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Subject: International Relations

  • India launches campaign brochure for UNSC seat

    India has launched its campaign brochure ahead of elections for five non-permanent members of UNSC.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. By any calculus, India will qualify for UNSC permanent seat. Analyse.

    India’s agenda for UNSC

    The normal process of international governance has been under increasing strain as frictions have increased. Traditional and non-traditional security challenges continue to grow unchecked. India will highlight:

    • International terrorism
    • UN reforms and Security Council expansion, and
    • Streamlining the world body’s peacekeeping operations
    • Various technological initiatives

    India and UNSC

    • India is guaranteed a place in the UNSC as it is the sole candidate for Asia-Pacific but needs two-thirds of the 193-member General Assembly to vote in its favour in a secret ballot scheduled this month in New York.
    • While India is expected to sail through with the 129 votes required for the seat, the government is setting its sights on much higher numbers than that ahead of the election.
    • In 2010, when India stood for the UNSC seat of 2011-2012, it won 187 of the 190 votes polled.

    Streamlining new NORMS

    • This will be the eighth time India will occupy a non-permanent UNSC seat, with its last stint in 2011-2012.
    • India’s overall objective during this tenure in the UN Security Council will be the achievement of N.O.R.M.S: a New Orientation for a Reformed Multilateral System.

    Non-permanent membership  isn’t a cup of tea

    • The government launched its plan for the UNSC seat as far back as 2013, officials said, with a keen eye on 2021, and the year that will mark its 75th year of Independence.
    • To our good fortune, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan agreed, in a gesture to our friendship, to step aside for the 2021-22 seats.
    • The next big challenge was to pursue the Asia-Pacific grouping nomination without any last-minute contenders being propped up against India.
    • While diplomacy between capitals certainly helps, the vote had to be tied down by negotiations on the ground.
    • India was able to win a unanimous endorsement from the 55-nation grouping that included both China and Pakistan, in June 2019.

    Back2Basics: United Nations Security Council

    • The UNSC is one of the six principal organs of the United Nations and is charged with the maintenance of international peace and security.
    • Its powers include the establishment of peacekeeping operations, the establishment of international sanctions, and the authorization of military action through Security Council resolutions.
    • It is the only UN body with the authority to issue binding resolutions to member states.
    • The Security Council consists of fifteen members. Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, and the United States—serve as the body’s five permanent members.
    • These permanent members can veto any substantive Security Council resolution, including those on the admission of new member states or candidates for Secretary-General.
    • The Security Council also has 10 non-permanent members, elected on a regional basis to serve two-year terms. The body’s presidency rotates monthly among its members.

    Also read:

    India’s Bid to United Nations Permanent Seat

  • The China conundrum

    India-China border issue and the latest standoff in Ladakh has forced India to consider the lasting solution to the problem. This article explains China’s anti-India strategy. And options available with India in the face of aggression are also considered.

    LAC: the reason for frequent face-offs

    • The debate has persisted whether it was China’s National Highway 219 cutting across Aksai Chin or Nehru’s “forward policy” which constituted the actual reason for the Sino-Indian border-conflict of 1962.
    • After declaring a unilateral ceasefire on November 20, troops of the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) withdrew 20 kms behind what China described as the “line of actual control” (LAC).
    • The LAC generally conformed to the British-negotiated McMahon Line.
    • In the west, the Chinese stuck to their 1959 claim-line in Ladakh, retaining physical control of the 14,700 sq km Aksai Chin.
    • The 1962 ceasefire line became the de facto Sino-Indian border.
    • But in a bizarre reality, both sides visualised their own version of the LAC, but neither marked it on the ground; nor were maps exchanged.
    • This has inevitably led to frequent face-offs.

    So, what were the steps taken the resolve the border issue after 1962?

    • Post-conflict, it is customary for belligerents to undertake early negotiations, in order to establish stable peace and eliminate the casus belli.
    • Strangely, in the Sino-Indian context, it took 25 years and a serious military confrontation in 1987 to trigger a dialogue.
    • The dialogue led the two countries to sign the first-ever Sino-Indian Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement (BPTA) in 1993.
    • Indian diplomats claim that this has helped maintain “mutual and equal security”, while the bilateral relationship has progressed in other spheres.
    • And yet, the failure to negotiate a boundary settlement after 22 meetings of special representatives of the two countries cannot be seen as anything but a failure of statesmanship and diplomacy.

    Now, let’s analyse China’s anti-India strategy and how LAC and Pakistan problem fits into it

    • China’s post-civil war leadership had conceived an early vision of the country’s future.
    • Ambitious and realist in scope, this strategy visualised China attaining, in the fullness of time, great-power status and acquiring a nuclear-arsenal.
    • Since the vision saw no room for an Asian rival, neutralising India became a priority.
    • It was for this specific purpose, that Pakistan was enlisted in 1963 as a partner.
    • In China’s anti-India strategy, Pakistan has played an invaluable role by sustaining a “hot” border and holding out the threat of a two-front war.
    • In China’s grand-strategy, an undefined LAC has become a vital instrumentality to embarrass and keep India off-balance through periodic transgressions.
    • These pre-meditated “land-grabs”, blunt messages of intimidation and dominance, also constitute a political “pressure-point” for New Delhi.

    Possibility of escalation into shooting war

    • While Indian troops have, so far, shown courage and restraint in these ridiculous brawls with the PLA.
    • But there is no guarantee that in a future melee, a punch on the nose will not invite a bullet in response.
    • In such circumstances, rapid escalation into a “shooting-war” cannot be ruled out.
    • Thereafter, should either side face a major military set-back, resort to nuclear “first-use” would pose a serious temptation.

    What are the options available with India?

    • For reasons of national security as well as self-respect, India cannot continue to remain in a “reactive mode” to Chinese provocations and it is time to respond in kind.
    • Since India’s choices vis-à-vis China are circumscribed by the asymmetry in comprehensive national power, resort must be sought in realpolitik.
    • According to theorist Kenneth Waltz, just as nature abhors a vacuum, international politics abhors an imbalance of power, and when faced with hegemonic threats, states must seek security in one of three options: 1) Increase their own strength, 2) ally with others to restore power-balance, 3) as a last resort, jump on the hegemon’s bandwagon.

    India’s decision-makers can start by posing this question to the military: “For how long do you have the wherewithal to sustain a combat against two adversaries simultaneously?” Depending on the response, they can consider the following 2 options.

    1. Alliance with the USA

    • Nehru, when faced with an aggressive China in 1962, asked support from the USA.
    •  Indira Gandhi in the run-up to the 1971 war with Pakistan asked support from the USSR.
    • Both had no qualms of jettisoning the shibboleth of “non-alignment” and seeking support from the USA and USSR respectively.
    • Today, India has greater freedom of action and many options to restore the balance of power vis-à-vis China.
    • Xi Jinping has opened multiple fronts — apart from the COVID-19 controversy — across the South China Sea, South East Asia, Hong Kong, Taiwan and South Asia.
    • Donald Trump is burning his bridges with China.
    • In the world of realpolitik, self-interest trumps all and India must find friends where it can.
    • Given China’s vulnerabilities in the Indian Ocean and the real possibility of America losing its strategic foothold in Diego Garcia, India has a great deal to offer as a friend, partner or even an ally; with or without the Quad.

    2. Accommodation with China

    •  If ideological or other reasons preclude the building of a power-balancing alliance, coming to an honourable accommodation with China remains a pragmatic option.
    • Zhou Enlai’s proposal of 1960 — repeated by Deng Xiaoping in 1982 — is worth re-examining in the harsh light of reality.
    • The price of finding a modus vivendi [an arrangement or agreement allowing conflicting parties to coexist peacefully]for the Sino-Indian border dispute may be worth paying if it neutralises two adversaries at one stroke and buys lasting peace.

    Consider the question “In the harsh light of reality and faced with aggression from its neighbour, India has to ally with other powers to restore the balance of power. Examine.”

    Conclusion

    Neither option will be easy to “sell”. However, India cannot afford to continue with the current situation for long and must choose one of the options to end the to find the solution.

  • A chill in US-China relations and India as a collateral damage

    Even before the covid pandemic we could sense the rising tension between the U.S. and China. However, pandemic proved to be the tipping point. This article explains the role the U.S. played in China’s rise. And its recent acceptance under Donald Trump of not so peaceful rise of China.

    Let’s look into recent announcements on China by the US President

    •  On May 29, the Trump administration said it would revoke Hong Kong’s special trade status under U.S. law.
    • It passed an order limiting the entry of certain Chinese graduate students and researchers who may have ties to the People’s Liberation Army.
    • The U.S. President has also ordered financial regulators to closely examine Chinese firms listed in U.S. stock markets.
    • And warned those that do not comply with U.S. laws could be delisted.

    So, what all these measures indicate?

    • These announcements are a clear indication that the competition between the U.S. and China is likely to sharpen in the post-COVID world.

    U.S. is complicit in China’s rise, but how?

    •  After the Chinese communists seized power, the Americans hoped to cohabit with Mao Zedong in a world under U.S. hegemony.
    • The Chinese allowed them to believe this and extracted their price.
    • U.S. President Richard Nixon gave China the international acceptability it craved in return for being admitted to Mao’s presence in 1972.
    • President Jimmy Carter terminated diplomatic relations with Taiwan in order to normalise relations with China in 1978.
    • President George H.W. Bush washed away the sins of Tiananmen in 1989 for ephemeral geopolitical gain.
    • And Bill Clinton, who as a presidential candidate had criticised Bush for indulging the Chinese, proceeded as President to usher the country into the World Trade Organization at the expense of American business.
    • All American administrations since the 1960s have been complicit in China’s rise in the unrealised hope that it will become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ under Pax Americana.

    China is creating its own universe

    • The collapse of the Soviet Union reinforced the view that the U.S. wants to keep its order and change China’s system.
    • This strengthened China’s resolve to resist by creating its own parallel universe.
    • China is building an alternate trading system: the Belt and Road Initiative.
    • A multilateral banking system under its control-Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, New Development Bank.
    • Its own global positioning system BeiDou.
    • Digital payment platforms like WeChat Pay and Alipay.
    • A world-class digital network-Huawei 5G.
    • Cutting-edge technological processes in sunrise industries.
    • And a modern military force.
    • It is doing this under the noses of the Americans and some of it with the financial and technological resources of the West.

    U.S. accepting the uneasy fact that China’s rise has not been peaceful

    • It is only under Mr. Trump that the Americans are finally acknowledging the uneasy fact that the Chinese are not graven in their image.
    • He has called China out on trade practices.
    • He has called China out on 5G.
    • It was Mr. Trump’s 2017 National Security Strategy document that, perhaps for the first time, clubbed China along with Russia as a challenge to American power, influence and interests.
    • His recent China-specific restrictions on trade and legal migration are, possibly, only the beginning of a serious re-adjustment.

    Decoupling of the economies and new cold war

    • A full-spectrum debate on China is now raging across the U.S.
    • Former White House Chief of Staff Steve Bannon declared that the U.S. is already at war with China.
    • Others like diplomat Richard Haass and former president of the World Bank, Robert Zoellick, warn that a new Cold War will be a mistake.
    • Scholar Julian Gewirtz, in his brilliant essay, ‘The Chinese Reassessment of Interdependence’, talks about a similar process underway in Beijing.
    • Both sides are acutely aware how closely their economies are tied together: from farm to factory, the U.S. is heavily dependent on supply chains in China and the Chinese have been unable to break free of the dollar.
    • If Mr. Trump’s wish is to disentangle China’s supply chains, Mr. Xi is equally determined to escape from the U.S. ‘chokehold’ on technology.
    • To what extent the de-coupling is possible is yet to be determined.
    • But one thing is inevitable, India will become part of the collateral damage.

    Hong Kong: Sign of U.S. China rivalry entering in ideological domain

    • Will Hong Kong become a game-changer in the post-COVID world?
    • China’s decision to enact the new national security law for Hong Kong has been condemned in unison by the U.S. and its Western allies as an assault on human freedoms.

    Why is this significant?

    • The points of divergence, even dispute, between them have so far been in the material realm.
    • With Hong Kong, the U.S.-China rivalry may, possibly, be entering the ideological domain.
    • For some time now there are reports about Chinese interference in the internal affairs of democracies.
    • Countries in the West have tackled this individually, always mindful of not jeopardising their trade with China.
    • Hong Kong may be different.
    • It is not only a bastion for Western capitalism in the East, but more importantly the torch-bearer of Western democratic ideals.
    • Think of it as a sort of Statue of Liberty; it holds aloft the torch of freedom and democracy for all those who pass through Hong Kong en route to China.
    • This is an assault on beliefs, so to speak.

    Issue of China’s role in Covid-19 pandemic

    • These is growing demands that China should come clean on its errors of omission in the early days of COVID-19.
    • In the months ahead, more information may become public, from sources inside China itself, about the shortcomings of the regime.
    • That will further fuel a debate on the superiority of the Chinese Model as an alternative to democracy.

    Will this form the ideological underpinning for the birth of a new Cold War?

    • That will depend on who wins in Washington in November.
    • It will also depend on whether profit will again trump politics in Europe.
    • Moreover, how skilfully the Wolf Warriors of China can manipulate global public opinion will also make the be an important factor.

    Consider the question-“Various recent measures by the U.S. on China and the debate on the role of China in Covid-19 makes it clear that the next Cold War is all but imminent. And India has to be careful to avoid being collateral damage in that war. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    The lines are beginning to be drawn between the Americans on the one side and China on the other. A binary choice is likely to test to the limit India’s capacity to maintain strategic and decisional autonomy.

  • Setting agenda for G-12

    Recently, there was a call for expansion of the membership of the G-7 by the U.S. President. But the expanded group should not be seen as an anti-China gang-up. Disciplining and not isolating China is what most of the members of the group would want. And to do so, this new group needs to have new agenda. This article discusses the items that must form the part of the new agenda.

    Evolution of the G-7

    • When it started in 1975—with six members, Canada joining a year later—it represented about 70% of the world economy.
    • And it was a cosy club for tackling issues such as the response to oil shocks.
    • Now it accounts for about 40% of global gdp.
    • Since the global financial crisis of 2007-09 it has sometimes been overshadowed by the broader g20.
    • The G-7 became the G-8 in 1997 when Russia was invited to join.
    • In 2014, Russia was debarred after it took over Crimea.

    Call for expansion of the membership

    • It was the French who first flew the kite of membership expansion.
    • France had invited heads of government of several “emerging economies” for a meeting of the group at Évian-les-Bains, France, in June 2003. 
    • After 2003, G-8 host countries began organising a meeting on the sidelines of their summits with a select group of five or six developing countries.
    • India and China were invited to all those summits.
    • Now, President Trump has, however, gone a step further.
    • Rather than invite “guests” to a G-7 summit, he has suggested expanding the G-7 to a G-10 or G-11.
    • Trump has come up with an interesting list of new members — Australia, India, South Korea and, possibly, Russia.
    • Inclusion of Russia: Trump’s pragmatism in including Russia should be welcomed.
    • The advantage of getting Russia in is that the group would not be viewed merely as an anti-China gang-up but, in fact, as a club of “free market democracies”.
    • The group could easily be made the G-12 with the inclusion of Indonesia — one of the few democratic nations in the Islamic world.

    Discipline China, not isolate it

    • Trump’s motivation in expanding the G-7 to include India and Russia while keeping China out is transparent.
    • If keeping China out was not the intention, the G-7 could easily have dissolved themselves and revitalised the presently inert G-20.
    • There are, of course, good reasons why Xi Jinping’s China requires to be put on notice for its various acts of omission and commission and disrespect for international law.
    • However, disciplining China is one thing, isolating it quite another.
    • If the new group is viewed as yet another arrow in the China containment quiver it would place India and most other members of the group in a spot.
    • Everyone wants China disciplined, few would like to be seen seeking its isolation.
    • Asia needs a law-abiding China, not a sullen China.
    • Japan and Australia, have serious concerns about China’s behaviour.
    • But they may not like the new group to be viewed purely as an anti-China gang-up.
    • That may well be the case with South Korea too.
    • Indeed, even India should tread cautiously.
    • India has more issues with China than most others in the group, spanning across economic and national security issues and yet it should seek a disciplined China, not an isolated one.

    So, what should be on the agenda of the new group?

    • The proposed new group should define its agenda in terms that would encourage China to return to the pre-Xi era of global good behaviour.
    • The G-7 came into being in the mid-1970s against the background of shocks to the global financial and energy markets.
    • The G-12 would come into being against the background of a global economic crisis and the disruption to global trade caused both by protectionism and a pandemic.
    • The two items on the next summit agenda would have to be the global response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the rising tide of protectionism and mercantilism and the global economic slowdown.
    • The summit will have to come forward with some international dos and don’ts to deal with the challenge posed by these disruptions.

    New rules should apply to both the US and China

    • These new rules of international conduct would have to apply to both China and the US.
    • The G-12— have a shared interest in ensuring that both China and the US respect international law and desist from unilateralism in dealing with neighbours and global challenges.

    Widening the agenda

    • To be able to alter China’s behaviour without isolating it, the G-12 will have to widen their agenda.
    • Widening involves going beyond the purely economic issues that the G-7 originally focused on, and include climate change, health care and human rights.

    What should the “free market democracies” mean

    • In identifying themselves as “free market democracies” the G-12 must issue a new charter of respect for human rights, adherence to international law and multilateralism in trade and security.
    • This is easier said than done.
    • President Trump will have to re-assure the group’s members that he has their combined interests at heart in proposing a new group.
    • And he also has to show that he has an imagination beyond just an “America First” policy.
    • Even as the world is increasingly wary of an assertive China and of Xi Jinping’s China Dream and his version of a “China First” policy, it is also wary of Trump’s unilateralism on many fronts.

    What should the invitee nations consider before joining the group?

    • Many countries share Trump’s displeasure with China for its manipulation of the World Health Organisation.
    • But many of them are equally unhappy with the manner in which the Trump administration has treated the World Trade Organisation.
    • A G-12 cannot ignore such partisan behaviour by either the US or China.
    • If Trump does issue an invitation to the three or four new members to join the new group, they should seek clarity on the terms of membership.
    • Russia’s experience, of being invited and then disinvited and now being considered for being re-invited should be a salutary message to all others invitees.

    Consider the question- “The expanded new G-12 with India as its member, should also needs new agenda with its focus beyond China. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    As the world’s largest free market democracy India deserves to be a member of not just a G-12 but of even a new G-7. India’s political and economic credentials are certainly stronger than those of Canada, Britain and Italy.

  • What is the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)?

    Security issue in the disputed South China Sea has helped convince the Philippines to delay quitting a key U.S. military pact called the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. What’s behind diplomatic tensions in the South China Sea? How it is set to become another flashpoint between the US and China?

    The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA)

    • A VFA is a version of a status of forces agreement that only applies to troops temporarily in a country.
    • The US military operates around the world thanks to Status of Forces Agreements (SOFA) in 100 or so countries.
    • Similarly, the VFA spells out the rules, guidelines and legal status of the US military when operating in the Philippines.
    • The VFA also affirms the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty as well as the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement — agreements that enable the U.S. military to conduct joint exercises and operations in the Philippines.
    • It came into force on May 27, 1999, upon ratification by the Senate of the Philippines.
    • It also exempts U.S. military personnel from visa and passport regulations in the Philippines.

    Significance of VFA

    • Both the US and Philippines remain wary of Beijing’s actions in the South China Sea (SCS). The VFA, therefore, act as an insurance policy against Chinese threats.
    • Terminating the VFA would leave the U.S. military without any legal or operational standing in the Philippines — and that’s a problem for the alliance.
    • Without a VFA, the U.S. military would not be able to support either of these defence agreements.

    Philippines-China spat on SCS

    • The Philippines has had diplomatic spats with China over the Scarborough Shoal and Spratlys in particular.
    • It says China’s “nine-dash line”, which China uses to demarcate its territorial claims, is unlawful under the UNCLOS convention.
    • The SCS is also a major shipping route and home to fishing grounds that supply the livelihoods of people across the region.

    Back2Basics: South China Sea Row

    • It is a dispute over territory and sovereignty over ocean areas, and the Paracels and the Spratlys – two island chains claimed in whole or in part by a number of countries.
    • China, Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei all have competing claims.
    • Alongside the fully-fledged islands, there are dozens of rocky outcrops, atolls, sandbanks and reefs, such as the Scarborough Shoal.
    • China claims by far the largest portion of territory – an area defined by the “nine-dash line” which stretches hundreds of miles south and east from its most southerly province of Hainan.
    • Beijing says its right to the area goes back centuries to when the Paracel and Spratly island chains were regarded as integral parts of the Chinese nation, and in 1947 it issued a map detailing its claims.
    • It showed the two island groups falling entirely within its territory. Those claims are mirrored by Taiwan.

    Spat over Chinese claims

    • China has backed its expansive claims with island-building and naval patrols.
    • The US says it does not take sides in territorial disputes but has sent military ships and planes near disputed islands, calling them “freedom of navigation” operations to ensure access to key shipping and air routes.
    • Both sides have accused each other of “militarizing” the South China Sea.
    • There are fears that the area is becoming a flashpoint, with potentially serious global consequences.

    With inputs from Washington Post

  • India should focus on Middle powers

    Let’s play a game. India and this country are both members of Commonwealth of nations. Cricket, English language and Nuclear relations is something common to both of us. In fact, India was this nation’s eighth-largest trading partner and fifth-largest export market in 2018-19. The Indian diaspora in this country is now third largest and fastest growing diaspora. Any guesses?

    What is a middle power?

    In international relations, a middle power is a sovereign state that is not a great power nor a superpower, but still has large or moderate influence and international recognition. The concept of the “middle power” dates back to the origins of the European state system.

    Plugging the big gap in India’s diplomatic tradition

    • India remains preoccupied with the perennial challenges in its neighbourhood, resulting in missing out on the opportunities for productive partnerships with the middle powers.
    • Thursday’s virtual summit between Prime Minister of India and the Australian premier, Scott Morrison, is an important part of Delhi’s current diplomatic effort to plug that big gap in India’s diplomatic tradition.

    Let’s see what opportunities Australia holds for India

    • Economic weight: With a GDP of more than US$1.4 trillion, Australia is the 13th largest economy in the world, following closely behind Russia which stands at $1.6 trillion.
    • Australia is rich in natural resources that India’s growing economy needs.
    • It also has huge reservoirs of strength in higher education, scientific and technological research.
    •  Its armed forces, hardened by international combat, are widely respected.
    • Canberra’s intelligence establishment is valued in many parts of the world.
    • Australia has deep economic, political and security connections with the ASEAN and a strategic partnership with one of the leading non-aligned nations, Indonesia.
    • Canberra has a little “sphere of influence” of its own — in the South Pacific (now under threat from Chinese penetration).
    • All these Australian strengths should be of interest and value to India.
    • Jawaharlal Nehru, believed Australia is a natural part of Asia and invited it to participate in the Asian Relations Conference in Delhi in 1947, a few months before independence.

    India’s nuclear test and it’s repercussions

    • A political dust-up between Delhi and Canberra in the wake of India’s nuclear tests in 1998 complicated the possibilities that the end of the Cold War opened up.
    • But since 2000, Canberra has taken consistent political initiative to advance ties with India by resolving the nuclear difference and expanding the template of engagement.

    Comparing India and China’s approach to Middle powers

    • A gap of nearly three decades between Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Australia in 1986 and Modi’s trip in 2014 only underlines how short-sighted India’s neglect of Australia has been.
    • It was exactly in these years that China transformed its relationship with Australia.
    • Delhi’s temptation to judge nations on the basis of their alignments with other powers stands in contrast to Beijing.
    • Beijing puts interests above ideology, promotes interdependence with a targeted middle power, turns it into political influence and tries to weaken its alignment with the rival powers.

    Growing India-Australia relations

    •  The Indian diaspora — now estimated at nearly 7,00,000— is the fastest growing in Australia and has become an unexpected positive factor in bilateral relations.
    • Common membership of many groupings like the G-20, East Asia Summit, IORA, and the Quad has increased the possibilities for diplomatic cooperation on regional and global issues.
    • Other host of emerging issues — from reforming the World Health Organisation to 5G technology and from strengthening the international solar alliance to building resilience against climate change and disasters — can lend to intensive bilateral political and institutional engagement.

    Geopolitics and Security cooperation

    • The geopolitical churn in the Indo-Pacific, growing Chinese assertiveness and the uncertain US political trajectory open space for security cooperation.
    • Over the last few years, defence engagement between the two countries has grown.
    • Defence engagement is likely to be capped by a military logistics support agreement to be unveiled at the summit.
    • For future, there is a need from both security establishments to develop strategic coordination in the various sub-regions of the Indo-Pacific littoral.

    Eastern Indian Ocean: top priority

    • The eastern Indian Ocean that lies between the shores of peninsular India and the west coast of Australia ought to be the top priority.
    • This is where Delhi and Canberra can initiate a full range of joint activities.
    • Joint activities should include maritime domain awareness, development of strategically located islands and marine scientific research.

    Seeking trilateral cooperation with Indonesia

    • The sea lines of communication between the Indian and Pacific oceans run through the Indonesian archipelago.
    • Given the shared political commitment to the Indo-Pacific idea between Delhi, Jakarta and Canberra and the growing pressures on them to secure their shared waters, Modi and Morrison must seek trilateral maritime and naval cooperation with Indonesia.

    Three other natural partners to expand cooperation

    • Besides Indonesia, three other powers present themselves as natural partners for India and Australia — Japan, France and Britain.
    • Tokyo has close ties with both Delhi and Canberra.
    • Their current trilateral dialogue can be expanded from the diplomatic level to practical maritime cooperation on the ground.
    • France is a resident power with territories in the Western Indian Ocean and the South Pacific.
    • Paris and Canberra are eager to develop a trilateral arrangement with Delhi that will supplement the bilateral cooperation among the three nations.

    Engagement between India & EPDA

    • There is the less discussed role of Britain, which wants to return to the oriental seas.
    • In the east, Britain continues to lead the so-called Five Power Defence Arrangement set up back in 1971, after Britain pulled back most of its forces from the East of Suez.
    • The FPDA brings together the armed forces of the UK, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand.
    • Modi and Morrison must explore the possibilities for engagement between India and the FPDA.

    Try a question:

    India and Australia nuclear deal was a major breakthrough in the bilateral relation. But this bilateral partnership has so much more potential in other areas. Critically examine.

    Conclusion

    It is only by building a series of overlapping bilateral and minilateral platforms for regional security cooperation that Delhi and Canberra can limit the dangers of the growing geopolitical imbalance in the Indo-Pacific.

  • Dilemma for Delhi in Ladakh standoff

    Though the rest of the world is preoccupied with Covid pandemic, China is busy in raising tension over border issues with its neighbour-India. What explains such actions by China? And timing selected by China has also puzzled many. India, on its part, faces a dilemma. This article dissects the various issues related to the standoff and explains the options available with India to deal with the Chinese intimidation.

    Why the latest transgression by PLA is unprecedented?

    • There are around 400 transgressions/faceoffs each year on an average along the LAC.
    • But the recent spate of territorial transgressions by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is unprecedented in its scope and manner.
    • Even as independent accounts point out that Chinese troops are yet to withdraw from the transgressed territories and restore status quo ante.
    • Those territories are traditionally considered by both sides to be on the Indian side of the LAC.
    • Chinese officials have gone ahead and stated that the “Situation in China-India border is overall stable & controllable”.

    What this move by China signals?

    • The Indian government is left with two basic choices: 1) accept territorial loss as a fait accompli or 2)  force or negotiate a reversal to status quo ante, unless of course the PLA unilaterally withdraws.
    • Either way, China’s growing territorial aggression on the LAC signals the end of Beijing’s peaceful rise and its traditional desire to maintain regional status quo with India.
    • China under its President, Xi Jinping, unequivocally seeks to demonstrate that it is the preponderant power in the region. 

    Let’s analyse the aggression

    • While the timing could be explained by the global political distraction caused by COVID-19.
    • And also the international pressure on China (including by India) to come clean on the origins of the novel coronavirus could have played the role.
    • But the proximate causes could be several. Consider the following-

    1. Statement by India on Aksai Chin

    • For one, New Delhi’s terse statements about Aksai Chin following the Jammu and Kashmir reorganisation in August last year had not gone down well with Beijing.
    • While not many in India believe that New Delhi was serious about getting back Aksai Chin from Chinese control, Beijing may have viewed it as India upping the ante.
    • More pertinently, in a clear departure from the past, New Delhi has been carrying out the construction of infrastructural projects along the LAC — a long overdue activity — which is something that seems to have made China uneasy.

    2. Broader context of long-term geopolitical world view

    • The Chinese angle to the J&K conundrum deserves more attention here.
    • The aggression must also be viewed in the broader context of a long-term geopolitical world view China has for the region. Consider the following in this regard-
    • 1) China’s China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) connectivity to Pakistan through the Karakoram and New Delhi’s criticism of it.
    • 2) The reported presence of PLA troops in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK).
    • 3) India’s new-found activism on Aksai Chin.
    • 4) The PLA’s incursions into areas in eastern Ladakh.

    3. Strategic goals

    • It is equally important to appreciate the larger Chinese strategic calculations behind its recent spate of aggressions.
    • Having given up its traditional slogan of ‘peaceful rise’, China, under Mr. Xi, is beginning to assert itself as the next superpower.
    • Over the years, Beijing has perhaps realised that India is not keen on toeing the Chinese line in the region.
    • So this is Beijing sending a message to New Delhi to fall in line.
    • A message that will not go unnoticed in the smaller capitals around China — from Colombo to Kathmandu to Hanoi.

    4. Political message

    • Given that China is currently engaged in what many analysts are describing as a new cold war with the United States, in the middle of a crackdown in Hong Kong along with fighting COVID-19 at home, one would not have expected the Chinese leadership to open another front.
    • And yet, by opening a limited military front with India on the LAC, China is signalling the U.S. that it can handle pressure.
    •  And telling India that it has the political and military wherewithal to put pressure on New Delhi notwithstanding its other preoccupations.

    Why limited scope confrontation is cost-effective and preferred option by China?

    • China’s limited scope military expeditions on the long-contested border is cost effective for the PLA.
    • This is because the ever-growing conventional military superiority that it enjoys with India.
    • Moreover, because limited fights or smaller land grabs may not provoke an all-out confrontation or nuclear use.
    • The side with conventional superiority and more border infrastructure would likely carry the day.

    India’s China dilemma

    • Picking a direct fight with India which might lead to an undesirable military escalation with India does not suit Beijing’s interests.
    • But carrying out minor military expeditions with the objective of inflicting small-scale military defeats on India is precisely what would suit the Chinese political and military leadership.
    • They are cost effective, less escalatory, and the message gets conveyed.
    • More so, India’s military response would depend a great deal on how far the regime in New Delhi is willing to acknowledge such territorial losses due to domestic political constraints.
    • If New Delhi acknowledges loss of territory, it would have to regain it, but doing so vis-à-vis a conventionally superior power would not be easy.
    • Put differently, growing conventional imbalance and domestic political calculations could prompt New Delhi to overlook minor territorial losses on the LAC.
    • But let us be clear: the more New Delhi overlooks them, the more Beijing would be tempted to repeat them.
    • These considerations lie at the heart of India’s China dilemma.

    How India could respond?

    • Yet, there are limits to China’s LAC adventurism.
    • 1) There are several places along the several thousand kilometre long LAC where the PLA is militarily weak, the Indian Army has the upper hand.
    • And, therefore, a tit-for-tat military campaign could be undertaken by New Delhi.
    • 2)  While China enjoys continental superiority over India, maritime domain is China’s weak spot, in particular Beijing’s commercial and energy interest to which the maritime space is crucial.
    • 3) Finally, and most importantly, would Beijing want to seriously damage the close to $100 billion trade with India with its military adventurism on the LAC?

    Way forward

    • In any case, for India, the age of pussyfooting around Chinese intimidation strategies is over.
    • The time has come to checkmate Beijing’s military aggression even as we maintain a robust economic relationship with our eastern neighbour.
    • It is also a reminder for us to get more serious about finalising a border agreement with China.
    • The bigger the power differential between India and China, the more concessions Beijing would demand from New Delhi to settle the dispute.

    Consider the question-“There have been growing instances of PLA aggression on India-China border. Examine the multiple objectives China’s actions seek to achieve. What are the options available with India to deal with situation?

    Conclusion

    There is little doubt that China is our neighbour and that we have to live next to the larger and more powerful China. However, India should not accept Beijing’s attempts at land grabs, or military intimidation. That China is a rising superpower located next door to us is a reality, but how we deal with that reality is a choice we must make as a nation.

  • Multilateralism in the new cold war

    The world is going through turmoil. The new world that will emerge will be different from what we have known. This provides India with some unique opportunities. This article explains the changes that are taking place and gives the outline of the changing order. So, how can India set and shape the global response? And what should be the principles on which the new multilateralism should be based? Read to know…

    Opportunity for India to set the global response

    • As chair of the Executive Board of the World Health Assembly – India can set the global response in terms of multilateralism, not just medical issues.
    • How can India set a global response in terms of multilateralism? Consider the following- a rare alignment of stars for agenda-setting.
    • 1) In September, the United Nations General Assembly will discuss the theme, “The Future We Want”.
    • 2) In 2021, India joins the UN Security Council (non-permanent seat).
    • 3) And chairs the BRICS Summit in 2021.
    • 4) Also hosts the G-20 in 2022.
    • New principles for international system: At the online summit of the Non-Aligned Movement, in May, Prime Minister Modi called for new principles for the international system.
    • His new globalisation model based on humanity, fairness and equality has wide support in a more equal world as, for the first time since 1950, everyone is experiencing the same (virus) threat.

    Changing global context

    • China is losing influence and the dynamics in its relations with the United States.
    • And Asia again is emerging as the centre of global prosperity.
    • The global governance, economy, scientific research and society are all in need of being re-invented.
    • India should use this opportunity to recover our global thought leadership.

    The US-China powerplay and its consequences for multilateralism

    • The clash between China and the U.S. at the just concluded World Health Assembly in May marks the end of the multilateralism of the past 70 years.
    • The donor-recipient relationship between developed and developing countries has ended with China’s pledge of $2-billion.
    • The agenda-setting role of the G7 over UN institutions and global rules has also been effectively challenged by WHO ignoring the reform diktat of the U.S. leading to its withdrawal, and characterisation of the G7 as “outdated”.
    • The U.S. has also implicitly rejected the G20 and UN Security Council, for an expanded G7 “to discuss the future of China”.
    • Important shift in the UN: After World War II, the newly independent states were not consulted when the U.S. imposed global institutions fostering trade, capital and technology dependence.
    • This was done ignoring the socio-economic development of these countries.
    • But social and economic rights have emerged to be as important as political and procedural rights.
    • Against this backdrop, China’s President Xi Jinping deftly endorsed the UN Resolution on equitable access to any new vaccine.

    Emergence of Asia and China: Challenges for the US and the West

    • The U.S. faces an uphill task in seeking to lead a new multidimensional institution in the face of China’s re-emergence.
    • The re-emergence of China is based on technology, innovation and trade balancing U.S. military superiority.
    • At the same time, there is a clear trend of declining global trust in free-market liberalism, central to western civilisation.
    • With the West experiencing a shock comparable to the one experienced by Asia, 200 years ago, the superiority of western civilisation is also under question.
    • The novel coronavirus pandemic has accelerated the shift of global wealth to Asia suggesting an inclusive global order based on principles drawn from ancient Asian civilisations.
    • Colonised Asia played no role in shaping the Industrial Revolution.
    • But, the Digital Revolution will be shaped by different values.
    • It is really this clash that multilateralism has now to resolve.

    World is questioning both U.S. and China’s exceptionalism

    • China has come out with alternative governance mechanisms to the U.S.-dominated International Monetary Fund, World Bank and World Trade Organization with its all-encompassing Belt and Road Initiative.
    • The U.S., European Union and Japan are re-evaluating globalisation as it pertains to China and the U.S. is unabashedly “America First”.
    • The world is questioning both U.S. and China’s exceptionalism.
    • For India, the strategic issue is neither adjustment to China’s power nor deference to U.S. leadership.

    Opportune moment for India to propose new multilateralism

    • The global vacuum, shift in relative power and its own potential, provides India the capacity to articulate a benign multilateralism.
    • It should include in its fold NAM-Plus that resonates with large parts of the world and brings both BRICS and the G7 into the tent.
    • This new multilateralism should rely on outcomes, not rules, ‘security’ downplayed for ‘comparable levels of wellbeing’ and a new P-5 that is not based on the G7.

    India in a important role

    • China, through an opinion piece by its Ambassador in India, has suggested writing “together a new chapter” with “a shared future for mankind”.
    • The U.S. wants a security partnership to contain China.
    • And the Association of Southeast Asian Nations trade bloc — with the U.S. walking out of the negotiations — is keen India joins to balance China.
    • With a new template. India does not have to choose.

    Three principles the new system should be based on-

    1. Peaceful coexistence

      • First, the Asian Century should be defined in terms of peaceful co-existence, freezing post-colonial sovereignty.
      • Non-interference in the internal affairs of others is a key lesson from the decline of the U.S. and the rise of China.
      • National security now relies on technological superiority in artificial intelligence (AI), cyber and space, and not expensive capital equipment, as India’s military has acknowledged.
      • Instead of massive arms imports, we should use the savings to enhance endogenous capacity.
      • And mould the global digital economy between state-centric (China), firm-centric (the U.S.) and public-centric (India) systems.

    2. New principles of trade

    • A global community at comparable levels of well-being requires new principles for trade, for example, rejecting the 25-year-old trade rule creating intellectual property monopolies.
    • Global public goods should include public health, crop research, renewable energy and batteries, even AI as its value comes from shared data.
    • We have the scientific capacity to support these platforms as part of foreign policy.

    3.  Civilisational values

    • Ancient civilisational values provide the conceptual underpinning, restructuring both the economic order and societal behaviour for equitable sustainable development.
    • Which is what a climate change impacted world, especially Africa, is seeking.

    Consider the question-“The global order is going through serious churn, and it provides India with an opportunity to shape the new multilateralism based on humanity, fairness and equality. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    In the new cold war, defined by technology and trade not territory, non-alignment is an uncertain option; India should craft a global triumvirate.

  • Seizing the moment at the WHO

    India has been tasked with helming the  WHO executive board at the turbulent times. The world is facing the health crisis. It is against this backdrop, India has to lead the executive board. This article suggests 5 elements that should form the part of India’s policy approach.

    Challenges for India as it heads WHO executive board

    • Minister of Health and Family Welfare is elected as the Chair of the World Health Organization’s (WHO) executive board.
    • The 34-member body is tasked with implementing the decisions of the recently concluded World Health Assembly (WHA).
    • The elevation affords India an important platform to steer the global public health response to COVID-19.
    • It also comes at a time when the WHO is being rocked politically as never before.

    WHO: caught between the US-China crossfire

    • Recently, U.S. President Donald Trump wrote a letter to the WHO Director-General.
    • In the letter, he threatened to make permanent his temporary funding freeze as well as reconsider the U.S’s membership in the organisation if the latter did not commit to major substantive reforms within 30 days.
    • By contrast, at the WHA plenary, Chinese President Xi Jinping pledged $2 billion to fight the virus.
    • He also promised to pair up 30 African hospitals with domestic counterparts, accelerate the building of the Africa Centers for Disease Control headquarters, and ensure that vaccine development in China, when available, would be made a global public good.

    So, as WHO executive body chair, India will have to navigate this treacherous power landscape with candour and tact. Following 5 elements should inform its policy approach.

    1. Set epidemic prevention and control as a priority

    • India must insist that epidemic prevention and control remain the international community’s foremost priority.
    • As the virus’ chain of transmission is broken, the focus should shift to identifying the animal-to-human transmission origins of SARS-CoV-2.
    • China shares an important interest in facilitating international access to investigate COVID-19’s zoonotic origins.
    • Why China shares interest? Because Wuhan and other previously infected zones could yet be susceptible to the risk of viral reintroduction.

    2. Review the early response of China and WHO to outbreak

    • India should lean on the WHO secretariat to fast-track the “impartial, independent, and comprehensive review” of the WHO’s – and China’s – early response to the outbreak.
    • The review’s findings should illuminate best practice and highlight areas for improvement, both in the WHO’s leadership and capacity as well as member states’ implementation of the International Health Regulations.
    • For those in New Delhi inclined to relish the prospect of Beijing’s comeuppance, the review’s findings may yet sorely disappoint.
    • The WHO-China Joint Mission featuring renowned global epidemiologists had termed China’s early COVID-19 response as the “most ambitious, agile and aggressive disease containment effort in history”.

    3. Ensure equitable access to COVID-19 vaccines for all

    • For ensuring equitable access to COVID-19 therapeutics and vaccines for all countries, India must promote the establishment of an appropriate multilateral governance mechanism.
    • The envisaged voluntary pooling mechanism to collect patent rights and regulatory test data should be suitably tailored to the needs of crisis.
    • And the World Trade Organization’s intellectual property rights provisions should be overridden as is allowed during a public health emergency to assure affordable vaccine availability.

    4. Taiwan issue at WHA: India should stay aloof

    •  India must stay aloof from the West’s campaign to re-seat Taiwan as an observer at the WHA.
    • When Taipei last attended in 2016, it did so under the explicit aegis of UN General Assembly Resolution 2758, whereby the UN considers Taiwan to be an integral part of the People’s Republic of China.
    • That the independence-minded Tsai government is unwilling to concede this basis for attendance has more to do with domestic political manoeuvring than Chinese or international ostracism.

    5.Global ban on consumption of wild animals

    •  India must lead the call for a permanent global ban on the consumption and trade of wild animals.
    • This ban should be with limited exceptions built-in for scientific research, species protection and traditional livelihood interests.
    • With two-thirds of emerging infections and diseases now arising from wildlife, the destruction of natural habitats and biodiversity loss must be taken much more seriously.

    Consider the question “The WHO has been facing the credibility crisis for its response to the Covid-19. In such a difficult time for the agency, India has to lead the executive board of WHA. In light of this, suggest the policy approach that India should adopt at WHA.”

    Conclusion

    India has its work cut out. The government should seize the moment to steer the global response in addressing the shortcomings in various areas exposed by the Covid-19 pandemic.

  • Depsang Plain near LAC

    Reports of a heavy Chinese presence at Depsang, an area at a crucial dip (called the Bulge) on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) have increased the recent tensions between Indian and Chinese troops.

    For the Depsang Plain, a prelim based question is hardly possible. However one must know all the fronts of border disputes from mains perspective.

    Depsang Plain

    • The “Depsang Plain” is one of the few places in the Western Sector where light armour (vehicles) would have ease of manoeuvre, so any Chinese buildup there is a cause for concern.
    • India controls the western portion of the plains as part of Ladakh, whereas the eastern portion is part of the Aksai Chin region, which is controlled by China and claimed by India.
    • The buildup invokes memories of both the 1962 war, when Chinese troops had occupied all of the Depsang plains.
    • More recently in April 2013, the PLA crossed the LAC and pitched tents on the Indian side for three weeks, before they agreed to pull out.

    Also read:

    [Burning Issue] India-China Skirmish in Ladakh