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Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • Our larger China picture

    Context

    • After the skirmish at the border, Beijing started to concentrate troops, armoured vehicles and munitions opposite our posts in Aksai China at Galwan.

    2 interpretations of China’s move

    • First believes that the Chinese exercise was a territorial snatch in Aksai Chin, which they believe is entirely theirs.
    • The move was accompanied by a “lesson” to the Indians on aggressive Indian behaviour in not conceding Aksai Chin.
    • The second school of thought in India believes that territory has nothing to do with it.
    • They believe that, due to growing economic power, Beijing will lay down the rules of world governance.

    How it matters for India

    • India contest China’s entire southern border, refuse to join the Belt and Road initiative, create an anti-China maritime coalition, compete with them for influence in South East Asia and Africa.
    • India is also unsupportive of their crackdown on Taiwan, Hong Kong and Xinjiang and move ever closer to the United States.
    • When China assumes hegemonic power after 2030, India is going to get a nasty surprise.
    • Secularism, democracy and the rights of man will play no part in Chinese foreign policy.
    • China will overturn every international, financial, trade, diplomatic, arms control and nuclear agreement that the world has put together in seven decades.

    Way forward

    • We in India need to conduct a large and vociferous debate on Chinese intentions.
    • If the Chinese intention is to “teach us a lesson” we need a new national strategy, combining diplomatic and military means.
    •  If our national goal is to concentrate on the creation of wealth and growing GDP, let us proclaim it, tighten our belt, look down and avoid conflict.

    Conclusion

    What China wants is Indian acceptance of Beijing’s benign superiority, and that is a purely Chinese trait, not to be confused with the known rules of international diplomacy. Talking from a position of inferiority will not lead to an equitable solution. But first, a national debate.

  • India needs to change the framework of non-involvement

    Realignment of relations is taking place in the Middle East with wider implications for the future of the region. India needs to reconsider its framework based on the non-involvement.

    Recent geopolitical developments

    • India-China tensions have soared over the border issue.
    • The Afghan peace process is underway with the first direct talks between Kabul and the Taliban insurgents at Doha, in Qatar.
    • The normalisation of the relations between Israel and Arab countries began with the UAE and Bahrain normalising the relations.

    Issues with the development

    • The chances of failure in Afghanistan are real.
    • The momentum behind the normalisation of ties between Israel and the Gulf kingdoms, may not necessarily lead to broader peace in the Middle East.
    • The US initiatives in Afghanistan and Arabia are driven by President Donald Trump’s quest for diplomatic victories.

    Why it matters to India

    1) The vulnerability of the peace process

    • Because of competing interests, the peace process in Afghanistan and the Middle East remain vulnerable.
    • The unfolding dynamic will alter the geopolitical landscape in both places.
    • Whether peace breaks out in Afghanistan or not, the Taliban is here to stay.
    • As UAE and Bahrain join Egypt and Jordan in having formal relationships with Israel, the contradiction between Arabs and Israelis is no longer the dominant one in the region.

    2) India should recognise the importance of Arabia

    •  India’s strategic community tends to take too narrow a view of the Arabian salience.
    • The focus is mostly on ensuring oil supplies, promoting manpower exports, and managing the Pakistan problem.
    • We should consider that the Afghan peace talks are taking place in Qatar, a tiny Gulf Kingdom.
    • The UAE and Saudi Arabia were the only countries to recognise the Taliban government in the late 1990s.
    • This time around, they appear to have taken a backseat.
    • Delhi will need to pay more attention to the unfolding realignments between the Arabs and non-Arab states like Iran, Turkey and Israel.

    3) Paradox of American power

    • The U.S. is being seen as a declining power in the matters of the Middle East and Afghanistan.
    •  But the reality remains that the US is the one forcing a change in both the places.

    4) Implications of strategic vacuum created by the U.S. exit

    • As the US steps back from the region, the resulting strategic vacuum is likely to be filled by Russia and China.
    • Russia and China are quite active in both the Middle East and Afghanistan.
    •  China’s future role in Afghanistan, in partnership with Pakistan, could be quite significant and will be of some concern for India.
    • Regional powers have already acquired much say in the new geopolitics of the Middle East.
    • Qatar and UAE punch way above their weight, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey are locked in a major contest for regional influence.

    5) Domestic politics in the country

    • Religious radicalism, sectarian and ethnic divisions, and the clamour for more representative governments are sharpening conflicts within and between countries.
    • The collapse of the oil market is undermining the region’s economic fortunes.
    • Collapsing oil market is also making it harder for political elites to address the emerging political challenges.

    Consider the question “Middle East is going through the major realignment of relations. What are its implications for India?.

    Conclusion

    As the old order begins to crumble in the greater Middle East, the question is no longer whether India should join the geopolitical jousting there; but when, how and in partnership with whom.

  • Neither war nor peace between India and China

    The article analyses the challenges in the India-China border dispute and the recent events of Chinese aggression.

    Trust deficit

    • The recent Chinese actions have set back trust between the two countries by decades.
    • Trust made sense when both sides could assume that the other side either did not have the capacity or would not rapidly deploy troops in strategic positions at the border.
    • With the building of infrastructure on both sides, this trust was bound to break.
    • Even after temporary disengagement, both sides will now have distrust about the deployment of the other side.
    • An infrastructure-thick environment will require a permanent presence and closer deployments.

    Challenges

    •  At the level of the army, India seems to have consistently misread the PLA’s intentions.
    •  The closer the armies get, the greater the risks.
    • There is a political logic that does not bode well. There is still speculation on why the Chinese are taking an aggressive posture.
    • The very fact that we are not sure of Chinese motives means it is hard to know their endgame.

    Chinese fears

    • At a basic level, they will want to secure their interests in CPEC.
    • Tibet issue has also been a sensitive issue for China.
    •  Chinese interest in Nepal is less to encircle India. It is to ensure Nepal is not used as a staging ground of resistance in Tibet.

    Tibet issues in India-China relations

    • On Tibet issue India is in an awkward situation.
    • Due to the presence of the Dalai Lama in India, China will see it as a potential threat to its cultural hegemony in Tibet.
    • Ladakh and Tawang are also important pieces in that cultural consolidation.
    • The Sino-India peaceful relations were premised on keeping the Tibet issue in check.
    • But just as we are not sure of Chinese motives, they may not be sure of our motives either.

    New paradigm in India’s foreign policy

    • India growing power means it needs a new paradigm of foreign policy.
    • This policy will supposedly safeguard India’s interests more assertively.
    • If diplomatically not well managed, this change also causes great uncertainty in the international system.
    • India’s Pakistan policy is premised entirely on keeping them guessing on what we might do, including possible military options and altering the territorial status quo.
    • Our domestic ideological articulation of India’s position ranges from reclaiming PoK to Aksai Chin.
    • We cannot abandon Tibetans.
    • This underscores a narrative of uncertainty over our intentions.

    Conclusion

    Our own trumpeted departure from the past, without either the diplomatic preparation, domestic political discipline, and full anticipation of military eventualities, does not make it easy for others to understand our endgame.

  • Chushul Valley and its Significance

    The Chushul sub-sector has come into focus in the standoff between the Indian and PLA troops.

    Tap to read more about Himalayan River System

    What is the Chushul Valley?

    • The Chushul sub-sector lies south of Pangong Tso in eastern Ladakh.
    • It comprises high, broken mountains and heights of Thatung, Black Top, Helmet Top, Gurung Hill, and Magger Hill besides passes such as Rezang La and Reqin La, the Spanggur Gap, and the Chushul valley.
    • Situated at a height of over 13,000 feet close to the LAC, the Chushul Valley has a vital airstrip that played an important role even during the 1962 War with China.

    What is its strategic importance to India?

    • Chushul is one among the five Border Personnel Meeting points between the Indian Army and the People’s Liberation Army of China.
    • It enjoys tremendous strategic and tactical importance because of its location and terrain, which make it a centre for logistics deployment.
    • This sector has plains that are a couple of km wide, where mechanized forces, including tanks, can be deployed. Its airstrip and connectivity by road to Leh add to its operational advantages.
    • Indian troops have now secured the ridgeline in this sub-sector that allows them to dominate the Chushul bowl on the Indian side, and Moldo sector on the Chinese side.
    • They also have a clear sight of the almost 2-km-wide Spanggur gap, which the Chinese used in the past to launch attacks on this sector in the 1962 War.

    How is Chushul important to China?

    • Simply put, Chushul is the gateway to Leh. If China enters the Chushul, it can launch its operations for Leh.
    • After the initial attacks, including on the Galwan valley by the Chinese in October 1962, the PLA troops prepared to attack Chushul airfield and the valley to get direct access to Leh.
    • However, just before the attacks were launched, the area was reinforced by the 114 Brigade in November 1962, which also had under its command two troops of armour and some artillery.

    What are the challenges in this area?

    • An immediate challenge is of a flare-up as troops of the two countries are deployed within a distance of 800 to 1,000 metres of each other at Black Top and Reqin La.
    • Logistics also pose a major challenge. There is a need to carry water and food to the top which soldiers cannot do.
    • The harsh winter that lasts for eight months of the year poses a big challenge.
    • It is very difficult to dig in and make shelters on the ridgeline. The temperature falls to minus 30 degrees Celsius, and there are frequent snowstorms.

  • What is the 13th Amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution, and why is it contentious?

    After the Rajapaksas’ win in the November 2019 presidential polls and the August 2020 general election, the spotlight has fallen on two key legislations in Sri Lanka’s Constitution.

    Sri Lankan amendments in news

    • One, the 19th Amendment was passed in 2015 to curb powers of the Executive President, while strengthening Parliament and independent commissions.
    • The Rajapaksa government has already drafted and gazetted the 20th Amendment.
    • The other legislation under sharp focus is the 13th Amendment passed in 1987, which mandates a measure of power devolution to the provincial councils established to govern the island’s nine provinces.

    What is the 13th Amendment?

    • It is an outcome of the Indo-Lanka Accord of July 1987, signed by the then PM Rajiv Gandhi and President J.R. Jayawardene, in an attempt to resolve the ethnic conflict and civil war.
    • The 13th Amendment, which led to the creation of Provincial Councils, assured a power-sharing arrangement to enable all nine provinces in the country, including Sinhala majority areas, to self-govern.
    • Subjects such as education, health, agriculture, housing, land and police are devolved to the provincial administrations.
    • But because of restrictions on financial powers and overriding powers given to the President, the provincial administrations have not made much headway.
    • In particular, the provisions relating to police and land have never been implemented.

    Why is it contentious?

    • The 13th Amendment carries considerable baggage from the country’s civil war years. It was opposed vociferously by both Sinhala nationalist parties and the LTTE.
    • The opposition within Sri Lanka saw the Accord and the consequent legislation as an imprint of Indian intervention.
    • It was widely perceived as an imposition by a neighbour wielding hegemonic influence.
    • The Tamil polity, especially its dominant nationalist strain, does not find the 13th Amendment sufficient in its ambit or substance. However, some find it as an important starting point, something to build upon.

    Why is it significant?

    • Till date, the Amendment represents the only constitutional provision on the settlement of the long-pending Tamil question.
    • In addition to assuring a measure of devolution, it is considered part of the few significant gains since the 1980s, in the face of growing Sinhala-Buddhist majoritarianism.

    Its criticism

    • Critics argue that in a small country, the provinces could be effectively controlled by the Centre.
    • The opposition camp also includes those fundamentally opposed to sharing any political power with the Tamil minority.
    • All the same, all political camps that vehemently oppose the system have themselves contested in provincial council elections.
    • The councils have over time also helped national parties strengthen their grassroots presence and organisational structures.

  • Non-War Military Tactics used by China

    An annual report from the U.S. Department of Defense describes Chinese leaders’ use of tactics short of armed conflict to further the country’s objectives, citing border conflicts with India and Bhutan among the examples.

    Try this question:

    Q. What are Non-War Military Activities (NWMA)? Discuss how China is using NWMA as a tool for its overtly ambitious expansionist policy.

    Various non-war military tactics

    The report describes Non-War Military Activities (NWMA) as one of two kinds of military operations (the other is war) used by the PLA. NWMA can be conducted internationally or domestically and encompass activities in multiple domains.

    (1) Provoking armed conflict

    • China calibrates its coercive activities to fall below the threshold of provoking conflict with the United States, its allies and partners, or others in the Indo-Pacific region.
    • It can notably include operations in which the PLA uses coercive threats and/or violence below the level of armed conflict against states and other actors to safeguard its expansionism.
    • These tactics are particularly evident in China’s pursuit of its territorial and maritime claims in the South and East China Seas as well as along its border with India and Bhutan.

    (2) Neo-imperialist tools

    • China also employs non-military tools coercively, including economic tools during periods of political tensions with countries that China accuses of harming its national interests.
    • The Belt and Road Initiative is leading to a greater overseas military presence for China in the guise to protect its economic interests.

    (3) Multilateralism as a strategic messaging tool

    • The report says that China uses multilateral forums and international organisations to generate new opportunities to expand its influence, strengthen its political influence.
    • It promotes strategic messaging that portrays China as a responsible global actor, advances its development interests, and limit outside interference in and criticism of its initiatives.
    • The Brazil Russia India China South Africa (BRICS) grouping and Shanghai Cooperation Organization are among those cited as examples of this alleged phenomenon.

  • India needs an internationalism that is rooted in realism

    The article analyses India’s approach towards regional integration in Asian unity and internationalism and its consequences.

    Clash between internationalism and nationalism

    • Three current developments reveal the clash between grandiose internationalism and the intractable nationalism.
    • 1) India pulled out of the military exercise of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, which was to herald a new era of Eurasian unity.
    • Sharpening contradictions between India and China comes in the way of uniting such a large geopolitical space.
    • 2) Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s claim to leadership of the Muslim world that has run into resistance from a large section of the Arab rulers.
    • 3) The tension between the globalism of the US foreign policy establishment and Donald Trump’s “America First” nationalism.

    Internationalism and threats to it

    • Western liberalism has had more power than anyone else to promote internationalism.
    • But the liberal internationalist effort at constructing supra-national institutions now faces big setbacks.
    • The greatest resistance to the liberal internationalist vision has not come within the US.
    • Trump channelled the American resentments against the globalist excesses of the Wall Street, Washington and the Silicon Valley.

    India’s nationalism

    • Indian nationalism was inevitably influenced by liberal internationalism, socialism, communism, pan-Islamism, pan-Asianism and Third-Worldism to name a few.
    • Both the Asian Relations Conference (Delhi 1947) and the Afro-Asian Conference (Bandung 1955) showed up the deep differences among the Asian elites.
    • India then turned its back on Asianism to claim the leadership of the broader Non-Aligned Movement.
    • After the Cold War, India re-embraced Asianism in the 1990s when it unveiled the Look East Policy.
    • India also joined the Asian regional institutions led by the Association of South-East Asian Nations.

    RCEP joining issue

    • Few could have anticipated that Delhi would walk out of one of the most consequential agreements negotiated by the ASEAN — the RCEP — that sought Asia-wide economic integration.
    • Delhi believed that the contradiction between India’s domestic commercial interests and a China-led Asian economic regionalism was irreconcilable.

    India’s approach toward Asian regionalism

    • Eurasian regionalism led by Moscow and Beijing is also facing tensions and there is deepening conflict between Indian and Chinese interests.
    • India’s diplomatic finesse on the SCO has become increasingly unsustainable after Chinese aggression in eastern Ladakh.
    • India underestimated the economic and political consequences of China’s rapid rise while seeking economic regionalism in East Asia and the multi-polar world with Russia and China.
    • India took a benign view of Chinese power and has been shocked to discover otherwise in 1962 and in 2020.

    Conclusion

    India today needs more internationalism, than less, in dealing with the Chinese power. But it must be an internationalism that is rooted in realism and tethered to India’s economic and national security priorities.

  • Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI)

    With COVID-19 and trade tensions between China and the US threatening supply chains or actually causing bottlenecks, Japan has mooted the Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) as a trilateral approach to trade, with India and Australia as the other two partners.

    Q.Discuss the efficacy of the idea of Supply Chain Resilience Initiative (SCRI) initiaited by Japan.

    What is Supply Chain Resilience (SCR)?

    • In the context of international trade, SCR is an approach that helps a country to ensure that it has diversified its supply risk across a clutch of supplying nations instead of being dependent on just one or a few.
    • Unanticipated events whether natural or man-made that disrupt supplies from a particular country or even intentional halts to trade, could adversely impact economic activity in the destination country.

    What is Japan proposing?

    • The pandemic has brought into sharp focus the assembly lines which are heavily dependent on supplies from one country.
    • While Japan exported $135 billion worth of goods to China in 2019, it also imported $169 billion worth from the world’s second-largest economy, accounting for 24% of its total imports.
    • So, any halt to supplies could potentially impair economic activity in Japan.
    • In addition, the U.S.-China trade tensions have caused alarm in Japanese trade circles for a while now.
    • If the world’s two largest economies do not resolve their differences, it could threaten globalisation as a whole and have a major impact on Japan.
    • It is heavily reliant on international trade both for markets for its exports and for supplies of a range of primary goods from oil to iron ore.

    Japan eyeing India as a partner for the SCRI

    • Japan is the fourth-largest investor in India with cumulative FDIs touching $33.5 billion in the 2000-2020 periods.
    • It accounts for 7.2% of inflows in that period, according to quasi-government agency India Invest.
    • Imports from Japan into India more than doubled over 12 years to $12.8 billion in FY19. Exports from India to the world’s third-largest economy stood at $4.9 billion that year, data from the agency showed.
    • It is a clear reflection that the two countries are unlikely to allow individual cases to cloud an otherwise long-standing and deepening trade relationship.

    Where does Australia stand?

    • Australia, Japan and India are already part of another informal grouping, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or the Quad, which includes the U.S.
    • Media reports indicate that China has been Australia’s largest trading partner and that it counts for 32.6% of Australia’s exports, with iron ore, coal and gas dominating the products shipped to Asia’s largest economy.
    • But relations including trade ties between the two have been deteriorating for a while now.
    • China banned beef imports from four Australian firms in May and levied import tariffs on Australian barley.

    India’s stand to gain or lose

    • Following the border tensions, partners such as Japan have sensed that India may be ready for dialogue on alternative supply chains.
    • Earlier, India would have done little to overtly antagonize China. But an internal push to suddenly cut links with China would be impractical.
    • China’s share of imports into India in 2018 stood at 14.5%. It supplies dominate segments of the Indian economy.
    • Sectors that have been impacted by supply chain issues arising out of the pandemic include pharmaceuticals, automotive parts, electronics, shipping, chemicals and textiles.
    • Over time, if India enhances self-reliance or works with exporting nations other than China, it could build resilience into the economy’s supply networks.

  • Striving for amicable relations with Pakistan

    The article pitches for the resumption of India-Pakistan relations. But there are obstacles on both the side which come in the way of such resumption.

    Pakistan and relations over Kashmir issue

    •  In July, the Turkish president had assured Pakistan’s parliament of his country’s support for Islamabad’s Kashmir stand.
    • More recently, Malaysia’s former Prime Minister, Mahathir Mohamad, has reiterated his backing for that stand.
    • Iran’s current negotiations with China do not necessarily mean alignment with the latter’s Kashmir policy.
    • Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries invited official criticism in Pakistan first time for their refusal to back Pakistan in its disputes with New Delhi.
    • Pakistan’s foreign minister had made a remark against Saudi Arabia over its reluctance to convene the meeting of IOC.
    • Given the long history of Saudi-Pakistani relations, such remarks suggest a high degree of frustration.

    India’s vulnerabilities and relations with Pakistan

    • An excess of confidence and an unwillingness to think things through may be India’s vulnerabilities.
    • Army’s chief of staff made the statement this year, “If Parliament wants that area [PoK] should be ours at some stage, and if we get such orders, we will definitely act on those directions.”
    • Prime Minister made the statement regarding time of a week to 10 days to defeat the neighbouring country in case of war.

    Picturing resumption of relations with Pakistan

    • In case of war, aware of the total devastation to follow, neither side in an India-Pakistan conflict will press the nuclear button.
    • On the other hand, it is also possible, before any war, to imagine negotiations that lead, not necessarily in that order, to a resumption of trade, travel and normal relations, the renunciation of terrorism, and the restoration of the democratic rights of the people of Kashmir.
    • While no realistic person today expects such talks, it is not a crime to picture them.

    Conclusion

    Amicable relations with Pakistan may seem remote but they are worth striving for.

  • Leveraging its market to force China to settle border issue

    The article charts out the plan to leverage the potential and the present size of the India markets to settle the boundary dispute with China.

    Boycott of Chinese goods: view and counterview

    • After Galwan incident, there have been calls for the boycott of Chinese goods.
    • Counter views have been expressed that the Indian economy is so dependent on China that the costs would be disproportionately higher for India.
    • Our dependence can be reduced substantially if there is a national will and resolve to do so.

    Need for mutually acceptable boundary agreement

    • China may not be willing to go back substantially from the areas they have occupied.
    • Agreeing on maintaining peace and tranquillity or clarification of the LAC has left space for the Chinese to create border incidents which have now led to casualties.
    • So India needs to get China to seriously negotiate a mutually acceptable boundary agreement.

    India could use its market as leverage

    • Size of Indian market: The size of the Indian market and its potential in the coming years provides India considerable leverage.
    • But to use this leverage, Indians, individual consumers as well as firms, have to accept that there would be a period of adjustment in which they would have to pay higher prices.
    • The Chinese have a competitive advantage and are integral to global supply chains.
    • But whatever they sell is, and can be, made elsewhere in the world.
    • Indian can produce everything imported by China: Most of what we import from China was, is and can be made in India itself.
    • With volumes and economies of scale, the cost of production in India would decline as it did in China.

    Steps need to be taken to use market as leverage

    • Focus on those imports from China which have been increasing: The initial focus should be on items which are still being made in India and where imports from China have been increasing.
    • Depriciate Rupees: If the RBI let the currency depreciate in real terms it would be equivalent to an increase in import duties of about 10 per cent.
    • China-specific safeguard duties and use of non-tariff trade barriers should be used in segments like electrical appliances to let Indian producers expand production and increase market share.
    • Government Finances for expansion: The government should also facilitate the flow of finances for expansion and provide technical support for testing, improving quality and lowering costs of production.
    • Look for other players: In critical areas such as Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients, we need a vigorous approach to procure from elsewhere and have early production in India.
    • The government could provide support for environmental compliance to bring down costs of production.This would create demand for domestic goods and services.
    • There are strategic sectors where we should reduce vulnerability: Like scrutiny of -Chinese FDI, Chinese 5G participation etc.
    • Assured government procurement: In critical areas like solar panel and grid storage batteries private investment for manufacturing in India would be triggered by assured government procurement.

    Consider the question “Size and potential of India market could be leverage by India to settle the issues it has with its neighbour. What India needs to achieve this is a strategy and its implementation. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    A sustained and graded economic response to the recent Chinese conduct on the border is needed. We should signal India’s firm resolve and willingness to bear the cost. China could choose to settle the border amicably and have full access to our market. We could then work together to make this the Asian century.