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Subject: International Relations

  • Pursuing national interests, at the UN high table

    The article highlights India’s challenges at the UNSC in its 2 year stint.

    India’s agenda at the UNSC

    • India’s two-year non-permanent stint at the UNSC should be viewed as a once-in-a-decade opportunity to clearly identify and pursue its national interests regionally and globally.
    • India’s entry into the UNSC coincides with the emergence of a new world order.
    • Under new world order, there is systemic uncertainty, little care for global commons, absence of global leadership, the steady division of the world into rival blocs, pursuit of narrow national interests.
    • Efforts by Biden administration in the United States may go on to ameliorate some of the harsh impact of this global order.
    • The UNSC has also reached a point wherein its very relevance is in serious doubt.
    • India too is no longer an ardent believer in the fantastical claims about a perfect world at harmony with itself, nor is it a timid observer in global geopolitics.
    • India’s pursuit of its interests at the UNSC should, therefore, reflect its material and geopolitical limitations, and its energies should be focused on a clearly identified agenda.

    Factors determining India’s agenda at the UNSC

    1) Rivalry with China

    • India’s tenure at the UNSC comes in the wake of its growing military rivalry with China.
    • China’s opposition to having India chair the Counter-Terrorism Committee (CTC) in 2022 was a precursor to the things to come ahead.
    • The next two years will be key to ensure checking further Chinese incursions along the Line of Actual Control and building up enough infrastructure and mobilising sufficient forces in the forward areas.

    2) Relations with Russia

    • Greater Indian alignment with the West at the UNSC, an unavoidable outcome, could, however, widen the growing gulf between Russia and India.
    • It might not be possible for India to sit on the fence anymore.
    • Fence sitting would bring more harm than goodwill in an international system where battlelines are sharpening by the day.

    3) Terrorism issue

    • Terror is likely to be a major focus for India at the UNSC.
    • External Affairs Minister’s statement at the UNSC Ministerial Meeting on the 20th Anniversary of Security Council Resolution 1373 and the establishment of the Counter Terrorism Committee has set the stage for New Delhi’s approach on the issue.
    • India recently assumed the chair of the Taliban sanctions committee which assumes significance given the fast-moving developments in Afghanistan.
    • India must formulate its policy towards terrorism with far more diplomatic finesse and political nuance especially given that it is chairing the Taliban sanctions committee while courting the very same Taliban.

    4) Coalition of like-minded states and setting the agenda for next decade

    • India should use the forum and its engagement there to build coalitions among like-minded states and set out its priorities for the next decade — from climate change to non-proliferation.
    • India should use its bargaining power at the UNSC to pursue its national interests in other forums and domains as well.
    • India’s UNSC strategy should involve shaping the narrative and global policy engagement vis-à-vis — the Indo-Pacific.
    • Given India’s centrality in the Indo-Pacific region and the growing global interest in the concept, New Delhi would do well to take it upon itself to shape the narrative around it.
    • In doing so, it should, through the UNSC and other means, court Moscow once again and assuage its concerns about the Indo-Pacific.

    Way forward

    • India’s pursuit of its national interest at UNSC must also be tempered by the sobering fact that the UNSC is unlikely to admit new members any time soon, if ever at all.
    • A glance at the recent debates on UNSC reforms and the state of the international system today should tell us that bending over backwards to please the big five to gain entry into the UNSC will not make a difference.

    Consider the question “What agenda should India pursue at the UNSC in its two year non-permanent stint? What are the challenges in pursuing such agenda?”

    Conclusion

    India must focus its energies on what it can achieve during the short period that it would be in the UNSC rather than what it wishes happened.

  • Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) at UNSC

    Seeking urgent reform of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), India has highlighted the failure of the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) since 13 years of its establishment.

    Note various countries in the various groups.

    What is the news?

    • India, along with Brazil, Japan and Germany are pressing for urgent reform of the UNSC and for a permanent seat in the reformed 15-member top organ of the world body.
    • India has said that the UNSC is finding itself unable to act effectively to address increasingly complex issues of international peace and security.
    • The UNSC lacks inclusivity of those who need to be members of the powerful organ of the world body.

    What is IGN?

    • The Intergovernmental Negotiations framework or IGN is a group of nation-states working within the United Nations to further reform of the UNSC.
    • The IGN is composed of several different international organizations, namely:
    1. African Union (55 member states)
    2. G4 nations (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan)
    3. Uniting for Consensus Group (UfC), also known as the “Coffee Club” (it aims to counter the bids for permanent seats proposed by G4 nations, includes Pakistan, Turkey, Canada, Spain and Italy)
    4. L69 Group of Developing Countries ( it includes developing countries from Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and the Pacific)
    5. Arab League (six members: Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria) and
    6. Caribbean Community ( a group of 15 member countries called CARICOM)

  • China builds a new village in Arunachal Pradesh

    Satellite images show that China has constructed a new village in Arunachal Pradesh, around 4.5 kilometres inside of the de facto border on the Indian side.

    Indian and Chinese soldiers have confronted each other in their deadliest clash in decades in Ladakh last year and the earlier one in Doklam. Now another front has been opened up by China in Arunachal.

    This year could face another ugliest standoffs and skirmishes.

    Location of the village

    • The village, located on the banks of the River Tsari Chu, lies in the Upper Subansiri district.
    • It is an area that has been long disputed by India and China and has been marked by armed conflict.
    • Sources in the defense ministry have said that Beijing has, for years, maintained an army post on this territory, and the various constructions by the Chinese have not happened suddenly.

    Background of the story

    • China’s June 1959 operation known as the Longju incident reportedly accused Indian troops of occupying some places in Tibet and colluding with Tibetan rebels.
    • In August same year, the PLA clashed with the Indian personnel of the 9 Assam Rifles.
    • Two Indian soldiers were killed in action and the issue was finally resolved through diplomatic channels. Both sides withdrew from the area on August 20, 1960.
    • And the Assam Rifles then did not re-occupy the post.
    • In the late 1990s however, China established a company level post 3 kilometers inside the Indian Territory. Since then, the area remains contested to this day.

    India and Arunachal

    • Arunachal Pradesh (called South Tibet in China) is a full-fledged state of India.
    • India’s sovereignty over the area is internationally recognized and its residents have not shown any inclination to leave India.
    • The majority of the international maps acknowledge the area to be an Indian Territory.
    • China has some (pre-) historical claims through its ownership of Tibet, but the people and geography primarily favor India.

    Back2Basics: Chinese claim over Arunachal Pradesh

    • When the new Peoples Republic of China was formed in February 1912 after the abdication of the Qing emperor, the Tibetans asserted their independence.
    • They forced the Chinese troops based in Lhasa to return to the mainland-via India. A year later, Tibet declared independence from China.
    • In order to ensure that the unrest did not spread to India and assert their boundaries, the ruling British convened a tripartite meeting at Shimla with Tibetan and Chinese delegates to define the border.
    • The meeting gave China suzerainty over most of Tibet, and the boundary defined in this treaty was later known as the McMohan line.

    Chinese reluctance

    • The essential dispute is over China’s refusal to acknowledge the McMohan Line as the border between the two nations, and staking claim to large tracts of land as a contiguous part of Tibet.
    • However, it laid claim to the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh.
    • In the 16th century, the most important heritage of the state – Tawang Monastery was built. This is one of the most important sites for Tibetan Buddhists.
    • China never recognized Tibet’s independence nor the 1914 Simla convention.
    • In 1950 China completely took over Tibet. Thus, according to their version, the Tawang region belongs to them.
    • It especially wants to hold on to the monastery as that is a leading center of Tibetan Buddhism in India.

  • Ratle Hydroelectric Project

    The Centre has decided to go ahead with the long-pending 850-megawatt Ratle hydroelectric power project on the river Chenab in J&K Kishtwar district, despite objections raised by the Pakistan government over the same.

    Tap to read more about Indus River System

    Ratle Hydel Plant

    • It is a run-of-the-river hydroelectric power station currently under construction on the Chenab River, downstream of the village near Drabshalla in Kishtwar district of the Indian UT of Jammu and Kashmir.
    • The project includes a 133 m (436 ft) tall gravity dam and two power stations adjacent to one another.
    • The installed capacity of both power stations will be 850 MW.
    • In June 2013, then PM Manmohan Singh laid the foundation stone for the dam.
    • Pakistan has frequently alleged that it violates the Indus Water Treaty.

    What is the Indus Water Treaty?

    • The Indus Waters Treaty is a water-distribution treaty between India and Pakistan, brokered by the World Bank signed in Karachi in 1960.
    • According to this agreement, control over the water flowing in three “eastern” rivers of India — the Beas, the Ravi, and the Sutlej was given to India.
    • The control over the water flowing in three “western” rivers of India — the Indus, the Chenab, and the Jhelum was given to Pakistan
    • The treaty allowed India to use western rivers water for limited irrigation use and unrestricted use for power generation, domestic, industrial, and non-consumptive uses such as navigation, floating of property, fish culture, etc. while laying down precise regulations for India to build projects
    • India has also been given the right to generate hydroelectricity through the run of the river (RoR) projects on the Western Rivers which, subject to specific criteria for design and operation is unrestricted.

  • India-Nepal relations in a new transition

    India-Nepal Joint Commission meeting took place at a time when Nepal in going through a political turmoil. The article examines the issues discussed in the meeting and how its implications for the bilateral relations between the two countries.

    India-Nepal joint commission meeting amid political chaos in Nepal

    • Recently, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Nepal visited New Delhi for the sixth meeting of the India-Nepal Joint Commission.
    • Nepal’s Prime Minister dissolved the House of Representatives in late December 2020, the move was termed ‘unconstitutional’ by the experts and the country’s Supreme Court is hearing writ petitions against the move.
    • As a unique characteristic, Nepal’s internal political fundamentals continue to shape its foreign policy choices. 
    • In such a scenario, any inbound or outbound delegation is seen from a different prism.

    Issues discussed in the meeting

    1) Progress on the development partnership front

    • On the development partnership front, the expansion of the Motihari-Amlekhganj petroleum products pipelines to Chitwan and the establishment of a new pipeline on the eastern side connecting Siliguri to Jhapa in Nepal formed a part of the discussions.
    • The operating procedures for commencement of train services of the first passenger railway line between India and Nepal from Jaynagar to Kurtha via Janakpurhave have been discussed.
    • Other cross-border rail connectivity projects, including a possible Raxaul-Kathmandu broad gauge railway line, were also discussed.
    • The joint hydropower projects, including the proposed Pancheshwar Multipurpose Project, should get positive momentum following this round of meetings.

    2) Facilitating the cross-border movement of people

    • The recently inaugurated Integrated Check Posts (ICPs) at Birgunj and Biratnagar have helped in the seamless movement of people and trade between the two countries.
    • The construction of a third integrated check post at Nepalgunj has already commenced, while the new integrated check post at Bhairahwa would begin shortly.
    • Since Nepal relies on India’s seaports in a big way for trading, and goods are transported by road, the integrated check posts are expected to ease trade and transit.

    3) Border issue

    • Nepali side’s demand to include the boundary in the Joint Commission Meeting.
    • However, India made it clear to find a fresh mechanism to resolve any such crucial long-pending issue.

    4) New direction to bilateral ties

    • India’s support for two more cultural heritage projects in Nepal, namely, the Pashupatinath Riverfront Development and the Bhandarkhal Garden Restoration in Patan Durbar is significant.
    • Nepal expressed support for India’s permanent membership of an expanded UN Security Council (UNSC) to reflect the changed balance of power.
    • The next meeting of the Joint Commission in Nepal should be crucial in giving a new direction to the bilateral ties, keeping a balance between change and continuity.

    India’s deepening engagement with all sections

    • There is growing disenchantment among the Nepali masses over the increased centralization of power, failure of the Provincial System in addressing the developmental issues, misuse of Presidential authority, and unprecedented corruption.
    • While the unusual developments are taking place in Nepal, there are many who still think that India is comfortable with some changes as its Nepal policy is heading very clearly towards a deeper engagement with all sections.

    Consider the question “How India-Nepal ties are affected by the internal political fundamentals in Nepal? What approach should be adopted by India in dealing with Nepal?” 

    Conclusion

    Nepal cannot afford to enter into another round of political instability, and those who have commanding authority to spearhead India-Nepal bilateral relations must give a humane consideration to it. At the crossroads, Nepal needs action and to come to terms with realities.

  • UK invites India to attend G7 Summit

    The United Kingdom has invited PM Modi to attend the G7 summit that is scheduled to be held in June.

    Note the members of G7 and G20. UPSC may puzzle you asking which G20 nation isn’t a member of G7.

    G7 Countries

    • The G-7 or ‘Group of Seven’ includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
    • It is an intergovernmental organisation that was formed in 1975 by the top economies of the time as an informal forum to discuss pressing world issues.
    • Initially, it was formed as an effort by the US and its allies to discuss economic issues.
    • The G-7 forum now discusses several challenges such as oil prices and many pressing issues such as financial crises, terrorism, arms control, and drug trafficking.
    • It does not have a formal constitution or a fixed headquarters. The decisions taken by leaders during annual summits are non-binding.
    • Canada joined the group in 1976, and the European Union began attending in 1977.

    Evolution of the G-7

    • When it started in 1975—with six members, Canada joining a year later—it represented about 70% of the world economy.
    • And it was a cozy club for tackling issues such as the response to oil shocks.
    • Now it accounts for about 40% of global GDP.
    • Since the global financial crisis of 2007-09, it has sometimes been overshadowed by the broader g20.
    • The G-7 became the G-8 in 1997 when Russia was invited to join.
    • In 2014, Russia was debarred after it took over Crimea.

    Significance of G7 for India

    • India will get more voice, more influence, and more power by entering the G7.
    • After the UN Security Council (UNSC), this is the most influential grouping.
    • If the group is expanded it will collectively address the humongous issues created by the Wuhan virus,
    • Diplomatically, a seat at the high table could help India further its security and foreign policy interests, especially at the nuclear club and UN Security Council reform as well as protecting its interests in the Indian Ocean.

    Back2Basics: The G-20

    • The G-20 is a larger group of countries, which also includes G7 members.
    • The G-20 was formed in 1999, in response to a felt need to bring more countries on board to address global economic concerns.
    • Apart from the G-7 countries, the G-20 comprises Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey.
    • Together, the G-20 countries make up around 80% of the world’s economy.
    • As opposed to the G-7, which discusses a broad range of issues, deliberations at the G-20 are confined to those concerning the global economy and financial markets.
    • India is slated to host a G-20 summit in 2022.

  • Russia withdraws from Open Skies Treaty

    Russia has announced that it was pulling out of the Open Skies Treaty, saying that the pact had been seriously compromised by the withdrawal of the United States.

    The New START, INF and now the OST …. Be clear about the differences of these treaties. For example- to check if their inception was during cold war era etc.

    Open Skies Treaty (OST)

    • OST is an agreement that allows countries to monitor signatories’ arms development by conducting surveillance flights over each other’s territories.
    • The idea behind the OST was first proposed in the early years of the Cold War by former U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower.
    • It came to existence decades later and was signed in 1992, during the George H.W. Bush presidency and after the Soviet Union had collapsed.
    • The OST came into effect in 2002 under the George W. Bush administration and it allows its 34 signatories to conduct unarmed reconnaissance flights over the territory of treaty countries.

    Issues with the OST

    • The U.S. has used the treaty more intensively than Russia.
    • Between 2002 and 2016, the U.S. flew 196 flights over Russia (in addition to having imagery from other countries) compared to the 71 flights flown by Russia.

  • Nepal once again raises Kalapani Boundary Issue

    Nepal has raised the Kalapani boundary dispute with India during the Joint Commission meeting of the Foreign Ministers.

    Q.The India-Nepal bilateral relations these days are increasingly seen through the lens of China factor. Examine.

    Kalapani Boundary Issue

    • Mapped within Uttarakhand is a 372-sq km area called Kalapani, bordering far-west Nepal and Tibet.
    • A treaty signed between Nepal and British India in 1816 determined the Makhali river, that runs through Kalapani, as the boundary between the two neighbours.
    • The Treaty of Sugauli concluded between British India and the Kingdom of Nepal in the year 1816, maps the Makhali River as the western boundary with India.
    • But different British maps showed the source of the tributary at different places which were mainly due to underdeveloped and less-defined surveying techniques used at that time.
    • However, the river has many tributaries that meet at Kalapani. For this reason, India claims that the river begins at Kalapani but Nepal says that it begins from Lipu Lekh pass, which is the source of most of its tributaries.
    • While the Nepal government and political parties have protested, India has said the new map does not revise the existing boundary with Nepal.
    • India claims that the river begins at Kalapani but Nepal says that it begins from Lipu Lekh pass, which is the source of most of its tributaries.

    Legal Dimension of Issue

    According to International Laws, the principles of avulsion and accretion are applicable in determining the borders when a boundary river changes course.

    • Avulsion: It is the pushing back of the shoreline by sudden, violent action of the elements, perceptible while in progress. Also, it can be defined as the sudden and perceptible change in the land brought about by water, which may result in the addition or removal of land from a bank or shoreline.
    • Accretion: It is the process of growth or enlargement by a gradual buildup. It is the natural, slow and gradual deposit of soil by the water.

    If the change of the river course is rapid – by avulsion – the boundary does not change. But if the river changes course gradually – that is, by accretion – the boundary changes accordingly.

    Since, the Gandak change, of course, has been gradual, India claimed Susta as part of their territory as per international laws.

    • On several occasions, India has tried to resolve the issue through friendly and peaceful negotiations, but the Nepali leadership has always shown hesitation in resolving the issue.
    • In Nepal, the issue has become a tool for arousing strong public sentiment against India. Therefore, resolving the issue may not be in the best interest of Nepal’s domestic politics.

    Significance for India

    • The Lipu Lekh pass serves strategic importance for India as a key point to monitor Chinese troop movement.
    • The link road via Lipulekh Himalayan Pass is also considered one of the shortest and most feasible trade routes between India and China.
    • The Nepalese reaction would probably have triggered in response to Chinese assertion.

    An undefined boundary claimed by Nepal

    • Nepal’s western boundary with India was marked out in the Treaty of Sugauli between the East India Company and Nepal in 1816.
    • Nepali authorities claim that people living in the low-density area were included in the Census of Nepal until 58 years ago.
    • Five years ago, Nepali Foreign Minister had claimed that the late King Mahendra “handed over the territory to India”.
    • By some accounts in Nepal, this allegedly took place in the wake of India-China War of 1962.

    Must read:

    [Burning Issue] India-Nepal Border Row

  • The ‘Difficult Four’ Countries

    A UK think-tank ‘Royal Institute of International Affairs’ has listed India in ‘Difficult 4’; clubs India with China, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey.

    This newscard helps analyse the Western esp. that of the EU’s perception of India and its global image under the present regime.

    What is the news?

    • A report called ‘Global Britain, Global Broker’ has warned the UK government to consider India as more of a rival that a cooperative partner.
    • It accepts the fact that India is set to be the largest country in the world by population very soon and will have the third-largest economy and defence budget at some point in this decade.
    • But it cautions that gaining direct national benefit from the relationship, whether economically or diplomatically, will be difficult for the UK government.
    • The report also accepts India’s importance to the UK as being “inescapable”.

    The ‘Difficult Four’

    • Clubbing India with China, Saudi Arabia and Turkey as the “difficult four”, the report says the Johnson government should be more realistic about developing deeper ties with India.
    • They may be important to the UK’s commercial interests, but they will be rivals or, at best, awkward counterparts on many of its global goals, the report warns.
    • India is now classed as a country, destined to count among the UK’s “rivals” or “awkward counterparts” as it pursues its global goals.

    India has had bitter (colonial) past

    • The think-tank strikes a note of caution over the two countries’ shared colonial history proving a stumbling block to the promise of a deeper relationship.
    • India has a long and consistent record of resisting being corralled into a ‘Western’ camp.
    • As a result, India is always on the list of countries with which a new UK government commits to engage.
    • But it should be obvious by now that the idea of a deeper relationship with India always promises more than it can deliver.
    • The legacy of British colonial rule consistently curdles the relationship.

    Indian flaws

    • The report points to India’s “complex, fragmented domestic politics”, which make it one of the countries resistant to open trade and foreign investment.
    • It highlights concerns raised by domestic groups as well as the UN over a “crackdown on human rights activists and civil society groups” not being actively challenged by the judiciary.
    • It raises concern over India’s pursuance of extreme right-winged policies. Indian domestic politics also has entered a more ethnic-nationalist phase, the report argues.
    • Against this backdrop, the report reflects on the prospect of including India within any new Democratic 10 or D10 coalition of 10 leading democracies.

    Try this question from 2019 CS Mains:

     

    Q.What are the challenges to our cultural practices in the name of secularism? (150W)

    UK’s resentment

    • In a critique of India’s diplomatic behaviour, the report points out that despite border clashes with China, “India did not join the group of countries that criticized China at the UN in July 2019 over HR violations in Xinjiang.
    • India has also been muted in its criticism of the passage of the new national security law in Hong Kong.

  • Europe’s China gambit will fall short of its stated goals

    Thought the article is not directly related to India, the conclusion of the investment treaty between the EU and China serves as the prelude to the post-pandemic world order which surely matters for India. The article explains the implications of the agreement.

    Investment agreement between EU and China

    • Recently, the EU and China announced the completion of a Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) between the two.
    • The CAI gives European firms enhanced access to the Chinese market, removes (or relaxes) Chinese government requirements on joint ventures and technology transfer in some sectors.
    • The European Commission has claimed that the CAI allows the EU to maintain its “policy space”, especially in “sensitive” sectors such as energy, infrastructure, agriculture, and public services
    • The deal also promises equal treatment with state enterprises and greater regulatory transparency in China.
    • Moreover, the Chinese government has undertaken some obligations on environmental sustainability and labour rights, notably by agreeing to make “continued and sustained efforts” to ratify the Forced Labour Convention.

    Reaction to the agreement

    • The US reaction ranged from disappointment to outright hostility.
    • The incoming Biden administration would have preferred a unified front against China, by striking an economic deal with Europe first.
    • For others, it was the EU’s apparent misjudgement on China’s human rights promises.

    Post-pandemic world order and role of democracies

    • The Europe-China agreement underscores a fundamental question of the post-pandemic world order: Can democracies remain true to their values while engaging in trade and investment with China?
    • To answer that, we must recognize two facts.
    • First, it is impossible to decouple the economies of the West from the Chinese economy without causing an economic catastrophe.
    • Second, there is little that Western countries can do to reshape China’s state-driven economic model or repressive human- and labour-rights regime.

    What should be the approach in dealing with China

    • The West should pursue more limited, more attainable, and ultimately more defensible goals.
    • Two goals are paramount.
    • First, trade and investment rules should be such that Western firms and consumers are not directly complicit in human-rights abuses in China.
    • Second, such rules should safeguard democratic countries against Chinese practices that could undermine their domestic institutional arrangements on labour, environment, technology, and national security.

    Lack of clarity over arbitration mechanism

    • The agreement contains an arbitration scheme that enables the parties to bring violation complaints against each other.
    • Arbitration scheme could serve as a means for the Chinese government to challenge specific entry barriers against Chinese firms.
    • How much this mechanism will be sensitive towards the issues such as treatment given to workers or the environmental protection is not clear.
    • Similarly, how much deference will panels show to exceptions to market access based on “national security” considerations is not clear.

    Conclusion

    We should not judge the CAI by whether it enables Europe to export its system and values. We should judge it by whether it allows Europe to remain true to its own.