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Subject: International Relations

  • Russia-China Relations and its effects on India-Russia Relations

    The article highlights Russia’s increasing inclinations towards China and its implications for India.

    Context

    Russian President Vladimir Putin has recently asserted that both the Indian Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, and the Chinese President, Xi Jinping, are “responsible” enough to solve issues between their countries, while underlining the need to debar any “extra-regional power” to interfere in the process.

    Implications for India-Russia ties

    • By this remark, Russia expects India to give up all efforts to reverse Beijing’s encroachment strategies.
    • The remarks can only be seen as reinforcing China’s claim that the Quadrilateral or Quad is aimed at containing China’s influence in the Indo-Pacific region.
    • Russia’s continued criticism of the Indo-Pacific and the Quad suggests the divergent perspectives of India and Russia on how to deal with China’s rise to global prominence.
    • While India needs Russia’s partnership for its defence needs, India cannot endorse the Russian perspective on the Indo-Pacific and the Quad
    • The Russian attitude toward China’s growing power and influence will be the touchstone of Russia’s relations with India.
    • Russia has rejected the Indo-Pacific construct in favour of the Asia-Pacific on the ground that the first is primarily an American initiative designed to contain both China and Russia.
    • With the rise of populist nationalism amidst the decline of globalisation, the resolution of the Sino-Indian boundary dispute appears a difficult task.

    Background of India’s balancing strategies

    • Following the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), India soon realised Russia was much weaker than the erstwhile USSR and incapable of helping India balance potential threats from Beijing. 
    • On the other hand, Russia began to cast Moscow as the leader of a supposed trilateral grouping of Russia-India-China against a U.S.-led unipolar world.
    • Russia became an early proponent of the ‘strategic triangle’ to bring together the three major powers.
    • India’s fear of the unipolar moment too made it easier for India to become part of this initiative.
    • But China’s dismissive attitude toward Indian capabilities, coupled with an emerging China-Pakistan nexus, prevented the success of this trilateral.
    • India, instead, invested its diplomatic energies in rapprochement with the United States.
    • Thus, India decided to get integrated in the economic order it once denounced.
    • Economic liberalisation also allowed India to buy sophisticated weapons from a wider global market that included suppliers such as Israel and France.
    • As the logic of intensive engagement with the West was effectively established, strategic partnership with the U.S. was a logical corollary.
    • India has been searching for other major powers to balance against China as it does not have the sufficient means for hard balancing.
    • India has deepened its ties with Japan and Australia in a way that is close to soft balancing. 
    •  among all of India’s balancing efforts, the stupendous growth in ties with the U.S. has been the greatest source of concern for China which views the India-U.S. rapprochement as containment.

    Way forward for India-Russia ties

    • While other powers such as France, Australia, Japan and Russia will have an impact on the emerging maritime structures of the Indo-Pacific region, it is the triangular dynamic between India, China and the U.S. that is going to be the most consequential.
    • Russia is yet to realise that it will gain immensely from the multilateralism that the Indo-Pacific seeks to promote.
    • Being China’s junior partner only undermines Moscow’s great-power ambitions.
    • Given Russia’s preoccupation with ‘status’ rivalry with the U.S., Russia’s view of India-China relations seems understandable.
    • But there is a danger in permitting it to harden into a permanent attitude as an increasingly pro-Beijing Russia might adopt more aggressive blocking of India’s policy agendas.
    • That is why India is particularly interested in a normalisation of relations between Washington and Moscow.
    • The normalisation of relations between the U.S. and Russia will help India steer ties among the great powers.

    India-China ties

    • Non-alignment, painful memories of colonial subjugation, opposition to great-power hegemony, and strong beliefs in sovereignty and strategic autonomy have been the key influencers in shaping India’s and China’s engagement with each other as well as the western world.
    •  But this has begun to change as Beijing is asserting its hegemony over Asia.
    • In such circumstances, multilateral forums such as the Russia-India-China (RIC) grouping and BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) have little practical value for Indian diplomacy.
    • Without China’s reciprocity, options before India are limited.
    • The response cannot be just symbolic or rhetorical. The absence of any material evidence of reciprocity is bound to doom an attempt at Sino-Indian rapprochement.

    Conclusion

    China is undoubtedly the most powerful actor in its neighbourhood but it cannot simply have its way in shaping Asia’s new geopolitics.

  • NATO and China

    In a communiqué issued following the June 14 summit of its member-states in Brussels, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), for the first time, explicitly described China as a security risk.

    Try answering this question:

    Q.NATO has been an ideal vehicle for power-projection around the world by the US. Critically comment.

    China as a global threat

    • China has never figured in NATO summit declarations before, except for a minor reference in 2019 to the “opportunities and challenges” it presented.
    • But China’s stated ambitions and assertive behaviour present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to NATO security.
    • China has reacted sharply. It has urged NATO to view China’s development rationally, stop exaggerating various forms of China threat theory.
    • The other two threats identified by the NATO communiqué are on predictable lines: Russia and terrorism.

    Focus over two nations

    • There is a significant difference, however, between a strategic focus on countering Russia and casting China as a “systemic challenge”.
    • This goes back to NATO’s founding mandate and subsequent history.

    What is NATO, btw?

    • NATO, the planet’s largest — and largest-ever — military alliance, was formed in 1949 by 12 Allied powers to counter the massive Soviet armies stationed in Eastern and Central Europe after Second World War.
    • According to Paul-Henri Spaak, the second Secretary-General of NATO, it was, ironically enough, Joseph Stalin who is the true father of NATO.
    • It was Stalin’s overreach — especially with the Berlin blockade of 1948-49 and the orchestrated coup in Czechoslovakia in 1948 — that convinced a diverse set of war-ravaged European nations to come together under an American security blanket.
    • The collective defence principle enshrined in NATO’s Article V states that “an attack against one ally is considered as an attack against all allies”.
    • The formation of NATO, and its Soviet counterpart, the Warsaw Pact, in 1955, inaugurated the Cold War era.

    NATO and its relevance now

    • NATO was completely successful in its mission of protecting the “Euro-Atlantic area” from Soviet expansion and preventing war between the two superpowers.
    • When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, questions were raised about NATO’s relevance and future.
    • Since the Non-aligned Movement (NAM) became irrelevant when the Communist bloc disappeared, one cannot justify the continuation of a military alliance formed to protect Europe from Communist expansion.

    Post-Cold War era mandate of NATO

    • Its bureaucracy succeeded in refashioning NATO for the post-Cold war era.
    • The refashioning rested on a paradigm shift — from collective defence, which implied a known adversary, to collective security, which is open-ended, and might require action against any number of threats.
    • The threat included unknown ones and non-state actors.
    • In other words, the elimination of one threat to Europe — communist Russia — did not necessarily mean that security risks to Europe have vanished.

    Why dismantle a beneficial arrangement

    • Another factor in the persistence of NATO is that, like all successful alliances, it has been a mutually beneficial arrangement.
    • For Europe, it was an attractive bargain where, in exchange for a marginal loss in autonomy, it enjoyed absolute security at a cheap price.
    • Not having to spend massively on defence allowed Europe to focus on building powerful economies and invest its surplus in a strong welfare state.
    • NATO also offered the added bonus of keeping Germany down — historically a major factor for peace and stability in the region.

    An effective American weapon

    • For the US, NATO has been an ideal vehicle for power projection around the world — in places beyond the Euro-Atlantic area, such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya.
    • It views NATO as a tool to ensure the primacy of American interests across the globe.
    • Unsurprisingly, NATO’s post-Cold War role has evolved in tandem with U.S. foreign policy priorities.
    • The NATO doctrine of “enlargement”, which Russia calls “expansion”, is essentially about extending the American military footprint by bringing in new members.
    • That is how NATO’s membership today stands at 30, having added 14 members between 1999 and 2020.

    The final truth

    • The Biden administration wants to mobilize NATO member-states behind its larger objective of containing China.
    • NATO’s European member states may view China as an economic rival and adversary, but they are unconvinced by the American line that it is an outright security threat.
    • This line also, in a way, points to the underlying logic behind NATO’s persistence in the post-Soviet world.
    • Unlike the Soviet Union, China offers no alternative vision of society that could make Western capitalism insecure.
    • In fact, its own economy is already deeply integrated into Western markets. China, nonetheless, is perceived as posing a ‘threat’.
    • It remains to be seen how far an ageing Europe would be willing to commit itself to a strategic path that prefers confrontation to collaboration like the US.

    Also read:

    India & NATO

  • A new era of partnership in social innovations that can benefit all South Asians

    Pandemic know no borders. So, dealing with it has necessited global cooperation. The article introduce us to some of the cross-country collaborations in dealing with the pandemic, igniting the hope for new era social partnership to the advantage of South Asia.

    Regionally-coordinated strategy against pandemic

    • Containing Covid pandemic has necessitated global cooperation.
    • The deadly pandemic surge in 2021 makes a regionally coordinated, evidence-driven strategy critical.
    • It is necessary to construct multi-stakeholder regional coalitions to devise new solutions and frugal innovations that can be applied across South Asia.
    • Given our shared and mostly similar social, economic and cultural contexts, local successes must be amplified across South Asia.
    • Despite wide variation in how nations have responded to the pandemic, the most successful strategies find commonality in their adherence to science and attention to local context.

    How successful interventions could be applied across the subcontinent

    • Beliefs, priorities, traditions and aversions to behavioural change are more similar across South Asia.
    • This means that interventions that are successful in changing behaviour in one place are highly likely applicable in other parts of the subcontinent.
    • For example, Community-Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) campaigns to solve the problem of open defecation, developed by Bangladeshi NGOs in partnership with an Indian consultant is now broadly applied across South Asia and beyond.
    • The Grameen Bank microcredit model was an indigenous South Asian innovation that spread rapidly.
    • India’s digitised social protection ecosystem with Aadhaar ids and Jan Dhan accounts serves as a model for the region.

    Changing social norm around mask-wearing

    • The new pan-South Asian consortium in response to Covid-19 evolved out of an experiment conducted in Bangladesh around mask-wearing in rural communities termed as NORM.
    • It was observed that a combination of no-cost distribution, information, reinforcing the message, modeling and endorsement by community leaders (NORM) leads to large, sustained increases in mask usage.
    • NORM implementation teams based in Lahore, Ahmedabad, Peshawar, Hyderabad, Dhaka, Kathmandu and Delhi are learning from each other’s successes and failures.
    • The Self-Employed Women’s Association (SEWA) quickly implemented the model to reach over one million members in Gujarat.
    •  Additional 1.5 million masks were shipped from Bangladesh to support SEWA’s outreach to other states.
    • Lahore’s commissioner worked with the research team to adapt the NORM model to an urban setting.
    • To manage mild and moderate cases of Covid-19 in rural India, where institutional health care access is limited a host of physicians, scientists and community-based organisations created the Swasth Community Science Alliance.
    • The Masking-Treatment-Vaccine Preparation (MTV) approach offers a sensible strategy to mitigate the pandemic until universal vaccination is achieved.

    Conclusion

    We need to come together to solve problems that affect us all. Let the lasting legacy of this pandemic be a new era of partnership in social innovations that can benefit all South Asians.

  • G7 Open Societies Pact on Universal Rights

    India has signed off on a joint statement by G-7 and guest countries on “open societies” that reaffirm and encourage the values of “freedom of expression, both online and offline, as a freedom that safeguards democracy and helps people live free from fear and oppression”.

    What is the Open Societies Pact?

    • The ‘Open Societies Statement’ was adopted at the end of an outreach session titled ‘Building Back Together—Open Societies and Economies’, where PM Modi was invited as a lead speaker.
    • The joint statement was signed by the G-7 countries, and India, South Korea, Australia and South Africa, with host British Prime Minister Boris Johnson calling them “Democracies 11”.
    • It refers to “politically motivated internet shutdowns” as one of the threats to freedom and democracy.
    • It affirms “human rights for all, both online and offline, as set out in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other HR instruments, and opposition to any form of discrimination, so that everyone can participate fully and equally in society”.

    Why needs such a pact?

    • Democracy and freedom were a part of India’s civilizational ethos”.
    • However, the common concern is that open societies are particularly vulnerable to disinformation and cyber-attacks.

    Impact of the pact

    • While the statement is directed at China and Russia, India has been under scrutiny over Internet curbs in Jammu and Kashmir.
    • Moreover, the center is locked in a face-off over its new IT rules with tech giants such as Twitter, which described a police search at its offices in India last month as a “potential threat to freedom of expression”.

  • The road from Galwan, a year later

    What happened in Galwan?

    • The Indian and Chinese armies are engaged in the standoff in Pangong Tso, Galwan Valley, Demchok and Daulat Beg Oldie in eastern Ladakh.
      • A sizable number of Chinese Army personnel even transgressed into the Indian side of the de-facto border in several areas including Pangong Tso.
      • The actions on the northern bank of Pangong Tso are not just for territorial gains on land, but enhanced domination of the resource-rich lake.
    • The stand-off at Ladakh’s Galwan Valley has escalated in June 2020 due to the infrastructure projects that India has undertaken in the recent years. India is building a strategic road through the Galwan Valley – close to China – connecting the region to an airstrip.
      • China is opposed to any Indian construction in the area. In 1962, a stand-off in the Galwan area was one of the biggest flashpoints of the 1962 war.
    • The border, or Line of Actual Control, is not demarcated, and China and India have differing ideas of where it should be located, leading to regular border “transgressions.” Often these don’t escalate tensions; a serious border standoff like the current one is less frequent, though this is the fourth since 2013.
      • Both countries’ troops have patrolled this region for decades, as the contested 2,200-mile border is a long-standing subject of competing claims and tensions, including a brief war in 1962.
    • Reasons: The violent clash happened when the Chinese side departed from the consensus to respect the LAC and attempted to unilaterally change the status quo.
      • It is part of China’s ‘nibble and negotiate policy’. Their aim is to ensure that India does not build infrastructure along the LAC. It is their way of attaining a political goal with military might, while gaining more territory in the process.

    The current situation in Ladakh

    •  With a continued deployment of 50,000-60,000 soldiers, the Indian Army has been able to hold the line to prevent any further ingress by the PLA.
    • There has been no progress in talks after the disengagement at Pangong lake and Kailash range in February.
    • Outside of Ladakh, the Indian Army remains in an alert mode all along the LAC to prevent any Chinese misadventure but the bigger change has been its reorientation of certain forces from Pakistan border towards the China border.
    • The Ladakh crisis has also exposed India’s military weakness to tackle a collusive threat from China and Pakistan.

    External balancing

    • To deal with the threat of combined China and Pakistan, the Government opened backchannel talks with Pakistan which led to the reiteration of the ceasefire on the Line of Control.
    • The Ladakh crisis has also led the Government to relook external partnerships, particularly with the United States.
    • The U.S. military officials have earlier spoken of the intelligence and logistics support provided to the Indian forces in Ladakh.
    • The military importance of the Quad remains moot, with India reportedly refusing to do joint naval patrolling with the U.S. in the South China Sea, the two treaty allies of the U.S., Japan and Australia, also refused.

    Challenges for India

    • India attempts to counter the growing Chinese influence in the neighbourhood have faltered, exacerbated by the mishandling of the second wave of the novel coronavirus pandemic.
    • With the widening power gap between New Delhi and Beijing, the challenge is as much economic as it is geopolitical.
    • Despite the border crisis and the Indian restrictions on Chinese technology companies, China displaced the U.S. to be India’s biggest trade partner in 2020-21, up to nearly 13% of India’s total trade compared to 10.4% a year ago.
    • For the past few decades, Indian planners operated on the premise that their diplomats will be able to manage the Chinese problem without it developing into a full-blown military crisis.
    • Militarily, Chinese incursions in Ladakh have shown that the idea of deterrence has failed.
    • India has learnt that it can no longer have simultaneous competition and cooperation with China.
    • A new reset in bilateral ties, àla the early 1990s, is difficult because China is now in a different league, competing with the U.S.

    Conclusion

    The events of the past one year have significantly altered India’s thinking towards China. The relationship is at the crossroads now. The choices made will have a significant impact on the future of global geopolitics.

    B2BASICS

    Line of Actual Control

    • Demarcation Line: The Line of Actual Control (LAC) is the demarcation that separates Indian-controlled territory from Chinese-controlled territory.
    • LAC is different from the Line of Control (LoC) with Pakistan:
      • The LoC emerged from the 1948 ceasefire line negotiated by the United Nations (UN) after the Kashmir War.
      • It was designated as the LoC in 1972, following the Shimla Agreement between the two countries. It is delineated on a map signed by the Director General of Military Operations (DGMO) of both armies and has the international sanctity of a legal agreement.
      • The LAC, in contrast, is only a concept – it is not agreed upon by the two countries, neither delineated on a map or demarcated on the ground.
    • Length of the LAC: India considers the LAC to be 3,488 km long, while the Chinese consider it to be only around 2,000 km.

  • A template for Indian engagement with the West

    The article highlights the significance of the recent G-7 summit for India.

    India’s engagement with the West

    • Two important messages emerge from India’s participation in G-7 with the members of the G-7 and three other invited guests — Australia, South Africa and South Korea.
    • First is that India is a “natural ally” of the G-7 and its partners.
    • The other is the emphasis on shared democratic values that bind India with the West.
    • The two ideas are certainly not new to India’s foreign policy, but they acquire special importance at the current juncture.
    • In the last few years, India embarked on an expansive engagement with Europe.
    • This G-7 summit can be seen as the beginning of an institutionalisation of India’s cooperation with the West.

    What makes this G-7 Summit different from the past Summits?

    • China factor: After the 2008 financial crisis, the more representative G-20, which includes China, Russia, India and many others, seemed to supersede the G-7.
    • But amidst the growing sense that China has gamed the global economic order to America’s disadvantage, there has been renewed interest in like-minded coalitions like the G-7.
    • Widening the base of G-7: There is also the recognition of the case for widening the base of institutions like the G-7 beyond the geographic West to include large democracies like India.
    • Coalition of democracies: The case for a “coalition of democracies” was certainly gaining ground over the last two decades within American academia and the political class.
    • But economic globalisation and the absence of great power rivalry meant there was no compelling policy urgency to construct an “alliance of democracies”.
    • That condition has altered radically in the last few years amidst the growing US tensions with China and Russia. 

    Dealing with the challenges presented by China

    • U.S. President Biden declared his main objective as rallying democracies to meet the great challenges of our time, especially those presented by China.
    • G-7 summit has responded to Biden’s call in the following forms:
    • 1) By offering the outline of a potential alternative to China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative.
    • 2)By calling for a reorientation of global supply chains away from China.
    • 3) By demanding a fresh inquiry into the origins of the Covid-19 pandemic in China.
    • 4) By reprimanding Beijing policies in Xinjiang and Hong Kong.
    • 5) By raising concerns about the conflict across the Taiwan Strait.
    • However, there is a strong view that the door must be kept open for engagement with China on issues like climate change while calling out its unacceptable policies.

    India’s relations with China: New context for engagement with West

    • The rupture in the US engagement with China coincides with the rapid deterioration in India’s relations with China.
    • This also sets up a new context for India’s partnership with the West.
    • If the Indo-Pacific provides a regional basis for India’s engagement with the US and Europe, mitigating climate change and the management of the Covid-19 pandemic provides a global template for India’s engagement with the West.

    Way forward

    • The case for renewal and reform of democratic institutions is urgent in both the US and India.
    • So is the need for sustained consultations between India and its Western partners on a range of new challenges presented by digital technologies, including radicalisation, disinformation, electoral interference, cyber-attacks and the role of large social media companies. 
    • The statement on open societies provides a sound basis for such an engagement.

    Conclusion

    India must begin institutionalisation of its relationship with the West and increase its engagement on various common issues including the China challenge.

  • Rare Earth Metals at the heart of China-US rivalry

    Beijing’s dominance in rare earth minerals, the key to the future of manufacturing, is a cause for concern for the West.

    Answer this question from CSP 2011 in the comment box:

    Q.What is the difference between a CFL and an LED lamp? 

    1. To produce light, a CFL uses mercury vapor and phosphor while an LED lamp uses semi-conductor material.
      2. The average life span of a CFL is much longer than that of an LED lamp
      3. A CFL is less energy-efficient as compared to an LED lamp.

    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    (a) Only 1

    (b) 2 and 3 only

    (c) 1 and 3 only

    (d) 1, 2 and 3

    What are Rare Earth Metals?

    • The rare earth elements (REE) are a set of seventeen metallic elements. These include the fifteen lanthanides on the periodic table plus scandium and yttrium.
    • Rare earth elements are an essential part of many high-tech devices.
    • They have a wide range of applications, especially high-tech consumer products, such as cellular telephones, computer hard drives, electric and hybrid vehicles, and flat-screen monitors and televisions.
    • Significant defense applications include electronic displays, guidance systems, lasers, and radar and sonar systems.
    • Rare earth minerals, with names like neodymium, praseodymium, and dysprosium, are crucial to the manufacture of magnets used in industries of the future, such as wind turbines and electric cars.

    Curbing dependence on China

    • At a time of frequent geopolitical friction among those three powers, Washington and Brussels want to avoid this scenario.
    • They are investing in the market for 17 minerals with unique properties that today are largely extracted and refined in China.
    • The expected exponential growth in demand for minerals that are linked to clean energy is putting more pressure on US and Europe to take a closer look.
    • Amid the transition to green energy, in which rare earth minerals are sure to play a role, China’s market dominance is enough to sound an alarm in western capitals.

    Why such a move?

    • In 2019, the U.S. imported 80% of its rare earth minerals from China.
    • The EU gets 98% of its supply from China.

  • Can the G-7 give new direction to globalisation?

    The article highlights the challenges associated with the globalisation and important role G-7 can play in dealing with these challenges.

    The context that makes this G-7 Summit significant

    • The most significant expectation of the summit is that it will help determine the shape of globalisation.
    • There has been much discussion of the possibility of the G-7 pushing for global coordination on minimum corporate taxation.
    • The summit also seeks to redefine the broader relationship between states and markets in three ways.

    Redefining the relationship between states and market in 3 ways

    1) States reasserting the control over markets

    • States are reasserting control over the terms on which markets operate.
    • The idea of Neoliberalism did convey the idea that states should follow where the market leads, or step in only where there is a market failure.
    • However, this account of the relationship between states and markets had four harmful consequences.
    • 1) It provided a misleading picture of what makes economies vibrant.
    • 2) It led to a sense of loss of collective control over our economic future.
    • 3) It led to great inequality.
    • 4) In some fields like technology, it created new forms of corporate power.
    • To reverse some of these consequences, some coordination at the global level on taxation, or treatment of technology monopolies etc is required.

    2) Global interdependence cannot be managed without global public goods

    • At one level the global roles of the G-7 or even the G-20 were something like the political steering committee for global capitalism.
    • Their most useful political roles were during the financial crisis, when global financial coordination was required.
    • But there was relatively little attention to the systemic vulnerabilities that globalisation might create.
    • These could be vulnerabilities because of the way supply chains were distributed, or those that arose from the creation of winners and losers within globalisation.
    • Most importantly, there was short shrift given to global public goods like health.
    • The Covid crisis has reminded us of all of these vulnerabilities.
    • The commitment of G-7 to provide one billion vaccine doses is a welcome step.
    • But whether this crisis-driven commitment will translate into an enduring and just framework for providing global public goods on health and environment remains to be seen.

    3) Geopolitical context

    •  There are two geopolitical “cold wars” that cast a shadow on the G-7.
    • The first involves China.
    • In the context of rising geopolitical tensions with China, greater coordination and unity of purpose amongst the G-7 will become more important.
    • The second is a threat of authoritarian disruption.
    • Greater global disarray strengthens the possibility of giving political support to these political tendencies.
    • It is important, therefore, to demonstrate that the G-7 countries are part of a functional democratic civilisation.

    Challenges ahead

    • Despite the directional changes, many of the central distributive conflicts that beset globalisation are likely to continue.
    • The talk of global public goods works only in a context where the advanced economies are at the receiving end.
    • Take the G-7 proposal for the coordination of taxation.
    • In principle, this is not a bad idea, if it can close off tax havens and prevent a global race to the bottom.
    • However, it is sobering to read the Tax Justice Network’s “The State of Tax Justice Report” 2020.
    • According to this report, the United States, Netherlands and United Kingdom are three of the top five countries (along with Cayman Islands and Luxembourg) responsible for tax losses inflicted on other countries.
    • The US, Switzerland, Singapore and Hong Kong are amongst the highest on the Financial Secrecy Index.
    • So, the visible corporate tax rate, or taxing at point of sales, may just be the window dressing the global tax problem that allows countries to hold onto their privileges.
    • Similarly, on climate change. There is a lot of encouraging talk of ambitious targets, investment-led transformations.
    • Intelligently done, this might be for the good.
    • But it could also repeat the familiar pattern of regulation serving to preserve the dominance of advanced economies.
    • There is also, in the talk of a new global economic order, the curious absence of discussions on finance.
    • But if one is looking at potential sources of vulnerability, the ability to create winners and losers, and possible threats to global resilience, then regulation and coordination of global finance deserve more attention.

    Consider the question “What are the vulnerabilities associated with globalisation. Suggest the solutions to deal with these vulnerabilities.”

    Conclusion

    If the G-7 wants to truly exercise more leadership, it will have to convince the world that all its wonderful new principles, resilience, inclusion, global public goods, are not simply ruses to serve only the interests of the developed world.

  • G-7 agenda this year and what is in it for India

    At the invitation of UK PM, PM Modi will participate in the Outreach Sessions of the G7 Summit this week.

    Note the members of G7 and G20. UPSC may puzzle you asking which G20 nation isn’t a member of G7.

    The Group of 7

    • The G-7 or ‘Group of Seven’ includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
    • It is an intergovernmental organization that was formed in 1975 by the top economies of the time as an informal forum to discuss pressing world issues.
    • Initially, it was formed as an effort by the US and its allies to discuss economic issues.
    • The G-7 forum now discusses several challenges such as oil prices and many pressing issues such as financial crises, terrorism, arms control, and drug trafficking.
    • It does not have a formal constitution or a fixed headquarters. The decisions taken by leaders during annual summits are non-binding.
    • Canada joined the group in 1976, and the European Union began attending in 1977.

    Evolution of the G-7

    • When it started in 1975—with six members, Canada joining a year later—it represented about 70% of the world economy.
    • And it was a cosy club for tackling issues such as the response to oil shocks.
    • Now it accounts for about 40% of global gdp.
    • Since the global financial crisis of 2007-09 it has sometimes been overshadowed by the broader g20.
    • The G-7 became the G-8 in 1997 when Russia was invited to join.
    • In 2014, Russia was debarred after it took over Crimea.

    Agenda of G-7 this year

    • The UK currently holds the presidency of the G7 and has invited India, along with Australia, Republic of Korea and South Africa, as guest countries for the Summit.
    • The meetings will be held in hybrid mode.
    • The theme for the summit is ‘Build Back Better’ and the UK has outlined four priority areas for its presidency:
    1. leading the global recovery from coronavirus while strengthening resilience against future pandemics;
    2. promoting future prosperity by championing free and fair trade;
    3. tackling climate change and preserving the planet’s biodiversity; and
    4. championing shared values and open societies.

    Is India attending it for the first time?

    • Since 2014, this is the second time PM Modi will be participating in a G7 meeting.
    • India had been invited by the G7 French Presidency in 2019 to the Biarritz Summit as a “Goodwill Partner” and the PM participated in the Sessions on ‘Climate, Biodiversity and Oceans’ and ‘Digital Transformation’.
    • During Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s UPA rule, India attended the G8 five times.
    • Russia was indefinitely suspended in March 2014 after the annexation of Crimea, reducing the count of the G8.

    What to watch out for at this G-7 summit?

    • This will be President Biden’s first visit to Europe, where he will signal his key message “America is back”.
    • He has flown down to the UK, where he will meet British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, Queen Elizabeth II and other allies at the G7 summit.
    • He’ll continue on to a NATO conclave in Brussels on June 14, before his conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin in Geneva two days later.
    • This sequencing of events has been done to coordinate Washington’s moves of consultations with allies before meeting the Russian President.
    • This ties in well with the US President’s initial foray into multilateralism — he held the first summit of leaders of “the Quad” — Australia, India, Japan and the US.
    • This was aimed at increasing vaccine production and aligning their positions toward Beijing.

    Why is this meeting important?

    • The US-Russia relations are going through a rough patch — some analysts even refer to it as possibly their nadir since the end of the Cold War.
    • Interestingly, the venue of the Biden-Putin meeting — Geneva — is the place where then US President Ronald Reagan held his first meeting with Soviet Union’s Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985.
    • The key element that is making Washington take the important step of engaging with Moscow to contain the damage in their bilateral ties is that the US wants to focus on its strategic rival, China.

    What’s in it for India?

    • India has long called for reforming global institutions and groupings to reflect modern-day geopolitical realities.
    • Trumps’ offer to expand G7 fitted into New Delhi’s idea of being part of the global high table.
    • With an assertive China looming, the US is calling all like-minded countries to partner in dealing with Beijing.
    • If Biden and Johnson want to take the leap forward and constitute a global democratic alliance of 10-11 countries, it will be an important signal.
    • India is likely to get vaccines from the US — both directly as well as through COVAX. Initial estimates suggest India will get about 2 to 3 million vaccines in the first tranche.

  • US, UK seek to sign New Atlantic Charter

    US President Joe Biden and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson seeks to sign a new Atlantic Charter.

    What is Atlantic Charter?

    • The Atlantic Charter was a statement issued on 14 August 1941 that set out American and British goals for the world after the end of World War II.
    • The charter’s adherents signed the Declaration by United Nations on 1 January 1942, which was the basis for the modern United Nations.
    • The charter inspired several other international agreements and events that followed the end of the war.
    • The dismantling of the British Empire, the formation of NATO, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) all derived from the Atlantic Charter.

    Why sign new charter?

    • At their meeting, the two leaders plan to sign what they’re calling a new Atlantic Charter, pledging to “defend the principles, values, and institutions of democracy and open societies.”
    • US hopes to reassure European allies that the US had shed the transactional tendencies of Donald Trump’s term and is a reliable partner again.
    • The US staunchly opposed the Brexit movement, the British exodus from the European Union that Mr. Johnson championed, and has expressed great concern with the future of Northern Ireland.
    • Biden once called the British leader a “physical and emotional clone” of Trump.