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Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • The wilting Sakura

    Context

    A resilient nation, Japan has risen from the ashes, phoenix-like, each time. It is now confronting COVID-19, which has wreaked havoc on global financial and economic systems and disrupted production, supply chains and markets.

    The cruise ship incident and no reprieve to the Japanese from Covid-19

    • COVID-19 received a high-rating televised start in Japan with the cruise ship, Diamond Princess, steaming into Tokyo Bay with 3,711 passengers on board and quickly being quarantined.
    • Over the next month, with more than 700 cases of infection on-board, it remained the single-largest cluster outside China.
    • Gradually, as numbers swelled exponentially elsewhere and the incidence of new cases remained low locally, the Japanese went back to their ways, with holiday crowds celebrating the annual Hanami (sakura viewing) season in idyllic spots
    • It seemed as if the Japanese had dodged the bullet even as it delayed until April 3 the blocking of tourists from 70-odd countries, including China, which accounted for nearly 9.6 million tourists in 2019, one-third of the total.
    • With new infections mounting in recent days, the reprieve, it seems, was as ephemeral as the bloom of the sakura.

    Postponing the Olympics

    • The biggest collateral damage of the fresh wave of COVID-19 infections in Japan is the belated decision to postpone the Tokyo Olympics to 2021.
    • It reminded the nation of the jinxed Olympics of 1940, which Japan was to host but fell victim to the Second Sino-Japanese War.
    • If the 1940 Olympics were intended to showcase Japan’s industrial and economic resurrection after the devastation of the 1923 Great Kanto earthquake, the 1964 Tokyo Olympics had symbolised the economic miracle in Japan after the ravages of the Second World War.
    • The 2020 Olympics, dubbed by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe as the “Recovery and Reconstruction Games”, were to demonstrate Japan’s mojo in the aftermath of the 2011 Triple Disaster.
    • Reports indicate that Japan has already spent $12.6 billion on the preparations for the Olympics.
    • Nikkei and Goldman Sachs estimate that the postponement of the games would easily set Japan back by another $5-6 billion.

    Impact on economy

    • Recession in the world: The pandemic could not have come at a worse time. The IMF has confirmed that COVID-19 has pushed the global economy into a recession, potentially much worse than the one in 2009.
    • The Japanese economy now faces the daunting prospect of a sharp contraction, with the OECD Report for March 2020 forecasting its GDP growth at 0.2 per cent in 2020.
    • Even before the global pandemic struck, Japan was dealing with the adverse effects on consumer spending of the hike in consumption tax from 8 per cent to 10 per cent.
    • Dwindling demand from China, where Japan has huge economic stakes, can only worsen the regional economic outlook already strained by US-China trade friction.
    • Abe’s decision this week to declare a month-long state of emergency in Tokyo and six other prefectures, alongside the release of a gargantuan stimulus package worth nearly $1 trillion, including cash doles and financial support to households and businesses, may help turn the tide.
    • However, providing healthcare to a rapidly ageing population in the face of an abrupt disruption in the sizeable inward flow of foreign care-givers will prove a daunting challenge.
    • Meanwhile, several prefectures that depend heavily on tourism from China and the Republic of Korea have suffered deep losses.

    Impact on Japan’s international commitments and initiatives

    • As one of the world’s richest countries, Japan can perhaps hope to cushion itself from such blows.
    • Whether the economic distress unleashed by COVID-19 also adversely impacts some of Japan’s commitments to its Official Development Assistance (ODA) or outlays for regional infrastructure and connectivity under flagship programmes such as the Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure (EPQI), the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) and the Indo-Pacific Business Forum, including the Blue Dot Network and LNG projects, remains to be seen.
    • This could well be true of the US too, in the context of the International Development Finance Corporation under the BUILD Act, aimed at countering China’s expanding writ across the region.

    Implications for Indo-Pacific region

    • The pandemic could have broader implications for military postures in the Indo-Pacific.
    • As it was seen in the outbreak of the COVID-19 virus onboard the US Navy’s Theodore Roosevelt, which had sailed from San Diego in January for a scheduled Indo-Pacific deployment.
    • It is at the centre of a controversy involving the sacking of its captain and the vessel’s ill-advised port visit to Da Nang in Vietnam earlier in March despite the high risk of contagion.
    • Of course, China’s PLA Navy (PLAN) could well be grappling with similar problems out at sea but, unlike in the democratic world, these facts will be treated as “state secrets”.
    • Opportunity for China to further its influence: As China gradually recovers from the pandemic, relatively earlier and faster than the West, Beijing’s “charm offensive” and leveraging of its deep pockets may help it to further its geopolitical influence.
    • Its assistance to developing countries in mitigating the impact of COVID-19 will create new scope to proselytise its governance and development models.

    India-Japan relations

    • Japan-China relations: A high-profile casualty of the pandemic is Chinese President Xi Jinping’s long-pending visit to Tokyo.
    • But Japan’s “mask diplomacy” and generous assistance to China at the start of the pandemic augur well for Sino-Japanese ties, which have improved in recent years, their inveterate differences notwithstanding.
    • India visit by Japan: Abe’s postponed visit to India, earlier scheduled to take place at the end of 2019, will be hard to resurrect before the pandemic is completely under control.
    • Nevertheless, the fundamental convergence of interests and the extraordinary political capital invested in the relationship by both PM Modi and Abe in recent years ensures that the Special Strategic and Global Partnership between India and Japan will remain robust.
    • New vistas for India-Japan cooperation: The pandemic opens up new vistas for cooperation in healthcare, non-traditional security and global governance, including reform of the UN and affiliated bodies such as the WHO whose contributions in the battle against COVID-19 are moot.

    How Japan tackled the pandemic so far?

    • So far, Japan had relied on its customary discipline and prevention methods, with an exhortation to the public to avoid the “three Cs” — closed spaces, crowded places and conversations at close proximity.
    • No lockdown: Japan has shied away from taking the bold approach that Modi took in announcing a 21-day nationwide lockdown.
    • The declaration of a state of emergency covering the megacities of Tokyo and Osaka and some prefectures would give local governors in the hardest-hit areas greater legal authority to impose curbs, albeit without the power to impose penalties.
    • Japan’s case-by-case approach to the reopening of schools by regional authorities has been criticised.
    • There have been calls for a strict lockdown before it is too late to avert the same fate as Italy, Spain and the US.
    • In a race to develop vaccine: With formidable scientific prowess at its disposal, Japan remains at the forefront in the race to develop a vaccine against COVID-19.

    Conclusion

    Prime Minister Abe is viewed by voters as a leader capable of taking bold decisions. If Abe’s administration overcomes the COVID-19 crisis despite the odds and succeeds in staving off a recession, there is every chance that the LDP might again amend its rules to grant him a fourth term. After all, it is not easy for any of his political rivals to step into his shoes in the middle of such a crisis.

  • Operation Sanjeevani

    An Indian Air Force (IAF) C-130J transport aircraft o delivered 6.2 tonne of essential medicines and hospital consumables to Maldives under Operation Sanjeevani.

    Operation Sanjeevani

    • At the request of the govt. of Maldives, the IAF aircraft activated Operation Sanjeevani and lifted these medicines from airports in New Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai and Madurai before flying to the Maldives.
    • Among other things, these medicines include influenza vaccines, anti-viral drugs such as lopinavir and ritonavir — which have been used to treat patients with COVID-19 in other countries.
    • The flights are being operated on commercial basis following demands from pharmaceutical companies and their intermediaries and will carry cargo on inbound as well as outbound flights.
    • The cargo operations will help the airline earn some revenue at a time there is a ban on passenger flights and the entire fleet is grounded.

  • [pib ] Indo-U.S. Science and Technology Forum

    Indian students will undertake a research internship at Viterbi School of Engineering, University of Southern California, LA, USA under the IUSSTF Program.

    What is IUSSTF?

    • IUSSTF is an acronym for the Indo-U.S. Science and Technology Forum.
    • It is established under an agreement between the Governments of India and the USA in March 2000.
    • It is an autonomous bilateral organization jointly funded by both the Governments that promote Sci-Tech, Engineering and Innovation through substantive interaction among government, academia and industry.
    • The Department of Science & Technology, Governments of India and the U.S. Department of States are respective nodal departments.

    About Viterbi Program

    • The Viterbi Program of IUSSTF was developed between IUSSTF and the Viterbi School of Engineering, University of Southern California (USC).
    • This program is a part of the Government’s endeavour to encourage research and development amongst the bright young Indian minds to create long-term, sustainable, and vibrant linkages between India and the US.

  • Explained: Sir Creek Dispute

     

     

    Former Pakistan Minister recalls plan for Sir Creek pact.

    Sir Creek

    • Sir Creek is a 96-km strip of water disputed between India and Pakistan in the Rann of Kutch marshlands. Originally named Ban Ganga, Sir Creek is named after a British representative.
    • The Creek opens up in the Arabian Sea and roughly divides the Kutch region of Gujarat from the Sindh Province of Pakistan.

    What’s the dispute?

    • The dispute lies in the interpretation of the maritime boundary line between Kutch and Sindh. Before India’s independence, the provincial region was a part of the Bombay Presidency of British India.
    • But after India’s independence in 1947, Sindh became a part of Pakistan while Kutch remained a part of India.
    • Pakistan claims the entire creek as per paragraphs 9 and 10 of the Bombay Government Resolution of 1914 signed between then the Government of Sindh and Rao Maharaj of Kutch.
    • The resolution, which demarcated the boundaries between the two territories, included the creek as part of Sindh, thus setting the boundary as the eastern flank of the creek popularly known as Green Line.
    • But India claims that the boundary lies mid-channel as depicted in another map drawn in 1925, and implemented by the installation of mid-channel pillars back in 1924.

    The Genesis 

    • The marshland of Sir Creek first became disputed in the early 20th century when the Rao of Kutch and the Chief Commissioner of Sindh Province of British India, due to different perceptions of the boundaries, laid claims over the creek.
    • The case was taken up by then Government of Bombay, which conducted a survey and mandated its verdict in 1914.
    • This verdict has two contradictory paragraphs, which make the India and Pakistan contenders on the same issue.
    • Paragraph 9 of this verdict states that the boundary between Kutch and Sindh lies ‘to the east of the Creek,’ (Green Line) which effectively implied that the creek belonged to Sindh and, therefore, to Pakistan.
    • On the other hand, Paragraph 10 states that since Sir Creek is navigable most of the year.
    • According to international law and the Thalweg principle, a boundary can only be fixed in the middle of the navigable channel, which meant that it has be divided between Sindh and Kutch, and thereby India and Pakistan.
    • India has used this para to consistently argue that the boundary needs to be fixed in the middle of the creek.
    • Pakistan, however, claims that Sir Creek isn’t navigable but India claims that since it’s navigable in high tide, the boundary should be drawn from the mid channel.

    What’s the importance of Sir Creek?

    • Apart from the strategic location, Sir Creek’s core importance is fishing resources. Sir Creek is considered to be among the largest fishing grounds in Asia.
    • Another vital reason for two countries locking horns over this creek is the possible presence of great oil and gas concentration under the sea, which are currently unexploited thanks to the impending deadlock on the issue.

    UNCLOS supports India’s stand

    • If Thalweg principle is to be upheld, Pakistan would lose a considerable portion of the territory that was historically part of the province of Sindh.
    • Acceding to India’s stance would mean shifting of the land/sea terminus point several kilometres to the detriment of Pakistan, leading in turn to a loss of several thousand square kilometres of its Exclusive Economic Zone under the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

    War in 1965 and tribunal

    • After the 1965 war, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson successfully persuaded both countries to end hostilities and set up a tribunal to resolve the dispute.
    • The verdict of the tribunal came in 1968 which saw Pakistan getting 10% of its claim of 9,000 km (3,500 sq. miles).
    • Since 1969, 12 rounds of talks have been held over the issue of Sir Creek, but both sides have denied reaching any solution.
    • The region fell amid tensions in 1999 after the Pakistan Navy shot down a MiG-21 fighter plane, but the last rounds of talks were held in 2012. Since then it’s been status quo.

  • The diplomatic cost

    Context

    The CAA and violence in Delhi have started to take its toll on India’s secular foreign policy.

    The US and other’s reaction to the situation in India

    • Trump visit to India: President Trump referred to India as a democracy which was peaceful and tolerant. He lauded freedom, rule of law, liberty and protection of human dignity, adding graphically that where India had the holy Ganges, it also had the Golden Temple and Jama Masjid.
      • Assurance to the critics at home: He thereby cleverly reassured critics at home, especially in the US Congress, that he was not ignoring the values the two great democracies shared.
      • However, as the situation in Delhi spun into violence the next day, in an untutored media interaction at the US ambassador’s residence, he ducked questions about the CAA or Delhi riots, nonchalantly remarking it was “up to India” to deal with it.
      • This may have brought comfort to the Indian government but the world at large differed.
    • Response from the other countries: Delhi had already exchanged angry words with Malaysia, Turkey and even Indonesia over their varied critique of India’s handling of its Muslim minority when Iran joined the issue.

    Iran’s response to violence in India

    • Condemnation by foreign ministers: Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif condemned the “wave of organised violence against Indian Muslims”, adding that “Iran has been a friend of India”.
      • India’s foreign ministry summoned the Iranian ambassador to protest the inappropriateness of the minister’s remark.
    • The reaction by the Iranian Supreme Leader: Soon after, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei found the time, in the middle of the COVID-19 outbreak, to excoriate the Indian government.
      • Adding insult to injury, he appended #IndianMuslimsInDanger.
    • No reaction on China problems: A facile response, can be that Iran is being hypocritical as it has not expressed remorse over the Chinese repression of Uyghurs.
    • The difference in India’s importance to China: China is a veto-wielding member of the UN Security Council, which also sustains the Iranian economy despite US sanctions. On the other hand, India has a Shia population second only to that of Iran.

    Relations with Iran

    • Two consulates in India: There are two Iranian consulates in India in Hyderabad and Mumbai. Iran seeks the third one in Lucknow.
      • Qom also hosts many Shia students, particularly from the Kargil region.
    • Historic links between the two countries: After Humanyun’s exile in Iran (1530-40) before recovering the Indian throne, the Persian language and culture fired the cultural renaissance at the Mughal court.
      • Religio-cultural heritage importance: India is important for Iran for its religio-cultural heritage, unlike China, which is needed for transactional and strategic reasons.
    • Two interrelated questions flow from this reasoning:
      • 1. What is Iran’s importance for India and the trajectory of India-Iran relations over the last two decades?
      • 2. And why is Iran adopting this sharp tone over what the Indian government argues is an internal matter?
    • Convergence in the relations: The closest India-Iran strategic convergence began in the 1990s, particularly after Kabul fell to the Taliban in 1996. These ties blossomed under reformist Iranian President Mohammad Khatami and Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.
    • Tehran Declaration: In 2001, the two signed the Teheran Declaration. Khatami in his opening remarks said that Iran always admired India’s secular credentials and Vajpayee had maintained that tradition.
      • In 2003, Khatami was the chief guest at India’s Republic Day and a New Delhi Declaration was issued.
    • Deterioration in relations and impact of India-US relation: The relationship began to slip as Iran’s clandestine nuclear programme and assistance from Pakistan’s rogue scientist A Q Khan was uncovered in mid-2003.
      • Impact of India-US closeness: Concomitantly, India was drawing closer to the US and negotiating a nuclear cooperation agreement.
      • The US used the nuclear issue to cause a cleavage as Indian and Iranian interests began seriously diverging.
      • Taliban factor: In any case, the Taliban had been ejected from Afghanistan and US troops literally surrounded Iran, having in 2003 overthrown Saddam Hussein. Geo-strategy trumped diplomacy.

    The US-Iran relation cycle

    • The nuclear deal with Iran: Iran-US relations also went through a cycle, with President Barack Obama recalibrating US policy towards the Gulf and West Asia.
      • Countering ISIS: Calculating that without Iran, ISIS could not be countered, the US in 2015 endorsed the nuclear deal that P-5 and Germany negotiated to end the nuclear stand-off.
    • Missing warmth of the 1990s: Although India-Iran relations after that returned to near normal as most US sanctions were lifted, the warmth of the 1990s was missing.
      • Iran was now beginning to extend its influence and role across Iraq and West Asia.
    • Maximum Pressure strategy of the US: President Donald Trump in 2016 reversed US policy and since then “maximum pressure” has been applied on Iran via tightened sanctions.
    • India’s engagement with Saudi Arabia and UAE: PM Modi also moved more forthrightly to engage Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
    • The fallout of the US strategy reversal: A fallout of the US policy reversal has been an exacerbation of not only the Shia-Sunni split but a Sunni-Sunni split as Qatar and Turkey are with Iran.

    Changing polity and increasing influence in the neighbourhood

    • Conservatives elected to power: In Iran’s parliamentary election on February 28, extremely conservative members have been elected, the moderates having been vetoed by the Guardians Council earlier.
      • Turnout was a low 43 per cent, due partly to fear of the coronavirus.
    • Increasing influence in the neighbourhood: Iran is even more isolated, though determined to resist US demands, due to communications being curtailed due to the virus.
      • Relations with the Taliban: It has good working relations with the Taliban and converging interests to see that US troops exit the region.
      • The friendly government in Baghdad: Iran is battling to ensure a friendly government in Baghdad, despite the killing of Major General Qasem Soleimani, by keeping militias aligned to it in play.

    Conclusion

    • Perception of India: Khamenei’s tweet reflects the perception that India is in the US-Saudi-Emirati corner and of little use as long as Trump is president.
      • Growing closeness Abu Dhabi, Riyadh and Ahmedabad would have led Iran to this conclusion.
    • Leveraging India’s dependence: In the Islamic world, Iran by publicly defending Indian Muslims embarrasses the silent Saudis.
      • It also calculates that India needs access to Afghanistan through Chabahar to assist the Ghani government or influence developments there.

     

  • After the Trump visit

    Context

    President Trump’s visit had the right optics. Attention must now turn to India-US priority areas.

    What were the mutual gains and highlights of the visit?

    • Security: Homeland Security is an American expression. For us to own it shows our concerns on cross-border sponsored terrorism.
    • Nuclear technology: Our nuclear VVER power plant technologies are state of the art and of Russian and French design.
      • Fast breeder: Good, but one more is better. We are well on the way to the fast breeder on the thorium route and these nuclear turbines are an essential step.
      • Unlimited thorium: We don’t have much uranium but unlimited thorium, so in the long run, apart from solar, this is the energy future.
      • Insurance obstacle resolved: Obviously, the insurance obstacle, as to who will bear the cost of insurance against disaster damage, which the Americans were raising earlier, has been resolved.
      • We have to build nuclear power to provide the initial feedstock for the thorium-based reactors.
    • No progress on trade pact: There are obviously differences between the two nations on the trade pact.
      • There is “progress”, but otherwise, we don’t know the way forward. Since the event was Ahmedabad-based, Amul is invading America and dairying is real politics.
    • US concerns over Kashmir issue: The US concern on Kashmir and minority rights is real.
      • If the largest foreign office establishment in the world is raising issues through their chief, let’s not bury our head in the sand.
      • Our defence minister expressing sadness at former chief ministers of Jammu and Kashmir being in detention was a gesture to the US President’s stand on pursuing solutions.
    • The bipartisan foreign policy of India shifting: The Americans generally rally behind the President on foreign policy.
      • We are more advanced now and have kicked a bipartisan approach to foreign affairs.
      • Seven decades of a bipartisan policy are thrown away without a word in explanation.

    Challenges to the rights in India

    • Every right is tampered with. Your religion, your identity in a country that never questioned it, you name it, it’s in question.
    • Multiple identity cards not accepted: The Aadhaar card, passport, ration card, election card are not enough. One office doesn’t accept another’s card, even if they carry the same information.
    • A study on a ration card and election cards: A study funded by the Canadian IDRC showed the poor only keep under lock and key the ration and election cards. One saves them from starvation, the other gives them dignity. At least once every five years, the mightiest knock at their door. We must not destroy, we must build.

    Conclusion

    There are obviously differences between the two nations on the trade pact. But apart from trade, there are many areas the cooperation on which can benefit both the countries.

     

     

  • Regional bonding: On Ranil Wickremesinghe’s prescription for peace

    Context

    Former Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s push for regional economic integration and for India-Pakistan dialogue should be studied carefully by New Delhi.

    What are the issues with SAARC?

    • Recent moves by India: India has more or less shut down all conversations on the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).
      • India also walked away from the ASEAN-led Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).
    •  Mr Wickremesinghe set out a number of suggestions:
    • The original purpose of SAARC-Regional growth: India-Pakistan tensions have brought economic integration within the SAARC region to a “standstill”.
      • That the original purpose of the South Asian group was to build a platform where bilateral issues could be set aside in the interest of regional growth.
    • Start at the sub-grouping levels: To engender more intra-regional trade, an even smaller sub-grouping of four countries with complementary economies: India, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Thailand, can start the process of reducing tariffs and demolishing non-tariff barrier regimes.
      • When it comes to the intra-regional share of total trade, SAARC and BIMSTEC languish behind groupings such as ASEAN, EU and MERCOSUR.
    • Economic Integration Road Map: The Sri Lankan leader also suggested that with India’s leadership, a more integrated South Asian region would be better equipped to negotiate for better terms with RCEP so as not to be cut out of the “productivity network” in Asia, and envisioned an Economic Integration Road Map to speed up the process.

    Governments stand

    • Talks with Pakistan off the table: The government has made it clear that talks with Pakistan are strictly off the table, and that a SAARC summit, which has not been held since 2014, is unlikely to be convened anytime soon.
    • More reliance on bilateral deals: The government, which has taken a protectionist turn on multilateral trade pacts, is relying more on direct bilateral deals with countries rather than overarching ones that might expose Indian markets to flooding by Chinese goods.
    • India’s trade deficit with the neighbours: For any regional sub-grouping in South Asia to flourish, it is India that will have to make the most concessions given the vast trade deficits India’s neighbours have at present, which it may not wish to do.

    Conclusion

    • The overall projection that India’s global reach will be severely constrained unless it is integrated with its neighbours, and tensions with Pakistan are resolved, cannot be refuted. India needs to be more accommodative for the realisation of its ambitions.

     

     

  • A U.S. strategy only meant to isolate China

    Context

    Since 2017, the United States government has released a few reports and fact sheets on its new Indo-Pacific strategy. Buried in these documents is a much deeper agenda of the U.S. government: to use three large Asian states — Australia, India, and Japan — to isolate China. There is nothing else to it.

    The scale of BRI and the US objections

    • Objections to BRI: The U.S. government has made it clear that what it finds most objectionable is China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which has signed on more than 70 countries in the world.
    • What BRI aims to achieve? Adopted in 2013, the BRI is intended as a mechanism to-
      • Development of new markets: BRI aims to end China’s reliance upon the markets of the West and to develop new markets in other continents.
      • Building infra: It is also intended to use China’s massive surpluses to build infrastructure in key parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
      • Investment of $ 1.3 trillion: By 2027, according to estimates by Morgan Stanley, China will spend about $1.3 trillion on this ambitious construction project.
      • Involvement of Saudi Arabia: Even Saudi Arabia, a close ally of the U.S., has made the BRI one of the cornerstones of its Saudi Vision 2030 plan.
    • Involvement of Pakistan: While China has invested $68 billion to build the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor from Xinjiang to Pakistan’s Gwadar Port.
      • Saudi Arabia has agreed to invest $10 billion in the port itself.

    Significance of the BRI and comparison with the US spending

    • Staggering scale and participation: The scale of Chinese investment, and the participation of a range of countries with different political identities in the BRI, is staggering.
    • Loss of appetite in the US to spend: At the Indo-Pacific Business Forum in July 2018 the U.S. said that it has spent $2.9 billion through the Department of State and the USAID (United States Agency for International Development).
      • It has lined up hundreds of millions of dollars more through its U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) and the Overseas Private Investment Corporation.
      • Inadequate US spending: If one adds up all the money that the U.S. intends to spend for economic projects, it is still a fraction of the amount spent by China.
      • ‘America First’ attitude: There is no appetite in Washington, D.C., with its ‘America First’ attitude, to funnel more money towards investments in the region currently being built by the BRI.

    Military Claims of the US and investment

    • US investment with military presence: It appears as if U.S. investments will come only with military claims.
      • The case of Nepal: A few years ago, Nepal discovered a large amount of uranium in Mustang, near the Nepal-China border; this has certainly motivated U.S. interest in Nepal’s economy.
      • If the U.S. money comes with U.S. military presence, this will create a serious flashpoint in the Himalayas.

    Raising human right and transparency issue against China

    • The argument of human rights and transparency
      • Rhetorical argument: Unable to outspend the Chinese, the U.S. government is making a rhetorical argument that it has more respect for “transparency, human rights, and democratic values” than China, which “practices repression at home and abroad”.
    • The argument of transparency and the debt trap
      • Debt trap used by the US: It is hard to imagine the U.S. being “transparent” with its trade deals. It is equally hard to imagine the U.S. being able to argue that it would not put countries into debt.
      • Debt crisis created by the US in the 1980s: The U.S. government enabled a massive Third World debt crisis in the 1980s, which was then used by the U.S.-driven International Monetary Fund’s Structural Adjustment Programs to strangle countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
      • This history is alive, and it makes a mockery of the U.S.’s attempt to say that its own approach is superior to that of China’s.

    US withdrawal from multilateralism

    • Apart from that, the U.S. government has already indicated that it is uninterested in multilateral deals.
    • Withdrawal from TPP: The US withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership in 2017, for instance.
      • Australia and Japan shrugged, and then put their energy into the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, which sidelines the U.S.

    The claim of free and open Indo-Pacific

    • Renaming the Pacific Command: In May 2018, the U.S. military’s Pacific Command was renamed the Indo-Pacific Command, a symbolic gesture that provides a military aspect to the Indo-Pacific Strategy.
    • What free and open mean to the US? The U.S. government has made it clear that for all its talk of a “free and open Indo-Pacific”, what it actually wants is an Indo-Pacific with fewer Chinese ships and more U.S. warships.
    • Just before this renaming, the U.S. National Security Strategy of 2017 noted that “China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region”, and so the Indo-Pacific Strategy intends for the S. to fight for its dominance in the Pacific Ocean, the Indian Ocean, and in the Asian rim.
    • This is a very dangerous war that the U.S. seeks to impose on Asia.

    India adopting the US project of Indo-Pacific

    • Australia and Japan moving away: As the military aspect of the Strategy increased, both Australia and Japan edged away from full-scale adoption of the U.S. project.
      • Japan has begun to use the term “Indo-Pacific” without the word “Strategy”.
      • Australia has signed onto a “comprehensive strategic partnership” with China.
    • Only India adopting the project: Only India remains loyal to the agenda set by U.S. President Donald Trump.
      • No US strategy to contain China: In all the documents released by the U.S. government and in all the speeches by officials, there is no discussion of the strategy to contain China.
      • There is only rhetoric that skates into the belligerent territory.

    Conclusion

    India would be advised to study the U.S. project rather than jump into it eagerly. Room for an independent foreign policy for India is already narrowed, and room for independent trade policy is equally suffocated. To remain the subordinate ally of the U.S. suggests that India will miss an opportunity to be part of a reshaped Asia.

     

     

  • Terms of transaction

    Context

    Trump administration seems supportive of India as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy, while also counting gains for itself.

    No substantive outcomes of the visit stated

    • Neither side has so far publicly touted any major substantive outcomes of the visit.
    • Creation of positive atmosphere: To create some positive atmospherics, the Indian Cabinet Committee on Security just gave final approval to $3 billion worth of pending contracts to purchase military helicopters from US companies Lockheed Martin and Boeing.
      • Missile defence system sale: The US Administration, on its part, informed Congress of its willingness to authorise the sale of another $1.8 billion worth missile defence system.
      • The move is indicative of the US’s growing willingness to allow higher technology defence equipment to India.
    • Placing India at level (STA-1) similar to its closest allies: The Trump Administration has gone farther than its predecessors in the technology levels it is willing to offer.
      • Including Guardian drones in 2017, and placing India at STA-1 level, similar to its closest allies and partners.
    • The expected MoUs: The spokesperson of the Ministry of External Affairs indicated on February 20 that five MoUs can be expected, inter alia,-
      • On intellectual property.
      • Trade facilitation and
      • Homeland security.
    • Making sense of the US’s actions in the present context: There will also be the regulation joint statement.
      • Analysing in greater details: This time, the statement will be parsed in more than usual detail for indications of future direction and intent for the partnership.
      • It is the time when the US has been talking of “Make America Great Again”, advocating for sovereignty and nationalism.
      • The US is also decrying-Alliance commitments, Readying to sign an agreement with the Taliban by month-end leading to a drawdown of US troop presence.
      • Yet, it is articulating repeatedly about India being a lynchpin of its “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy”.

    No development on the limited trade front

    • No progress on limited trade package: The two countries have not been able to finalise even a “limited trade package”, which has been under discussion for two years.
    • Gaps between the expectations: Obviously, there is a gap between what India can accommodate, and what the US negotiators want for their own political reasons.
    • The Trump administration has taken several steps that have negatively impacted India.
      • It has imposed additional tariffs on steel and aluminium imports from India, ostensibly on national security grounds.

    Contradictory impulses

    • The above action flies in the face of citing strategic partnership and convergence in Indo-Pacific strategy.
    • GSP withdrawal: It has withdrawn hitherto available GSP benefits from certain categories of labour-intensive Indian products.
    • Labelling India a ‘Developed’ country: The US has taken India out of its list of “developing” countries, lowering the threshold for countervailing trade action.
    • Against the spirit of the beneficial rise of India: These actions go against the grain of the US articulation that it sees the rise of India to be in US benefit.
      • Treating the trade deficit with China and India on equal footing: It also does not make sense when India is an overall trade deficit country.
      • Even though it has a $20 billion surplus with the US which pales compared to China’s $350 billion surplus.
    • Unprecedented actions against the closest allies: Trump has taken unprecedented action against the closest US allies.
      • He has also repeatedly publicly ridiculed Indian tariffs, claiming recently that India has not treated the US fairly.

    What the future holds for the India-US relationship

    • Is the US “all-weather” partner: Given the contradictory impulses, it would be fair to ask what the future holds for the India-US relationship, and where would the Trump visit and its aftermath take us.
      • Can India consider the US a reliable and “all-weather” partner, or be constantly juggling convergences and divergences?
    • The factors that affected relationship: Historically, four factors have affected the India-US relationship at any point of time:
      • US global posture and priorities.
      • Strength of bilateral relations.
      • The role assigned to Pakistan in its global objectives.
      • The strategy towards China.

    Evolution of India-US relationship

    • Under Democrat Presidents
    • Roosevelt Period: During the Second World War, Roosevelt pushed Britain to grant independence to India, facilitated a separate official Indian representation in Washington through an Agent-General since 1941.
      • But did not go far enough fearing disruption of the necessary wartime alliance. In the post-war period.
    • Truman Period: Truman spoke of partnering with developing countries for their industrial and scientific progress.
      • He welcomed Indian PM Nehru for an acclaimed visit in 1949.
      • But initiated the Cold War containment strategy against the Soviet Union, and the assessment of newly independent countries from that lens.
    • Kennedy Period: He was extremely supportive of democratic India’s economic assistance requirements, and for military assistance during the 1962 China conflict.
    • Carter Period: Carter, wedded to human rights issues, acclaimed India’s post Emergency elections.
      • But was critical on non- proliferation differences.
    • Clinton Period: Clinton stabilised the relationship after the dissonance and sanctions following our 1998 nuclear tests.
      • And gave full support to India’s position during the 1999 Kargil conflict with Pakistan.
    • Obama Period: He came out in support of India’s permanent membership of the UN Security Council, and declared India a Major Defence Partner, enabling higher-level technology authorisations.
    • Under Republican Presidents
    • Eisenhower Period: Eisenhower embraced and armed Pakistan in its CENTO and SEATO military alliances.
      • India as a bulwark against China: He emphasised food and economic assistance to India seeing it as a democratic bulwark against a Communist China.
      • First-ever visit to India by the US president: He made a successful first-ever visit of a serving US President to India, welcomed also by a 5 lakh crowd in Connaught Place.
    • Nixon Period: He visited India for a day in 1959, was upset with Indian criticism of his Vietnam military offensives.
      • Sided completely with Pakistan during the Bangladesh crisis of 1971.
      • He sent the US seventh fleet into the Bay of Bengal to pressurise India and sought to reorder the global balance by outreach to China through a secret Kissinger visit that year.
    • Reagan Period: He explored economic and scientific cooperation with India, but was absorbed with Pakistan’s support in pushing the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan.
    • George W Bush Period: George W Bush transformed the relationship with the civil nuclear cooperation agreement of 2008.
      • Perceiving again the technological, military and political challenge to the US from a rising China.

    Conclusion

    It is clear that India’s interests have been impacted a bit by party orientation on issues, but more by the overall global circumstance. Under the present circumstance, therefore, India will have to deal with a transactional administration, supportive of strengthening India as part of its Indo-Pacific strategy, but also counting the gains for itself.

     

  • An agenda for Modi-Trump

    Context

    With the withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan and other regions, India must think about its new role in the region.

    The US plans for Afghanistan and the Gulf-cause of concerns for India

    • Why it matters? Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be eager to get a first-hand briefing from the US President on his plans for the Af-Pak region and the Gulf.
      • These two regions are vital to India’s economic, political and military security.
    • End of an important era in northwestern frontier: The impending withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan and the downsizing of the American security role in the Gulf region mark the end of an important era in India’s northwestern frontiers — both land and maritime.
    • Can India overcome the past reluctance? The question is whether Modi and Trump can overcome the past reluctance in both capitals to collaborate in the regions west of India.
      • Suitable for both the countries: There is a good fit between-
      • America’s downward adjustment in the region under Trump, and-
      • India’s ambition to play a larger role in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean.

    Broad understandingIndo-Pacific and extending it to the West

    • Development in the last three years: Over the last three years of the Trump presidency, Delhi and Washington had developed a broad understanding of how to secure the Indo-Pacific that the US had defined.
    • Need to extend the same to Western Indian Ocean: Officials in Delhi frequently complained that these common perspectives did not extend to the Western Indian Ocean.
    • In recent weeks, though, senior US officials have said the Indo-Pacific region extends to the east coast of Africa.
      • Question of strategic cooperation: Extending Indo-Pacific is not a question of defining geography but finding ways to secure common ground through strategic cooperation.

    Elevation of South West Asia to the top of America’s security concerns

    • Filling the vacuum created by the British Empire: As the sun set over the British empire in the east after a century and a half, the US stepped in to fill the breach.
      • What began as a cautious entry into the Indian Ocean became a full-blown military power projection at the end of the 1970s.
    • Other events that played an important role? The dramatic rise in oil prices, the Islamic Revolution in Iran and its threat to export it to the Arab World, and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, saw the elevation of South West Asia to the top of America’s security concerns.
    • Events after Gulf War: The First Gulf War during 1990-91 saw the US intervene to restore the sovereignty of Kuwait that was swallowed by Iraq’s Saddam Hussein.
      • 9/11 attacks: The terror attacks on September 11, 2001, invited a ferocious response from the US that ousted the Taliban from power in Afghanistan.

    The Iraq and Afghanistan war-Endless wars

    • Costly failures: Notwithstanding the initial successes in both Afghanistan and Iraq, there is a growing consensus in the US that these occupations have been costly failures.
      • Trump has been among the first political leaders in the US to call these wars initiated by a Republican predecessor in the White House as “stupid”.
      • The promise of ending the endless wars: During his presidential campaign in 2016 and since Trump has promised to end the “endless wars” in the Greater Middle East and bring the boys back home.
      • It is an idea that has found considerable resonance among Democrats.
    • Focusing on great power competition instead of small wars: While the security establishment is not willing to give up, US is now focusing more on the great power competition with Russia and China than the small wars that had preoccupied it over the last three decades.
    • The Oil factor: The steep decline in US energy dependence on the Gulf, too, has reduced the salience of the region in Washington.

    Three consequence of the change in the US policy

    • Cutting down the military commitments
      • The Middle East and Africa: Trump has been cutting down military commitments in the Middle East and Africa.
      • His officials are about to sign an agreement with the Taliban that provides for American withdrawal from Afghanistan.
      • Maritime front: On the maritime front, Trump has called on all major powers, especially those importing oil from the Gulf, to contribute to the security of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz.
    • How it matters for India?
      • Challenges of limiting the consequences: The challenge for Indian policymakers has been to limit the consequences of what seems a definitive turn in US policy.
      • Chance to extend the own role: It should also be about seizing the possibilities for expanding India’s own role in the western marches of the Subcontinent.
    • To expand its role Delhi needs to make a few important shifts in its own thinking.
      • One, it must overcome the still powerful belief in sections of the Indian establishment that the US-Pakistan relationship is unchanging.
      • The US tilt toward India and away from Pakistan: Over the last two decades, there has been a tilt in US policies away from Pakistan and towards India.
      • For instance, the US pressures on Pakistan to vacate the Kargil heights, an exclusive nuclear exemption to India and efforts to rein in Pakistan’s cross-border terrorism during the Obama years.
      • Support in Trump period: Trump went further to acknowledge that Pakistan is part of the problem in Afghanistan and turned up the heat on Pakistan’s support for terrorism.
      • He has supported India’s efforts at the UNSC to bring Masood Azhar to book in the face of Chinese resistance.
      • Helped India isolate Pakistan at the Financial Action Task Force.
      • Prevented the UNSC from discussing Kashmir.
      • But India must also recognise: That there will be a measure of cooperation between the US and Pakistan.
      • Delhi’s focus should, instead, be on expanding its own security cooperation with the US in the troubled lands to the west of India.
    • India needs to prepare for a larger security role in Afghanistan
      • Question of being at the next-door: Trump has been asking a simple question: If India is next door to Afghanistan, should it not be doing more for Afghan security?
      • Need to explore the options: The NDA government has stepped up security assistance to Kabul. As Afghanistan enters a turbulent phase, regional and other powers are bound to fill the vacuum left by the US.
      • There are many options–  between doing nothing and sending the Indian army into Afghanistan- that Delhi and Washington could discuss.
    • Need to increase Naval activity
      • Increased role as regional security provider: Delhi has already stepped up its naval activity within the Gulf and beyond as part of its emergence as a regional security provider.
      • Cooperation with others: Effectiveness of India’s role will rise manifold if it acts in concert with the US and other partners.
      • Modi and Trump could begin by laying the political foundation for such cooperation.

    Conclusion

    At the beginning of Trump’s term, sceptics dismissed the prospects for India-US security cooperation in the eastern Indian Ocean and the Pacific, but progress has been steady. That cooperation can and must be extended now to the Western Indian Ocean.