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Subject: International Relations

  • Pakistan- Sri Lanka Relations

    Pakistani PM is in Colombo on a two-day visit for ways and means to enhance trade and connectivity with Sri Lanka.

    What is the news?

    • Pakistan PM’s visit has attracted a fair amount of controversy because of a cancelled invitation to address the Sri Lankan parliament.
    • India too granted permission for using its airspace for the Pakistani PM’s aircraft.

    Try this question:

    Q.The triangulation in the ties between Sri Lanka, China and Pakistan is an emerging threat in the Indian Ocean Region. Discuss.

    Sri Lanka- Pakistan Relations

    • For Colombo, the visit holds much value. It comes at a fraught time for the government on the international stage.
    • Imminently, it is bracing to be hauled over the coals at the UN Human Rights Commission for withdrawing from resolution 30/1 of September 2015, under which it committed to carrying out war crime investigations.
    • To make matters worse, the Islamic world is appalled by Sri Lanka’s tight rules for the cremation and not burials of Muslims who have died of COVID-19.
    • The rule created a storm in Sri Lanka, with community leaders convinced that this is nothing but an extension of the state’s persecution of Muslims.

    Why Pakistan?

    (1) Trade ties

    • Pakistan is Sri Lanka’s second-largest trading partner in South Asia after India.
    • Sri Lanka and Pakistan have a free trade agreement dating back to 2005.
    • Pakistan’s top exports to Sri Lanka are textiles and cement.
    • Sri Lanka’s top exports to Pakistan are tea, rubber and readymade garments.

    (2) Cultural ties

    • In addition to trade cooperation, Pakistan invokes cricket and Buddhism, topics that most Sri Lankans share a deep connection with.
    • Over the last decade, Pakistan has also been projecting its ancient Buddhist sites to promote cultural ties with Sri Lanka.

    (3) Defence ties

    Defence ties are a strong pillar of Sri Lanka- Pakistan bilateral relationship.

    • During the 1971 war, Pakistan Air Force jets refuelled in Sri Lanka.
    • India pulled back the peacekeeping forces in 1990, it provided no active defence support to the Sri Lankan military.
    • Sri Lanka turned to Pakistan for arms, ammunition as well as training for its fighter pilots.
    • Gotabaya, who was defence secretary at the time, visited Pakistan in 2008 to make a request for emergency assistance with military supplies.
    • Earlier this month, Sri Lanka participated in Pakistan’s multi-nation naval exercise Aman.

    India’s observations and concerns

    • As Sri Lanka’s closest neighbour with strong, all-encompassing ties, even if these are sometimes problematic, India has not perceived Pakistan as a serious rival in Sri Lanka so far.
    • Sporadically, the Indian security establishment has voiced concerns about Pakistan’s role in the radicalization of people, especially in Eastern Sri Lanka.
    • Funds have poured in for new mosques from some West Asian countries, and the effect that this could have in India.

    Emerging threats from the ‘Triad’

    • There is now a new wariness about triangulation in the ties between Sri Lanka, China and Pakistan in defence co-operation, though it has not been publicly expressed.
    • In 2016, India put pressure on Sri Lanka to drop a plan to buy the Chinese JF-17 Thunder aircraft made in Pakistan and co-produced by the Chinese Chengdu Aircraft Corporation.
    • The most recent threat was from excluding India from the Colombo Terminal Project.

  • China-Taiwan conflict

    The article underscores the centrality of Taiwan in the realms of semiconductor production and how that dominant spills over in geopolitics.

    Silicon shield of Taiwan

    • Taiwan’s security situation has been worsening amidst mounting economic, political and military pressure from China.
    • Any Chinese attack on Taiwan that disrupts the flow of semiconductors would produce significant challenges not only for the US but also China that relies on semiconductor supplies from Taiwan.
    • That factor appears to be preventing the crisis from boiling over into a full-scale war that could draw the US and Japan into it.
    •  It is Taiwan’s so-called “silicon shield”.

    Taiwan’s dominance in semiconductor industry

    • Taiwan is the world’s leading producer of semiconductors and other electronic components.
    • The Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) has more than 55 per cent of the global market share in the production of high-end custom-made chips.
    • Of the two rival companies that have survived, US-based Intel is in trouble and Korea’s Samsung has challenges of its own.
    •  There will be no generation of data without the semiconductors.
    • It might be more accurate to say that “semiconductors are the new oil” and their production is increasingly dominated by Taiwan and the TMSC.

    Geopolitics over Taiwan

    • As its economic heft and political salience rose in the 21st century, China has ratcheted up pressure on countries that have diplomatic relations with Taiwan.
    • China has also compelled international organisations to push Taiwan out of their activities, even when Taiwan had much to contribute.
    • Amidst the deterioration of US-China relations in recent years, President Donald Trump was far more supportive of Taiwan than his recent predecessors.
    • The Biden team has also signalled continuity with Trump’s Taiwan policies.
    • All indications are that Washington will continue to seek some technological decoupling and diversification of sensitive supplies away from China.
    • Taiwan will inevitably be the key element in the American quest for resilient supply chains in the digital domain.

    Opportunity for India

    • Taiwan’s position as a semiconductor superpower opens the door for more intensive strategic-economic cooperation between Delhi and Taipei.
    • Part of the problem is that India’s strategic community continues to view Taiwan as an adjunct to India’s “One-China policy”.
    • India’s policy oscillates between keeping needless distance with Taipei when ties with Beijing are warm and remembering it when Sino-Indian ties enter a freeze.
    • This changed in the early 1990s, when it began to engage with Taiwan, but the policy remained a restricted one.
    • In the last few years, though, there has been a steady expansion of bilateral engagement.
    • Trade has increased from about $1 billion in 2001 to about $7 billion in 2018.
    • India has made a special effort to woo Taiwanese companies that are moving some of their production away from China.
    • India is yet to tap into the full range of commercial and technological opportunities possibilities with Taiwan.
    • This is particularly true of semiconductor production.

    Way forward

    • Delhi must begin to deal with Taiwan as a weighty entity in its own right that offers so much to advance India’s prosperity.
    • Delhi does not have to discard its “One-China policy” to recognise that Taiwan is once again becoming the lightning rod in US-China tensions.

    Consider the question “India needs to explore the opportunities in relationship with Taiwan even as it pursues and sticks to its One China policy. Comment.

    Conclusion

    As Taiwan becomes the world’s most dangerous flashpoint, the geopolitical consequences for Asia are real. Although Delhi has embraced the Indo-Pacific maritime construct, it is yet to come to terms with Taiwan’s critical role in shaping the strategic future of Asia’s waters.

  • New York Convention

    Cairn Energy has filed a case in a U.S. district court to enforce a $1.2 billion arbitration award it won in a tax dispute against India. Cairn aims to enforce the award under international arbitration rules, commonly called the New York Convention.

    New York Convention

    • The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards is commonly known as the New York Convention.
    • It was adopted by a UN diplomatic conference on 10 June 1958 and entered into force on 7 June 1959.
    • It requires courts of contracting states to give effect to private agreements to arbitrate and to recognize and enforce arbitration awards made in other contracting states.
    • Widely considered the foundational instrument for international arbitration, it applies to arbitrations that are not considered domestic awards in the state where recognition and enforcement are sought.

    What was the case?

    • The Indian government has lost an international arbitration case to energy giant Cairn Plc over the retrospective levy of taxes and has been asked to pay damages worth $1.2 billion to the UK firm.
    • The Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague has maintained that the Cairn tax issue is not a tax dispute but a tax-related investment dispute and, hence, it falls under its jurisdiction.
    • India’s demand in past taxes, it said, was in breach of fair treatment under the UK-India Bilateral Investment Treaty.

  • The U.S. policy options and its implications for the world order

    The article spells out the U.S.’s foreign policy approach in the changing global order. Though the article doesn’t mention India, the U.S.’s policies and it’s bearing on India need no mention. From that perspective, we should follow their approach.

    Decision on the JCPOA

    • During the U.S. presidential election campaign, Joe Biden had criticised the U.S. withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
    • He had then promised that subject to Iran’s compliance with its obligations, the U.S. would re-enter the agreement.
    • In office, Mr. Biden has shown little urgency on the JCPOA matter.
    • Israel has given the opposite message and said that the nuclear agreement was “bad and must not be allowed”.
    • Israel and the U.S.’s Gulf allies, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have also insisted that they be involved with the discussions with Iran on the revival of the agreement.

    U.S.’s Policy approach

    •  The U.S. policy is likely to show more continuity than change where the U.S.’s core interests are concerned, specifically in its ties with Russia, China and Iran.
    •  Mr. Biden is likely to reverse his predecessor Donald Trump’s personal accommodative approach towards Russia and adopt the U.S.’s traditional confrontational posture.
    • Mr. Biden’s Iran policy is likely to match Mr. Trump’s hardline approach on substantive matters.
    • This approach also panders to Iran’s regional rivals who wish to see the Islamic republic weakened and isolated.
    • There will thus be no dramatic change in the U.S.’s approach to Iran on the nuclear question.

    Regional concerns and role of global powers

    • Despite the sanctions, Iran’s regional influence remains significant.
    • The Iranian ability to mobilise militants across the region is viewed by Israel and some the Gulf Arab states as threatening their security.
    • Gulf states are also concerned about Iran’s influence with their Shia populations.
    • The capabilities of Iran’s precision missiles and drones are also a matter of regional anxiety.
    •  Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates will be in a face-off with Iran and its allies, Iraq, Syria and its Shia militia.
    • Alternatively, we could see a genuine regional effort to ease tensions and promote regional confidence, spearheaded by Qatar, working with Russia and, possibly, China.
    • Perhaps, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, already facing heat from the Biden administration, will see the value of this approach.
    • Russia now an influential player in the region, China, too, with its Belt and Road Initiative, has high stakes in regional stability.
    • The Sino-Iran 25 years agreement, envisages their substantial and long-term cooperation in political, security, military, economic, energy and logistical connectivity areas.

    Consider the question “How far Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) has been successful in achieving its goals? How peace in the Middle East influence India’s interests?” 

    Conclusion

    The new U.S. administration will thus witness a new world order, shaped by a coalition of Russia, China and Iran, in which the U.S. is no longer the most significant role-player.

  • New disengagement agreement in eastern Ladakh

    In the first major breakthrough in talks China’s Defence Ministry that PLA and Indian troops on the southern and northern shores of Pangong Tso began synchronized and organized disengagement.

    This newscard presents a holistic report on the ground situation of Sino-India border disputes in Ladakh.

    Also, try this PYQ from CSP 2020:

    Q.Siachen Glacier is situated to the

    (a) East of Aksai Chin

    (b) East of Leh

    (c)North of Gilgit

    (d) North of Nubra Valley

    New plan in eastern Ladakh

    • As of now, the disengagement process seems restricted to the north and south banks of Pangong Tso.
    • The process has started with the pulling back of certain columns of tanks from the south bank region by both sides.
    • At the moment, there is no pullback of troops from the friction points and the heights they are positioned on.
    • That will happen in a phased and verified manner.

    Disengagement from Pangong Tso

    • China will pull its troops on the north bank towards the east of Finger 8.
    • Similarly, India will also position its forces at its permanent base near Finger 3.
    • Similar action will be taken by both the parties in the south bank area as well.
    • Both sides have also agreed that the area between Finger 3 and Finger 8 will become a no-patrolling zone temporarily, till both sides reach an agreement through military and diplomatic discussions to restore patrolling.
    • Further, all the construction done by both sides on the north and south banks of the lake since April 2020 will be removed.

    Why is this area important?

    • The north and south banks of Pangong Tso are two of the most significant and sensitive regions when it comes to the current standoff that began in May 2020.
    • What makes the areas around the shores of the lake so sensitive and important is that clashes here marked the beginning of the standoff.
    • It is one of the areas where the Chinese troops had come around 8 km deep west of India’s perception of the Line of Actual Control.
    • China had positioned its troops on the ridgeline connecting Fingers 3 and 4, while according to India the LAC passes through Finger 8.

    Take a glimpse of all friction points along Indian borders:

    India is at an advantage

    • Further, it is in the south bank of the lake that Indian forces in an action in late August had gained a strategic advantage by occupying certain peaks, outwitting the Chinese.
    • Indian troops had positioned themselves on heights of Magar Hill, Mukhpari, Gurung Hill, Rezang La and Rechin La, which were unoccupied by either side earlier.
    • Since then, the Chinese side had been particularly sensitive as these positions allowed India to not only dominate Spanggur Gap.
    • It is a two-km wide valley that can be used to launch an offensive, as China had done in 1962, they also allow India a direct view of China’s Moldo Garrison.

    Why has this taken so long?

    • Since September, China has insisted that India first pull its troops back from the south bank of Pangong Tso, and the Chushul sub-sector.
    • However, India has been demanding that any disengagement process should include the entire region, and troops should go back to their April 2020 positions.
    • However, it seems that for now, both sides have agreed to first disengage from the Pangong Tso area only.

    Principles of disengagement

    In military and diplomatic discussions with China India expects a solution to the issue on the basis of three principles:

    1. LAC should be accepted and respected by both parties.
    2. Neither party should attempt to change the status quo unilaterally.
    3. All agreements should be fully adhered to by both parties.

    Does this mean that the standoff is resolved?

    • There are still some outstanding issues that remain regarding deployment and patrolling on LAC.
    • The Pangong Tso region is just one of the friction areas. There are other friction points, all north of the Pangong Tso, where the troops have been face-to-face since last year.
    • The situation in Depsang Plains continues to be a concern.
    • Both sides agree that complete disengagement under bilateral agreements and protocols should be done as soon as possible.
    • After the talks so far, China is also aware of our resolve to protect the sovereignty of the country.

    Need for confidence building

    • Two of the main stumbling blocks in finding a permanent resolution are lack of trust and no clarity on intent.
    • Any permanent resolution will include first, disengagement of troops from the frontlines from all friction points.
    • Then de-escalation will entail sending the troops from the depth areas to their original bases.
    • Both sides have around 50,000 troops in the region, along with additional tanks, artillery and air defence assets.

    Conclusion

    • A resolution has to include sending these troops and military equipment where they came from on both sides.
    • But neither side had been willing to take the first step to reduce their troop or military strength, as it does not trust the other side.

  • Taking the long view with China

    The article explains the various choices India faces in the geopolitical landscape shaped by emergence of two Asian giants.

    New challenges and hard choices on geopolitical front

    • As it moves to becoming the third largest economy in the world, India needs to have a clear-eyed world view and strategy as it makes hard choices.
    • It needs to reject the developing country regional mindset that has shaped India’s  national aims and foreign policy.
    • We have a “special and privileged strategic partnership” with Russia which provides more than three-quarter of India’s military equipment and a “comprehensive global strategic partnership” with the U.S.
    • India’s relationship with the U.S.-led Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), where the others are military allies, has rightly been cautious, as U.S. President Joe Biden sees China as a ‘strategic competitor’ rather than a ‘strategic rival’.
    • Realism dictates that India does not need to compromise on its strategic autonomy.
    • India faces two sides of the China conundrum: Defining engagement with its neighbour which is consolidating an expanding BRI while remaining involved with the strategic, security and technological concerns of the U.S.

    China’s dominance in financial sphere

    • In the financial sphere, there is the real possibility of the Chinese renminbi becoming a global reserve currency or e-yuan becoming the digital payments currency.
    • China is the world’s largest trading economy.
    • It could soon become the world’s largest economy.
    • China has stitched together an investment agreement with the EU and with most of Asia.
    • Relative attractiveness will determine when the dollar goes the way of the sterling and the guilder.
    • China, facing technological sanctions from the U.S., may well put in the hard work to make this happen soon.

    China: Partner, competitor, and economic rival

    • Some form of the EU’s China policy of seeing the emerging superpower as a partner, competitor, and economic rival depending on the policy area in question is going to be the global norm. 
    • This broad perspective is also reflected in India’s participation in both the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, designed to resist the spread of Western interests, and in the U.S.-led Quad, with its anti-China stance.
    • Within the United Nations, India’s interests have greater congruence with China’s interests rather than the U.S.’s and the EU’s.
    • Sharing the COVID-19 vaccine with other countries distinguishes India, and China, from the rest.

    India’s engagement with the U.S.

    • The congruence between India and the U.S. lies in the U.S.’s declared strategic objective of promoting an integrated economic development model in the Indo-Pacific as a credible alternative to the BRI, but with a caveat.
    • Instead of an alternate development model, India should move the Quad towards supplementing the infrastructure push of the BRI in line with other strategic concerns in the region.
    • For example, developing their scientific, technological capacity and digital economy, based on India’s digital stack and financial resources of other Quad members, will resonate with Asia and Africa.

    India’s role in global governance

    • Another area where India can play a ‘bridging role’ is global governance.
    • President Xi Jinping’s “community with shared future for mankind”, and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s “climate justice” and asking how long India will be excluded from the UN Security Council, challenge the frame of the liberal order without providing specific alternatives.
    • With respect to digital data, India has recently expressed that there must be reciprocity in data sharing, and this is the kind of ‘big idea’ for sharing prosperity that will gain traction with other countries.

    India’s growing influence

    • India’s recent policies are gaining influence at the expense of China and the West, and both know this trend will accelerate.
    • The steps to a $5 trillion economy, shift to indigenous capital military equipment, and a new Science, Technology and Innovation Policy underline impact, capacity and interests.
    • ASEAN remains keen India re-join its trade pact to balance China.
    • It is being recognised that India’s software development prowess could shape a sustainable post-industrial state different to the U.S. and China model.

    Consider the question “Examine how India’s foreing policy priorities and its role in global governance is shaped by China’s rise.”

    Conclusion

    As in the historical past, Asia is big enough for both Asian giants to have complementary roles, share prosperity and be independent of each other and of the West.

     

  • Places in news: Shahtoot Dam

    India and Afghanistan have signed an agreement to build the Shahtoot Dam in Kabul to provide drinking water facility in the Afghan capital.

    Try this question from prelims 2020:

    Consider the following pairs

    Sr. River Flows into
    1. Mekong — Andaman Sea
    2. Thames — Irish Sea
    3. Volga — Caspian Sea
    4. Zambezi — Indian Ocean


    Which of the pairs given above is/are correctly matched?

    (a) 1 and 2 only

    (b) 3 only

    (c) 3 and 4 only

    (d) 1, 2 and 4 only

    Shahtoot Dam

    • It is a proposed dam in the Kabul river basin, one of the five river basins in Afghanistan.
    • This project will provide drinking, irrigation and Environmental water for Kabul province.
    • The dam will provide potable water to more than 2 million residents of Kabul, in addition to the irrigation of 4000 hectares of land in the district of Charasiab and Khairabad.
    • The dam will also provide water for irrigation to nearby areas, rehabilitate the existing irrigation and drainage network and help in flood protection and management efforts.
    • The project is expected to produce electricity for the region.

  • India’s challenge in dealing with international criticism

    Tweets by international celebrities in support of farmers’ protests and the government’s response to it have brought focus the issue of international scrutiny of India’s policies. The article analyses this issue.

    Issue of external criticism of India

    • Recently, India has been at the receiving end of international criticism over its dealing with the farmers’ protests against recently passed farm laws.
    • But neither the negative international scrutiny nor the Indian nationalist rejection of it are new.
    • Mobilising nationalist sentiment and evoking territorial sovereignty in fending off external criticism have been consistent themes in the conduct of independent India’s foreign policy.
    • The intensity of international scrutiny has varied over time and space, but they are unlikely to ever disappear.
    • As India becomes more connected to the world, there will be more global interest in its internal dynamics.
    • At the same time, like all rising powers, India will push back against demands that it must always measure up to external expectations.

    Why the Western criticism matters

    • Western power to turn sensible sentiments on democracy and human rights into consistent policies is rather limited.
    • Also, the issue of human rights has never been the sole factor shaping US foreign policy towards other nations.
    • But there is no denying that the Western power to create problems is real.
    • There are also implications of needless political arguments with the US over your domestic politics.
    • Asian realists also know that it is not difficult to neutralise Western liberal critics by emphasising engagement with others that might have commercial and security interests.

    Dealing with the criticism in the U.S. Congress

    • In the early 1990s, passing resolutions against India on Punjab and Kashmir in the US Congress was routine.
    • But once Delhi began to engage with US Congress and explained the complexity of the issues involved, the tide began to turn.
    • The Indian diaspora helped by reaching out to their representatives and pressing them to reconsider their positions.
    • Within a decade, supporters of separatism in Punjab and Kashmir could not even move the resolutions in the US Congress.

    Domestic polarisation and role of diaspora in international criticism

    • India’s problem is not with external criticism, India’s real challenge is the deepening domestic political divide.
    • India’s internal conflicts have inevitably enveloped the diaspora.
    • Sections of the diaspora that are opposed to Indian policies are actively mobilising the political class in their adopted countries to raise the voice against India.
    • They are also building wider coalitions to put the Indian government on the mat.
    • If the diaspora in the past helped India overcome some difficult problems with the US, it is the counter mobilisation of the diaspora that is shaping the western criticism of India.

    Way forward

    • The government’s ability to overcome external criticism depends on rebuilding the national consensus on key policies and healing the multiple social rifts.
    • Without a visible and sincere political effort to promote unity at home, internal divisions will get worse and make India more vulnerable to external meddling.

    Consider the question “Recently, India has been at the receiving end of the international criticism for its internal issues. What are the reasons for such criticism? Suggest the strategy to deal with such criticisms.” 

    Conclusion

    India’s own experience with Sri Lanka and Nepal underlines how hard it is to persuade other societies to accept Delhi’s preferences on the rights of minorities and federalism. In the end, democracy and pluralism can never be foreigner’s gifts. The struggle to construct and preserve democracies remains an internal one.

  • India’s Myanmar dilemma

    The coup in Myanmar poses several challenges for India. For one, it poses a dilemma in India’s dealing with Myanmar’s military. Also, it has implications for the Rohingya issue and containing the insurgency in north-east India.

    Implications of the coup in Myanmar

    1) Political realignment and role of Aung San Suu Kyi

    • Threat of sanctions from the United States and the West in the wake of the recent coup could lead to unique political realignments in Myanmar.
    • As a result, the international community may not have any alternatives than Aung San Suu Kyi when it comes to pursuing the restoration of democracy in the country.
    • The democratic credentials of Aung San Suu Kyi, remain deeply diminished today due to her justification of the ill-treatment meted out to the Rohingya,
    • Yet the recent events have brought her right back into the centre of the international community’s political calculations in Myanmar.

    2) Implications for Rohingya issus

    • International community will have to condone the government’s past actions against the Rohingya in order to highlight Suu Kyi as an anchor of democracy in Myanmar.
    • The case against Myanmar’s conduct during her government’s tenure at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) will most likely be put on the backburner.
    • Increasing global support for Ms. Suu Kyi could potentially negative consequences for the persecuted Rohingya.

    3) China factor

    • In the short run, the coup stands to hurt the interests of China, India and even the rest of the international community, all of whom were able to do business with Myanmar in their own unique ways.
    • For China, the coup has complicated its larger regional economic plans in Myanmar.
    • However, the international community’s sharp reactions will likely force the Tatmadaw (Myanmar’s military) to turn to China.
    • International sanctions are unlikely to have a major impact on the country’s largely inward-looking junta and its Generals.
    • However, it Generals would still expect Beijing to give them
    • For China, the coup has complicated its larger regional economic plans in Myanmar.
    • On the positive side for Beijing, decisive western sanctions will force the military to get closer to China.
    • To that extent, China will be its biggest beneficiary of the February coup by default.

    India’s dilemma

    • India faces the most challenging dilemma on how to respond to the military coup in Myanmar.
    • The dual power centres of the military and the civilian government that existed in Naypyitaw until recently, suited India.
    • While India’s national interests clearly lie in dealing with whoever is in power in Myanmar, India would find it difficult to openly support the junta given the strong western and American stance.
    • On the other hand, it can ill-afford to offend the junta by actively seeking a restoration of democracy there.
    • While Ms. Suu Kyi was getting cozy with Beijing, it was the Myanmar military that had been more circumspect.

    India’s concerns

    • While a friendless Myanmar junta getting closer to China is a real worry for New Delhi, there are other concerns too.
    • For one, Myanmar’s military played a helpful role in helping India contain the north-eastern insurgencies.
    • Equally important is the issue of providing succour to the Rohingya in the wake of the military coup in Myanmar.

    Consider the question “Developments in Myanmar have several implications for the regional geopolitics. In light of this, examine the challenges India faces from the development in Myanmar.”

    Conclusion

    India is left with very few clear policy options. And yet, it must continue to maintain relations with the government in power in Myanmar while discreetly pushing for political reconciliation in the country. In the meantime, the focus must be on improving trade, connectivity, and security links between the two sides.

  • US moves to rejoin UN Human Rights Council

    The Biden administration is set to reengage with the much-maligned UN Human Rights Council that former Donald Trump withdrew from almost three years ago.

    Try this PYQ:

    Q.Consider the following:

    1. Right to education.
    2. Right to equal access to public service.
    3. Right to food.

    Which of the above is/are Human Right/Human Rights under “Universal Declaration of Human Rights”?

    (a) 1 and 2 only

    (b) Only 1

    (c) 1, 2 and 3

    (d) Only 3

    Why did the US pulled-out earlier?

    • Trump pulled out of the world body’s main human rights agency in 2018 due to its disproportionate focus on Israel.
    • Israel had received by far the largest number of critical council resolutions against any country.
    • The Trump administration took issue with the body’s membership, which currently includes China, Cuba, Eritrea, Russia and Venezuela, all of which have been accused of human rights abuses.

    About UN Human Rights Council

    • The UNHRC describes itself as “an inter-governmental body within the UN system responsible for strengthening the promotion and protection of human rights around the globe.
    • It addresses situations of human rights violations and make recommendations on them.
    • The first session took place from June 19-30, 2006, three months after the Council was created by UN General Assembly Resolution 60/251 on March 15 that year.
    • The UNHRC has the ability to discuss all thematic human rights issues and situations that require its attention throughout the year.
    • The HRC replaced the former United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR).

    HRC Meetings

    • The Human Rights Council holds no fewer than three regular sessions a year, for a total of at least 10 weeks.
    • The meetings take place for four weeks in March, for three weeks in June, and for another three weeks in September.
    • The sessions are held at the UN Office in Geneva, Switzerland.
    • If one-third of the Member States so request, the HRC can decide at any time to hold a special session to address human rights violations and emergencies.

    Membership

    • The Council is made up of 47 UN Member States, which are elected by the UNGA through a direct and secret ballot.
    • The General Assembly takes into account the contribution of the candidate states to the promotion and protection of human rights, as well as their voluntary pledges and commitments in this regard.
    • Members of the Council serve for a period of three years and are not eligible for immediate re-election after serving two consecutive terms.
    • As of January 1, 2019, 114 UN Member States have served on the HRC. Both India and Pakistan are on this list.
    • The HRC has a Bureau of one President and four Vice-Presidents, representing the five regional groups. They serve for a year, in accordance with the Council’s annual cycle.

    Seat distribution

    • African States: 13 seats
    • Asia-Pacific States: 13 seats
    • Latin American and Caribbean States: 8 seats
    • Western European and other States: 7 seats
    • Eastern European States: 6 seats