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Subject: Internal Security

  • World Drug Report: India in top five list

    According to the latest World Drug Report of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the fourth highest seizure of opium in 2018 was reported from India, after Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

    Drug seizures in India and neighbourhood

    • The maximum of 644 tonnes of opium was seized in Iran, followed by 27 tonnes in Afghanistan and 19 tonnes in Pakistan.
    • In India, the figure stood at four tonnes in 2018.

    Heroin

    • Heroin is manufactured from the morphine extracted from the seed pod of opium poppy plants.
    • Iran reported the highest seizure of heroin (25 tonnes), followed by Turkey, United States, China, Pakistan and Afghanistan.
    • India was at the 12th position in the world.

    Global pattern

    • 97% of the total global production of opium in the past five years came from only three countries.
    • About 84% of the total opium was produced in Afghanistan, from where it is supplied to neighbouring countries, Europe, west Asia, south Asia and Africa.
    • From Myanmar, which accounts for 7% of the global opium production, and Laos, where 1% of the opium is produced, it is supplied to east and south-east Asia and Oceania.
    • Mexico accounts for 6% of the global opium production, while Colombia and Guatemala account for less than 1% of global production.

    Some other details

    • The report said that the global area under opium poppy cultivation declined for the second year in a row in 2019.
    • It went down by 17% in 2018 and by 30% in 2019.
    • Despite the decline in cultivation, opium production remained stable in 2019, with higher yields reported in the main opium production areas.
    • Quantities of seized opiates remained concentrated in Asia, notably in south-west Asia (70%).
    • Asia is host to more than 90% of global illicit opium production.
    • Also, it is the world’s largest consumption market for opiates and also accounts for almost 80% of all opiates seized worldwide in 2018.

    Consider the question asked in 2018 “India’s proximity to two of the world’s biggest illicit opium-growing states has enhanced her internal security concerns. Explain the linkages between drug trafficking and other illicit activities such as gunrunning, money laundering and human trafficking. What countermeasures should be taken to prevent the same?”

  • Time to revisit the strategies on northern borders

    Two issues have been discussed in this article:change in strategy on northern border and the role of political leaders. Leveraging LAC for premeditated aggression has been part of China’s policy. This makes the change in our policy an imperative.

    LAC as leverage against India

    • India and China have had parleys since 1981, meetings of Joint Working Groups from 1988 to 2005 and 22 rounds of Special Representatives talks, in addition to many summit-level meetings.
    • Despite nearly four decades of discussions delineation and demarcation of the boundary has not been possible.
    • Throughout this period CMC/PLA had been at the helm of the defence and foreign policy decision-making,
    • The intrusion at Finger 4/5 of Pangong Tso and the transgression up to LAC in Galwan are instructive.
    • Out of the blue, most inexplicably and without any historical basis, the official Chinese statement came out seeking the “estuary” of Shyok and Galwan rivers.
    • The Chinese have deliberately ensured that the nebulous nature of the LAC is retained as leverage against India.

    Modernisation of PLA: So, was Galwan a testbed?

    • The PLA is at the threshold of achieving its interim modernisation goals of informatised, integrated joint operations by 2021.
    • It is well likely that the events of Eastern Ladakh of May-June 2020 are part of a larger testbed.
    • Over the years, the face-offs have witnessed PLA’s jostling and pushing, posse of horses intruding, and scant disregard for the treaties with India.
    • Pangong Tso and Galwan showed a new picture.

    Need to strategise and revisit the rules of engagement

    • For the Indian Army units and formations in Eastern Ladakh or elsewhere facing the PLA, there are limits to adherence to good faith and honour.
    •  The Indian Army has to strategise and should revisit its rules of engagement on the Northern Borders.
    • It has to be mindful that troops in tactical situations cannot be shackled by past treaties, which the PLA deals with disdain.
    • The Indian Army has to remain prepared to militarily handle the situations that will arise.
    • PLA has always shown extraordinary interest in Eastern Ladakh, especially Daulat-Beg-Oldi, the Chip-Chap river, Track Junction and Karakoram Pass.
    • The management practices for the Northern Borders have to be revisited, like placing the nearly division-sized force of ITBP in Eastern Ladakh under the army operationally.
    • Real-time intelligence, surveillance equipment and satellite imageries must be available to field formations that need to act on it.
    • This should not be delayed by the bureaucratic maze.

    Role of political leadership

    • At political level, there are representative forums like Parliament, the committees and regular briefings to seek clarifications, which is the right of politicians.
    • On national security issues, there must be national unity.
    • There ought to be faith in those at the helm that the issues of national security will not be sacrificed for political gains.
    • Similarly, within the norms and constraints of national security, the establishment must keep the nation informed, to avoid an information vacuum.

    Conclusion

    We need to strategise for the future, including the modern manifestations of non-contact, non-kinetic warfare. We must avoid unnecessary nitpicking on semantics of statements made in a particular context.

  • Why high-altitude warfare is challenging, how soldiers are trained

    The violent standoff between Indian and Chinese troops in Galwan Valley of Ladakh region has thrown the spotlight on high-altitude warfare and the challenges that troops face, particularly when advantageous positions on the heights are occupied by the other side.

    In the clouds of war, one may recall the huge amount of casualties faced by the Indian Army compared to the Pakistani side (being at advantageous positions) during the Kargil War.

    Try this question for mains:

    Q. Discuss why high-altitude warfare is challenging. Also discuss about India’s preparedness for a long-term war.

    How is high-altitude warfare fought?

    • High-altitude warfare is fought keeping the terrain and weather in mind.
    • The kind of infrastructure and training that the troops require for high-altitude warfare are key factors.
    • The evolution of such warfare goes back a long way: European countries had mountain brigades in view of the kind of terrain prevalent in those countries.
    • The harshness of the terrain calls for a specialised kind of training to prepare soldiers in terms of mindset and acclimatization.

    How is India equipped in such warfare?

    • Generally, India is considered a hub of mountain warfare skills since most of the country’s north and northeast requires such skills.
    • Ladakh Scouts are considered the best in this kind of warfare.
    • Mountain chop, a tactic involved in such warfare, evolved in India where the mountainous terrain is very difficult to scale.
    • To begin with, the troops are imparted training in basic and advance training in mountaineering to make them equipped for mountain warfare.

    Actual tactics involved

    • The mindsets of the enemy sitting above are assessed. Taking stock of the entire situation, one needs to find out the easiest approaches.
    • Especially when there are vertical cliffs, it is generally perceived that the enemy that has taken defensive positions will be less guarded from the side of difficult approaches.
    • Basically, the most difficult approaches where the enemy is likely to give the least resistance need to be used efficiently.

    What are the challenges involved in warfare in a high-altitude place like Galwan Valley?

    • A big factor is who has taken defensive positions and who is sitting on higher ground.
    • Once troops are sitting on high ground, it becomes very difficult to dislodge them from there.
    • In a place like Galwan Valley, which is absolutely barren, there is not much hiding place.
    • The soldier on high ground is absolutely stationary, which makes those on lower terrain easy targets; the enemy can pick them up one by one.
    • Normally in mountain warfare, troops on lower ground use a combat ratio of 1:6, but in circumstances as in Galwan, it may go up to 1:10.

    How to approach such situations?

    • Generally, mountain warfare is fought using the period of darkness to reach the opposing army, engage and overpower them before the first light of day.
    • In case troops do not have the capabilities, fitness or strategies to do so before dawn, then it is a lost cause.
    • But without adequate trained troops who are well-versed with the terrain and are properly acclimatized, it is not an easy game.

    What are the other challenges faced by soldiers in high altitudes?

    • The first major factor is acclimatization since the oxygen supply reduces drastically.
    • Next, the load-carrying capacity of individuals reduces drastically.
    • Things move very slowly in the mountains and mobilization of troops consumes time.
    • Thus, time and place need to be kept on top priority when deciding where the troops have to be stationed and how they have to be mobilized.

    What are the logistical challenges in this kind of warfare?

    • One major challenge is that weapons jam, particularly in high-altitude areas.
    • When a soldier is at a height of 17,000 ft or above, it is very cold, and he needs to grease the weapons and clean the barrels at least once a week to ensure they function efficiently.
    • But at the time of combat, this becomes difficult.
    • Vehicles do not start when fuel jams. If the fuel is diesel, it won’t ignite unless it is mixed with thinners or other chemicals to make them thin enough to fire the engine.

    Ensuring proper reinforcement

    • In Galwan, which is an extremely tactical area and strategically important, reinforcement plays a vital role, particularly when the Indian troops are not in a position of advantage.
    • For communication equipment, troops need to carry more batteries because they drain very quickly at high altitude.
    • While a battery tends to last for 24 hours in the plains, it will drain in 1-2 hours in these severely cold areas.
    • Transport animals such as mules need to be used to maintain adequate supplies, which is not an easy task. Weather constraints play a major factor.

  • Financial Action Task Force (FATF)

    Indian officials attended the virtual 32nd special Eurasian Group on Combating Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism (EAG) plenary meeting, under the aegis of the FATF.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. What is FATF? Discuss its role in combating global financial crimes and terror financing.

    What is the FATF?

    • FATF is an intergovernmental organization founded in 1989 on the initiative of the G7 to develop policies to combat money laundering.
    • The FATF Secretariat is housed at the OECD headquarters in Paris.
    • It holds three Plenary meetings in the course of each of its 12-month rotating presidencies.
    • As of 2019, FATF consisted of 37 member jurisdictions.
    • India became an Observer at FATF in 2006. Since then, it had been working towards full-fledged membership. On June 25, 2010, India was taken in as the 34th country member of FATF.

    EAG of FATF

    • The EAG is a regional body comprising nine countries: India, Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Belarus.
    • It is an associate member of the FATF.

    What is the role of FATF?

    • The rise of the global economy and international trade has given rise to financial crimes such as money laundering.
    • The FATF makes recommendations for combating financial crime, reviews members’ policies and procedures, and seeks to increase acceptance of anti-money laundering regulations across the globe.
    • Because money launderers and others alter their techniques to avoid apprehension, the FATF updates its recommendations every few years.

    What is the Black List and the Grey List?

    • Black List: The blacklist, now called the “Call for action” was the common shorthand description for the FATF list of “Non-Cooperative Countries or Territories” (NCCTs).
    • Grey List: Countries that are considered safe haven for supporting terror funding and money laundering are put in the FATF grey list. This inclusion serves as a warning to the country that it may enter the blacklist.

    Consequences of being in the FATF grey list:

    • Economic sanctions from IMF, World Bank, ADB
    • Problem in getting loans from IMF, World Bank, ADB and other countries
    • Reduction in international trade
    • International boycott

    Pakistan and FATF

    • Pakistan, which continues to remain on the “grey list” of FATF, had earlier been given the deadline till the June to ensure compliance with the 27-point action plan against terror funding networks.
    • It has been under the FATF’s scanner since June 2018, when it was put on the Grey List for terror financing and money laundering risks.
    • FATF and its partners such as the Asia Pacific Group (APG) are reviewing Pakistan’s processes, systems, and weaknesses on the basis of a standard matrix for anti-money laundering (AML) and combating the financing of terrorism (CFT) regime.

  • Defence reforms must ensure the alignment of its various domains

    This article draws on the model used for accident investigation but in a reverse manner. For proper functioning of the defence system of a country, proper alignment of various domains is essential. This article divides the defence system of the country into three layers and visualises them as a slice of cheese in the model. Each component is analysed and the issues associated with it are looked into.

    What is the Swiss Cheese Model?

    • The Swiss cheese model is associated with accident investigation in an organisation or a system.
    • A system consists of multiple domains or layers, each having some shortcomings.
    • These layers are visualised in the model as slices of Swiss cheese, with the holes in them being the imperfections.
    • Normally, weaknesses get nullified, other than when, at some point, the holes in every slice align to let a hazard pass through and cause an accident.

    Applying the Swiss Cheese Model for nations defence preparedness

    • When applied to a nation’s defence preparedness, the Swiss cheese model, in its simplest form, works the reverse way.
    • The slices represent the major constituents in a nation’s war-making potential, while the holes are pathways through which the domains interact.
    • At the macro level, there are only three slices with holes in each.
    • These must align to ensure that a nation’s defence posture is in tune with its political objectives.
    • Any mismatch may turn out to be detrimental to the nation’s aatma samman (self-respect) when the balloon goes up.
    • In these days of the Aatmanirbhar Bharat Abhiyan, a clinical analysis is necessary to obviate any missteps that may prove costly a few years or decades down the line.

    Let’s analyse the Indian defence set-up from three slice perspective

    • In the Indian defence set-up, the three slices are as described below-
    • 1)The policymaking apparatus comprising the Department of Military Affairs (DMA) and Ministry of Defence (MoD).
    • 2) The defence research and development (R&D) establishment and domestic manufacturing industry.
    • 3) The three services.
    • When the MoD alone existed, a certain relationship between the three layers saw India prosecute four major wars since independence.
    • The holes in the three slices were aligned to different degrees and hence the results were varied in each conflict.
    • That the system required an overhaul would be an understatement.

    So, let’s look at the three-slices of Indian defence

    1) Policymaking: How changes in technology forced militaries to be joint?

    • With technology progressing exponentially, a single service prosecution of war was no longer tenable.
    • Because the advent of smart munitions, computer processing, networking capabilities and the skyrocketing cost of equipment brought in the concept of parallel warfare.
    • Synergised application of tools of national power became an imperative.
    • Thus, it became essential for militaries to be joint to apply violence in an economical way.
    • Economical in terms of time, casualties, costs incurred, and political gains achieved.
    • The setting up of the DMA and the creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) to achieve synergy are the most fundamental changes.
    • As further modifications and tweaking take place in the way the services prepare to go to war, it is imperative that the transformation be thought through with clinical analysis, without any external, emotional, political or rhetorical pressure.

    Hostile security environment

    • India’s security managers have to factor in the increasingly belligerent posture of the country’s two adversaries.
    • Terrorist activities have not reduced in Jammu and Kashmir.
    • Ongoing incidents along the northern border with China do not foretell a peaceful future.
    • And the China-Pakistan nexus can only be expected to get stronger and portentous.
    • Such a security environment demands that capability accretion of the three services proceed unhindered.

    2) Indigenous R&D and manufacturing is still some years away

    • To elaborate, the Indian Air Force at a minimum requires 300 fighters to bolster its squadron strength.
    • The Army needs guns of all types; and the Navy wants ships, helicopters, etc.
    • The requirements are worth billions of dollars but with COVID-19-induced cuts in defence spending.
    • Enter the well-meaning government diktat for buying indigenous only, but for that, in-house R&D and manufacturing entities have to play ball.
    • Hindustan Aeronautics Limited can, at best, produce just eight Tejas fighters per year presently.
    • The Army has had to import rifles due to the failure of the Defence Research and Development Organisation to produce them.
    • And the Navy has earnest hopes that the hull designs that its internal R&D makes get the vital innards for going to war.
    • So, the Swiss cheese slice representing indigenous R&D and a manufacturing supply chain that ensures quality war-fighting equipment, at the right time and in required quantities, is still some years away.

    3) The three services and creation of theatre commands

    • The forthcoming reform of creating theatre commands is the most talked about result of jointness expected from the Swiss cheese slice in which lie the DMA and a restructured MoD.
    • Doing so would be a shake-up of huge proportions as it strikes at the very foundation of the war-fighting structure of the services.
    • The three-year deadline spoken about by the CDS must take into account the not-so-comfortable state of assets of each service which would need to be carved up for each theatre.
    • The Chinese announced their ‘theaterisation’ concept in 2015; it is still work in progress.
    • The U.S. had a bruising debate for decades before the Goldwater-Nichols Act came into force in 1986.
    • New relationships take time to smooth out, and in the arena of defence policymaking, which is where the DMA and MoD lie, the element of time has a value of its own.
    • Any ramming through, just to meet a publicly declared timeline, could result in creating a not-so-optimal war-fighting organisation to our detriment.
    • So, the three services that constitute the third Swiss cheese slice have to contend with the other two slices being in a state of flux for some time to come.

    Consider the question “Any defence system reforms must ensure the alignment and coordination of the various component of it which involves policymaking apparatus,  defence R&D and manufacturing and the three services. Comment.”

    Conclusion

    The political, civil and military leadership must have their feet firmly on ground to ensure that the holes in their Swiss cheese continue to stay aligned; impractical timelines and pressures of public pronouncements must not be the drivers in such a fundamental overhaul of our defence apparatus.

  • Malabar Naval Exercise to include Australia

    India is prepared to expand the Malabar trilateral naval exercise involving India, the U.S. and Japan, to permanently include Australia.

    Go through the list for once. UPSC may ask a match the pair type question asking exercise name and countries involved.

    [Prelims Spotlight] Defence Exercises

    About Ex. Malabar

    • Exercise Malabar is a trilateral naval exercise involving the United States, Japan and India as permanent partners.
    • Originally begun in 1992 as a bilateral exercise between India and the United States, Japan became a permanent partner in 2015.
    • Past non-permanent participants are Australia and Singapore.
    • The annual Malabar series began in 1992 and includes diverse activities, ranging from fighter combat operations from aircraft carriers through Maritime Interdiction Operations Exercises.

    Significance of Australia’s inclusion

    • Earlier, India had concerns that it would give the appearance of a “quadrilateral military alliance” aimed at China.
    • Now both look forward to the cooperation in the ‘Indo-Pacific’ and the strengthening of defence ties.
    • This has led to a convergence of mutual interest in many areas for a better understanding of regional and global issues.
    • Both are expected to conclude the long-pending Mutual Logistics Support Agreement (MLSA) as part of measures to elevate the strategic partnership.

  • Missile Park ‘AGNEEPRASTHA’

    Foundation Stone for a Missile Park “AGNEEPRASTHA” was recently laid at INS Kalinga, Vizag.

    Caution: Agneeprastha is a missile park of the eastern naval command of the Indian Navy. It has nothing to do with the Agni missiles.

    Missile Park ‘Agneeprastha’

    • ‘Agneeprastha’ aims to capture glimpses of Missile History of INS Kalinga since 1981 till date.
    • The Missile Park has been set up with a replica of missiles and Ground Support Equipment (GSE) that showcase the evolution of missiles handled by the unit.
    • The exhibits have been created from scrap / obsolete inventory which have been reconditioned in-house.
    • The main attraction is P-70 ‘Ametist’, an underwater launched anti-ship missile from the arsenal of the old ‘Chakra’ (Charlie-1 submarine) which was in service with IN during 1988-91.
    • It will also provide a one-stop arena for motivation and stimulation of inquisitive minds regarding the missiles and related technologies, from school children to naval personnel and their families.

  • Rising incidences of Chinese Transgressions

    As tensions remain high between Indian and Chinese soldiers, the number of recorded Chinese transgressions across the disputed India-China border surged by 75 per cent in Ladakh in 2019, and the Chinese forays into Indian Territory in the first four months of the current year have also witnessed an increase compared to the same period last year.

    Chinese Transgression:

      • The border between India and China is not fully demarcated and the Line of Actual Control (LAC) is neither clarified nor confirmed by the two countries.
      • This leads to different perceptions of the LAC for the two sides while soldiers from either side try to patrol the area.
      • Observation Methods: Use of surveillance equipment, face-offs by patrols, reliable indications by locals, or evidence left by the Chinese in the form of wrappers, biscuit packets etc. in an unmanned area.
      • Official data shows that 80% of Chinese transgressions across the LAC since 2015 have taken place in four locations of which three are in eastern Ladakh in the western sector.
        • These areas of eastern Ladakh are Pangong Tso, Trig Heights and Burtse.
        • The fourth area is the Dichu Area/Madan Ridge area (Arunachal Pradesh) of the Eastern sector.

    •  Implications of Increased Number of Transgressions:

      • It is an indicator of increased Chinese assertiveness.
      • Even if there are no major incidents, it should not be taken lightly.
      • So far, there has been no major standoff between the two sides after the 73-day Doklam standoff on Sikkim-Bhutan border in 2017.

    Concerns

    • India is worried about the tensions at Naku La in Sikkim and at Galwan river and Pangong Tso in Ladakh.
    • The increased transgressions lead to more tensions between both countries which are already struggling to contain the Covid-19 pandemic.
    • Nepal’s recent behaviour on the Mansarovar Link Road raising the border map issue also raises Indian concerns.
    • The constant accusations on each other also cause tensions and disrupt the peace on borders.
      • Recently, Chinese media accused India of building defence facilities in the Galwan Valley region of the contested Aksai Chin area.
    • India and China are both nuclear-armed countries with strong militaries and the constant border conflicts are not a desirable thing.

    Way Forward

    • In the Wuhan and Mahabalipuram summits, both China and India had reaffirmed that they will make efforts to ensure peace and tranquility in the border areas.
    • On 1st April, 2020 India and China completed their 70 years of diplomatic relations.
    • Both countries have resolved border issues peacefully in the past four decades which gives the hope that the tensions will subside soon.
    • Establishment of peace between the two big powers of such an important geopolitical region is essential for their own growth and development as well as for maintenance of global peace.

    Practice question for mains:

    Q. Clear demarcation of the national borders is the need of the hour. Discuss.

  • Towards self-reliance in defence manufacturing

    External dependence for defence equipment could turn out to be the chink in the armour of any country, literally. As one of the major importer of defence equipment, India has been struggling to wean itself away from this vulnerability. This article discusses the recent changes announced by the finance minister in defence procurement and manufacturing policy. So, what are the changes and how will these changes benefit us? Read to know more…

    Promoting self-reliance: Addressing strategic and national security concern

    • Recently the Finance Minister announced measures to promote self-reliance in defence production.
    • This address long-standing strategic and national security concerns about the extent of India’s external dependence for its defence-preparedness.
    • For most of the past decade, India had the dubious distinction of being the world’s largest arms importer.
    • India accounted for about 12% of global arms imports.
    • Saudi Arabia jumped to first place in 2018 and 2019, but India still takes over 9% of global imports.
    • This external dependence for weapons, spares and, in some cases, even ammunition creates vulnerabilities during military crises.
    • COVID-19 has, once again, focused minds on the impact of supply chain disruptions on both civil and defence sectors.
    • With its security environment, its great power ambitions and its technological capacities, India should have a robust defence manufacturing capacity.
    • New Defence Procurement Procedures (DPP) 2020 are under formulation.
    • We now have a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) tasked with promoting indigenous equipment in the armed forces.

    Following are some of the moves declared by the government and their significance for the country

    1. Encouraging  private manufacturers

    • The decision i) to notify a list of weapons systems for sourcing entirely from Indian manufacturers, ii) the promise to progressively expand this list iii) a separate Budget provision for domestic capital procurement- will encourage our private defence manufacturers.
    • The research capacities, technological skills and quality commitment of our private defence manufacturer are often better appreciated by foreign clients for whom they are subcontractors.
    • There is a range of platforms and subsystems, developed in India and qualified in trials, some of which face hurdles to their induction by our armed forces because of foreign competition.
    • These include missile systems such as Akash and Nag, the Light Combat Aircraft and the Light Combat Helicopter, artillery guns, radars, electronic warfare systems and armoured vehicles.

    2. Time-bound procurement

    • The government has promised i) a time-bound defence procurement process, ii) overhauling trial and testing procedures iii) establishing a professional project management unit.
    • To understand the significance of the above measures consider the fact below-
    • Over the past five years, the Indian government has approved over 200 defence acquisition proposals, valued at over â‚č4 trillion.
    • But most are still in relatively early stages of processing.
    • Of course, this delay now provides the opportunity to re-examine them and to prioritise those with indigenous research and development.
    • The CDS could also examine them from a tri-service angle, to avoid redundancy of capacities across the services.

    3. Corporatisation of Ordnance Factory Board

    • Over the decades, our ordnance factories have been the backbone of indigenous supplies to our armed forces.
    • Their structure, work culture and product range now need to be responsive to technology and quality demands of modern armed forces.
    • Corporatisation, including public listing of some units, ensures a more efficient interface of the manufacturer with the designer and end-user.
    • The factories would be better integrated into the larger defence manufacturing ecosystem.

    4. Realistic specifications of desired weapon platforms

    • Our defence planners will frame “realistic” specifications for their desired weapons platforms.
    • These specifications should be based on the requirements of India’s defence strategy, rather than on aspirational considerations which, the Finance Minister said, may lead to a single foreign vendor.
    • It is also imperative that when we import weapon systems, we should plan for the ammunitions and spares for them to be eventually manufactured in India.
    • This will ensure that we are not driven to seek urgent replenishments from abroad during crises.
    • The same goes for repair, maintenance and overhaul facilities and, at the next level, the upgrade of weapons platforms.

    5. FDI limit increased to 74% by automatic route

    • The liberalisation of foreign direct investment in defence manufacturing, raising the limit under the automatic route to 74%, should open the door to more joint ventures of foreign and Indian companies for defence manufacturing in India.
    • It would also sustain domestic industrial activity in the research, design and manufacture of systems and sub-systems.
    • Our companies would now get the opportunity to directly contribute to Indian defence manufacturing.

    Way forward

    • The development of a thriving indigenous defence industry needs an overhaul of existing regulations and practices.
    • A long-term integrated perspective plan of the requirements of the armed forces should give industry a clear picture of future requirements.
    • DPP 2020 should incorporate guidelines to promote forward-looking strategic partnerships between Indian and foreign companies.
    • This partnership should be with a view to achieving indigenisation over a period of time for even sophisticated platforms.
    • Cost evaluation has to evolve from mechanical application of the L1 (lowest financial bid) principle to prioritising indigenous content.
    • The definition of indigenisation itself needs to privilege technology over value or volume.
    • Investment, Indian or foreign, will be viable only if the door to defence exports is opened, with a transparent policy.
    • To give private industry a level playing field for developing defence technologies, conflicts of interest, created by the role of our Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) as the government’s sole adviser, developer and evaluator of technologies have to be addressed.

    Consider the question, “India has been aspiring to reduce its external dependence for defence equipment but has not succeeded in doing so. Examine the challenges in the way of self-sufficiency in this area. How effective will be the recent policy changes made in meeting the goal?”

    Conclusion

    The government has rightly clarified that self-reliance would not be taken to overzealous extremes. The thrust for indigenous research and development will coexist with the import of cutting-edge military technologies to obviate near-term defence vulnerabilities. Of the key components of any major reform — money, method and mindset — mindset is the most critical and the most intractable. It takes a crisis to change it.

     

     

     

     

  • Terrorism and its ideologies

    Pakistan is a unique country in the sense that it is both a victim and the perpetrator of terrorism. This article explains the situations which made Pakistan home to the terrorism. So, why some terrorist organisations turned against Pakistan? What are the ideologies followed by various terrorist organisation and how it makes a difference in their functioning? Read to know…

    Terrorism paradox of Pakistan: Both Victim and perpetrator

    • This Terrorism paradox can be traced to the deliberate policy of the Pakistani state to create and foster terrorist groups in order to engage in low-intensity warfare with its neighbours.
    • Pakistan first operationalised this strategy in regard to Afghanistan in 1973.
    • And intensified it with the cooperation of the U.S. and Saudi Arabia after the Marxist coup of 1978 after which USSR entered Afghanistan.

    Soviet withdrawal and rise in insurgency in Kashmir

    • The Soviet withdrawal in 1989 left the Pakistani military with a large surplus of Islamist fighters that it had trained and armed.
    • Islamabad decided to use this “asset” to intensify the insurgency in the Kashmir Valley.

    Radicalisation of Pakistani population

    • The decade-long Afghan “jihad” in Afghanistan had also radicalised a substantial segment of the Pakistani population.
    • Radicalisation was intense in the North-West Frontier Province and Punjab.
    • Sectarian divisions were also on the rise not only between Sunnis and Shias but also among various Sunni sects.
    • The division was intense between two Sunni sects-the puritanical Deobandis and the more syncretic and Sufi-oriented Barelvis.
    • In the process, a number of homegrown terrorist groups emerged that the Pakistan Army co-opted for its use in Kashmir and the rest of India.
    • But, it soon became clear that Pakistan had created a set of Frankenstein’s monsters some of whom turned against their creator.
    • The Musharraf government, under American pressure, decided to collaborate with the latter in the overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.
    • This resulted in some of the terrorist organisation turning against Pakistan.

    Monsters who don’t spare even its creator

    • The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has ideological affinity with the Afghan Taliban.
    • The TTP and its affiliates have fought pitched battles with the Pakistan Army in the Federally-Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and parts of the NWFP.
    • Also, the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) has not hesitated to launch terrorist attacks on targets within Pakistan as well, especially against the Shias and Sufi shrines.

    Did all terrorist organisation turn against Pakistan?

    • No!
    • Consider the case of ‘loyalist’ LeT.
    • Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), is a classic example of a “loyalist” terrorist organisation that has played by the rules set by the Pakistani military.
    • It only launches attacks on targets outside Pakistan, primarily in India.
    • As the evidence in the case of the Mumbai carnage of 2008 clearly indicates LeT operations are coordinated with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
    • ISI provides it with intelligence and logistical support in addition to identifying specific targets.
    • This is why the LeT and its front organisations have continued to receive the military’s patronage and unstinting support.
    • Consequently, its leader, Hafiz Saeed, was until recently provided protection by the Pakistani state.

    Ideological differences

    • Both the LeT and the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) have been engaged in attacks on Indian targets identified by Pakistan’s ISI.
    • The difference between LeT and JeM lies in the fact that while the LeT is more pragmatic and less ideological.
    • The JeM is highly ideological and sectarian.
    • JeM draws its ideological inspiration from a very extreme form of Deobandi puritanism.
    • That extreme form considers all those who do not believe in its philosophy beyond the pale of Islam.
    • For many JeM diehards, these include not only Shias and Barelvis but also the Pakistani state and the Pakistani military.
    • LeT on the other hand does not consider Muslims of different theological orientations as non-believers and therefore legitimate targets of attack.
    • This relatively “liberal” interpretation is related to the fact that LeT draws its ideological inspiration from the sect called the Ahl-e-Hadis, which composes only a small proportion of Pakistan’s Muslim population and cannot afford to engage in sectarian conflict.
    • Moreover, it draws its membership from different Muslim sects including the Sufi-oriented Barelvis and the puritanical Deobandis.
    • Both these factors drive LeT toward greater tolerance in sectarian terms and to eschew intra-Islamic theological battles.
    • Its primary goals are political; above all, driving India out of Kashmir.
    • This jells well with the objectives of the Pakistani military and makes LeT and Hafiz Saeed, favourites of the Pakistani establishment.

    Consider the question asked by UPSC in 2017-“The scourge of terrorism is a grave challenge to national security. What solution do you suggest to curb this growing menace? What are the major sources of terrorist funding?

    Conclusion

    The fact that using terrorist outfits for state objectives is a highly risky business whose blowback cannot be predicted and can have very negative consequences for the stability of the state itself.