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Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • What India should consider about the proposition to isolate China

    The economic grip China exerts on the world protects it from the threat of isolation. This article examines this issue and its implications for India.

    Worsening U.S.-China ties and implications for other countries

    • After years of cooperating with one another, the U.S. and China are currently at the stage of confrontation.
    • Both are seeking allies to join their camps.
    • This places several countries in Asia, in a difficult position as most of them, loathe to take sides.
    • The U.S. may not necessarily be the first choice for many countries of Asia and the Asia-Pacific region.
    • In the case of China, it is clearly more feared than loved.

    China’s aggression

    •  Beijing’s virtual takeover of Hong Kong has only confirmed what had long been known about China’s intentions.
    • In March-April this year, China further stepped up its aggressive actions, renaming almost 80 geographical features in the region as an index of Chinese sovereignty.
    •  Taiwan, Japan, Vietnam, Indonesia and South Korea have all complained about China’s menacing postures in their vicinity.

    How countries are resisting China

    • Hardly any country in Asia is willing to openly confront China, and side with the U.S.
    • East Asian countries explain that China was always known to be over-protective of the South China Sea.
    • And China consider South China Sea a natural shield against possible hostile intervention by outside forces inimical to it.
    • No U.S. assurance and Chinese aggression has been enough to make countries in the region openly side with the U.S. and against China.

    China’s economic grip and lessons for India

    • Despite a series of diktats from Washington to restrict economic and other relations, China remains unfazed.
    • China seems confident that its stranglehold on the global economy ensures that it does not face any real challenge.
    • It would be wise for India to recognise this.
    • It is equally necessary to realise how fickle some of these countries can be when it comes to economic issues.
    •  At a recent meeting in Washington Australia (a member of the Quad) made it clear that China is important for Australia.
    • Likewise, the U.K.’s Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, recently stated in its Parliament, that the U.K. wants a positive relationship with China.
    • It is evident that few nations across the world are willing to risk China’s ire because of strong economic ties.

    India’s relations with neighbouring countries: concerns

    • India’s relations with Nepal, meanwhile, have hit a roadblock over the Kalapani area.
    • In Sri Lanka, the return of the Rajapaksas to power after the recent elections does not augur too well for India-Sri Lanka relations.
    • The strain in India-Bangladesh relations is a real cause for concern since it can provide a beachhead against Chinese activities in the region.

    Growing Chinese presence in India’s sphere of influence

    •  In July, the Chinese Foreign Minister organised a virtual meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Nepal, Afghanistan and Pakistan.
    • In this meeting, China proposed economic corridor plan with Nepal, styled as the Trans-Himalayan Multi-Dimensional Connectivity Network.
    • China has also made headway in Iran to an extent, again at India’s expense.

    Conclusion

    Geo-balancing is not happening to China’s disadvantage. This lesson must be well understood when India plan its future strategy.

  • Back in news: Indus Water Treaty (IWT)

    India has refused a request by Pakistan to hold a meeting on issues around the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) at the Attari check post near the India-Pakistan border.

    The IWT has been in existence since 1960, and reached a flash point in the aftermath of the Uri attacks in 2016 with PM declaring that “blood and water couldn’t flow together”.

    About Indus Waters Treaty, 1960

    • The IWT is a water-distribution treaty between India and Pakistan, brokered by the World Bank signed in Karachi in 1960.
    • According to this agreement, control over the water flowing in three “eastern” rivers of India — the Beas, the Ravi and the Sutlej was given to India
    • The control over the water flowing in three “western” rivers of India — the Indus, the Chenab and the Jhelum was given to Pakistan
    • The treaty allowed India to use western rivers water for limited irrigation use and unrestricted use for power generation, domestic, industrial and non-consumptive uses such as navigation, floating of property, fish culture, etc. while laying down precise regulations for India to build projects
    • India has also been given the right to generate hydroelectricity through the run of the river (RoR) projects on the Western Rivers which, subject to specific criteria for design and operation is unrestricted.

    Talks stalled on key projects

    • Among the key points on the table was evolving a procedure to solve differences on technical aspects governing the construction of the Ratle run-of-the-river (RoR) project on the Chenab in the Kishtwar district.
    • India has called for the appointment of a ‘neutral’ party while Pakistan favours a Court of Arbitration to agree upon a final resolution on the design parameters of this hydropower project.
    • According to the IWT, India has the right to build RoR projects on the three ‘western’ rivers — the Chenab, Jhelum and Indus — provided it does so without substantially impeding water flow in Pakistan downstream.
    • Pakistan believes that the project’s current design does pose a serious impediment and has told the World Bank that it wants a Court of Arbitration (CoA) set up to decide on the issue.
    • India says this is only a technical issue and mutually solvable.

  • What are Confucius Institutes, and why are they under the scanner in India?

    • The Ministry of Education (previously HRD) had sent a letter to several institutions seeking information about the activities of their Confucius Institutes (CIs) and Chinese language training centres.
    • This has brought the spotlight to China’s CI programme, a key pillar of Beijing’s global soft power effort, and raised questions about the future of India-China cooperation in the education space.

    Try this question for mains:

    Q.“It cannot be business as usual with China after the border clash.” Critically comment.

    What are the Confucius Institutes (CI)?

    • Starting with a CI in Seoul in 2004, China’s National Office for Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language (NOCFL) known as Hanban establishes CI.
    • China has established 550 CIs and 1,172 Confucius Classrooms (CCs) housed in foreign institutions, in 162 countries.
    • As the Hanban explains on its website, following the experience of the British Council, Alliance Française and Germany’s Goethe-Institut, China began “establishing non-profit public institutions which aim to promote Chinese language and culture in foreign countries”.

    What is the presence of CIs in India?

    • India is reviewing the presence of CIs in seven universities, in addition to 54 MoUs on inter-school cooperation involving China, which is not connected to the CI programme.

    How have CIs been viewed around the world?

    • The CI arrangement has generated debate in the West, where some universities have closed the institutes amid concern over the influence of the Chinese government and it’s funding on host institutions.
    • Closures of some CIs have been reported in the United States, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, France and Sweden.
    • While the closures in the West have made news, these cases still represent a minority. Faced with this backlash, China is now rebranding the programme.
    • Most of the 550 CIs and more than 1,000 CCs around the world are still active, with a presence spanning Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, and across Asia.

    What does it mean for India-China relations?

    • CIs and CCs had already been in India for more than 10 years.
    • Even prior to the border skirmishes, Indian authorities had viewed the CI arrangement somewhat warily.
    • Along with the new move to review CIs, Mandarin has been dropped from the list of foreign languages that can be taught in schools in the new National Education Policy.

    Not a perfect move

    • Recent moves by India shows that it cannot be business as usual with China after the border clash.
    • However, India’s long-term objectives are not clear.
    • De-emphasizing learning Mandarin is neither likely to impact China’s stance on the border nor help India in developing the expertise and resources it needs in dealing with China.

  • Pakistan’s new Political Map

    Recently Pakistani PM announced a new political map of Pakistan.

    Do you think that the recent launch of new political maps depicting Indian territories by Pakistan would make any difference on the international community’s stance on Kashmir?

    A chain reaction

    • With this, Pakistan became the third country to launch a new political map after India and Nepal did the same.
    • India had reiterated its territorial claims in J&K, and Ladakh with the new map; this triggered a reaction from Nepal which contested Indian claims in the Kalapani region of Pithoragarh district.

    What are the features of the new map?

    • The new political map of Pakistan has claimed the entire region of Jammu and Kashmir stretching all the way to the edge of Ladakh.
    • The map also claims Junagarh and Manavadar, a former princely State and territory, respectively that are part of present-day Gujarat.
    • Pakistan also claimed the entire territory and water bodies that fall in the Sir Creek region in the westernmost part of India.

    Defiance of old agreements

    • The territorial claims of Pakistan are, however, of a far greater extent and challenge many of the past understandings and treaties.
    • This clearly runs counter to the Simla Agreement which treated Kashmir as a bilateral matter.
    • It leaves out a claim line at the eastern end of J&K indicating Pakistan’s willingness to make China a third party in the Kashmir issue.

    How different is it from previous ones?

    • A similar map has been part of school textbooks of Pakistan for many years which highlights the territorial aspiration of Pakistan over the northern part of the subcontinent.
    • The document also maintains bits of reality on the ground as it shows the Line of Control in Kashmir in a red-dotted line.
    • The map may be used to provide legal cover for some of Islamabad’s territorial ambitions, especially in Kashmir and Sir Creek.

    A Cartographical warfare

    • The map is likely to lead to changes in Pakistan’s position on territorial disputes with India.
    • By demanding the entire J&K region, Pak is changing the main features of its Kashmir discourse as it includes the Jammu region prominently.
    • The inclusion of Junagarh and Manavadar opens fundamental issues of territorial sovereignty of India.
    • Manavadar, a princely territory, joined India on February 15, 1948, and Indian troops marched into Junagarh in September that year incorporating it into Indian Territory.
    • By normalizing Islamabad’s claims over these former princely territories, Pakistan is most likely to assert its rights over the former princely State of Hyderabad as well.

    What does Pakistan plan to gain by this exercise?

    • Sir Creek is a collection of water bodies that extend from the Arabian Sea deep inside the territory of Kutch and is rich in biodiversity and mangrove forests.
    • India’s position on Sir Creek is based on the Kutch arbitration case of 1966-69.
    • The new map can be used to reassert Pakistan’s claims regarding the Rann which it had lost in the arbitration conducted in Geneva.
    • India’s position regarding Sir Creek is based on the fact that the arbitration had granted the entire Rann and its marshy areas to India while leaving the solid land across the Rann to Pakistan.
    • By demanding the demarcation to shift towards the eastern bank, Pakistan appears to be going back also on the spirit of the Rann of Kutch arbitration where the overwhelming evidence of maps supported India’s claims.

    Are there any claims on its western borders?

    • The map is silent about territorial claims in the west and northwest of Pakistan.
    • It indicates Islamabad’s acceptance of the Durand Line as the border with Afghanistan.
    • The reality on the ground, however, shows problems that continue to haunt Pakistan on that front as well where law and order have been difficult to maintain because of free movement of armed fighters.
    • A deadly clash between Afghan civilians and Pakistani troops near its Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province is a usual discourse.
    • The resultant situation has placed Afghan and Pakistani troops in a confrontational position.

  • Global coalition of democracies amid Chinese assertion

    In the recent speed Mike Pompeo, the US Secretary of State, floated the idea of an ‘alliance of democracies’. This article discusses its implications for India.

    Two propositions on China

    • The US Secretary of State laid out two propositions.
    • One is that nearly five decades of US engagement with China have arrived at a dead-end.
    • Second is that the US can’t address the China challenge alone and called for collective action.
    • He mused on whether “it’s time for a new grouping of like-minded nations, a new alliance of democracies.”

    How it matters for India?

    • Both the propositions signal the breakdown of the relationship between the world’s two most important powers.
    • They also reflect on the need to create new frameworks to cope with emerging global challenges.
    • China, is a large neighbour of India and America, is India’s most important partner makes the new context rather different from the Cold War.

    Concerns for India in the propositions

    •  Many in Delhi would like to know if the current direction of China policy will endure if Joe Biden wins the presidential election in November.
    • India must pay close attention to the unfolding China debate in the US.
    • India also note the structural changes in American engagement with China over the last two decades.
    •  Delhi will certainly avoid calling the group proposed by US Secretary of State an “alliance”.
    • India would rather have it described as a “coalition of democracies”.

    Idea of ‘Coalition of democracies’

    • Over the last many years, India has become comfortable with the idea of a political partnership with the world’s leading democracies.
    • India also supported past US initiatives like-Clinton Administrations “Community of Democracies”, Bush Administrations democracy promotion fund at the UN.
    • Delhi has also welcomed President Trump’s initiative to convene an expanded gathering of the G-7 leaders.
    • The idea of democracies working together has an enduring appeal for the US.
    • India figures in this American vision is relatively new. So is Delhi’s readiness to reciprocate.

    Consider the question “In the ongoing geopolitical situation the U.S. has proposed the idea of ‘alliance of democracies’. Where does India feature in this vision and what are the implications of it for India.”

    Conclusion

    Constructing a global coalition of democracies will take much work and quite some time. But engaging with that initiative, amidst the rise and assertion of China, should open a whole range of new possibilities for Indian foreign and security policies.

    Original article:

    https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/us-india-democracy-china-cold-war-global-economy-6526409/

  • Indian foreign policy and decline in soft power in neighbourhood

    The article examines the issue of declining political capital in India’s neighbourhood and the factors responsible for this. 

    India’s standing in neighbourhood: Past

    • Not long ago, India was seen as a natural rising power in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region.
    • It was the de facto leader of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
    • It has historical and cultural ties with Nepal.
    • It enjoyed traditional goodwill and influence in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.
    • It had made investments worth billions of dollars in Afghanistan and cultivated vibrant ties with the post-Taliban stakeholders in Kabul.
    • It had committed itself to multilateralism and the Central Asian connectivity project, with Iran being its gateway.
    • It was competing and cooperating with China at the same time.

    India’s relations in with the neighbourhood: Present

    • India is perhaps facing its gravest national security crisis in 20 years, with China along the Line of Actual Control (LAC).
    • SAARC is defunct.
    • Nepal has turned hostile having adopted a new map and revived border disputes with India.
    • Sri Lanka has tilted towards China.
    • Bangladesh is clearly miffed at the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019.
    • When Afghanistan is undergoing a major transition, India is out of the multi-party talks.
    • Iran has inaugurated a railway link project connecting the Chabahar port, on the Gulf of Oman, to Zahedan.

    What are the factors responsible for this?

    When we dig deep, three problems can be found which are more or less linked to this decline.

    1) Alignment with US

    • As India started moving away from non-alignment, there has been a steady erosion in India’s strategic autonomy.
    • India’s official policy is that it is committed to multilateralism.
    •  When India started deepening its partnership with the United States, New Delhi began steadily aligning its policies with U.S. interests.
    • The case of Iran is the best example.
    • India’s deepening defence and military ties with the U.S.  probably altered Beijing’s assessment of India.
    • One of the reasons for the shift could be Beijing’s assessment that India has already become a de facto ally of the U.S.
    • The forceful altering of the status quo on the border is a risky message as much to New Delhi as it is to Washington.

    2) Domestic politics

    • The passing of the CAA is regionalisation of the domestic problems of the countries in India’s neighbourhood.
    • Bangladesh took offence at the CAA and the National Register of Citizens, there were anti-India protests even in Afghanistan.
    • CAA also drove new wedges between India and the countries that had a Muslim majority and were friendly to India in the neighbourhood.
    • The abrogation of the special status of Jammu and Kashmir was another such move.
    • But it damaged India’s reputation as a responsible democratic power and gave propaganda weapons to Pakistan.
    • The change of status quo in Jammu and Kashmir, could be another factor that prompted the Chinese to move aggressively towards the border in Ladakh.

    3) Misplaced confidence

    • Great powers wait to establish their standing before declaring that they have arrived.
    • China bided its time for four decades before it started taking on the mighty U.S.
    • India should learn from at least these modern examples.
    • If it did, it would not have used high-handedness in Nepal during the country’s constitutional crisis and caused a traditional and civilisational ally to turn hostile.
    • The updated political map which India released in November rubbed salt into the wound on the Nepal border.

    Consider the question “India’s standing in its neighbourhood has been on the decline for some time now. Examine the factors responsible for this.”

    Conclusion

    To address the current crises, India has to reconsider its foreign policy trajectory. It does not lack resources to claim what is its due in global politics. What it lacks is strategic depth.

    Original article:

    https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/needed-a-map-for-indias-foreign-policy/article32206877.ece

  • Deepening ties with South Korea

    South Korea’s technological advancement and manufacturing capabilities can be helpful in India’s economic growth and human resource development. Seoul’s successful development story of the last few decades can complement Modi’s vision of making a “New India” by 2022.

  • India should not jump to conclusion in dealing with Iran

    Two events which happened in quick succession raised concern in India. Iran’s decision to continue the railway project on its own and the reports of deal with China, both the events weighs heavily on India’s interests. This article examines the future course of action which India must adopt in such a situation.

    Context

    • Iran and China are close to concluding a 25-year strategic partnership.
    • This is being linked to reports that Iran has decided to undertake the construction of the Chabahar-Zahedan railway line on its own.
    • The project has not been handed over to China — at least not yet — so the “India loses, China wins” narrative is premature.

    What does the China-Iran deal indicate?

    • China attaches importance to Iran, which is a key source of energy supplies, a part of Belt and Road Initiative, and a potentially lucrative market.
    • However, like India, China has also in parallel cultivated closer relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
    • China continues to have a strong relationship with Israel.
    • As China’s economic, military and technological capabilities have increased, its profile in this strategically important region has also expanded.

    What should be India foreign policy approach towards Iran

    • While acknowledging changed regional geopolitical landscape, India should pursue continue the policy of maintaining positive relations with Iran, the Arab states and Israel.
    • India will have more room for manoeuvring in the region by continuing to maintain a strong and friendly relationship with Iran.
    • One should also not exclude the possibility of a Democratic US President reviving the Iran nuclear deal.
    •  The revival of the deal will open the door for US and European companies to resume business with Iran.
    • It is the reinstatement of severe economic sanctions that has led Iran to turn to China, but the latter has remained cautious.
    • The pursuit of a closer security partnership with the US does not mean that India should follow the US lead on its other important relationships.

    Concerns for India

    • While maintaining the relations, India should not monitor closely the development of relations between China and Iran, which could complicate our security interests on our western flank. 
    • Of particular concern is a reference to China constructing a new port at Jask at the mouth of the Hormuz strait.
    •  If the port were operated by China, India’s maritime security would be at further risk.
    • It would also be of deep concern to the Arab states who will suffer from any closing of the Hormuz Strait while Iran remains less affected.
    • This is an issue on which the Arab states may well react adversely to China.
    • India, too, should press its concerns on Iran while working on a counter-strategy.

    Consider the question “Balancing the contrasts has been the basis of India’s relations with Iran. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    India should continue its engagement with Iran while pressing for its concerns at the same time in particular when it comes to Iran’s relations with China endangering India’s interest.

  • Exploring options to tackle China

    There are several options which India could explore in dealing with China with less cost but significant effectiveness. Diplomacy is one of them. What are the other options? Read the article to know…

    Context

    • China’s aggression and Galwan valley incident dismantles the Border Agreements of 1993, 1996, 2005 and 2013.
    • Understanding China’s objectives become critical in this situation.

    Analysing China’s objectives

    • Humbling India in the eyes of Asia and the world was all important for China.
    • Despite China’s territorial aggression, it would be a mistake to think that China is preparing for a conflict over territory.
    • China is well aware that it cannot be certain whether it will emerge a victor from an all-out conflict with India.
    •  China cannot afford to jeopardise its future for the present.
    • China has been intent on transforming the Asian region in its own image, and, simultaneously, seeking to become a continental and a maritime power.

    What are the options to deal with China

    • India may well find non-military tools not only more cost-effective but also less risky.
    • 1)  Exploiting the current widespread opposition to China, India must try to create international opinion in its support regarding border violations.
    • 2) Cultivation of foreign leaders with a view to draw their specific attention to China’s aggressive policies and designs is the second option.
    • India’s involvement with the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) should prove invaluable in this respect.
    • 3) India must also overhaul its ‘messaging’ capacity.
    • It should make greater use of technology to send across its message and ideas in its vicinity and across the globe, highlighting its peaceful intentions in stark contrast to China’s aggressive policies and tactics.
    • 4)  India must pay particular attention to relations with countries in its neighbourhood, such as Nepal and Bangladesh, and allies such as Iran and Vietnam.
    • Relationship with these countries seems to have frayed at the edges, with India being more intent on strengthening relations with the West.
    • Smaller countries of Asia, which constantly face China’s aggressive interference in their internal affairs, have not received much support from India, and this needs India’s attention.
    • 5) India’s true strength is its unity in diversity. A truly united and resilient India is the best antidote to China’s attempts to humble India.
    • China has never been able to properly understand, the strength India seems to derive from its spiritual, religious and cultural attributes, which are a part of its civilisational heritage.
    • 6) India would do well to take pole position in propagating ‘Himalayan Buddhism’ which China has been seeking to subvert to achieve its ends.

    Consider the question “To counter the challenges manifested by China through recent events India needs to explore along with other options the subtler tools of power available to it. Examine the other tools available with India.”

    Conclusion

    Military no doubt project the country’s power but there are other options with less cost and significant benefits. India should focus on these options as well while dealing with China.

  • Costs of neglecting new Arabian business

    The article contrasts the over-emphasis put on the ties with Iran with the neglect of ties with Arab countries in India’s foreign policy. It explores the inherent difficulties in dealing with Iran. And opportunities for India in Arab countries.

    Context

    • Iran is accorded high priority in India’s foreign policy.
    • This stands in stark contrast to the under-appreciation of relationship with Arab countries.

    Reasons for a special relationship with Iran

    • Historical connections.
    • Civilisational bonds.
    • Energy supplies.
    • Regional security.
    • Geographic and demographic size, the geopolitical location next door.
    • Natural resources and the extraordinary talents of its people.

    Importance of Arab countries for India

    • Millions of Indian immigrants in the Arab nations.
    • Massive hard currency remittances from them, and the density of commercial engagement with the Arab Gulf is important for India.
    • The UAE and Saudi Arabia have, in recent years, extended invaluable support in countering terrorism and blocked attempts to condemn India in the Muslim world.

    Let’s analyse the issue of railway contract in Iran

    • Large countries with major foreign investments and projects win some and lose some.
    • Then there is no escaping the political risk associated with foreign projects.
    • And politics, both domestic and international, is all-consuming in Iran.
    • The sanctions regime imposed by the US has crippled the Iranian economy.
    • India is careful not to attract the US sanctions.
    • India did gain an exemption from the US sanctions regime for its participation in the Chabahar port project in Iran.
    • But they don’t apply to some of the partners suggested by Iran in the railway project.
    • So, Iran would like India to break the US sanctions regime.
    • A prudent India is resisting that temptation.
    • It would rather lose the railway contract than get into the raging crossfire between the US and Iran.

    Issue of balancing the relations with Iran and U.S.

    • India’s Iran policy cannot be seen as a test of India’s “strategic autonomy”.
    • Some expect Delhi to conduct its relationship with Iran without a reference to either a cost-benefit calculus or Iran’s troubled relationship with others with whom India has important partnerships.
    • No government in Delhi can buy into that proposition.
    • Criticism of the government policy is similar to what happened in 2005 over India’s stance on Iran’s covert nuclear programme.
    • Delhi’s vote against Iran in the International Atomic Energy Agency drew criticism.
    • But governments stand proved right when Iran concluded a nuclear deal of its own with the US and major powers, a decade later.
    • Iran surely can take care of its own interests, and there is little reason why Delhi must back Tehran in every one of its fights with Washington.

    India should focus on Arab countries

    • The Arab world has had its doors open for political, economic and technological cooperation with India.
    • Three moderate Arab nations — Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the UAE — are confronting radical forces in the region and are valuable partners for India in countering forces of destabilisation.
    •  There is real Chinese economic action in the Arab world as the region embraces China’s Belt and Road Initiative.
    • India is no minor economic force in the Arab world, having had a much longer engagement with the region than China.
    • Delhi must up its own commercial game in the Arab world, and one of the new possibilities for India lies in the domain of new technologies.
    • There is emerging sentiment among the Gulf Arabs to reduce the over-dependence on oil, promote alternative energy sources, invest in higher education, and develop technology hubs.

    Consider the question “India’s relations with Iran has always been driven by the geopolitical contexts. This poses an inherent challenge for both countries. In light of this examine the importance of Iran for India and challenges India’s foreign policy faces in dealing with Iran.”

    Conclusion

    India must focus on elevating India’s economic partnership with the Arab world to the next level. For India, the costs of neglecting the new possibilities for wide-ranging Arabian business are far higher than a lost railway contract in Iran.