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Subject: International Relations

  • SAARC

    Context

    Despite the framework SAARC provides for cooperation amongst South Asian nations, it has remained sidelined and dormant since its 18th summit of 2014 in Kathmandu. No alternative capable of bringing together South Asian countries for mutually beneficial diplomacy has emerged.

    Common challenges facing South Asia

    • The region is beset with unsettled territorial disputes, as well as trans-border criminal and subversive activities and cross-border terrorism.
    • The region also remains a theatre for ethnic, cultural, and religious tensions and rivalries besides a current rise in ultra-nationalism
    • Nuclear-armed neighbours India and Pakistan are at loggerheads.
    • US military withdrawal from Afghanistan has fuelled fears of intensification of these trends.

    Significance of SAARC

    • As the largest regional cooperation organisation, SAARC’s importance in stabilising and effectively transforming the region is becoming increasingly self-evident.
    • SAARC is needed as institutional scaffolding to allow for the diplomacy and coordination that is needed between member-states in order to adequately address the numerous threats and challenges the region faces.
    • Though SAARC’s charter prohibits bilateral issues at formal forums, SAARC summits provide a unique, informal window — the retreat — for leaders to meet without aides and chart future courses of action.
    • The coming together of leaders, even at the height of tensions, in a region laden with congenital suspicions, misunderstandings, and hostility is a significant strength of SAARC that cannot be overlooked.
    • In March last year, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi seized the Covid-19 crisis and utilised SAARC’s seal to convene a video conference of SAARC leaders.
    • Such capacity to bring member-states together shows the potential power of SAARC.

    What role SAARC can play in Afghanistan

    • Commitment to get rid of terrorism: The third SAARC summit in 1987 adopted a Regional Convention on Suppression of Terrorism and updated it in 2004 with the signing of an additional protocol.
    • These instruments demonstrate the collective commitment to rid the region of terror and promote regional peace, stability, and prosperity.
    • Using the network of institutions: In 36 years of existence, SAARC has developed a dense network of institutions, linkages, and mechanisms.
    • SAARC members are among the top troop-contributing countries to UN peacekeeping missions.
    • Joint peacekeeping force: With the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, a joint peacekeeping force from the SAARC region under the UN aegis could be explored to fill the power vacuum that would otherwise be filled by terrorist and extremist forces.

    Consider the question “What role SAARC can play in stabilising the region after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan? Is SAARC still relevant for the region?”

    Conclusion

    Allowing SAARC to become dysfunctional and irrelevant greatly distorts our ability to address the realities and mounting challenges facing SAARC nations.

    Back2Basics: About SAARC

    •  In 1985, at the height of the Cold War, leaders of South Asian nations — namely Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka — created a regional forum.
    • The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was established with the goal of contributing “to mutual trust, understanding and appreciation of one another’s problems.”
    • Afghanistan was admitted as a member in 2007.

  • OPEC Reaches Compromise With U.A.E. Over Oil Production

    Context

    The end to the UAE’s weeks-long impasse with Saudi Arabia and Russia, a non-OPEC state, was brought about by Sunday’s deal.

    What was the deal about?

    • United Arab Emirates (UAE), said to hold the world’s largest untapped crude reserves, had demanded an increase in its oil output quotas.
    • The end to the UAE’s weeks-long impasse with Saudi Arabia, one of the world’s biggest crude exporters, and Russia, a non-OPEC state, was brought about by Sunday’s deal.
    • Under its terms, the UAE’s demand for an increase in its oil output quotas, in recognition of its higher production capacity, has been conceded.
    • The baselines have also been raised for Saudi Arabia, Russia, Iraq, and Kuwait.
    • The bloc will now step up crude production by 400,000 barrels a day starting in August.
    • The output boost is in response to rising oil prices in the wake of the rebound in economic activity.
    • The cartel had cut oil production by 9.7 million barrels a day (mbd) as oil demand fell from 100 mbd to 91.1 mbd and prices plummeted from $70 in January 2020 to around $20 in April.

    Strain in Saudi Arabia-UAE relations

    • The UAE has played hardball during the bloc’s attempts to deal with the pandemic-induced price volatility.
    • Thus, while the internal rift has been resolved for now, the danger cannot be ruled out of an increasingly economically and politically assertive UAE flexing its muscle.
    • Bilateral relations between the traditional allies, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have been especially strained since the UAE established diplomatic ties with Israel last year and withdrew troops from the Saudi-spearheaded war in Yemen the year before.
    • A more recent arena of tension is the tariffs Riyadh has imposed on imports from the six-nation Gulf Cooperation Council.
    • Saudi Arabia will now exclude from the GCC tariff agreement goods made by companies with a workforce of less than 25% of locals and industrial products with less than 40% of the added value after their transformation process.
    • Home to a predominantly migrant population, the move could hit the UAE especially hard.

    OPEC’s concerns

    • The OPEC, forecast in 2016 that a strict implementation of the Paris climate accord could see the demand for oil peak by 2030.
    • There is an eagerness to maximise the returns on their substantial hydrocarbon resources, amid growing speculation of a peak in oil demand within sight.
    • The International Energy Agency (IEA), which in 2016 forecast a continued rise in oil consumption until the 2040s, has more recently hinted at about a 5% rise or fall relative to the demand before the pandemic within a decade.
    • OPEC’s other concerns are the stabilization of world oil prices without jeopardizing national expenditure programs, and the diversification of economies in anticipation of the unfolding global energy transition.

    Conclusion

    The latest OPEC compromise echoes growing recognition of the delicate balance between competing domestic and global priorities.

    B2BASICS

    OPEC

    • The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) is a permanent, intergovernmental organization, created at the Baghdad Conference in 1960, by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela.
    • It aims to manage the supply of oil in an effort to set the price of oil in the world market, in order to avoid fluctuations that might affect the economies of both producing and purchasing countries.
    • It is headquartered in Vienna, Austria.
    • OPEC membership is open to any country that is a substantial exporter of oil and which shares the ideals of the organization.
    • Gabon terminated its membership in January 1995. However, it rejoined the Organization in July 2016.
    • As of 2019, OPEC has a total of 14 Member Countries viz. Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates(UAE), Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Republic of Congo, Angola, Ecuador, and Venezuela are members of OPEC.

     

  • ‘Open talks’ with the Taliban is India’s strategic necessity

    Context

    With over a third of Afghanistan’s more than 400 districts under Taliban control, the talk-to-the-Taliban option is indeed the best of the many less than perfect options available to India.

    India need a reset in its Afghanistan policy

    • India has ‘temporarily’ closed its consulate in Kandahar.
    • This follows the decision to suspend operations in the Indian consulates in Jalalabad and Herat.
    • India’s decision to partially “withdraw” from Afghanistan shows that betting only on the government in Kabul was a big mistake,
    • It also shows that India realises the threat the Taliban poses to Indian assets and presence in Afghanistan.
    • To safeguard its civilian assets there as well as to stay relevant in the unfolding ‘great game’ in and around Afghanistan, India must fundamentally reset its Afghanistan policy.
    • India must, in its own national interest, begin ‘open talks’ with the Taliban before it is too late.
    • Open dialogue with the Taliban should no longer be a taboo; it is a strategic necessity.

    Reason for avoiding open talks with Taliban

    • There are at least five possible reasons why India appears to want to keep the Taliban engagement slow and behind closed doors.
    • First, if India chooses to engage the Taliban directly, it could make Afghanistan President Ashraf Ghani, to look towards China and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) for national security and personal political survival.
    • Second, India is also faced with the dilemma of who to talk to within the Taliban given that it is hardly a monolith.
    • Third, given the global opprobrium that Taliban faced in its earlier avatar and the lack of evidence about whether the outfit is a changed lot today, New Delhi might not want to court the Taliban so soon.
    • Fourth, there is little clarity about what the Taliban’s real intentions are going forward and what they would do after ascending to power in Kabul.
    • Fifth, it would not be totally unreasonable to consider the possibility of Pakistan acting out against India in Kashmir if India were to establish deeper links with the Taliban.

    Reasons India should engage with the Taliban openly

    • Wide international recognition: Whether we like it or not, the Taliban, is going to be part of the political scheme of things in Afghanistan, and unlike in 1996, a large number of players in the international community are going to recognise/negotiate/do business with the Taliban.
    • Countering Pakistan: The Taliban today is looking for regional and global partners for recognition and legitimacy especially in the neighbourhood.
    • So the less proactive the Indian engagement with the Taliban, the stronger Pakistan-Taliban relations would become.
    • A worldly-wise and internationally-exposed Taliban 2.0 would develop its own agency and sovereign claims including perhaps calling into question the legitimacy of the Durand Line separating Pakistan and Afghanistan, something Pakistan was always concerned about. T
    • The Taliban would want to hedge their bets on how far to listen to Pakistan.
    • That is precisely when New Delhi should engage the Taliban.
    • Security of civilian assets: India needs to court all parties in Afghanistan, including the Taliban if it wants to ensure its security of its civilian assets there.
    • It makes neither strategic nor economic sense to withdraw from Afghanistan after spending over $3 billion, something the Government seems to be prepared to do
    • Being a part of Afghanistan’s future course: If India is not proactive in Afghanistan at least now, late as it is, Russia, Iran, Pakistan and China will emerge as the shapers of Afghanistan’s political and geopolitical destiny, which for sure will be detrimental to Indian interests there.
    • Continental grand strategy:  Backchannel talks with Pakistan and a consequent ceasefire on the Line of Control, political dialogue with the mainstream Kashmiri leadership, secret parleys with Taliban all indicate that India is opening up its congested north-western frontier.
    •  Except for the strategic foray into the Indo-Pacific, India today is strategically boxed in the region and it must break out of it. Afghanistan could provide, if not immediately, India with such a way out.

    Consider the question ” India’s Afghan policy is at a major crossroads; to safeguard its civilian assets there as well as to stay relevant in the unfolding ‘great game’ in and around Afghanistan, New Delhi must fundamentally reset its Afghanistan policy. Comment.” 

    Conclusion

    In the end, India’s engagement with the Taliban may or may not achieve much, but non-engagement will definitely hurt Indian interests.

    Back2Basics: Durand Line

    • Durand Line, boundary established in the Hindu Kush in 1893 running through the tribal lands between Afghanistan and British India, marking their respective spheres of influence.
    • In modern times it has marked the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.
    • The acceptance of this line—which was named for Sir Mortimer Durand, who induced ʿAbdor Raḥmān Khān, amir of Afghanistan, to agree to a boundary—may be said to have settled the Indo-Afghan frontier problem for the rest of the British period.

  • China’s role in stabilising Afghanistan

    Context

    Amid the gloom that has enveloped Afghanistan, one hope for many countries has been China’s potential role in stabilising it.

    Factors that call for China to play role in Afghanistan

    • Scope for India-China cooperation: In the past, even India thought that Afghanistan would be a natural area for India and China to work together.
    • But little came out of the understanding after the Wuhan summit in 2018.
    • Northern neighbours: Afghanistan’s northern neighbours, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan all have expanding political and economic ties with China but have traditionally relied on Russia for their security.
    • They might support a larger role for Beijing in Afghanistan in partnership with Russia.
    • Iran, Kabul’s western neighbour, also has deepening ties with China.
    • Bilateral cooperation with the U.S.: Washington, now locked in an escalating confrontation with Beijing, sees Afghanistan as a potential area of bilateral cooperation. 
    • Role of Pakistan: Beijing is indeed critical in Pakistan’s plans for Afghanistan.
    • Afghan leaders have also been eager to draw China’s BRI into their plans for economic modernisation.
    • China was also important for Kabul’s political calculus in limiting Pakistan’s quest for dominance.

    Two challenges in China playing role in stabilising Afghanistan

    1) Caution in Chinese policy

    • The first relates to the deep sources of caution in Chinese policy.
    • Neither the prospect of mining Afghanistan’s natural resources nor the vanity of being the newest superpower will compel China to rush into the Afghan vacuum.
    • China has deep concerns about Taliban’s ideology and its potential role in fomenting instability in its restive Muslim-majority province, Xinjiang. 
    • Beijing cannot depend on its special relationship with the Pakistan army to ensure the security of China’s frontiers as well as its investments in Afghanistan.
    •  The growing attacks on CPEC projects in Pakistan, underline the difficulty of pursuing economic development amid endemic violence.

    2) Priorities of Taliban

    • The second set of problems relate to the priorities of Taliban.
    • It remains to be seen whether the economic development of Afghanistan is a top priority for the Taliban or not.
    • Also, is it open to let in foreign capital and all the baggage that comes with it?
    • More fundamentally, there is no clarity on the role of economic modernisation in Taliban’s fierce insistence on the creation of an Islamic emirate in Afghanistan.

    Conclusion

    It is against this backdrop that the chances of China playing a major role in stabilising Afghanistan remain slim.

  • Explained: India’s Afghan investment

    As the Taliban push ahead with military offensives across Afghanistan, preparing to take over after the exit of US and NATO forces, India faces a situation in which it may lose all its stakes.

    India-Afghan ties

    • After a break between 1996 and 2001, when India joined the world in shunning the previous Taliban regime (only Pakistan, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia kept ties).
    • One-way New Delhi re-established ties with the country in the two decades after the 9/11 attacks was to pour in development assistance, under the protective umbrella of the US presence.
    • India built vital roads, dams, electricity transmission lines and substations, schools and hospitals, etc. India’s development assistance is now estimated to be worth well over $3 billion.
    • And unlike in other countries where India’s infrastructure projects have barely got off the ground or are mired in the host nation’s politics, it has delivered in Afghanistan.

    A soft corner

    • Afghanistan is vital to India’s strategic interests in the region.
    • It is also perhaps the only SAARC nation whose people have much affection for India.
    • Taliban takeover would mean a reversal of nearly 20 years of rebuilding a relationship that goes back centuries.

    Projects across the country

    [1] SALMA DAM

    • Already, there has been fighting in the area where one of India’s high-visibility projects is located — the 42MW Salma Dam in Herat province.
    • The hydropower and irrigation project, completed against many odds and inaugurated in 2016, is known as the Afghan-India Friendship Dam.
    • In the past few weeks, the Taliban have mounted attacks in nearby places, killing several security personnel.
    • The Taliban claim the area around the dam is now under their control.

    [2] ZARANJ-DELARAM HIGHWAY

    • The other high-profile project was the 218-km Zaranj-Delaram highway built by the Border Roads Organisation. Zaranj is located close to Afghanistan’s border with Iran.
    • With Pakistan denying India overland access for trade with Afghanistan, the highway is of strategic importance to New Delhi, as it provides an alternative route into landlocked Afghanistan through Iran’s Chabahar port.

    [3] AFGHAN PARLIAMENT

    • The Afghan Parliament in Kabul was built by India at $90 million.
    • It was opened in 2015; PM Modi inaugurated the building.
    • A block in the building is named after former PM AB Vajpayee.

    [4] STOR PALACE

    • In 2016, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and PM Modi inaugurated the restored Stor Palace in Kabul, originally built in the late 19th century.
    • It is famous for the 1919 Rawalpindi Agreement by which Afghanistan became an independent country.

    [5] POWER INFRA

    • Other Indian projects in Afghanistan include the rebuilding of power infrastructure such as the 220kV DC transmission line from Pul-e-Khumri, the capital of Baghlan province to the north of Kabul.
    • Indian contractors and workers also restored telecommunications infrastructure in many provinces.

    [6] HEALTH INFRA

    • India has reconstructed a children’s hospital it had helped build in Kabul in 1972 —named Indira Gandhi Institute for Child Health in 1985 — that was in shambles after the war.
    • ‘Indian Medical Missions’ have held free consultation camps in several areas.
    • Thousands who lost their limbs after stepping on mines left over from the war have been fitted with the Jaipur Foot.
    • India has also built clinics in the border provinces of Badakhshan, Balkh, Kandahar, Khost, Kunar, Nangarhar, Nimruz, Nooristan, Paktia and Paktika.

    [7] TRANSPORTATION

    • According to the MEA, India gifted 400 buses and 200 mini-buses for urban transportation, 105 utility vehicles for municipalities, 285 military vehicles for the Afghan Army.
    • It also gave three Air India aircraft to Ariana, the Afghan national carrier, when it was restarting operations.

    [8] OTHER PROJECTS

    • India has contributed desks and benches for schools, and built solar panels in remote villages, and Sulabh toilet blocks in Kabul.
    • New Delhi has also played a role in building capacity, with vocational training institutes, scholarships to Afghan students, mentoring programmes in the civil service, and training for doctors and others.

    Various ongoing project

    • India had concluded with Afghanistan an agreement for the construction of the Shatoot Dam in Kabul district, which would provide safe drinking water to 2 million residents.
    • Last year, India pledged $1 million for another Aga Khan heritage project, the restoration of the Bala Hissar Fort south of Kabul, whose origins go back to the 6th century.
    • Bala Hissar went on to become a significant Mughal fort, parts of it were rebuilt by Jahangir, and it was used as a residence by Shah Jahan.

    Bilateral trade

    • Despite the denial of an overland route by Pakistan, the India-Afghanistan trade has grown with the establishment in 2017 of an air freight corridor.
    • In 2019-20, bilateral trade crossed $1.3 billion.
    • The balance of trade is heavily tilted — exports from India are worth approximately $900 million, while Afghanistan’s exports to India are about $500 million.
    • Afghan exports are mainly fresh and dried fruit.
    • Some of this comes overland through the Wagah border; Pakistan has permitted Afghan trade with India through its territory.
    • Indian exports to Afghanistan take place mainly through government-to-government contracts with Indian companies.
    • Exports include pharmaceuticals, medical equipment, computers and related materials, cement, and sugar.
    • Trade through Chabahar started in 2017 but is restricted by the absence of connectivity from the port to the Afghan border.

  • Regional powers and the Afghanistan question

    Context

    A regional conclave of foreign ministers taking place in Dushanbe this week under the banner of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) should give us a sense of the unfolding regional dynamic on Afghanistan.

    SCO addressing challenges in Afghanistan

    • Geography, membership and capabilities make the SCO an important forum to address the post-American challenges in Afghanistan.
    • The SCO was launched 20 years ago by China and Russia to promote inner Asia stability. 
    • The current members of the SCO are China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, and India.
    • The SCO has four observer states — Iran, Afghanistan, Mongolia and Belarus.
    • The idea of a regional solution to Afghanistan has always had much political appeal.
    • But divergent regional strategic perspectives limit the prospects for a sustainable consensus on Afghanistan.

    Implications of the US exit for the region

    • The quiet satisfaction in Moscow, Beijing, Tehran and Rawalpindi at the US’s exit from Afghanistan, however, is tinged by worries about the long-term implications of Washington’s retreat
    • Regional players have to cope with the consequences of the US withdrawal and the resurgence of the Taliban.
    • Neither Moscow nor Beijing would want to see Afghanistan becoming the hub of international terror again under the Taliban.
    • For China, potential Taliban support to the Xinjiang separatist groups is a major concern.
    • Iran can’t ignore the Sunni extremism of the Taliban and its oppressive record in dealing with the Shia, and Persian-speaking minorities.
    • Pakistan worries about the danger of the conflict spilling over to the east of the Durand Line, and hostile groups gaining sanctuaries in Afghanistan.

    Three factors that drive India’s Afghan policy

    • The US exit means a new constraint on Delhi’s ability to operate inside Afghanistan.
    • There is also the danger that Afghanistan under the Taliban could also begin to nurture anti-India terror groups.
    • If India remains active but patient, many opportunities could open up in the new Afghan phase.
    • Three structural conditions will continue to shape India’s Afghan policy.
    • One is India’s lack of direct physical access to Afghanistan.
    • This underlines the importance of India having effective regional partners.
    • Second, it remains to be seen if Pakistan’s partnership with China and the extension of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor into Afghanistan can address Pakistan’s inability to construct a stable and legitimate order in Afghanistan.
    • Third, the contradiction between the interests of Afghanistan and Pakistan is an enduring one.
    • While many in Pakistan would like to turn Afghanistan into a protectorate, Afghans deeply value their independence.
    • All Afghan sovereigns, including the Taliban, will inevitably look for partners to balance Pakistan.

    Way forward for India

    • India must actively contribute to the SCO deliberations on Afghanistan, but must temper its hopes for a collective regional solution.
    • At the same time, Delhi should focus on intensifying its engagement with various Afghan groups, including the Taliban, and finding effective regional partners to secure its interests in a changing Afghanistan.

    Conclusion

    India should pursue the regional solution to Afghanistan challenge after the US exit while increasing the engagement with the various players in Afghanistan including the Taliban.

  • Strategic cooperation between India, Italy and Japan can ensure a free Indo-Pacific

    Context

    Recently, Mr. Draghi, Italy’s Prime Minister described Chinese competitive practices as “unfair” and invited the EU to be franker and more courageous in confronting Beijing on various issues. Against this backdrop, a trilateral partnership between India-Japan-Italy could play important role in the Indo-Pacific region.

    India’s growing centrality in Indo-Pacific strategic architecture

    • Countries that share similar values and face similar challenges are coming together to create purpose-oriented partnerships.
    • In the context of the Indo-Pacific, the challenges posed by China’s assertive initiatives clash with a region lacking multilateral organisations capable of solving problems effectively.
    • But as a new pushback against China takes shape and as Indian foreign policy becomes strategically clearer, there is new momentum to initiatives such as the Quad.

    India-Italy-Japan trilateral partnership

    • Recently, Italy has also begun to signal its intention to enter the Indo-Pacific geography.
    • It has done so by seeking to join India and Japan in a trilateral partnership.
    • Italy has become more vocal on the risks emanating from China’s strategic competitive initiatives.
    • On the Indian side, there is great interest in forging new partnerships with like-minded countries interested in preserving peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific.
    • The responsibility of keeping the Indo-Pacific free and open, and working for the welfare of its inhabitants falls on like-minded countries within and beyond the region.

    Potential of trilateral partnership

    • Their compatible economic systems can contribute to the reorganisation of the global supply chains that is now being reviewed by many players as a natural result of the Chinese mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic.
    •  At the security level, the well-defined India-Japan Indo-Pacific partnership can easily be complemented by Italy.
    • At the multilateral level, the three countries share the same values and the same rules-based world view.

    The way forward for trilateral cooperation

    • The Italian government must formulate a clear Indo-Pacific strategy that must indicate its objectives.
    • But Rome must go beyond that in defining and implementing, at the margins of the EU’s common initiatives, its own policy with respect to the Indo-Pacific.
    • The India, Italy and Japan trilateral initiative can be a forum to foster and consolidate a strategic relationship between these three countries, and specifically expand India-Italy bilateral relations.
    • A trilateral cooperation can be the right forum for India and Italy to learn more from each other’s practices and interests and consolidate a strategic dialogue that should include the economic, the security and the political dimensions.
    •  To consolidate the trilateral cooperation in this field, the three countries need to define a common economic and strategic agenda.

    Conclusion

    A clear political will is needed from all sides, and Italy, in particular, should recognise its interests in playing a larger role towards the maintenance of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Robust India-Italy strategic ties can be the first step towards the realisation of this goal.

  • EAM hands over relics of 17th century Georgian Queen St. Ketevan to Georgia

    After a long-standing request of Georgia, External Affairs Minister handed over the holy relics of 17th century Georgian Queen St. Ketevan nearly 16 years after they were found in Goa.

    Who was St. Ketevan?

    • Queen Ketevan was a 17th century Georgian Queen.
    • From Kakheti, a kingdom in eastern Georgia, she was tortured and killed in 1624 in Shiraz during the rule of the Safavid dynasty.
    • Portuguese missionaries were said to have carried the relics to Goa in 1627.
    • In 2005, after years of research and study of medieval Portuguese records, the relics were found at the St. Augustine Church in Old Goa.

    Importance of Georgia for India

    • Georgia a strategically important country situated at the intersection of Eastern Europe and Western Asia.
    • Relations between Georgia and India date back to ancient times.
    • The Panchatantra influenced Georgian folk legends. During the medieval period, Georgian missionaries, travelers, and traders visited India.
    • Some Georgians served in the courts of Mughal emperors, and a few rose to the rank of governor.
    • India was among the first countries to officially recognize Georgia, doing so on 26 December 1991.
    • India is a net exporter to Georgia.
    • The main commodities exported by India to Georgia are cereals, nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and mechanical appliances, pharmaceuticals, electrical machinery and equipment, aluminium and aluminium articles.

    Answer this PYQ in the comment box:

    Q.Consider the following pairs:

    Sea Bordering Country
    1. Adriatic Sea Albania
    2. Black Sea Croatia
    3. Caspian Sea Kazakhstan
    4. Mediterranean Sea Morocco
    5. Red Sea Syria

    Which of the pairs given above are correctly matched? (CSP 2019)

    (a) 1, 2 and 4 only

    (b) 1, 3 and 4 only

    (c) 2 and 5 only

    (d) 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5

  • Crafting a unique partnership with Africa

    This op-ed analyses the future of India-Africa cooperation in agriculture amid the looming Chinese involvement in African countries.

    Agricultural significance of Africa

    • With 65% of the world’s uncultivated arable land, employing over 60% of the workforce, and accounting for almost 20% of Sub-Saharan Africa’s GDP, agriculture is critical to Africa’s economy.

    China factor behind

    • As this relationship enters the post-pandemic world, it is vital to prioritize and channel resources into augmenting partnerships in agriculture.
    • This is crucial given its unexplored potential, centrality to global food security, business prospects and to provide credible alternatives to the increasing involvement of Chinese stakeholders in the sector.

    Analyzing Chinese engagement

    Chinese corporations, small and medium-sized enterprises and entrepreneurs adopt has provided a layered perspective of the sociopolitical, economic and environmental impact of Chinese engagement.

    • Trade: China is among Africa’s largest trading partners.
    • Credit facility: It is also Africa’s single biggest creditor.
    • Infrastructure: Its corporations dominate the region’s infrastructure market and are now entering the agri-infra sector.
    • Strategic support: While access to Africa’s natural resources, its untapped markets and support for ‘One China Policy’ are primary drivers of Chinese engagement with the region, there are other factors at play.

    China is going strategic in the guise of agriculture

    • Increasingly critical to China’s global aspirations, its engagement in African agriculture is taking on a strategic quality.
    • Chinese-built industrial parks and economic zones in Africa are attracting low-cost, labour-intensive manufacturing units that are relocating from China.
    • Chinese engineers interviewed spoke of how their operations in Africa are important to accumulate global experience in management, risk and capital investments.
    • Not only are they willing to overlook short-term profits in order to build a ‘brand China’, but they want to dominate the market in the long term, which includes pushing Chinese standards in host countries.
    • Chinese tech companies are laying critical telecommunications infrastructure, venture capital funds are investing in African fintech firms, while other smaller enterprises are expanding across the region.

    Agricultural landscape

    • While many Chinese entities have been active in Africa’s agriculture for decades now, the nature, form and actors involved have undergone substantial change.
    • In Zambia, Chinese firms are introducing agri-tech to combat traditional challenges, such as using drone technology to control the fall armyworm infestation.
    • They have set up over Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centers (ATDCS) in the continent where Chinese agronomists work on developing new crop varieties and increasing crop yields.
    • This ATDCs partner with local universities, conduct workshops and classes for officials and provide training and lease equipment to small holder farmers.
    • Chinese companies with no prior experience in agriculture are setting out to build futuristic ecological parks while others are purchasing large-scale commercial farms.

    Inducing their soft power

    • The exponential growth in the China-Africa economic ties and the emergence of Beijing as an alternative to traditional western powers have motivated change in perceptions across groups.
    • Governments and heads of state are recalibrating approaches, media houses are investing more resources for on-the-ground reporting.

    Dark Side of the Sino-Africa ties

    • Simultaneously, Africa-China relations are becoming complex with a growing, insular diaspora, lopsided trade, looming debt, competition with local businesses and a negative perception accompanied by greater political and socioeconomic interlinkages.
    • On occasion, there seems to be a gap between skills transferred in China and the ground realities in Africa.
    • In some cases, the technology taught in China is not available locally and in others, there is inability to implement lessons learnt due to the absence of supporting resources.
    • Larger commercial farms run by Mandarin-speaking managers and the presence of small-scale Chinese farmers in local markets aggravates socio-cultural stresses.

    India’s agricultural engagement

    • Diverse portfolios: India-Africa agricultural cooperation currently includes institutional and individual capacity-building initiatives, an extension of soft loans, supply of machinery, acquisition of farmlands and the presence of Indian entrepreneurs in the African agricultural ecosystem.
    • Land acquisition: Indian farmers have purchased over 6,00,000 hectares of land for commercial farming in Africa.
    • States cooperation: Sub-national actors are providing another model of cooperation in agriculture. Consider the case of the Kerala government trying to meet its requirement for cashew nuts with imports from countries in Africa.
    • Civil society: Similar ideas could encourage State governments and civil society organizations to identify opportunities and invest directly.
    • Agri-business: There is also promise in incentivizing Indian industries to tap into African agri-business value chains and connecting Indian technology firms and startups with partners in Africa.
    • Investment: In the past year, despite the pandemic, the sector witnessed a record increase in investments.

    Way forward

    • A thorough impact assessment needs to be conducted of the existing capacity-building initiatives in agriculture for India to stand in good stead.
    • This could include detailed surveys of participants who have returned to their home countries.
    • Country-specific and localized curriculum can be drawn up, making skill development demand-led.
    • In all senses, India has consistently chosen well to underline the development partnership to be in line with African priorities.
    • It is pertinent, therefore, that we collectively craft a unique modern partnership with Africa.

    Conclusion

    • While India’s Africa strategy exists independently, it is important to be cognizant of China’s increasing footprint in the region.
    • Beijing’s model, if successful here, could be heralded as a replica for the larger global south.
    • It is important to note, however, that prominent African voices have emphasized that their own agency is often overlooked in the global discourse on the subject.

  • India-Turkey relations

    As a new round of geopolitical jousting begins on India’s north-western frontiers, Delhi must deal with a number of new actors that have carved out a role for themselves in the region.

    Overambitious Turkey

    • Our focus today is on Turkey’s regional ambitions (particularly in Afghanistan) and their implications for India.
    • Ankara is in negotiations with the US on taking charge of the Kabul airport which is critical for an international presence in Afghanistan that is coming under the Taliban’s control.
    • Turkey has been running Kabul airport security for a while, but doing so after the US pullout will be quite demanding.
    • Taking a longer view, though, Turkey is not a new regional actor in India’s northwest.

    Turkey and Afghanistan

    • Ankara and Kabul have recently celebrated the centennial of the establishment of diplomatic relations.
    • Through this century, Turkey has engaged purposefully with Afghanistan over a wide domain.
    • While it joined the NATO military mission in Afghanistan after the ouster of the Taliban at the end of 2001, Turkey avoided any combat role and differentiated itself from the Western powers.
    • Ankara has contributed to the training of the Afghan military and police forces.
    • It has also undertaken much independent humanitarian and developmental work.

    Affinity with Pakistan

    • Turkey’s good relations with both Afghanistan and Pakistan have also given space for Ankara to present itself as a mediator between the warring South Asian neighbours.
    • Turkey’s “Heart of Asia” conference or the Istanbul Process has been a major diplomatic vehicle for attempted Afghan reconciliation in the last few years.
    • Widespread goodwill for Turkey in Afghanistan has now come in handy for the US in managing some elements of the post-withdrawal phase.
    • In Pakistan, PM Imran Khan has rallied behind Erdogan’s ambition to seize the leadership of the Islamic world from Saudi Arabia.
    • Pakistan’s Army Chief had to step in to limit the damage with Saudi Arabia, which has long been Pakistan’s major economic benefactor.

    Challenges for India

    • Turkey’s growing role in Afghanistan opens a more difficult phase in relations between Delhi and Ankara.
    • India’s opposition to alliances and Turkey’s alignments reflected divergent international orientations of Delhi and Ankara after the Second World War.
    • And Turkey’s deepening bilateral military-security cooperation with Pakistan made it even harder for Delhi to take a positive view of Ankara.
    • Turkey and Pakistan were part of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) that was set up in 1955 by the British.
    • Although CENTO eventually wound up in 1979, Turkey and Pakistan remained close partners in a number of regional organizations and international forums like the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

    Pre-Erdogan era Turkey

    • The shared secular values between Delhi and Ankara in the pre-Erdogan era were not enough to overcome the strategic differences between the two in the Cold War.
    • To make matters more complicated, the positive legacy of the Subcontinent’s solidarity with the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, emerged out of its ruins in the early 20th century, accrued mostly to Pakistan.
    • There were moments — during the tenures of PM Rajiv Gandhi and Mr Vajpayee, when India and Turkey seemed poised for a more productive relationship.
    • But those have been rather few and far between.

    Turkey’s departure from Secularism

    • Meanwhile, Turkey’s Islamist internationalism under Recep Tayyip Erdogan has inevitably led to its deeper alliance with Pakistan, greater meddling in South Asia, and a sharper contraction with India.
    • The Pakistani prism through which Delhi has long seen Ankara, however, has prevented it from fully appreciating the growing strategic salience of Turkey.
    • Erdogan’s active claim for leadership of the Islamic world has seen a more intensive Turkish political, religious, and cultural outreach to the Subcontinent’s 600 million Muslims.

    Self-goals on Kashmir

    • Turkey has become the most active international supporter of Pakistan on the Kashmir question.
    • Delhi is aware of Erdogan’s hypocrisy on minority rights.
    • While pitching for self-determination in Kashmir, Erdogan actively tramples on the rights of its Kurdish minority at home and confronts them across Turkey’s border in Syria and Iraq.

    Other ambitions in Asia

    • Erdogan was quick to condemn the Bangladesh government’s hanging of a senior extremist leader in 2016.
    • But in a reflection of his strategic suppleness, Erdogan also offered strong political support for Dhaka on the Rohingya refugee crisis.
    • As Bangladesh emerges as an attractive economy, Ankara is now stepping up its commercial cooperation with Dhaka.
    • Turkey, which hosted the Caliphate in the Ottoman era, had natural spiritual resonance among the South Asian Muslims.

    Riving the Caliphate

    • With the abolition of the Caliphate in 1924, Turkey’s Westernization under Ataturk reduced its religious significance.
    • Erdogan’s Islamist politics are about regaining that salience.
    • Erdogan’s strategy marks the declining relevance of the old antinomies — between alliances and autonomy, East and West, North and South, Islam and the West, Arabs and the Jews — that so resonate with the traditional Indian foreign policy discourse.

    Stance on Israel

    • Turkey was the first Muslim-majority nation that established full diplomatic relations with Israel.
    • Erdogan now actively mobilizes the Arab and Islamic world against Israel without breaking relations with Tel Aviv.
    • Erdogan’s outrage on Israel is about presenting himself as a better champion of Palestine than his Arab rivals.

    India’s option against Turkey

    • India, which has been at the receiving end of Erdogan’s internationalism, has multiple options in pushing back.
    • The recent naval exercise between India and Greece in the Mediterranean offers a small hint of India’s possibilities in Turkey’s neighbourhood.
    • Many Arab leaders reject Erdogan’s policies that remind them of Ottoman imperialism.
    • They resent Erdogan’s support of groups like the Muslim Brotherhood that seek to overthrow moderate governments in the Middle East.
    • There is much that India can do to up its game in the Arab world.

    Lessons for India

    • The new fluidity in geopolitics in India’s extended neighbourhood to the west.
    • Agency for regional powers is growing as the influence of great power weakens.
    • Religious ideology, like the more secular ones, is a cover for the pursuit of power.
    • Finally, Erdogan has carefully modulated his confrontation with major powers by avoiding a breakdown in relations.

    Conclusion

    • For Erdogan, the choices are not between black and white. That should be a good guide for India’s own relations with Turkey.
    • Delhi needs to vigorously challenge Turkey’s positions where it must, seize the opportunities opened by regional resentments against Erdogan’s adventurism, and at the same time prepare for a more intensive bilateral engagement with Ankara.