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Type: Amended/Enacted

  • National Medical Commission proposes a single national licence to practise medicine

    Why in the News

    The National Medical Commission has notified draft regulations under which a doctor registered with any one State Medical Council would be able to practise anywhere in India without fresh registration, using a unique identification number in the National Medical Register. The right to practise is being nationalised while the power to discipline stays with the State where the alleged misconduct occurred.

    What do the draft Registration of Medical Practitioners and Licence to Practice Medicine (Amendment) Regulations, 2026 propose?

    1. The core change: A medical practitioner once registered with a State Medical Council would be eligible to practise across India without obtaining fresh registration or a licence in another State.
    2. The identifier: The practitioner would be allotted a Unique Identification (UID) number in the National Medical Register (NMR), which becomes the single reference for the right to practise.
    3. What it amends: The draft amends the 2023 regulations governing registration and licensing of doctors, and routes the process through a unified registration portal of the Commission's Ethics and Medical Registration Board.
    4. Stage and consultation: The draft was notified by the Commission on 11 August 2026, and objections and suggestions have been invited for 30 days from the date of notification.

    What is the National Medical Register (NMR)?

    1. Function: The National Medical Register is the central repository of registration details of all medical practitioners in India, maintained by the National Medical Commission alongside the State Medical Registers kept by each State Medical Council. Under the draft it would also hold disciplinary records and the active or inactive status of every licence.

    Who is the Ethics and Medical Registration Board?

    1. Role: The Ethics and Medical Registration Board is one of the four autonomous boards of the National Medical Commission, responsible for maintaining the National Medical Register and regulating professional conduct and ethics. Under the draft it would allot the unique identification number and operate the unified registration portal.

    How would the unique identification number work?

    1. Composition of the number: The unique identification number assigned in the register would incorporate the State or Union Territory code and the practitioner's State Medical Register number.
    2. Sequence of grant: The State Medical Council first grants registration, and the Ethics and Medical Registration Board then allots the unique identification number.
    3. Effect of allotment: Once the number is allotted, the doctor would not require fresh registration or a separate licence to practise in another State or Union Territory.
    4. Register synchronisation: The draft proposes automatic electronic synchronisation between the national and State registers, so a change made in one register is reflected in the other.

    What changes for State Medical Councils?

    1. Entry point unchanged: State Medical Councils would continue to scrutinise applications and to grant registration and licence for doctors to practise.
    2. Dual reflection of approval: The approval would be reflected in both the State Medical Register and the National Medical Register.
    3. Central oversight added: The Ethics and Medical Registration Board and the Commission would have powers to seek records and monitor State Medical Councils.
    4. The stated purpose of oversight: The monitoring power is intended to promote uniformity and transparency in regulation across States.

    How is disciplinary jurisdiction handled under the draft?

    1. Territorial principle retained: Disciplinary jurisdiction stays primarily with the State Council in whose territorial jurisdiction the alleged professional misconduct, unethical conduct or medical negligence occurred.
    2. Powers of that Council: It has the power to inquire into and decide the matter, and to record the outcome against the practitioner's credentials in the online register.
    3. Cross council cases: Where disciplinary action is recommended by a State Council other than the doctor's primary registering council, the action would be reflected in the National Medical Register.
    4. Automatic flow back: That action would then be automatically updated in the State register of the council of primary registration.
    5. What the register would carry: The National Medical Register would hold disciplinary proceedings including suspension, removal and restoration of registration, and details of disciplinary action taken.

    What happens to licence validity and renewal?

    1. Validity retained: The proposal retains the five year validity of a licence to practise.
    2. Renewal window: If a doctor does not apply for renewal within three months of expiry, the registration will be marked inactive.
    3. Consequence of inactive status: A practitioner whose registration is marked inactive is not entitled to practise medicine.
    4. Visibility of status: The National Medical Register would carry whether a doctor's licence is active or inactive, so the status is nationally visible.

    Does a national licence without a national disciplinary forum close the accountability gap?

    1. Portability of practice is immediate: A single number confers the right to practise in every State and Union Territory from the moment it is allotted.
    2. Portability of accountability is derived: Discipline still runs through whichever State Council has territorial jurisdiction over the place of the alleged misconduct, and reaches the rest of the country only through register synchronisation.
    3. The gap is procedural, not conceptual: If synchronisation lags or a State Council does not record an outcome, a suspended practitioner remains visible as active elsewhere.
    4. Uniformity of standards is not guaranteed: Different State Councils apply the professional conduct regulations with differing rigour, and a national licence carries the outcome of the least rigorous forum as readily as the most rigorous.
    5. The Commission's answer is oversight, not adjudication: The draft responds with powers to seek records and monitor State Councils rather than with a central disciplinary forum.

    Challenges to the proposed national licence framework

    1. Synchronisation dependence: The entire accountability design rests on electronic updates between the national and State registers working without delay. e.g. a suspension recorded by one State Council but not reflected in the National Medical Register would leave a barred doctor practising elsewhere.
    2. Uneven State Council capacity: State Medical Councils differ widely in staffing, digitisation and case disposal, and the weakest becomes the entry point for the whole country. e.g. State Councils with long pending complaint backlogs would still be the first scrutiny layer for national practice rights.
    3. Forum shopping in registration: Applicants may seek primary registration with the council perceived to have the lightest scrutiny, since the licence is then valid everywhere. e.g. the unique identification number carrying the State code makes the choice of registering State visible but does not restrict it.
    4. Renewal lapse risk: A three month renewal window creates a cliff on which an administrative omission ends the right to practise. e.g. a practitioner on long clinical assignment abroad missing the window and finding registration marked inactive.
    5. Data accuracy in the register: A national register carries forward whatever errors and duplicates the State registers already contain. e.g. duplicate entries across State registers have long complicated counts of registered allopathic practitioners in India.
    6. No stated appellate route in the draft: The draft records the State Council's power to inquire and decide without setting out a national appellate forum against an adverse finding. e.g. a doctor disciplined by a State Council other than the primary registering council faces consequences nationally through the register.
    7. Interface with the criminal and consumer forums: Professional discipline runs alongside criminal prosecution and consumer litigation, and the register reflects only the first. e.g. a practitioner facing a medical negligence complaint under the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 with no corresponding entry in the register.

    Conclusion

    The draft Registration of Medical Practitioners and Licence to Practice Medicine (Amendment) Regulations, 2026 stand notified by the National Medical Commission on 11 August 2026, with objections and suggestions invited for 30 days from the date of notification, which is the next milestone in the process. The proposal creates portable practice rights through a unique identification number while leaving discipline with the State Council of the place of misconduct. The accountability question turns on whether automatic synchronisation between the National Medical Register and the State registers actually works in practice. A national licence with a fragmented disciplinary record would widen mobility faster than it widens accountability.

    Medical Regulation in India

    1. The apex regulator: The National Medical Commission (NMC) regulates medical education and medical practice in India, having replaced the Medical Council of India in 2020.
    2. Four autonomous boards: The Under Graduate Medical Education Board, the Post Graduate Medical Education Board, the Medical Assessment and Rating Board, and the Ethics and Medical Registration Board.
    3. Two tier registration: Registration is granted by State Medical Councils and recorded in State Medical Registers, with the National Medical Register maintained centrally.
    4. Common entrance and exit: Admission to undergraduate and postgraduate medical courses runs through the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test, and the National Exit Test is provided for as a common final year and licentiate examination.
    5. Scale of the system: India has expanded medical college and undergraduate seat capacity substantially over the past decade, with the government citing a doctor to population ratio better than the World Health Organization norm of one per thousand when practitioners of all recognised systems are counted.
    6. Plural systems of medicine: Allopathic practice is regulated by the National Medical Commission. Ayurveda, Yoga, Unani and Siddha are regulated by the National Commission for Indian System of Medicine, and homoeopathy by the National Commission for Homoeopathy.

    Laws and Rules Governing Medical Practice in India

    1. National Medical Commission Act, 2019: Establishes the Commission and its four autonomous boards, provides for the National Medical Register, the National Eligibility cum Entrance Test and the National Exit Test, and repealed the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956.
    2. Statutory basis of the register: The Act requires a National Register of licensed practitioners to be maintained and made publicly available.
    3. Registration of Medical Practitioners and Licence to Practice Medicine Regulations, 2023: The regulations the present draft seeks to amend, governing registration and licensing procedure.
    4. National Medical Commission Registered Medical Practitioner (Professional Conduct) Regulations, 2023: Set out the ethical duties of doctors, including on prescribing by generic name, telemedicine and consent.
    5. Clinical Establishments (Registration and Regulation) Act, 2010: Provides for registration and minimum standards for clinical establishments in adopting States and Union Territories.
    6. Consumer Protection Act, 2019: Provides the forum for medical negligence claims as deficiency in service, separate from professional disciplinary proceedings.
    7. Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940: Regulates the manufacture, sale and prescription of drugs that registered practitioners are authorised to prescribe.
    8. Mental Healthcare Act, 2017: Governs the treatment and rights of persons with mental illness and the registration of mental health professionals and establishments.
    9. Transplantation of Human Organs and Tissues Act, 1994: Regulates removal, storage and transplantation of human organs, with obligations placed on registered practitioners.

    Government Initiatives in Medical Regulation and Health Human Resources

    1. National Medical Register portal: Launched by the Commission to create a verifiable public register of allopathic practitioners with unique identification numbers.
    2. Ayushman Bharat Digital Mission: Maintains the Healthcare Professionals Registry and the Health Facility Registry, linking verified practitioner identity to digital health records.
    3. Pradhan Mantri Swasthya Suraksha Yojana: Funds new All India Institutes of Medical Sciences and upgrades existing government medical colleges to expand tertiary care and teaching capacity.
    4. Centrally Sponsored Scheme for district hospital upgradation: Supports establishment of new medical colleges attached to existing district and referral hospitals in underserved districts.
    5. National Exit Test: Provided for under the National Medical Commission Act, 2019 as a single examination serving as the final year undergraduate examination, the licentiate examination and the postgraduate entrance test.
    6. Telemedicine Practice Guidelines, 2020: Permit registered practitioners to consult remotely within a defined professional and ethical framework.
    7. eSanjeevani: The national teleconsultation platform connecting patients to registered practitioners through health and wellness centres and directly from home.

    Key Facts about the National Medical Commission

    1. Year of operation: The Commission came into being in 2020 on the repeal of the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956 and the dissolution of the Medical Council of India.
    2. Composition: It is headed by a Chairperson and includes ex officio and part time members, with the presidents of the four autonomous boards as members.
    3. Medical Advisory Council: The Act creates a Medical Advisory Council as the primary platform through which States and Union Territories place their views before the Commission.
    4. Rating power: The Medical Assessment and Rating Board assesses and rates medical institutions and grants permission to establish new medical colleges.
    5. Fee regulation: The Commission frames guidelines for the determination of fees for a proportion of seats in private medical institutions and deemed universities.

    Challenges in Medical Regulation in India

    1. Maldistribution rather than absolute shortage: Doctors concentrate in metropolitan and urban districts while rural and tribal blocks remain unstaffed. e.g. persistent vacancies of specialists at Community Health Centres reported in successive Rural Health Statistics.
    2. Quackery and unqualified practice: Unregistered practitioners operate widely where regulated supply is thin, and a national register alone does not displace them. e.g. State Medical Councils issuing repeated public notices against unqualified practitioners in rural districts.
    3. Ethics enforcement capacity: Professional conduct proceedings are slow and outcomes are inconsistent across State Councils. e.g. complaints of professional misconduct pending for years before State Medical Councils.
    4. Cost of medical education: High private medical college fees shape both who enters the profession and where graduates practise. e.g. the Commission having to issue fee determination guidelines for a share of private and deemed university seats.
    5. Postgraduate seat bottleneck: Undergraduate seat expansion has outpaced postgraduate capacity, leaving a specialist training gap. e.g. the ratio of postgraduate to undergraduate seats remaining a standing constraint on specialist availability.
    6. Faculty shortage in new colleges: Rapid expansion of colleges has outrun the availability of qualified teaching faculty. e.g. assessment findings of faculty deficiencies at newly permitted medical colleges.
    7. Fragmented digital records: Practitioner data sits across State registers, the national register and separate health workforce databases with limited reconciliation. e.g. duplicate and outdated entries complicating any count of practising allopathic doctors.

    Back2Basics: National Medical Commission (NMC)

    1. Governing Act: Established under the National Medical Commission Act, 2019.
    2. Year established: Constituted in 2020, replacing the Medical Council of India which functioned under the Indian Medical Council Act, 1956.
    3. Parent ministry: Functions under the Union Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.
    4. Jurisdiction: Regulates medical education, medical institutions, medical research and medical professionals in the allopathic system across India.
    5. Composition: A Chairperson, ex officio members including the presidents of the four autonomous boards, part time members, and members representing States and Union Territories on a rotational basis.
    6. Autonomous boards: Under Graduate Medical Education Board, Post Graduate Medical Education Board, Medical Assessment and Rating Board, and Ethics and Medical Registration Board.
    7. Core mandate: To improve access to quality and affordable medical education, ensure availability of adequate and high quality medical professionals, and maintain a national register of licensed practitioners.
    8. Key instruments: The National Eligibility cum Entrance Test, the National Exit Test, the National Medical Register and the professional conduct regulations.

    Way Forward

    1. Guarantee synchronisation by design: Build the national and State registers on a single source of truth rather than on periodic updates, so that a suspension takes effect nationally the moment it is recorded.
    2. Set uniform disciplinary standards: Issue binding procedure and timeline norms for State Council inquiries, so that a national licence does not carry the outcome of the weakest forum.
    3. Create a national appellate tier: Provide an appeal from a State Council's disciplinary decision to the Ethics and Medical Registration Board, since the consequence of that decision is now national.
    4. Clean the register before nationalising it: Complete deduplication and verification of State registers before unique identification numbers become the basis of practice rights everywhere.
    5. Make the register publicly searchable: Allow patients and employers to verify a practitioner's licence status and disciplinary record by unique identification number, which is the only way a register changes behaviour.
    6. Provide a renewal grace mechanism: Allow reactivation on application with reasons where the three month window has lapsed for demonstrable cause, so that an administrative lapse does not end a career.
    7. Use the register for workforce planning: Link active licence data to district level workforce mapping so that maldistribution can be measured and addressed rather than estimated.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “No direct PYQ traced in the provided files. Closest microtheme: Sectoral Regulatory Bodies.”

  • District Collectors in six border States, Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh empowered to grant citizenship

    Why in the News

    The Union Home Ministry has notified the Citizenship (Third Amendment) Rules, 2026, authorising District Collectors in six border States and two Union Territories to grant registration or naturalisation to applicants found fit and proper. The power now sits with a single district officer in place of the Empowered Committees and Designated Officers that previously exercised it, in exactly the regions where citizenship determination is most contested.

    What do the Citizenship (Third Amendment) Rules, 2026 provide?

    1. Delegation of power: The Rules authorise District Collectors in the specified States and Union Territories to process applications seeking citizenship by registration or naturalisation.
    2. The operative provision: The Collector, on being satisfied with the suitability of the applicant, that he is a fit and proper person to be registered or naturalised, shall grant him the citizenship of India.
    3. Full processing authority: The gazette notification authorises Collectors to receive, scrutinise and dispose of such applications in accordance with the laid down parameters.
    4. Replacement of earlier authorities: Collectors in these States replace the Empowered Committees and Designated Officers that previously held these powers, and all pending applications with those committees are to be transferred immediately to the relevant Collector.

    What is the difference between registration and naturalisation?

    1. Registration: Acquisition of citizenship under Section 5 of the Citizenship Act, 1955 by persons with a defined connection to India, such as persons of Indian origin, spouses of Indian citizens and minor children of Indian citizens, on shorter residence conditions.
    2. Naturalisation: Acquisition under Section 6 of the Citizenship Act, 1955 by a foreigner with no such prior connection, on satisfying the longer residence and other conditions set out in the Third Schedule.

    What is the current status of citizenship acquisition in India?

    1. Single citizenship: India provides for a single citizenship of the Union with no separate State citizenship, and there is a single domicile for the whole territory.
    2. Five modes of acquisition: The Citizenship Act, 1955 provides for acquisition by birth under Section 3, descent under Section 4, registration under Section 5, naturalisation under Section 6, and incorporation of territory under Section 7.
    3. Naturalisation threshold: The Third Schedule requires residence in India for twelve months immediately preceding the application, and residence or government service for eleven years in the aggregate in the fourteen years preceding those twelve months.
    4. Reduced threshold under the 2019 amendment: The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 reduces the aggregate residence requirement to five years for Hindus, Sikhs, Buddhists, Jains, Parsis and Christians from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan who entered India on or before 31 December 2014.
    5. Birth rule as it now stands: A person born in India on or after 3 December 2004 is a citizen by birth only if both parents are citizens, or one parent is a citizen and the other is not an illegal migrant at the time of birth.
    6. Loss of citizenship: Citizenship may be lost by renunciation under Section 8, termination on voluntary acquisition of foreign citizenship under Section 9, and deprivation by the Union government under Section 10 on specified grounds including fraud and disloyalty.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to Citizenship

    1. Article 5: Confers citizenship at the commencement of the Constitution on persons domiciled in India who were born in India, or either of whose parents was born in India, or who had been ordinarily resident in India for at least five years.
    2. Article 6: Confers citizenship on persons who migrated to India from Pakistan, subject to conditions of date of migration and registration.
    3. Article 7: Deals with persons who migrated to Pakistan after 1 March 1947 and later returned to India under a permit for resettlement.
    4. Article 8: Confers citizenship on persons of Indian origin residing outside India who register with an Indian diplomatic or consular mission.
    5. Article 9: Bars a person from being a citizen of India if that person has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of a foreign State.
    6. Article 10: Provides that every person who is or is deemed to be a citizen continues to be so, subject to any law made by Parliament.
    7. Article 11: Empowers Parliament to regulate the right of citizenship by law, which is the source of the Citizenship Act, 1955 and every amendment to it.
    8. Seventh Schedule, Union List Entry 17: Places citizenship, naturalisation and aliens exclusively within Parliament's legislative competence, which is why the Rules are made by the Union Home Ministry and not by States.

    Which regions and authorities does the new delegation cover?

    1. Six States: Gujarat, Rajasthan, Punjab, West Bengal, Assam and Tripura.
    2. Two Union Territories: Jammu and Kashmir, and Ladakh.
    3. A carve out for tribal areas: In Assam and Tripura, the Rules specifically exclude tribal areas, which remain outside the Collector's new authority.
    4. Common characteristic of the list: Every State and Union Territory in the list shares an international land border, which is what links the eight jurisdictions.
    5. Transfer of pending cases: All applications pending with the Empowered Committees and Designated Officers in the specified regions are to be transferred immediately to the relevant Collector.

    Why does routing this power through the District Collector matter?

    1. From a collegial body to a single officer: An Empowered Committee decides collectively while a Collector decides individually, which changes both the speed and the internal check on a citizenship grant.
    2. The standard is discretionary: The Rules turn on the Collector's satisfaction that the applicant is a fit and proper person, a formulation that leaves the assessment to the officer.
    3. Proximity to the applicant: The district is where residence, documents and antecedents can actually be verified, which is the administrative case for the delegation.
    4. Border districts are where determination is contested: The delegation applies precisely in the jurisdictions where migration histories, documentary gaps and citizenship disputes are most concentrated.
    5. A rules level change to a statutory power: The delegation is effected through subordinate legislation under the Citizenship Act, 1955 rather than through an amendment to the Act itself.

    Major debates surrounding citizenship determination in India

    1. Documentary burden versus lived residence: Determination rests on documents that the poorest and most mobile populations are least able to produce, which converts an evidentiary problem into an exclusion outcome.
    2. Executive determination versus judicial safeguard: Citizenship in India is decided in the first instance by executive authorities, with judicial review available only afterwards and at the individual's cost.
    3. The 2019 amendment and Article 14: The Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 uses religion and country of origin as criteria for a reduced naturalisation threshold, and its consistency with the equality guarantee is before the Supreme Court.
    4. National register proposals: The relationship between the National Population Register, a National Register of Indian Citizens and the Citizenship Rules is contested, particularly on whether enumeration becomes verification.
    5. The Assam experience: The Assam National Register of Citizens exercise, with its cut off of 24 March 1971 under Section 6A of the Citizenship Act, 1955, remains the reference case for the administrative and human cost of large scale determination.
    6. Statelessness risk: A person excluded from citizenship without any other State recognising them has no status at all, and India is not a party to the 1954 and 1961 statelessness conventions.
    7. Uniformity across deciding authorities: Where dozens of district officers apply a fit and proper standard independently, the same facts can produce different outcomes in adjacent districts.

    Challenges to the Collector led citizenship grant framework

    1. Discretion without a stated test: The fit and proper standard is not defined in the Rules, so its content depends on the individual officer. e.g. two applicants with identical residence records in adjacent districts of Rajasthan can receive different outcomes.
    2. Workload of the office: A District Collector already carries revenue, magisterial, election, disaster and development functions, and citizenship scrutiny is added to that list. e.g. Collectors in border districts of West Bengal simultaneously handle electoral roll administration and law and order duties.
    3. Loss of collegial scrutiny: Replacing an Empowered Committee with a single officer removes the internal deliberation that a multi member body provided. e.g. pending applications before those committees now move to a single decision maker without any recorded transition of standards.
    4. No stated appeal route in the notification: The Rules set out the grant power without specifying an appellate forum against refusal at the district level. e.g. an applicant refused by a Collector is left to writ jurisdiction of the High Court rather than a departmental appeal.
    5. Tribal area exclusion creates a two track system: Applicants in the excluded tribal areas of Assam and Tripura continue under the earlier authorities, producing different processes within the same State. e.g. two applicants in Tripura face different deciding authorities depending on whether their residence falls inside a tribal area.
    6. Verification capacity in border districts: Establishing residence and antecedents requires police and revenue verification chains that are already stretched in border districts. e.g. the Assam National Register of Citizens exercise showed how documentary verification at scale outruns administrative capacity.

    Conclusion

    The Citizenship (Third Amendment) Rules, 2026 have been notified in the Gazette and are in force, replacing Empowered Committees and Designated Officers with District Collectors in six border States and two Union Territories, with tribal areas of Assam and Tripura excluded. The immediate next step named in the notification is the transfer of all pending applications to the relevant Collector, and the source states no further date or milestone beyond that. The change is administrative in form and consequential in effect, because it places a sovereign determination in the hands of a single district officer applying an undefined fit and proper standard. Whether the delegation speeds up disposal or widens variation depends on the guidance and appeal architecture that follows.

    What is Citizenship?

    1. About: Citizenship is the legal relationship between an individual and a State that carries full civil and political membership, including the right to vote, to hold public office and to hold an Indian passport.
    2. Rationale: It defines who belongs to the political community, and therefore who may claim the rights the Constitution reserves for citizens rather than for all persons.
    3. Rights reserved for citizens: Articles 15, 16, 19, 29 and 30 of the Constitution are available only to citizens. Articles 14 and 21 extend to every person.
    4. Jus soli, the territorial principle: Citizenship by place of birth, which India applied without qualification until 1987.
    5. Jus sanguinis, the descent principle: Citizenship by parentage, which India progressively adopted through the 1986, 2003 and 2004 changes to the birth rule.
    6. Naturalisation, the acquired principle: Citizenship granted by the State to a foreigner on satisfying residence, conduct and language conditions, which is the mode the new Rules deal with.

    Laws and Rules Governing Citizenship in India

    1. Citizenship Act, 1955: The principal statute, enacted under Article 11, providing for acquisition, determination and termination of Indian citizenship.
    2. 1986 amendment: Ended unqualified citizenship by birth, requiring at least one parent to be an Indian citizen for those born on or after 1 July 1987.
    3. 2003 amendment: Introduced the concept of the illegal migrant, barred illegal migrants from citizenship, and provided for a National Register of Indian Citizens and compulsory registration of all citizens.
    4. 2005 amendment: Expanded the categories eligible for the Overseas Citizen of India status.
    5. 2015 amendment: Merged the Person of Indian Origin card with the Overseas Citizen of India card, creating the Overseas Citizen of India Cardholder category.
    6. 2019 amendment: Reduced the naturalisation residence requirement to five years for six specified minority communities from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan who entered India on or before 31 December 2014.
    7. Section 6A: Provides the Assam specific framework with the 24 March 1971 cut off, upheld by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in 2024.
    8. Citizenship Rules, 2009: The principal subordinate legislation prescribing forms, procedures and authorities for applications under the Act.
    9. Citizenship (Amendment) Rules, 2024: Prescribed the application procedure and the district and empowered committee structure for grants under the 2019 amendment.
    10. Citizenship (Third Amendment) Rules, 2026: Transfers the grant power in the specified border States and Union Territories to District Collectors.
    11. Immigration and Foreigners Act, 2025: Consolidates the law on entry, stay and exit of foreigners, replacing the earlier Passport (Entry into India) Act, 1920, the Registration of Foreigners Act, 1939, the Foreigners Act, 1946 and the Immigration (Carriers' Liability) Act, 2000.
    12. Passports Act, 1967: Governs the issue of Indian passports and travel documents, for which proof of citizenship is a precondition.

    Government Initiatives Related to Citizenship

    1. Indian Citizenship Online portal: The Ministry of Home Affairs portal through which applications for citizenship by registration and naturalisation are filed and tracked.
    2. Dedicated portal and mobile application under the 2019 amendment: Launched in 2024 to receive applications from eligible applicants of the six specified communities.
    3. National Population Register: Maintained under the Citizenship Act, 1955 and the Citizenship Rules, 2003 as a register of usual residents, updated alongside the census housing phase.
    4. Long Term Visa scheme: Provides extended stay, employment and property rights to minority community migrants from Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan pending decision on their citizenship applications.
    5. Overseas Citizen of India Cardholder scheme: Provides lifelong visa free travel and parity with non resident Indians in specified economic and educational fields, without conferring citizenship or voting rights.

    Key Facts about Citizenship in India

    1. Constitutional location: Citizenship is dealt with in Part II of the Constitution, comprising Articles 5 to 11.
    2. Single citizenship: India follows single citizenship on the pattern of the United Kingdom, unlike the dual citizenship model of the United States.
    3. No dual citizenship: India does not permit dual citizenship, and voluntary acquisition of foreign citizenship terminates Indian citizenship under Section 9.
    4. Overseas Citizen of India status is not citizenship: An Overseas Citizen of India Cardholder cannot vote, hold constitutional office or purchase agricultural land.
    5. The 2004 birth rule cut off: Persons born in India on or after 3 December 2004 must have at least one citizen parent and no illegal migrant parent.
    6. Union subject: Citizenship, naturalisation and aliens is Entry 17 of the Union List in the Seventh Schedule.

    Challenges in Citizenship Determination in India

    1. Documentary proof in a low documentation society: Establishing descent and residence over decades requires records many households never held. e.g. the Assam National Register of Citizens process excluded over 19 lakh persons from the final list published in 2019.
    2. Gendered documentation gap: Married women who moved at marriage often lack independent linkage documents to a parent's record. e.g. panchayat residence certificates for married women became a contested category of proof during the Assam exercise.
    3. Adjudication capacity: Determination bodies handle far more cases than their sanctioned strength can process fairly. e.g. Foreigners Tribunals in Assam handling large pendency with limited members.
    4. Detention and post declaration limbo: A person declared a foreigner with no country willing to receive them remains in indefinite administrative limbo. e.g. the Supreme Court's directions on conditional release of long term detainees from Assam detention centres.
    5. Legal challenge to the 2019 framework: The reduced naturalisation threshold for specified religious communities is under constitutional challenge, leaving the framework unsettled. e.g. petitions against the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, 2019 pending before the Supreme Court.
    6. Variation across deciding authorities: Multiple district level authorities applying an undefined standard produce inconsistent outcomes. e.g. the fit and proper test in the 2026 Rules carrying no statutory definition.
    7. Absence of a statelessness framework: India has no domestic law on statelessness and is not party to the 1954 and 1961 conventions on the subject. e.g. persons excluded from a citizenship register having no recognised alternative legal status.

    Way Forward

    1. Issue binding guidance on the fit and proper test: Publish parameters, documentary standards and a reasoned order requirement so that Collector level discretion is structured rather than open ended.
    2. Provide a departmental appeal: Create an appellate authority above the Collector for refusals, so that recourse does not begin at the High Court.
    3. Mandate speaking orders and time limits: Require every grant and refusal to record reasons and to be disposed of within a stated period, with the position published in aggregate.
    4. Publish disposal data: Release district wise data on applications received, granted and refused, so that variation between Collectors becomes visible and correctable.
    5. Train and support district staff: Provide dedicated staff and training on citizenship law to Collectorates in the eight jurisdictions, given the additional workload placed on an already loaded office.
    6. Enact a statelessness framework: Provide in domestic law for the status, rights and documentation of persons who are found to be citizens of no country, so that exclusion does not produce legal invisibility.
    7. Harmonise the tribal area carve out: Specify which authority decides applications from the excluded tribal areas of Assam and Tripura, so that no applicant falls between two regimes.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2021] With reference to India, consider the following statements: 1. There is only one citizenship and one domicile. 2. A citizen by birth only can become the Head of State. 3. A foreigner, once granted citizenship, cannot be deprived of it under any circumstances. Which of the statements given above is/are correct? (a) 1 only (b) 2 only (c) 1 and 3 (d) 2 and 3 Answer: (a)”

  • Prevention of Insults to National Honour (Amendment) Act, 2026 makes obstructing Vande Mataram an offence

    Why in the News

    Parliament passed the Prevention of Insults to National Honour (Amendment) Act, 2026 in the recently concluded Monsoon Session, making it an offence to attempt to stop or prevent the singing or playing of Vande Mataram. The amendment lands on a live political dispute over whether public rendition may be confined to the first two stanzas, a practice the principal Opposition party traces to a 1937 Congress Working Committee resolution and the ruling party contests against the Constituent Assembly declaration of 24 January 1950. A statute now attaches criminal liability to conduct around a symbol whose status rests on a Presidential declaration in the Constituent Assembly rather than on any article of the Constitution.

    What is the Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971?

    1. Purpose: The Prevention of Insults to National Honour Act, 1971 penalises insults to India’s national symbols, and is the parent statute the 2026 amendment modifies.
    2. Protection of the Flag and the Constitution: Section 2 penalises burning, mutilating, defacing, defiling, disfiguring, destroying or showing contempt to the Indian National Flag or the Constitution of India.
    3. Protection of the National Anthem: Section 3 penalises intentionally preventing the singing of the National Anthem or causing disturbance to any assembly engaged in singing it.
    4. Punishment: Contravention attracts imprisonment of up to three years, or a fine, or both.
    5. Disqualification for repeat offenders: Section 3A provides for disqualification from contesting elections to Parliament and State legislatures for a specified period on a second or subsequent conviction.
    6. Earlier amendments: The Act has been amended previously, including in 2003 to extend the prohibition on improper use of the Flag and in 2005 to permit specified respectful uses.

    What does the 2026 Amendment change?

    1. New offence created: The amendment makes it an offence to attempt to stop or prevent the singing or playing of Vande Mataram.
    2. Extension of the Section 3 principle to the national song: The parent Act protected the National Anthem from obstruction, and the amendment extends comparable protection to the national song.
    3. Trigger for the amendment: The controversy over the national song began after Parliament passed the amendment in the recently concluded Monsoon Session.
    4. The conduct targeted is obstruction, not abstention: The offence attaches to attempts to stop or prevent rendition, which distinguishes it from a duty to sing.

    What other provisions of the parent framework does the amendment sit alongside?

    1. The Flag Code of India, 2002: Governs display and use of the National Flag, and was amended in 2021 to permit polyester and machine made flags and in 2022 to permit display by night.
    2. The Orders relating to the National Anthem of India: Issued by the Ministry of Home Affairs, they specify the occasions for the full and short versions and the playing time of 52 seconds.
    3. The Emblems and Names (Prevention of Improper Use) Act, 1950: Bars improper commercial and professional use of specified names and emblems, including the National Flag.
    4. The State Emblem of India (Prohibition of Improper Use) Act, 2005: Regulates use of the State Emblem, adapted from the Lion Capital of Ashoka at Sarnath.
    5. No parallel protection exists for the national song in the parent Act: Before this amendment, the 1971 Act protected the Flag, the Constitution and the National Anthem, but not Vande Mataram.

    Why does the two stanza convention exist?

    1. The 1937 resolution: The Congress Working Committee passed a resolution in 1937 on the public rendition of the national song.
    2. The stated reason: Leading figures of the freedom movement, including Mahatma Gandhi and Rabindranath Tagore, backed limiting public rendition to the first two stanzas to avoid verses containing specific religious imagery.
    3. Continuity claimed: The Congress president stated that the version sung was the same one sung by Mahatma Gandhi, Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel and former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee.
    4. The 90 year framing: The party position is that it has continued a practice in place for 90 years, and that a governing party’s preference does not by itself set a national standard.
    5. State units following the same line: The Karnataka unit stated that only the first two stanzas would be sung at its programmes, in keeping with existing practice.
    6. The counter allegation: The ruling party alleged that the Congress entered into a pact with the Muslim League in 1936-37, under whose pressure only two stanzas were to be sung.

    What did the Constituent Assembly decide on 24 January 1950?

    1. The declaration: Dr Rajendra Prasad, as President of the Constituent Assembly, declared on 24 January 1950 that Jana Gana Mana would be the National Anthem and Vande Mataram the national song.
    2. Equal honour, unequal legal treatment: The declaration accorded the national song honour equal to the anthem, without conferring on it the same statutory protection the anthem later received in 1971.
    3. The source of authority: The status of both symbols rests on this declaration and subsequent executive practice, not on any article of the Constitution.
    4. Historical lineage invoked: The contributions of Bankim Chandra Chattopadhyay, Rabindranath Tagore and Bal Gangadhar Tilak were recalled, with the song described as a major source of inspiration during the freedom struggle.
    5. The political point pressed: The ruling party emphasised that the person who made the declaration was himself a Congress member and later the President of India.
    6. The broader charge: The Congress was accused of compromising national symbols and the core values of its own freedom movement.

    Why does criminalising obstruction of a national song raise a free speech question?

    1. The anthem precedent cuts both ways: Section 3 of the 1971 Act penalises preventing the singing of the anthem, and the Supreme Court has separately held that respectful silence is not an offence.
    2. Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, 1986: The Court held that expelling students who stood respectfully but did not sing the anthem violated Article 19(1)(a) and Article 25.
    3. The definitional problem of attempt: An offence framed around an attempt to stop or prevent rendition turns on intention, which is inferred from conduct at a charged political event.
    4. Partial rendition is not obstruction: Singing two stanzas of a five stanza song is a choice about what to sing, distinct from preventing others from singing.
    5. Article 19(2) is the test: Any restriction must fall within the enumerated grounds, and the sustainability of this offence depends on locating it within public order or decency.
    6. The unresolved consequence: The dispute has moved from a convention about rendition into a question about who can be prosecuted at a public event, without the constitutional status of the national song itself being settled.

    Challenges to enforcing the amended Act

    1. Proving intention to obstruct: Distinguishing deliberate obstruction from ordinary disorder at a crowded event is evidentially difficult, e.g. complaints under Section 3 of the 1971 Act arising from cinema hall incidents have frequently collapsed for want of proof of intent.
    2. Risk of politically motivated complaints: A criminal provision attached to a contested symbol invites first information reports as a campaign instrument, e.g. the current dispute arose from rendition at an Independence Day event at a party headquarters and a subsequent event in Goa.
    3. Conflict with the respectful silence doctrine: Enforcement can slide from obstruction into compelled participation, e.g. Bijoe Emmanuel v. State of Kerala, 1986 protected students who declined to sing while standing in respect.
    4. No settled authoritative text or duration: Unlike the anthem, the national song has no notified official version or playing time, e.g. the Orders relating to the National Anthem fix a playing time of 52 seconds with no counterpart for Vande Mataram.
    5. Judicial reversal risk from over enforcement: Courts have withdrawn mandatory rendition directions when enforcement produced harassment, e.g. the 2016 direction making the anthem compulsory in cinema halls was made optional in 2018.
    6. Federal enforcement variation: Police being a State subject, prosecution practice will differ across States, e.g. identical conduct at party events in different States can attract different responses.

    Conclusion

    The amendment converts a ninety year old convention about how much of a national song is sung in public into a matter capable of criminal prosecution, without resolving the underlying question of what legal status the national song holds. The 1971 Act protected the Flag, the Constitution and the National Anthem because each has a notified form, and the national song has none, so the offence rests on a symbol defined only by the Constituent Assembly declaration of 24 January 1950. The stage reached is that Parliament passed the Prevention of Insults to National Honour (Amendment) Act, 2026 in the recently concluded Monsoon Session. The source names no commencement date, rules or further milestone, so the next step on the record is notification bringing the amendment into force.

  • Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2026 creates National Tribunals Commission after a decade-long tussle with the Supreme Court

    Why in the News

    Parliament passed the Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2026, which creates a National Tribunals Commission, fixes member tenure at five years and repeals the Tribunals Reforms Act of August 2021. The measure ends a decade in which the Centre re-enacted provisions the Supreme Court had struck down, most recently in November 2025 when a Bench called the 2021 re-enactment an impermissible legislative override. It concedes the institution the Court had demanded while retaining the appointment, funding and rule making levers that produced the dispute.

    What is the National Tribunals Commission?

    1. An independent oversight body for tribunals: The National Tribunals Commission is created to sever the dependence of tribunals on their parent government ministries for administrative and financial needs.
    2. Composition: It will be headed by a former Supreme Court judge or a former Chief Justice of a High Court, with two judicial members and two technical members.
    3. Qualification for technical members: Technical members must have at least 25 years of experience in fields such as public administration, finance or law.
    4. Core functions: The Commission will conduct the selection process for vacancies, review the performance of tribunals and oversee inquiries into complaints against members.
    5. Data function: It will maintain a National Tribunals Data Grid.
    6. Executive appointment retained: The Centre appoints the chairperson and members, with the chairperson and judicial members appointed after consulting the Chief Justice of India.

    What is the National Tribunals Data Grid?

    1. A central case data repository: The National Tribunals Data Grid is the consolidated database of tribunal case and disposal data to be maintained by the Commission.
    2. Purpose: It supplies the performance data on which the Commission’s review of tribunal functioning will rest, mirroring the role the National Judicial Data Grid performs for courts.

    What is an impermissible legislative override?

    1. Re-enacting a struck down provision: A legislative override is impermissible when a legislature re-enacts the same provision a court has declared unconstitutional, without removing the defect the court identified.
    2. The settled distinction: A legislature may cure the basis of a judgment by changing the underlying law, but it cannot simply nullify the judgment by restoring the identical text.

    Why did the Centre and the Supreme Court end up in a decade long confrontation?

    1. Finance Act, 2017: The statute empowered the Centre to frame rules for tribunals, transferring service conditions and qualifications to executive rule making.
    2. Constitution Bench ruling, 2019: A Constitution Bench struck down those rules for undermining judicial independence.
    3. New rules and a judicial recommendation, 2020: The Centre notified fresh rules, and the Court recommended several modifications, including a five year tenure for members.
    4. Ordinance, April 2021: Instead of incorporating those suggestions, the Centre promulgated an Ordinance fixing tenure at four years, setting a minimum appointment age of 50, and requiring selection committees to recommend a panel of two names.
    5. Provisions struck down as arbitrary: The Court struck down those provisions.
    6. Tribunals Reforms Act, August 2021: Parliament then passed an Act re-enacting the exact provisions the Court had just declared unconstitutional.

    What did the Supreme Court hold in November 2025?

    1. Re-enactment condemned: A two judge Bench struck down provisions of the 2021 Act, calling the re-enactment an impermissible legislative override of earlier judgments.
    2. Criticism of persistent non compliance: The Court criticised the government for its persistent refusal to adhere to its pronouncements.
    3. Four year tenure held anti merit: The Court ruled that a short four year tenure is anti-merit and increases interference by the executive, jeopardising the independence of the judiciary.
    4. Panel of two names rejected: It held that the government could not demand a panel of two names, since this gave the executive undue discretion in appointments.
    5. Direction to create the Commission: It reiterated the need for a National Tribunals Commission and directed the Centre to establish one within four months.
    6. Transitional protection: It protected certain existing appointments and selections while the new framework was being put in place.

    What are the other major changes proposed?

    1. Repeal of the 2021 Act (change to an existing provision): The 2026 Bill repeals the Tribunals Reforms Act of August 2021 in its entirety.
    2. Tenure fixed at five years (change to an existing provision): Chairpersons and members will hold office for a term of five years, replacing the contested four year tenure.
    3. Age ceilings specified (change to an existing provision): The maximum age limit is set at 70 years for chairpersons and 67 years for members.
    4. Reappointment permitted (new provision): Chairpersons and members can be considered for reappointment.
    5. Search cum selection committee restructured (new provision): The committee for members will be headed by a judicial member of the Commission and will include a retired High Court judge, a government secretary, a technical member and experts.
    6. One name per vacancy (change to an existing provision): The committee will recommend one suitable candidate for each vacancy, with one additional name kept on a waiting list, replacing the panel of two.
    7. Appointment deadline imposed (new provision): The government must make the appointment within three months of receiving the recommendation.
    8. Stated legislative intent: The Statement of Objects and Reasons says the Bill is introduced in consonance with the directions of the Supreme Court, to improve efficiency and ensure independence, transparency and uniformity in the functioning of tribunals.

    Why does the Bill not fully sever executive control?

    1. Appointment power retained: The Centre appoints the chairperson and members of the Commission itself, so the body meant to insulate tribunals is constituted by the executive.
    2. Consultation is not concurrence: The chairperson and judicial members are appointed after consulting the Chief Justice of India, a formulation that does not bind the government to the advice.
    3. Secretariat under the Centre: The Centre appoints the Commission’s secretary, which places the administrative machinery of the oversight body within executive reach.
    4. Financial dependence continues: The Centre provides grants to the Commission, reproducing at one remove the funding dependence the Court objected to.
    5. Rule making powers preserved: The Centre retains rule making powers over several aspects of tribunal members’ qualifications and service conditions.
    6. Reappointment as a pressure point: Permitting reappointment gives the appointing authority a continuing hold over a serving member’s prospects.

    Challenges to the National Tribunals Commission

    1. Vacancies outlast reform statutes: Tribunal benches sit without presiding officers for long periods, e.g. the National Green Tribunal has functioned with single member or non functional zonal benches for extended stretches.
    2. Parent ministry conflict of interest persists in adjudication: A tribunal often decides cases against the very ministry that shapes its service rules, e.g. the Armed Forces Tribunal adjudicates disputes against the Ministry of Defence.
    3. Appeal architecture keeps burdening the Supreme Court: Several statutes provide a direct appeal from a tribunal to the Supreme Court, e.g. appeals from the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal go straight to the Supreme Court, bypassing the High Courts.
    4. Technical member dominance dilutes judicial character: Benches weighted toward administrative expertise weaken the adjudicatory function, e.g. the Court in the Madras Bar Association line of cases repeatedly objected to bench composition tilted against judicial members.
    5. Uneven infrastructure and geographic access: Litigants travel long distances because benches are concentrated in a few cities, e.g. the abolition of appellate bodies in the 2021 rationalisation pushed those appeals to High Courts already carrying large backlogs.
    6. Rationalisation without capacity transfer: Abolishing a tribunal shifts its docket to courts without a matching increase in judicial strength, e.g. the 2021 rationalisation abolished nine appellate tribunals including the Intellectual Property Appellate Board and moved their work to High Courts.
    7. Non compliance with judicial directions: The record of the last decade shows directions being met with re-enactment rather than implementation, e.g. the 2021 Act reproduced the very four year tenure the Court had struck down months earlier.

    Conclusion

    A decade of contest between the legislature and the Court has ended with the Centre conceding the institution, since the Bill creates the National Tribunals Commission the Court had demanded and restores the five year tenure the Court recommended in 2020. The concession stops short of independence, because the Centre still appoints the Commission’s chairperson, members and secretary, funds it through grants and retains rule making powers over qualifications and service conditions. The measure has reached the stage of passage by both Houses of Parliament as the Tribunals Reforms Bill, 2026, and awaits Presidential assent and notification before it can take effect. The next milestone named in the record is the constitution of the National Tribunals Commission, which the Supreme Court’s November 2025 judgment directed the Centre to complete within four months.

  • Parliament curbs States’ power to tax mineral rights through MMDR Amendment Bill, 2026

    Why in the News

    Parliament has passed the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2026, which restricts the power of States to impose levies on mineral rights and mineral bearing lands. The change follows a Supreme Court ruling that had upheld exactly that State taxing power and permitted recovery of arrears going back to 1 April 2005. A legislative measure aimed at investor certainty now sits directly against a judicially affirmed source of State revenue.

    What is the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957?

    1. Governing statute: The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (MMDR Act) is the central law regulating the grant of mineral concessions and the development of mines in India. It is administered by the Ministry of Mines.
    2. Union declaration: Section 2 of the Act declares it expedient in the public interest that the Union take control of the regulation of mines and mineral development, which activates Parliament’s competence over the field.
    3. Concession regime: No person may undertake reconnaissance, prospecting or mining except under a licence or lease granted under the Act and the rules made under it.
    4. Auction based allocation: The 2015 amendment made auction the sole method for granting mineral concessions for major minerals, replacing discretionary allotment.
    5. Minor minerals carve out: Section 15 empowers State governments to frame rules for granting concessions in respect of minor minerals, while the power to notify a mineral as minor rests with the Central government.

    What is royalty in mining?

    1. Definition: Royalty is the payment a lessee makes to the State for the privilege of extracting and removing a mineral from the land, calculated per tonne or as a percentage of sale value.
    2. Statutory rates: Royalty rates for major minerals are fixed in the Second Schedule of the MMDR Act by the Central government, so a State cannot revise them on its own.

    What is a tax on mineral bearing land?

    1. Definition: A tax on mineral bearing land is a State levy imposed on the land itself, with the mineral yield of that land used as the measure of the tax.
    2. Distinct head: It is levied separately from royalty and from the auction premium a bidder pays to win a mine, and it is the head of levy the current amendment restricts.

    Current status of States’ power to tax mineral rights in India

    1. Judicially affirmed right: The Supreme Court upheld the right of States to impose taxes on mineral rights and mineral bearing lands, and separately permitted recovery of arrears going back to 1 April 2005.
    2. State levies already in force: Jharkhand imposed a mineral bearing land tax on iron ore at Rs 100 per tonne, subsequently hiked, and Tamil Nadu set a tax on limestone at Rs 160 per tonne.
    3. Scale of the levy structure: States impose 14 types of taxes, charges, fees and levies, including royalty and auction premium, and the rates of royalty and taxes vary across States.
    4. Statutory deductions already fixed centrally: Lessees additionally pay into the District Mineral Foundation (DMF) and the National Mineral Exploration Trust (NMET) at rates pegged to royalty, which the Centre sets.
    5. Position after the amendment: The new law restricts the State levies on mineral rights and mineral bearing lands, and a government fact sheet states that States will continue to receive the overwhelming share of mining revenue.

    Constitutional provisions related to the taxation of mineral rights

    1. Article 246 with the Seventh Schedule: Distributes legislative competence between Parliament and the State legislatures across the Union, State and Concurrent Lists.
    2. Entry 54, List I: Gives Parliament power over the regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent declared by law to be expedient in the public interest.
    3. Entry 23, List II: Gives States power over the regulation of mines and mineral development, expressly subject to Entry 54 of List I.
    4. Entry 50, List II: Gives States the power to levy taxes on mineral rights, expressly subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development.
    5. Entry 49, List II: Gives States the power to levy taxes on lands and buildings, the head under which mineral bearing land taxes are framed.
    6. Article 265: Bars the levy or collection of any tax except by authority of law.

    Why has Parliament moved to restrict State levies?

    1. Certainty and predictability: The stated rationale is to provide greater certainty and predictability in the mining sector for project developers.
    2. Investment flows: A stable levy structure is intended to facilitate investment flows into a sector the Union treats as vital to growth.
    3. Cost pass through: Higher State levies feed into the price of minerals and therefore into infrastructure costs downstream.
    4. Price uniformity: The change is also read as a bid to bring some degree of uniformity in the prices of major minerals, since royalty and tax rates currently differ from State to State.
    5. Critical minerals push: The Union government has launched a critical mineral mission, and a more predictable framework is meant to support that programme.

    Why do States read the amendment as an erosion of fiscal federalism?

    1. Loss of an affirmed revenue head: States moved to raise revenue from mining only after the Supreme Court affirmed that they could, and the amendment removes that opening.
    2. Concentration of dependence: For mineral rich States such as Odisha, Jharkhand and Chhattisgarh, revenue from this channel accounts for a significant share of non tax revenue.
    3. Narrow revenue base: State governments already have limited avenues to raise resources on their own, so each restriction on a taxing head weighs heavily.
    4. Arrears at stake: The right to recover arrears from 1 April 2005 represented a large one time accrual that the restriction places in doubt.
    5. Centre State friction: The apprehension is expressed as a concern about State revenues in particular and fiscal federalism in general, which needs to be addressed rather than assumed away.

    What does the tax burden on Indian mining actually look like?

    1. Effective tax rate: The effective tax rate in India is higher than 50 percent of revenues, according to a report on States’ Best Practices in Mining by FIMI-EY.
    2. Comparative burden: The same report places the effective rate in other countries at 35 to 40 percent of revenues.
    3. Cumulative structure: The Indian figure is the result of stacking royalty, auction premium, statutory contributions and State levies, and not of any single rate.
    4. Rationalisation as the fix: Rationalisation of taxes and royalties is presented as the step that would facilitate greater investor interest in the sector.

    What do cross country comparisons show, and how far does the evidence go?

    1. Limits of the source evidence: The comparison offered is a single aggregate figure of 35 to 40 percent, with no individual country named, so it establishes a gap rather than a model to copy.
    2. Australia: Mineral royalties are a State subject, and Western Australia levies ad valorem royalties on iron ore without a federal ceiling on State rates.
    3. Chile: The mining royalty law of 2023 combines an ad valorem component with a margin linked component on large copper producers, and caps the combined burden on a firm.
    4. South Africa: The Mineral and Petroleum Resources Royalty Act, 2008 sets a formula based royalty that moves with the producer’s profitability and with whether the mineral is refined.
    5. Canada: Mining taxes are levied by provinces such as Ontario and Quebec on mine profits, layered above federal corporate income tax.

    Why does the amendment set investor certainty against a judicially affirmed State right?

    1. Reversal of an outcome, not of a principle: The Court affirmed the competence of States under the Constitution, and Parliament has used its own competence to restrict the exercise of that power.
    2. Two legitimate claims: A predictable national mining framework is a genuine requirement for large, long gestation projects. A stable taxing head is a genuine requirement for a State with few own revenue sources.
    3. Uniformity has a price: Uniform mineral prices across States are achieved by removing the very differentiation that reflected each State’s own fiscal need.
    4. Arrears create the sharpest edge: The recovery window from 1 April 2005 was the largest single revenue expectation created by the ruling, and it is the first casualty of the restriction.
    5. Assurance without a mechanism: The assurance that States will keep the overwhelming share of mining revenue rests on royalty and statutory contributions whose rates the Centre alone fixes.

    Major debates surrounding the taxation of mineral rights

    1. Is royalty a tax: A seven judge Bench in India Cement Ltd. v. State of Tamil Nadu (1989) held royalty to be a tax, and a nine judge Bench in Mineral Area Development Authority v. Steel Authority of India (2024) held by an 8 to 1 majority that royalty is a contractual consideration and not a tax, restoring the States’ Entry 50 power.
    2. Legislative override: The dispute is whether a statute that removes a taxing power after a ruling is a permissible change in the legal basis or an impermissible override of a binding judgment under Article 141.
    3. Retrospective recovery: Recovery of arrears from 1 April 2005 raises the question of whether long settled project economics can be reopened, against the States’ claim to revenue already lawfully due.
    4. Uniformity versus autonomy: National price uniformity for major minerals is set against the constitutional design that lets a State calibrate levies to its own resource endowment.
    5. Compensation gap: There is no settled empirical answer on what mineral rich States lose in absolute terms, since the 14 State levies are not reported on a common basis across States.

    Challenges to the mineral concession framework after the amendment

    1. Revenue substitution for mineral States: States losing a taxing head have no equivalent replacement within their own competence. e.g. Odisha, which draws a large part of its non tax revenue from mining, has no comparable own source levy to fall back on.
    2. Litigation risk: A statute narrowing a power the Court affirmed invites a fresh constitutional challenge, prolonging exactly the uncertainty the amendment targets. e.g. the India Cement to Mineral Area Development Authority sequence ran for 35 years before a settled answer emerged.
    3. Auction premium distortion: Aggressive premium bidding in auctions inflates costs regardless of tax rationalisation. e.g. several iron ore blocks in Odisha were won at premiums exceeding 100 percent of sale value, squeezing operating margins.
    4. Exploration deficit: Rationalising levies does not fix the shortage of drilled and proved resources that investors actually need. e.g. India has explored only a small fraction of its obvious geological potential area despite the National Mineral Exploration Trust being funded since 2015.
    5. Clearance and land bottlenecks: Forest, environment and land acquisition delays, not levy rates, hold up most mine starts. e.g. blocks in the Hasdeo Arand coalfield in Chhattisgarh have stalled for years over forest clearance and Gram Sabha consent.
    6. District Mineral Foundation utilisation: Funds meant for mining affected communities remain unspent or diverted, weakening the social licence for expansion. e.g. DMF collections have exceeded Rs 1 lakh crore cumulatively, with large unspent balances reported in mineral rich districts.
    7. Critical mineral import dependence: Domestic levy reform does not address dependence on imported processed minerals. e.g. India imports the bulk of its lithium and cobalt requirements for battery manufacturing.

    Conclusion

    Parliament has restricted the States’ power to tax mineral rights and mineral bearing lands, undoing in law the revenue consequence of a ruling that had affirmed that power and allowed arrears from 1 April 2005. Investor certainty has been purchased with the tax autonomy of the States that hold the minerals, and the assurance that States keep the overwhelming share of mining revenue rests on rates the Centre alone sets. The measure has been passed by both Houses of Parliament; the source states no further date or next step beyond that stage. Resolving the resulting Centre State friction, not the levy structure alone, is what will determine whether the new framework actually attracts investment.

    Foundational Context: Mining in India

    1. Scale of the sector: India produces 95 minerals, covering fuel, metallic, non metallic, atomic and minor minerals, and mining contributes roughly 2.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) including the associated quarrying activity.
    2. Global standing: India is among the world’s largest producers of coal, iron ore, bauxite, chromite and mica, and is the second largest coal producer globally.
    3. Ownership principle: Minerals vest in the State government where they occur, except in offshore areas and for atomic minerals, where they vest in the Union.
    4. Classification: Minerals are divided into major minerals and minor minerals, with minor minerals such as sand, ordinary clay and building stone regulated by State rules under Section 15 of the MMDR Act.
    5. Institutional set up: The Geological Survey of India (GSI) carries out regional exploration, the Indian Bureau of Mines (IBM) oversees conservation and scientific mining, and the Directorate General of Mines Safety (DGMS) regulates safety.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Mineral Taxation and Federal Finance

    1. Article 245: Sets the territorial extent of laws made by Parliament and by State legislatures.
    2. Article 246: Distributes legislative power across the three Lists of the Seventh Schedule.
    3. Entry 54, List I: Union control over the regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent declared by Parliament.
    4. Entry 23, List II: State power over regulation of mines and mineral development, subject to Entry 54 of List I.
    5. Entry 50, List II: State power to tax mineral rights, subject to limitations imposed by Parliament by a law relating to mineral development.
    6. Entry 49, List II: State power to tax lands and buildings.
    7. Article 141: Makes the law declared by the Supreme Court binding on all courts within India.
    8. Article 265: Bars levy or collection of any tax except by authority of law.
    9. Article 280: Provides for the Finance Commission, which recommends the sharing of Union taxes with the States.

    Laws and Rules Governing Mining in India

    1. Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957: The parent statute for mineral concessions and mineral development.
    2. Second Schedule: Fixes royalty rates for major minerals centrally.
    3. Section 15: Empowers States to make rules for minor mineral concessions.
    4. MMDR Amendment Act, 2015: Introduced auction as the sole route for granting major mineral concessions.
    5. Section 9B and Section 9C: Created the District Mineral Foundation for mining affected communities and the National Mineral Exploration Trust for exploration funding.
    6. MMDR Amendment Act, 2021: Removed the distinction between captive and merchant mines and eased the transfer of mineral concessions.
    7. MMDR Amendment Act, 2023: Created the exploration licence for deep seated minerals and empowered the Centre to exclusively auction 24 critical and strategic minerals.
    8. MMDR Amendment Act, 2025: Widened support for critical mineral recovery, including recovery from mine waste and tailings.
    9. Mines Act, 1952: Governs the health, safety and working conditions of persons employed in mines.
    10. Offshore Areas Mineral (Development and Regulation) Act, 2002: Regulates mineral development in India’s territorial waters and exclusive economic zone.
    11. Mineral Conservation and Development Rules, 2017: Prescribe scientific mining, conservation and mine closure obligations.
    12. Minerals (Evidence of Mineral Contents) Rules, 2015 and Mineral (Auction) Rules, 2015: Govern the exploration thresholds and the auction procedure for major minerals.

    Back2Basics: National Critical Mineral Mission

    1. What it is: A central mission to build self reliance across the critical mineral value chain, from exploration and mining to processing, recycling and recovery from waste.
    2. Approved: By the Union Cabinet in January 2025.
    3. Administering ministry: The Ministry of Mines.
    4. Duration: Covers the period from 2024-25 to 2030-31.
    5. Outlay: An outlay of about Rs 16,300 crore, with a further expected investment of about Rs 18,000 crore by public sector undertakings and other agencies.
    6. Exploration target: A large programme of exploration projects by the Geological Survey of India within India, along with exploration in offshore areas.
    7. Overseas component: Acquisition of critical mineral assets abroad by Indian public and private entities, supported by trade and diplomatic engagement.
    8. Circularity component: Promotion of recycling of end of life products and recovery of critical minerals from mine tailings and overburden.
    9. Stockpiling: Creation of a stockpile of critical minerals to insulate domestic industry from supply disruption.
    10. Regulatory support: Fast tracking of regulatory approvals for critical mineral projects, alongside the exclusive Central auction of the notified critical and strategic minerals.

    Government Initiatives

    1. National Critical Mineral Mission: Secures the critical mineral supply chain through domestic exploration, overseas asset acquisition, recycling and stockpiling under the Ministry of Mines.
    2. National Mineral Policy, 2019: Sets the policy framework for sustainable mining, exploration incentives and a transparent auction regime.
    3. Star Rating of Mines: A self assessment and verification system run by the Indian Bureau of Mines rating mines on scientific mining and sustainability parameters.
    4. Pradhan Mantri Khanij Kshetra Kalyan Yojana (PMKKKY): Implemented through District Mineral Foundations to fund drinking water, health, education and livelihood works in mining affected districts.
    5. National Geoscience Data Repository and the exploration licence regime: Open access geoscience data and a dedicated licence to draw private explorers into deep seated mineral search.

    Key Facts about Indian Mining

    1. Ministry: The Ministry of Mines administers the MMDR Act, other than for coal, lignite, petroleum, natural gas and atomic minerals.
    2. Critical minerals list: India notified a list of 30 critical minerals in 2023, of which 24 are auctioned exclusively by the Centre.
    3. District Mineral Foundation contribution: Lessees contribute 10 percent of royalty for concessions granted after 12 January 2015 and 30 percent for earlier concessions.
    4. National Mineral Exploration Trust contribution: Set at 2 percent of royalty paid by the lessee.
    5. Geological Survey of India: Established in 1851, headquartered at Kolkata, and the principal agency for regional mineral exploration.

    Challenges in the Mining Sector

    1. Long clearance timelines: A block cleared at auction still waits years for forest, environment and consent approvals. e.g. bauxite mining in the Niyamgiri hills of Odisha was halted after Gram Sabhas exercised their veto under forest rights law.
    2. Illegal mining: Unregulated extraction of minor minerals erodes State revenue and damages river systems. e.g. sand mining in the Yamuna and Sone river beds has repeatedly drawn National Green Tribunal intervention.
    3. Rehabilitation deficit: Displacement from large mines is inadequately compensated and land losers rarely regain livelihoods. e.g. displacement in the Talcher and Ib Valley coalfields of Odisha has produced long running resettlement disputes.
    4. Mine safety: Accidents in underground and rat hole operations continue despite the Mines Act framework. e.g. the Ksan mine flooding in Meghalaya in December 2018 trapped and killed rat hole miners in an illegal coal pit.
    5. Low value addition: India exports raw and semi processed ore and imports finished products. e.g. iron ore fines are exported while high grade steel inputs are imported back.
    6. Exploration underinvestment: Private participation in greenfield exploration remains thin despite the exploration licence. e.g. only a small share of India’s obvious geological potential area has been explored in detail.
    7. Import dependence in critical minerals: Processing capacity, not deposits alone, is the binding constraint. e.g. India relies on imports for nearly all its rare earth magnet requirements.

    Way Forward

    1. Institutionalise Centre State consultation on levies: Route mineral levy changes through a standing Centre State forum so that revenue impacts are quantified before a restriction is legislated.
    2. Publish a common levy dashboard: Report the 14 State levies on a uniform basis so that the effective tax rate claim of over 50 percent of revenues can be verified block by block.
    3. Compensate the transition: Provide a time bound, formula based transfer to mineral rich States for the revenue head withdrawn, on the model used for other tax transitions.
    4. Rationalise auction premium: Cap or stagger premium payments so that the auction price, rather than the tax rate, stops inflating the delivered cost of minerals.
    5. Front load exploration: Expand National Mineral Exploration Trust funded drilling and release geoscience data before auction so that bids reflect proved resources.
    6. Ring fence District Mineral Foundation spending: Enforce end use audit of DMF funds on drinking water, health and education in mining affected districts to rebuild the social licence for expansion.

    “[2025] Consider the following statements:
    Statement I: In India, State Governments have no power for making rules for grant of concessions in respect of extraction of minor minerals even though such minerals are located in their territories.
    Statement II: In India, the Central Government has the power to notify minor minerals under the relevant law.
    Which one of the following is correct in respect of the above statements?
    (a) Both Statement I and Statement II are correct and Statement II explains Statement I
    (b) Both Statement I and Statement II are correct but Statement II does not explain Statement I
    (c) Statement I is correct but Statement II is not correct
    (d) Statement I is not correct but Statement II is correct

  • ID cards issued to transgender persons remain valid: Centre

    Why in the News

    The Union government assured a three judge Bench of the Supreme Court that transgender identity cards issued before the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Act, 2026 came into force continue to remain valid. The assurance was given in a challenge arguing that the amendment, in force since 30 March, dismantles the right to self identification recognised in the National Legal Services Authority v Union of India (2014) line of cases. The dispute turns on whether gender identity is declared by the person or certified by the State.

    What is the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Act, 2026?

    1. About: It amends the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019, the statute that governs recognition of transgender identity and the certificate of identity issued to a transgender person.
    2. Commencement: It came into force on 30 March 2026.
    3. Core objection to it: Petitioners argue that it dismantles the right to self identification and gives the State unfettered authority to determine gender identity.
    4. Status of earlier cards: The Solicitor General assured the Court that identity cards issued before the amendment remain valid, and their validity is unaffected by the new law.
    5. Judicial position so far: The Court had already indicated in the previous hearing that the 2026 law should not operate retrospectively to invalidate cards issued under the earlier legislation.
    6. Forum: The challenge is before a three judge Bench headed by the Chief Justice of India.

    What is self identification of gender?

    1. About: Self identification is the principle that a person’s gender is determined by that person’s own declaration of identity, without any requirement of medical examination or third party certification.
    2. Legal origin in India: The Supreme Court recognised it in National Legal Services Authority v Union of India (2014), holding that the right to determine one’s gender is integral to dignity under Article 21.

    What is a transgender identity card?

    1. About: A certificate of identity issued to a transgender person that provides official recognition of the person’s self identified gender.
    2. Practical use: It is used to support changes to name and gender across official records, and the government’s transgender portal expressly enables such changes.

    What is the current status of gender identity recognition in India?

    1. Statutory basis: Recognition runs through the certificate of identity issued under the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Act, 2019 and the rules made under it.
    2. Application route: An application is made to the District Magistrate, who issues a certificate of identity as a transgender person and a revised certificate after gender affirming surgery.
    3. Third gender status: Transgender persons are recognised as a third gender for the purposes of state welfare and identity documents.
    4. Prohibition of discrimination: The 2019 Act bars discrimination in education, employment, healthcare, access to public goods and the right to residence.
    5. Reservation position: No reservation in education or public employment has been extended to transgender persons as a class, despite the direction in the 2014 judgment to treat them as socially and educationally backward.
    6. Position after the amendment: The 2026 Amendment Act is in force from 30 March 2026, and its validity is under challenge before a three judge Bench.
    7. Position of existing card holders: Cards issued before the amendment continue to remain valid on the government’s own assurance to the Court.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to gender identity

    1. Article 14: Guarantees equality before the law and equal protection of the laws to every person, not only to men and women.
    2. Article 15: Prohibits discrimination on grounds of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth, with sex read to include gender identity.
    3. Article 16: Guarantees equality of opportunity in matters of public employment and permits reservation for backward classes.
    4. Article 19(1)(a): Protects freedom of expression, which includes expression of gender identity through dress, speech and behaviour.
    5. Article 21: Guarantees life and personal liberty, read to include dignity, personal autonomy and the right to determine one’s gender.
    6. Article 15(4) and Article 16(4): Permit special provisions and reservation for socially and educationally backward classes, the route directed in the 2014 judgment.
    7. Article 32: Provides the remedy through which the present challenge to the amendment has been brought.
    8. Article 23: Prohibits trafficking and forced labour, relevant to the exploitation the community faces in the absence of livelihood options.

    What did the National Legal Services Authority judgment establish?

    1. Recognition of a third gender: The Supreme Court held in April 2014 that transgender persons must be recognised as a third gender for the purposes of law.
    2. Right to self identification: It held that the gender to which a person belongs is to be determined by that person’s own identification and not by biological or medical criteria.
    3. Constitutional grounding: It located the right in Articles 14, 15, 16, 19(1)(a) and 21, treating gender identity as an aspect of dignity and personal autonomy.
    4. Backward class direction: It directed the Centre and the States to treat transgender persons as socially and educationally backward for the purposes of reservation.
    5. Positive obligations: It directed provision of separate public toilets, medical facilities, welfare schemes and measures to address social stigma.
    6. The wider line of cases: Puttaswamy v Union of India (2017) recognised privacy and decisional autonomy, Navtej Singh Johar v Union of India (2018) decriminalised consensual same sex relations, and Arunkumar v Inspector General of Registration (2019) upheld the marriage rights of a transgender person.

    What do the petitioners argue against the 2026 amendment?

    1. Loss of self determination: The amendment allows the State unfettered authority to determine gender identity, displacing the person’s own declaration.
    2. Conflict with binding precedent: Self identification was recognised as a constitutional right in 2014, and a statute cannot narrow a right located in Article 21.
    3. Value of existing documents: The importance of transgender identity cards already issued cannot be trifled away, since name and gender across official records depend on them.
    4. Retrospective effect: Any reading that invalidates earlier cards would strip recognition already granted under a previous legislation.
    5. Who is before the Court: The petitioners include community members and activists, so the challenge is brought by the group the law regulates.

    Can the State certify gender identity without displacing the right to determine it?

    1. Two claims in tension: The State has an interest in a verifiable identity document, and the individual has a constitutional right to declare gender without external validation.
    2. Where certification becomes control: A certificate that records a declaration is administrative, and a certificate that decides the declaration is determinative of the right itself.
    3. Documentary dependence: Name and gender in every other official record follow from the certificate, so control over the certificate is control over legal personality.
    4. Precedent against statute: The right was recognised through Article 21 in 2014, and the amendment operates on the same subject through ordinary legislation.
    5. The retrospectivity carve out: Protecting existing cards resolves the immediate hardship of current holders and leaves the question of future applicants untouched.
    6. The unresolved core: The assurance settles who keeps a card already issued, not who will be entitled to one under the amended procedure.

    Major debates surrounding gender self identification

    1. Declaration against certification: Whether recognition should follow a self declaration or require screening by a district authority.
    2. Medicalisation of identity: Whether any surgical or medical requirement for a revised certificate is consistent with autonomy under Article 21.
    3. Appeal and remedy: Whether refusal of a certificate by a District Magistrate should carry a statutory appeal, which the 2019 Act was criticised for omitting.
    4. Reservation for transgender persons: Whether the 2014 direction to treat the community as socially and educationally backward requires a horizontal reservation across categories.
    5. Penalty asymmetry: Whether the lower punishment for sexual violence against transgender persons under the 2019 Act compared with the general criminal law is constitutionally sustainable.
    6. Family and residence: Whether the requirement to reside with the natal family or in a rehabilitation centre respects the autonomy of adults who leave hostile homes.
    7. Data and enumeration: Whether recognition can be operationalised at all without accurate population data, since the last enumeration of the community was in Census 2011.

    Challenges to the transgender rights framework

    1. Certification bottleneck: Recognition depends on a single district officer with no statutory appeal against refusal. e.g. applicants under the Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Rules, 2020 have reported long delays in issue of the certificate of identity.
    2. Absence of reservation: The 2014 direction on backward class status has not been operationalised at the national level. e.g. Karnataka became the first State to provide a one per cent reservation in public employment in 2021, and most States have not followed.
    3. Weak penalty structure: Offences against transgender persons carry lower punishment than equivalent offences in the general criminal law. e.g. the 2019 Act prescribes six months to two years for sexual abuse of a transgender person.
    4. Healthcare exclusion: Gender affirming care and mental health support are unevenly available and rarely insured. e.g. Ayushman Bharat TG Plus was created precisely because transgender persons were excluded from mainstream health coverage.
    5. Livelihood and employment: Discrimination pushes the community towards begging and sex work despite a statutory bar on discrimination. e.g. the SMILE scheme’s livelihood component was designed to move persons out of begging.
    6. Documentation mismatch: Records in education certificates, bank accounts and property documents do not update automatically after a change in gender. e.g. the government’s transgender portal exists specifically to enable name and gender changes across records.
    7. Data invisibility: Policy runs on a 2011 count with no subsequent enumeration. e.g. Census 2011 recorded 4.88 lakh transgender persons, a figure widely regarded as an undercount.

    Conclusion

    The assurance protects existing card holders and leaves the constitutional question untouched, since the dispute is about whether gender identity is declared or certified. The Transgender Persons (Protection of Rights) Amendment Act, 2026 remains in force from 30 March 2026, and its validity is pending before a three judge Bench of the Supreme Court on a challenge grounded in the 2014 line of cases. The Court has recorded that the law should not operate retrospectively and the government has accepted that position on the record. The source names no next date for the hearing, so the stage reached is the government’s undertaking and the pending challenge.

    [2024] Under which of the following Articles of the Constitution of India, has the Supreme Court of India placed the Right to Privacy?
    (a) Article 15
    (b) Article 16
    (c) Article 19
    (d) Article 21

  • The Centre-states tussle over the Mines and Minerals Bill

    Why in the News

    Parliament passed the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2026 last week, barring States from imposing specified levies on mineral rights and on mineral bearing land. The bar removes the very taxing power the Supreme Court had affirmed for States on 25 July 2024. Mineral bearing States say the change strips out a revenue stream they control fully, while the Centre says uncapped State levies raise the cost of minerals for the whole economy.

    What is the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2026?

    1. About: It amends the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957, the parent law governing grant of mineral concessions and regulation of mines.
    2. Core bar: It restricts States from imposing specified levies on mineral rights and on mineral bearing land.
    3. Extinguishment of past dues: It wipes out unpaid or unrecovered dues arising from such levies imposed before the amendment comes into force.
    4. Scale of the dues: Estimates place outstanding dues of this kind across the mining sector at about Rs 2 lakh crore.
    5. Ceiling design: Mines Ministry officials state that about 14 levies in the mineral sector will survive, subject to a combined percentage ceiling.
    6. Stated purpose: The Centre frames the measure as fiscal certainty for mining companies over their total statutory burden.

    What is royalty on minerals?

    1. About: Royalty is the payment a lease holder makes to the State government for every unit of mineral extracted under a mining lease.
    2. Who fixes it: Rates are specified in the Schedules to the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 and revised by the Union government, not by the State that receives the money.

    What is the District Mineral Foundation?

    1. About: A non profit trust set up in every mining affected district, funded by a statutory contribution from lease holders, created by the 2015 amendment.
    2. Use of funds: Money is spent on people and areas affected by mining under the Pradhan Mantri Khanij Kshetra Kalyan Yojana.

    What is the National Mineral Exploration Trust?

    1. About: A trust created by the 2015 amendment and funded by a contribution equal to 2 per cent of royalty paid by lease holders.
    2. Use of funds: It finances regional and detailed mineral exploration through accredited agencies.

    What is the current status of State powers to tax mineral rights in India?

    1. Judicial position: A nine judge Constitution Bench held on 25 July 2024 that States hold legislative competence to tax mineral rights and mineral bearing land.
    2. Precedent overruled: That ruling overruled India Cement Ltd v State of Tamil Nadu (1989), which had treated royalty as a tax and placed the subject beyond State competence.
    3. Statutory position now: The 2026 amendment bars the specified levies, so a power the Court restored stands narrowed by ordinary legislation.
    4. Levies that survive: About 14 levies continue, including environmental and pollution cesses, subject to a combined ceiling still to be fixed.
    5. Centrally fixed payments: Royalty, District Mineral Foundation contributions and National Mineral Exploration Trust contributions remain set under central law.
    6. Effect on accrued claims: Levies imposed before commencement lose their recoverability, so demands already raised become unenforceable.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to taxation of mineral rights

    1. Article 246: Distributes legislative power between Parliament and State legislatures through the three lists of the Seventh Schedule.
    2. Entry 54, Union List: Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent Parliament declares expedient in the public interest.
    3. Entry 23, State List: Regulation of mines and mineral development, expressly subject to Entry 54 of the Union List.
    4. Entry 49, State List: Taxes on lands and buildings, the entry States have relied on for a mineral bearing land cess.
    5. Entry 50, State List: Taxes on mineral rights, subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development.
    6. Article 265: Bars the levy or collection of any tax except by authority of law.
    7. Article 300A: Bars deprivation of property save by authority of law, the provision invoked when accrued statutory dues are extinguished.
    8. Article 39(b): Directs the State to ensure that ownership and control of material resources are distributed to subserve the common good.

    Why does the 25 July 2024 ruling sit at the centre of the dispute?

    1. What was decided: The Court upheld the power of States to tax mineral rights and mineral bearing land as a distinct field from royalty.
    2. What was overruled: The 1989 India Cement position, that royalty is itself a tax, had blocked States from taxing the same subject for 35 years.
    3. What States did next: Several mineral bearing States began framing fresh cesses on mineral bearing land after the judgment.
    4. What the Centre saw: Mines Ministry officials describe the resulting levies as excessive cesses stacked on top of existing statutory payments.
    5. How Parliament responded: The amendment uses the limitation power built into Entry 50 to restrict what the Court had permitted.

    Why do mineral bearing States say the Bill damages their finances?

    1. Dependence on mining: Mining revenue accounted for about 84.9 per cent of Jharkhand’s own non tax revenue in the 2024 to 2025 financial year.
    2. Forgone cess: The Mineral Bearing Land Cess was expected to yield about Rs 11,000 crore a year for Jharkhand alone.
    3. Dues written off: Outstanding dues across the mining sector estimated at about Rs 2 lakh crore cease to be recoverable.
    4. Fiscal capacity argument: The Jharkhand Chief Minister wrote to the Prime Minister that mineral revenues are a critical component of the State’s fiscal capacity and not marginal receipts.
    5. Federal objection: The Kerala Chief Minister has raised concerns over the implications of the amendment for India’s federal structure.
    6. Political response: Jharkhand has threatened protests against the amendments.

    What is the Centre’s case for restricting State levies?

    1. Cost of key minerals: Unchecked State levies raise mineral prices and feed into inflation and infrastructure costs.
    2. Predictability for industry: A single combined ceiling gives mining companies certainty over their total fiscal burden across States.
    3. Cumulative burden: Companies already pay royalty, District Mineral Foundation and National Mineral Exploration Trust contributions and environmental and pollution cesses.
    4. The largest single addition: Industry assessment identifies the mineral bearing land tax as the biggest additional burden of the recent levies.
    5. A ceiling, not abolition: About 14 levies survive, with the combined percentage to be fixed after consulting all States.
    6. Limited realised loss: Industry view holds that most of these levies were legally contested for decades, so little was actually collected.

    Does fiscal certainty for industry justify overriding a power the Court has just affirmed?

    1. Two legitimate claims: Investment certainty in a capital heavy sector sits against the fiscal autonomy of the States that hold the minerals.
    2. A judicial gain reversed: States won the power in 2024 and lost its practical use in 2026 without any change in the constitutional text.
    3. The retrospective element: Extinguishing accrued dues removes revenue already claimed, which goes further than limiting future levies.
    4. Sequence of consultation: The ceiling is to be fixed after the bar is enacted, so States negotiate the number after losing their leverage.
    5. Who gains and who pays: The saving accrues to mining companies and mineral consuming States, the loss falls on a small group of mineral bearing States.
    6. Cost borne locally: Land loss, displacement and pollution stay with the producing State even after its claim on the rent is narrowed.

    Major debates surrounding taxation of mineral rights

    1. Royalty as tax or as consideration: India Cement treated royalty as a tax, the 2024 ruling treated it as contractual consideration, and that classification decides State competence.
    2. Reach of the Entry 50 limitation: How far Parliament may hollow out a State taxing entry through a limitation clause remains legally contested.
    3. Recovery of past dues: The 2024 ruling allowed staggered recovery of past demands, the amendment extinguishes them outright.
    4. Producer against consumer States: Mineral bearing States argue they carry the ecological and social cost while value addition and tax revenue accrue elsewhere.
    5. Cooperative against unilateral federalism: The Centre frames the change as integration of a national market, States frame it as unilateral action on their own revenue base.
    6. Deepening vertical fiscal imbalance: Non tax mineral revenue is one of the few sources States control fully, so its removal raises dependence on central transfers.

    Challenges to the Mines and Minerals Amendment Bill

    1. Litigation risk: States can challenge the bar and the extinguishment of accrued dues as a colourable exercise of legislative power. e.g. Jharkhand and Kerala both registered formal objections within days of the Bill’s passage in August 2026.
    2. Concentrated revenue shock: A small set of States carries almost the entire loss. e.g. Odisha and Jharkhand together account for the bulk of India’s iron ore and coal output.
    3. Undecided ceiling: The combined percentage is unfixed at the point of enactment, leaving States unable to plan budgets. e.g. the Mines Ministry states only that the figure will follow consultation with all States.
    4. Weak district level spending: Money already collected for mining affected areas is poorly used. e.g. audits have repeatedly flagged large unspent District Mineral Foundation balances in mining districts.
    5. Unpriced ecological damage: Removing land based levies weakens the price signal for land degradation. e.g. the Shah Commission findings preceded the suspension of iron ore mining in Goa in 2012.
    6. Certainty alone does not unlock supply: Fiscal predictability does not resolve clearance and land bottlenecks. e.g. several auctioned coal blocks remain unoperationalised for want of forest clearance.
    7. Weak consultation machinery: Resource disputes between the Union and States lack a standing forum for settlement. e.g. the Inter State Council has met only rarely since its creation in 1990.

    Conclusion

    The dispute is about who captures the rent from a fixed natural resource, not about the rate of any single cess. Parliament has passed the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2026, and the measure now moves to Presidential assent and commencement. The next concrete step named by the Mines Ministry is fixing the combined percentage ceiling on the roughly 14 surviving levies after consulting all States. Until that ceiling is notified, mineral bearing States carry a quantified loss against an unquantified entitlement.

    “[2025, GS2, 15 marks] Examine the evolving pattern of Centre-State financial relations in the context of planned development in India. How far have the recent reforms impacted the fiscal federalism in India?”

  • Mines and Minerals Amendment Bill 2026 curbs State taxing powers over mineral rights

    Why in the News

    Parliament passed the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Amendment Bill, 2026 on 13 August 2026, restricting the power of States to levy taxes on mineral rights and mineral bearing lands. The measure reverses in statute the fiscal gain that a nine judge Bench of the Supreme Court gave mineral rich States in 2024, and it has united ruling and opposition parties in Kerala, Odisha and Jharkhand against it.

    What is the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957?

    1. About: The Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 is the central law regulating the grant of mineral concessions and the development of mines in India.
    2. The declaration it carries: Section 2 declares it expedient in the public interest that the Union take control of the regulation of mines and mineral development, which activates Entry 54 of the Union List.
    3. Royalty setting: Section 9 empowers the Central Government to fix and revise royalty rates, and revision is permitted not more than once every three years.
    4. Concession route: Since the 2015 amendment, mineral concessions are granted by States through competitive auction rather than by discretionary allotment.
    5. Local sharing: Section 9B requires a District Mineral Foundation in every district affected by mining, funded by a contribution linked to royalty.

    What is a royalty on minerals?

    1. Definition: Royalty is the payment a lessee makes to the owner of the mineral for the privilege of extracting and removing it, calculated on the quantity or value produced.
    2. Legal character: The Supreme Court has held royalty to be a contractual consideration flowing from the mining lease, not a tax levied by the state.

    What is a cess?

    1. Definition: A cess is a levy imposed for a specified purpose, with its proceeds earmarked for that purpose rather than merged into general revenue.
    2. Why it matters here: Mineral bearing States had imposed cesses on royalty and on mineral bearing land, and it is this class of levy that the amendment restricts.

    What is the District Mineral Foundation (DMF)?

    1. Definition: The District Mineral Foundation is a non profit trust established in every mining affected district to work for the benefit of persons and areas affected by mining.
    2. Funding: Lessees contribute a share of royalty to the Foundation, and the money is spent through the Pradhan Mantri Khanij Kshetra Kalyan Yojana on health, education, drinking water and livelihood in mining affected areas.

    What is the current status of State taxing power over mineral rights in India?

    1. Constitutional entry: Entry 50 of the State List gives States the power to tax mineral rights, expressly subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development.
    2. Judicial position since 2024: A nine judge Bench held that royalty is not a tax and that States retain legislative competence to tax mineral rights and mineral bearing land.
    3. Retrospective effect: The Court permitted recovery of dues from 1 April 2005, to be paid in staggered instalments over twelve years beginning 1 April 2026, without interest or penalty for the earlier period.
    4. State levies in force: Mineral rich States including Odisha, Jharkhand and West Bengal had enacted or revived levies on mineral rights in reliance on that ruling.
    5. The new limitation: The 2026 amendment now exercises the limitation power in Entry 50 to restrict those levies and vests sole authority to frame rules in the Centre.
    6. Central levies unaffected: Royalty under Section 9, the District Mineral Foundation contribution and the National Mineral Exploration Trust contribution of 2 per cent of royalty continue to be fixed centrally.

    Constitutional Provisions Related to Mineral Rights and State Taxation

    1. Article 246: Distributes legislative power between Parliament and State legislatures through the three lists of the Seventh Schedule.
    2. Entry 54, Union List: Gives Parliament power over the regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent that such control is declared by law to be expedient in the public interest.
    3. Entry 23, State List: Gives States power over the regulation of mines and mineral development, expressly subject to Entry 54 of the Union List.
    4. Entry 18, State List: Places land, including rights in land and land tenures, within the exclusive competence of the States.
    5. Entry 49, State List: Gives States the power to tax lands and buildings, which covers mineral bearing land as a class of land.
    6. Entry 50, State List: Gives States the power to tax mineral rights, subject to limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development.
    7. Article 265: Provides that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law.
    8. Article 254: Governs repugnancy between a central and a State law on a concurrent subject, and gives the central law primacy.

    What does the 2026 amendment actually change?

    1. Restriction on State taxes: The Bill restricts the power of States to levy taxes on mineral rights and on mineral bearing lands.
    2. Restriction on cesses: The restriction extends to cesses and other levies imposed on the same subject matter.
    3. Rule making centralised: An amendment grants sole authority over the framing of rules to the Centre.
    4. The Centre’s stated purpose: The government has argued that the amendment will promote mineral production, ensure mineral security and create a more uniform regulatory framework.
    5. Passage: The Bill was cleared by the Rajya Sabha and passed by Parliament on 13 August 2026 amid Opposition protests.

    How did the 2024 nine judge ruling set up this legislative response?

    1. The question referred: Whether royalty under the 1957 Act is a tax, and whether States retain independent power to tax mineral rights and mineral bearing land.
    2. The holding: By a majority of eight to one the Court held that royalty is not a tax, and that State competence under Entry 50 survives.
    3. The precedent overruled: The 1990 ruling that had treated royalty as a tax, and had thereby denied States a separate taxing field, was overturned.
    4. The fiscal consequence: Mineral rich States became entitled to arrears accumulated since 2005, an amount running into more than a lakh crore rupees across States.
    5. The opening the Court left: The judgment expressly preserved Parliament’s power under Entry 50 to impose limitations on State taxation of mineral rights, and the 2026 amendment uses exactly that power.

    Why do mineral rich States say the Bill strips their revenue base?

    1. Encroachment on land: The Kerala Chief Minister described the legislation as a serious encroachment on the State’s constitutional powers over land and a grave threat to India’s federal structure, and said the State would mount political and, if necessary, legal opposition.
    2. Land is a State subject: The Leader of the Opposition in Kerala argued that land falls under Entry 18 of the State List and that taxation of land is also a State subject, so the restriction enters the States’ constitutional domain.
    3. Disproportionate impact: Odisha’s former Chief Minister wrote that the provisions would disproportionately impact mineral rich States and cause massive revenue losses that would stifle the State’s developmental agenda.
    4. What the revenue funds: He stated that mining revenue finances healthcare, education, welfare schemes and infrastructure development across the State, and demanded a special Assembly session and a unanimous resolution.
    5. Fiscal autonomy claim: He described fiscal autonomy as a constitutional principle built into the federal system, and said stripping States of the power to tax their own mineral bearing lands strikes at cooperative federalism.
    6. Protest in Jharkhand: The Jharkhand Chief Minister called it a black Bill and warned of protests in every district, block, panchayat and town of the State.
    7. The privatisation charge: The Kerala Opposition alleged that the larger objective was to weaken the public sector and create opportunities for corporates to earn windfall profits.

    How was the Bill carried through Parliament?

    1. Passage amid protest: The Bill was passed while the Opposition was protesting, and the concerns raised about federalism were not addressed on the floor.
    2. Rights of affected people: The legislation overlooks the rights of those living on resource rich land, who are the first to bear the cost of expanded extraction.
    3. A pattern, not an exception: The amendment follows an established pattern of hurried lawmaking and continuing expansion of central powers at the cost of States and local communities.
    4. Session context: The monsoon session that began on 20 July 2026 passed several Bills with inadequate deliberation.
    5. What deliberation would have required: An all party meeting, circulation of the draft and consultation with State Chief Ministers were available and were not used.

    Can a Bill be constitutionally valid and still weaken federalism?

    1. The text supports the Centre: Entry 50 has always made State taxation of mineral rights subject to limitations imposed by Parliament, so the amendment uses a power the Constitution itself confers.
    2. The Court anticipated it: The 2024 judgment recognised that parliamentary limitation was available, so the amendment is a legislative answer within the space the ruling left open.
    3. The effect side: A limitation that removes the entire field converts a qualified State power into no power at all, which is a different thing from regulating its exercise.
    4. Who bears the loss: The States that lose most are the poorest resource States, whose own tax base is narrow and whose transfers do not compensate for mineral revenue.
    5. The federal principle at stake: Fiscal autonomy is not merely a revenue question, because a State that cannot tax its own resource base cannot plan expenditure independently of central transfers.
    6. The objection is not uniformly principled: The Kerala Opposition itself pointed out that the State government’s Revised Budget and White Paper on State finances proposed full privatisation of beach sand mining, which is the same direction it attacks in the Centre.

    Major Debates Surrounding Mineral Taxation and Federalism

    1. Royalty as tax or consideration: The 1990 ruling treated royalty as a tax, the 2004 five judge ruling read that as a drafting error, and the 2024 nine judge ruling settled it as a contractual consideration.
    2. How far a limitation may go: Whether Parliament’s power to impose limitations under Entry 50 extends to extinguishing the State’s taxing field altogether remains contested.
    3. Retrospective recovery burden: The staggered recovery of arrears from 2005 falls heavily on public sector miners and steel producers, and industry has argued it will be passed into input costs.
    4. Uniformity against autonomy: The Centre’s case for a single national regulatory framework for mineral security runs directly against the States’ claim to price their own resource endowment.
    5. Resource curse: Mineral rich States record among the highest poverty rates despite the highest extraction, which raises whether royalty and District Mineral Foundation flows compensate the host population at all.
    6. Community consent: The rights of Scheduled Area residents under the Fifth Schedule and the 1996 Panchayats Extension to Scheduled Areas Act sit uneasily with a centralised concession regime, as the Samatha and Niyamgiri rulings demonstrated.
    7. District Mineral Foundation utilisation: Large unspent balances and expenditure outside mining affected areas have raised the question whether local sharing works in practice.

    Challenges to the Mineral Taxation Framework after the Amendment

    1. Revenue substitution gap: No mechanism replaces the levies the States lose, e.g. Odisha’s mining revenue funds a large share of its own tax receipts and no equivalent central transfer has been announced.
    2. Litigation risk: The amendment invites a fresh constitutional challenge, e.g. the Kerala Chief Minister has already said the State will consider legal opposition to the Act.
    3. Investment uncertainty: Repeated changes to the fiscal regime deter long lead mining investment, e.g. bidders in mineral auctions price in future levy changes through lower premium bids.
    4. Local community exclusion: Centralised rule making distances the decision from those displaced, e.g. Niyamgiri in Odisha showed that consent of gram sabhas can defeat a project cleared at higher levels.
    5. Auction premium distortion: High auction premiums already compress operating margins, e.g. several iron ore blocks won at premiums above 100 per cent of sale value have remained unoperated.
    6. Enforcement of illegal mining controls: Restricting State fiscal powers does not address extraction outside the legal framework, e.g. illegal sand and iron ore mining continues to be reported across multiple States despite the auction regime.
    7. Environmental cost transfer: The framework does not price ecological damage into the concession, e.g. mining in the Aravallis and in central Indian forest belts has continued alongside contested clearances.

    Conclusion

    Entry 50 always made State taxation of mineral rights subject to limitation by Parliament, so the amendment uses a power the Constitution grants. Its effect is to reverse in statute the fiscal gain that a nine judge Bench gave mineral rich States in 2024. What remains unresolved is whether a formally valid limitation that removes an entire revenue base is compatible with fiscal federalism, and that question is now headed back to the courts.

    What is Fiscal Federalism?

    1. About: Fiscal federalism is the division of taxation powers, expenditure responsibilities and transfer mechanisms between the Union and the States in a federal system.
    2. Rationale: Revenue raising capacity is concentrated at the centre while service delivery responsibility sits with the States, so a transfer system is required to close the gap.
    3. Vertical fiscal imbalance: The mismatch between the Union’s revenue powers and the States’ expenditure responsibilities, corrected through tax devolution.
    4. Horizontal fiscal imbalance: The mismatch between States of differing income and need, corrected through the Finance Commission’s inter se distribution formula.
    5. Third tier imbalance: The mismatch at the level of panchayats and municipalities, whose own revenue is minimal and whose transfers depend on State Finance Commissions.

    Key Concerns Regarding Fiscal Federalism

    1. Shrinking divisible pool: Cesses and surcharges are not shared with States, so a growing share of central revenue sits outside the devolution formula.
    2. Loss of taxation autonomy under GST: States surrendered most of their independent indirect taxing power, leaving mineral rights and land among the few residual fields.
    3. Conditional transfers: Centrally sponsored schemes come with matching share and design conditions that constrain State expenditure choices.
    4. Weak third tier finance: Local bodies remain dependent on State transfers because property tax and user charge collection is under exploited.
    5. Borrowing limits: State borrowing under Article 293 requires central consent where the State is indebted to the Union, which constrains counter cyclical spending.

    Constitutional Framework Governing Mineral Rights and State Taxation

    1. Article 246: Distributes legislative competence between the Union and the States through the Seventh Schedule.
    2. Seventh Schedule: Contains the Union List, the State List and the Concurrent List that operationalise Article 246.
    3. Entry 54, Union List: Regulation of mines and mineral development to the extent declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest.
    4. Entry 23, State List: Regulation of mines and mineral development, subject to Entry 54 of the Union List.
    5. Entry 18, State List: Land, rights in land, land tenures and the relation of landlord and tenant.
    6. Entry 49, State List: Taxes on lands and buildings.
    7. Entry 50, State List: Taxes on mineral rights, subject to any limitations imposed by Parliament by law relating to mineral development.
    8. Article 265: No tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law.
    9. The Mineral Area Development Authority line of cases: India Cement in 1990 treated royalty as a tax, Kesoram Industries in 2004 read that as a drafting error, and Mineral Area Development Authority in 2024 held by eight to one that royalty is not a tax and that Entry 50 competence survives.

    Laws and Rules Governing Mining in India

    1. Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957: The parent statute for mineral concessions; its Section 2 declaration is what brings mineral regulation under Union control.
    2. MMDR Amendment Act, 2015: Introduced auction as the only route for granting mineral concessions and created the District Mineral Foundation and the National Mineral Exploration Trust.
    3. MMDR Amendment Act, 2021: Removed the distinction between captive and merchant mines and allowed transfer of statutory clearances with the lease.
    4. MMDR Amendment Act, 2023: Created the exploration licence and moved twelve critical and deep seated minerals, including lithium and beryllium, to central auction under a new Part D.
    5. Mines Act, 1952: Governs worker safety, working hours and welfare in mines, enforced through the Directorate General of Mines Safety.
    6. Offshore Areas Mineral (Development and Regulation) Act, 2002: Governs mineral rights in territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone, amended in 2023 to introduce auctions.
    7. Mineral Conservation and Development Rules, 2017: Prescribe scientific mining, mine closure and conservation obligations for lessees.
    8. Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 and Forest Rights Act, 2006: Govern diversion of forest land and require settlement of individual and community forest rights before diversion.
    9. Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) Act, 1996 (PESA): Requires consultation with the gram sabha before granting a mineral concession in a Scheduled Area.

    Back2Basics: Mineral Area Development Authority v. Steel Authority of India (2024)

    1. Bench strength: It was decided by a nine judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, the largest bench to sit on the question.
    2. Majority: The ruling was by a majority of eight to one.
    3. Core holding: Royalty payable under Section 9 of the 1957 Act is a contractual consideration and not a tax.
    4. Competence upheld: States retain legislative competence under Entry 50 of the State List to tax mineral rights, and under Entry 49 to tax mineral bearing land.
    5. Precedent overruled: It overruled India Cement Limited v. State of Tamil Nadu (1990), which had treated royalty as a tax.
    6. Limitation preserved: The Court recorded that Parliament may impose limitations on the Entry 50 power through a law relating to mineral development.
    7. Prospectivity ruling: In a separate order the Court allowed recovery of dues from 1 April 2005 in instalments over twelve years starting 1 April 2026, and waived interest and penalty for the period before the judgment.

    Government Initiatives for the Mineral Sector

    1. National Mineral Policy, 2019: Sets the policy framework for sustainable mining, exploration expansion and a right of first refusal in auctions for existing lessees.
    2. National Critical Mineral Mission: Launched to secure supply of critical minerals, targeting 1,200 domestic exploration projects by 2030 to 2031, production of 15 critical minerals and acquisition of 50 overseas assets.
    3. Khanij Bidesh India Limited (KABIL): A joint venture of three public sector undertakings to acquire mineral assets abroad, including lithium acreage in Argentina.
    4. Pradhan Mantri Khanij Kshetra Kalyan Yojana: Spends District Mineral Foundation funds on drinking water, health, education, sanitation and livelihoods in mining affected areas.
    5. National Mineral Exploration Trust: Funded by a levy of 2 per cent of royalty, it finances regional and detailed exploration by notified agencies.
    6. Mining Tenement System and Star Rating of Mines: Digitise concession records and grade operating mines on sustainable development performance.

    Key Facts about India’s Mineral Sector

    1. Production base: India produces 95 minerals, comprising fuel, metallic, non metallic, atomic and minor mineral categories.
    2. Global standing: India is the world’s second largest producer of coal and among the largest producers of iron ore and crude steel.
    3. Leading States: Odisha, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Karnataka and Rajasthan account for the bulk of the value of mineral production.
    4. Critical minerals list: India notified a list of 30 critical minerals in 2023, of which twelve were moved to central auction under the 2023 amendment.
    5. Foundation contribution: Lessees contribute 10 per cent of royalty to the District Mineral Foundation for auctioned leases and 30 per cent for older leases.
    6. Sector share: Mining and quarrying contribute roughly 2 to 3 per cent of gross value added, well below the share in comparable resource economies.

    Challenges in India’s Mining Sector

    1. Exploration deficit: Only a small fraction of the obvious geological potential area has been explored in detail, e.g. India still imports the bulk of its lithium, cobalt and rare earth requirement despite favourable geology.
    2. Land and forest clearance delays: Concession holders wait years for statutory clearances, e.g. blocks auctioned in central India have remained unoperated pending forest diversion approval.
    3. Displacement and rehabilitation: Mining displaces tribal populations without durable resettlement, e.g. the Niyamgiri hills case turned on the Dongria Kondh community’s rights over the proposed bauxite site.
    4. Illegal mining: Extraction outside the legal framework persists in high value and low value minerals alike, e.g. river sand mining continues to be reported across States despite auction and monitoring rules.
    5. Environmental damage: Overburden, dust and water table impact are inadequately priced, e.g. coal mining in the Singrauli belt has produced sustained air and water contamination.
    6. Occupational safety: Accident rates in mines remain high, e.g. rat hole coal mining in Meghalaya has caused repeated fatal flooding incidents despite prohibition.
    7. Value addition gap: India exports ore and imports processed metal, e.g. iron ore fines have historically been exported while high grade steel inputs are imported.

    Way Forward

    1. Compensate the fiscal loss: Route a defined share of central mineral levies back to producing States to replace the revenue the amendment removes.
    2. Legislate the limitation narrowly: Define the scope of the Entry 50 limitation in the statute so that the residual State field is stated rather than left to litigation.
    3. Institutionalise consultation: Refer contested federal legislation to a Joint Parliamentary Committee and consult State Chief Ministers before introduction.
    4. Strengthen local sharing: Audit District Mineral Foundation spending and restrict it to a defined radius around mining affected habitations.
    5. Expand exploration: Use the exploration licence route to bring private and junior exploration capital into deep seated and critical mineral search.
    6. Build processing capacity: Support domestic refining and separation of critical minerals so that concession reform translates into value addition rather than ore export.

    Matching Previous Year Question

    “[2025, GS2, 15 marks] Examine the evolving pattern of Centre-State financial relations in the context of planned development in India. How far have the recent reforms impacted the fiscal federalism in India?”

  • Draft rules under the SHANTI Act open nuclear power to captive industrial use and a composite licence

    Why in the News

    The Department of Atomic Energy released draft rules under the Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India (SHANTI) Act on 14 August 2026, opening nuclear power generation to private and captive users. Comments are invited until 4 September 2026.

    What is the SHANTI Act?

    • Replaces the earlier state monopoly framework with a licensing regime for non-government operators.
    • Covers private participation, captive generation, foreign reactor technology, safety and nuclear liability.
    • Provides a single composite licence for building, owning, operating and decommissioning a reactor.

    Key Provisions

    1. Captive nuclear power: Industries can generate nuclear electricity mainly for their own consumption.
    2. In-principle approval: Allows land acquisition and vendor negotiations before final licensing.
    3. Foreign technology: Imported designs must be certified by the regulator in the country of origin and already operational.
    4. Nuclear liability: Operators must maintain insurance or financial security; a Nuclear Liability Fund is proposed.
    5. Eligible users: Aluminium, cement, data centres, semiconductor fabs and Artificial Intelligence (AI) facilities.

    Key Concern

    • The country-of-origin certification may speed up safety approval but restrict technology sourcing to a few countries. Requiring continued support and retaining Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) with foreign developers could also limit technology transfer and indigenous reactor design.

    India’s Nuclear Programme

    • Stage 1: Pressurised Heavy Water Reactors (PHWRs) using natural uranium.
    • Stage 2: Fast Breeder Reactors (FBRs) using plutonium.
    • Stage 3: Thorium-based reactors using Uranium-233 (U-233).
    • Target: 100 GW nuclear capacity by 2047.

    Challenges

    • Supplier liability concerns
    • Limited regulatory independence
    • Land and public acceptance
    • Uranium and fuel constraints
    • Nuclear waste management
    • High project costs and long construction timelines

    Prelims Pointers

    • DAE: Department of Atomic Energy
    • AERB: Atomic Energy Regulatory Board
    • NPCIL: Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited
    • BHAVINI: Bharatiya Nabhikiya Vidyut Nigam Limited
    • NPT: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
    • NSG: Nuclear Suppliers Group
    • India is not a signatory to NPT and received an NSG waiver in 2008.

    [2018, GS3, 15 marks] With growing energy needs should India keep on expanding its nuclear energy programme? Discuss the facts and fears associated with nuclear energy.”

    [2020]  In India, why are some nuclear reactors kept under “IAEA safeguards” while others are not ?

    a) Some use uranium and others use thorium
    b) Some use imported uranium and others use domestic supplies
    c) Some are operated by foreign enterprises and others are operated by domestic enterprises
    d) Some are State-owned and others are privately-owned

  • Anti-paper-leak law amended amid exam-integrity protests

    Why in the News

    The Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair Means) Amendment Bill, 2026 seeks to strengthen the 2024 law against organised cheating and examination paper leaks amid concerns over NEET and recruitment examination irregularities.

    What is the Public Examination Act, 2024?

    1. Objective: Criminalises organised cheating, paper leaks, impersonation and other unfair means.
    2. Coverage: Applies to major public examinations conducted by bodies such as UPSC, SSC and NTA.
    3. Penalties: Provides imprisonment and heavy fines for organised examination malpractice.
    4. Focus: Targets organised networks rather than genuine candidate errors.

    Why was it amended?

    • Exam-leak crisis: Repeated paper leaks and irregularities exposed weaknesses in examination governance.
    • Enforcement gaps: Strengthening was considered necessary after experience with the 2024 framework.
    • Public trust: Fair examinations are essential for merit-based recruitment and equal opportunity.

    What does the crisis reveal?

    • Aspiration-opportunity gap: Large numbers of candidates compete for limited government jobs.
    • Institutional trust deficit: Repeated leaks undermine confidence in recruitment institutions.
    • Governance challenge: Legal punishment alone cannot ensure examination integrity without secure technology, accountable agencies and speedy investigation.

    Prelims Pointers

    • Act: Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024
    • Ministry/Department: Department of Personnel and Training
    • Targets: Organised cheating, paper leaks and impersonation
    • Important distinction: The Act does not automatically cover all university or State board examinations unless the concerned government adopts the framework.

    “[2024, GS2, 15] What are the aims and objects of the recently passed and enforced, The Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024? Whether University/State Education Board examinations, too, are covered under the Act?”

    [2021] With reference to the Union Government, consider the following statements:
    1. N. Gopalaswamy Iyengar Committee suggested that a minister and a secretary be designated solely for pursuing the subject of administrative reform and promoting it.
    2. In 1970, the Department of Personnel was constituted on the recommendation of the Administrative Reforms Commission, 1966, and this was placed under the Prime Minister’s charge.
    Which of the statements given above is/are correct?

    [A] 1 only

    [B] 2 only

    [C] Both 1 and 2

    [D] Neither 1 nor 2