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Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • Multilateralism in the new cold war

    The world is going through turmoil. The new world that will emerge will be different from what we have known. This provides India with some unique opportunities. This article explains the changes that are taking place and gives the outline of the changing order. So, how can India set and shape the global response? And what should be the principles on which the new multilateralism should be based? Read to know…

    Opportunity for India to set the global response

    • As chair of the Executive Board of the World Health Assembly – India can set the global response in terms of multilateralism, not just medical issues.
    • How can India set a global response in terms of multilateralism? Consider the following- a rare alignment of stars for agenda-setting.
    • 1) In September, the United Nations General Assembly will discuss the theme, “The Future We Want”.
    • 2) In 2021, India joins the UN Security Council (non-permanent seat).
    • 3) And chairs the BRICS Summit in 2021.
    • 4) Also hosts the G-20 in 2022.
    • New principles for international system: At the online summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, in May, Prime Minister Modi called for new principles for the international system.
    • His new globalisation model based on humanity, fairness and equality has wide support in a more equal world as, for the first time since 1950, everyone is experiencing the same (virus) threat.

    Changing global context

    • China is losing influence and the dynamics in its relations with the United States.
    • And Asia again is emerging as the centre of global prosperity.
    • The global governance, economy, scientific research and society are all in need of being re-invented.
    • India should use this opportunity to recover our global thought leadership.

    The US-China powerplay and its consequences for multilateralism

    • The clash between China and the U.S. at the just concluded World Health Assembly in May marks the end of the multilateralism of the past 70 years.
    • The donor-recipient relationship between developed and developing countries has ended with China’s pledge of $2-billion.
    • The agenda-setting role of the G7 over UN institutions and global rules has also been effectively challenged by WHO ignoring the reform diktat of the U.S. leading to its withdrawal, and characterisation of the G7 as “outdated”.
    • The U.S. has also implicitly rejected the G20 and UN Security Council, for an expanded G7 “to discuss the future of China”.
    • Important shift in the UN: After World War II, the newly independent states were not consulted when the U.S. imposed global institutions fostering trade, capital and technology dependence.
    • This was done ignoring the socio-economic development of these countries.
    • But social and economic rights have emerged to be as important as political and procedural rights.
    • Against this backdrop, China’s President Xi Jinping deftly endorsed the UN Resolution on equitable access to any new vaccine.

    Emergence of Asia and China: Challenges for the US and the West

    • The U.S. faces an uphill task in seeking to lead a new multidimensional institution in the face of China’s re-emergence.
    • The re-emergence of China is based on technology, innovation and trade balancing U.S. military superiority.
    • At the same time, there is a clear trend of declining global trust in free-market liberalism, central to western civilisation.
    • With the West experiencing a shock comparable to the one experienced by Asia, 200 years ago, the superiority of western civilisation is also under question.
    • The novel coronavirus pandemic has accelerated the shift of global wealth to Asia suggesting an inclusive global order based on principles drawn from ancient Asian civilisations.
    • Colonised Asia played no role in shaping the Industrial Revolution.
    • But, the Digital Revolution will be shaped by different values.
    • It is really this clash that multilateralism has now to resolve.

    World is questioning both U.S. and China’s exceptionalism

    • China has come out with alternative governance mechanisms to the U.S.-dominated International Monetary Fund, World Bank and World Trade Organization with its all-encompassing Belt and Road Initiative.
    • The U.S., European Union and Japan are re-evaluating globalisation as it pertains to China and the U.S. is unabashedly “America First”.
    • The world is questioning both U.S. and China’s exceptionalism.
    • For India, the strategic issue is neither adjustment to China’s power nor deference to U.S. leadership.

    Opportune moment for India to propose new multilateralism

    • The global vacuum, shift in relative power and its own potential, provides India the capacity to articulate a benign multilateralism.
    • It should include in its fold NAM-Plus that resonates with large parts of the world and brings both BRICS and the G7 into the tent.
    • This new multilateralism should rely on outcomes, not rules, ‘security’ downplayed for ‘comparable levels of wellbeing’ and a new P-5 that is not based on the G7.

    India in a important role

    • China, through an opinion piece by its Ambassador in India, has suggested writing “together a new chapter” with “a shared future for mankind”.
    • The U.S. wants a security partnership to contain China.
    • And the Association of Southeast Asian Nations trade bloc — with the U.S. walking out of the negotiations — is keen India joins to balance China.
    • With a new template. India does not have to choose.

    Three principles the new system should be based on-

    1. Peaceful coexistence

      • First, the Asian Century should be defined in terms of peaceful co-existence, freezing post-colonial sovereignty.
      • Non-interference in the internal affairs of others is a key lesson from the decline of the U.S. and the rise of China.
      • National security now relies on technological superiority in artificial intelligence (AI), cyber and space, and not expensive capital equipment, as India’s military has acknowledged.
      • Instead of massive arms imports, we should use the savings to enhance endogenous capacity.
      • And mould the global digital economy between state-centric (China), firm-centric (the U.S.) and public-centric (India) systems.

    2. New principles of trade

    • A global community at comparable levels of well-being requires new principles for trade, for example, rejecting the 25-year-old trade rule creating intellectual property monopolies.
    • Global public goods should include public health, crop research, renewable energy and batteries, even AI as its value comes from shared data.
    • We have the scientific capacity to support these platforms as part of foreign policy.

    3.  Civilisational values

    • Ancient civilisational values provide the conceptual underpinning, restructuring both the economic order and societal behaviour for equitable sustainable development.
    • Which is what a climate change impacted world, especially Africa, is seeking.

    Consider the question-“The global order is going through serious churn, and it provides India with an opportunity to shape the new multilateralism based on humanity, fairness and equality. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    In the new cold war, defined by technology and trade not territory, non-alignment is an uncertain option; India should craft a global triumvirate.

  • Depsang Plain near LAC

    Reports of a heavy Chinese presence at Depsang, an area at a crucial dip (called the Bulge) on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) have increased the recent tensions between Indian and Chinese troops.

    For the Depsang Plain, a prelim based question is hardly possible. However one must know all the fronts of border disputes from mains perspective.

    Depsang Plain

    • The “Depsang Plain” is one of the few places in the Western Sector where light armour (vehicles) would have ease of manoeuvre, so any Chinese buildup there is a cause for concern.
    • India controls the western portion of the plains as part of Ladakh, whereas the eastern portion is part of the Aksai Chin region, which is controlled by China and claimed by India.
    • The buildup invokes memories of both the 1962 war, when Chinese troops had occupied all of the Depsang plains.
    • More recently in April 2013, the PLA crossed the LAC and pitched tents on the Indian side for three weeks, before they agreed to pull out.

    Also read:

    [Burning Issue] India-China Skirmish in Ladakh

  • Fortifying the African outreach: Contrast in the approach adopted by China and India

    As both India and China try and vie for increasing the influence in the African continent, the difference in the approach they adopted become evident. Both countries have been providing assistance in Africa amid the COVID pandemic. This article analyses the difference in the approach of the two countries.

    Impact of covid pandemic in Africa

    • Although African countries moved quickly to curb the initial spread, they are still woefully ill-equipped to cope with a public health emergency.
    • They are facing shortages of masks, ventilators, and even basic necessities such as soap and water.
    • Such conditions have meant that Africa’s cycle of chronic external aid dependence continues.
    • Africa needs medical protective equipment and gear to support its front line public health workers.
    • India and China have increased their outreach to Africa through medical assistance.
    • Their efforts are directed to fill a part of the growing African need at a time when not many others have stepped in to help.

    China’s donation diplomacy in Africa

    • China, being Africa’s largest trading partner, was quick to signal its intent to help Africa cope with the pandemic.
    • It despatched medical protective equipment, testing kits, ventilators, and medical masks to several African countries.
    • The primary motive of such donations has been to raise Beijing’s profile as a leading provider of humanitarian assistance and “public goods” in the global public health sector.
    • China’s billionaire philanthropy was also in full display when tech founder Jack Ma donated three rounds of anti-coronavirus supplies.
    • Chinese embassies across Africa have taken the lead by coordinating both public and private donations to local stakeholders.
    • However, the sub-optimal quality of China’s medical supplies and its deputing of medical experts have been a major cause for concern.

    Let’s understand the objectives of China’s donation diplomacy

    • Beijing’s ‘donation diplomacy’ in Africa aims to achieve three immediate objectives:
    • 1) Shift the focus away from talking about the origins of the virus in Wuhan.
    • 2) Build goodwill overseas.
    • 3) Establish an image makeover.
    • For the most part, it succeeded in achieving these ends until China faced widespread backlash over the ill-treatment of African nationals in Guangzhou city.
    • The issue quickly grew into a full-blown political crisis for Beijing.

    Let’s analyse the depth of China’s political influence in Africa

    • For the most part, China has been successful in controlling the Guangzhou narrative due to the depth of its political influence in Africa.
    • It is no secret that China relies heavily on diplomatic support and cooperation from African countries on key issues in multilateral fora.
    • For example, Beijing used African support for securing a win for Chinese candidates as the head of Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and in the World Health Organization (WHO).
    • On Africa’s part, the problem lies in the deep disjuncture and credibility gap between Africa’s governing class, the people, the media and civil society.
    • Even when criticisms have been levelled against Chinese indiscretions, it has hardly ever surfaced at the elite level.
    • Overall, China’s donation diplomacy towards Africa during COVID-19 has received mixed reactions, but Beijing’s advantage lies in its economic heft and political influence in Africa.

    Understanding India’s diplomacy in Africa: Responsible and reliable global stakeholder

    • For India, the pandemic presents an opportunity to demonstrate its willingness and capacity to shoulder more responsibility.
    • The fact that even with limited resources, India can fight the virus at home while reaching out to developing countries in need is testament to India’s status as a responsible and reliable global stakeholder.
    • Nowhere has India’s developmental outreach been more evident than in Africa with the continent occupying a central place in Indian government’s foreign and economic policy in the last six years.
    • Africa has been the focus of India’s development assistance and also diplomatic outreach, as evident in plans to open 18 new embassies.
    • These efforts have been supplemented by an improved record of Indian project implementation in Africa.

    Trade ties and cooperation amid pandemic

    • India’s role as ‘the pharmacy of the world’, as the supplier of low-cost, generic medicines is widely acknowledged.
    • Pharmaceutical products along with refined petroleum products account for 40% of India’s total exports to African markets.
    • India is sending consignments of essential medicines, including hydroxychloroquine (HCQ) and paracetamol, to 25 African countries in addition to doctors and paramedics at a total cost of around ₹600 million ($7.9 million) on a commercial and grant basis.
    • The initial beneficiaries were the African Indian Ocean island nations of Mauritius, the Seychelles, Comoros, and Madagascar under India’s ‘Mission Sagar’.
    • While transportation and logistics remain a concern, most of the consignments have already reached various African states.
    • A timely initiative has been the e-ITEC COVID-19 management strategies training webinars exclusively aimed at training health-care professionals from Africa and the SAARC nations and sharing of best practices by Indian health experts.
    • Nigeria, Kenya, Mauritius, and Namibia have been beneficiaries.
    • Across Africa, there is a keen interest to understand the developments and best practices in India because the two share similar socioeconomic and developmental challenges.
    • There is also growing interest in research and development in drugs and vaccines.
    • A few African countries such as Mauritius are pushing for health-care partnerships in traditional medicines and Ayurveda for boosting immunity.
    • The Indian community, especially in East African countries, has also been playing a crucial role in helping spread awareness.
    • Prominent Indian businessmen and companies in Nigeria and Kenya have donated money to the respective national emergency response funds.
    • Country-specific chapters of gurdwaras and temples have fed thousands of families by setting up community kitchens, helplines for seniors and distributing disinfectants and sanitisers.

    The contrast between approaches adopted by India and China

    • Both India and China, through their respective health and donation diplomacy, are vying to carve a space and position for themselves as reliable partners of Africa in its time of need.
    • Burnishing their credentials as humanitarian champions is the name of the game.
    • But there are significant differences in the approaches.
    • For China, three aspects are critical:
    • 1) Money, political influence and elite level wealth creation.
    • 2) Strong state-to-state relations as opposed to people-to-people ties.
    • 3) Hard-infrastructure projects and resource extraction.
    • India’s approach, on the other hand, is one that focuses on building local capacities and an equal partnership with Africans and not merely with African elites concerned.

    Consider the question “Both India and China have been playing an active role in the African continent and vying for the outreach there. But there is a fundamental difference in their approach. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    As these two powers rise in Africa, their two distinct models will come under even greater scrutiny. And both New Delhi and Beijing might find that they need to adapt to the rising aspirations of the African continent.

  • Time to revisit the special relationship with Nepal

    A new map released by Nepal delivered a blow to the India-Nepal relations. But this is hardly the first time this has happened. The article clears some cobwebs about Nepal’s foreign policy. First, it throws light on the past trend set by Nepal. And drawing on the past experience, it suggests the changes India should adopt in new framework to deal with Nepal.

    Nepal’s new map: Yet another knock on India-Nepal relations

    • As the parliament in Nepal gets ready to approve a new map that will include parts of Indian territory in Uttarakhand, Delhi is bracing for yet another knock to a bilateral relationship.
    • Many in the Indian strategic community believe that the train wreck was avoidable.
    • But others view the collision between Delhi and Kathmandu as both inevitable and imminent.
    • Even if the territorial issue had been finessed, something else would have triggered the breakdown.

    Bigger fissures in relation

    • A closer look suggests that the territorial dispute is merely a symptom of the structural changes.
    • These structural changes are unfolding in the external and internal context of the bilateral relationship.
    • The question, then, is not what Delhi could have done to prevent the current crisis.
    • It should be about looking ahead to build more sustainable ties with Kathmandu.

    2 factors India must consider and depart from

    • Any new framework for engaging Kathmandu must involve two important departures from the past in Delhi.
    • 1) First is coming to terms with Nepal’s natural politics of balance.
    • 2) The other is the recognition that Delhi’s much-vaunted “special relationship” with Kathmandu is part of the problem.

    Let’s look at the history of Nepal’s geopolitics

    • The founder of the modern Nepali state, Prithvi Narayan Shah, described Nepal as a “yam between two rocks”.
    • He was pointing to the essence of Nepal’s geographic condition between the dominant power in the Gangetic plains on the one hand and Tibet and the Qing empire on the other.
    • Contrary to the conventional wisdom in India, China has long been part of Kathmandu’s international relations.
    • As the East India Company gained ground at the turn of the 19th century, Nepal’s rulers made continuous offers to Beijing to act as China’s frontline against Calcutta’s expansion into the Himalayas.
    • Kathmandu also sought to build a coalition of Indian princes to counter the Company.
    • Even after it lost the first Anglo-Nepal war in 1816, Kathmandu kept up a continuous play between Calcutta and Beijing.
    • As the scales tilted in the Company’s favour after the First Opium War (1839-42), Nepal’s rulers warmed up to Calcutta.
    • When the 1857 Mutiny shook the Company, Kathmandu backed it and regained some of the territories it lost when the Raj replaced the Company.
    • As the fortunes of the Raj rose, Kathmandu rulers enjoyed the benefits of being Calcutta’s protectorate.
    • India inherited this framework but has found it impossible to sustain.

    Why the Treaty of Peace and Friendship (1950) lost its appeal?

    • The 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship gave the illusion of continuity in Nepal’s protectorate relationship with the Raj and its successor, independent India.
    • That illusion was continuously chipped away amid the rise of mass politics in Nepal, growing Nepali nationalism, and Kathmandu’s acquisition of an international personality.
    • The 1950 Treaty, which proclaims an “everlasting friendship” between the two nations, has become the symbol of Indian hegemony in Nepal.
    • In a paradox, its security value for India has long been hollowed out.
    • It is a political millstone around India’s neck that Delhi is unwilling to shed for the fear of losing the “special relationship”.
    • Delhi has been trapped into a perennial political play among Kathmandu’s different factions and responding to Nepal’s China card.

    Weakening of “special relationship”: Essence of Nepal’s foreign policy

    • Once the Chinese Communist Party consolidated its power in Tibet and offered assurances to Nepal, Kathmandu’s balancing impulses were back in play.
    • At the risk of oversimplification, Nepal’s foreign policy since the 1950s has, in essence, been about weakening the “special relationship” with India and building more cooperation with China.
    • Kathmandu has used different labels to package its desire for greater room for manoeuvre between its two giant neighbours — non-alignment, diversification, “zone of peace”, equidistance, and a Himalayan bridge between India and China.
    • The stronger China has become, the wider have Kathmandu’s options with India become.

    Way forward

    • It makes no sense for Delhi to hanker after a “special relationship” that a large section of Kathmandu does not want.
    • If Delhi wants a normal and good neighbourly relationship with Kathmandu, it should put all major bilateral issues on the table for renegotiation.
    • Such issues should include the 1950 treaty, national treatment to Nepali citizens in India, trade and transit arrangements, the open border and visa-free travel.
    • Delhi should make it a priority to begin talks with Nepal on revising, replacing, or simply discarding the 1950 treaty.
    • It should negotiate a new set of mutually satisfactory arrangements.
    • India had conducted a similar exercise with Bhutan to replace the 1949 treaty during 2006-07.
    • The issues and political context are certainly more complicated in the case of Nepal.
    • It is better that Delhi bites the bullet and makes a fresh beginning with Kathmandu rather than let the relationship deteriorate.
    • No bilateral relationship between nations can be built on sentiment — whether it is based on faith, ideology or inheritance.
    • Only those rooted in shared interests will endure.
    • Rather than object to Kathmandu’s China ties, Delhi must focus on how to advance India’s relations with Nepal.
    • It should bet that the logic of Nepal’s economic geography, its pursuit of enlightened self-interest, and Kathmandu’s natural balancing politics, will continue to provide a strong framework for India’s future engagement with Nepal.

    Conclusion

    Discarding the appearances of the “special relationship” might, in fact, make it easier for Delhi to construct a more durable and interest-based partnership with Kathmandu that is rooted in realism and has strong popular support on both sides.

  • A phantom called the Line of Actual Control with China

    Yet again, India and China are engaged in a standoff on the border. But why the issues persist even after four agreements with a view to solve the boundary problem? This article explains the problem in wording of the agreement. And also explains the lack of intent from China’s part.

    Four agreements: vision of progress or strategic illusion?

    •  At the heart of India’s and China’s continued inability to make meaningful progress on the boundary issue are four agreements.
    • Those agreements were signed in September 1993, November 1996, April 2005 and October 2013 — between the two countries.
    • Ironically, India and China keep referring to these agreements as the bedrock of the vision of progress on the boundary question.
    • Unfortunately, these are deeply flawed agreements.
    • And also make the quest for settlement of the boundary question at best a strategic illusion and at worst a cynical diplomatic parlour trick.

    Let’s look into LAC provision in 1993 and 1996 agreements

    • According to the 1993 agreement, “pending an ultimate solution”, “the two sides shall strictly respect and observe the LAC between the two sides… No activities of either side shall overstep the LAC”.
    • Further, both the 1993 and the 1996 agreement—on confidence-building measures in the military field along the LAC— say they “will reduce or limit their respective military forces within mutually agreed geographical zones along the LAC.”
    • This was to apply to major categories of armaments and cover various other aspects as well, including air intrusions “within ten kilometres along the LAC”.

    Okay, but where is the LAC?

    • The specification of this phantom LAC as the starting point and the central focus has made several key stipulations and articles of the four agreements effectively inoperable for more than a quarter of a century.
    • In fact, many of the articles have no bearing on the ground reality.
    • Article XII of the 1996 agreement, for instance, says, “This agreement is subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date of exchange of instruments of ratification.”
    • It is not clear if and when that happened.
    • Nowhere in the 1993 agreement is there the provision to recognise the existing lines of deployment of the respective armies, as they were in 1993.
    • The agreement does not reflect any attempt to have each side recognise the other’s line of deployment of troops at the time it was signed.
    • That would have been the logical starting point.
    • If both armies are to respect the LAC, where is the line?
    • The ambiguity over the LAC has brought a prolonged sense of unease and uncertainty and thus exponentially contributed to the military build-up in those areas.
    • The absence of a definition of this line allows ever new and surreptitious advances on the ground.

    What could have been done?

    • Had the 1993 agreement begun the exercise with the phrase “pending an ultimate solution, each side shall strictly respect and observe the line of existing control/deployment” instead of the “LAC”, it would have been more possible to keep the peace.
    • In such a case there would have been two existing lines of control on the map — one for the physical deployment of the Chinese troops and the other for the physical deployment of the Indian troops.
    • This would have rendered the areas between the two lines no man’s land, and would have ensured that the two armies were frozen in their positions.

    The issue of two LAC in the eastern and western sector

    • The LAC is two hypothetical lines in the following two sectors-
    • 1) In the eastern sector, where the Chinese have not accepted the loosely defined McMahon line which follows the principle of watershed.
    • 2) The western sector, which is witnessing another episodic stand-off.
    • The first is what Indian troops consider the extent to which they can dominate through patrols, which is well beyond the point where they are actually deployed and present.
    • The second is what the Chinese think they effectively control, which is well south of the line they were positioned at in 1993.

    Why map exchange didn’t happen for the western sector?

    • It is in this theatre of the militarily absurd that we should look at the outcome of the attempted exchange of maps in the western sector.
    • It is the sector where this round of confrontation continues between India and China.
    • This came after the exchange of maps in the middle sector.
    • In the middle sector, divergences were the least, i.e., the existing line and the Chinese and Indian idea of the LAC were more or less the same (in 2002).
    • The Foreign Secretary India and the head of the Chinese delegation, met in New Delhi in 2003 for sharing the map of the western sector.
    • It had been agreed that both sides would exchange maps to an agreed scale on each side’s perceptions of the location of the LAC in the western sector.
    • The idea was to superimpose the maps to see where the perceptions converged and, crucially, where they diverged.
    • Due to the contentious nature of the sector, it would provide a starting point, not the end point, to discuss how to reconcile divergences presumed to be significant, given Chinese military behaviour on the ground there.
    • Each side handed over its map to the other.
    • But, head of the Chinese delegation gave it a long, hard look, and wordlessly returned it.
    • They provided no reason for their action.
    • The meeting effectively ended there.

    Consider the question “Examine the reasons for the persistent nature of the India-China border issue.”

    Conclusion

    By disregarding the map, China is not bound in any way by New Delhi’s perception of the LAC, and therefore does not have to limit liberty of action. This was evident then and is especially evident now. Because the nature of the terrain, deployment, and infrastructure and connectivity asymmetries in the border areas continue to be so starkly in China’s favour that it is clear that the Chinese are in no hurry to settle the boundary question. They see that the cost to India in keeping this question open suits them more than settling the issue.

  • The 5G Club ‘D10’

    Britain said that it was pushing the U.S. to form a club of 10 nations that could develop its own 5G technology and reduce dependence on Huawei.

    We can expect prelims question asking the purpose of the D10 group like-

    Q. The D10 Club recently seen in news is a- Environment NGO/ Group of Democracies/ etc.

    The D10 Club

    • The Britain is proposing a ‘D10’ club of democratic partners that groups the G7 nations with Australia and the Asian technology leaders South Korea and India.
    • It would include G7 countries – UK, US, Italy, Germany, France, Japan and Canada – plus Australia, South Korea and India.
    • It is aimed for channelling investments into existing telecommunication companies within the 10 member states.
    • The group aim to create alternative suppliers of 5G equipment and other technologies to avoid relying on China.

    Ruling out Huawei

    • Britain has allowed the Chinese global leader in 5G technology to build up to 35% of the infrastructure necessary to roll out its new speedy data network.
    • But their PM Boris Johnson was reported to have instructed officials to draw up plans to cut Huawei out of the network by 2023 as relations with China sour.

  • Anchoring the ties with Australia the virtual way

    India-Australia relations have been growing in depth and diversity. Though two countries have been collaborating in various areas there is still potential to be realised in many areas. This article discusses the India-Australia ties. The area in which the two countries are collaborating and scope to further it.

    Relations with much potential

    • Mr. Modi convened a virtual multilateral summit to bring South Asia together to face the pandemic, and he also spoke online with G-20 leaders on similar issues.
    • On June 4, India will have its first virtual bilateral summit with Australia.
    • The convergence of interests and values has been patently obvious.
    • But the time has also come to translate that potential into reality.

    So, let’s see how India and Australia are expanding the scope of cooperation

    • 1) The two countries have sought to reconstruct their increasingly turbulent regional geography in the Indo-Pacific and see the Quad (with Japan and the United States) as the most potent instrument to promote cooperation.
    • The Quad, not surprisingly has been causing apprehensions in Beijing.
    • 2) It is expected that the ‘Mutual Logistics Support Agreement’ will be signed during the summit.
    • That should enhance defence cooperation and ease the conduct of large-scale joint military exercises.
    • 3) Last April, Australia and India conducted AUSINDEX, their largest bilateral naval exercise.
    • And there are further developments on the anvil, including Australia’s permanent inclusion in the Malabar exercise with Japan.
    • 4) It may be prudent too for New Delhi and Canberra to elevate the ‘two plus two’ format for talks from the Secretary level to the level of Foreign and Defence Ministers.

    Now, let’s look at the cooperation in areas that matter to the lives of the people of the countries-

    1) Pandemic control through controlled adaptation:  Lesson from Australia

    • Australia is one of the few countries that has managed to combat COVID-19 so far through “controlled adaptation” by which the coronavirus has been suppressed to very low levels.
    • Two of the leaders of this great Australia-wide effort are Indian-born scientists.
    • There is much that the two Prime Ministers can share on this front.

    2) Collaboration in  health, safe food and supply chains

    • In terms of health and safe food as well the supply chains that facilitate their delivery, there are important lessons to be learnt.
    • One of Australia’s richest businessman and first patron of the Australia-India Leadership Dialogue recently described the promise of DTC-CPG (direct to consumer; consumer packaged goods) which could transform global supply chains.
    • Here too there is much room for collaboration and new thinking.

    3) Higher education

    • The recovery of Australia’s universities, most of which are publicly funded and many rank among the top in the world, is still in question.
    • But they are proving to be resilient and pioneers in distance and online learning.
    • Australian universities could well open earlier than most and emerge as a safer destination for quality education than their European or Ivy league counterparts.

    Consider the question “India’s relations with Australia have of late acquired a dept and diversity which is visible in their cooperation in diverse areas. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    As India and Australia with shared values try to bring about fresh order in a turbulent world, the virtual summit, in this sense, could not have been better timed.

  • For a reset in India-Nepal relations

    Over the past few years, we have been  witness to the deteriorating India-Nepal relations. Reserves of goodwill which India had accumulated is fast depleting in Nepal. The latest issue over the map is a new addition to the decline in relations. This article stresses the need for political maturity to find the solution to the complex issue of the underlying problem.

    Need for the fundamental reset in relations between Indian and Nepal

    • The immediate provocation for the contention is the long-standing territorial issue surrounding Kalapani.
    • It is a patch of land near the India-Nepal border, close to the Lipulekh Pass on the India-China border.
    • However, the underlying reasons are far more complex.
    • Yet, Nepali Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli’s exploitation of the matter, by raising the banner of Nepali nationalism and painting India as a hegemon, is part of a frequent pattern.
    • Which indicates that relations between the two countries need a fundamental reset.

    Let’s look at the historical background of the India-Nepal border

    • India inherited the boundary with Nepal, established between Nepal and the East India Company in the Treaty of Sugauli in 1816.
    • Kali river constituted the boundary, and the territory to its east was Nepal.
    • The dispute relates to the origin of Kali.
    • Near Garbyang village in Dharchula Tehsil of the Pithoragarh district of Uttarakhand, there is a confluence of different streams coming from north-east from Kalapani and north-west from Limpiyadhura.
    • The early British survey maps identified the north-west stream, Kuti Yangti, from Limpiyadhura as the origin.
    • But after 1857 changed the alignment to Lipu Gad, and in 1879 to Pankha Gad, the north-east streams, thus defining the origin as just below Kalapani.
    • Nepal accepted the change and India inherited this boundary in 1947.

    More past events dealing with the LIpulech pass

    • The Maoist revolution in China in 1949, followed by the takeover of Tibet, created deep misgivings in Nepal.
    • So, India was ‘invited’ by Nepal to set up 18 border posts along the Nepal-Tibet border.
    • The westernmost post was at Tinkar Pass, about 6 km further east of Lipulekh.
    • In 1953, India and China identified Lipulekh Pass for both pilgrims and border trade. After the 1962 war, pilgrimage through Lipulekh resumed in 1981, and border trade, in 1991.
    • In 1961, King Mahendra visited Beijing to sign the China-Nepal Boundary Treaty that defines the zero point in the west, just north of Tinkar Pass.
    • By 1969, India had withdrawn its border posts from Nepali territory.
    • The base camp for Lipulekh remained at Kalapani, less than 10 km west of Lipulekh.
    • In their respective maps, both countries showed Kalapani as the origin of Kali river and as part of their territory.
    • After 1979, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police has manned the Lipulekh Pass.

    So, when was the issue of the origin of Kali river raised?

    • After the 1996 Treaty of Mahakali -Kali river is also called Mahakali/Sarada further downstream-the issue of the origin of Kali river was first raised in 1997.
    • The matter was referred to the Joint Technical Level Boundary Committee that had been set up in 1981 to re-identify and replace the old and damaged boundary pillars along the India-Nepal border.
    • The Committee clarified 98% of the boundary, leaving behind the unresolved issues of Kalapani and Susta when it was dissolved in 2008.
    • It was subsequently agreed that the matter would be discussed at the Foreign Secretary level.
    • Meanwhile, the project to convert the 80-km track from Ghatibagar to Lipulekh into a hardtop road began in 2009 without any objections from Nepal.

    Objections raised by Nepal to the new map released by India

    • The Survey of India issued a new political map (eighth edition) on November 2, 2019, to reflect the change in the status of Jammu and Kashmir as two Union Territories.
    • Nepal registered a protest though the map in no way had changed the boundary between India and Nepal.
    • However, on November 8, the ninth edition was issued.
    • The delineation remained identical but the name Kali river had been deleted.
    • Predictably, this led to stronger protests, with Nepal invoking Foreign Secretary-level talks to resolve issues.

    New map released by Nepal and issues with it

    • A new map of Nepal based on the older British survey reflecting Kali river originating from Limpiyadhura in the north-west of Garbyang was adopted by parliament and notified on May 20.
    • On May 22, a constitutional amendment proposal was tabled to include it in a relevant Schedule.
    • The new alignment adds 335 sq km to Nepali territory, territory that has never been reflected in a Nepali map for nearly 170 years.

    Following issue explains why there is need for rewriting the fundamental of India-Nepal relations

    1. Nepali nationalism is being equated to anti-Indianism

    • Prime Minister Narendra Modi has often spoken of the “neighbourhood first” policy.
    • But the relationship took a nosedive in 2015 when India first got blamed for interfering in the Constitution-drafting in Nepal.
    • And then for an “unofficial blockade” that generated widespread resentment against the country.
    • It reinforced the notion that Nepali nationalism and anti-Indianism were two sides of the same coin.

    2. China factor

    • In Nepali thinking, the China card has provided them the leverage to practise their version of non-alignment.
    • In the past, China maintained a link with the Palace and its concerns were primarily related to keeping tabs on the Tibetan refugee community.
    • With the abolition of the monarchy, China has shifted attention to the political parties as also to institutions like the Army and Armed Police Force.
    • Also, today’s China is pursuing a more assertive foreign policy and considers Nepal an important element in its growing South Asian footprint.

    3. India has ignored the changing political narrative for long

    • The reality is that India has ignored the changing political narrative in Nepal for far too long.
    • India remained content that its interests were safeguarded by quiet diplomacy even when Nepali leaders publicly adopted anti-Indian postures.
    • Long ignored by India, it has spawned distortions in Nepali history textbooks and led to long-term negative consequences.
    • For too long India has invoked a “special relationship”, based on shared culture, language and religion, to anchor its ties with Nepal.
    • Today, this term carries a negative connotation — that of a paternalistic India that is often insensitive and, worse still, a bully.
    • The 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship which was sought by the Nepali authorities in 1949  is viewed as a sign of an unequal relationship, and an Indian imposition.
    • The purpose of the treaty was to continue the special links Nepal had with British India and it  provides for an open border and right to work for Nepali nationals
    • Yet, Nepali authorities have studiously avoided taking it up bilaterally even though Nepali leaders thunder against it in their domestic rhetoric.

    Consider the question, “Examine the issues that have been testing the old ties between India and Nepal.”

    Conclusion

    The urgent need today is to pause the rhetoric on territorial nationalism and lay the groundwork for a quiet dialogue where both sides need to display sensitivity as they explore the terms of a reset of the “special relationship”. A normal relationship where India can be a generous partner will be a better foundation for “neighbourhood first” in the 21st century.

  • India-China confrontation: Not a standalone event

    The recent India-China standoff in Ladakh points to a larger picture of the Chinese agenda of regional dominance. The US-China tension has proved to be the backdrop against which the Ladakh standoff is playing out. This article suggests that this standoff is not a standalone event. It could well be a trigger for domino effect.

    What the intensification of tension between India-China suggests?

    1) China is feeling threatened

    • An authoritarian regime whose legitimacy rests primarily on its economic performance is faced with a situation where growth is expected to plummet.
    • It is a sign that Beijing is increasingly feeling beleaguered.
    • In response, it has embarked on a strategy of brinkmanship with several goals in mind.
    • External adventurism, when cloaked in the garb of ultra-nationalism, can shore up a regime’s legitimacy at home.

    2) It could be a move to divert the attention of the world

    • Simultaneously, it can act as a diversionary measure to escape international criticism for Beijing’s attempt to cover up the spread of the coronavirus.
    • Many countries hold China responsible for the huge cost in human lives and suffering as well as the unprecedented economic distress.
    • In the face of such criticism, the Chinese regime is increasingly using jingoistic jargon to build up domestic support.
    • President Xi Jinping’s recent speech to the PLA is an outstanding example of this strategy.
    • He exhorted the Chinese armed forces to “prepare for war” in order to “resolutely safeguard national sovereignty” and “the overall strategic stability of the country”.
    • This is a sign that the Communist Party of China (CPC) feels increasingly threatened both domestically and externally.

    Let’s look at the deterioration of the US-China relations

    • China’s relations with the U.S. have been going downhill almost since the beginning of the Donald Trump presidency.
    • Washington has periodically imposed economic sanctions on China and Beijing has retaliated in kind.
    • Trade talks have faltered because of growing protectionist sentiments in the U.S. and Chinese inability to adequately respond to them.
    • The chipping away at Hong Kong’s autonomous status by Beijing and the suppression of the pro-democracy movement in Hong Kong has led to severe criticism by the U.S. administration and in the Congress.
    • Differences over the issue of Taiwan have added to tensions, with China viewing the U.S. as the primary impediment preventing Taiwan’s integration.
    • The Trump administration has significantly increased support to Taiwan with arms sales that have added to China’s concern.

    U.S.-China rivalry in South-China Sea

    • Above all, the U.S.-China rivalry in the South China Sea acts as the potential flashpoint that may well lead to a shooting war.
    • So far, it has been careful that these moves do not trigger a serious confrontation with the U.S.
    • Washington has a strong interest in preventing China from asserting control over the South China Sea as maintaining free access to this waterway is important to it for economic reasons.
    • It also has defence treaty obligations to the Philippines, which has vigorously contested Chinese territorial claims.
    • Further, China’s control of the South China Sea would be a major step toward replacing the U.S. as the foremost power in the Indo-Pacific region.

    India-China relation questions have been the leitmotif in the UPSC papers. Just the theme of the question changes. Consider 2017 question “China is using its economic relations and positive trade surplus as a tool to develop potential military power status in Asia. In light of this statement, discuss its impact on India as her neighbour.”

    Conclusion

    Increased Chinese adventurism could result in an escalation of U.S.-China confrontation in the South China Sea. If that happens, the India-China face-off in Ladakh could become part of a much larger “great game”, with the U.S. trying to preserve the status quo and China attempting to change it to further its objective of regional dominance at the U.S.’s expense. The current India-China crisis should, therefore, be seen in its proper context and not as an isolated event.

  • India-Pak cooperation against Locusts Attack

    As another locust swarm comes from Pakistan, the spotlight is again on the India-Pakistan dynamic that has come into play.

    Do you know?

    The Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) believes locusts have decimated close to 70,000 hectares of crops in Kenya, 30,000 hectares in Ethiopia and 42,000 hectares of crops in the state of Rajasthan.
    Just so you can perhaps assess the kind of damage we are talking about here. A large swarm can eat as much as about 35,000 people in one day 😀 !

    What are Locusts?

    • The desert locust (Schistocerca gregaria) is a short-horned grasshopper that is innocuous while it is in a “solitary phase” and moving about independently.
    • These winged insects differ from normal hoppers and become dangerous only when their populations build up rapidly and the close physical contact in crowded conditions triggers behavioural changes.
    • They, then, enter the “gregarious phase”, by grouping into bands and forming swarms that can travel great distances (up to 150 km daily), while eating up every bit of vegetation on the way.
    • If not controlled at the right time, these insect swarms can threaten the food security of countries.

    India reaches out to Pak

    • The Ministry of External Affairs said that it has reached out to Pakistan for cooperation, and is awaiting their response.
    • Despite the ups and downs in the bilateral relationship, cooperation on the locust warning system has survived the wars, terrorist attacks, and political turmoil.

    History of outbreaks in India

    • Records suggest that since the beginning of the 19th century, there have been at least eight “outbreaks” in India from 1812 to 1889, and a ninth in 1896-1897.
    • According to the history of the Locust Warning Office published by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), there were “serious invasions” of locusts in India every few years during the 1900s.
    • A “five-year invasion” from 1926 to 1931 is estimated to have damaged crops worth Rs 2 crore (about $100 million at today’s prices).
    • The princely states and provinces had their own structures to deal with this, but there was no coordination.

    The Locust Warning Organization (LWO)

    • After the 1926-32 “invasion”, the British Indian government-sponsored a research scheme, starting in 1931, which led to the permanent Locust Warning Organization (LWO) in 1939.
    • It had its headquarters in New Delhi and a substation in Karachi.
    • In 1941, a conference of princely states in desert areas and provinces affected by locusts was held.
    • Its role was expanded in 1942, and in 1946 a bureaucratic structure was put in place.

    Beginning of cooperation

    • Iran too suffered locust attacks, in 1876, and in 1926-1932.
    • Apparently the first case of collaboration between countries in the region occurred in 1942 when a delegation from India helped with locust control work in southwest Persia.
    • Over the next two years, Indian help was also provided to Oman and Persia.
    • This was followed by the first conference within the region on Desert Locust, which was held in Tehran in 1945 and involved Iran, India, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.
    • A second conference took place in 1950 also in Tehran with Pakistan participating.

    Bringing in Pakistan

    • In the 1950s, India and Iran cooperated and Pakistan provided two aircraft for locust surveys in Saudi Arabia.
    • Following another attack during 1958-61, a decision was taken to group Iran, Afghanistan, Pakistan and India together and the FAO Desert Locust commission was formed in 1964.
    • The commission held annual sessions skipped in 1965 and 1999 but held in 1971.
    • Even in the last six years when the relationship between India and Pakistan has deteriorated, it has been held in 2014, 2016 and 2018.
    • The meetings are attended by locust control experts, with no diplomats.

    India and Pakistan

    • In 1977, the two countries began to meet on the border.
    • From 1991 to 2003, special border surveys took place during the summer, undertaken by locust control officers in their respective countries.
    • Joint border meetings have taken place every year since 2005 till 2019, except in 2011. This has been despite every diplomatic strain; including the 26/11 Mumbai attacks.
    • Arrangements are made in advance and protocols are followed for crossing the border.
    • While politics and diplomacy is kept out of the technical discussions, locust control authorities feel that one of the more difficult challenges faced by the commission is that of “insecurity and sensitivities” in the region.

    Also read:

    Risk of Early Locusts Attacks: A new concern

    Try this:

    Q. Time and again normal ocean cycles got more pronounced or disrupted, resulting in all kinds of unintended consequences, like an ever-increasing domino effect of locust attacks in Asia and the Indian Sub Continent. We need to understand these links if we are to plan effectively for climate change mitigation and adaptation. Discuss. (250W)