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Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • Patrolling Points along LAC

    The standoffs between Indian and Chinese troops in Ladakh on the Line of Actual Control (LAC), where initial steps towards disengagement have taken place, are around a number of patrolling points or PPs in Galwan, Hot Springs and Gogra areas.

    Do you know?

    The Galwan River flows from the Aksai Chin region occupied by China in the UT of Ladakh.  It originates in the area of Samzungling on the eastern side of the Karakoram Range and flows west to join the Shyok River.  It is one of the upstream tributaries of the Indus River.

    What exactly are Patrolling Points?

    • PPs are patrolling points identified and marked on the LAC, which are patrolled with a stipulated frequency by the security forces.
    • They serve as a guide to the location of the LAC for the soldiers, acting as indicators of the extent of ‘actual control’ exercised on the territory by India.
    • By regularly patrolling up to these PPs, the Indian side is able to establish and assert its physical claim about the LAC.

    Are all the Patrolling Points numbered?

    • Some of the PPs are prominent and identifiable geographical features, such as a pass, or a nala junction where no numerals are given.
    • Only those PPs, where there are no prominent features, are numbered as in the case of PP14 in Galwan Valley.

    Do all Patrolling Points fall on the LAC?

    • Mostly, yes. Except for the Depsang plains in northern Ladakh, where PP10, PP11, PP11A, PP12 and PP13 – from Raki Nala to Jivan Nala – do not fall on the LAC.
    • These are short of the LAC, on the Indian side.

    Are these Patrolling Points not manned?

    • The PPs are not posts and thus not manned. Unlike on the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan, the border with China is not physically held by the Army all along.
    • They are just physical markers on the ground, chosen for their location and have no defensive potential or tactical importance for the Army.

    How is the claim asserted on LAC?

    • The claim is asserted by the Army or joint Army-ITBP patrols as they show more visible presence in these areas.
    • This is done by physically visiting PPs with a higher frequency, as the deployment has moved closer to the LAC and due to improved infrastructure.
    • As the Chinese may not see when the Indian patrols visit these PPs, they will leave come cigarette packets or food tins with Indian markings behind.
    • That lets the Chinese know that Indian soldiers had visited the place, which indicates that India was in control of these areas.

    Who has given these Patrolling Points?

    • These PPs have been identified by the high-powered China Study Group, starting from 1975 when patrolling limits for Indian forces were specified.
    • It is based on the LAC after the government accepted the concept in 1993, which is also marked on the maps with the Army in the border areas.
    • But the frequency of patrolling to PPs is not specified by the CSG – it is finalised by the Army Headquarters in New Delhi, based on the recommendations made by the Army and ITBP.

    PP under dispute

    • PPs 10 to 13 in Depsang sector, PP14 in Galwan, PP15 in Hot Spring, and PP17 and PP17A in Gogra are currently being disputed by both sides, where the standoffs have taken place in the past nine weeks.

  • U.S. stance on CAATSA unchanged

    Recently India had planned for the purchase of Mig-19 fighter aircraft with Russia at an estimated Rs. 18,148 crore. The U.S has reacted to countries, including India, on sanctions for the purchase of Russian arms has not changed.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q.What is CAATSA law? Discuss how it will impact India’s ties with Russia.

    About CAATSA

    • CAATSA stands for Countering America’s Adversaries through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).
    • It is a US federal law that imposed sanctions on Iran, North Korea, and Russia.
    • The bill provides sanctions for activities concerning:

    (1) cybersecurity, (2) crude oil projects, (3) financial institutions, (4) corruption, (5) human rights abuses, (6) evasion of sanctions, (7) transactions with Russian defence or intelligence sectors, (8) export pipelines, (9) privatization of state-owned assets by government officials, and (10) arms transfers to Syria.

    A cause of worry

    • While the US has become its second-largest defence supplier, mainly of aircraft and artillery, India still relies heavily on Russian equipment, such as submarines and missiles that the US has been unwilling to provide.
    • Seventy per cent of Indian military hardware is Russian in origin.
    • India is set to receive the S-400 Triumf air defence system.

    Is India the only country facing CAATSA sanctions?

    • Notably, Russia is India’s major defence supplier for over 6 decades now, and Iran is India’s second-largest oil supplier.
    • By coincidence, CAATSA has now been invoked by the US twice already, and both times for countries buying the Triumf system from Russia.
    • In September 2018, the US announced sanctions for the procurement of the S-400 Triumf air defence system and Sukhoi S-35 fighter aircraft.
    • Washington expelled Turkey from the F-35 fighter jet programme in July this year after the first delivery of S-400s was received.
    • India is neither like China, which has an inimical relationship with the U.S., and hence not bound by its diktats, nor like Turkey which is a NATO ally of the US.

  • De-escalation begins on LAC

    Three weeks after the worst military clashes in decades, India and China have begun the process of disengagement at contentious locations along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

    Must read:

    [Burning Issue] India-China Skirmish in Ladakh

    China is moving back

    • In the Galwan Valley, Chinese troops have shifted 2 kilometres from the site violent clashes while some tents had been removed by the PLA in the Finger 4 area of Pangong Tso.
    • India’s claim is till Finger 8 as per the alignment of the LAC.
    • Some rearward movement of vehicles was seen at the general area of Galwan, Hotsprings and Gogra.
    • Without giving the specific distances moved, the source said the pullback at each location would be confirmed after verification.

    Lessons learnt

    • The lesson for us in Doklam is that disengagement is not enough in order to declare an end to tensions at the LAC.
    • It is necessary that we define endpoints up to where the troops must withdraw to and no understanding should be reached without the restoration of status quo ante.
    • Endpoint variances reflect the potential for future troubles along the LAC.

  • Indo-Pacific region

    As India tries to diffuse the tension along the disputed northern border with China, it must focus on the other potential fronts that China could open. India Ocean could be the next one. This article examines the centrality of the Indian Ocean for China and their approach to the region.

    India’s Indo-Pacific vision

    • This vision is based on our historical associations with this region.
    • This vision also acknowledges the importance of the Indian Ocean in building prosperity in this century.
    • So, the key points of this vision are thus-
    • 1) Inclusiveness, openness and ASEAN centrality and unity.
    • 2) India does not see the Indo-Pacific Region as a strategy or as a club of limited members.
    • 3) It is not directed against any country.

    China should have equal access

    • China is not a littoral state in the Indian Ocean.
    • Historically, Chinese naval activity was limited to the East China Sea, the Bohai Sea, the Yellow Sea, and the South China Sea.
    •  In today’s context, China is the second-largest economy and the world’s largest trading nation.
    • The sea-lanes of communication in the Indian Ocean are vital to her economy and security.
    • Under international law, China should have equal access to the Indian ocean.

    China’s “Malacca Dilemma”

    • China thinks that others would block the Malacca Straits to “contain” the Chinese.
    • So, China has strategized to dominate not just the Malacca Straits, but the ocean beyond it.
    • The PLA Navy (PLAN) made its first operational deployment in the Gulf of Aden in 2008.
    • In 2009 China planned for overseas base or facility.
    • In 2010 a China State Oceanic Administration report alluded to plans to build aircraft carriers.

    BRI: Overcoming the deficiencies China face in India Ocean

    • The US hegemony and India’s regional influence in the Indian Ocean are thought of as a challenge to China.
    • So, China focused on 3 inherent deficiencies that they wanted to overcome.
    • (a) China is not a littoral state.
    • (b) Its passage through key maritime straits could be easily blocked.
    • (c) The possibility of US-India cooperation against China.
    • How to overcome these deficiencies?
    • (1) carefully selecting sites to build ports — Djibouti, Gwadar, Hambantota, Sittwe and Seychelles.
    • (2) By conducting activities in a low-key manner to “reduce the military colour as much as possible”.
    • (3) By not unnerving India and America by cooperating at first, then slowly penetrating into the Indian Ocean, beginning with detailed maritime surveys, ocean mapping, HADR, port construction and so on.

     China acting on the plans

    • The PLA’s new base in Djibouti is the prototype for more “logistics” facilities to come.
    • More port construction projects like Gwadar and Hambantota, are being offered to vulnerable countries.
    • These projects are commercially unviable but have military possibilities,
    • Chinese “civilian” vessels routinely conduct surveys in the EEZ of littoral states.
    • In January 2020 the PLA Navy conducted tripartite naval exercises with Russia and Iran in the Arabian Sea.
    • They have the largest warship building programme in the world.

    Consider the question “What constitutes India’s Indo-Pacific vision? Elaborate on the factors that explain China’s reluctance to subscribe to this vision.”

    Conclusion

    The idea of Indo-Pacific might potentially derail the carefully crafted Chinese plan. So, they now wish to cause alarm by raising fears about Great Power “strategic collision” caused by the so-called American-led “containment” strategy. It is important to look past their propaganda.

  • Italian Marines case judgement could set a dangerous precedent

    The tribunal’s judgement in the Italian marines case was in Italy’s favour. But the basis used in the judgement could set a wrong precedent. India also ensures a fair trial against the marines in Italy. So, what would be the wrong precedent and why would be trial against marines will continue in Italy? Read to know…

    Background

    • On February 15, 2012 two Italian marines were held for killing two Indian fishermen
    • Fishermen were in India’s Contiguous Zone, 20.5 nautical miles off the Kerala coast.
    • And the marines were part of a security contingent on the Enrica Lexie, an Italian commercial oil tanker.

    What is said in the judgement

    • The tribunal was established by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS).
    • ITLOS was under the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
    • Only the operative portion of the tribunal’s award is available till now.
    • It held that the marines were entitled to immunity in relation to the acts that they committed.
    • The tribunal also said that India is precluded from exercising its jurisdiction over the Marines.
    • However, the tribunal found that by firing on the fishermen Italy was guilty of “violating India’s freedom and right of navigation”.
    • The tribunal majority agreed with the Italian plea that the marines had immunity for they were state officials.

    The judgement could set the wrong precedent

    • India’s stand was that UNCLOS is not concerned with issues relating to immunity.
    • Immunity of state officials has to be governed by specific multilateral or bilateral treaties or agreements.
    • It should not be invoked to settle issues of jurisdiction.
    • Even if Italian marines are considered as state officials, they were serving on a commercial vessel.
    • Italy did so unilaterally without the cover of any multilateral or bilateral arrangement.
    • There is no convention that such persons as the marines in such cases are immune from local criminal jurisdiction.
    • Only heads of states, heads of governments and foreign ministers customarily enjoy immunity abroad apart from accredited diplomats who are covered by the
    • Countries may now enact specific laws to give immunity to their military and para-military personnel and others by declaring them state official.
    •  This can lead to an increase in tensions generally and especially between inimical states.

    What should be the next course of action for India

    • Indian government should ensure that Italy is made to pay fully for the loss of life and the suffering it has caused in this matter.
    • The government should also ensure that it closely monitors the case proceedings in the Italian court against two marines.
    • This is also a time for the executive and judicial branches of the Indian state to introspect on how they handled the whole affair politically, diplomatically and legally.

    Consider the question “The judgement of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in Italian marines case was based on the immunity of state officials. What could be the implication of invoking immunity of state official in this judgement? What should be the next course of action for India?”

    Conclusion

    As a good international citizen, India has accepted the tribunal’s award. Now it must ensure that Italy fully honours it. The matter remains open.

  • Ladakh and its Geo-strategic Importance

    With the long-standing border standoff with China, Ladakh, a rugged, high-altitude region that is generally far removed from the lives and imagination of most Indians, has become part of our daily conversations and worries.

    Let’s have a look at a short primer on the region, its history, and some of the places where Indian soldiers are locked in conflict with the Chinese army. Try remembering its geographical features.

    Ladakh through the History

    • Lying between the Kunlun mountain range in the north and Himalayas to the south, Ladakh was originally inhabited by people of Indo-Aryan and Tibetan descent.
    • Historically the region included the valleys of Baltistan, Indus, and Nubra, besides Zanskar, Lahaul and Spiti, Aksai Chin, Ngari and Rudok.
    • Located at the crossroads of important trade routes since ancient times, Ladakh has always enjoyed great geostrategic importance.
    • At the beginning of the first century AD, Ladakh was part of the Kushan Empire. Till the 15th century, it was part of Tibet and was ruled by dynasties of local Lamas.
    • Later it changed hands multiple times, alternating between the kingdoms of Kashmir and Zhangzhung.
    • In 1834, Gen Zorawar Singh, a general of Raja Gulab Singh who ruled Jammu as part of the Sikh empire, extended the boundaries of Maharaja Ranjit Singh’s kingdom to Ladakh.

    Partition, Pakistan and Chinese occupations

    Immediately after India’s Partition, tribal raiders (the disguised Pakistani Army) attacked Ladakh. They captured Kargil and were heading for Leh when they were confronted by the Indian Army, who got back Kargil.

    • Although India has always considered Aksai Chin to be part of Jammu and Kashmir, in the 1950s the Chinese built a highway, called western highway or NH219, connecting Tibet with Xinjiang through this region.
    • It was always more easily accessible to the Chinese than to the Indians, who were across the Karakoram.
    • India learnt of this road in 1957, and it was one of the causes of the 1962 India-China war, after which China strengthened its control over this region.
    • China today claims Aksai Chin to be part of Hotan County of its Xinjiang province.
    • Pakistan ceded the Shaksgam Valley, which was part of the Baltistan region north of the Karakoram, to China following a Sino-Pakistani agreement signed on March 2, 1963.

    Ladakh through the Chinese eyes

    • China’s forays into the region began after the 1949 Communist Revolution, when Chairman Mao Zedong, a veteran of guerrilla warfare, began consolidating China’s periphery as part of his expansionist designs.
    • The PLA occupied Tibet in 1951 and then began to eye Ladakh.
    • The reason was that the road connecting Kashgar in Xinjiang to Lhasa in Tibet had to pass through Aksai Chin, which was held by Indians but was seldom patrolled by them.

    Galwan Valley in the limelight

    • The Tibetan revolt of 1959 and the Dalai Lama’s flight to India saw China further strengthening its military presence in Ladakh to ensure the security of NH 219.
    • India reacted with its ‘forward policy’ as part of which it began setting up Army posts in the region to prevent Chinese expansion.
    • This resulted in the initial clash between the Indian and Chinese forces in the Kongka Pass area in 1959.
    • Later, Galwan Valley became the scene of action when the Indian Army established a post to cut off the Chinese post in the Samjunjling area, marking the beginning of the 1962 war.

    Pangong Tso: The contested lake

    • In the latest face-off, Indian troops first spied the Chinese on the banks of Pangong Tso.
    • This lake, which is one-third in India and two-thirds in China, is of great tactical significance to the Chinese who have built infrastructure along both its sides to ensure the speedy build-up of troops.
    • Chinese incursions in this region aim at shifting the LAC westward so that they are able to occupy important heights both on the north and the south of the lake, which will enable them to dominate the Chushul Bowl.
    • The narrow Chushul valley, which lies on the road to Leh with Pangong Tso to its north, was an important target for the Chinese even during the 1962 war. It was here that the Battle of Chushul was fought.

    Strategic SSN: To the far north

    • The area spanning Galwan, Depsang plateau, and Daulat Beg Oldie (DBO), is called Sub-Sector North (SSN).
    • This enclave that lies to the east of the Siachen glacier is of immense significance given its proximity to the Karakoram Pass, close to China’s western highway or NH 219 going to Aksai Chin.
    • It’s the SSN that provides land access to Central Asia through the Karakoram Pass.
    • Domination of this area is also crucial for the protection of the Siachen glacier, lying between the Saltoro ridge on the Pakistani side and the Saser ridge close to the Chinese claim line.
    • The Galwan heights overlook the all-weather Durbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DSDBO) Road, which connects Leh to DBO at the base of the Karakoram Pass that separates China’s Xinjiang Region from Ladakh.
    • Domination over these heights allows China to easily interdict this road.

    Why is China stubborn on Galwan?

    • Occupation of Galwan will neutralize the tactical advantage India gained by building the all-weather Durbuk-DBO road over the last two decades.
    • Last year, the Border Road Organisation (BRO) made this rugged terrain even more accessible by completing the 430-metre-long bridge across the Shyok River.
    • With this, the Darbuk route to DBO became available round the year, and the travel time of troops to the SSN was halved.
    • It was this bridge, coupled with the ongoing work on a link road to LAC in this area, prompted the PLA to enter Galwan.

  • Resistance to China is going to be definitive moment for India

    How India overcomes the challenge posed by China would have far-reaching effects. Role of Russia and the U.S. is important for India. This article discusses these factors and the significance of the outcome of the conflict started at Galwan. 

    Two takes on India’s China policy

    • Following Galwan encounter, there are two views about the future of India’s China policy.
    • Some say that structural constraints would limit dramatic changes in policy once the heat of the moment dissipates.
    • While others say that the Galwan clash comes amidst the deepening crisis in bilateral relations over the last decade.
    • Stalled boundary talks, a widening trade deficit, the clash of national interests in the region, and Chinese opposition to India’s global aspirations have together strained Sino-Indian relations.
    • Galwan is the last straw, the argument goes, that broke the camel’s back.

    So, what will be the outcome

    •  The relationship is likely to depend on how the current military confrontation in Ladakh is resolved.
    • If it ends with a quick return to the status quo that prevailed in April, inertia is likely to limit radical policy departures.
    • If the Ladakh crisis ends in a setback for India, the pressure on Delhi to radically reorient its China policy will mount.

    What if the standoff continues?

    • In that case strengthening India’s military and political hand against China is the immediate objective of Delhi’s post-Galwan diplomacy.
    • The long term steps suggested include the construction of a military alliance with the US and other Western partner.
    • As as well as economic decoupling and diversification.
    • Short term steps are about being able to stare down the Chinese in the current military confrontation and hold its ground.

    Role of Russia

    • Three decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, India’s dependence on Russian arms remains substantive.
    • Rajnath Singh’s visit to Moscow amidst the crisis with China underlines the weight of the past in India’s security policy.
    • India is also pressing other major defence suppliers, including France and Israel, to accelerate deliveries on contracted defence equipment.
    • There have been reports from Russia, that China is pressing Moscow not to sell the new fighter aircraft to India.
    • Russia and China are strong strategic partners today.
    • While the past suggests India has a special claim to Russian affections, there is a Sino-Russian strategic cohabitation today in opposition to America
    • How Russia responds to India’s request will have a major bearing on the future evolution of Delhi’s ties with Moscow.

    Role of the U.S.

    • Unlike Russia’s public stance of neutrality between India and China, Washington has come out in favour of Delhi.
    • There was vocal public support of the US defence and foreign policy establishment against Chinese aggression at Galwan.
    •  Media reports from Delhi say the US is already supplying valuable real-time military intelligence of value to the Indian armed forces.
    • Washington is apparently willing to do more but is letting Delhi decide the pace and intensity of that cooperation.

    Challenges in the U.S. cooperation

    • The uncertain political moment in the US amidst the general election scheduled for early November can’t be underestimated.
    • A change of guard in Washington will certainly slow things down as the new administration settles down and reviews its priorities.
    • America’s stakes in China are far higher than Russia’s.
    • Profound economic interdependence of the U.S. and China is a significant political constraint on the US’s options.
    • On deeper military cooperation with Washington, Delhi would want to move with care rather than rush into it as it did in 1962.

    How will outcomes of the crisis matter for India

    • If Delhi comes out of this crisis wounded, its troubles at home and the world will mount significantly.
    • A weakened India will find recasting its China policy even harder.
    • But victorious India will find its international political stock rising and its options on China expanding.
    •  Successful Indian resistance to China’s expansionism would be a definitive moment in the geopolitical evolution of Asia.
    • The stakes for India and the world, then, are far higher today than in 1962.

    Consider the question “Examine the issues that introduce friction in India-China relations. Also, elaborate on the scope of India’s alliance with the U.S to counter the challenges posed by China.”

    Conclusion

    Outcomes of the resistance will have a profound impact on India’s standing and India’s destiny.

  • Making sense of moves of China

    The role played by intelligence and emphasis on Summit diplomacy in relation with China are the two issues discussed in this article. So, what went wrong in Galwan incident from the intelligence point of view? And what are the perils of Summit diplomacy? Read to know...

    Galwan-New and fractious phase

    • What occurred in the Galwan heights on June 15, must not be viewed as an aberration.
    • It would be more judicious to view it as signifying a new and fractious phase in China-India relations.
    • Even if the situation reverts to what existed in mid-April India-China relations appear set to witness a “new and different normal”.
    • China’s reaction has been consistent — India must move out of Galwan.
    • This is something that India cannot ignore any longer.
    • Galwan incident cannot be viewed as a mere replay of what took place in Depsang (2013), Chumar (2014) and Doklam (2017).
    • This is a new and different situation and India must not shrink from addressing the core issue that relations between India and China are in a perilous state.

    Close and careful analysis of China’s claim is necessary

    • China’s assertion of its claim to the whole of the Galwan Valley needs close and careful analysis for following reasons-
    • 1) Point 14 gives China a virtual stranglehold over the newly completed, and strategically significant, Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie Road, which leads on to the Karakoram Pass.
    • 2) The strategic implications for India of China’s insistence on keeping the whole of the Galwan Valley are serious as it fundamentally changes the status quo.
    • 3) By laying claim to the Galwan Valley, China has reopened some of the issues left over from the 1962 conflict.
    • And this demonstrates that it is willing to embark on a new confrontation.

    LAC and claim line of China

    • Ambiguity has existed regarding the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in this sector.
    • The Chinese “claim line” is that of November 1959.
    • For India the LAC is that of September 1962.
    • In recent years, both sides had refrained from reopening the issue, but China has never given up its claims.
    • By its unilateral declaration now, China is seeking to settle the matter in its favour. India needs to measure up to this challenge.

    Importance of Aksai Chin

    • The importance of Aksai Chin for China has greatly increased of late, as it provides direct connectivity between two of the most troubled regions of China, viz., Xinjiang and Tibet.
    • This does not seem to have been adequately factored in our calculations.
    • While Indian policymakers saw the reclassification of Ladakh as purely an internal matter.
    • They overlooked the fact that for China’s military planners it posited a threat to China’s peace and tranquillity.

    Intelligence capabilities

    • Admittedly, the timing and nature of China’s actions should have aroused keen interest in intelligence circles about China’s strategic calculations.
    • The Chinese build-up in the Galwan Valley, Pangong Tso and Hotsprings-Gogra did not require any great intelligence effort, since there was little attempt at concealment by the Chinese.
    • India also possesses high-quality imagery intelligence (IMINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) capabilities.
    • These capabilities are distributed between the National Technical Research Organisation, the Directorate of Signals Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence and other agencies.
    • Which made it possible to track Chinese movement.
    • Where intelligence can be faulted is with regard to inadequate appreciation of what the build-up meant, and what it portended for India.
    • This is indicative of a weakness in interpretation and analysis of the intelligence available.
    • And also of inability to provide a coherent assessment of China’s real intentions.
    • Intelligence assessment of China’s intentions, clearly fell short of what was required.
    • While India’s technological capabilities for intelligence collection have vastly increased in recent years, the capacity for interpretation and analysis has not kept pace with this.
    • Advances in technology, specially Artificial Intelligence have, across the world, greatly augmented efforts at intelligence analysis.

    Who has the responsibility of intelligence assessment and analysis

    • The principal responsibility for intelligence assessment and analysis concerning China, rests with the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) and India’s external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW).
    • To a lesser extent, it remains with the Defence Intelligence Agency.
    • The decision of the NSCS to dismantle the Joint Intelligence Committee has contributed to a weakening of the intelligence assessment system.
    • In the case of the R&AW, lack of domain expertise, and an inadequacy of China specialists might also have been a contributory factor.

    Adverse impact of certain policy measures

    •  The preference given recently to Summit diplomacy over traditional foreign policy making structures proved to be a severe handicap.
    • Summit diplomacy cannot be a substitute for carefully structured foreign office policy making.
    • Currently, India’s Summit diplomacy has tended to marginalise the External Affairs Ministry with regard to policy making, and we are probably paying a price for it.
    • As it is, the Ministry of External Affairs’s (MEA) stock of China experts seems to be dwindling.
    • And MEA’s general tilt towards the U.S. in most matters, has resulted in an imbalance in the way the MEA perceives problems and situations.

    Conclusion

    Along with the other factors, India should also focus on intelligence analysis and interpretation and make sure there are enough China experts in the MEA.

  • Will banning Chinese imports hurt India’s exports?

    • Following the recent clashes with Chinese troops in Ladakh, there has been a growing clamour in the country to boycott goods from the neighbouring country.
    • However, the development has caused an alarm among various industry bodies that are concerned about the adverse impact in the event of a blanket ban on exports in several sectors.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q.“Curbing Chinese imports to India will do more harm than any good”. Analyse.

    How dependent is India on Chinese imports?

    China accounts for a sizable portion of India’s top imports, especially where intermediate products or components and raw materials are concerned.  Electronics: The neighbouring country also accounts for 45 per cent of India’s total electronics imports.

    • A third of machinery and almost two-fifths of organic chemicals that India purchases from the world come from China.
    • Automotive parts and fertilizers are other items where China’s share in India’s import is more than 25 per cent.
    • Several of these products are used by Indian manufacturers in the production of finished goods, thus thoroughly integrating China in India’s manufacturing supply chain.
    • For instance India sources close to 90 per cent of certain mobile phone parts from China.

    India’s export to China

    • Even as an export market, China is a major partner for India. At $15.5 billion, it is the third-largest destination for Indian shipments.
    • At the same time, India only accounts for a little over two per cent of China’s total exports, according to the Federation of Indian Export Organisation (FIEO).

    How could a blanket ban on Chinese imports hit India’s exports?

    • Across sectors from pharmaceuticals to telecommunications and automobiles, industry associations have been speaking up against a complete boycott of Chinese imports.
    • A “blanket ban” may not be feasible because of India’s dependence on the country for crucial raw materials.
    • Banning the imports of raw materials from China without which products over here cannot be manufactured will make things difficult.
    • If China takes any retaliatory measures, it would impact India more negatively.

    Most crucial: The Pharma sector could be worst hit

    • For instance, of the nearly $3.6 billion worth of ingredients that Indian drug-makers import to manufacture several essential medicines, China catered to around 68 per cent.
    • India is considered one of the largest pharma industries in the world and accounts for a considerable portion of imports of finished formulations by other large economies like the US.
    • While pharma consignments from China have unofficially been stopped at ports in India, and are expected to be cleared after thorough checks,
    • A ban could create shortages of medicines both for India’s domestic and export markets.

    Are there any alternatives in this situation?

    • The decision to boycott non-essential products made in China can be left to the individuals.
    • However, trade-related measures like raising duties on cheaper raw materials imported from China would be better than an outright embargo.
    • This would still allow access to crucial ingredients in the short-term while India looks to build self-reliance or maybe switch to alternate trade partners.
    • It would be better to maybe raise duties on cheaper raw materials instead of going in for a blanket ban.

    Alternatives to Chinese imports

    • Countries like the US, Vietnam, Japan, Mexico and certain European countries could be tapped as alternate import sources for some critical electronic, vehicular and pharmaceutical components as well.
    • It is likely that the costs of the raw materials from these alternate sources will be higher and may get passed on to consumers if the manufacturers cannot absorb them.
    • India will need to look into the totality of its trade with China and Hong Kong and implement certain short- to long-term plans to reduce its dependence on them, according to FIEO.

    Way forward

    • The government’s “Atmanirbhar” focus is expected to help ministries handhold industries where self-reliance needs to be built.
    • Some measures, like the decision to push bulk drug parks in India, have to be executed.
    • While an increase in tariff can be one way to achieve import substitution, the more effective strategy would be to provide an ecosystem that addresses the cost disability of Indian manufacturing leading to such imports.

  • Why China is being aggressive along the LAC

    Despite India’s careful approach which involved not upsetting China’s domestic and geopolitical sensitivities, Galwan happened. What explains the Chinese aggression? There could be many factors. This article delves into these factors. 

    Not upsetting China

    • The India government has been very careful not to upset China’s domestic and geopolitical sensitivities.
    • Barring occasional joint statements issued with leaders from the U.S. and Asia-Pacific countries, reasserting India’s commitment to “freedom of navigation”  India has stayed away from criticising China on controversial topics,
    • On issues such as “de-radicalisation” camps in Xinjiang, crackdown on protests in Hong Kong, or disputes with Taiwan India India didn’t criticise China.

    Yet China chose to increase tensions along the LAC. Why?

    1. China wants to reorient global order

    • Unlike the Soviet Union of the 1940s China is not an ideological state that intends to export communism to other countries.
    • When it was rising, China had adopted different tactical positions — “hide your capacity and bide your time”, “peaceful rise” or “peaceful development”.
    • That era is over.
    • Under President Xi Jinping, the Chinese think they have arrived.
    • With the global economy in the doldrums, globalisation in a crisis and the U.S. under an isolationist President hostile towards China Beijing believes the global order is at a breaking point.
    • It is fighting back through what game theorists call “salami tactics” — where a dominant power attempts to establish its hegemony piece by piece.
    • India is one slice in this salami slice strategy.

    2. India: An ally-in-progress of the US

    • It sees India as an ally-in-progress of the U.S.
    •  So, China actions are a result of the strategic loss [India] that has already happened.
    • If India is what many in the West call the “counterweight” to China’s rise, Beijing’s definite message is that it is not deterred by the counterweight.
    • This is a message not just to India, but to a host of China’s rivals that are teaming up and eager to recruit India to the club.

    Factors that could explain China’s move

    Global factors

    • Europe has been devastated by the virus.
    • The U.S. is battling in an election year the COVID-19 outbreak.
    • It is also battling the deepest economic meltdown since the Great Depression.
    • Its global leadership is unravelling fast.

    Regional and local factors

    • The Indian economy was in trouble even before COVID-19 struck the country, slowing down its rise.
    • Social upheaval over the Citizenship (Amendment) Act (CAA), 2019, and the National Register of Citizens had weakened the Indian polity.
    • India’s traditional clout in its neighbourhood was slipping.
    • Tensions with Pakistan have been high keeping the troops occupied in the border areas.
    • Nepal raised boundary issues with India.
    • Sri Lanka is diversifying its foreign policy.and China is making deep inroads into that region.
    • Bangladesh was deeply miffed with the CAA.
    • Even in Afghanistan, where Pakistan, China, Russia and the U.S. are involved in the transition process, India is out.
    •  A confluence of all these factors, which point to a decline in the country’s smart power, allowed China to make aggressive moves on the LAC.

    Consider the question “At the time when relations reached a nadir with China, India needs to focus on its neighbourhood and mend win back the friendly neighbours. Comment”

    Conclusion

    What India needs is a national security strategy that’s decoupled from the compulsions of domestic politics and anchored in neighbourhood realism. It should stand up to China’s bullying on the border now, with a long-term focus on enhancing capacities and winning back its friendly neighbours. There are no quick fixes this time.