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GS Paper: GS2

  • The great Afghan microcosm

    The article highlights how players at 3 levels: global, regional and local level influence Afghan dynamics.

    Role of global powers in Afghanistan

    1) What the US exit from Afghanistan mean

    • The exit of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan underlines the end of the unipolar moment in international affairs.
    • Ending US military involvement, however, does not necessarily make Washington marginal to the future evolution of Afghanistan.
    • The US remains the most significant global power even after the end of the unipolar moment.
    • Its ability to weigh in on multiple issues is considerable.
    • President Joe Biden is under some pressure at home not to be seen as abandoning Afghanistan.
    • Nor can the US President ignore the dangers of Afghanistan re-emerging as a breeding ground for international terrorism.
    • The US will figure prominently in any Taliban strategy to win international diplomatic recognition and political legitimacy.
    • It will also need Western economic assistance for stabilising the war-torn country.

    2) Russia’s role in Afghanistan

    • Russia is determined to play an important role in the future of Afghanistan.
    • As a member of the UNSC, the joint leader of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation with China, and a major source of weapons, Russian clout is real.
    • Above all, Putin brings plenty of political will to compensate for Moscow’s loss of superpower status as we have seen across the world, from Venezuela to Myanmar and Mozambique to Syria.

    3) How China will benefit from the US withdrawal

    • If the US is a distant power, China is Afghanistan’s neighbour.
    • Unlike Russia, China can deliver massive economic resources to Afghanistan under the umbrella of the Belt and Road Initiative.
    • China’s expanding relations with the different nations of the Gulf and Central Asia and a deep partnership with Pakistan lends much potential depth to Beijing’s role in Afghanistan.
    • Both Kabul and the Taliban have seen China as a valuable partner in the pursuit of their divergent interests.
    • Beijing has often talked of extending the China Pakistan Economic Corridor to Afghanistan.
    • However, China is vulnerable to the extremist politics of the region that fan the flames of religious and ethnic separatism in its Xinjiang province.

    Regional powers influencing Afghan dynamics

    • One of the biggest concern about the Afghan future is the kind of influence Islamic radicals might regain in the country under Taliban rule and its consequences for the subcontinent, Central Asia, and the Middle East.
    • Pakistan and Iran, which share long physical borders, have had the greatest natural influence on land-locked Afghanistan.
    • When the Taliban ruled Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE were the only countries other than Pakistan to recognise the government-run by its leader, Mullah Omar.
    • They have taken a back seat in the current round of Afghan diplomacy, but would certainly return to the centre stage sooner than later.
    • Meanwhile, bold Qatar and ambitious Turkey have injected themselves into the Afghan jousting.

    Influence of local actors

    • The local actors in Afghanistan have agency of their own.
    • All of them know how to manipulate external powers for their own ends in Afghanistan.
    • The image of the Taliban as a creature of the Pakistan army is misleading, the Taliban is quite capable of making independent deals with the rest of the world.
    • The Taliban’s opponents, too, are likely to fight for their interests and will seek out external partners.

    Consider the question “Discarding old hesitations and building new geopolitical coalitions will be critical for a successful Indian engagement with the Afghan microcosm. Comment.” 

    Conclusion

    Several contentions unfolding in and around Afghanistan promise to reorder the region again. Delhi needs much strategic activism to secure its interests and promote regional stability in this flux.

  • India and Russia look for a reset

    Avoiding military alliances and retaining its strategic autonomy could help India play an important role in geopolitics at the same time maintaining the diversity in its relationships.

    Transformation in India-Russia relations

    • The principal objective of the Russian Foreign Minister was to prepare the ground for the visit of President Vladimir Putin later this year.
    • The Indian perspective on the Indo-Pacific was conveyed to the Foreign Minister of Russia.
    •  India insists that its Indo-Pacific initiatives seek a cooperative order, that the Quad is not the nucleus of a politico-military alliance.
    • A $1 billion Indian line of credit for projects in the Russian Far East and activation of a Chennai-Vladivostok maritime corridor were announced in 2019.
    • The message was that India’s effort to restrain Chinese aggression is compatible with Russia’s vision of a Eurasian partnership.
    • Russia remains unconvinced, either because it feels India’s words do not match its actions or because of its close ties with China.

    China factor in India-Russia relations

    • India is concerned about Russia’s China embrace, encompassing close political, economic and defence cooperation: Russia accounted for 77% of China’s arms imports in 2016-20.
    • India’s apprehensions about their technology- and intelligence-sharing were heightened by Mr. Putin’s remark that he would not rule out a future Russia-China military alliance. 

    Russia-Pakistan relations

    • Foreign Minister visited Pakistan directly after India — the first time a Russian Minister has done so.
    • .He confirmed that Russia would strengthen Pakistan’s “counter-terrorism capability” .
    • Russia is now Pakistan’s second-largest defence supplier, accounting for 6.6% of its arms imports in 2016-20.
    • Their cooperation includes joint “counter-terrorism” drills and sharing perspectives on military tactics and strategic doctrines.

    Factors to consider about defence cooperation with Russia

    • Despite being a major defence supplier of China and Pakistan, Russia remains a major supplier of cutting-edge military technologies to India.
    • The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) records that Russia supplied 49% of India’s arms imports in 2016-20.
    • SIPRI estimates that recent orders for Russian arms could boost future import figures. T
    • his is a reality check.
    • Defence cooperation is not a transactional exchange. Sharing of technologies and strategies is underpinned by a mutual commitment to protection of confidentiality.
    • Sustainable defence cooperation is based on a credible assurance that what is transferred to our adversaries will not blunt the effectiveness of our weapons systems.
    • In this already complex mix, the American sanctions legislation, CAATSA (Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act), adds an external layer of complexity.

    Criticality of geography influence India’s relationship with Russia and China

    • The Eurasian landmass to India’s north is dominated by Russia and China.
    • Strategic and security interests in Central Asia, West Asia and Afghanistan dictate our engagement with the region and the connectivity projects linking it, like the International North-South Transport Corridor through Iran.
    • India cannot vacate this space to a Russia-China condominium (with Pakistan in tow), without potentially grave security consequences.

    The broader geopolitical context

    • The principal element in this is the drive for the superpower status of a powerful, assertive China.
    • The U.S., as the pre-eminent superpower, seeks to retard this process.
    • In a deviation from classical geopolitical strategy, the U.S. is taking on both China and Russia.
    • This move is driving Russia and China together and arguably accelerating the move to bipolarity.
    • Even so, the differentials in military, economic and political power across countries may complicate the emergence of two clear poles of the Cold War variety.
    • A decline in Western hostility to Russia could add to the complexity, if Russia takes the opportunity to loosen the Chinese embrace and position itself as a pole in the multipolar world.

    Consider the question “The depth of India’s relationship with Russia will depend on the willingness and capacity of both countries to show mutual sensitivity to core security concerns. Comment.” 

    Conclusion

    India has to explore the space within these processes to maximise its global influence by steering clear of alliances and retaining the autonomy of policy.

  • When Aadhaar-related problems lead to denial of rations and benefits: what the data show

    The Supreme Court recently asked the Centre to respond to allegations made in a Public Interest Litigation with respect to 3 crore ration cards being cancelled in the country because of the insistence on Aadhaar linkage and biometric authentication.

    Key Points

    About Aadhar Card:

    • Aadhar Card is basically a biographic and biometric data of Indian citizens that includes name, date of birth, gender, address, a photograph, and ten fingerprint and two iris scans.
    • It includes a unique 12-digit Aadhaar number.
    • The Aadhar Card is a residential proof and not a citizenship card.

  • The Election Commission of India cannot be a super government

    The article highlights the issue of lack of clarity on the extent of the power of the Election Commission of India.

    Where ECI derives its power from

    • Supreme Court held in Mohinder Singh Gill vs Chief Election Commissioner that Article 324 contains plenary powers to ensure free and fair elections.
    • These plenary powers are vested in the ECI which can take all necessary steps to achieve this constitutional object.
    • Thus, the model code of conduct has been issued in exercise of its powers under Article 324.
    • Besides the code, the ECI issues from time to time directions, instructions and clarifications on a host of issues which crop up in the course of an election.

    The model code of conduct

    • The model code of conduct issued by the ECI is a set of guidelines meant for political parties, candidates and governments to adhere to during an election.
    • This code is based on consensus among political parties.
    • The model code is observed by all stakeholders for fear of action by the ECI.
    • However, there exists a considerable amount of confusion about the extent and nature of the powers which are available to the ECI in enforcing the code as well as its other decisions in relation to an election.

    Issues with model code of conduct

    1) Issue of enforceability

    • As the code of conduct is framed on the basis of a consensus among political parties, it has not been given any legal backing.
    • A committee of Parliament recommended that the code should be made a part of the Representation of the People Act 1951.
    • However, the ECI did not agree to it on the ground that once it becomes a part of the law, all matters connected with the enforcement of the code will be taken to court, which would delay elections.
    • But then the question about the enforceability of the code remains unresolved.
    • Paragraph 16A of the Election Symbols (Reservation and Allotment) Order, 1968 says that the commission may suspend or withdraw recognition of a recognised political party if it refuses to observe the model code of conduct.
    • But it is doubtful whether this provision is legally sustainable.
    • When the code is legally not enforceable, how can the ECI resort to a punitive action such as withdrawal of recognition?

    2) Transfer of officials

    • Observers of ECI report to it about the conduct of certain officials of the States where elections are to be held.
    • Transfer of an official is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the government.
    • It is actually not clear whether the ECI can transfer a State government official in exercise of the general powers under Article 324 or under the model code.
    • Transfer of an official is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the government.
    • It is actually not clear whether the ECI can transfer a State government official in exercise of the general powers under Article 324 or under the model code.
    • Further, to assume that a police officer or a civil servant will be able to swing the election in favour of the ruling party is extremely unrealistic and naive.

    3) ECI’s intervention in administrative decisions

    • According to the model code, Ministers cannot announce any financial grants in any form, make any promise of construction of roads, provision of drinking water facilities, etc or make any ad hoc appointments in the government. departments or public undertakings.
    • These are the core guidelines relating to the government.
    • But in reality, no government is allowed by the ECI to take any action, administrative or otherwise, if the ECI believes that such actions or decisions will affect free and fair elections.
    • A recent decision of the ECI to stop the Government of Kerala from continuing to supply kits containing rice, pulses, cooking oil, etc is a case in point.
    • The Supreme Court had in S. Subramaniam Balaji vs Govt. of T. Nadu & Ors (2013) held that the distribution of colour TVs, computers, cycles, goats, cows, etc, done or promised by the government is in the nature of welfare measures and is in accordance with the directive principles of state policy, and therefore it is permissible during an election.
    • So, how can the distribution of essential food articles which are used to stave off starvation be electoral malpractice?

    Consider the question “The model code of conduct issued by the Election Commission of India is in the forms of guidelines and lacks legal backing. In light of this, examine the issues that arise due to the lack of legal backing.”

    Conclusion

    There is no doubt that the ECI, through the conduct of free and fair elections in an extremely complex country, has restored the purity of the legislative bodies. However, no constitutional body is vested with unguided and absolute powers.

  • Vaccine diplomacy that needs specific clarifications

    Amid the second wave of covid pandemic, India’s decision to supply vaccine to foreign countries has been questioned from various quarters. The article deals with this issue.

    Issue of vaccine supply to foreign countries

    • While responding to a question  Minister of State in the Ministry of External Affairs noted that India was sending these vaccines abroad in the form of grant, commercial sales of manufacturers GAVI’s COVAX facility.
    • The supply to GAVI’s COVAX facility is an obligation since India is a member of this multilateral body and also a recipient of vaccines from this body.
    • By doing this, India wishes to signal that it is a responsible global power which does not self-obsessively think of itself alone.
    • This desire to be a good global citizen can be traced to the Objective Resolution moved by Jawaharlal Nehru in the Constituent Assembly on December 13, 1946.
    • The premise of the ideal ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’ is no different to that of the Objective Resolution.

    Factors to consider

    • The government made estimates of the vaccines that could be sent abroad on the interplay of three factors: domestic production, the demands of the national vaccine programme and requests for vaccines manufactured in India.
    • What is not known is how these factors were collectively addressed in the decision-making process.
    • It is also argued that it was obligatory to send vaccines contracted under GAVI’s COVAX facility.
    • However, sovereign states can always invoke supreme national interest to over-ride obligations.
    • Certainly, the vaccines sent as grants were voluntary and the commercial contracts of the company concerned could always be disregarded under existing laws.

    Conclusion

    The government needs to convince Indians that the vaccine exports have not been made at the cost of their health.

  • The roots of a decentred international order

    With the declining American supremacy in the global order, the world is set for new global order led by the developing countries. The article deals with this rise of alternate global order.

    Factors that explains decentred and pluralistic global order

    • The international order is under threat of the rising economic power of the BRICS nations, with China dominating in its economic and military capacity.
    • It is apparent that the future of global politics requires a significant agenda in the hands of the rising powers that are aggressively building a parallel economic order envisaging new centres of hegemonic power.
    •  It forebodes the final decline of American ascendancy.
    • It was the Bandung Conference of 1955, a meeting of Asian and African states, most of which were newly independent, that set the schema for the rise of Asia, politically and economically.
    • The confrontational stance was therefore the expected corollary in third world struggles to create a parallel order.
    •  America will continue to play a prime role in international affairs though its image representing universal brotherhood has sharply declined under the Trump regime.
    • The rising tide of far-right ultra-nationalism and ethnic purity experienced in the Brexit phenomena, in Trumpism and in the promotion of the right-wing agenda in India, has set in motion the wearing down of liberal democracy.
    • Other threats such as terrorism, ethnic conflicts and the warning of annihilation owing to climate change necessarily demand joint international action where American “exceptionalism” becomes an incongruity and an aberration.
    • This indeed has chipped away at the American global supremacy.
    • The world is, as a result, witness to a more decentred and pluralistic global order.

    New world order led by developing countries

    • Though pandemic has ravaged economies such as Brazil, India, Turkey and South Africa into a downward spiral, in the post-pandemic period, these economies would rise to meet the American-led liberal hegemonic world order.
    •  With China spearheading Asian regionalism, a serious challenge is possible.
    • China must strengthen the opposition to the West through the promotion of regional multilateral institutions.
    •  More than having individual partners or allies, China must embrace and give a push to multilateral affiliations in order to not further exacerbate regional tensions.
    • Power rivalry in a multipolar world would remain a possibility with military conflict not ruled out.
    • However, the capabilities of the rising economies cannot be underestimated.
    • China and India clearly have the age-old potential to lead as, historically, they have been pioneers of some of the oldest civilisations in the world.
    • China is indisputably a serious rival to the U.S. in the South China Sea, a world leader in renewable energy, and a formidable actor on the global stage of investment and trade, penetrating India, Israel, Ethiopia and Latin America.
    • Thus, a kind of dualism persists in the world order with no clear hegemony that can be bestowed on one single nation.

    Conclusion

    It is feared that there could be a possibility of a multipolar world turning disordered and unstable, but it is up to the rising nations to attempt to overcome territorial aspirations and strike a forceful note of faith on cultural mediation, worldwide legitimacy, and the appeal of each society in terms of its democratic values.

     

  • US Treasury keeps India on currency watch list

    India is one of the 11 countries on the US Treasury’s ‘Monitoring List’ with regard to their currency practices for the first time in the Biden administration.

    What is Currency Manipulation?

    • Currency manipulation refers to actions taken by governments to change the value of their currencies relative to other currencies in order to bring about some desirable objective.
    • The typical claim – often doubtful – is that countries manipulate their currencies in order to make their exports effectively cheaper on the world market and in turn make imports more expensive.

    Why do countries manipulate their currencies?

    • In general, countries prefer their currency to be weak because it makes them more competitive on the international trade front.
    • A lower currency makes a country’s exports more attractive because they are cheaper on the international market.
    • For example, a weak Rupee makes Indian exports less expensive for offshore buyers.
    • Secondly, by boosting exports, a country can use a lower currency to shrink its trade deficit.
    • Finally, a weaker currency alleviates pressure on a country’s sovereign debt obligations.
    • After issuing offshore debt, a country will make payments, and as these payments are denominated in the offshore currency, a weak local currency effectively decreases these debt payments.

    US treasury’s criteria

    To be labelled a manipulator by the U.S. Treasury:

    • Countries must at least have a $20 billion-plus bilateral trade surplus with the US
    • foreign currency intervention exceeding 2% of GDP and a global current account surplus exceeding 2% of GDP

    Implications for India

    • India has traditionally tried to balance between preventing excess currency appreciation on the one hand and protecting domestic financial stability on the other.
    • India being on the watch list could restrict the RBI in the foreign exchange operations it needs to pursue to protect financial stability.
    • This comes when global capital flows threaten to overwhelm domestic monetary policy.
    • The two most obvious consequences could be an appreciating rupee as well as excess liquidity that messes with the interest rate policy of the RBI.
    • Indian policymakers have to be sensitive to the unpredictable nature of policy-making in the US under Trump, especially concerning global trade.

  • A multipolarity, scripted by the middle powers

    Four middle powers: India, Japan, China and Turkey anchor the world to multipolarity. The article deals with this issue.

    New cold war

    • In respect of three crucial relationships, namely China, Russia and Iran, Mr. Biden is following in the footsteps of his predecessor.
    • Mr. Biden has also extended his firm backing for the “Indo-Pacific” and the associated alignment — the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad for short.
    • The U.S. continues to view China as its principal adversary on the world stage and that it will use the Quad to challenge China in the Indo-Pacific.
    • The U.S.’s hostility for Russia goes back to the latter’s war with Ukraine and the occupation of Crimea in 2014, followed by allegations of Russian cyber-interference in the U.S. presidential elections of 2016.
    • U.S. animosity has encouraged China and Russia to solidify their relations.
    • The two countries have agreed to harmonise their visions under the Eurasian Economic Union sponsored by Russia and China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
    • This idea has now been subsumed under the ‘Greater Eurasian Partnership’ to which both are committed.
    • Thus, the new Cold War is now being reflected in a new geopolitical binary — the Indo-Pacific versus Eurasia.

    How middle powers can play an important role

    • Four nations, Japan, Iran, Turkey and India, which, as “middle powers”, have the capacity to project power regionally, build alliances, and support (or disrupt) the strategies
    • But all four seems to be already aligned.
    • Japan and India are part of the Quad and have substantial security ties with the U.S.
    • Iran has found strategic comfort with the Sino-Russian alliance.
    • Turkey, a NATO member, has found its interests better-served by Russia and China rather than the U.S. and its European allies.
    • So, why the uncertainty? The main reason is that, despite the allure, the four nations are not yet prepared to join immutable alliances.

    Why the middle powers are reluctant to join alliances

    1) India’s China concerns

    • India has been expanding defence ties with the U.S. since 2016, by massive defence purchases and agreements on inter-operability and intelligence-sharing and frequent military exercises, as also the elevation of the Quad to ministerial level.
    • This might have signalled to China that India was now irreversibly in the U.S. camp.
    • But China has a point: while the Quad has made India a valuable partner for the U.S. in the west Pacific, neither the U.S. nor the Quad can address the challenges it faces at its 3,500-kilometre land border with China. 
    • Moreover, the U.S.’s intrusive approach on human rights issues ensures that India will need to manage its ties with China largely through its own efforts while retaining Russia as its defence partner.

    2) Sino-Japan relations

    • Japan has an ongoing territorial dispute with China relating to the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea.
    • But there is more to Sino-Japanese relations: in 2019, 24% of Japanese imports came from China, while 19% of its exports went to China, affirming the adage.

    3) Why Iran is reluctant

    • The crippling sanctions on Iran and the frequent threats of regime change make it a natural ally of the Sino-Russian axis.
    • However, its strategic culture eschews long-term security alignments.

    4) Why Turkey is reluctant to join

    • Turkey is steady distancing from its western partners and increasing geopolitical, military and economic alignment with Russia and China.
    • But Turkey still wishes to keep its ties with the U.S. intact and retain the freedom to make choices.
    • Its “New Asia” initiative involves the strengthening of east-west logistical and economic connectivity backed by western powers and China.

    Consider the question “What are the factors India need to consider as it deepens its involvement in the Quad?” 

    Conclusion

    As the clouds of the new Cold War gathers over the world, these four nations could find salvation in “strategic autonomy” — defined by flexible partnerships, with freedom to shape alliances to suit specific interests at different times.

  • National Pension System (NPS)

    The National Pension System (NPS) will no longer compel investors to convert 40% of their accumulated retirement corpus into an annuity.

    An annuity is a long-term investment that is issued by an insurance company and is designed to help protect you from the risk of outliving your income. Through annuitisation, your purchase payments (what you contribute) are converted into periodic payments that can last for life.

    Why such a move?

    • Poor yields on annuities and high inflation are translating into negative returns.
    • Since annuities are taxable, deducting the tax and factoring in inflation means annuities are yielding negative returns.

    Try this PYQ:

    Q.Who among the following can join the National Pension System (NPS)?

    (a) Resident Indian citizens only

    (b) Persons of age from 21 to 55 only

    (c) All-State Government employees joining the services after the date of notification by the respective State Governments

    (d) All Central Governments Employees including those of Armed Forces joining the services on or after 1st April 2004

    National Pension Scheme (NPS)

    • NPS is a government-sponsored pension scheme. It was launched in January 2004 for government employees.
    • It was extended to all citizens of Indian on a voluntary basis from May 2009 and to corporates in December 2011 and to Non-Resident Indians in October 2015.
    • PFRDA is the statutory authority established by an enactment of the Parliament, to regulate, promote and ensure orderly growth of the NPS and pension schemes to which this Act applies.
    • The scheme allows subscribers to contribute regularly in a pension account during their working life.
    • On retirement, subscribers can withdraw a part of the corpus in a lump sum and use the remaining corpus to buy an annuity to secure a regular income after retirement.

    Who can join NPS?

    • Any Indian citizen between 18 and 60 years can join NPS.
    • The only condition is that the person must comply with know your customer (KYC) norms.
    • An NRI can join NPS. However, the account will be closed if there is a change in the citizenship status of the NRI.
    • Now, any Indian citizen, resident or non-resident and OCIs are eligible to join NPS till the age of 65 years.

  • [pib] National Internet Exchange of India (NIXI)

    The Ministry of Electronics & Information Technology (MeitY) has inaugurated three path-breaking initiatives for the National Internet Exchange of India (NIXI).

    What is NIXI?

    National Internet Exchange of India (NIXI) is a not-for-profit organization (section 8 of the Companies Act 2013) working since 2003 for spreading the internet infrastructure to the citizens of India through the following activities:

    1. Internet Exchanges through which the internet data is exchanged amongst ISP’s, Data Centers and CDNs.
    2. .IN Registry, managing and operation of .IN country-code domain and .भारत IDN domain for India.
    3. IRINN, managing and operating Internet protocol (IPv4/IPv6).

    Which are the three new initiatives?

    (1) IPv6 Expert Panel (IP Guru) (https://nixi.in):

    • IP Guru is a group to extend support to all the Indian entities who are finding it technically challenging to migrate and adopt IPv6.
    • In addition to this, the IPv6 expert group will help in identifying & hiring an agency that will help end customer by providing necessary technical support to adopt IPv6.
    • This panel will guide all such Indian entities and help in increasing IPv6 adoption.

    Note: An Internet Protocol (IP) address is a numerical label assigned to each device connected to a computer network that uses the Internet Protocol for communication. An IP address serves two main functions: host or network interface identification and location addressing.

    (2) NIXI Academy (https://training.nixi.in):

    • NIXI Academy is created to educate technical/non-technical people in India to learn and relearn technologies like IPv6 which are normally not taught in Educational Institutes.
    • NIXI academy comprises an IPv6 training portal which is developed with the help of various technical experts in order to provide mass training to the community.
    • The easy-to-use platform helps network operators and educators understand networking best practices, principles and techniques; manage Internet resources better; and use appropriate Internet technologies more effectively.

    (3) NIXI-IP-INDEX (https://ipv6.nixi.in):

    • NIXI has developed an IPv6 index portal for the Internet community.
    • NIXI-IP-INDEX portal will showcase the IPv6 adoption rate in India and across the world.
    • It can be used to compare the IPv6 Indian adoption rate with other economies in the world.
    • NIXI will populate this portal with web adoption in IPv6, IPv6 traffic etc. in the coming days.
    • This portal will motivate organisations to adopt IPv6, provide inputs for planning by technical organisations and research by academicians.