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Subject: International Relations

  • Fortifying the African outreach: Contrast in the approach adopted by China and India

    As both India and China try and vie for increasing the influence in the African continent, the difference in the approach they adopted become evident. Both countries have been providing assistance in Africa amid the COVID pandemic. This article analyses the difference in the approach of the two countries.

    Impact of covid pandemic in Africa

    • Although African countries moved quickly to curb the initial spread, they are still woefully ill-equipped to cope with a public health emergency.
    • They are facing shortages of masks, ventilators, and even basic necessities such as soap and water.
    • Such conditions have meant that Africa’s cycle of chronic external aid dependence continues.
    • Africa needs medical protective equipment and gear to support its front line public health workers.
    • India and China have increased their outreach to Africa through medical assistance.
    • Their efforts are directed to fill a part of the growing African need at a time when not many others have stepped in to help.

    China’s donation diplomacy in Africa

    • China, being Africa’s largest trading partner, was quick to signal its intent to help Africa cope with the pandemic.
    • It despatched medical protective equipment, testing kits, ventilators, and medical masks to several African countries.
    • The primary motive of such donations has been to raise Beijing’s profile as a leading provider of humanitarian assistance and “public goods” in the global public health sector.
    • China’s billionaire philanthropy was also in full display when tech founder Jack Ma donated three rounds of anti-coronavirus supplies.
    • Chinese embassies across Africa have taken the lead by coordinating both public and private donations to local stakeholders.
    • However, the sub-optimal quality of China’s medical supplies and its deputing of medical experts have been a major cause for concern.

    Let’s understand the objectives of China’s donation diplomacy

    • Beijing’s ‘donation diplomacy’ in Africa aims to achieve three immediate objectives:
    • 1) Shift the focus away from talking about the origins of the virus in Wuhan.
    • 2) Build goodwill overseas.
    • 3) Establish an image makeover.
    • For the most part, it succeeded in achieving these ends until China faced widespread backlash over the ill-treatment of African nationals in Guangzhou city.
    • The issue quickly grew into a full-blown political crisis for Beijing.

    Let’s analyse the depth of China’s political influence in Africa

    • For the most part, China has been successful in controlling the Guangzhou narrative due to the depth of its political influence in Africa.
    • It is no secret that China relies heavily on diplomatic support and cooperation from African countries on key issues in multilateral fora.
    • For example, Beijing used African support for securing a win for Chinese candidates as the head of Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and in the World Health Organization (WHO).
    • On Africa’s part, the problem lies in the deep disjuncture and credibility gap between Africa’s governing class, the people, the media and civil society.
    • Even when criticisms have been levelled against Chinese indiscretions, it has hardly ever surfaced at the elite level.
    • Overall, China’s donation diplomacy towards Africa during COVID-19 has received mixed reactions, but Beijing’s advantage lies in its economic heft and political influence in Africa.

    Understanding India’s diplomacy in Africa: Responsible and reliable global stakeholder

    • For India, the pandemic presents an opportunity to demonstrate its willingness and capacity to shoulder more responsibility.
    • The fact that even with limited resources, India can fight the virus at home while reaching out to developing countries in need is testament to India’s status as a responsible and reliable global stakeholder.
    • Nowhere has India’s developmental outreach been more evident than in Africa with the continent occupying a central place in Indian government’s foreign and economic policy in the last six years.
    • Africa has been the focus of India’s development assistance and also diplomatic outreach, as evident in plans to open 18 new embassies.
    • These efforts have been supplemented by an improved record of Indian project implementation in Africa.

    Trade ties and cooperation amid pandemic

    • India’s role as ‘the pharmacy of the world’, as the supplier of low-cost, generic medicines is widely acknowledged.
    • Pharmaceutical products along with refined petroleum products account for 40% of India’s total exports to African markets.
    • India is sending consignments of essential medicines, including hydroxychloroquine (HCQ) and paracetamol, to 25 African countries in addition to doctors and paramedics at a total cost of around â‚č600 million ($7.9 million) on a commercial and grant basis.
    • The initial beneficiaries were the African Indian Ocean island nations of Mauritius, the Seychelles, Comoros, and Madagascar under India’s ‘Mission Sagar’.
    • While transportation and logistics remain a concern, most of the consignments have already reached various African states.
    • A timely initiative has been the e-ITEC COVID-19 management strategies training webinars exclusively aimed at training health-care professionals from Africa and the SAARC nations and sharing of best practices by Indian health experts.
    • Nigeria, Kenya, Mauritius, and Namibia have been beneficiaries.
    • Across Africa, there is a keen interest to understand the developments and best practices in India because the two share similar socioeconomic and developmental challenges.
    • There is also growing interest in research and development in drugs and vaccines.
    • A few African countries such as Mauritius are pushing for health-care partnerships in traditional medicines and Ayurveda for boosting immunity.
    • The Indian community, especially in East African countries, has also been playing a crucial role in helping spread awareness.
    • Prominent Indian businessmen and companies in Nigeria and Kenya have donated money to the respective national emergency response funds.
    • Country-specific chapters of gurdwaras and temples have fed thousands of families by setting up community kitchens, helplines for seniors and distributing disinfectants and sanitisers.

    The contrast between approaches adopted by India and China

    • Both India and China, through their respective health and donation diplomacy, are vying to carve a space and position for themselves as reliable partners of Africa in its time of need.
    • Burnishing their credentials as humanitarian champions is the name of the game.
    • But there are significant differences in the approaches.
    • For China, three aspects are critical:
    • 1) Money, political influence and elite level wealth creation.
    • 2) Strong state-to-state relations as opposed to people-to-people ties.
    • 3) Hard-infrastructure projects and resource extraction.
    • India’s approach, on the other hand, is one that focuses on building local capacities and an equal partnership with Africans and not merely with African elites concerned.

    Consider the question “Both India and China have been playing an active role in the African continent and vying for the outreach there. But there is a fundamental difference in their approach. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    As these two powers rise in Africa, their two distinct models will come under even greater scrutiny. And both New Delhi and Beijing might find that they need to adapt to the rising aspirations of the African continent.

  • Time to revisit the special relationship with Nepal

    A new map released by Nepal delivered a blow to the India-Nepal relations. But this is hardly the first time this has happened. The article clears some cobwebs about Nepal’s foreign policy. First, it throws light on the past trend set by Nepal. And drawing on the past experience, it suggests the changes India should adopt in new framework to deal with Nepal.

    Nepal’s new map: Yet another knock on India-Nepal relations

    • As the parliament in Nepal gets ready to approve a new map that will include parts of Indian territory in Uttarakhand, Delhi is bracing for yet another knock to a bilateral relationship.
    • Many in the Indian strategic community believe that the train wreck was avoidable.
    • But others view the collision between Delhi and Kathmandu as both inevitable and imminent.
    • Even if the territorial issue had been finessed, something else would have triggered the breakdown.

    Bigger fissures in relation

    • A closer look suggests that the territorial dispute is merely a symptom of the structural changes.
    • These structural changes are unfolding in the external and internal context of the bilateral relationship.
    • The question, then, is not what Delhi could have done to prevent the current crisis.
    • It should be about looking ahead to build more sustainable ties with Kathmandu.

    2 factors India must consider and depart from

    • Any new framework for engaging Kathmandu must involve two important departures from the past in Delhi.
    • 1) First is coming to terms with Nepal’s natural politics of balance.
    • 2) The other is the recognition that Delhi’s much-vaunted “special relationship” with Kathmandu is part of the problem.

    Let’s look at the history of Nepal’s geopolitics

    • The founder of the modern Nepali state, Prithvi Narayan Shah, described Nepal as a “yam between two rocks”.
    • He was pointing to the essence of Nepal’s geographic condition between the dominant power in the Gangetic plains on the one hand and Tibet and the Qing empire on the other.
    • Contrary to the conventional wisdom in India, China has long been part of Kathmandu’s international relations.
    • As the East India Company gained ground at the turn of the 19th century, Nepal’s rulers made continuous offers to Beijing to act as China’s frontline against Calcutta’s expansion into the Himalayas.
    • Kathmandu also sought to build a coalition of Indian princes to counter the Company.
    • Even after it lost the first Anglo-Nepal war in 1816, Kathmandu kept up a continuous play between Calcutta and Beijing.
    • As the scales tilted in the Company’s favour after the First Opium War (1839-42), Nepal’s rulers warmed up to Calcutta.
    • When the 1857 Mutiny shook the Company, Kathmandu backed it and regained some of the territories it lost when the Raj replaced the Company.
    • As the fortunes of the Raj rose, Kathmandu rulers enjoyed the benefits of being Calcutta’s protectorate.
    • India inherited this framework but has found it impossible to sustain.

    Why the Treaty of Peace and Friendship (1950) lost its appeal?

    • The 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship gave the illusion of continuity in Nepal’s protectorate relationship with the Raj and its successor, independent India.
    • That illusion was continuously chipped away amid the rise of mass politics in Nepal, growing Nepali nationalism, and Kathmandu’s acquisition of an international personality.
    • The 1950 Treaty, which proclaims an “everlasting friendship” between the two nations, has become the symbol of Indian hegemony in Nepal.
    • In a paradox, its security value for India has long been hollowed out.
    • It is a political millstone around India’s neck that Delhi is unwilling to shed for the fear of losing the “special relationship”.
    • Delhi has been trapped into a perennial political play among Kathmandu’s different factions and responding to Nepal’s China card.

    Weakening of “special relationship”: Essence of Nepal’s foreign policy

    • Once the Chinese Communist Party consolidated its power in Tibet and offered assurances to Nepal, Kathmandu’s balancing impulses were back in play.
    • At the risk of oversimplification, Nepal’s foreign policy since the 1950s has, in essence, been about weakening the “special relationship” with India and building more cooperation with China.
    • Kathmandu has used different labels to package its desire for greater room for manoeuvre between its two giant neighbours — non-alignment, diversification, “zone of peace”, equidistance, and a Himalayan bridge between India and China.
    • The stronger China has become, the wider have Kathmandu’s options with India become.

    Way forward

    • It makes no sense for Delhi to hanker after a “special relationship” that a large section of Kathmandu does not want.
    • If Delhi wants a normal and good neighbourly relationship with Kathmandu, it should put all major bilateral issues on the table for renegotiation.
    • Such issues should include the 1950 treaty, national treatment to Nepali citizens in India, trade and transit arrangements, the open border and visa-free travel.
    • Delhi should make it a priority to begin talks with Nepal on revising, replacing, or simply discarding the 1950 treaty.
    • It should negotiate a new set of mutually satisfactory arrangements.
    • India had conducted a similar exercise with Bhutan to replace the 1949 treaty during 2006-07.
    • The issues and political context are certainly more complicated in the case of Nepal.
    • It is better that Delhi bites the bullet and makes a fresh beginning with Kathmandu rather than let the relationship deteriorate.
    • No bilateral relationship between nations can be built on sentiment — whether it is based on faith, ideology or inheritance.
    • Only those rooted in shared interests will endure.
    • Rather than object to Kathmandu’s China ties, Delhi must focus on how to advance India’s relations with Nepal.
    • It should bet that the logic of Nepal’s economic geography, its pursuit of enlightened self-interest, and Kathmandu’s natural balancing politics, will continue to provide a strong framework for India’s future engagement with Nepal.

    Conclusion

    Discarding the appearances of the “special relationship” might, in fact, make it easier for Delhi to construct a more durable and interest-based partnership with Kathmandu that is rooted in realism and has strong popular support on both sides.

  • What is Antifa Movement?

    As massive protests following the death of a person in racial discrimination continued to rock the US, President Donald Trump has announced that the alleged far-left group Antifa would be designated as a terrorist organisation by his government.

    One can expect a similar prelims question:

    Q. The Antifa movement recently seen in news is an: Free trade movement/Anti-terror movement etc.

    Why the US seeks to ban Antifa?

    • Trump has blamed for the protests that have convulsed cities across the US,
    • Antifa is considered the loosely affiliated group of far-left anti-fascist activists.

    Antifa: The group

    • Antifa is an acronym for ‘Anti-Fascist’. It is not an organisation with a leader nor does it have a defined structure or membership roles.
    • Antifa has been around for several decades, though accounts vary on its exact beginnings.
    • The term dates the term as far back as Nazi Germany, describing the etymology of ‘Antifa’ as “borrowed from German Antifa, short for antifaschistische ‘anti-fascist’.
    • Rather, Antifa is more of a movement of activists whose followers share a philosophy and tactics.
    • They have made their presence known at protests, including the “Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, Virginia, in 2017.

    Its members

    • It is impossible to know how many people count themselves as members.
    • Its followers acknowledge that the movement is secretive, has no official leaders and is organised into autonomous local cells.
    • It is also only one in a constellation of activist movements that have come together in the past few years to oppose the far right.
    • Antifa members campaign against actions they view as authoritarian, homophobic, racist or xenophobic.

    Activism over years

    • Antifa members typically dress in black and often wear a mask at their demonstrations, and follow far-left ideologies such as anti-capitalism.
    • The movement has been known to have a presence in the US in the 1980s.
    • It shot into prominence following the election of President Trump in 2016, with violence marking some of its protests and demonstrations.
    • Criticizing mainstream liberal politicians for not doing enough, Antifa members have often physically confronted their conservative opponents on the streets.
    • The group also participates in non-violent protests. Apart from public counter-protests, Antifa members run websites that track white extremist and ultra-right groups.

    Criticisms

    • The movement has been widely criticised among the mainstream left and right.
    • Conservative publications and politicians routinely rail against supporters of Antifa, who they say are seeking to shut down peaceful expression of conservative views.

  • A phantom called the Line of Actual Control with China

    Yet again, India and China are engaged in a standoff on the border. But why the issues persist even after four agreements with a view to solve the boundary problem? This article explains the problem in wording of the agreement. And also explains the lack of intent from China’s part.

    Four agreements: vision of progress or strategic illusion?

    •  At the heart of India’s and China’s continued inability to make meaningful progress on the boundary issue are four agreements.
    • Those agreements were signed in September 1993, November 1996, April 2005 and October 2013 — between the two countries.
    • Ironically, India and China keep referring to these agreements as the bedrock of the vision of progress on the boundary question.
    • Unfortunately, these are deeply flawed agreements.
    • And also make the quest for settlement of the boundary question at best a strategic illusion and at worst a cynical diplomatic parlour trick.

    Let’s look into LAC provision in 1993 and 1996 agreements

    • According to the 1993 agreement, “pending an ultimate solution”, “the two sides shall strictly respect and observe the LAC between the two sides… No activities of either side shall overstep the LAC”.
    • Further, both the 1993 and the 1996 agreement—on confidence-building measures in the military field along the LAC— say they “will reduce or limit their respective military forces within mutually agreed geographical zones along the LAC.”
    • This was to apply to major categories of armaments and cover various other aspects as well, including air intrusions “within ten kilometres along the LAC”.

    Okay, but where is the LAC?

    • The specification of this phantom LAC as the starting point and the central focus has made several key stipulations and articles of the four agreements effectively inoperable for more than a quarter of a century.
    • In fact, many of the articles have no bearing on the ground reality.
    • Article XII of the 1996 agreement, for instance, says, “This agreement is subject to ratification and shall enter into force on the date of exchange of instruments of ratification.”
    • It is not clear if and when that happened.
    • Nowhere in the 1993 agreement is there the provision to recognise the existing lines of deployment of the respective armies, as they were in 1993.
    • The agreement does not reflect any attempt to have each side recognise the other’s line of deployment of troops at the time it was signed.
    • That would have been the logical starting point.
    • If both armies are to respect the LAC, where is the line?
    • The ambiguity over the LAC has brought a prolonged sense of unease and uncertainty and thus exponentially contributed to the military build-up in those areas.
    • The absence of a definition of this line allows ever new and surreptitious advances on the ground.

    What could have been done?

    • Had the 1993 agreement begun the exercise with the phrase “pending an ultimate solution, each side shall strictly respect and observe the line of existing control/deployment” instead of the “LAC”, it would have been more possible to keep the peace.
    • In such a case there would have been two existing lines of control on the map — one for the physical deployment of the Chinese troops and the other for the physical deployment of the Indian troops.
    • This would have rendered the areas between the two lines no man’s land, and would have ensured that the two armies were frozen in their positions.

    The issue of two LAC in the eastern and western sector

    • The LAC is two hypothetical lines in the following two sectors-
    • 1) In the eastern sector, where the Chinese have not accepted the loosely defined McMahon line which follows the principle of watershed.
    • 2) The western sector, which is witnessing another episodic stand-off.
    • The first is what Indian troops consider the extent to which they can dominate through patrols, which is well beyond the point where they are actually deployed and present.
    • The second is what the Chinese think they effectively control, which is well south of the line they were positioned at in 1993.

    Why map exchange didn’t happen for the western sector?

    • It is in this theatre of the militarily absurd that we should look at the outcome of the attempted exchange of maps in the western sector.
    • It is the sector where this round of confrontation continues between India and China.
    • This came after the exchange of maps in the middle sector.
    • In the middle sector, divergences were the least, i.e., the existing line and the Chinese and Indian idea of the LAC were more or less the same (in 2002).
    • The Foreign Secretary India and the head of the Chinese delegation, met in New Delhi in 2003 for sharing the map of the western sector.
    • It had been agreed that both sides would exchange maps to an agreed scale on each side’s perceptions of the location of the LAC in the western sector.
    • The idea was to superimpose the maps to see where the perceptions converged and, crucially, where they diverged.
    • Due to the contentious nature of the sector, it would provide a starting point, not the end point, to discuss how to reconcile divergences presumed to be significant, given Chinese military behaviour on the ground there.
    • Each side handed over its map to the other.
    • But, head of the Chinese delegation gave it a long, hard look, and wordlessly returned it.
    • They provided no reason for their action.
    • The meeting effectively ended there.

    Consider the question “Examine the reasons for the persistent nature of the India-China border issue.”

    Conclusion

    By disregarding the map, China is not bound in any way by New Delhi’s perception of the LAC, and therefore does not have to limit liberty of action. This was evident then and is especially evident now. Because the nature of the terrain, deployment, and infrastructure and connectivity asymmetries in the border areas continue to be so starkly in China’s favour that it is clear that the Chinese are in no hurry to settle the boundary question. They see that the cost to India in keeping this question open suits them more than settling the issue.

  • G-7

    Calling the existing Group of Seven (G-7) club a “very outdated group of countries”, US Prez. Trump said that he wanted to include India, Russia, South Korea, and Australia in the group.

    Note the members of G7 and G20. UPSC may puzzle you asking which G20 nation isn’t a member of G7.

    The Group of 7

    • The G-7 or ‘Group of Seven’ includes Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
    • It is an intergovernmental organisation that was formed in 1975 by the top economies of the time as an informal forum to discuss pressing world issues.
    • Initially, it was formed as an effort by the US and its allies to discuss economic issues.
    • The G-7 forum now discusses several challenges such as oil prices and many pressing issues such as financial crises, terrorism, arms control, and drug trafficking.
    • It does not have a formal constitution or a fixed headquarters. The decisions taken by leaders during annual summits are non-binding.
    • Canada joined the group in 1976, and the European Union began attending in 1977.

    Evolution of the G-7

    • When it started in 1975—with six members, Canada joining a year later—it represented about 70% of the world economy.
    • And it was a cosy club for tackling issues such as the response to oil shocks.
    • Now it accounts for about 40% of global gdp.
    • Since the global financial crisis of 2007-09 it has sometimes been overshadowed by the broader g20.
    • The G-7 became the G-8 in 1997 when Russia was invited to join.
    • In 2014, Russia was debarred after it took over Crimea.

    Expelling Russia

    • The G-7 was known as the ‘G-8’ for several years after the original seven were joined by Russia in 1997.
    • The Group returned to being called G-7 after Russia was expelled as a member in 2014 following the latter’s annexation of the Crimea region of Ukraine.
    • Since his election in 2016, President Trump has suggested on several occasions that Russia be added again, given what he described as Moscow’s global strategic importance.

    Why Trump wants to expand the G7 group?

    1.Joint  front against China

    •  The expanded G7 is seen as an attempt by the US to form a joint front against China.
    • The US President has stepped up his criticism of the Asian powerhouse over a range of issues, from initially holding back information on the coronavirus outbreak to its actions on Taiwan and changes in Hong Kong’s special status.

    2.Pressure  from G7 countries

    • Another reason is Trump has faced heat from other G7 members in the last two summits, for various controversial decisions taken by him such as pulling out from trade deals, the Iran nuclear deal as well as the Paris climate pact.
    • Trump’s “America First” policy and his attacks on key US allies over various trade and economic issues have created faultlines within the grouping.

    3.Add more weight to the grouping’s profile. 

    The participation and eventual inclusion of Australia, South Korea, Russia (not favoured by the UK) and India could certainly add more weight to the grouping’s profile.

    Why G7 needs a revival?

    • The rise of India, China, and Brazil over the past few decades has reduced the G-7’s relevance, whose share in global GDP has now fallen to around 40%.

    Relevance of G7 for India

    • India will get more voice, more influence and more power by entering the G7.
    • After UN Security Council (UNSC), this is the most influential grouping.
    • If the group is expanded it will collectively address the humongous issues created by the Wuhan virus,
    • Diplomatically, a seat at the high table could help New Delhi further its security and foreign policy interests, especially at the nuclear club and UN Security Council reform as well as protecting its interests in the Indian Ocean.

    Challenges in India’s entry

    1.Lack of consensus:

    • The decision to expand the grouping cannot be taken by the US alone.
    • Other members such as the UK, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Canada, have to not only agree to Trump’s proposal to expand the grouping but also on the new members that he wants to add, said a diplomatic source of one of the G7 member countries.

    2.Upset China:

    • China is upset at the plans to expand the G7, stating that such actions will result in the creation of a “small circle” against Beijing and thus such a plan is “doomed to fail”.
    • China will put pressure on G-7 countries

    Discipline China, not isolate it

    • Trump’s motivation in expanding the G-7 to include India and Russia while keeping China out is transparent.
    • If keeping China out was not the intention, the G-7 could easily have dissolved themselves and revitalised the presently inert G-20.
    • There are, of course, good reasons why Xi Jinping’s China requires to be put on notice for its various acts of omission and commission and disrespect for international law.
    • However, disciplining China is one thing, isolating it quite another.
    • If the new group is viewed as yet another arrow in the China containment quiver, it would place India and most other members of the group in a spot.
    • Everyone wants China disciplined, few would like to be seen seeking its isolation.
    • Asia needs a law-abiding China, not a sullen China.
    • Japan and Australia, have serious concerns about China’s behaviour.
    • But they may not like the new group to be viewed purely as an anti-China gang-up.
    • That may well be the case with South Korea too.
    • Indeed, even India should tread cautiously.
    • India has more issues with China than most others in the group, spanning across economic and national security issues and yet it should seek a disciplined China, not an isolated one.

    So, what should be on the agenda of the new group?

    • The proposed expanded G7 group should define its agenda in terms that would encourage China to return to the pre-Xi era of global good behaviour.
    • The G-7 came into being in the mid-1970s against the background of shocks to the global financial and energy markets.
    • The G-12(proposed expanded group)  would come into being against the background of a global economic crisis and the disruption to global trade caused both by protectionism and a pandemic.
    • The two items on the next summit agenda would have to be the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the rising tide of protectionism and mercantilism and the global economic slowdown.
    • The summit will have to come forward with some international dos and don’ts to deal with the challenge posed by these disruptions.
    • New rules should apply to both the US and China: These new rules of international conduct would have to apply to both China and the US.
    • Widening the agenda: To be able to alter China’s behaviour without isolating it, the expanded group will have to widen their agenda.
    • Widening involves going beyond the purely economic issues that the G-7 originally focused on, and include climate change, health care and human rights.

    Back2Basics: The G-20

    • The G-20 is a larger group of countries, which also includes G7 members.
    • The G-20 was formed in 1999, in response to a felt need to bring more countries on board to address global economic concerns.
    • Apart from the G-7 countries, the G-20 comprises Argentina, Australia, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey.
    • Together, the G-20 countries make up around 80% of the world’s economy.
    • As opposed to the G-7, which discusses a broad range of issues, deliberations at the G-20 are confined to those concerning the global economy and financial markets.
    • India is slated to host a G-20 summit in 2022.

  • The 5G Club ‘D10’

    Britain said that it was pushing the U.S. to form a club of 10 nations that could develop its own 5G technology and reduce dependence on Huawei.

    We can expect prelims question asking the purpose of the D10 group like-

    Q. The D10 Club recently seen in news is a- Environment NGO/ Group of Democracies/ etc.

    The D10 Club

    • The Britain is proposing a ‘D10’ club of democratic partners that groups the G7 nations with Australia and the Asian technology leaders South Korea and India.
    • It would include G7 countries – UK, US, Italy, Germany, France, Japan and Canada – plus Australia, South Korea and India.
    • It is aimed for channelling investments into existing telecommunication companies within the 10 member states.
    • The group aim to create alternative suppliers of 5G equipment and other technologies to avoid relying on China.

    Ruling out Huawei

    • Britain has allowed the Chinese global leader in 5G technology to build up to 35% of the infrastructure necessary to roll out its new speedy data network.
    • But their PM Boris Johnson was reported to have instructed officials to draw up plans to cut Huawei out of the network by 2023 as relations with China sour.

  • Anchoring the ties with Australia the virtual way

    India-Australia relations have been growing in depth and diversity. Though two countries have been collaborating in various areas there is still potential to be realised in many areas. This article discusses the India-Australia ties. The area in which the two countries are collaborating and scope to further it.

    Relations with much potential

    • Mr. Modi convened a virtual multilateral summit to bring South Asia together to face the pandemic, and he also spoke online with G-20 leaders on similar issues.
    • On June 4, India will have its first virtual bilateral summit with Australia.
    • The convergence of interests and values has been patently obvious.
    • But the time has also come to translate that potential into reality.

    So, let’s see how India and Australia are expanding the scope of cooperation

    • 1) The two countries have sought to reconstruct their increasingly turbulent regional geography in the Indo-Pacific and see the Quad (with Japan and the United States) as the most potent instrument to promote cooperation.
    • The Quad, not surprisingly has been causing apprehensions in Beijing.
    • 2) It is expected that the ‘Mutual Logistics Support Agreement’ will be signed during the summit.
    • That should enhance defence cooperation and ease the conduct of large-scale joint military exercises.
    • 3) Last April, Australia and India conducted AUSINDEX, their largest bilateral naval exercise.
    • And there are further developments on the anvil, including Australia’s permanent inclusion in the Malabar exercise with Japan.
    • 4) It may be prudent too for New Delhi and Canberra to elevate the ‘two plus two’ format for talks from the Secretary level to the level of Foreign and Defence Ministers.

    Now, let’s look at the cooperation in areas that matter to the lives of the people of the countries-

    1) Pandemic control through controlled adaptation:  Lesson from Australia

    • Australia is one of the few countries that has managed to combat COVID-19 so far through “controlled adaptation” by which the coronavirus has been suppressed to very low levels.
    • Two of the leaders of this great Australia-wide effort are Indian-born scientists.
    • There is much that the two Prime Ministers can share on this front.

    2) Collaboration in  health, safe food and supply chains

    • In terms of health and safe food as well the supply chains that facilitate their delivery, there are important lessons to be learnt.
    • One of Australia’s richest businessman and first patron of the Australia-India Leadership Dialogue recently described the promise of DTC-CPG (direct to consumer; consumer packaged goods) which could transform global supply chains.
    • Here too there is much room for collaboration and new thinking.

    3) Higher education

    • The recovery of Australia’s universities, most of which are publicly funded and many rank among the top in the world, is still in question.
    • But they are proving to be resilient and pioneers in distance and online learning.
    • Australian universities could well open earlier than most and emerge as a safer destination for quality education than their European or Ivy league counterparts.

    Consider the question “India’s relations with Australia have of late acquired a dept and diversity which is visible in their cooperation in diverse areas. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    As India and Australia with shared values try to bring about fresh order in a turbulent world, the virtual summit, in this sense, could not have been better timed.

  • China and the Rhineland moment in Hong Kong

    While the world is busy battling pandemic, China has embarked upon completing its pet project: stripping Hong Kong off its special status. This article explains the significance of China’s actions. And the options the U.S. could explore as a response to China’s move.

    Tipping points in History

    • In 1911 Germany sparked an international crisis when it sent a gunboat into the Moroccan port of Agadir.
    • Winston Churchill wrote in his history of the First World War, “all the alarm bells throughout Europe began immediately to quiver.”
    • In 1936 Germany provoked another crisis when it marched troops into the Rhineland, in flagrant breach of its treaty obligations.
    • In 1946, the Soviet Union made it obvious it had no intention of honoring democratic principles in Central Europe, and Churchill was left to warn that “an iron curtain has descended across the Continent.”

    Analogies: Not perfect, but not inapt, either.

    • Analogies between these past episodes and China’s decision this week to draft a new national security law on Hong Kong aren’t perfect.
    • First, Hong Kong is a Chinese port, not a faraway foreign one.
    • Second, Hong Kong’s people have ferociously resisted Beijing’s efforts to impose control, unlike the Rhineland Germans who welcomed Berlin’s.
    • And lastly, the curtailment of freedom that awaits Hong Kong is nothing like the totalitarian tyranny that Joseph Stalin imposed on Warsaw, Budapest and other cities.
    • But the analogies aren’t inapt, either.
    • Beijing has spent the better part of 20 years subverting its promises to preserve Hong Kong’s democratic institutions.
    • Now it is moving to quash what remains of the city’s civic freedoms through a forthcoming law that allows the government to punish speech as subversion and protest as sedition.
    • The concept of “one country, two systems,” was supposed to last at least until 2047 under the terms of the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration.
    • Now China’s rulers have been openly violating that treaty, much as Germany openly violated the treaties of Locarno and Versailles.

    Rethink of the U.S. strategic approach to China

    • US administration has undertaken a sober rethink of it’s strategic approach to China.
    • The outlines of which are described in a new inter-agency document quietly released by the White House last week.
    • Gone from this new vision are the platitudes about encouraging China’s “peaceful rise” as a “responsible stakeholder” in a “rules-based order.”
    • Instead, Beijing is described, accurately, as a habitual and aggressive violator of that order.
    • It also describes China as a domestic tyrant, international bully and economic bandit that systematically robs companies of their intellectual property, countries of their sovereign authorities, and its own people of their natural rights.
    • A critic might note that this description of China’s behavior sounds a lot like Trump’s.
    • Sort of, except that the comparison trivializes the scale of China’s abuses and neglects the breadth and longevity of its challenge.

    Why Now and what is the US response?

    • Beijing almost certainly chose this moment to strike because it calculated that a world straining under the weight of a pandemic and a depression lacked the will and attention to react.
    • On Friday, Trump said he would strip Hong Kong of its privileged commercial and legal ties to the U.S.
    • Issue with the move: That punishes the people of Hong Kong at least as much as it does their rulers in Beijing.

    What’s a better course for the U.S.? A few ideas:

    • Sanction Chinese officials engaged in human-rights abuses in Hong Kong under the Global Magnitsky Act.
    • Upgrade relations with Taiwan and increase arms sales, including top-shelf weapons’ systems such as the F-35 and the Navy’s future frigate.
    • Re-enter the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)agreement as a counter to China’s economic influence.
    • Publicly press all G-7 countries to stop doing business with telecom-giant Huawei as a meaningful response to the Hong Kong law.
    • Give every Hong Kong person an opportunity to easily obtain a U.S. residency card, even a passport.

    Conclusion

    If all this and more were announced now, it might persuade Beijing to pull back from the brink. In the meantime, think of this as  Rhineland moment with China — and remember what happened the last time the free world looked aggression in the eye, and blinked

  • For a reset in India-Nepal relations

    Over the past few years, we have been  witness to the deteriorating India-Nepal relations. Reserves of goodwill which India had accumulated is fast depleting in Nepal. The latest issue over the map is a new addition to the decline in relations. This article stresses the need for political maturity to find the solution to the complex issue of the underlying problem.

    Need for the fundamental reset in relations between Indian and Nepal

    • The immediate provocation for the contention is the long-standing territorial issue surrounding Kalapani.
    • It is a patch of land near the India-Nepal border, close to the Lipulekh Pass on the India-China border.
    • However, the underlying reasons are far more complex.
    • Yet, Nepali Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli’s exploitation of the matter, by raising the banner of Nepali nationalism and painting India as a hegemon, is part of a frequent pattern.
    • Which indicates that relations between the two countries need a fundamental reset.

    Let’s look at the historical background of the India-Nepal border

    • India inherited the boundary with Nepal, established between Nepal and the East India Company in the Treaty of Sugauli in 1816.
    • Kali river constituted the boundary, and the territory to its east was Nepal.
    • The dispute relates to the origin of Kali.
    • Near Garbyang village in Dharchula Tehsil of the Pithoragarh district of Uttarakhand, there is a confluence of different streams coming from north-east from Kalapani and north-west from Limpiyadhura.
    • The early British survey maps identified the north-west stream, Kuti Yangti, from Limpiyadhura as the origin.
    • But after 1857 changed the alignment to Lipu Gad, and in 1879 to Pankha Gad, the north-east streams, thus defining the origin as just below Kalapani.
    • Nepal accepted the change and India inherited this boundary in 1947.

    More past events dealing with the LIpulech pass

    • The Maoist revolution in China in 1949, followed by the takeover of Tibet, created deep misgivings in Nepal.
    • So, India was ‘invited’ by Nepal to set up 18 border posts along the Nepal-Tibet border.
    • The westernmost post was at Tinkar Pass, about 6 km further east of Lipulekh.
    • In 1953, India and China identified Lipulekh Pass for both pilgrims and border trade. After the 1962 war, pilgrimage through Lipulekh resumed in 1981, and border trade, in 1991.
    • In 1961, King Mahendra visited Beijing to sign the China-Nepal Boundary Treaty that defines the zero point in the west, just north of Tinkar Pass.
    • By 1969, India had withdrawn its border posts from Nepali territory.
    • The base camp for Lipulekh remained at Kalapani, less than 10 km west of Lipulekh.
    • In their respective maps, both countries showed Kalapani as the origin of Kali river and as part of their territory.
    • After 1979, the Indo-Tibetan Border Police has manned the Lipulekh Pass.

    So, when was the issue of the origin of Kali river raised?

    • After the 1996 Treaty of Mahakali -Kali river is also called Mahakali/Sarada further downstream-the issue of the origin of Kali river was first raised in 1997.
    • The matter was referred to the Joint Technical Level Boundary Committee that had been set up in 1981 to re-identify and replace the old and damaged boundary pillars along the India-Nepal border.
    • The Committee clarified 98% of the boundary, leaving behind the unresolved issues of Kalapani and Susta when it was dissolved in 2008.
    • It was subsequently agreed that the matter would be discussed at the Foreign Secretary level.
    • Meanwhile, the project to convert the 80-km track from Ghatibagar to Lipulekh into a hardtop road began in 2009 without any objections from Nepal.

    Objections raised by Nepal to the new map released by India

    • The Survey of India issued a new political map (eighth edition) on November 2, 2019, to reflect the change in the status of Jammu and Kashmir as two Union Territories.
    • Nepal registered a protest though the map in no way had changed the boundary between India and Nepal.
    • However, on November 8, the ninth edition was issued.
    • The delineation remained identical but the name Kali river had been deleted.
    • Predictably, this led to stronger protests, with Nepal invoking Foreign Secretary-level talks to resolve issues.

    New map released by Nepal and issues with it

    • A new map of Nepal based on the older British survey reflecting Kali river originating from Limpiyadhura in the north-west of Garbyang was adopted by parliament and notified on May 20.
    • On May 22, a constitutional amendment proposal was tabled to include it in a relevant Schedule.
    • The new alignment adds 335 sq km to Nepali territory, territory that has never been reflected in a Nepali map for nearly 170 years.

    Following issue explains why there is need for rewriting the fundamental of India-Nepal relations

    1. Nepali nationalism is being equated to anti-Indianism

    • Prime Minister Narendra Modi has often spoken of the “neighbourhood first” policy.
    • But the relationship took a nosedive in 2015 when India first got blamed for interfering in the Constitution-drafting in Nepal.
    • And then for an “unofficial blockade” that generated widespread resentment against the country.
    • It reinforced the notion that Nepali nationalism and anti-Indianism were two sides of the same coin.

    2. China factor

    • In Nepali thinking, the China card has provided them the leverage to practise their version of non-alignment.
    • In the past, China maintained a link with the Palace and its concerns were primarily related to keeping tabs on the Tibetan refugee community.
    • With the abolition of the monarchy, China has shifted attention to the political parties as also to institutions like the Army and Armed Police Force.
    • Also, today’s China is pursuing a more assertive foreign policy and considers Nepal an important element in its growing South Asian footprint.

    3. India has ignored the changing political narrative for long

    • The reality is that India has ignored the changing political narrative in Nepal for far too long.
    • India remained content that its interests were safeguarded by quiet diplomacy even when Nepali leaders publicly adopted anti-Indian postures.
    • Long ignored by India, it has spawned distortions in Nepali history textbooks and led to long-term negative consequences.
    • For too long India has invoked a “special relationship”, based on shared culture, language and religion, to anchor its ties with Nepal.
    • Today, this term carries a negative connotation — that of a paternalistic India that is often insensitive and, worse still, a bully.
    • The 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship which was sought by the Nepali authorities in 1949  is viewed as a sign of an unequal relationship, and an Indian imposition.
    • The purpose of the treaty was to continue the special links Nepal had with British India and it  provides for an open border and right to work for Nepali nationals
    • Yet, Nepali authorities have studiously avoided taking it up bilaterally even though Nepali leaders thunder against it in their domestic rhetoric.

    Consider the question, “Examine the issues that have been testing the old ties between India and Nepal.”

    Conclusion

    The urgent need today is to pause the rhetoric on territorial nationalism and lay the groundwork for a quiet dialogue where both sides need to display sensitivity as they explore the terms of a reset of the “special relationship”. A normal relationship where India can be a generous partner will be a better foundation for “neighbourhood first” in the 21st century.

  • Deepening India’s engagement with Africa amid pandemic

    Long thought to be the backwater of the world, Africa has been successful in shading its past image and emerge on the global stage as region hard to ignore. And countries across the world are vying to increase their engagement with the region. This article examines the scope for increasing the ties with the region amid the pandemic.

    India’s association with African Union

    • Africa Day is observed every year on May 25 to commemorate the founding of the Organisation of African Unity, now known as the African Union.
    • India has been closely associated with it on account of its shared colonial past and rich contemporary ties.
    • The Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses has hosted an Africa Day Round Table annually for the last four years in order to commemorate this epochal event.

    Economy and pandemic

    • The World Bank in its April report, assessed that the COVID-19 outbreak has sparked off the Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) region’s first recession in 25 years.
    • Growth is expected to plummet to between -2.1 and -5.1 per cent in 2020, from a modest 2.4 per cent in 2019.
    • With high rates of HIV, malaria, diabetes, hypertension and malnourishment prevalent, a large number of Africans were already faced with a health and economic crisis.
    • The steep decline in commodity prices has spelt disaster for the economies of Nigeria, Zambia and Angola.

    Need for financial support

    • Precarious fiscal positions have ruled out any major governmental stimulus.
    • Public debt has mounted.
    • According to the World Bank, the SSA region paid $35.8 billion in total debt service in 2018.
    • Which is 2.1 per cent of regional gross domestic product (GDP).
    • Together, African countries have sought a $100 billion rescue package.
    • This rescue package includes a $44 billion waiver of interest payment by the world’s 20 largest economies.
    • The IMF’s debt service relief of $500 million is meant for 25 countries of which 19 are in Africa, but that is a drop in the bucket.
    • It is clear that without outside support, Africa will find it very difficult to meet the challenge.

    Why the increased interest in engagement with Africa?

    • Africa’s rich natural resources, long-term economic potential, youthful demography and influence as a bloc of 54 countries in multi-lateral organisations is apparent.
    • Many have an eye for economic opportunities, including in energy, mining, infrastructure and connectivity. 
    • Japan hosted the 7th Tokyo International Conference for African Development (TICAD) in August 2019.
    • Russia hosted the first-ever Russia-Africa Summit last year.
    • Brazil, home to the largest population of people of African descent outside of Africa, has also sought to develop closer ties.
    • Cuba has sent medical teams to help Africa.

    Chinese Bonhomie with the region

    • China’s engagement of Africa, as elsewhere, is huge but increasingly regarded as predatory and exploitative.
    • Its annual trade with Africa in 2019 stood at $208 billion, in addition to investments and loans worth $200 billion.
    • Traditionally, China’s participation in infrastructure projects has been astonishing.
    • Having famously built the 1,860 km Tanzania-Zambia railway line in 1975, and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti and Mombasa-Nairobi lines more recently, China is now eyeing to develop the vast East Africa Master Railway Plan.
    • It is also developing the Trans-Maghreb Highway, the Mambilla Hydropower Plant in Nigeria, the Walvis Bay Container Terminal in Windhoek and the Caculo Cabaca Hydropower project in Angola.
    • At the Forum for China-Africa Cooperation (COCAC) in 2018, China set aside $60 billion in developmental assistance.
    • And it was followed by a whopping $1 billion Belt and Road (BRI) Infrastructure Fund for Africa.
    • China has followed up with robust health sector diplomacy in the wake of the pandemic.
    • But its image has been tarnished by defective supplies of PPE gear and discriminatory behaviour against Africans in Guangzhou.
    • This also led to an embarrassing diplomatic row.

    India’s relations with Africa

    • In the last few years, India’s relations with Africa saw a revival.
    • India-Africa trade reached $62 billion in 2018 compared to $39 billion during 2009-10.
    • After South Asia, Africa is the second-largest recipient of Indian overseas assistance with Lines of Credit (LOC) worth nearly $10 billion (42 per cent of the total) spread over 100 projects in 41 countries.
    • Ties were boosted at the India Africa Forum Summit (IAFS) in 2015.
    • 40 per cent of all training and capacity building slots under the ITEC programme have traditionally been reserved for Africa.
    • Approximately 6,000 Indian soldiers are deployed in UN peace-keeping missions in five conflict zones in Africa.
    • Bilateral cooperation includes solar energy development, information technology, cyber security, maritime security, disaster relief, counter-terrorism and military training.
    • India has also launched several initiatives to develop closer relations, including the first-ever India Africa Defence Ministers conclave in February this year on the margins of the Defence Expo 2020.
    • India provides about 50,000 scholarships to African students each year.
    • The huge Indian diaspora is a major asset.
    • India had planned to host the Fourth India Africa Forum Summit in September this year.
    • However, the COVID-19 pandemic may cause it to be delayed.

    India’s support amid covid pandemic

    • India has already despatched medical assistance to 25 African countries.
    • PM Modi has had a telephonic talk with President Cyril Ramaphosa of South Africa who is the current chairperson of the African Union, and separately others such as the presidents of Uganda and Ethiopia.
    • India could consider structuring a series of virtual summits in zonal groups with African leaders across the continent over the next few months.
    • That could both provide a platform for a cooperative response to the pandemic and also serve as a precursor to the actual summit in the future.
    • The Ministry of External Affairs has already extended the e-ITEC course on “COVID-19 Pandemic: Prevention and Management Guidelines for Healthcare Professionals” to healthcare workers in Africa.
    • The Aarogya Setu App and the E-Gram Swaraj App for rural areas for mapping COVID-19 are technological achievements that could be shared with Africa.
    • Since the movement of African students to India for higher education has been disrupted, India may expand the e-VidyaBharti (tele education) project to establish an India-Africa Virtual University. Agriculture and food security can also be a fulcrum for deepening ties.
    • With the locust scourge devastating the Horn of Africa and the pandemic worsening the food crisis, India could ramp up its collaboration in this sector.
    • India could also create a new fund for Africa and adapt its grant-in-aid assistance to reflect the current priorities.
    • This could include support for new investment projects by Indian entrepreneurs especially in the pharmaceutical and healthcare sectors in Africa.

    Time for Quad Plus to propose cooperation with African countries

    • Both India and Japan share a common interest in forging a partnership for Africa’s development.
    • It is time for the Quad Plus, in which the US, India, Japan and Australia have recently engaged other countries such as the ROK, Vietnam, New Zealand, Israel and Brazil, to exchange views and propose cooperation with select African countries abutting the Indian Ocean.
    • After all, the Indo-Pacific straddles the entire maritime space of the Indian Ocean.

    Consider the 2015 question asked by the UPSC “Increasing interest of India in Africa has its pros and cons. Critically examine”

    Conclusion

    The pandemic is a colossal challenge but it may create fresh opportunities to bring India and Africa closer together.