Indian maintained this stance in its foreign policy when the world order was bipolar from 1947 to 1991, dominated by the U.S. and Russia.
    • Also, when the world was unipolar from 1991 to 2008, dominated by the U.S.
    • Or when it is multipolar as at the present times.
    • The need for autonomy in making foreign policy choices has remained constant.

    Flexibility in foreign policy

    • However, strategic autonomy has often been adjusted in India’s history as per the changing milieu.
    • During the 1962 war with China, Prime Minister Nehru, had to appeal to the U.S. for emergency military aid.
    • In the build-up to the 1971 war with Pakistan, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi had to enter a Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union to ward off both China and the U.S.
    • And in Kargil in 1999, India welcomed a direct intervention by the U.S. to force Pakistan to back down.
    • In all the above examples, India did not become any less autonomous when geopolitical circumstances compelled it to enter into de facto alliance-like cooperation with major powers.
    • Rather, India secured its freedom, sovereignty and territorial integrity by manoeuvering the great power equations and playing the realpolitik game.

    Concerns over India’s growing closeness to the U.S.

    • As India is facing China’s growing aggression along the LAC, Non-alignment 2.0 with China and the U.S. makes little sense.
    • Fears that proximity to the U.S. will lead to loss of India’s strategic autonomy are overblown.
    • Because independent India has never been subordinated to a foreign hegemon.

    What should be India’s strategy

    • In the threat environment marked by a pushy China, India should aim to have both- American support and stay as an independent power centre by cooperation with middle powers in Asia and around the world.
    • For India complete dependence on the U.S. to counter China would be an error.
    • Such complete dependence would be detrimental to India’s national interest such as its ties with Iran and Russia and efforts to speed up indigenous defence modernisation.
    • A wide and diverse range of strategic partners, including the U.S. is the only viable diplomatic way forward in the current emerging multipolar world order.

    Consider the question “Does India’s close alignment with the U.S. harms its strategic autonomy? Suggest the strategy to balance India’s security concerns and maintaining strategic autonomy.”

    Conclusion

    We are free and self-reliant not through isolation or alliance with one great power, but only in variable combinations with several like-minded partners. India is familiar with the phrase ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy. It is time to maximise its potential.

  • A new direction for India-U.S. ties

    This article analyses what the new shift in the India-U.S. ties will require for the mutual benefit.

    Following 12 factors would influence the depth and longevity of the India-U.S. ties.

    1) Outcome of the  U.S. Presidential elections

    • The success of India’s new bonding with the U.S. will depend on the outcome of the U.S. Presidential elections.
    • The Democratic party candidate with the Left wing and liberals in the U.S. has been highly critical of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act.

    2) Need to build trust with the U.S.

    • India purchased of the S-400 air defence missile system from Russia disregarding the U.S. concerns.
    • India refused to send Indian troops to Afghanistan.
    • We need to build trust with the U.S. that we will give to the U.S. as good as it gives us.
    • For this structuring we must realise that India-U.S. relations require give and take on both sides.
    • What India needs to take today is for dealing with the Ladakh confrontation with China.
    • India needs U.S. hardware military equipment.

    3)  Fighting the U.S. enemy in neighbourhood

    • The U.S. needs India to fight her enemies in the neighbourhood such as in Afghanistan.
    • India should send two divisions gradually to Afghanistan and relieve U.S. troops to go home

    4) Intelligence sharing and cooperation

    • India needs the support of the U.S. and its ally, Israel, in cyberwarfare, satellite mappings of China and Pakistan.
    • There is a need for sharing intercepts of electronic communication, hard intelligence on terrorists, and controlling the military and the Inter-Services Intelligence in Pakistan.

    5) Developing naval bases

    • India needs the U.S. to completely develop the Andaman & Nicobar, and also the Lakshadweep Islands as a naval and air force base.
    • These naval bases can be used by the U.S  and shared along with its allies such as Indonesia and Japan.

    6) Economic relations and India’s concerns

    • The economic relations must be based on macroeconomic commercial principles.
    • Free, indiscriminate flow of U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) is not in India’s national interest.

    7) Technology sharing

    • India needs technologies such as thorium utilisation, desalination of sea water, and hydrogen fuel cells.

    8) U.S. should allow import of agricultural product

    • The U.S. must allow India’s exports of agricultural products including Bos indicus milk, which are of highly competitive prices in the world.

    9) FDI in India

    • FDI should be allowed into India selectively from abroad, including from the U.S.
    • FDI in India should be based on the economic theory of comparative advantage and not on subsidies and gratis.

    10) Tariffs

    • Tariffs of both India and the U.S. should be lowered, and the Indian rupee should be gradually revalued to ₹35 to a dollar.
    • Later, with the economy picking up, the rupee rate should go below 10 to the dollar.

    11) Stay away from certain issues

    •  India should not provide the U.S. with our troops to enter Tibet, or be involved in the Hong Kong and Taiwan issue.
    • There is always a possibility of a leadership change in China.
    • Thus, China’s policy changed very favourably towards India.
    • In the cases of Tibet, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, we have made explicit agreements.
    • In the case of Tibet, two formal treaties were signed by Nehru (1954) and A.B. Vajpayee (2003).

    12) Trilateral commitment to world peace

    • In the long run, India, the U.S., and China should form a trilateral commitment for world peace provided Chinese current international policies undergo a healthy change.

    Consider the question “What are the factors influencing the India-U.S. ties? Suggest the pathway to address the issues that hamper the deepening of India-U.S. ties.”

    Conclusion

    Both countries need to recognise each other’s concern and work towards the deepening of the ties for the mutual benefit and with a view to dealing with the challenges confronting both the countries.

  • What India should consider about the proposition to isolate China

    The economic grip China exerts on the world protects it from the threat of isolation. This article examines this issue and its implications for India.

    Worsening U.S.-China ties and implications for other countries

    • After years of cooperating with one another, the U.S. and China are currently at the stage of confrontation.
    • Both are seeking allies to join their camps.
    • This places several countries in Asia, in a difficult position as most of them, loathe to take sides.
    • The U.S. may not necessarily be the first choice for many countries of Asia and the Asia-Pacific region.
    • In the case of China, it is clearly more feared than loved.

    China’s aggression

    •  Beijing’s virtual takeover of Hong Kong has only confirmed what had long been known about China’s intentions.
    • In March-April this year, China further stepped up its aggressive actions, renaming almost 80 geographical features in the region as an index of Chinese sovereignty.
    •  Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia and South Korea have all complained about China’s menacing postures in their vicinity.

    How countries are resisting China

    • Hardly any country in Asia is willing to openly confront China, and side with the U.S.
    • East Asian countries explain that China was always known to be over-protective of the South China Sea.
    • And China consider South China Sea a natural shield against possible hostile intervention by outside forces inimical to it.
    • No U.S. assurance and Chinese aggression has been enough to make countries in the region openly side with the U.S. and against China.

    China’s economic grip and lessons for India

    • Despite a series of diktats from Washington to restrict economic and other relations, China remains unfazed.
    • China seems confident that its stranglehold on the global economy ensures that it does not face any real challenge.
    • It would be wise for India to recognise this.
    • It is equally necessary to realise how fickle some of these countries can be when it comes to economic issues.
    •  At a recent meeting in Washington Australia (a member of the Quad) made it clear that China is important for Australia.
    • Likewise, the U.K.’s Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, recently stated in its Parliament, that the U.K. wants a positive relationship with China.
    • It is evident that few nations across the world are willing to risk China’s ire because of strong economic ties.

    India’s relations with neighbouring countries: concerns

    • India’s relations with Nepal, meanwhile, have hit a roadblock over the Kalapani area.
    • In Sri Lanka, the return of the Rajapaksas to power after the recent elections does not augur too well for India-Sri Lanka relations.
    • The strain in India-Bangladesh relations is a real cause for concern since it can provide a beachhead against Chinese activities in the region.

    Growing Chinese presence in India’s sphere of influence

    •  In July, the Chinese Foreign Minister organised a virtual meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Nepal, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
    • In this meeting, China proposed economic corridor plan with Nepal, styled as the Trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network.
    • China has also made headway in Iran to an extent, again at India’s expense.

    Conclusion

    Geo-balancing is not happening to China’s disadvantage. This lesson must be well understood when India plan its future strategy.

  • Back in news: Indus Water Treaty (IWT)

    India has refused a request by Pakistan to hold a meeting on issues around the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) at the Attari check post near the India-Pakistan border.

    The IWT has been in existence since 1960, and reached a flash point in the aftermath of the Uri attacks in 2016 with PM declaring that “blood and water couldn’t flow together”.

    About Indus Waters Treaty, 1960

    • The IWT is a water-distribution treaty between India and Pakistan, brokered by the World Bank signed in Karachi in 1960.
    • According to this agreement, control over the water flowing in three “eastern” rivers of India — the Beas, the Ravi and the Sutlej was given to India
    • The control over the water flowing in three “western” rivers of India — the Indus, the Chenab and the Jhelum was given to Pakistan
    • The treaty allowed India to use western rivers water for limited irrigation use and unrestricted use for power generation, domestic, industrial and non-consumptive uses such as navigation, floating of property, fish culture, etc. while laying down precise regulations for India to build projects
    • India has also been given the right to generate hydroelectricity through the run of the river (RoR) projects on the Western Rivers which, subject to specific criteria for design and operation is unrestricted.

    Talks stalled on key projects

    • Among the key points on the table was evolving a procedure to solve differences on technical aspects governing the construction of the Ratle run-of-the-river (RoR) project on the Chenab in the Kishtwar district.
    • India has called for the appointment of a ‘neutral’ party while Pakistan favours a Court of Arbitration to agree upon a final resolution on the design parameters of this hydropower project.
    • According to the IWT, India has the right to build RoR projects on the three ‘western’ rivers — the Chenab, Jhelum and Indus — provided it does so without substantially impeding water flow in Pakistan downstream.
    • Pakistan believes that the project’s current design does pose a serious impediment and has told the World Bank that it wants a Court of Arbitration (CoA) set up to decide on the issue.
    • India says this is only a technical issue and mutually solvable.
  • What are Confucius Institutes, and why are they under the scanner in India?

    • The Ministry of Education (previously HRD) had sent a letter to several institutions seeking information about the activities of their Confucius Institutes (CIs) and Chinese language training centres.
    • This has brought the spotlight to China’s CI programme, a key pillar of Beijing’s global soft power effort, and raised questions about the future of India-China cooperation in the education space.

    Try this question for mains:

    Q.“It cannot be business as usual with China after the border clash.” Critically comment.

    What are the Confucius Institutes (CI)?

    • Starting with a CI in Seoul in 2004, China’s National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language (NOCFL) known as Hanban establishes CI.
    • China has established 550 CIs and 1,172 Confucius Classrooms (CCs) housed in foreign institutions, in 162 countries.
    • As the Hanban explains on its website, following the experience of the British Council, Alliance Française and Germany’s Goethe-Institut, China began “establishing non-profit public institutions which aim to promote Chinese language and culture in foreign countries”.

    What is the presence of CIs in India?

    • India is reviewing the presence of CIs in seven universities, in addition to 54 MoUs on inter-school cooperation involving China, which is not connected to the CI programme.

    How have CIs been viewed around the world?

    • The CI arrangement has generated debate in the West, where some universities have closed the institutes amid concern over the influence of the Chinese government and it’s funding on host institutions.
    • Closures of some CIs have been reported in the United States, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Sweden.
    • While the closures in the West have made news, these cases still represent a minority. Faced with this backlash, China is now rebranding the programme.
    • Most of the 550 CIs and more than 1,000 CCs around the world are still active, with a presence spanning Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, and across Asia.

    What does it mean for India-China relations?

    • CIs and CCs had already been in India for more than 10 years.
    • Even prior to the border skirmishes, Indian authorities had viewed the CI arrangement somewhat warily.
    • Along with the new move to review CIs, Mandarin has been dropped from the list of foreign languages that can be taught in schools in the new National Education Policy.

    Not a perfect move

    • Recent moves by India shows that it cannot be business as usual with China after the border clash.
    • However, India’s long-term objectives are not clear.
    • De-emphasizing learning Mandarin is neither likely to impact China’s stance on the border nor help India in developing the expertise and resources it needs in dealing with China.
  • Pakistan’s new Political Map

    Recently Pakistani PM announced a new political map of Pakistan.

    Do you think that the recent launch of new political maps depicting Indian territories by Pakistan would make any difference on the international community’s stance on Kashmir?

    A chain reaction

    • With this, Pakistan became the third country to launch a new political map after India and Nepal did the same.
    • India had reiterated its territorial claims in J&K, and Ladakh with the new map; this triggered a reaction from Nepal which contested Indian claims in the Kalapani region of Pithoragarh district.

    What are the features of the new map?

    • The new political map of Pakistan has claimed the entire region of Jammu and Kashmir stretching all the way to the edge of Ladakh.
    • The map also claims Junagarh and Manavadar, a former princely State and territory, respectively that are part of present-day Gujarat.
    • Pakistan also claimed the entire territory and water bodies that fall in the Sir Creek region in the westernmost part of India.

    Defiance of old agreements

    • The territorial claims of Pakistan are, however, of a far greater extent and challenge many of the past understandings and treaties.
    • This clearly runs counter to the Simla Agreement which treated Kashmir as a bilateral matter.
    • It leaves out a claim line at the eastern end of J&K indicating Pakistan’s willingness to make China a third party in the Kashmir issue.

    How different is it from previous ones?

    • A similar map has been part of school textbooks of Pakistan for many years which highlights the territorial aspiration of Pakistan over the northern part of the subcontinent.
    • The document also maintains bits of reality on the ground as it shows the Line of Control in Kashmir in a red-dotted line.
    • The map may be used to provide legal cover for some of Islamabad’s territorial ambitions, especially in Kashmir and Sir Creek.

    A Cartographical warfare

    • The map is likely to lead to changes in Pakistan’s position on territorial disputes with India.
    • By demanding the entire J&K region, Pak is changing the main features of its Kashmir discourse as it includes the Jammu region prominently.
    • The inclusion of Junagarh and Manavadar opens fundamental issues of territorial sovereignty of India.
    • Manavadar, a princely territory, joined India on February 15, 1948, and Indian troops marched into Junagarh in September that year incorporating it into Indian Territory.
    • By normalizing Islamabad’s claims over these former princely territories, Pakistan is most likely to assert its rights over the former princely State of Hyderabad as well.

    What does Pakistan plan to gain by this exercise?

    • Sir Creek is a collection of water bodies that extend from the Arabian Sea deep inside the territory of Kutch and is rich in biodiversity and mangrove forests.
    • India’s position on Sir Creek is based on the Kutch arbitration case of 1966-69.
    • The new map can be used to reassert Pakistan’s claims regarding the Rann which it had lost in the arbitration conducted in Geneva.
    • India’s position regarding Sir Creek is based on the fact that the arbitration had granted the entire Rann and its marshy areas to India while leaving the solid land across the Rann to Pakistan.
    • By demanding the demarcation to shift towards the eastern bank, Pakistan appears to be going back also on the spirit of the Rann of Kutch arbitration where the overwhelming evidence of maps supported India’s claims.

    Are there any claims on its western borders?

    • The map is silent about territorial claims in the west and northwest of Pakistan.
    • It indicates Islamabad’s acceptance of the Durand Line as the border with Afghanistan.
    • The reality on the ground, however, shows problems that continue to haunt Pakistan on that front as well where law and order have been difficult to maintain because of free movement of armed fighters.
    • A deadly clash between Afghan civilians and Pakistani troops near its Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province is a usual discourse.
    • The resultant situation has placed Afghan and Pakistani troops in a confrontational position.
  • Global coalition of democracies amid Chinese assertion

    In the recent speed Mike Pompeo, the US Secretary of State, floated the idea of an ‘alliance of democracies’. This article discusses its implications for India.

    Two propositions on China

    • The US Secretary of State laid out two propositions.
    • One is that nearly five decades of US engagement with China have arrived at a dead-end.
    • Second is that the US can’t address the China challenge alone and called for collective action.
    • He mused on whether “it’s time for a new grouping of like-minded nations, a new alliance of democracies.”

    How it matters for India?

    • Both the propositions signal the breakdown of the relationship between the world’s two most important powers.
    • They also reflect on the need to create new frameworks to cope with emerging global challenges.
    • China, is a large neighbour of India and America, is India’s most important partner makes the new context rather different from the Cold War.

    Concerns for India in the propositions

    •  Many in Delhi would like to know if the current direction of China policy will endure if Joe Biden wins the presidential election in November.
    • India must pay close attention to the unfolding China debate in the US.
    • India also note the structural changes in American engagement with China over the last two decades.
    •  Delhi will certainly avoid calling the group proposed by US Secretary of State an “alliance”.
    • India would rather have it described as a “coalition of democracies”.

    Idea of ‘Coalition of democracies’

    • Over the last many years, India has become comfortable with the idea of a political partnership with the world’s leading democracies.
    • India also supported past US initiatives like-Clinton Administrations “Community of Democracies”, Bush Administrations democracy promotion fund at the UN.
    • Delhi has also welcomed President Trump’s initiative to convene an expanded gathering of the G-7 leaders.
    • The idea of democracies working together has an enduring appeal for the US.
    • India figures in this American vision is relatively new. So is Delhi’s readiness to reciprocate.

    Consider the question “In the ongoing geopolitical situation the U.S. has proposed the idea of ‘alliance of democracies’. Where does India feature in this vision and what are the implications of it for India.”

    Conclusion

    Constructing a global coalition of democracies will take much work and quite some time. But engaging with that initiative, amidst the rise and assertion of China, should open a whole range of new possibilities for Indian foreign and security policies.


    Original article:

    https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/us-india-democracy-china-cold-war-global-economy-6526409/

  • Indian foreign policy and decline in soft power in neighbourhood

    The article examines the issue of declining political capital in India’s neighbourhood and the factors responsible for this. 

    India’s standing in neighbourhood: Past

    • Not long ago, India was seen as a natural rising power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region.
    • It was the de facto leader of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
    • It has historical and cultural ties with Nepal.
    • It enjoyed traditional goodwill and influence in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.
    • It had made investments worth billions of dollars in Afghanistan and cultivated vibrant ties with the post-Taliban stakeholders in Kabul.
    • It had committed itself to multilateralism and the Central Asian connectivity project, with Iran being its gateway.
    • It was competing and cooperating with China at the same time.

    India’s relations in with the neighbourhood: Present

    • India is perhaps facing its gravest national security crisis in 20 years, with China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
    • SAARC is defunct.
    • Nepal has turned hostile having adopted a new map and revived border disputes with India.
    • Sri Lanka has tilted towards China.
    • Bangladesh is clearly miffed at the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019.
    • When Afghanistan is undergoing a major transition, India is out of the multi-party talks.
    • Iran has inaugurated a railway link project connecting the Chabahar port, on the Gulf of Oman, to Zahedan.

    What are the factors responsible for this?

    When we dig deep, three problems can be found which are more or less linked to this decline.

    1) Alignment with US

    • As India started moving away from non-alignment, there has been a steady erosion in India’s strategic autonomy.
    • India’s official policy is that it is committed to multilateralism.
    •  When India started deepening its partnership with the United States, New Delhi began steadily aligning its policies with U.S. interests.
    • The case of Iran is the best example.
    • India’s deepening defence and military ties with the U.S.  probably altered Beijing’s assessment of India.
    • One of the reasons for the shift could be Beijing’s assessment that India has already become a de facto ally of the U.S.
    • The forceful altering of the status quo on the border is a risky message as much to New Delhi as it is to Washington.

    2) Domestic politics

    • The passing of the CAA is regionalisation of the domestic problems of the countries in India’s neighbourhood.
    • Bangladesh took offence at the CAA and the National Register of Citizens, there were anti-India protests even in Afghanistan.
    • CAA also drove new wedges between India and the countries that had a Muslim majority and were friendly to India in the neighbourhood.
    • The abrogation of the special status of Jammu and Kashmir was another such move.
    • But it damaged India’s reputation as a responsible democratic power and gave propaganda weapons to Pakistan.
    • The change of status quo in Jammu and Kashmir, could be another factor that prompted the Chinese to move aggressively towards the border in Ladakh.

    3) Misplaced confidence

    • Great powers wait to establish their standing before declaring that they have arrived.
    • China bided its time for four decades before it started taking on the mighty U.S.
    • India should learn from at least these modern examples.
    • If it did, it would not have used high-handedness in Nepal during the country’s constitutional crisis and caused a traditional and civilisational ally to turn hostile.
    • The updated political map which India released in November rubbed salt into the wound on the Nepal border.

    Consider the question “India’s standing in its neighbourhood has been on the decline for some time now. Examine the factors responsible for this.”

    Conclusion

    To address the current crises, India has to reconsider its foreign policy trajectory. It does not lack resources to claim what is its due in global politics. What it lacks is strategic depth.

    Original article:

    https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/needed-a-map-for-indias-foreign-policy/article32206877.ece

  • Deepening ties with South Korea

    South Korea’s technological advancement and manufacturing capabilities can be helpful in India’s economic growth and human resource development. Seoul’s successful development story of the last few decades can complement Modi’s vision of making a “New India” by 2022.