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Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • A case for quiet diplomacy to resolve standoff

    Apart from the recent one, there had been several stand-offs between India and China over the border issue. The use of quiet diplomacy to diffuse the situation underlies all these stand-offs. However, politicisation of stand-off could make the situation difficult to resolve. This article explains the use of quiet diplomacy and problems posed by the politicisation of the stand-offs.

    Process to diffuse tension began but not at all points

    •  Both sides have agreed on a broad plan to defuse four of the five points of discord.
    • The situation at the fifth, Pangong Lake remains uncertain as also in Galwan valley and north Sikkim.
    • At Pangong Tso, the Chinese have entrenched their positions with tents and remain on India’s side of the LAC.
    • There is a major point of difference which will not be easy to resolve.

    Let’s look into the strategy used by India in the past to resolve stand-offs

    • The pattern of resolution of past stand-offs underlines the key role played by quiet diplomacy in unlocking complicated stand-off situations.
    • Both the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) and National Democratic Alliance (NDA) governments have followed an approach that has coupled quiet diplomacy with a strong military posture, while at the same time allowing the adversary a way out.
    • This has been the broad strategy in dealing with challenges from China across the LAC.
    • And this strategy has generally worked.

    Let’s look into three specific incidents

    1) 2013-Depsang plains

    • In 2013, when Chinese troops pitched tents on India’s side of the LAC on the Depsang plains, similar to Pangong Tso.
    • The UPA government was under fire, both for being weak on China and for its reticence.
    • While the government was being publicly attacked for doing nothing, it had privately conveyed to China that if the stand-off didn’t end, an upcoming visit by Premier Li Keqiang would be off.
    • If that demand had been made public at the time, China would have only dug in its heels, even if the government may have won the headlines of the day.

    2) Chumar stand-off

    • The government adopted a similar strategy during the 2014 stand-off at Chumar, which coincided with President Xi Jinping’s visit to India.
    • Mr. Xi’s visit went ahead, while India quietly but forcefully stopped the Chinese road-building and deployed 2,500 soldiers, outnumbering the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
    • The PLA withdrew.
    • Both sides disengaged and followed a moratorium into patrolling into contested areas, which was observed for many months thereafter.

    Ultimately, in both cases, the objective was achieved. China, faced with firm resistance, was prevented from changing the status quo.

    3) Doklam stand-off in 2017

    • In 2017, the government came under particularly intense fire because it stayed studiously silent through a 72-day stand-off at Doklam.
    • Indian troops crossed over into Bhutan to stop a Chinese road construction on territory India sees as Bhutanese but China claims.
    • By extending the road, India argued, China was unilaterally altering the India-Bhutan-China trijunction.
    • Beijing demanded an unconditional withdrawal.
    • When both finally disengaged, neither divulged the terms.
    • It would later emerge that the deal struck involved India withdrawing first.
    • China then stopped construction, and the status quo at the face-off site was restored.

    Stand-off politics in the country

    • Politics over border stand-offs is not new.
    •  The Opposition and the media are certainly right to hold the government to account.
    • Indeed, neither the Opposition nor the media would be doing its job if they weren’t.
    • The tensions on the LAC are neither the first nor likely to be the last.
    • With every incident, they are, however, getting increasingly politicised in an environment where there is a 24/7 demand on social media for information — and unprecedented capacity for disinformation.
    • Rather than wish away this reality — and adopt a stand that it is above questioning — the government needs to come to terms with it. 

    Dealing with the politicisation of stand-offs

    •  First, it needs to keep the Opposition informed, which it is clear it hasn’t.
    • Second, it needs to proactively engage with the media, even if that may be through low-key engagement as was the case on June 9, that does not escalate into a public war of words.
    • At the same time, expectations of having a public debate about the intricacies of every border stand-off — or for the Prime Minister to weigh in even while negotiations are ongoing — need to be tempered.
    • This will only risk inflaming tensions, and reduce the wiggle room for both sides to find an off-ramp.
    • The broader objective shouldn’t get lost in political debates.
    • That objective is to ensure India’s security interests remain protected — and that the status quo on India’s borders isn’t changed by force.

    Consider the question “Border issue between India and China has several times resulted in the stand-off between the two countries but the use of quiet diplomacy helped defuse the tension. But the politicisation of such issue could complicate the situation in the future. Comment.

    Conclusion

    • Past incidents have shown that quiet diplomacy, coupled with strong military resolve that deters any Chinese misadventures, has been more effective than public sabre-rattling, even if we may be inhabiting a media environment that misconstrues loudness as strength, and silence as weakness.

  • Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890 and its significance

    The skirmishes between Indian and Chinese troops at Naku La in Sikkim that is considered settled may be Beijing’s way of attempting a new claim. Defence experts highlighted the historical Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890 as proof of India’s ownership of the territory.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. China’s actions on dormant areas mask a hidden agenda of broader assertiveness in the entire Asia-Pacific. Comment.

    China creates a new flashpoint

    • Referring to a major scuffle that took place at Naku La in May, it was unusual for Chinese troops to open up a part of the LAC that has not been in contention before.

    Sikkim-Tibet Convention of 1890

    • Of the entire 3,488km Sino-Indian border, the only section on which both countries agree that there is no dispute is the 220km Sikkim-Tibet section of the boundary.
    • This is because under the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 1890, the Sikkim-Tibet border was agreed upon and in 1895 it was jointly demarcated on the ground.
    • Not only that but the new government of People’s Republic of China, which took power in 1949, confirmed this position in a formal note to the government of India on 26 December 1959.

    Chinese claims

    • Prior to Sikkim’s merger with India in 1975, the Chinese side accepted the Watershed based alignment of the International Border (IB).
    • The Sikkim – Tibet boundary has long formally been delimited and there is neither any discrepancy between the maps nor any dispute in practice.
    • The Chinese reiterate that, as per para (1) of the Convention of 1890, the tri-junction is at Mount Gipmochi.

    India’s stance

    • The geographic alignment of the features was so prominent that it could easily be identified and recognized.
    • Even analysing the available Google images of the past, the location of Naku La could be discerned by anyone as the watershed parting line in the area was very prominent. “
    • There exist no ambiguity with respect to the location of the pass, since geographic realities cannot be altered.

    How Sikkim came into the picture?

    • Earlier, Sikkim came into the limelight in 1965 during the India-Pakistan conflict, when the Chinese suddenly and without any provocation sent a strongly-worded threat.
    • Then PM Lal Bahadur Shastri neatly sidestepped the issue by stating that if the bunkers were on the Chinese side they were well within their rights to demolish them.
    • The point that the Chinese were trying to make was not military, but political, for they wanted to bolster the Pakistani spirit, which by then was rapidly losing steam.
    • As India stood firm with the backing of USSR and the US, nothing emerged from Chinese threats on the Sikkim-Tibet border.

    Series of activity since then

    • In 1967, the Chinese again activated the Sikkim-Tibet border and on 11 September, suddenly opened fire on an Indian patrol party near Nathu La pass. The main point was that India did not lose any position, nor did it yield any ground.
    • The next important episode was in 2003. When PM Vajpayee conceded during his visit to China in 2003 that “the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) was a part of the PRC” with the expectation that China would recognize Sikkim as a part of India.
    • This did not materialize then but in the joint statement issued by premier Wen Jiabao and prime minister Manmohan Singh on 11 April 2005.
    • In part 13, the Chinese recognized “Sikkim State of the Republic of India”. Wen even handed over an official map of the People’s Republic of China to Singh, showing Sikkim as a part of India.

    Nothing new about the skirmishes over Sikkim

    • History would thus indicate that the present stand-off between India and China over the Sikkim-Tibet boundary is nothing new.
    • The latest episode after a road construction party entered Doklam area, despite Bhutanese attempts to dissuade them.

    Ignoring usual behaviour

    • The clearly orchestrated actions on an otherwise dormant area mask a hidden agenda.
    • The Chinese push at several points along the LAC and also the ongoing aggression in the South China Sea and Taiwan Straits are testimony to this.
    • The timeline of initiating this incident indicates a high level of pre-planning, possibly at senior levels of the PLA as well as the Chinese government.

    Way forward

    • There is no question of India bending to Chinese “demands”, for like in 1967, it must stand its ground firmly.
    • That would be a sufficient lesson for the Chinese that the Indian Army is no pushover and this is perhaps the only way to deal with China that likes to flaunt its economic and military prowess.

  • Strategic importance of Daulat Beg Oldie, Ladakh

    In the reporting on the LAC stand-off, the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DSDBO) road has often appeared in news.

    Practice questions for mains:

    Q. Discuss how India’s all-weather border infrastructure has created new festering points for the Sino-Indian border skirmished.

    Daulat Beg Oldie

    • DBO is the northernmost corner of Indian Territory in Ladakh, in the area better known in Army parlance as Sub-Sector North.
    • DBO has the world’s highest airstrip, originally built during the 1962 war but abandoned until 2008 when the Indian Air Force (IAF) revived it as one of its many Advanced Landing Grounds (ALGs) along the LAC.

    The DSDBO Road

    • DSDBO is an all-weather 255-km long road 255-km long built by India over nearly 20 years.
    • Running almost parallel to the LAC, the DSDBO road, meandering through elevations ranging between 13,000 ft and 16,000 ft, took India’s Border Roads Organisation (BRO) almost two decades to construct.
    • Its strategic importance is that it connects Leh to DBO, virtually at the base of the Karakoram Pass that separates China’s Xinjiang Autonomous Region from Ladakh.

    A trigger for PLA incursions

    • Of the possible triggers cited for the PLA targeting of Indian Territory along the LAC in eastern Ladakh, the construction of DSDBO all-weather road is possibly the most consequential.
    • The Chinese build-up along the Galwan River valley region overlooks and hence poses a direct threat to the DSDBO road.

    Significance of DSDBO Road

    • The DSDBO highway provides the Indian military access to the section of the Tibet-Xinjaing highway that passes through Aksai Chin.
    • The road runs almost parallel to the LAC at Aksai Chin, the eastern ear of erstwhile Jammu and Kashmir state that China occupied in the 1950s, leading to the 1962 war in which India came off worse.
    • The DSDBO’s emergence seemingly panicked China, evidenced by the 2013 intrusion by the PLA into the nearby Depsang Plains, lasting nearly three weeks.
    • DBO itself is less than 10 km west of the LAC at Aksai Chin. A military outpost was created in DBO in reaction to China’s occupation of Aksai Chin.
    • It is at present manned by a combination of the Army’s Ladakh Scouts and the paramilitary Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP).

    Other strategic considerations

    • To the west of DBO is the region where China abuts Pakistan in the Gilgit-Baltistan area, once a part of the erstwhile Kashmir principality.
    • This is also the critical region where China is currently constructing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) in Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir (PoK), to which India has objected.
    • As well, this is the region where Pakistan ceded over 5,180 sq km of PoK to China in 1963 under a Sino-Pakistan Boundary Agreement, contested by India.

    Also read:

    https://www.civilsdaily.com/burning-issue-india-china-skirmish-in-ladakh/

     

  • LAC row: China reaches accord with India

    China said that it had “reached an agreement” with India on the ongoing tensions along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), a day after India announced troops from both sides had begun a “partial disengagement” from some of the stand-off points.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. “Early settlement of the boundary question serves the fundamental interests of both countries”. Discuss in light of the ongoing border skirmishes between India and China.

    Read the complete story here:

    [Burning Issue] India-China Skirmish in Ladakh

    Troops moving back

    • Partial deinduction has happened from some points in Galwan and Hot Springs areas.
    • Chinese side removed some of the tents and some troops and vehicles have been moved back, and the Indian side to has reciprocated.
    • At some points in the Galwan Valley, Chinese troops have moved back 2-3 km. However, there is no change in the ground situation at Pangong Tso.

    De-escalation begins

    • India and China held Major general-level talks to discuss further de-escalation at several standoff points in Eastern Ladakh including Patrolling Point (PP) 14, following a broad accord reached on Saturday in talks held at the Corps Commander-level.
    • As per the agreement, a series of ground-level talks would be held over the next 10 days, with four other points of conflict identified at PP15, PP17, Chushul and the north bank of Pangong Lake.
    • The Chinese Foreign Ministry said both sides had agreed to handle the situation “properly” and “in line with the agreement” to ease the situation.
    • However, it did not provide specific details on some of the stand-off points, such as Pangong Lake, where Chinese troops are still present on India’s side of the LAC.

    No final solution yet

    • At present, the two sides are taking actions in line with the agreement to ameliorate the border situation.
    • Government officials said a partial disengagement had happened at some points in the Galwan area and at Hot Springs, but there was no change at Pangong Lake.
    • Chinese state-run media has revealed that the ongoing dispute will not escalate into a conflict.
    • But it added due to the complexity of the situation, the military stand-off could continue for a little longer.

    Way forward

    • The military-level talks showed that both sides do not want to escalate tensions further.
    • It showed that China and India remain determined to peacefully resolve border issues.
    • However, the ongoing stand-off is not likely to end immediately, as concrete issues must still be resolved.

  • Complexity of India-Nepal relations

    This article helps us understand Nepal’s perspective of the India-Nepal border dispute. Though the issue dates back to India’s independence, it came to dominate the political landscape in Nepal since 1990s. But there is no solution in sight. So, what makes the issue complex? Read to know…

    What the border dispute between two countries is about?

    • The inauguration of the “new road to Mansarovar” on May 8 by India’s defence minister has strained the relations between Nepal and India.
    • Nepal claims that a section of the road passes through the territory of Nepal and links with the Tibetan Autonomous Region of China through the Lipu Lekh pass in Nepal.
    • The 1816 Sugauli Treaty between Nepal and British India placed all the territories east of the Kali (Mahakali) river, including Limpiyadhura, Kalapani and Lipu Lekh at the northwestern front of Nepal, on its side.
    • The borders of Nepal, India and China intersect in this area.
    • Given the situation in 1961, Nepal and China fixed pillar number one at Tinker pass with the understanding that pillar number zero (the tri-junction of Nepal, India, and China) would be fixed later.
    • Lipu Lekh pass is 4 km northwest and Limpiyadhura 53 km west of Tinker pass.

    No progress on the solution of the issue

    • The dispute over the Kalapani area has spanned the last seven decades.
    • Both Nepal and India have recognised it as an outstanding border issue requiring an optimal resolution.
    • When in August 2014, Prime Minister Narendra Modi became the first Indian Prime Minister to visit Nepal in 17 years, Nepal’s Prime Minister Sushil Koirala raised this issue again.
    • The two prime ministers agreed to resolve the issue on a priority basis and directed their foreign secretaries “to work on the outstanding boundary issues including Kalapani and Susta”.
    •  There was virtually no progress on the ground.

    Nepal’s objection to India-China agreement

    •  In May 2015, Prime Minister Modi visited China, and the two countries agreed to “enhance border areas cooperation”.
    • The May 2015 agreement is a broad one compared to the 1954 India-China agreement “on trade and intercourse between Tibet Region of China and India”, which mentions Lipu Lekh pass as one of the six passes “through which traders and pilgrims of both countries may travel”.
    • Nepal protested against the inclusion of its territory, Lipu Lekh, in the joint statement without its consent and demanded that the two countries make necessary corrections to reflect the ground realities.
    • The protest was ignored.

    Growing nationalism and distrust let to the deterioration of relations

    • The tone of Nepal-India relations appears to be dominated by frustrations of the past and traditional attitudes more than the opportunities of the future.
    • The widening gap in understanding each other’s concerns has helped feed Nepali nationalism and create a dense cloud of distrust and suspicion between the two countries.
    • The gap widened after India chose to impose an economic blockade in response to Nepal’s sovereign decision to promulgate a democratic constitution.
    • The current ruling Communist Party of Nepal made people’s anger over the blockade its campaign plank during the 2017 general election.

    What makes the border issues complex and difficult to solve?

    • Complexity of the issue stems from the fact that the political leadership handles only a small part of this very important bilateral relationship.
    • India as a big neighbour is rarely seen grasping the psychological dimensions of the relationship.
    • Officials handling these multifaceted relations may momentarily influence the atmospherics but they rarely touch the core of these relations, let alone reorient or transform them in the rapidly changing context.
    • This is manifest in the deferring of substantive conversations on the outstanding boundary issue for decades.
    • The foreign secretary level mechanism has not met even once to discuss the border issue since its formation.
    • There are over three dozen bilateral mechanisms between Nepal and India to engage at various levels.
    • The meetings of these mechanisms are rarely regular.

    Consider the question “The India-Nepal border dispute looks minor, but allowing it to fester is likely to sow the seeds of immense competition and intense rivalry in the sensitive Himalayan frontier with far-reaching geopolitical implications. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    Geography, history, and economy make Nepal and India natural partners, sharing vital interest in each other’s freedom, integrity, dignity, security and progress. People-to-people relations are unique strengths of bilateral relations. India, for it’s part and in the spirit of its ‘neighbourhood first’ policy, must start a solution-oriented dialogue and find the solution to the dispute.

  • Pay attention to their objectives in dealing with China and Pakistan

    While their interests overlap, Pakistan and China diverge when it comes to their objective in Kashmir. Both want to keep the pressure on India to avoid it from changing the status quo. Extending this line of argument, the author in this article suggest that India should separate the policy response to China from Pakistan, as they differ in their objectives.

    Coordinated efforts to corner India?

    • Latest news on the Ladakh front suggests that Chinese and Indian forces have begun to disengage in select areas.
    • But this does not detract from the reality that in the past few weeks Beijing and Islamabad are making coordinated efforts to challenge India’s presence in the Kashmir-Ladakh region.
    • There is stepped-up activity on Pakistan’s part to infiltrate terrorists into the Valley.
    • China has undertaken provocative measures on the Ladakh front to assert control over disputed areas around the Line of Actual Control (LAC).

    Let’s see how Pakistan and China’s interests overlap

    • In Pakistan’s case the intensification in its terrorist activities is related in part to the dilution of Article 370. 
    • Dilution of Article 370 helps India de-link Ladakh from the Kashmir problem.
    • For China, the division of Ladakh from Jammu and Kashmir allows India a freer hand in contesting China’s claims in the region.
    • Increasing road-building activity on India’s part close to the LAC augments this perception.
    • In addition, Ladakh borders China’s most restive provinces of Xinjiang and Tibet.
    • Ladakh is also contiguous to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), Gilgit and Baltistan, where the Chinese have invested hugely under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project.
    • External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar’s remark last year that India expects to have “physical jurisdiction over (POK) one day” has alarmed Beijing which sees any such Indian move as threatening the CPEC project.
    • These factors demonstrate the overlapping interests that Beijing and Islamabad have regarding India in this region.

    The above factors explain why Pakistan and China would want India to be so preoccupied with taking defensive measures in Kashmir and Ladakh as to have little time and energy left to attempt to alter the status quo in POK or in Aksai Chin.

    But there are major differences in Pakistani and Chinese objectives regarding India

    • These differences are related to their divergent perceptions of their disputes and their different force equations with India.
    • For China, Ladakh is primarily a territorial dispute with strategic ramifications.
    • China also believes it is superior to the Indian militarily and, therefore, can afford to push India around within limits as it has been attempting to do in the recent confrontation.
    • For Pakistan, its territorial claim on Kashmir is based on an immutable ideological conviction that it is the unfinished business of partition and as a Muslim-majority state is destined to become a part of Pakistan.
    • Islamabad also realises that it is the weaker power in conventional terms and therefore has to use unconventional means, primarily terrorist infiltration, to achieve its objective of changing the status quo in Kashmir.
    • China is a satiated power in Ladakh having occupied Aksai Chin and wants to keep up the pressure on New Delhi to prevent the latter from trying to change the situation on the ground.

    Way forward-Pay attention to objectives while negotiating

    • China’s primary concern with regard to Kashmir is to prevent any Indian move from threatening the CPEC project.
    • It does not challenge the status quo in Kashmir.
    • Pakistan, on the other hand, is committed to changing the status quo in Kashmir at all cost.
    • It has been trying to do so since Partition not only through clandestine infiltration but also by engaging in conventional warfare.
    • Therefore, while it is possible to negotiate the territorial dispute with China on a give-and-take basis.
    • Doing the same is not possible in the case of Pakistan which considers Kashmir a zero-sum game.
    • India should, therefore, distinguish the different objectives on the part of Beijing and Islamabad and tailor its responses accordingly without conflating the two threats to its security.

    Consider the question “Policy response of India in dealing with Pakistan and China should consider differences in their objectives in relation to Kashmir. And clubbing them together just because of their tactical overlap should be avoided. Elaborate.”

    Conclusion

    Lumping the twin threats posed by Pakistan and China together because of a tactical overlap between them makes it difficult to choose policy options rationally. So, the policy response must understand the difference in their objectives and avoid clubbing them together.

  • India-China border crisis: It is not about the U.S.

    India’s growing closeness to the U.S. could be the reason for China’s aggression along India’s border. This is the explanation we often come across. But is it really the case?. This article probes the same question. Example of China’s dispute with Indonesia and Philippine help us analyse the U.S. angle to Indo-China border dispute. So, what is the conclusion?

    An easy explanation to India-China border crisis

    • Why has China precipitated a fresh military crisis with India in eastern Ladakh?
    • Among the many explanations making the rounds in Delhi, there is always the easy and attractive one — it’s all about America.
    • Delhi has incurred Beijing’s wrath by moving closer to Washington, goes the argument.
    • India’s renewed enthusiasm for the US-led Quad, it is said, is encouraging China to teach a lesson to Delhi.

    But does this explanation applies to the other countries as well? Look at Indonesia

    • No!
    • This theory does not hold up in relation to other countries having problems with China.
    • Let us turn to the South China Sea, where China is on a bold and ambitious drive to expand its control over the disputed waters.
    • Let us start with gathering tensions over the territorial dispute between Beijing and Jakarta.
    • Over the last year and more, Jakarta is coping with a Chinese challenge in its waters off its Natuna Islands.
    • The Natuna are nearly 1,500 km from the Chinese mainland.
    • The Natuna themselves lie outside Beijing’s nine-dash line that claims nearly 80 per cent of the South China Sea.
    • The dispute is over the exclusive economic zone that the islands confer on Indonesia.
    • China says it has historic rights to these waters and has been dispatching its fishing fleet into these waters.

    Maybe China sees a problem with Jakarta-Washington relations: Let’s analyse

    • Jakarta did not support the US approach to the Indo-Pacific.
    • and went to great lengths to develop a concept of its own and get it endorsed by the ASEAN.
    • Indonesia is not a member of the much-maligned Quad.
    • Its foreign policy is wedded to non-alignment.
    • And as the host of the historic Bandung Conference in 1955, Indonesia is a founding member and champion of Non-aligned Movement.

    Now, let’s consider second example: Philippines

    • The story of the Philippines — one of the oldest military allies of the US in Asia — nicely complements the non-aligned Indonesia’s troubles with China.
    • When he came to power in 2016, President Rodrigo Duterte decided to distance the Philippines from the US and embraced China.
    • He had a hope of finding a reasonable settlement to the substantive maritime territorial dispute with Beijing.
    • In February this year, Manila announced the decision to terminate the agreement that lets American troops operate in the Philippines.
    • But last week, the Philippines “suspended” the decision to terminate military cooperation with the US.
    • The reason: The PLA’s relentless military pressure on the South China Sea islands claimed by Manila and including them in a new Chinese administrative district.

    So, what the two examples suggest?

    • Neither Jakarta that is scrupulously non-aligned nor Manila that was ready to break its alliance with the US has been spared from Beijing’s current muscular approach to China’s territorial disputes.
    • China has long-standing claims, right or wrong, on the territories of its neighbours.
    • The other is the dramatic shift in the regional power balance in favour of China.
    • Unlike in the past, China now has the military power to make good its claims and alter the territorial status quo, if only in bits and pieces.
    • This is what China is doing in the South China Sea.
    • And the situation may not be any different in Ladakh.

    Consider the question “The shift in the regional power balance and not the growing Indo-U.S. relations explains the assertive nature of China in India-China border issues. Elaborate.”

    Conclusion

    The real challenge for Delhi in managing its expansive territorial dispute with Beijing, then, is to redress the growing power imbalance with China. The rest is detail.

  • Cooperative security in Persian Gulf littoral and Implications for India

    This article analyses the security environment in the Gulf countries. Their common characteristic as being the oil producers and similarity in their social and security problems are also explained in detail in this article. And all this has implications for India. So, what are the implications? Read to know…

    Let’s look at the importance of countries surrounding Persian Gulf

    • The United Nations defines this body of water as the Persian Gulf.
    • The lands around it are shared by eight countries: Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
    • All are the members of the UN.
    • There is a commonality of interest among them in being major producers of crude oil and natural gas.
    • And thereby contribute critically to the global economy and to their own prosperity.
    • This has added to their geopolitical significance.
    • At the same time, turbulence has often characterised their inter se political relations.
    Arab Countries surrounding Persian Gulf

    Power play and security of the region

    • For eight decades prior to 1970, this body of water was a closely guarded British lake, administered in good measure by imperial civil servants from India.
    • When that era ended, regional players sought to assert themselves.
    • Imperatives of rivalry and cooperation became evident and, as a United States State Department report put it in 1973, ‘The upshot of all these cross currents is that the logic of Saudi-Iranian cooperation is being undercut by psychological, nationalistic, and prestige factors, which are likely to persist for a long time.’
    • The Nixon and the Carter Doctrines were the logical outcomes to ensure American hegemony.
    • An early effort for collective security, attempted in a conference in Muscat in 1975, was thwarted by Baathist Iraq.
    • The Iranian Revolution put an end to the Twin Pillar approach and disturbed the strategic balance.
    • The Iraq-Iran War enhanced U.S. interests and role.
    • Many moons and much bloodshed later, it was left to the Security Council through Resolution 598 (1987) to explore ‘measures to enhance the security and stability in the region’.

    Gulf regional security framework: Some questions

    • Any framework for stability and security thus needs to answer a set of questions:
    • Security for whom, by whom, against whom, for what purpose?
    • Is the requirement in local, regional or global terms?
    • Does it require an extra-regional agency?
    • Given the historical context, one recalls a Saudi scholar’s remark in the 1990s that ‘Gulf regional security was an external issue long before it was an issue among the Gulf States themselves.’

    What should be the ingredients of a  regional security framework?

    • The essential ingredients of such a framework would thus be to ensure: 1) conditions of peace and stability in individual littoral states; 2) freedom to all states of the Gulf littoral to exploit their hydrocarbon and other natural resources and export them; 3) freedom of commercial shipping in international waters of the Persian Gulf 4)freedom of access to, and outlet from, Gulf waters through the Strait of Hormuz; 5) prevention of conflict that may impinge on the freedom of trade and shipping and 6)prevention of emergence of conditions that may impinge on any of these considerations.
    • Could such a framework be self-sustaining or require external guarantees for its operational success?
    • If the latter, what should its parameters be?

    Misunderstanding the role great powers can play

    • Statesmen often confuse great power with total power and great responsibility with total responsibility.
    • The war in Iraq and its aftermath testify to it.
    • The U.S. effort to ‘contain’ the Iranian revolutionary forces, supplemented by the effort of the Arab states of the littoral (except Iraq)  GCC initially met with success in some functional fields and a lack of it in its wider objectives.

    The turbulent nature of US-Iran relations

    • In the meantime, geopolitical factors and conflicts elsewhere in the West Asian region — Yemen, Syria, Libya — aggravated global and regional relationships.
    • And it hampered a modus vivendi in U.S.-Iran relations that was to be premised on the multilateral agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme agreed to by western powers and the Obama Administration.
    • But it was disowned by U.S. President Donald Trump whose strident policies have taken the region to the brink of armed conflict.

    Perception of declining U.S. commitment to sub-regional security

    • Perceptions of declining U.S. commitment to sub-regional security have been articulated in recent months amid hints of changing priorities.
    • This is reported to have caused disquiet in some, perhaps all, members of the GCC, the hub of whose security concern remains pivoted on an Iranian threat (political and ideological rather than territorial).
    • And American insurance to deter it based on a convergence of interests in which oil, trade, arms purchases, etc have a role along with wider U.S. regional and global determinants.
    • It is evident that a common GCC threat perception has not evolved over time.
    • It has been hampered by the emergence of conflicting tactical and strategic interests and subjective considerations.
    • The current divisions within the organisation are therefore here to stay.
    • These have been aggravated by 1)the global economic crisis, 2) the immediate and longer term impact of COVID-19 on regional economies, 3) the problems in the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 4) and the decline in oil prices.

    Let’s look at the emerging trends in the region

    • One credible assessment suggests that in the emerging shape of the region.
    • 1) Saudi Arabia is a fading power.
    • 2) UAE, Qatar and Iran are emerging as the new regional leaders.
    • 3) Oman and Iraq will have to struggle to retain their sovereign identities.
    • 4)The GCC is effectively ended, and OPEC is becoming irrelevant as oil policy moves to a tripartite global condominium.
    • None of this will necessarily happen overnight and external intervention could interfere in unexpected ways.
    • But it is fair to say that the Persian Gulf as we have known for at least three generations is in the midst of a fundamental transformation.

    Improvement relations between Arab states and Iran

    • With the Arab League entombed and the GCC on life-support system, the Arab states of this sub-region are left to individual devices to explore working arrangements with Iraq and Iran.
    • The imperatives for these are different but movement on both is discernible.
    • With Iran in particular and notwithstanding the animosities of the past, pragmatic approaches of recent months seem to bear fruit.
    • Oman has always kept its lines of communication with Iran open.
    • Kuwait and Qatar had done likewise but in a quieter vein.
    • And now the UAE has initiated pragmatic arrangements.
    • These could set the stage for a wider dialogue.
    • Both Iran and the GCC states would benefit from a formal commitment to an arrangement incorporating the six points listed above.
    • So would every outside nation that has trading and economic interests in the Gulf. This could be sanctified by a global convention.
    • Record shows that the alternative of exclusive security arrangements promotes armament drives, enhances insecurity and aggravates regional tensions.
    • It unavoidably opens the door for Great Power interference.

    Ties with India and impact on its strategic interests

    • Locating the Persian Gulf littoral with reference to India is an exercise in geography and history.
    • The distance from Mumbai to Basra is 1,526 nautical miles and Bander Abbas and Dubai are in a radius of 1,000 nautical miles.
    • The bilateral relationship, economic and political, with the GCC has blossomed in recent years.
    • The governments are India-friendly and Indian-friendly and appreciate the benefits of a wide-ranging relationship.
    • This is well reflected in the bilateral trade of around $121 billion and remittances of $49 billion from a workforce of over nine million.
    • GCC suppliers account for around 34% of our crude imports and national oil companies in Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi are partners in a $44 billion investment in the giant Ratnagiri oil refinery.
    • In addition, Saudi Aramco is reported to take a 20% stake in Reliance oil-to-chemicals business.
    • The current adverse impact of the pandemic on our economic relations with the GCC countries has now become a matter of concern.

    India’s relationship with Iran

    • The relationship with Iran, the complex at all times and more so recently on account of overt American pressure, has economic potential and geopolitical relevance on account of its actual or alleged role in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
    • Iran also neighbours Turkey and some countries of Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea region.
    • Its size, politico-technological potential and economic resources, cannot be wished away, regionally and globally, but can be harnessed for wider good.

    Consider the question “Stability and security of the Persian Gulf region has wider consequences for Indians strategic concerns. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    Indian interests would be best served if this stability is ensured through cooperative security since the alternative — of competitive security options — cannot ensure durable peace.

  • Mission SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region)

    As part of Mission SAGAR, INS Kesari has entered Port Victoria, Seychelles to providing assistance in dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic.

    Try this question from CSP 2017:

    Q. Which of the following is geographically closest to Great Nicobar?

    (a) Sumatra

    (b) Borneo

    (c) Java

    (d) Sri Lanka

    Mission SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region)

    • SAGAR is a term coined by PM Modi in 2015 during his Mauritius visit with a focus on the blue economy.
    • It is a maritime initiative which gives priority to the Indian Ocean region for ensuring peace, stability and prosperity of India in the Indian Ocean region.
    • The goal is to seek a climate of trust and transparency; respect for international maritime rules and norms by all countries; sensitivity to each other`s interests; peaceful resolution of maritime issues; and increase in maritime cooperation.
    • It is in line with the principles of the Indian Ocean Rim Association.

    Back2Basics: IORA (Indian Ocean Rim Association)

    • Established in 1997 in Ebene Cyber City, Mauritius.
    • First established as Indian Ocean Rim Initiative in Mauritius on March 1995 and formally launched in 1997 by the conclusion of a multilateral treaty known as the Charter of the IORA for Regional Cooperation.
    • It is based on the principles of Open Regionalism for strengthening Economic Cooperation particularly on Trade Facilitation and Investment, Promotion as well as Social Development of the region.

  • The China conundrum

    India-China border issue and the latest standoff in Ladakh has forced India to consider the lasting solution to the problem. This article explains China’s anti-India strategy. And options available with India in the face of aggression are also considered.

    LAC: the reason for frequent face-offs

    • The debate has persisted whether it was China’s National Highway 219 cutting across Aksai Chin or Nehru’s “forward policy” which constituted the actual reason for the Sino-Indian border-conflict of 1962.
    • After declaring a unilateral ceasefire on November 20, troops of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) withdrew 20 kms behind what China described as the “line of actual control” (LAC).
    • The LAC generally conformed to the British-negotiated McMahon Line.
    • In the west, the Chinese stuck to their 1959 claim-line in Ladakh, retaining physical control of the 14,700 sq km Aksai Chin.
    • The 1962 ceasefire line became the de facto Sino-Indian border.
    • But in a bizarre reality, both sides visualised their own version of the LAC, but neither marked it on the ground; nor were maps exchanged.
    • This has inevitably led to frequent face-offs.

    So, what were the steps taken the resolve the border issue after 1962?

    • Post-conflict, it is customary for belligerents to undertake early negotiations, in order to establish stable peace and eliminate the casus belli.
    • Strangely, in the Sino-Indian context, it took 25 years and a serious military confrontation in 1987 to trigger a dialogue.
    • The dialogue led the two countries to sign the first-ever Sino-Indian Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA) in 1993.
    • Indian diplomats claim that this has helped maintain “mutual and equal security”, while the bilateral relationship has progressed in other spheres.
    • And yet, the failure to negotiate a boundary settlement after 22 meetings of special representatives of the two countries cannot be seen as anything but a failure of statesmanship and diplomacy.

    Now, let’s analyse China’s anti-India strategy and how LAC and Pakistan problem fits into it

    • China’s post-civil war leadership had conceived an early vision of the country’s future.
    • Ambitious and realist in scope, this strategy visualised China attaining, in the fullness of time, great-power status and acquiring a nuclear-arsenal.
    • Since the vision saw no room for an Asian rival, neutralising India became a priority.
    • It was for this specific purpose, that Pakistan was enlisted in 1963 as a partner.
    • In China’s anti-India strategy, Pakistan has played an invaluable role by sustaining a “hot” border and holding out the threat of a two-front war.
    • In China’s grand-strategy, an undefined LAC has become a vital instrumentality to embarrass and keep India off-balance through periodic transgressions.
    • These pre-meditated “land-grabs”, blunt messages of intimidation and dominance, also constitute a political “pressure-point” for New Delhi.

    Possibility of escalation into shooting war

    • While Indian troops have, so far, shown courage and restraint in these ridiculous brawls with the PLA.
    • But there is no guarantee that in a future melee, a punch on the nose will not invite a bullet in response.
    • In such circumstances, rapid escalation into a “shooting-war” cannot be ruled out.
    • Thereafter, should either side face a major military set-back, resort to nuclear “first-use” would pose a serious temptation.

    What are the options available with India?

    • For reasons of national security as well as self-respect, India cannot continue to remain in a “reactive mode” to Chinese provocations and it is time to respond in kind.
    • Since India’s choices vis-à-vis China are circumscribed by the asymmetry in comprehensive national power, resort must be sought in realpolitik.
    • According to theorist Kenneth Waltz, just as nature abhors a vacuum, international politics abhors an imbalance of power, and when faced with hegemonic threats, states must seek security in one of three options: 1) Increase their own strength, 2) ally with others to restore power-balance, 3) as a last resort, jump on the hegemon’s bandwagon.

    India’s decision-makers can start by posing this question to the military: “For how long do you have the wherewithal to sustain a combat against two adversaries simultaneously?” Depending on the response, they can consider the following 2 options.

    1. Alliance with the USA

    • Nehru, when faced with an aggressive China in 1962, asked support from the USA.
    •  Indira Gandhi in the run-up to the 1971 war with Pakistan asked support from the USSR.
    • Both had no qualms of jettisoning the shibboleth of “non-alignment” and seeking support from the USA and USSR respectively.
    • Today, India has greater freedom of action and many options to restore the balance of power vis-à-vis China.
    • Xi Jinping has opened multiple fronts — apart from the COVID-19 controversy — across the South China Sea, South East Asia, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Asia.
    • Donald Trump is burning his bridges with China.
    • In the world of realpolitik, self-interest trumps all and India must find friends where it can.
    • Given China’s vulnerabilities in the Indian Ocean and the real possibility of America losing its strategic foothold in Diego Garcia, India has a great deal to offer as a friend, partner or even an ally; with or without the Quad.

    2. Accommodation with China

    •  If ideological or other reasons preclude the building of a power-balancing alliance, coming to an honourable accommodation with China remains a pragmatic option.
    • Zhou Enlai’s proposal of 1960 — repeated by Deng Xiaoping in 1982 — is worth re-examining in the harsh light of reality.
    • The price of finding a modus vivendi [an arrangement or agreement allowing conflicting parties to coexist peacefully]for the Sino-Indian border dispute may be worth paying if it neutralises two adversaries at one stroke and buys lasting peace.

    Consider the question “In the harsh light of reality and faced with aggression from its neighbour, India has to ally with other powers to restore the balance of power. Examine.”

    Conclusion

    Neither option will be easy to “sell”. However, India cannot afford to continue with the current situation for long and must choose one of the options to end the to find the solution.