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Subject: International Relations

  • Freedom of Navigation Operations

    The US Navy has had “asserted navigational rights and freedoms approximately 130 nautical miles west of Lakshadweep Islands, inside India’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), without requesting India’s prior consent, consistent with international law”.

    Try this question:

    Q.What do you mean by Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs)? What are its legal backings?  Discuss its significance.

    Freedom of Navigation Operations

    • FONOPs are closely linked to the concept of freedom of navigation, and in particular to the enforcement of relevant international law and customs regarding freedom of navigation.
    • It involves passage conducted by the US Navy through waters claimed by coastal nations as their exclusive territory.
    • It is carried under the US policy of exercising and asserting its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms around the world”.
    • It says these “assertions communicate that the US does not acquiesce to the excessive maritime claims of other nations, and thus prevents those claims from becoming accepted in international law”.

    Significance of FONOPs

    • FONOPs are a method of enforcing UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) and avoiding these negative outcomes by reinforcing freedom of navigation through practice.
    • It is exercised by sailing through all areas of the sea permitted under UNCLOS, and particularly those areas that states have attempted to close off to free navigation as defined under UNCLOS.

    What about EEZs?

    • An exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is prescribed by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
    • It is an area of the sea in which a sovereign state has special rights regarding the exploration and use of marine resources, including energy production from water and wind.
    • It stretches from the baseline out to 200 nautical miles from the coast of the state in question.
    • It is also referred to as a maritime continental margin and, in colloquial usage, may include the continental shelf.
    • The term does not include either the territorial sea or the continental shelf beyond the 200 nautical mile limit.
    • The difference between the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone is that the first confers full sovereignty over the waters, whereas the second is merely a “sovereign right” which refers to the coastal state’s rights below the surface of the sea.
    • The surface waters, as can be seen on the map, are international waters.

    Is FONOP violative of India’s EEZ?

    • As per India’s Territorial Waters Act, 1976, the EEZ of India “is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial waters, and the limit of such zone is two hundred nautical miles from the baseline”.
    • India’s “limit of the territorial waters is the line every point of which is at a distance of twelve nautical miles from the nearest point of the appropriate baseline”.
    • Under the 1976 law, “all foreign ships (other than warships including submarines and other underwater vehicles) shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial waters”.

    Back2Basics: UNCLOS

    • The Law of the Sea Treaty formally known as the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was adopted in 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It entered into force in 1994.
    • The convention establishes a comprehensive set of rules governing the oceans and replaces previous U.N. Conventions on the Law of the Sea
    • The convention defines the distance of 12 nautical miles from the baseline as Territorial Sea limit and a distance of 200 nautical miles distance as Exclusive Economic Zone limit.

  • Jordan Crisis and its significance for the Arab Region

    The royal household in Jordan has recently seen intense drama, with the King’s popular half-brother and former crown prince was placed under de facto house arrest.

    Study the map; especially, the Israel-Jordan border and Dead Sea.

    Signs of a Coup

    • Jordanian government statements have has stated that there had been an attempted coup to destabilize the country, mentioning unnamed “foreign entities” involved in the plot.
    • The events have thus put a spotlight on Jordan’s unique position as one of the most stable countries in the Arab world, and given rise to questions about who could stand to benefit from the alleged coup.

    Jordan’s stability matters

    • Jordan, which this year celebrates 100 years since its creation after World War I, has for decades remained stable in a part of the world that is prone to conflict and political uncertainty.
    • For its allies in the West and in the Gulf, Jordan is a strategic partner which can be relied upon for furthering political objectives in the region, which includes war-torn Syria and Iraq as well as conflict-prone Israel and Palestine.
    • The support of Jordanian intelligence has proven critically important in the fight against terrorism.
    • Though impoverished, the country of about a crore people has served as a haven for refugees in the conflict-ridden region.

    The asylum giver

    • After the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948 and 1967, Jordan received waves of refugees, to the point that about half of Jordan’s population today is made up of Palestinians.
    • It has also welcomed refugees after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, and currently hosts over 10 lakh from Syria, where a protracted civil war is going on.
    • Jordan is also considered important to any future peace deal between Israel and Palestine.

    How does Jordan get along with regional powers?

    (1) West

    • Traditionally, Jordan has maintained close relations with the US, and the fellow Sunni Muslim powers of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which together stand against Shia Iran.
    • It also has diplomatic relations with Israel, and the two countries have been bound by a peace treaty since 1994.

    (2) Within Gulf

    • In recent years, however, Jordan’s relations with the Saudis and UAE have seen ups and downs.
    • It has been particularly since the rise of their respective crown prince’s Mohammed bin Salman (known by initials MBS) and Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ).
    • One of the points of friction was Saudi-UAE’s blockade of Qatar in 2017.
    • It caused further consternation in Saudi and Emirati circles by maintaining strong ties with Turkey.

    (3) Ties with Israel

    • Jordan’s role as the region’s interlocutor has also diminished since last year, after the UAE normalized relations with Israel.

    What have the powers said of the alleged coup?

    • Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have expressed full support for King Abdullah. The US has called the ruler a “key partner”.
    • To drive home the point, Saudi Arabia sent its foreign minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, to Jordan’s capital Amman to express complete solidarity with Jordan’s King and his government.
    • Saudi and the UAE have little to gain by destabilizing Jordan, a country that has long served as a dependable ally.

  • Ukraine urges NATO to speed up membership

    Ukrainian President has urged NATO to speed up his country’s membership in the alliance, saying it was the only way to end fighting with pro-Russia separatists.

    North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

    • The NATO, also called the North Atlantic Alliance, is an intergovernmental military alliance between 30 European and North American countries.
    • The organization implements the North Atlantic Treaty that was signed on 4 April 1949.
    • NATO constitutes a system of collective defence whereby its independent member states agree to mutual defence in response to an attack by any external party.
    • NATO’s Headquarters are located in Haren, Brussels, Belgium, while the headquarters of Allied Command Operations is near Mons, Belgium.

    Its members

    • Since its founding, the admission of new member states has increased the alliance from the original 12 countries to 30.
    • The most recent member state to be added to NATO was North Macedonia on 27 March 2020.
    • NATO currently recognizes Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Ukraine as aspiring members.
    • An additional 20 countries participate in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, with 15 other countries involved in institutionalized dialogue programs.

    Why NATO matters?

    • The combined military spending of all NATO members constitutes over 70% of the global nominal total.
    • Members agreed that their aim is to reach or maintain the target defence spending of at least 2% of their GDP by 2024.

    Also read:

    India & NATO

  • E9 Initiative for Digital Learning

    Nine countries including India, China and Brazil will explore the possibility of co-creating and scaling up digital learning to achieve the UN sustainable goal on quality education under the E9 initiative.

    The E9 is the first of its kind global collaboration for digital learning. Note the participating countries.

    E9 Initiative

    • It is the first of a three-phased process to co-create an initiative on digital learning and skills, targeting marginalised children and youth, especially girls.
    • The initiative aims to accelerate recovery and advance the Sustainable Development Goal 4 agenda by driving rapid change in education systems.
    • It is spearheaded by the UN, the E9 countries – Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria and Pakistan.
    • It will have the opportunity to benefit from this global initiative and accelerate progress on digital learning, according to UNESCO.

    Various functions

    • The initiative will discuss the co-creation of the Digital Learning initiative by the nine countries.
    • This Consultation will highlight progress, share lessons and explore opportunities for collaboration and scale-up to expand digital learning and skills.
    • In addition, a Marketplace segment, for public-private partnership will focus on promising local and global solutions and opportunities for digital learning to strengthen local ecosystems.

  • India & NATO

    India has jettisoned many of its foreing policy shibboleths of late, however, avoiding NATO is not one of them. The article suggests engaging NATO to be in sync with the changing geopolitics.

    Why India avoided engagement with NATO in the past

    • India’s real problem is not with NATO, but with Delhi’s difficulty in thinking strategically about Europe.
    • Through the colonial era, Calcutta and Delhi viewed Europe through British eyes.
    • After Independence, Delhi tended to see Europe through the Russian lens.
    • The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union demanded a fresh approach to Europe.
    • But Delhi could not devote the kind of strategic attention that Europe demanded.
    • The bureaucratisation of the engagement between Delhi and Brussels and the lack of high-level political interest prevented India from taking full advantage of a re-emerging Europe.
    • In the last few years, Delhi has begun to develop an independent European framework, but has some distance to go in consolidating it.

    Ending political neglect of Europe

    • India has certainly sought to end prolonged political neglect of Europe.
    • The deepening maritime partnership with France since 2018 is an example.
    • Joining the Franco-German Alliance for Multilateralism in 2019 is another.
    • India’s first summit with Nordic nations in 2018 was a recognition that Europe is not a monolith but a continent of sub-regions.
    • India’s engagement with Central Europe’s Visegrad Four also highlighted the fact that Europe is not monolith.

    Why India should engage NATO

    • During the Cold War, India’s refusal was premised on its non-alignment.
    • That argument had little justification once the Cold War ended during 1989-91.
    • An India-NATO dialogue would simply mean having regular contact with a military alliance, most of whose members are well-established partners of India.
    • If Delhi is eager to draw a reluctant Russia into discussions on the Indo-Pacific, it makes little sense in avoiding engagement with NATO.
    • If Delhi does military exercises with China and Pakistan — under the rubric of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), why should talking to NATO be anathema?
    • To play any role in the Indo-Pacific, Europe and NATO need partners like India, Australia and Japan.
    • Delhi, in turn, knows that no single power can produce stability and security in the Indo-Pacific.
    • India’s enthusiasm for the Quad is a recognition of the need to build coalitions.
    • A sustained dialogue between India and NATO could facilitate productive exchanges in a range of areas, including terrorism, changing geopolitics; the evolving nature of military conflict, the role of emerging military technologies, and new military doctrines.
    • More broadly, an institutionalised engagement with NATO should make it easier for Delhi to deal with the military establishments of its 30 member states.
    • On a bilateral front, each of the members has much to offer in strengthening India’s national capabilities.

    What about Russia

    • Russia has not made a secret of its allergy to the Quad and Delhi’s growing closeness with Washington.
    • Putting NATO into that mix is unlikely to make much difference.
    • Delhi, in turn, can’t be happy with the deepening ties between Moscow and Beijing.
    • As mature states, India and Russia know they have to insulate their bilateral relationship from the larger structural trends buffeting the world today.
    • Meanwhile, both Russia and China have intensive bilateral engagement with Europe.

    Consider the question “India has to end its prolonged political neglect of Europe and engage a major European institution like NATO. In light of this, examine the factors restraining India’s engagement with the Europe.“

    Conclusion

    India’s continued reluctance to engage a major European institution like NATO will be a stunning case of strategic self-denial and we should avoid it.

  • US foreign policy has changed, India can’t bank on being its ‘ally’ anymore

    The article highlights the paradigm shift in the U.S. foreign policy in which the U.S. engages with a country on several parallel lines with little or no scope for a trade-off between them.

    Changes in the U.S. foreign policy

    •  US foreign policy is no longer based on old friend-or-foe classification under which transgressions by a “friend” or an “ally” were overlooked if the country was helpful to US self-interests.
    • Instead, the US foreign policy paradigm has shifted to one where a country’s position on an issue — trade, climate change, security, or human rights — is the categorising principle and not the country.
    • Put differently, engagement with countries will be done on issues with little or no trade-off among them.
    • Competition, cooperation, and confrontation can all characterise the US’s bilateral engagement depending on the specific issue.
    • For example, trade will involve competition while climate change and pandemics will necessitate cooperation.
    • Human rights and national security issues could be confrontational.

    Smart sanctions

    • A key instrument of foreign policy will be the now well-honed system of “smart” sanctions.
    • Sanctions in the past were directed at a country as a whole but such sanctions were counterproductive and created anti-US sentiment.
    • In its latest version, smart sanctions do not target countries, but specific individuals, firms, and institutions for a variety of alleged transgressions.
    • US businesses and individuals cannot transact with sanctioned entities.
    • The Magnitsky Accountability Act of 2012, for example, targeted those involved in the death of Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky and others responsible for human rights abuses in Russia.
    • When this was found to be successful, an executive order, passed in 2017, extended the provisions in the Magnitsky Act, to all who are corrupt or violate human rights in the world.

    What does this mean for India

    • Unlike in the antiquated rational-actor paradigm where there are imagined trade-offs across issues, in the new framework the US engages with countries on parallel lines.
    • The engagement is multifaceted across trade, intellectual property rights, climate change, security, terrorism, and, importantly, human rights, with limited trade-off across them.
    • Whether cooperation, competition, or confrontation dominate the nature of the engagement will depend on the specifics not whether India is a friend or a foe.

    Conclusion

    This marks the shift in the U.S. foreign policy, if others, including India, do not adapt to this paradigm shift, then they will find engagement with the US starkly different and surprisingly difficult.

  • Pakistan allows import of cotton, sugar from India

    Partially reversing a two-year-old decision to suspend all trade with India, Pakistan recently announced that it would allow the import of cotton and sugar from across the border.

    Ever wonder why the neighbour next door suddenly wants to normalize all ties? Read this edition of ours:

    India-Pakistan trade relations

    • Trade between the subcontinental neighbours has always been linked to their political interactions, given their tumultuous relationship.
    • For instance, India’s exports to Pakistan dropped by around 16 per cent to $1.82 billion in the 2016-17 financial years from $2.17 billion in 2015-16.
    • This coincided with the rise in tensions between the two countries following the terrorist attacks in Uri in 2016 and the surgical strikes by India against Pakistan-based militants.

    How much is the volume of trade?

    • Trade between the two countries grew marginally in subsequent years despite continuing tensions.
    • India’s exports to Pakistan increased to nearly 6 per cent to $1.92 billion in 2017-18, and by around 7 per cent to $2.07 billion in 2018-19.
    • Imports from Pakistan, though much lower than India’s exports to the country, also increased by 7.5 per cent to $488.56 million in 2017-18 from $454.49 million in 2016-17.
    • Growth of imports from Pakistan slowed to around $494.87 million in 2018-19 — an increase of around 1 per cent — before political relations between the two countries took a turn for the worse in 2019.

    Why did Pakistan ban trade with India?

    • Pakistan’s decision to suspend bilateral trade with India in August 2019 was primarily a fallout of India’s decision to scrap Article 370.
    • Pakistan called the move “illegal”, and took this trade measure as a way of showing its dissatisfaction.
    • However, an underlying reason for suspending trade between the two countries was also the 200 per cent tariff imposed by New Delhi on Pakistani imports.
    • This was a move that India implemented earlier that year after revoking its status as a Most Favoured Nation following the suicide bomb attack on the CRPF in Pulwama.
    • Pakistan’s announcement, coupled with India’s decision to revoke its MFN status and hike duties on its goods, was considered by some experts to be one of the most drastic measures ever taken in diplomatic tensions.

    Why is Pakistan allowing cotton and sugar import now?

    • Textiles from Pakistan are its value-added export.
    • The proposal to lift the ban on cotton imports came in the backdrop of a shortfall in raw material for Pakistan’s textile sector, which has reportedly been facing issues due to a low domestic yield of cotton in the country.
    • On top of this, imports from other countries like the US and Brazil have reportedly been more expensive and takes longer to arrive in the country.

    Why only these two commodities?

    • Even when we had a very small positive list (of goods for trade with Pakistan), agricultural commodities were always there in the list.
    • Cotton has been one of Pakistan’s major imports from India. In 2018-19, Pakistan imported $550.33 million worth of cotton from India.
    • When coupled with $457.75 million worth of organic chemicals, these products made up around half of its total imports from India.
    • Where sugar is concerned, trade experts feel it is a result of a long-standing interdependence between India and Pakistan over such agricultural commodities and a potential shortage in domestic supply.
    • If finally approved, cotton and sugar would be the second and third commodities allowed for export from India after Islamabad lifted the ban on medicine and related raw material imports during the Covid-19 pandemic.

  • Places in news: Whitsun Reef

    China’s aggressive expansion in the South China Sea has found a new ground, Whitsun Reef, where 220 Chinese vessels are currently anchored under the Philippines’ Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ).

    Once again, the South China Sea finds itself closer to becoming a security flashpoint amidst rising concerns over a military conflict.

    Also, try this:

    Q.Recently, Senkaku Island was in the news. Where is it located?

    a) South China Sea

    b) Indian Ocean

    c) East China sea

    d) Red sea

    Whitsun Reef

    • Whitsun Reef is a reef at the northeast extreme limit of the Union Banks in the Spratly Islands of the West Philippine Sea.
    • It is the largest reef of the Union Banks.
    • The reef is V-shaped with an area of about 10 sq. km.
    • Until at least the 1990s it was submerged most of the time and was visible above the water only during the low tide, at other times the reef could be detected due to the pattern of breaking waves.
    • At the end of the 20th-century small sand dunes had developed on the reef making a territorial claim possible (an International Court of Justice judgment in 2012 stated that “low-tide elevations cannot be appropriated”).
    • The development of the dunes could have occurred naturally, but the rumours had it that the island was being built up by Vietnam and China.

    Territorial disputes

    • As of 2016, the reef was unclaimed, the reports to the contrary (Chinese control) were based on confusion.
    • However, due to the reef’s strategic importance, it was expected that the reef would be occupied “soon”.
    • On 21 March 2021, about 220 Chinese fishing ships were moored at the reef ostensibly taking shelter due to the sea conditions.

    Why is the Philippines concerned?

    • The Philippines considers the reef to be a part of its exclusive economic zone and continental shelf and protested the Chinese presence.
    • Currently, Philippine military aircraft and navy are monitoring the situation daily, and China has been warned that there will be an increased military presence to conduct ‘sovereignty patrols’.
    • If China is successful with its moves, the Philippines may lose another fishing ground, similar to what happened in 2012 when China took control of Scarborough Shoal.

    The larger dispute

    • China and the Philippines, along with other Southeast Asian countries, have long been part of disputes over sovereign claims over the region’s islands, reefs and seabeds.
    • A third of the world’s maritime trade travels through the South China Sea annually.
    • The seabeds here are believed to be reserves of oil and natural gas while being home to fisheries essential for the food security of millions in South Asia.
    • The majority of the disputes concern the lack of adherence to the international ‘Exclusive Economic Zones’ which stretch up to 200 nautical miles from the coast of any state.
    • China, especially, has been notorious for disregarding the law on various occasions.

    What does China have to say?

    • On the present matter, the Chinese have reiterated that the vessels are mere fishing boats seeking shelter from unruly weather, though no bad weather has been reported in the area.
    • It is also unlikely that fishermen would have the financial capital to remain stationary for weeks on end.
    • Experts say through their present occupation, China might be looking to create a civilian base on the reef, an artificial island or even just control the airspace.
    • It is widely assessed that Philippines’s soft approach has further strengthened China’s ambitions in the South China Sea.

    Back2Basics: South China Sea Row

    • It is a dispute over territory and sovereignty over ocean areas, and the Paracels and the Spratlys – two island chains claimed in whole or in part by a number of countries.
    • China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei all have competing claims.
    • Alongside the fully-fledged islands, there are dozens of rocky outcrops, atolls, sandbanks and reefs, such as the Scarborough Shoal.
    • China claims by far the largest portion of territory – an area defined by the “nine-dash line” which stretches hundreds of miles south and east from its most southerly province of Hainan.
    • Beijing says its right to the area goes back centuries to when the Paracel and Spratly island chains were regarded as integral parts of the Chinese nation, and in 1947 it issued a map detailing its claims.
    • It showed the two island groups falling entirely within its territory. Those claims are mirrored by Taiwan.

    Spat over Chinese claims

    • China has backed its expansive claims with island-building and naval patrols.
    • The US says it does not take sides in territorial disputes but has sent military ships and planes near disputed islands, calling them “freedom of navigation” operations to ensure access to key shipping and air routes.
    • Both sides have accused each other of “militarizing” the South China Sea.
    • There are fears that the area is becoming a flashpoint, with potentially serious global consequences.

  • On Myanmar, India has to decide whether it is on the side of the future

    The article highlights the factors India needs to consider in formulating its response to the crisis in Myanmar.

    Implications of Myanmar issue for India

    • India, because of its proximity to Myanmar, its geopolitical role, and its interests, will inevitably be drawn into the train of events.
    • The most immediate challenge is, of course, dealing with the refugee crisis that this coup occasions.
    • The rich and powerful nations have not pulled their weight in crafting an adequate multilateral response.
    • Myanmar’s other neighbours, and especially ASEAN countries, are also unlikely to intervene.
    • The principle of non-refoulement has to be the cornerstone of any civilised state’s response to a politically induced humanitarian disaster.
    • It is not clear where India stands on this.

    Factors India should consider in its Myanmar policy

    1) Protestors are widespread

    • The protests for democracy are widespread, involve young people, and are driven by a genuine opposition to military rule.
    • India has to decide whether it is on the side of the future. 

    2) Concerns of Northeastern states

    • Northeastern states like Manipur and Mizoram which will immediately bear the costs of helping refugees are calling for a more generous and imaginative policy.
    • The concerns of the Northeast states have often been historically sidelined in India’s handling of the “trijunction”.
    • This was partly because of counterinsurgency fears, and partly because of suspicion of political forces in the Northeast.
    • But ignoring accommodative sentiments in the Northeast, would be to potentially signal their marginality in shaping India’s calculations.

    3) Reputation for humanitarian concern

    • The counterinsurgency and subversion fears have to be intelligently handled.
    • Relying only on cooperation with the Myanmar military, without support for the local population, we will once again be setting ourselves up for long-term problems.
    • A broadbased reputation for humanitarian concerns and the welfare of people is a strategic asset, not a liability in the long term.
    • India should also now have the confidence that it can both politically and militarily handle any risks that occasionally arise in the context of doing the decent thing.
    • But by closing down its borders, it is not sending a signal of strength but one of weakness.

    4) Geopolitical factors

    • With every major power, from Russia to China now seeing Myanmar in terms of geopolitical terms, the stakes for India are going to be high.
    • But its military seems more repressive, and its elites, including Aung San Suu Kyi, have been more conservative in harnessing democratic and progressive impulses.
    • So under such circumstances, it will be tempting for India to deeply engage with the military.
    • There is also a great deal of exaggeration about Myanmar’s economic importance to India.
    • Certainly, connectivity and trade with Myanmar provide momentum for India’s eastward interests.
    • But the benefits from engagement with Myanmar are not so great that India cannot put them aside to act on a modicum of principle.

    Way forward

    • Presumably, India wants to be a key interlocutor in two contexts.
    • It wants to be a key player in shaping a global response to the crisis.
    • And it wants to have some role in helping with a settlement towards a less repressive transition within Myanmar.
    • But for both of those roles, it is important that India has widespread credibility with the different groups and movements inside Myanmar.

    Conclusion

    India needs to consider these factors before deciding its response to the situation developing in Myanmar.

  • Heart of Asia – Istanbul Process (HoA-IP)

    External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar has attended the Heart of Asia Conference in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.

    The 9th Heart of Asia-Istanbul Process (HoA-IP) ministerial conference is part of the Istanbul Process – a regional initiative on security and cooperation for a stable and peaceful Afghanistan – that was launched on November 2, 2011, in Turkey.

    Note the participating countries from the logo itself.

    Heart of Asia – Istanbul Process

    • The Heart of Asia – Istanbul Process (HoA-IP) is an initiative of Afghanistan and Turkey, which was officially launched at a conference hosted by Turkey in Istanbul on 2 November 2011.
    • Since then, Afghanistan supported by fourteen participating countries and supporting countries beyond the region as well as 12 Regional and International Organizations is leading and coordinating this Process.

    Goals of the Process

    • The HoA-IP aims at promoting and strengthening peace, security, stability and prosperity in Afghanistan and in the region.
    • The HoA-IP has become one of the most interactive voluntary state-groupings in the HoA Region.
    • It brings Afghanistan’s immediate and extended neighbours as well as international supporters together through the following focus areas:
    1. Political Consultations
    2. Implementation of the Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)
    3. Cooperation with Regional Organizations

    Note: India too, has held the Ministerial Conferences of HoA-IP back on 4 December 2016 at Amritsar.