Subject: Internal Security

The article explains the issues with the two common themes adopted for explaining the Naxal movement in India.

Two approaches to explain Naxal movement

1) Root cause and alienation approach

• The recent attack in and around Tekulagudem village in Sukma district demonstrates the threat posed by Maoists.
• The post-incident analysis of such setbacks comes in two flavours.
• The most popular theory amongst our intelligentsia and media is the root cause and alienation approach. 
• This approach states that it is the failure of the Indian state to provide economic development and social justice to the tribals living in these areas that has fuelled the Naxal movement and sustained it for five decades.
• As a prescription, a development-centric approach and negotiations are suggested as the way forward.

Issues with root cause and alienation approach

• There are several problems with this approach.
• First, it ignores the ideological foundations of the movement, specifically its rejection of India’s Constitution and democracy.
• Second, it fails to see that social and economic deprivation is not unique to the jungles of Chhattisgarh.
• Third, it doesn’t account for the possibility that while alienation and deprivation may help in igniting the spark of revolution, once lit the flames draw oxygen from many sources.
• Fourth, the role of external forces in fomenting and sustaining this movement is deliberately underplayed.
• Fifth, the grubby ground reality of the praxis of revolution is conveniently swept under the carpet.
• The organised extortion racket from all economic stakeholders in the Naxal-affected areas by our alienated revolutionaries seldom gets talked about.
• Sixth, the extensive ideological, financial and logistical ecosystem that provides sustenance to these revolutionaries in the jungle is seldom acknowledged.

2) Leadership issue

• According to this view, our tactical failures against the Maoists are entirely due to the poor quality of leadership provided by the Indian Police Service.
• The when, where, how of a setback simply don’t matter.
• When in doubt, identify the first IPS officer in the chain of command and hoist him on the petard of tactical incompetence.
• This view completely ignores the many successes of IPS leadership in counterinsurgency operations in Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and most recently in Odisha.
• Even in the Northeast and Jammu and Kashmir, where the Indian Army provides the backbone of the counterinsurgency grid, the police forces of the respective states and their IPS leadership play a crucial role in gathering intelligence and in executing operations.
• So, the failures and setbacks in the Naxal areas of Chhattisgarh need to be placed in perspective.

Way forward

• The fact that the Indian state has adopted a broad policy of economic development, military restraint and gradual attrition and rejected indiscriminate violence in the Naxal theatre is the democratically prudent and morally just course of action.
• This hasn’t dissuaded Maoist sympathisers from gaining international attention through relentless propaganda against our security forces.
• However, such attacks also help in exposing their true nature and hardening public resolve against them.
•  \We have enough examples of successful, police led CI Ops in our country.
• Why we are not able to replicate these successes in Chhattisgarh is a matter of larger political issues, well beyond the narrow scope of operational tactics and individual lapses of police leadership.
• Not just the politics, the geography and demography of the Naxal-affected areas, make it an even more complex challenge of internal security.

Consider the question “What are the factors that make Naxal movement a persistent threat to India’s internal security? ” 

Conclusion

Not just the politics, the geography and demography of the Naxal-affected areas, make it an even more complex challenge of internal security.

The article deals with the counterinsurgency strategies to deal with the issues of left wing extremism in India

Threat of left-wing extremism

• The killing of 22 security personnel by Maoists serves as a grim reminder that left-wing insurgency continues to be one of the biggest internal security threats for the country.
• In the past few years, Maoist violence seemed to have been on a downward spiral.
• The figures associated with the key indicators of violence like the number of incidents also support the contention that “insurgency is on the downward spiral”.
• But the attack should thus serve as a wake-up call to those who had begun to get complacent about the Maoist threat.

Approach in counterinsurgency strategy

• One school believes that given the Maoist insurgency posturing itself as a “people’s war”, the mandate is for a people-centric approach of “winning hearts and minds”.
• Others argues that an enemy-centric approach predicated on kinetic operations is best suited for the Maoist insurgency, where the fear of the population seceding from India is remote.
• The success of the erstwhile state of Andhra Pradesh in curbing the Maoist problem is often attributed to this enemy-centric approach.
• However, there is robust scholarly work available that shows that the Andhra government based its counterintelligence strategy on a judicious mix of the enemy-centric and population-centric approaches.
•  Andhra Pradesh had successfully implemented short-gestation-period developmental works in the Maoist-affected rural areas.
• Moreover, the erstwhile state is also the first state to have a comprehensive surrender-cum-rehabilitation policy.
• After the 2014 guidelines of the central government were brought out, many states have crafted attractive surrender and rehabilitation policies.
• Another important question is whether the government should keep the option of talking to Maoists open.
• The willingness to talk to rebel groups seems to incentivise insurgents and may demonstrate that violence pays.
• But bringing an end to civil war invariably involves negotiating with the enemy.

Way forward

• Indian counterinsurgency has to work with a dual objective of defeating the insurgents militarily and fully quell the insurgent impulses.
• This will need institutional overhauls.
• In the last decade or so, insurgency-affected states have started to raise special forces on the lines of Greyhounds.
• These forces are being given rigorous training in “counter-guerrilla” tactics and jungle warfare.
•  Besides, the jungles around the interstate borders have always been the preferred hiding spaces for the Maoists.
•  States must do more to synergise their efforts by launching coordinated operations, thereby denying Maoists any space for manoeuvrability.
• These efforts need to be supplemented by well-crafted development schemes.
• It is also important to segregate the population from the insurgents both operationally and ideologically.
• The conflict over the distribution of resources can be mended with economic development.
• But the bigger challenge would be to create a system where the tribal population feels that the government is representative, not repressive.
• Opening negotiation channels and policies like surrender and rehabilitation can give such a representative sense to the rebels.

Consider the question “Discuss the causes of left wing extremism in India. Suggest the way forward to deal with the issue.”

Conclusion

The government needs to follow these policies to end the challenge of left wing extremism from India.

The article highlights the issues facing India’s internal security architecture and suggests the restructuring of roles and capacity building to address the challenge.

Recent setback to internal security (IS) capability

• The COMBING OPERATION by local and central police forces in the Tekulguda region of Bastar went terribly wrong and resulted in the death of 22 security personnel.
• This tragic incident is a major and embarrassing setback to the IS (internal security) capability of India at many levels and highlights the challenge that LWE (left-wing extremism) continues to pose. 

Strategic inadequacies

• India has been dealing with three variants of the internal security challenge for decades.
• These three are: 1) a proxy war and terrorism in Kashmir 2) sub-national separatist movements in the Northeast. 3) the Naxal-Maoist insurgency ( LWE) in the Red Corridor.
• And these challenges have warranted different responses.
• The first two strands have been reasonably contained.
• LWE and the current Maoist movement has its genesis in poor governance, lack of development in the tribal belt and an oppressive/exploitative hierarchy of the state and society.
•  In November 2005, then PM Manmohan Singh described the LWE challenge as the most serious security threat to India and exhorted the professionals to evolve appropriate responses.

Need for restructuring

• One of the recommendations of the Kargil Review Committee (KRC) report was the restructuring of the role and the tasks of the para-military forces particularly with reference to command and control and leadership functions.
• This critical component of restructuring the leadership of the central police forces (in this case the CRPF and BSF) has not been addressed, much less redressed.
• By training, the police officer is expected to be a competent Superintendent and to maintain law and order.
• This is not the skill-set that is relevant when an officer has to “command” and lead his men into insurgency operations.
• In the current scenario, barring a few exceptions, many of the senior police officers (IPS cadre) who are introduced into the central police forces at senior ranks have little or no platoon/battalion experience. 

Consider the question “What are the factors making Left Wing Extremism such a persistent internal security problem for India? Suggest the measure to improve the internal security architecture in India.”

Conclusion

The political leadership of the country needs to act and complete the task of restructuring and capacity building to address India’s internal security challenge.