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Subject: Internal Security

  • Pakistan’s State-Sponsored Terrorism Threatens SCO’s Regional Security Efforts

    Terrorism

    Central Idea

    • The Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) recently convened in Goa to address pressing regional issues. Unfortunately, on the same day, the People’s Anti-Fascists Front (PAF), an offshoot of Pakistan-sponsored Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), claimed the lives of five Indian army personnel in Jammu and Kashmir’s Rajouri district.

    Background: SCO’s Anti-Terrorism Agenda

    • The SCO’s origins trace back to the establishment of the Shanghai Five in 1996, consisting of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan.
    • In 1998, the group recognized the joint fight against separatism, extremism, and terrorism originating from the Af-Pak region as a top priority. The inclusion of Uzbekistan in 2001 led to the organization’s renaming as the SCO.
    • Subsequently, the Regional Anti-Terrorists Structure (RATS) was formed in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, to institutionalize and consolidate anti-terrorism efforts within the SCO.
    • RATS facilitated joint counterterrorism exercises, training, and the preparation of countermeasures.

    Pakistan’s Role in State-Sponsored Terrorism

    • Safe Haven for Terrorist Groups: Pakistan has served as a safe haven and provided sanctuary for various terrorist groups. These groups, such as the Taliban, Haqqani Network, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), and Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), operate from Pakistani soil, carry out attacks in neighboring countries, and then seek refuge in Pakistan.
    • Training and Recruitment: Pakistan has been involved in training and recruiting terrorists. Extremist organizations have established training camps within Pakistan where individuals are indoctrinated, radicalized, and trained in various aspects of terrorism, including bomb-making, guerrilla warfare, and ideological indoctrination.
    • Financial and Logistical Support: Pakistan has been accused of providing financial and logistical support to terrorist groups. This support includes funding, weapons, ammunition, and intelligence assistance, enabling these groups to carry out their activities with impunity.
    • Proxy Warfare: Pakistan has used terrorism as a proxy warfare strategy to achieve its geopolitical objectives. By sponsoring terrorist groups, Pakistan seeks to influence and destabilize neighboring countries, particularly India and Afghanistan, with the aim of furthering its own interests in the region.
    • Infiltration of Terrorists: Pakistan has facilitated the infiltration of terrorists across its borders into neighboring countries. This includes providing safe passage, forged documents, and logistical support to terrorists to carry out attacks or join insurgencies in other regions.
    • State-Sponsored Radicalization: Pakistan has promoted and facilitated the radicalization of individuals, both within its own territory and abroad. Madrasas (religious schools) in Pakistan have been accused of spreading extremist ideologies, fueling hatred, and recruiting individuals for terrorist activities.
    • Instrument of Influence: Pakistan has used terrorism as a tool to exert influence and control over regions and communities. By supporting and sponsoring terrorist groups, Pakistan seeks to manipulate political dynamics, create instability, and maintain a degree of control over areas of strategic importance.

    Impact of Pakistan-Sponsored Terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir

    • Loss of Lives: Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir has resulted in the loss of countless innocent lives, including civilians, security forces, and terrorists themselves. The region has witnessed numerous terror attacks, suicide bombings, and armed encounters, leading to a tragic loss of human lives.
    • Destabilization and Conflict: The continuous infiltration of terrorists from Pakistan into Jammu and Kashmir has fueled instability and prolonged the conflict in the region. The presence of terrorist groups has created an atmosphere of fear and insecurity, hindering the social and economic development of the region.
    • Human Rights Violations: The activities of Pakistan-sponsored terrorist groups have been accompanied by human rights violations in Jammu and Kashmir. These violations include targeted killings, forced disappearances, torture, and intimidation of civilians, leading to a climate of fear and repression.
    • Disruption of Normalcy: The persistent threat of terrorism has disrupted normal life in Jammu and Kashmir. Educational institutions, businesses, and daily activities have been severely affected as people live under constant fear and uncertainty.
    • Obstruction of Peace Processes: Pakistan-sponsored terrorism acts as a major obstacle to the peace process between India and Pakistan. The violence and unrest created by these terrorist groups hinder any meaningful dialogue and diplomatic efforts aimed at resolving the Kashmir issue.
    • Economic Impact: The sustained presence of terrorist activities has had a detrimental impact on the economy of Jammu and Kashmir. Tourism, a significant source of revenue for the region, has suffered due to the prevailing security concerns, leading to job losses and economic downturn.
    • Psychological Impact: The ongoing terrorism has taken a toll on the mental health and well-being of the people of Jammu and Kashmir. The constant threat of violence, loss of loved ones, and living under a state of fear have resulted in psychological trauma for individuals and communities.

    Consequences of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism on internal peace in Pakistan

    • Increased Violence and Insecurity: Pakistan-sponsored terrorism has led to a rise in violence and insecurity within the country. Terrorist attacks carried out by extremist groups have resulted in the loss of numerous lives and widespread fear among the population.
    • Loss of Civilian Lives: Innocent civilians have been the primary victims of terrorist attacks sponsored by Pakistan. These attacks have targeted public places, religious institutions, markets, and educational institutions, causing significant casualties among the civilian population.
    • Sectarian and Ethnic Tensions: Pakistan has witnessed an escalation in sectarian and ethnic tensions as a result of state-sponsored terrorism. Extremist groups have targeted specific religious and ethnic communities, exacerbating divisions and leading to a breakdown of social harmony.
    • Internal Displacement: The violence and insecurity caused by Pakistan-sponsored terrorism have resulted in internal displacement of populations within Pakistan. People are forced to leave their homes and seek refuge in safer areas, leading to the displacement crisis and additional socio-economic burdens.

    SCO’s Limited Authority and Implications

    • Lack of Enforcement Power: The SCO does not possess strong enforcement power or mechanisms to compel member states to adhere to its mandates or take action against state-sponsored terrorism. It heavily relies on voluntary cooperation among member states, making it challenging to address non-compliance effectively.
    • Ineffectiveness in Holding States Accountable: The absence of robust mechanisms for accountability limits the SCO’s ability to hold member states accountable for their actions, including Pakistan’s involvement in state-sponsored terrorism. This undermines the credibility and effectiveness of the organization in addressing terrorism-related issues.
    • Risk of Becoming a Platform for Political Maneuvering: The limited authority of the SCO creates a risk that member states, including Pakistan, may use the organization as a platform for political maneuvering rather than genuinely addressing the issue of terrorism. Geopolitical rivalries and divergent interests among member states can impede the organization’s ability to effectively combat terrorism.
    • Compromised Regional Security: The limited authority of the SCO in dealing with state-sponsored terrorism hampers its ability to effectively address security threats in the region. This compromises the overall regional security and stability, as terrorist groups continue to exploit the gaps and operate with impunity.
    • Diminished Credibility: The inability of the SCO to take decisive action against state-sponsored terrorism can lead to a diminished credibility of the organization in the international community. The lack of concrete measures to address terrorism undermines its role as a regional security organization and casts doubts on its effectiveness
    • Weakening of Counterterrorism Efforts: The limited authority of the SCO hampers its ability to coordinate and implement comprehensive counterterrorism efforts among member states. This undermines the potential of collective action in addressing the shared threat of terrorism and limits the effectiveness of joint initiatives and cooperation.

    Conclusion

    • The limited authority of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) to address state-sponsored terrorism, coupled with growing divergence among member states and the inclusion of rogue nations like Pakistan, threatens its effectiveness in countering terror threats. Without stronger mechanisms and unified action, the SCO risks becoming ineffective in tackling the rising challenges of terrorism, thereby compromising regional security and stability.

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    Also read:

    Drugs in the valley: Pakistan’s new weapon to finance terrorism

     

  • Strengthening Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) for India’s Maritime Security

    Central Idea

    • China’s aggressive construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea highlights the strategic significance of India’s Andaman and Nicobar (A&N) Islands. These islands provide India with a unique opportunity to project power, safeguard its interests, and exert influence in the region. However, there is an urgent need to reinforce the Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) and recognize its potential in the evolving Indo-Pacific security landscape.

    All you need to about Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC)

    • The Andaman and Nicobar Command (ANC) is a unified military command of the Indian Armed Forces. It brings together the three branches of the Indian Armed Forces, the Army, Navy, and Air Force along with the Coast Guard, under the command of a designated Commander-in-Chief, Andaman and Nicobar (CINCAN).
    • It was established on October 1, 2001, and is responsible for the defense and security of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, which are strategically located in the Bay of Bengal.
    • The ANC plays a significant role in regional security in the Indo-Pacific and contributes to joint military exercises and collaborations with partner countries.
    • It serves as a model for jointness and integration in India’s military structure, promoting coordination, interoperability, and efficiency in operations.

    China’s rapid construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea and concerns for India

    • Security Threat: China’s militarization of these islands, including the deployment of military infrastructure and guided-missile batteries, poses a direct security threat to India. It enables China to extend its defensive perimeter and project power in the region, potentially affecting India’s strategic interests.
    • Maritime Domain Awareness: China’s island-building campaign allows it to enhance its maritime domain awareness by monitoring and controlling the sea routes in the South China Sea. This could potentially impact India’s freedom of navigation and its ability to operate in the region.
    • Regional Power Projection: China’s presence in the South China Sea, coupled with its growing military capabilities, challenges the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region. This has implications for India’s security calculus, as it seeks to maintain a favorable regional environment and protect its interests.
    • Geopolitical Influence: China’s assertive actions in the South China Sea have regional and global geopolitical implications. It allows China to expand its influence in the Indo-Pacific, potentially impacting India’s relationships with other countries in the region.
    • Disputed Territory: China’s island-building activities in the South China Sea involve disputed territorial claims with other countries in the region, including India’s close partner, Vietnam. These disputes raise the risk of potential conflicts and heighten regional tensions

    Facts for prelims: Geography of Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANI)

    Aspect Information
    Location Located between 6° and 14° North Latitude and 92° and 94° East Longitude, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands are a union territory in India.
    Two groups of Islands The islands north of 10° north latitude are known as Andaman, while the islands south of 10° north latitude are called Nicobar.
    The Andamans The Andamans consist of more than 300 islands, with North, Middle, and South Andaman, collectively known as Great Andaman, being the main islands.
    The 10-degree channel The 10-degree channel, approximately 145 km long, separates Little Andaman in the south from the Nicobar Islands.
    The Nicobars The Nicobars consist of 19 islands, including Car Nicobar in the north and Great Nicobar in the south. The northwestern tip of Sumatra, Indonesia, is located about 90 miles southwest of Great Nicobar.
    Formation Both the Andaman and Nicobar groups are formed by above-sea extensions of submarine ridges of mountains and are part of a great island arc. The highest peaks include Saddle Peak on North Andaman, Mount Thullier on Great Nicobar, and Mount Harriet on South Andaman.
    Andaman Terrain The terrain of the Andamans is rough, with hills and narrow longitudinal valleys, formed of sandstone, limestone, and shale of Cenozoic age. Flat land is limited to a few valleys.
    Nicobar Terrain The terrain of the Nicobar islands is diverse, ranging from flat coral-covered surfaces with offshore coral formations on islands like Car Nicobar to hilly regions with fast-flowing streams on islands like Great Nicobar.
    Fresh Water Great Nicobar is the only island in the territory with a significant amount of fresh surface water.
    Climate The climate of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands is tropical but moderated by the sea.

    Main Features of the Climate

    • Temperature:
      Usually ranges between 23°C and 31°C throughout the year. Seasonal variation is small.
    • Humidity:
      High humidity, often around 70–90%.
    • Rainfall:
      Heavy rainfall occurs due to the southwest monsoon and northeast monsoon.
      Average annual rainfall is about 3000 mm.

    Seasons

    1. Summer (March to May)
      • Warm and humid
      • Temperature around 30°C
    2. Rainy/Monsoon Season (May to December)
      • Heavy rainfall and storms
      • Strong monsoon winds
    3. Winter (December to February)
      • Pleasant and cooler
      • Temperature around 23–28°C
      • Best season for tourism

    The Importance of Strengthening ANC

    • Comprehensive Maritime Domain Awareness: The ANC must have enhanced capabilities to monitor and defend India’s territorial waters, airspace, and exclusive economic zone. It should focus on advanced surveillance systems and establish an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the islands.
    • Defense against Military Intrusions: The ANC needs increased force levels and firepower to deter potential military incursions and protect the archipelago from hostile elements.
    • Tracking and Interdicting Hostile Forces: Strengthening the ANC’s capabilities to track and neutralize hostile ships and submarines is essential for maintaining maritime security.
    • Rapid Reaction Force: The command should be equipped to deploy a rapid reaction force promptly through airlift or sealift, ensuring swift response to emerging threats

    Quad and Malabar exercises to balance China’s growing influence in the region

    • Quad Coordination: The Quad, comprising India, the US, Japan, and Australia, should take decisive steps to counter China’s aggression. Establishing a Quad secretariat in Port Blair could serve as a hub for naval coordination and cooperation.
    • Multinational Operations: The Quad navies, with their growing interoperability, should expand their joint operations beyond exercises. Engaging in non-traditional activities such as disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and maritime security operations would reinforce regional stability and dissuade potential hegemons.

    Conclusion

    • To maximize the strategic potential of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and ensure a robust presence in the Bay of Bengal, it is imperative to strengthen and retain the ANC as an independent joint command. By bolstering its capabilities and leveraging partnerships like the Quad, India can secure its maritime interests and actively contribute to a stable Indo-Pacific region. The ANC has the potential to be a vital asset in the ongoing Indo-Pacific “Great Game.

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    Must read:

    India’s compulsion to develop The Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANI)

  • Protecting Critical Information Infrastructure: The Role of the G20

    Central Idea

    • Technology has become pervasive, impacting various aspects of society, including national and foreign policies, governance, service delivery, and warfare. However, this dependence on technology also exposes critical systems to potential disruptions. Safeguarding critical systems is a nation’s responsibility to ensure the continuity of vital services.

    What is critical information infrastructure?

    • Critical information infrastructure refers to the interconnected systems and assets that are essential for the functioning of a nation’s society, economy, and government. It encompasses the hardware, software, networks, data, and communication channels that support vital services and processes.
    • It includes sectors such as transportation, energy, banking and finance, healthcare, telecommunications, water and sanitation, emergency services, and government networks.
    • Protecting critical information infrastructure is crucial to ensure the continuity of services, safeguard sensitive data, and defend against cyber threats, including cyberattacks, data breaches, and other malicious activities.

    Differences in defining critical information infrastructure

    • Criteria for Criticality: Different countries employ distinct criteria to determine the criticality of information infrastructure.
    • For example: One country may consider infrastructure critical if its failure impacts national security, economy, public health, or safety. Another country may define critical infrastructure based on the potential for sustained supply shortages, disruptions to public safety and security, or other significant consequences.
    • Scope of Infrastructure: There may be variations in the scope of infrastructure considered critical. While certain sectors like energy, transportation, banking, and telecommunications are commonly recognized as critical across many countries, there might be differences in identifying sub-sectors or specific enterprises within those sectors. Some countries may include additional sectors like water and sanitation, emergency services, healthcare, or government networks in their definition of critical information infrastructure.
    • Overlapping Criteria: In some cases, the criteria used to identify critical infrastructure may overlap with one another. For instance, ensuring the availability, delivery, or integrity of essential services can encompass vital societal functions, information flow, and communication channels. Harmonizing these overlapping criteria can help establish specific and comprehensive criteria that cater to the needs of all countries.
    • National Context: National priorities and contextual factors also influence the definition of critical information infrastructure. Countries may consider their unique geopolitical situation, existing threats, vulnerabilities, and the potential impact on their economy and citizens. This context-specific approach allows each country to address its specific challenges and ensure the protection of infrastructure crucial to its national well-being.

    Role of the G20 in developing global norms for protecting critical infrastructure

    • Platform for Discussion: The G20 provides a platform for member countries to engage in discussions and exchanges on pressing global issues, including cybersecurity and the protection of critical infrastructure. It brings together policymakers, experts, and stakeholders from various sectors to share insights, experiences, and best practices.
    • Building Consensus: The G20 aims to build consensus among member countries on critical issues related to protecting infrastructure. Through dialogue, negotiations, and diplomatic efforts, the G20 seeks to develop common understandings and principles that can guide international cooperation in safeguarding critical information infrastructure.
    • Initiating Discussions: The G20 has the capacity to initiate discussions on specific topics and themes relevant to critical infrastructure protection. By placing the issue on the G20 agenda, it draws attention to the importance of addressing cybersecurity risks and establishing global norms in this area.
    • Leveraging Economic Influence: The G20 represents around 85 percent of global GDP, over 75 percent of global trade, and a significant portion of the world population. This economic influence provides the G20 with leverage to drive discussions and encourage member countries to prioritize the protection of critical infrastructure.
    • Collaboration with International Organizations: The G20 collaborates with international organizations such as the United Nations (UN), International Telecommunication Union (ITU), and Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). This collaboration helps leverage the expertise, resources, and frameworks of these organizations to inform discussions and develop comprehensive approaches to protecting critical infrastructure.
    • Promoting International Stability: The G20 recognizes that protecting critical infrastructure is crucial for international stability and economic cooperation. By advocating for global norms and responsible state behavior, the G20 aims to enhance cybersecurity, prevent disruptions, and promote a secure digital environment for economic activities.
    • Influencing Policy Development: The G20’s discussions and recommendations on critical infrastructure protection can influence policy development at the national and international levels. Member countries may align their policies and frameworks with the norms and principles identified through G20 deliberations, thereby fostering harmonization and cooperation.

    Recommendations to the G20

    • Common Definition and Critical Sectors: The G20 should adopt a phased approach, beginning with establishing a common definition of critical infrastructure. Subsequently, a broader consensus on critical sectors should be built, followed by the formulation of common principles for regulating critical infrastructure. This process will facilitate a global consensus, ensure cooperation among member countries, and guide nations that are in the early stages of regulating critical infrastructure.
    • Common Principles: While formulating common principles for regulating critical infrastructure, the G20 should reaffirm and adopt existing norms as the foundation for future discussions. This includes commitments made in G20 documents like the Hamburg Action Plan and the Buenos Aires Declaration. Furthermore, the G20 can draw from the initiatives of other multilateral groupings, such as the G7, G8, and OECD, that have focused on protecting critical infrastructure.
    • Respecting International Law: The G20 should commit to protecting critical infrastructure and refrain from intentionally damaging it. Member countries should conduct themselves in accordance with international law and uphold responsible state behavior in cyberspace.
    • International Cooperation: G20 countries must enhance cooperation to prevent, mitigate, trace, and investigate cyber incidents targeting critical infrastructure. Sharing information regarding such incidents should be encouraged. Adopting international standards relevant to critical infrastructure will help harmonize approaches to regulation and enforcement, reducing conflicts and improving cooperation.
    • Capacity Building: Investing in research and development and building capacity in emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), drones, and space is crucial. G20 countries should support low- and middle-income nations in accessing research and technologies. Additionally, countries should respond to requests for assistance from states whose critical infrastructure has been affected, and promote the application of certified security technologies based on international standards.
    • Multistakeholder Approach: A multistakeholder commitment is vital to protecting critical information infrastructure. Governments, technology companies, and civil society groups should collaborate to share and analyze critical infrastructure information, prevent attacks, and respond to damage. Awareness should be raised to ensure stakeholders understand the nature and extent of critical information infrastructure and their respective roles in protecting it.
    • National Laws: G20 countries should incorporate the principles and norms for protecting critical infrastructure into their national laws. This will help create a culture of enforcement and cooperation at both the national and international levels.
    • Institutional Mechanism: Establishing an institutional mechanism for continuous research and the development of new standards for protecting critical infrastructure is essential. Drawing lessons from initiatives like the Christchurch Call, public-private partnerships can play a crucial role in establishing a global order for a safe cyberspace.

    Conclusion

    • The protection of critical information infrastructure is of paramount importance in today’s interconnected world. The G20, with its representation of major economies and commitment to international cooperation, plays a crucial role in developing global norms for safeguarding critical infrastructure. By establishing a common understanding and definition of critical information infrastructure, the G20 can facilitate discussions and build consensus among member countries.

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    Also read:

    Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI): New Backbone of India’s Economy

     

  • 25th anniversary of Pokhran-II

    pokhran

    Central Idea: The article provides a historical context for India’s nuclear program and focuses specifically on the Pokhran-II nuclear tests conducted in 1998. This year is special, marking 25 years since we started celebrating National Technology Day.

    India’s Nuclear Journey: A quick recap

    • India conducted nuclear bomb test explosions at Pokhran Test Range in 1998.
    • Codenamed Operation Shakti, these tests showcased India’s capability to build nuclear weapons.
    • The tests marked the culmination of a long journey that began in the 1940s-50s.
    • Physicist Homi J Bhaba played a crucial role in laying the foundations of India’s nuclear program.
    • Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru supported Bhaba’s efforts and established the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) in 1954.

    Reasons: Threat of China and Pakistan

    • India’s perspective on nuclear weapons changed after the 1962 Sino-Indian War and China’s nuclear bomb test in 1964.
    • The political establishment realized the need for self-sufficiency in the face of an unfriendly China and Pakistan.
    • India sought nuclear guarantees from established nuclear weapons states but was unsuccessful.
    • The path to obtaining nuclear weapons became a priority for India.

    The “Discriminatory” NPT

    • The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was established in 1968, creating a divide between nuclear-weapon states and non-nuclear states.
    • India refused to sign the treaty, as it felt it did not address its concerns about reciprocal obligations from nuclear weapons states.
    • The NPT gained widespread international acceptance, but India remained one of the few non-signatories.

    Pokhran-I and its Aftermath

    • In 1974, India conducted its first nuclear test at Pokhran, known as Pokhran-I or Operation Smiling Buddha.
    • The test was described as a “peaceful nuclear explosion” but faced international condemnation and sanctions.
    • Political instability, including the Emergency in 1975, hindered India’s nuclear program’s progress.
    • Clamor for nuclear weapons resurfaced in the 1980s due to Pakistan’s advancing nuclear capabilities.

    The Period between the Two Tests

    • India faced challenges due to domestic political instability and changing international dynamics.
    • The fall of the USSR in 1991 weakened India’s military alliances.
    • The US continued to support Pakistan despite concerns about its nuclear program.
    • India faced pressure to quickly develop nuclear weapons as the window of opportunity appeared to be closing.

    Pokhran-II: Projecting India’s Strength

    • In 1998, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) came to power under Atal Bihari Vajpayee.
    • Operation Shakti, conducted as a response to Pakistan’s missile launch, marked the culmination of India’s nuclear weaponization.
    • India declared itself a nuclear weapons state following Pokhran-II.
    • The tests faced some sanctions, but India’s growing economy and market potential helped it withstand international pressure.

     

     

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  • Celebrating India’s Nuclear Tests

    Nuclear Tests

    Central Idea

    • On May 11 and 13, 1998, India conducted five nuclear tests that brought about significant changes in the country’s self-esteem and status in the world. The country’s military nuclear policy had been shrouded in ambiguity and opacity for two decades since its first test in 1974. However, with the 1998 tests, India emerged as a nuclear weapons state, which was received with mixed reactions from the international community, resulting in sanctions and isolation. Nonetheless, the tests marked a significant moment for India’s self-confidence and awareness of its potential.

    Nuclear Tests

    India’s nuclear tests

    • Smiling Buddha (Pokhran-I): India’s first nuclear test was conducted on May 18, 1974, in Pokhran, Rajasthan. The test was code-named “Smiling Buddha” and was a “peaceful nuclear explosion.”
    • Pokhran-II: India’s second series of nuclear tests were conducted on May 11 and 13, 1998, in Pokhran, Rajasthan. The tests included three underground nuclear tests on May 11 and two on May 13. These tests were conducted under the leadership of Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and were code-named Operation Shakti.

    Nuclear tests dispelled myths that had dominated international opinion

    • India’s Isolation: The myth that India would be isolated and its economy would collapse under the weight of sanctions and international opprobrium was dispelled. Instead, the US took the first steps to mainstream India, treating it as an exceptional case, which culminated in the India-US Civil Nuclear Agreement in 2005.
    • India’s Inability to Manage nuclear weapons: The ethnocentric myth perpetuated by non-proliferation absolutists of the West that India and South Asia could not be trusted to manage nuclear weapons was also dispelled.

    Facts for prelims

    Treaty/Agreement Objective India’s Status
    NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) To prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology Non-signatory
    CTBT (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty) To ban all nuclear explosions for both civilian and military purposes Signatory
    FMCT (Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty) To prohibit the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other explosive devices Supporter
    NSG (Nuclear Suppliers Group) A group of countries that seeks to contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons through the implementation of guidelines for nuclear exports and nuclear-related exports Not a member but has applied for membership
    New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) To limit the number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery systems Not a signatory
    MTCR (Missile Technology Control Regime) To limit the spread of missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction Member since 2016

    Advantages of the nuclear tests: From India’s point of view

    • Deterrence: The nuclear tests provided India with a credible nuclear deterrence capability, which could potentially deter other nuclear-armed adversaries and prevent them from using nuclear weapons against India.
    • National pride and self-confidence: The successful nuclear tests were seen as a major achievement and a source of national pride for many Indians. They helped boost India’s self-confidence and reaffirmed its status as a major global power.
    • Recognition: India’s successful nuclear tests brought it international recognition and established it as a nuclear-armed state. This recognition was particularly important for India’s security and diplomatic interests.
    • Negotiating power: With its new nuclear status, India gained greater negotiating power in international forums and in its bilateral relationships with other countries.
    • Technological advancement: The development and testing of nuclear weapons required advanced scientific and technological capabilities, and the successful tests demonstrated India’s progress in these areas.

    International Consequences: series of events

    • The United States imposed sanctions against India under the Glenn Amendment.
    • Pakistan conducted a series of nuclear tests in response.
    • Many other countries, including China, castigated India for what they saw as an outrageous contempt for the common will of the international community.

    Nuclear Tests

    Conclusion

    • India’s nuclear tests on May 11 and 13, 1998, marked a significant moment in the country’s history, boosting its self-confidence and changing its status in the world. Despite facing international criticism and sanctions, India’s nuclear program has helped to create a credible nuclear deterrent, making it a vital player in the international system.

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    Also Read:

    Whether The Nuclear Power in India Should Be Phased Out?

     

  • China objects to Indian proposal to blacklist terrorist at UN

    Central Idea: China has objected to India’s proposal to blacklist Abdul Rauf Azhar, a senior terrorist from Pakistan-based Jaish-e Mohammed (JeM) on the UN Security Council’s 1267 List.

    China’s objection to the proposal

    • China is a permanent, veto-wielding member of the UN Security Council.
    • It has put a hold on proposals to blacklist other Pakistan-based terrorists in the past, including Hafiz Talah Saeed, Shahid Mahmood, and Sajid Mir.

    The UNSC 1267 list

    • The UNSC resolution 1267 was adopted unanimously on 15 October 1999.
    • It came to force in 1999, and strengthened after the September 2001 attacks.
    • It is now known as the Da’esh and Al Qaeda Sanctions Committee.

    What is UNSC 1267 committee?

    • It comprises all permanent and non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
    • The 1267 list of terrorists is a global list, with a UNSC stamp.
    • It is one of the most important and active UN subsidiary bodies working on efforts to combat terrorism, particularly in relation to Al Qaeda and the Islamic State group.
    • It discusses UN efforts to limit the movement of terrorists, especially those related to travel bans, the freezing of assets and arms embargoes for terrorism.

    How is the listing done?

    (1) Submission of Proposal

    • Any member state can submit a proposal for listing an individual, group, or entity.
    • The proposal must include acts or activities indicating the proposed individual/group/entity had participated in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing, or perpetrating of acts or activities linked to the said organizations.

    (2) Actual decision

    • Decisions on listing and de-listing are adopted by consensus.
    • The proposal is sent to all the members, and if no member objects within five working days, the proposal is adopted.
    • An “objection” means rejection for the proposal.

    (3) Putting and resolving ‘Technical Holds’

    • Any member of the Committee may also put a “technical hold” on the proposal and ask for more information from the proposing member state.
    • During this time, other members may also place their own holds.
    • The matter remains on the “pending” list of the Committee.
    • Pending issues must be resolved in six months, but the member state that has placed the hold may ask for an additional three months.
    • At the end of this period, if an objection is not placed, the matter is considered approved.

    Here is a timeline of how China disrupts the global efforts against terrorism:

    • 2009: After the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, India moved an independent terror designation proposal against Masood Azhar but China blocked the move.
    • 2016: After seven years, India proposes listing of Masood Azhar as a global terrorist and is supported by the US, the UK and France. China blocks the move again.
    • 2017: The trio moves a third proposal only to be blocked by China again.
    • 2019: After the attacks on the CRPF personnel in J-K’s Pulwama, India calls 25 envoys of different countries to highlight the role Islamabad plays in funding, promoting and strengthening global terrorism. India moves the fourth proposal demanding Masood Azhar’s listing. China lifted its technical hold.
    • June 2022: China blocked a proposal by India and the US to list Pakistan-based terrorist Abdul Rehman Makki as a ‘Global Terrorist’
    • August 2022: China blocks India-US joint proposal to list Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) deputy chief Abdul Rauf Azhar as UNSC designated terrorist.

    Conclusion

    • China’s actions expose its double speak and double standards when it comes to the international community’s shared battle against terrorism.
    • This clearly depicts its care for its vassal state Pakistan.

    Back2Basics: United Nations Security Council

    Description
    Purpose International peace and security
    Powers Establish peacekeeping operations, impose international sanctions, and authorize military action. Its resolutions are binding.
    Membership 15 members. 5 permanent members are Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, and the United States. The remaining 10 are non-permanent members elected on a regional basis to serve two-year terms.
    Veto Power P5 members have veto power, which means they can veto any substantive resolution, including those on new member states or candidates for Secretary-General.
    Presidency Rotates monthly among its members.

     

     

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  • How to minimise the threat from IEDs?

    Central Idea: The article discusses various measures that need to be taken to minimise errors in anti-terrorist operations. This has been particularly discussed after recent incidents of IED (improvised explosive device) explosions.

    What are IED (Improvised Explosive Device)?

    • IEDs are homemade explosive device made from commonly available materials such as fertilizer, diesel fuel, and metal scraps.
    • They are typically used as a form of guerrilla warfare by non-state actors such as terrorists, insurgents, and other militant groups.

    Why discuss IEDs?

    • IEDs are a popular choice for such groups as they are relatively easy to construct, difficult to detect, and can be triggered by a range of mechanisms including pressure plates, remote control, and tripwires.
    • IEDs are often responsible for a large number of casualties and fatalities in conflict zones.

    Disadvantage faced by Indian armed forces

    • The security forces are dealing with an enemy who is faceless, unidentifiable, and hidden among the people.
    • Security personnel can open fire only in self-defence, not on apprehension, giving militants the ‘first mover advantage’.
    • The reaction or the response time available for “Immediate Action (IA) or Counter Ambush drill” is a few seconds.
    • All standard operating systems and procedures, technological measures, etc., are directed towards the identification and detection of IEDs/landmines and to avoid being caught in them.

    Preventing IED Fatalities

    (1) Minimizing Errors

    • Avoid vehicle travel: To avoid casualties/fatalities in Maoist territories, vehicle travel should be avoided.
    • Foot patrolling: Routine operations like area domination, cordon-and-search, long-range patrolling, ambush-cum-patrolling should only be undertaken on foot.
    • Route security: If vehicle travel is essential, the onward and return journeys should never be by the same route, nor undertaken during the daytime.
    • Smaller convoys: Security forces should travel in a convoy of a minimum of two to three vehicles, maintaining a distance of at least 40 to 50 meters between them.

    (2) Camouflage and Protective Gear

    • In certain war zones, vehicular deployment is inevitable.
    • Security forces should be equipped with appropriate protective gear and their vehicles should be equipped with V-shaped and armour-plated hull, blast-resistant technology, and proper sandbagging to minimize damage in the event of an explosion.

    (3) Making a Region Safe for Travel

    • Detection: Rigorous and regular implementation of various detection methods, such as metal detectors, ground-penetrating radar, and trained sniffer dogs, to locate and clear landmines and IEDs, is essential.
    • Multi strata surveillance: This carried out through drones and road opening parties equipped with UGVs (Unmanned Ground Vehicles) can detect the presence of terrorists and pick tell-tale signs of a likely ambush.
    • Mapping of such areas: Areas known or suspected to contain landmines or IEDs can be mapped, and contingency plans prepared for them.

    (4) Intelligence Inputs and Investigation

    • Confidence building: Winning of hearts and minds is essential to gather actionable intelligence.
    • Diligent and scientific investigation: Establishment of linkages through meticulous collection and marshalling of evidence, framing of chargesheets, followed by speedy trials and conviction, serve as a strong deterrent to terrorism.

    Policy measures required

    • Regulating explosives: Legislative measures are required for the mandatory addition of odoriferous chemicals and/or biosensors to explosives used in industry and mining for their easy detection during transport.
    • Collaboration with international organizations: Other countries have taken several counter-IED measures, such as the U.S. setting up the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Organization and spending about $20 billion on counter-IED measures since 2005.
    • Overarching agency: It is needed under the Ministry of Home Affairs to coordinate the efforts of both the GoI and the states, and to provide legislative, technological, and procedural support to law enforcement agencies.

    Conclusion

    • It is crucial for governments to take necessary measures to protect their security personnel and prevent casualties caused by IEDs.
    • Again it is essential to raise awareness about the challenges and dangers faced by security personnel in conflict zones and to find effective solutions to mitigate the risks.

     

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  • Common Uniforms at Higher Ranks of Army

    uniform

    Central Idea: A decision has been taken at the recent Army Commanders Conference to change the uniforms worn by senior Army officers.

    Changes in Uniform

    • All officers of the rank of Brigadier and above will now wear common uniform items.
    • The common uniform items include berets, badges of rank, belt buckle, and pattern of shoes.
    • Regimental lanyards and shoulder flashes will no longer be worn by officers of these higher ranks.
    • There will be no item of uniform that will identify them as belonging to a particular Regiment or Corps.

    Present Uniform Accoutrements

    • Officers from the rank of Lieutenant to General currently wear uniform accoutrements as per their regimental or corps affiliation.
    • Each Infantry Regiment and Corps has its own pattern of lanyard, badges of rank, buttons, and belt buckle as per regimental traditions.

    Reason for Change

    • Regimental service in the Army ends at the rank of Colonel for most officers who rise further.
    • Senior officers commanding troops of mixed regimental lineage should present themselves in a neutral uniform rather than a regimental one.

    Reversion to Past Practice

    • The Army is now reverting to the practice that was followed almost 40 years ago, when the changes towards wearing regimental affiliations took hold in the service.
    • Until about the mid-1980s, officers of the rank of Colonel and above had common uniform patterns and insignia.

    Tradition in Other Armies

    • In the British army, the uniform worn by officers of the rank of Colonel and above is referred to as the Staff uniform, to distinguish it from the Regimental uniform.
    • Among neighbouring countries, the Pakistan and Bangladesh armies follow the same pattern as the British army.

     

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  • Analysis of the Maoist Attack and The Way Forward

    Maoist

    Central Idea

    • The April 26 attack on District Reserve Guard (DRG) personnel and a civilian driver by Maoists in Dantewada, Chhattisgarh highlights the need for a comprehensive approach to tackling the insurgency. Despite claims of a weakened Maoist movement, the attack shows that they still have the ability to strike at will.

    About District Reserve Guards (DRG)

    • District Reserve Guards (DRG) is a special unit of the police force in some Indian states, primarily in Chhattisgarh, that is trained and equipped to combat Naxalite and Maoist insurgency.
    • DRG personnel are typically drawn from local tribal communities and are familiar with the local terrain, which makes them effective in fighting the insurgency.
    • They are provided with specialized training in guerrilla warfare, jungle warfare, and use of modern weaponry.
    • The DRG is often at the forefront of anti-Naxalite operations and is considered a vital component of the Indian government’s efforts to counter the Maoist insurgency in the country.

    Maoist ability to strike at will

    • Strategic planning by Maoist Central Committee: A strike such as the one carried out on April 26 cannot be the brainchild of a local Maoist unit; it is highly likely that this was a trap laid out under the directions of the Maoist Central Committee, indicating the sustained hierarchy of the Maoists.
    • Timing of attacks: The Maoists carry out maximum attacks against security forces during the tactical counter-offensive campaign which is the period between February and June every year. Out of a total of 17 major strikes in Chhattisgarh (2010-2023), six were carried out in April alone, indicating a pattern that should give the government enough leads to plan its strategy.
    • Flouting of standard operating procedures: Standard operating procedures and protocols were blatantly flouted during the unfortunate strike on April 26. It is imperative that the security forces remain extra cautious during the months of the tactical counter-offensive campaign by strictly adhering to standard operating procedures and protocols.

    Challenges associated with employing local tribal youth for the DRG

    • False sense of empowerment: When armed, local tribal youth often get a false sense of empowerment, which can lead to feuds with the Maoists. This is because they are familiar with the ecosystem of the Maoists and may harbor resentment towards them.
    • Intelligence network: During the April 26 incident, the intelligence network of the DRG was outclassed by that of the Maoists. This highlights the need for better training and support for local tribal youth who are employed by the DRG.
    • Ad-hoc planning: The DRG personnel, in this case, seem to have acted independently, exposing their ad-hoc planning. This demonstrates the need for better coordination and control over the DRG by the state police.
    • Lack of discipline: Although the combat-worthiness of the DRG is beyond doubt, it is not complemented by the rigor of discipline, which is an imperative quality for troops in any protracted counter-insurgency campaign. The track record of the DRG regarding discipline is not too encouraging, with many of the cadres having been cashiered on disciplinary grounds and some having been found to be involved in crime. This highlights the need for better training and support to ensure that the DRG personnel are adequately disciplined and accountable for their actions.

    Way ahead: Lasting solutions

    • Effective Policing: Effective policing in insurgency-affected regions is the function of a strong State police force. It is widely acknowledged that Central police forces should supplement and not supplant the State police.
    • Vacancies in State Police Force: According to data of the Bureau of Police Research and Development, there are many vacancies in the State police forces. Without comprehensive transformation of the State police, Central forces would achieve little beyond random and misplaced killings.
    • Control on Local Tribal Youth: Local tribal youth should be employed for the DRG in a controlled manner by the State police. Security should not be simply outsourced to them.
    • DRG Personnel Discipline: The combat-worthiness of the DRG is beyond doubt, but it is not complemented by the rigour of discipline. This is an imperative quality for troops in any protracted counter-insurgency campaign. The track record of the DRG regarding discipline is not too encouraging.
    • Deeper reflection on the discontent and dispossession of tribal people: The incident calls for a deeper reflection on the discontent and dispossession of the tribal people of central India, who are in all respects the most disadvantaged of citizens.
    • Perception management: The government needs to pay adequate attention to perception management. The government should communicate that extensive road construction projects in Bastar will ease the lives of the local population and not just enhance the reach of the security forces.
    • Weaken the Maoist ideology: The futility of the Maoist ideology in current times is not adequately exposed to weaken the insurgency. Security is no doubt necessary, but the focus needs to be beyond security and development.

    Conclusion

    • The Dantewada attack highlights the need for a comprehensive approach to tackling the insurgency, taking into account the tactical counter-offensive campaign, the need for strong state police forces, and the controlled employment of DRG personnel. The government should focus on addressing the root causes of the insurgency, paying attention to perception management and exposing the futility of Maoist ideology

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    Also Read:

    The Maoist Insurgency: Challenges and The Way Forward

  • The Maoist Insurgency: Challenges and The Way Forward

    Insurgency

    Central Idea

    • The recent ambush of the convoy in Chhattisgarh’s Dantewada district resulting in the deaths of 10 personnel of the District Reserve Guards (DRG) highlights that the Maoist insurgency remains a significant threat in India. The Home Minister has repeatedly given the impression that the end of the Maoist problem is near, but history has shown otherwise.

    What is mean by Insurgency?

    • Insurgency refers to a violent uprising against the established government or authority of a country, typically carried out by a group of individuals or an organization that seeks to challenge the existing political, economic, or social order.
    • It often involves armed conflict, sabotage, and other forms of violence aimed at destabilizing the government or seizing power.
    • The ultimate goal of an insurgency is to overthrow the existing government and establish a new political system that is more in line with the insurgents’ ideology or goals

    Rise of Insurgency India

    • The Communist Party of India (Marxist) split in 1967, with a section of the party rejecting the electoral path and advocating for armed struggle to overthrow the Indian state.
    • The Naxalbari uprising in West Bengal in 1967, where a group of peasants led by Charu Majumdar and Kanu Sanyal revolted against the local landlords and police. The uprising was brutally crushed by the state, but it gave birth to the Naxalite movement.
    • The formation of the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) in 1969, which became the political front of the Naxalite movement.
    • The formation of the People’s War Group in Andhra Pradesh in 1980, which became one of the most active Naxalite groups in the country.
    • The merger of the People’s War Group with the Maoist Communist Centre in 2004, to form the Communist Party of India (Maoist), which is the largest Naxalite group in India today.
    • The expansion of the Naxalite movement from West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh to other states, including Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Odisha, and Maharashtra, among others.
    • The violent attacks by Naxalites on the state and central police forces, government officials, politicians, and civilians, resulting in the loss of thousands of lives over the years.

    Facts for prelims

    District Reserve Guards (DRG)

    • District Reserve Guards (DRG) is a special unit of the police force in some Indian states, primarily in Chhattisgarh, that is trained and equipped to combat Naxalite and Maoist insurgency.
    • DRG personnel are typically drawn from local tribal communities and are familiar with the local terrain, which makes them effective in fighting the insurgency.
    • They are provided with specialized training in guerrilla warfare, jungle warfare, and use of modern weaponry.
    • The DRG is often at the forefront of anti-Naxalite operations and is considered a vital component of the Indian government’s efforts to counter the Maoist insurgency in the country.

    What are the flaws in the anti-Naxal strategy?

    1. Outsourcing operations to central armed police forces:
    • In most states, there is a tendency to outsource the operations against Naxals to the central armed police forces.
    • This strategy is flawed because unless the local police, who know the language and terrain, take the lead in anti-Naxal operations, the problem would linger.
    1. Imposed development paradigm:
    • The development paradigm pursued since independence has always been imposed on the tribal communities and has been insensitive to their needs and concerns. As a result, government plans have ended up in destroying their social organization, cultural identity, and resource base and generated multiple conflicts.
    • The tribals want schools and hospitals, but they neither need nor want capital-intensive plants or factories, which are inevitably accompanied by deforestation and displacement.
    1. Insensitivity towards tribal communities:
    • The development paradigm pursued since independence has always been imposed on the tribal communities and has been insensitive to their needs and concerns. As a result, government plans have ended up destroying their social organization, cultural identity, and resource base and generated multiple conflicts.
    1. Lack of an overall strategic plan:
    • There is no overall strategic plan against the Naxals. States have been carrying out anti-Naxal drives according to their individual understanding.
    • Territorial domination is essential, and security forces are able to achieve that, but that should be followed by the administrative apparatus establishing its network in the affected areas.
    1. Absence of peace talks:
    • The government should seriously think of applying the healing touch. If it can have peace talks with the Nagas and several other insurgent outfits in the Northeast, there is no reason why it should not take the initiative to have a dialogue with the Maoist leadership. This would not be seen as a sign of weakness on the contrary, it would be taken as a magnanimous gesture.

    The way ahead to address the Naxal insurgency in India

    • Multi-pronged approach: The government should adopt a multi-pronged approach to address the Naxal problem that includes development initiatives, security measures, and dialogue with the Naxal leadership.
    • Focus on development: The government should focus on development initiatives in Naxal-affected areas that are tailored to meet the needs of the local population. This includes building infrastructure like schools, hospitals, and roads, creating employment opportunities, and addressing land rights issues.
    • Empowering local police: The state police should be empowered to take the lead in anti-Naxal operations as they have a better understanding of the local language and terrain.
    • Humanitarian approach: The government should adopt a humanitarian approach in dealing with the problem. The use of excessive force should be avoided, and care should be taken to ensure that the local population is not adversely affected.
    • Dialogue with Naxal leadership: The government should initiate a dialogue with the Naxal leadership to address their grievances and concerns. This would help in building trust and confidence between the two sides and pave the way for a peaceful resolution of the problem.
    • Coordination among states: The states should coordinate their efforts to address the Naxal problem. The sharing of intelligence, resources, and best practices would go a long way in addressing the issue.
    • Strengthening of institutions: The government should strengthen institutions like the police, judiciary, and administrative machinery to ensure that they are better equipped to deal with the problem.
    • Long-term vision: A long-term vision should be adopted to address the Naxal problem. This requires sustained efforts over a period of time to ensure that the problem is effectively tackled.

    Conclusion

    • India’s Maoist insurgency problem is not one that can be solved by just law and order enforcement. It is crucial to address the underlying social and economic aspects of the problem. The government should acknowledge the flaws in its anti-Naxal strategy and undertake a comprehensive approach to solve the problem. It must ensure that the local police take the lead in anti-Naxal operations, and the development policies must be sensitive to the needs and concerns of the tribal communities. Initiating peace talks with the Maoist leadership could also go a long way in resolving the issue.

    Mains Question

    Q. The recent events of violent attacks on security forces highlights that the Maoist insurgency remains a significant threat in India. In light of this discuss what are the flaws in anti-Naxal strategy and what is needed to address the Naxal insurgency in India?

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    Also Read:

    Village Defence Guards (VDG): A sense of security and confidence