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Subject: International Relations

  • Factors driving India’s growing security footprints in West Asia

    The article examines the factors that are leading to a growing footprint of Asian economies in West Asia.

    Growing interest of Asian Economies  in West Asia

    • This month, a contingent of the Indian Air Force participated in a multi-nation exercise hosted by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) named Desert Flag (March 3-27).
    • Other than India and the UAE, Bahrain, France, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and the United States are also participating.
    • While joint exercises in West Asia between Arab states and their western counterparts is common, the 2021 edition’s involvement of contingents from India and South Korea.
    • This showcases the growing interests of Asian economies.
    • As net importers of crude oil, these Asian economies rely heavily on the West Asian states for their supplies,
    • And, by association, Asian economies have increased stakes in the safety and security of the region from the perspective of political and economic stability.
    • And more importantly, in the protection of vital sea lanes in areas such as the Strait of Hormuz, the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea stretching out into the Arabian Sea and the wider Indian Ocean.

    Declining U.S. influence

    • In April 2020, Saudi Arabia was India’s top supplier of oil followed by Iraq.
    • For South Korea, in late 2019, it was also Saudi Arabia as the top supplier.
    • The participation of both India and South Korea in these exercises in the Persian Gulf is reflective of these trends and growing concerns in Asian capitals over an eroding U.S. security blanket in the region.

    Tension in Iran-U.S. relations

    • Both India and South Korea have found themselves caught in regional tensions as the pressure on Iran to restart the 2015 nuclear agreement (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, or JCPOA) increases.
    • Both India and South Korea have faced carbon-copy consequences over the past decade as the West first negotiated with Iran, and later tried to manage the fallout of the JCPOA collapse.

    India’s role in protecting it’s energy interests

    • The idea of Asian nations having to band together to protect their energy interests in West Asia is not new.
    • Former Indian diplomats have even suggested an idea equitable to an ‘importers OPEC’ led by Asian states which today have a much larger stake in West Asia’s oil than the West.
    • The Indian Navy has made multiple port calls from the UAE and Kuwait to Iran and Qatar in recent years.
    • In 2020, India had also planned its first bilateral naval exercise with Saudi Arabia.

    Consider the question “Examine the factors responsible for India’s growing security footprint in West Asia and how India is achieving its objectives?”

    Conclusion

    Regional states will become more responsible for their own security, and as Asian economies become stronger stakeholders, their geopolitics will become more visible across this geography.

  • Biden’s Afghanistan Peace Plan

    The Joe Biden administration has proposed a new peace plan to the Afghan government and the Taliban, seeking to bring violence to a halt and form an interim government.

    What is Biden’s proposal?

    • The US has asked the Afghan President to show “urgent leadership in the coming weeks”.

    The proposal included many elements.

    • It has proposed an UN-led conference of representatives of Russia, China, Pakistan, Iran, India and the US to discuss a unified approach to support peace in Afghanistan.
    • It urges both sides including the Taliban to reach a consensus on Afghanistan’s future constitutional and governing arrangements.
    • It asks to find a road map to a new “inclusive government”; and agree on the terms of a “permanent and comprehensive ceasefire”.

    Why the US is making this peace push?

    • The US has pointed out that accelerating the peace process is the best way to advance the shared interests of the US and the Afghan government.
    • According to the agreement the U.S. signed with the Taliban in February 2020, American troops – currently some 2,500 troops are in Afghanistan – are set to vacate by May 1.
    • The Taliban and the Afghan government started peace talks in Doha in September last year but reached no breakthrough.
    • The Biden administration is concerned about the slow pace of the talks.

    Why is the US delaying troops withdrawal?

    • The US assessment is that if American troops are pulled out of Afghanistan, the Taliban would make quick gains.
    • So, the Biden administration’s believes that the Taliban are on the ascent.
    • It hopes that the best way to prevent a complete Taliban takeover is a regional peace process and an interim unity government.
    • The Taliban are yet to respond to America’s proposal.

    What is the Afghan government’s stand?

    • The Ghani administration has consistently been critical of the US’s direct outreach to the Taliban.
    • The Trump administration held direct talks with the Taliban, excluding the government.
    • Later, Washington put pressure on Kabul to release Taliban prisoners as part of an agreement it reached with the insurgents.
    • Even when the Doha talks between the Taliban and the Afghan government were underway, Mr Ghani made it clear that he, as elected President, is the only legitimate representative of the Afghan people.
    • He resisted making concessions to the Taliban.

    India’s position in the process

    • Since the Afghan peace process began two years ago, India’s role in it has been peripheral at best.
    • Our EAM has iterated India’s long-held support for an “Afghan-led, Afghan-owned, and Afghan-controlled” peace process.

    What lies ahead

    • While the Afghan government’s opposition to sharing power with the Taliban is well known, it is not clear whether Mr Ghani could continue to resist American pressure.
    • And if the Biden administration decides to stick to the Taliban deal and withdraw troops by May, Mr Ghani would be in a tougher spot.
    • The people of Afghanistan do not have any good options. If Ghani rejects the American offer, the war will continue forever.
    • The Taliban have already taken over much of the country’s hinterlands and are breathing down the neck of its cities.
    • Either way, the Taliban are set to make gains.

  • Quad Summit

    As India deepens its engagement with the Quad, it must consider several aspects related to such engagement. The article deals with this issue.

    Background of India’s engagement with Quad

    • India’s engagement with the Quad goes back to China’s expanding footprint in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region over the last few years.
    • China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative rang alarm bells in India as the projects were viewed as encroachments into India’s strategic space.
    • The U.S.’s focus on the west Pacific due to aggressive Chinese maritime activity gradually pulled India into the ambit of the Indo-Pacific that views the western Pacific and the Indian Ocean as an integrated geopolitical space.
    • Besides the U.S. navy, India expanded its maritime ties with other regional states, the most high-profile of the interactions being the Quad.

    Core structural problems with Quad

    • The Quad has a core structural problem as well in that it pivots around the U.S.
    • The Quad riles China as a hostile grouping, but hardly serves the security interests of its members.
    • The U.S. views China’s rise as a threat to the world order it has led since the Second World War.
    • Despite rhetoric relating to the promotion of a ‘rules-based’ world order, the Quad neither shares a strategic vision nor is it animated by a shared agenda.
    • This is obvious not only from its inability to deter China in the west Pacific, but also by its members’ anxiety to maintain close ties with China.

    Implications for India

    • By affiliating with the U.S.-led maritime coalition, India ignored the principal areas of its security concerns which is an undemarcated 3,500-km land border with China.
    • From April 2020, Indian and Chinese forces had their latest border face-off in Ladakh, abruptly ending a long period of productive relations.
    • In retrospect, this confrontation appears to be China’s sharp response to the steady shift in India’s regional posture in favour of an alignment with the U.S. and its allies against China.
    • The stand-off at Ladakh has been a bitter experience for India: it has affirmed the limits of India-U.S. security ties, the folly of Indian involvement in the Quad.
    • The stand-off has also underscored need to focus national attention and resources in areas of abiding interest for India — the border, the neighbours and the Indian Ocean.

    Lessons for India

    • Ladakh also offers some valuable lessons for India.
    • One, the rebuilding of ties with China will have to be a priority concern.
    • India need to dilute its focus on the Indo-Pacific and the Quad and accept that the borders and the Indian Ocean are where its crucial interests lie.
    • Two, the Ladakh experience has highlighted certain deficiencies at home:
    • It hardly needs reiteration that India’s capacities can only be built by a united people committed to the national cause.
    • Finally, foreign policy cannot be a part-time concern of the national leadership; in terms of priority and attention, it should be on a par with domestic affairs.

    Consider the question “Examine the factors that India should consider as it seeks to deepen its engagement in the Quad.”

    Conclusion

    As the global scenario gets more complex and India’s ambitions increase, a cohesive strategic vision would give substance and drive to India’s pursuit of its interests over the long term.

  • Why does the deepening Indo-US friendship puzzle so many?

    The India-US ties have advanced by leaps and bounds. Yet, there is a persistent underestimation of India’s capacity to rework its great power relations. The article deals with this issue.

    Expanding partnership

    • India-US relations have been on a steady upward trajectory over the last three decades.
    • This partnership withstood significant political transitions in both countries and managed to overcome many difficult barriers.
    • The US is now India’s most comprehensive partner.
    • The Russia relationship is long on defence but short on commerce.
    • India’s commercial ties with China are large, but tilted heavily in Beijing’s favour.
    • Collective Europe is big on commerce but small on security cooperation.
    • The US has a sizeable presence in both economic and security dimensions and the political common ground with India has steadily expanded.

    So, why persistent doubt in India about the US partnership

    • One part of it is the ingrained ideological bias in the dominant foreign policy elite.
    • Delhi’s stilted debate on the US is, unfortunately, reinforced by the sad absence of investment in institutional capabilities to study American politics, economics and international relations.

    Issues with our assessment of relations with India

    • There is an enduring reluctance of India’s foreign policy community to either acknowledge or accept the unfolding transformation of India’s ties with the US.
    • There is also continuing underestimation of India’s capacity to rework its great power relations to meet India’s changing interests and circumstances.
    • It was widely held that the Indo-Pacific and the Quad will become footnotes in Biden’s foreign policy.
    • This in turn was based on the bet that Biden is likely to embrace China rather than confront it in the manner that Trump did.
    • All these assumptions turned out to be inaccurate.
    • Concern for democracy and human rights has always been part of US foreign policy ideology.
    • But no state, not even a revolutionary one, can run its foreign policy on a single-point agenda. 

    Underestimating India’s agency to shape the partnership

    • Even as it continuously misjudged the US, the Indian foreign policy elite has not appreciated India’s agency to shape the relationship with America.
    • The conviction that Delhi is perennially under US pressure to accept policies harmful for itself further distorts the discourse in the media and among the chattering classes.
    • The evidence from the 1990s — one of India’s most vulnerable moments after Independence — should have corrected this misperception.
    • The traditional discourse finds it hard to come to terms with the twin factors shaping India’s new approach.
    • One is the significant increase in India’s material capabilities.
    • India’s aggregate GDP increased ten-fold between 1990 ($270 billion) and 2020 (about $2,700 billion).
    • Equally important is the new political will in Delhi.

    Consider the question “There is a continuing underestimation of Delhi’s capacity to rework its great power relations with the US to meet India’s changing interests and circumstances. Critically examine.” 

    Conclusion

    The new India no longer wrings its hands in dealing with the US; it relishes the large room for strategic bargaining with America. Even more important, Delhi is no longer a reluctant partner to Washington.

  • [pib] Maitri Setu between India and Bangladesh

    PM will inaugurate ‘Maitri Setu’ between India and Bangladesh tomorrow.

    Maitri Setu

    • The bridge ‘Maitri Setu’ has been built over the Feni River which flows between the Indian boundary in Tripura State and Bangladesh.
    • The 1.9 Km long bridge joins Sabroom in India with Ramgarh in Bangladesh.
    • The construction was taken up by the National Highways and Infrastructure Development Corporation Ltd.

    Try this PYQ:

    Q. Recently, which of the following States has explored the possibility of constructing an artificial inland port to be connected to the sea by a long navigational channel?

    (a) Andhra Pradesh

    (b) Chhattisgarh

    (c) Karnataka

    (d) Rajasthan

    Significance of the bridge

    • With this inauguration, Tripura is set to become the ‘Gateway of North East’ with access to Chittagong Port of Bangladesh, which is just 80 kms from Sabroom.
    • The name ‘Maitri Setu’ symbolizes growing bilateral relations and friendly ties between India and Bangladesh.

    About Feni River

    • Feni is a river in southeastern Bangladesh and Tripura.
    • It is a trans-boundary river with an ongoing dispute about water rights.
    • It originates in the South Tripura district and flows through Sabroom town and then enters Bangladesh.
    • The question of sharing the waters of the river between India and Pakistan was first discussed in 1958.

    Other associated projects

    Sabroom Check Post

    • PM will lay the foundation stone for setting up an Integrated Check Post at Sabroom.
    • It will help ease the movement of goods and passengers between the two countries provide new market opportunities for products of North-East states and assist the seamless movement of passengers to and from India and Bangladesh.
    • The project is being taken up by the Land Ports Authority of India.

  • Food Waste Index Report 2021

    The Food Waste Index Report 2021 was recently released by the UNEP.
    Even though the world produces enough food to feed twice the world’s present population, food wastage is ironically behind the billions of people who are starving.

    Food Waste Index

    • The Food Waste Index is released by the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and partner organisation WRAP.
    • It measures tons of wasted food per capita, considering a mixed stream of products from processing through to consumption.
    • It was prepared by using data from 54 countries and then extrapolated to the remaining countries.
    • Contrary to belief, the study by the UNEP revealed that food waste was a global problem and not that of just the developed world.

    Highlights of the 2021 report

    • The report has revealed that 17 per cent of all food available at consumer levels was wasted in 2019.
    • That year, some 690 million people had to go hungry.
    • The food waste amounted to a whopping 931 million tonnes of food sold to households, retailers and restaurants.
    • Waste at household, foodservice and retail amounted to 79, 26 and 13 kilogram /capita / year respectively.
    • The data, though scarce, revealed that food waste was substantial, regardless of income level.

    Data on India

    • The report notes that food waste at the consumer level happens in almost every country, regardless of income level.
    • In South Asia, while 50 kilograms of food is wasted per person each year at the household level in India.
    • Others include- 65 kilograms of this happening in Bangladesh, 74 kilograms in Pakistan, 76 kilograms in Sri Lanka, 79 kilograms in Nepal and 82 kilograms in Afghanistan.

    Why it is important to prevent food wastage?

    • Food waste also has a substantial environmental, social and economic impact.
    • Food loss and waste cause about $940 billion per year in economic losses. Reductions can save money for farmers, companies, and households.
    • For example, 8-10 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions are associated with food that is not consumed.
    • Reducing food waste would cut greenhouse gas emissions, slow the destruction of nature through land conversion and pollution, enhance the availability of food and thus reduce hunger and save money.

  • Ceasefire between India and Pakistan.

     

    Why it is different from the past

    • The February ceasefire has triggered widespread speculation about its durability, significance and implication for bilateral relations in general.
    • This agreement is different from the routine ceasefire assurances that the two sides made till January 2021.
    • What makes the February 2021 ceasefire different is its two distinct features:
    • First, this was a joint statement by the two DGsMO.
    • Second, unlike the previous declarations, the recent agreement mentions a specific date, i.e., the night of February 24-25, to begin the ceasefire.
    • The agreement is also path-breaking from a conflict management point of view.
    • The ceasefire is also significant because this helps India to defuse an ugly two-front situation and a feeling of being boxed in by an inimical Pakistan and an aggressive China.

    Historical background of ceasefires with Pakistan

    • The Karachi agreement of 1949, which ended the first war between newly formed India and Pakistan, was the first ceasefire agreement between the two countries that created the India Pakistan boundary in Kashmir called the Ceasefire Line or CFL.
    • The United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was mandated to monitor the ceasefire along the CFL.
    • Following the India-Pakistan war of 1971, the Suchetgarh Agreement of 1972 delineated the ‘line of control’ in Jammu and Kashmir thereby renaming the CFL as the LoC.
    • The 2003 agreement between the DGsMO, communicated through a telephone call between them, was a reiteration of the December 1971 war termination ceasefire.

    Rules and norms required

    • A ceasefire requires a clearly articulated and mutually-agreed-upon set of rules and norms for effective observance along with an intent to observe them. 
    • The February ceasefire is an expression of such an intent, but without the rules and norms to enforce it.
    • The Simla Agreement or the Suchetgarh Agreement do not have those rules either.
    • The Karachi Agreement, on the other hand, has clearly laid down provisions on how to manage the CFL which, of course, was overtaken by the LoC.
    • Therefore, armed forces deployed on either side of the LoC in Kashmir often have to resort to Karachi Agreement to observe the ceasefire.
    • Now that the two DGsMO have declared a joint ceasefire, the next logical step is to arrive at a set of rules to govern that ceasefire.
    • An unwritten ceasefire, experiences from conflict zones around the world show, tend to break down easily and trigger tensions in other domains.

    Role of back channels

    • What is also significant to note about the ceasefire agreement between the two DGsMO is that this was preceded by weeks.
    • Interestingly, the 2003 ceasefire was also preceded by discreet parleys between the heads of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan and the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) of India.
    • The 2003 CFA led to a sustained period of back channel talks on Kashmir which, by mid 2007, had almost finalised a deal to resolve the Kashmir conflict.
    • Ane key reason why the CFA held at least till 2008 was because there were parallel talks, along with holding fire on the LoC, on other outstanding bilateral issues, principally Kashmir.

    Conclusion

    While whether the 2021 CFA would prompt talks in other areas is unclear as of now, the possibility of piecemeal agreements to create durable stability bilaterally unless followed by progress in other domains remains to be seen.

  • Recalibrating relations with EU

    With India about to lose preferential access to the EU, there is a need to deepen the trade and investment ties with the region. The article deals with this issue.

    Export potential to the EU

    • India has an untapped export potential of $39.9 billion in the EU and Western Europe.
    • India benefits from tariff preferences under the EU’s Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) for several of these products.
    • In fact, India is among the major beneficiaries of the EU’s GSP, accounting for nearly 37% of India’s merchandise exports.

    India losing EU-GSP benefits: Product graduadion

    • Product graduation applies when average imports of a product from a beneficiary country exceed 17.5% of EU-GSP imports of the same product from all beneficiary countries over three years.
    • There are several products where India has export potential in the EU, but these have “graduated” or are at the brink of “graduation” under EU GSP.
    • India’s exports of products such as textiles, inorganic and organic chemicals, gems and jewellery, iron, steel and their articles, base metals and automotives are already out of the ambit of EU-GSP benefits.
    •  In apparel, India’s exports to the EU were valued at $7 billion in 2019, of which nearly 94% was under EU-GSP, indicative of the impact that the graduation may have on apparel exports.
    • Bangladesh’s apparel exports would continue to receive tariff benefits in the EU under Everything but Arms Initiative.
    • Another competitor, Vietnam, concluded a free trade agreement (FTA) with the EU in 2019.

    Need to deepen trade and investment ties

    • In light of the declining preferential access and the plausible erosion of competitiveness in the EU market, there is clearly a need to deepen trade and investment ties with the region.
    • Broad-based Trade and Investment Agreement, which commenced in 2007, is yet to materialise due to lack of concurrence in areas like automotives and dairy and marine products.
    • Therefore, a thorough assessment of the benefits from FTA for domestic producers is warranted, with due consideration to the impact on sensitive sectors, and possibility of inclusion of safeguards such as sunset clause on concessions for some items.
    • Further, there should also be provisions for aspects such as investment and non-tariff measures (NTMs).
    • India also needs to negotiate on investment-related aspects with the EU to foster stronger value chains, especially in technology-intensive sectors in which the EU has a comparative advantage.
    • As far as NTMs are concerned, India faces as many as 414 NTMs in the EU, in a wide array of sectors. FTAs have some institutional arrangements for NTMs.

    Consider the question “Forging stronger ties with the EU could pave way for the greater cooperation and stronger trade ties. Elucidate.” 

    Conclusion

    Post-Brexit EU finds itself in the midst of a growing need for recalibrating ties with its partner countries. Forging stronger ties with the region through a mutually beneficial agreement could help strengthen Indian manufacturing and revitalise the flailing exports.

  • India, Japan back in another Sri Lanka port project

    Sri Lanka has confirmed that it will develop the West Container Terminal (WCT) at the Colombo Port along with India and Japan.

    Q.The threat of Chinese presence in South Asia can be tackled more effectively if India changes course in its dealings with its neighbours and becomes more sensitive to their concerns. Critically analyse.

     Why in news?

    • The decision comes a month after the Rajapaksa government ejected the two partners from a 2019 tripartite agreement to jointly develop the East Container Terminal (ECT), citing resistance to “foreign involvement”.
    • Neither India nor Japan has officially commented on the offer, or on the said private investment from the countries.

    An alternative to ECT

    • SL has offered India and Japan the WCT as an alternative, allowing higher stakes.
    • In the ECT project agreed upon earlier, the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA) was to hold a majority 51%, but in the WCT proposal, India and Japan will be accorded an 85% stake.
    • The nearby Colombo International Container Terminal (CICT), where China Merchants Port Holdings Company Limited holds 85%.
    • This makes it a strategically desirable spot for India, whose concerns over China’s presence in Sri Lanka are well known.

    Issues with a new project

    • The WCT is adjacent to the China-run CICT and just a couple of kilometres away from the China-backed Port City being built on reclaimed land.
    • The West Container Terminal, however, has to be built from scratch, requiring a much higher investment.
    • The return on investment has not been envisaged yet.

    Why is Colombo so generous this time?

    • Colombo’s alternative offer also comes at a time when Sri Lanka is seeking support at the ongoing UN Human Right Council session, where a resolution on the country’s rights record will soon be put to vote.

  • India, Pak, China must build on de-escalation

    Three power, India, Pakistan and China need to take a new look at the factors underlying their relationship with each other. The article deals with this issue.

    Hope for regional politics to turn a new leaf

    • The announcement by India and Pakistan of strict observance of all agreements, understandings and cease firing along the Line of Control is a welcome step.
    • It is premature to conclude what all this will amount to in the long term.
    • But if all three powers, China, Pakistan and India, can draw the appropriate lessons in humility, there is hope for regional politics to turn over a new leaf.

    Lessons for India

    • First, the belligerent use of foreign policy in domestic politics has unintended effects on your international standing.
    • In 2019, the official rhetoric was promising India retaking PoK and putting more military pressure on Pakistan.
    • In contrast, the discourse on foreign policy since the Chinese pressure on the LAC has been one of marked sobriety scaling back all expectations of a flippant militarism.
    • Second, the standoff with China has brought home some stark realities. We can speculate on Chinese motives.
    •  The LAC standoff considerably released the pressure on Pakistan.
    • We were reminded that the LAC and LoC can be linked; that the zone around Kashmir was a trilateral and not a bilateral contest, and that India will need significant resources to deal with China.
    • In the matter of the CAA the talk of evicting Bangladeshis has been starkly checkmated by the need to placate Bangladesh, which is vital to our strategic interests.

    Lessons for Pakistan

    • First, India now has enough weight in the international system that any attempts to internationalise Kashmir are a non-starter.
    • Second, the revocation of Article 370 did not unleash the kinds of fissures and cycle of violence within the Valley that Pakistan might have been hoping to exploit.
    • Third, the pandemic is a great opportunity for Pakistan to recognise that opening up to the South Asian region is in its interest in the long term than acting on the coattails of China.

    Lessons for China

    • India may not have, in a literal sense, restored the status quo ante on the LAC, the fact of the matter is that it has stood up with enough firmness to send the signal that it will not be a pushover.
    • India signalled a resolve that Chinese military and economic hegemony can be resisted.
    • China cannot wish away considerable Indian power.
    • In fact, by concentrating India’s mind on the China challenge, it may have unwittingly done India a favour.

    Way forward

    • So this moment can be a constructive one if everyone understands the one lesson in world politics: There are diminishing returns to belligerence.
    • With Pakistan, India should seize the moment and build on the de-escalation.
    • The pandemic offers an opportunity for greater economic cooperation.
    • Political establishments of both countries will have to think of what is a win-win political narrative they can legitimately offer their citizens.

    Consider the question “If all three powers, China, Pakistan and India, can draw the appropriate lessons in humility, there is hope for regional politics to turn over a new leaf. Comment.“

    Conclusion

    The region will be better off with a humility that tries to align them, rather than a hubris that exults in unilateral triumphalism.