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Subject: International Relations

  • Explaining Pakistan’s flip-flop on trade with India

    The article highlights the key takeaways from Pakistan’s vacillations on resuming the trade ties even in the face of impending economic crisis.

    U-turn on resuming trade

    • On March 31, Pakistan announced the decision to import cotton, yarn, and sugar from India.
    • However, it took a U-turn on that announcement about resuming trade ties.
    • This highlights the internal differences and the emphasis on politics over economy and trade.
    • It also signifies Pakistan cabinet’s grandstanding, linking the normalisation of ties with India to Jammu and Kashmir.

    3 takeaways from the decision

    1) Immediate economic needs

    • Pakistan’s decision was to import only three items from India, namely cotton, yarn and sugar.
    • It was based on Pakistan’s immediate economic needs and not designed as a political confidence-building measure to normalise relations with India.
    • For the textile and sugar industries in Pakistan, importing from India is imperative, practical and is the most economic.
    • This is because cotton and sugarcane production declined there by 6.9% and 0.4%, respectively.
    •  By early 2019, the sugar prices started increasing, and in 2020, there was a crisis due to shortage and cost.
    • Importing sugar from India would be cheaper for the consumer market in Pakistan.

    2) Politics first

    • The second takeaway is the supremacy of politics over trade and economy, even if the latter is beneficial to the importing country.
    • The interests of its own business community and its export potential have become secondary.
    • However, Pakistan need not be singled out; this is a curse in South Asia, where politics play supreme over trade and economy.
    • The meagre percentage of intra-South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) trade and the failure of SAARC engaging in bilateral or regional trade would underline the above.

    3) Emphasis on Jammu and Kashmir issue

    • The third takeaway is the emphasis on Jammu and Kashmir by Pakistan to make any meaningful start in bilateral relations.
    • This goes against what it has been telling the rest of the world that India should begin a dialogue with Pakistan.
    • There were also reports that Pakistan agreeing to re-establish the ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC) was a part of this new strategy.

    Consider the question: “Trade is unlikely to triumph over politics in South Asia; especially in India-Pakistan relations. This is a curse in South Asia, where politics play supreme over trade and economy.” Critically Examine.

    Conclusion

    Pakistan has been saying that the onus is on India to normalise the process. Perhaps, it is India’s turn to tell Islamabad that it is willing, but without any preconditions, and start with trade.

  • Why the Indo-Pacific has assumed significance for Europe after the pandemic

    The article highlights Asia’s growing significance in the wake of the pandemic. This is underscored by Europe’s meaningful engagement with Asia which is based on an understanding of the region’s geopolitical and economic significance.

    Asia’s rise

    • The pandemic has upended many certainties. But it has reinforced one major trend in global politics: The rise of Asia.
    • The region’s rise has created three Asias.
    • First, there is the familiar Asia of business — open, dynamic, interconnected.
    • Second, an Asia of geopolitics, with ever-starker nationalisms, territorial conflicts, arms races and Sino-American rivalry.
    • Lastly, we have an Asia of global challenges.
    • These three Asias are also marked by 3 dynamics:
    • 1) Geopolitical rivalries that threaten free trade.
    • 2) The fight against the pandemic is mutating into a systemic competition between democracy and authoritarianism.
    • 3) And frenzied economic growth is fuelling climate change.

    European strategy for Indo-Pacific

    • Germany together with France and the Netherlands, have commenced work on a European strategy for the Indo-Pacific.
    • The strategy seeks cooperation with all countries of the region: For open economies and free trade; for the fight against pandemics and climate change; and for an inclusive, rules-based order.
    • Such a European strategy for the Indo-Pacific must take all three Asias into account.
    • Europe is a key trading, technology and investment partner for many countries of the region.
    •  The EU recently concluded groundbreaking free trade agreements with Japan, Singapore and Vietnam that set environmental and social standards.
    • In late 2020, the countries of East and Southeast Asia signed Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, encompassing one-third of the global economy.
    • It is time for the EU to swiftly conclude the ongoing negotiations on trade agreements with Australia and New Zealand – and to move forward with negotiations with Indonesia and India.

    Reducing dependencies

    • Following the above policies, Europe will also reduce dependency and following the principle of diversification.
    • Together with its Indo-Pacific partners, Europe can set standards for new technologies, human-centred digitisation and sustainable connectivity. 
    • In this endeavour, Europe can draw on its innovative and economic strength as well as its regulatory power.
    • At the EU-India Summit in May, the launch of a connectivity partnership with India will further connect India’s and Europe’s digital economies.

    Rising tensions and rules-based Indo-Pacific

    • Meanwhile, tensions are rising in the Asia of geopolitics.
    • New cold wars or even hot conflicts in the Indo-Pacific would be an economic and political nightmare.
    • Europe must, therefore, take a firmer stand against polarisation and more strongly advocate an inclusive, rules-based Indo-Pacific.
    • The strategic partnership concluded between the EU and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) last December connects us with like-minded middle powers.

    Asia of geopolitical challenges

    • Containing geopolitical rivalries in Asia is also a precondition for shaping the future with the Asia of global challenges.
    •  As the biggest emitters of CO2, the US, China, India and the EU will only win the fight against climate change together.
    • The Leaders Summit on Climate that will be hosted by the US next week sets the stage for cooperation.
    • Europe and the countries of the Indo-Pacific need each other also in the fight against the virus.
    • The EU is by far the biggest supporter of the international vaccine platform COVAX, and India as a leading producer of vaccines is the most important COVAX supplier.
    • We will all benefit from this as, without the worldwide vaccination rollout, mutations will keep on setting us back in the fight against the pandemic.
    • Europe will continue to stand up for human rights and democracy in the Indo-Pacific.
    • This was demonstrated with sanctions against those responsible for human rights violations in Xinjiang — and also against Myanmar’s generals.

    Conclusion

    Europe is ready for a new partnership — a partnership founded on seeking dialogue with the open Asia of business, taming geopolitical rivalry in Asia together and coming up with responses to the world of tomorrow with the Asia of global challenges. This must be the objective of European policy — for and with the Indo-Pacific

  • 7th Fleet’s patrol in India’s EEZ was an act of impropriety

    The explains the implications of a recent incident in which the US 7th fleet asserted navigation freedom and rights inside India’s Exclusive Economic Zone.

    Freedom of navigation operation in India’s EEZ

    • The US 7th fleet recently declared that on 7th April, 2021 USS John Paul Jones asserted navigational rights and freedom inside India’s EEZ, without requesting India’s prior consent.
    • The statement also said that  “India requires prior consent for military exercises or manoeuvres in its EEZ, a claim inconsistent with international law.

    Which international law the statement referred to

    • The “international law” being cited by Commander 7th Fleet is a UN Convention which resulted from the third UN Conference on Law of the Seas (UNCLOS 1982).
    • India has ratified the Convention, which came into force in 1994.
    • However, amongst the 168 nations who have either acceded to or ratified UNCLOS 1982, the US is conspicuous by its absence.

    Background of the UNCLOS

    • In 1945, the US unilaterally declared its jurisdiction over all natural resources on that nation’s continental shelf. 
    • Taking cue from the US, some states extended their sovereign rights to 200 miles, while others declared territorial limits as they pleased.
    • To bring order to a confusing situation, conferences for codifying laws of the seas were convened by the UN.
    • After negotiations, an agreement was obtained on a set of laws that formalised the following maritime zones:
    • (a) A 12-mile limit on territorial sea;
    • (b) A 24-mile contiguous zone.
    • (c) Amnewly conceived “exclusive economic zone” (EEZ) extending up to 200 miles within which the state would have sole rights over natural resources.
    • The EEZ was said to be unique in that it was neither high seas nor territorial waters.

    Issues with the UNCLOS 1982

    • The signatories UNCLOS 1982 have chosen to remain silent on controversial issues with military or security implications and mandated no process for resolution of ambiguities.
    • Resort to the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea or a Court of Arbitration are amongst the options available.
    • However, many states have expressed a preference for “negotiating in good faith”.
    • The time has, perhaps, come for signatories of UNCLOS 1982 to convene another conference to review laws and resolve issues of contention.

    Why US refused to ratify UNCLOS

    • It was accepted that the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction was not subject to national sovereignty but would be “the common heritage of mankind” .
    • This seems to have been at the root of the US opposition to UNCLOS.
    • It was felt in the US that this concept favoured the under-developed countries thereby denying America the fruits of its technological superiority.
    • The US Senate, therefore, refused to ratify UNCLOS.
    • Amongst the areas of major contention or sharp divergence in the interpretation of rules are:
    • 1) Applicability of the EEZ concept to rocks and islets.
    • 2) The right of innocent passage for foreign warships through territorial seas.
    • 3) Conduct of naval activities in the EEZ and the pursuit of marine scientific research in territorial waters and EEZ.

    Containing China

    • China has insulated itself against US intervention, through the progressive development of its “anti-access, area-denial” or A2AD capability.
    • China has accelerated its campaign to achieve control of the South China Sea (SCS).
    • In 2013, China commenced on an intense campaign to build artificial islands in the SCS on top of reefs in the Spratly and Paracel groups.
    • In 2016, China disdainfully rejected the verdict of the UN Court of Arbitration in its dispute with the Philippines.
    • So far, none of the US initiatives including Obama’s abortive US Pivot/Re-balance to Asia, Trump’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, seem to have had the slightest impact on China’s aggressive intent
    • Therefore, it seems pointless for the US Navy to frighten the Maldives or friendly India and it needs to focus on China instead.

    Consider the question “What are the different types of maritime zones under the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea 1982? What are the flaws in the convention?

    Conclusion

    In this fraught environment, the ever-expanding, worldwide FONOP campaign needs a careful reappraisal by US policy-makers for effectiveness — lest it alienates friends instead of deterring adversaries.

  • India’s refugee Policy & Issues with it

    The article highlights the issue of the lack of refugee protection framework in India and suggests enacting domestic law to deal with the issue. 

    India’s record on refugee protection

    • India, for the most part, has had a stellar record on the issue of refugee protection.
    • But this moral tradition has come under great stress of late.
    • New Delhi has been one of the largest recipients of refugees in the world in spite of not being a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol.

    Confusion in policies for immigrants and refugees

    • Much of the debate in India is about illegal immigrants, not refugees, the two categories tend to get bunched together.
    • Our policies towards illegal immigrants and refugees is confused is because as per Indian law, both categories of people are viewed as one and the same and are covered under the Foreigners Act, 1946.
    • The act offers a simple definition of a foreigner — “foreigner” means “a person who is not a citizen of India”.
    • There are fundamental differences between illegal immigrants and refugees, but India is legally ill-equipped to deal with them separately due to a lack of legal provisions.
    • Also, India is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the key legal documents pertaining to refugee protection.

    How absence of policy framework creates problems

    • The absence of legal framework for refugees leads to policy ambiguity whereby India’s refugee policy is guided primarily by ad hocism and ‘political utility’.
    • At the same time, the absence of a legal framework increases the possibility of the domestic politicisation of refugee protection and complicates its geopolitical faultlines.
    • The absence of a clearly laid down refugee protection law also opens the door for geopolitical considerations while deciding to admit refugees or not.
    • For example, India’s decision in the recent case of admitting Myanmarese refugees fleeing to India was influence by the possibility of irking the Generals in Naypyitaw.
    • However, hypothetically speaking, if New Delhi had domestic legislation regarding refugees it could have tempered the expectations of the junta to return the fleeing Myanmarese.

    Why India has not signed convention and protocol on refugee protection

    • The definition of refugees in the 1951 convention only pertains to the violation of civil and political rights, but not economic rights, of individuals.
    • If the violation of economic rights were to be included in the definition of a refugee, it would clearly pose a major burden on the developed world.
    • This argument, if used in the South Asian context, could be a problematic proposition for India too.
    • India also need to argue that the North is violating the convention in both letter and spirit, and make its accession conditional on the Western States rolling back the non-entrée (no entry) regime.
    • The non-entrée regime is constituted by a range of legal and administrative measures that include visa restrictions, carrier sanctions, interdictions, third safe-country rule, restrictive interpretations of the definition of ‘refugee’, withdrawal of social welfare benefits to asylum seekers, and widespread practices of detention.”
    • In other words, India must use its exemplary, though less than perfect, history of refugee protection to begin a global conversation on the issue.

    Way forward

    • What other options do we have to respond to the refugee situation we are faced with?
    • The answer perhaps lies in a new domestic law aimed at refugees.
    • The CAA, however, is not the answer to this problem primarily because of its deeply discriminatory nature.
    • What is perhaps equally important is that such a domestic refugee law should allow for temporary shelter and work permit for refugees.
    • India must also make a distinction between temporary migrant workers, illegal immigrants and refugees and deal with each of them differently through proper legal and institutional mechanisms.

    Consider the question “What are the reasons for India’s not singing 1951 Refugee Convention? What are the options India can explore for refugee protection? 

    Conclusion

    Our traditional practice of managing these issues with ambiguity and political expediency has become deeply counterproductive: It neither protects the refugees nor helps stop illegal immigration into the country.

  • Freedom of Navigation Operations

    The US Navy has had “asserted navigational rights and freedoms approximately 130 nautical miles west of Lakshadweep Islands, inside India’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ), without requesting India’s prior consent, consistent with international law”.

    Try this question:

    Q.What do you mean by Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs)? What are its legal backings?  Discuss its significance.

    Freedom of Navigation Operations

    • FONOPs are closely linked to the concept of freedom of navigation, and in particular to the enforcement of relevant international law and customs regarding freedom of navigation.
    • It involves passage conducted by the US Navy through waters claimed by coastal nations as their exclusive territory.
    • It is carried under the US policy of exercising and asserting its navigation and overflight rights and freedoms around the world”.
    • It says these “assertions communicate that the US does not acquiesce to the excessive maritime claims of other nations, and thus prevents those claims from becoming accepted in international law”.

    Significance of FONOPs

    • FONOPs are a method of enforcing UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) and avoiding these negative outcomes by reinforcing freedom of navigation through practice.
    • It is exercised by sailing through all areas of the sea permitted under UNCLOS, and particularly those areas that states have attempted to close off to free navigation as defined under UNCLOS.

    What about EEZs?

    • An exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is prescribed by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
    • It is an area of the sea in which a sovereign state has special rights regarding the exploration and use of marine resources, including energy production from water and wind.
    • It stretches from the baseline out to 200 nautical miles from the coast of the state in question.
    • It is also referred to as a maritime continental margin and, in colloquial usage, may include the continental shelf.
    • The term does not include either the territorial sea or the continental shelf beyond the 200 nautical mile limit.
    • The difference between the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone is that the first confers full sovereignty over the waters, whereas the second is merely a “sovereign right” which refers to the coastal state’s rights below the surface of the sea.
    • The surface waters, as can be seen on the map, are international waters.

    Is FONOP violative of India’s EEZ?

    • As per India’s Territorial Waters Act, 1976, the EEZ of India “is an area beyond and adjacent to the territorial waters, and the limit of such zone is two hundred nautical miles from the baseline”.
    • India’s “limit of the territorial waters is the line every point of which is at a distance of twelve nautical miles from the nearest point of the appropriate baseline”.
    • Under the 1976 law, “all foreign ships (other than warships including submarines and other underwater vehicles) shall enjoy the right of innocent passage through the territorial waters”.

    Back2Basics: UNCLOS

    • The Law of the Sea Treaty formally known as the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea was adopted in 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. It entered into force in 1994.
    • The convention establishes a comprehensive set of rules governing the oceans and replaces previous U.N. Conventions on the Law of the Sea
    • The convention defines the distance of 12 nautical miles from the baseline as Territorial Sea limit and a distance of 200 nautical miles distance as Exclusive Economic Zone limit.

  • Jordan Crisis and its significance for the Arab Region

    The royal household in Jordan has recently seen intense drama, with the King’s popular half-brother and former crown prince was placed under de facto house arrest.

    Study the map; especially, the Israel-Jordan border and Dead Sea.

    Signs of a Coup

    • Jordanian government statements have has stated that there had been an attempted coup to destabilize the country, mentioning unnamed “foreign entities” involved in the plot.
    • The events have thus put a spotlight on Jordan’s unique position as one of the most stable countries in the Arab world, and given rise to questions about who could stand to benefit from the alleged coup.

    Jordan’s stability matters

    • Jordan, which this year celebrates 100 years since its creation after World War I, has for decades remained stable in a part of the world that is prone to conflict and political uncertainty.
    • For its allies in the West and in the Gulf, Jordan is a strategic partner which can be relied upon for furthering political objectives in the region, which includes war-torn Syria and Iraq as well as conflict-prone Israel and Palestine.
    • The support of Jordanian intelligence has proven critically important in the fight against terrorism.
    • Though impoverished, the country of about a crore people has served as a haven for refugees in the conflict-ridden region.

    The asylum giver

    • After the Arab-Israeli wars of 1948 and 1967, Jordan received waves of refugees, to the point that about half of Jordan’s population today is made up of Palestinians.
    • It has also welcomed refugees after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, and currently hosts over 10 lakh from Syria, where a protracted civil war is going on.
    • Jordan is also considered important to any future peace deal between Israel and Palestine.

    How does Jordan get along with regional powers?

    (1) West

    • Traditionally, Jordan has maintained close relations with the US, and the fellow Sunni Muslim powers of Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which together stand against Shia Iran.
    • It also has diplomatic relations with Israel, and the two countries have been bound by a peace treaty since 1994.

    (2) Within Gulf

    • In recent years, however, Jordan’s relations with the Saudis and UAE have seen ups and downs.
    • It has been particularly since the rise of their respective crown prince’s Mohammed bin Salman (known by initials MBS) and Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ).
    • One of the points of friction was Saudi-UAE’s blockade of Qatar in 2017.
    • It caused further consternation in Saudi and Emirati circles by maintaining strong ties with Turkey.

    (3) Ties with Israel

    • Jordan’s role as the region’s interlocutor has also diminished since last year, after the UAE normalized relations with Israel.

    What have the powers said of the alleged coup?

    • Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have expressed full support for King Abdullah. The US has called the ruler a “key partner”.
    • To drive home the point, Saudi Arabia sent its foreign minister, Prince Faisal bin Farhan, to Jordan’s capital Amman to express complete solidarity with Jordan’s King and his government.
    • Saudi and the UAE have little to gain by destabilizing Jordan, a country that has long served as a dependable ally.

  • Ukraine urges NATO to speed up membership

    Ukrainian President has urged NATO to speed up his country’s membership in the alliance, saying it was the only way to end fighting with pro-Russia separatists.

    North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)

    • The NATO, also called the North Atlantic Alliance, is an intergovernmental military alliance between 30 European and North American countries.
    • The organization implements the North Atlantic Treaty that was signed on 4 April 1949.
    • NATO constitutes a system of collective defence whereby its independent member states agree to mutual defence in response to an attack by any external party.
    • NATO’s Headquarters are located in Haren, Brussels, Belgium, while the headquarters of Allied Command Operations is near Mons, Belgium.

    Its members

    • Since its founding, the admission of new member states has increased the alliance from the original 12 countries to 30.
    • The most recent member state to be added to NATO was North Macedonia on 27 March 2020.
    • NATO currently recognizes Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, and Ukraine as aspiring members.
    • An additional 20 countries participate in NATO’s Partnership for Peace program, with 15 other countries involved in institutionalized dialogue programs.

    Why NATO matters?

    • The combined military spending of all NATO members constitutes over 70% of the global nominal total.
    • Members agreed that their aim is to reach or maintain the target defence spending of at least 2% of their GDP by 2024.

    Also read:

    India & NATO

  • E9 Initiative for Digital Learning

    Nine countries including India, China and Brazil will explore the possibility of co-creating and scaling up digital learning to achieve the UN sustainable goal on quality education under the E9 initiative.

    The E9 is the first of its kind global collaboration for digital learning. Note the participating countries.

    E9 Initiative

    • It is the first of a three-phased process to co-create an initiative on digital learning and skills, targeting marginalised children and youth, especially girls.
    • The initiative aims to accelerate recovery and advance the Sustainable Development Goal 4 agenda by driving rapid change in education systems.
    • It is spearheaded by the UN, the E9 countries – Bangladesh, Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria and Pakistan.
    • It will have the opportunity to benefit from this global initiative and accelerate progress on digital learning, according to UNESCO.

    Various functions

    • The initiative will discuss the co-creation of the Digital Learning initiative by the nine countries.
    • This Consultation will highlight progress, share lessons and explore opportunities for collaboration and scale-up to expand digital learning and skills.
    • In addition, a Marketplace segment, for public-private partnership will focus on promising local and global solutions and opportunities for digital learning to strengthen local ecosystems.

  • India & NATO

    India has jettisoned many of its foreing policy shibboleths of late, however, avoiding NATO is not one of them. The article suggests engaging NATO to be in sync with the changing geopolitics.

    Why India avoided engagement with NATO in the past

    • India’s real problem is not with NATO, but with Delhi’s difficulty in thinking strategically about Europe.
    • Through the colonial era, Calcutta and Delhi viewed Europe through British eyes.
    • After Independence, Delhi tended to see Europe through the Russian lens.
    • The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union demanded a fresh approach to Europe.
    • But Delhi could not devote the kind of strategic attention that Europe demanded.
    • The bureaucratisation of the engagement between Delhi and Brussels and the lack of high-level political interest prevented India from taking full advantage of a re-emerging Europe.
    • In the last few years, Delhi has begun to develop an independent European framework, but has some distance to go in consolidating it.

    Ending political neglect of Europe

    • India has certainly sought to end prolonged political neglect of Europe.
    • The deepening maritime partnership with France since 2018 is an example.
    • Joining the Franco-German Alliance for Multilateralism in 2019 is another.
    • India’s first summit with Nordic nations in 2018 was a recognition that Europe is not a monolith but a continent of sub-regions.
    • India’s engagement with Central Europe’s Visegrad Four also highlighted the fact that Europe is not monolith.

    Why India should engage NATO

    • During the Cold War, India’s refusal was premised on its non-alignment.
    • That argument had little justification once the Cold War ended during 1989-91.
    • An India-NATO dialogue would simply mean having regular contact with a military alliance, most of whose members are well-established partners of India.
    • If Delhi is eager to draw a reluctant Russia into discussions on the Indo-Pacific, it makes little sense in avoiding engagement with NATO.
    • If Delhi does military exercises with China and Pakistan — under the rubric of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), why should talking to NATO be anathema?
    • To play any role in the Indo-Pacific, Europe and NATO need partners like India, Australia and Japan.
    • Delhi, in turn, knows that no single power can produce stability and security in the Indo-Pacific.
    • India’s enthusiasm for the Quad is a recognition of the need to build coalitions.
    • A sustained dialogue between India and NATO could facilitate productive exchanges in a range of areas, including terrorism, changing geopolitics; the evolving nature of military conflict, the role of emerging military technologies, and new military doctrines.
    • More broadly, an institutionalised engagement with NATO should make it easier for Delhi to deal with the military establishments of its 30 member states.
    • On a bilateral front, each of the members has much to offer in strengthening India’s national capabilities.

    What about Russia

    • Russia has not made a secret of its allergy to the Quad and Delhi’s growing closeness with Washington.
    • Putting NATO into that mix is unlikely to make much difference.
    • Delhi, in turn, can’t be happy with the deepening ties between Moscow and Beijing.
    • As mature states, India and Russia know they have to insulate their bilateral relationship from the larger structural trends buffeting the world today.
    • Meanwhile, both Russia and China have intensive bilateral engagement with Europe.

    Consider the question “India has to end its prolonged political neglect of Europe and engage a major European institution like NATO. In light of this, examine the factors restraining India’s engagement with the Europe.“

    Conclusion

    India’s continued reluctance to engage a major European institution like NATO will be a stunning case of strategic self-denial and we should avoid it.

  • US foreign policy has changed, India can’t bank on being its ‘ally’ anymore

    The article highlights the paradigm shift in the U.S. foreign policy in which the U.S. engages with a country on several parallel lines with little or no scope for a trade-off between them.

    Changes in the U.S. foreign policy

    •  US foreign policy is no longer based on old friend-or-foe classification under which transgressions by a “friend” or an “ally” were overlooked if the country was helpful to US self-interests.
    • Instead, the US foreign policy paradigm has shifted to one where a country’s position on an issue — trade, climate change, security, or human rights — is the categorising principle and not the country.
    • Put differently, engagement with countries will be done on issues with little or no trade-off among them.
    • Competition, cooperation, and confrontation can all characterise the US’s bilateral engagement depending on the specific issue.
    • For example, trade will involve competition while climate change and pandemics will necessitate cooperation.
    • Human rights and national security issues could be confrontational.

    Smart sanctions

    • A key instrument of foreign policy will be the now well-honed system of “smart” sanctions.
    • Sanctions in the past were directed at a country as a whole but such sanctions were counterproductive and created anti-US sentiment.
    • In its latest version, smart sanctions do not target countries, but specific individuals, firms, and institutions for a variety of alleged transgressions.
    • US businesses and individuals cannot transact with sanctioned entities.
    • The Magnitsky Accountability Act of 2012, for example, targeted those involved in the death of Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky and others responsible for human rights abuses in Russia.
    • When this was found to be successful, an executive order, passed in 2017, extended the provisions in the Magnitsky Act, to all who are corrupt or violate human rights in the world.

    What does this mean for India

    • Unlike in the antiquated rational-actor paradigm where there are imagined trade-offs across issues, in the new framework the US engages with countries on parallel lines.
    • The engagement is multifaceted across trade, intellectual property rights, climate change, security, terrorism, and, importantly, human rights, with limited trade-off across them.
    • Whether cooperation, competition, or confrontation dominate the nature of the engagement will depend on the specifics not whether India is a friend or a foe.

    Conclusion

    This marks the shift in the U.S. foreign policy, if others, including India, do not adapt to this paradigm shift, then they will find engagement with the US starkly different and surprisingly difficult.