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Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • [25th June 2026] The Hindu OpED: PACOM, the deeper meaning behind a dropped prefix 

    Mentor’s Comment

    The United States military renamed its Indo-Pacific Command from “US INDOPACOM” to “US PACOM,” reverting to the pre-2018 designation. The rename signals a deliberate U.S. retreat from the Indo-Pacific strategic framework that has anchored India’s external and maritime policy since 2018. The significance lies not in the name but in the concurrent withdrawal of Indo-Pacific language from the U.S. Secretary of War Pete Hegseth’s Shangri-La Dialogue speech in May 2026.

    What Does the PACOM Rename Actually Signal?

    1. Reversal of 2018 doctrine: The 2018 renaming recognised the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean, the Indian subcontinent and India. The reversal withdraws that recognition.
    2. Disappearance of Indo-Pacific language: Hegseth’s 2025 Shangri-La speech referred to the Indo-Pacific over 30 times. His 2026 speech omitted it entirely.
    3. Unchanged area of responsibility: PACOM’s jurisdiction remains unchanged, extending from the U.S. West Coast to India’s western border. The change is strategic framing, not geography.
    4. Signal of U.S.-China accommodation: The rename reflects Trump’s effort to reduce tensions with China, which has long criticised the Quad and the Indo-Pacific concept.
    5. Three geographies at risk: India’s strategic position is affected across the Indo-Pacific, West Asia and South Asia.

    How Has U.S. Outreach to China Weakened the Quad?

    1. Trump’s G-2 framing: Trump’s references to a “G-2” suggest a U.S.-China-led order that conflicts with India’s vision of multipolar Asia.
    2. Diplomatic signals of accommodation: Trump’s Beijing visit and Xi Jinping’s planned U.S. visit indicate a preference for managing competition.
    3. Quad omitted from U.S. National Defense Strategy: The January 2026 National Defense Strategy does not mention the Quad, reducing its doctrinal significance.
    4. Quad agenda pared down: Cooperation is now limited to maritime security, economic prosperity, critical minerals and disaster response.
    5. Internal setbacks within a reduced agenda: U.S. restrictions on Anthropic’s AI models weakened Quad technology cooperation despite the Pax Silica and Critical Minerals Initiative Framework.
    6. India denied Quad Summit hosting rights: India has sought to host the summit since 2024. The grouping risks being reduced to a Foreign Ministers’ forum.
    7. Maritime security incidents within the Quad framework: Incidents involving IRIS Dena and attacks on ships carrying Indians exposed gaps in maritime domain awareness.

    What Does the U.S.-Iran Settlement Mean for India’s West Asia Position?

    1. U.S. ceasefire signals fatigue with regional allies: The ceasefire indicates reduced U.S. willingness to remain deeply engaged in West Asian conflicts.
    2. Islamabad MoU: Paragraph 4: The U.S. proposes withdrawing forces near Iran within 30 days of a final agreement.
    3. Islamabad MoU: Paragraph 5: Iran and Oman will help shape the future administration of the Hormuz Strait after demining.
    4. Islamabad MoU: Paragraph 6: Regional allies will contribute at least $300 billion for Iran’s reconstruction, strengthening Iran’s regional leverage.
    5. Regional realignment against India’s interests: Oman and Qatar have moved closer to Iran, while Saudi Arabia is diversifying its security partnerships.
    6. India’s West Asia policy is now misaligned: India may need to reassess its approach to Iranian oil, Chabahar and its regional balancing strategy.

    Why Does the Floundering Quad Require India to Build Alternative Maritime Architecture?

    1. Australia-India-Japan trilateral must be revived: Upcoming engagements with Japan, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand provide an opportunity to strengthen alternative maritime partnerships.
    2. Maritime domain awareness is now India’s responsibility: India must expand bilateral and minilateral maritime cooperation as the Quad’s role diminishes.
    3. The Quad’s founding premise has reversed: Built to balance China under Trump 1.0, the Quad faces reduced relevance as Trump 2.0 pursues accommodation.

    Where Does the U.S.-China Competition Most Directly Threaten India’s Neighbourhood?

    1. South Asia as a new competitive theatre: The U.S. is expanding its strategic engagement across South Asia to compete with China.
    2. U.S. attempt at supra-entity status in South Asia: Washington increasingly seeks a broader regional role beyond India-Pakistan relations.
    3. Gor’s travels signal breadth of U.S. engagement: Visits to Kathmandu, Thimphu, Dhaka and Colombo reflect wider U.S. regional outreach.
    4. SAARC and BIMSTEC are constrained: Political tensions with Pakistan and Bangladesh limit the effectiveness of both regional organisations.
    5. China has already built South Asia mechanisms: Beijing has expanded regional cooperation platforms that bypass India.
    6. India’s multilateral opportunities: India can reinforce its leadership through IORA, BIMSTEC, SCO and potentially a revived SAARC.

    What Does the Central Tension Reveal About India’s Strategic Position?

    1. The surface-level bonhomie conceals structural divergence: Diplomatic warmth contrasts with U.S. policy shifts that challenge India’s interests across three regions.
    2. India’s strategic calculus was built on a U.S. Indo-Pacific commitment that no longer holds: The assumptions underpinning India’s post-2018 strategy are being simultaneously questioned.
    3. The G-2 world order conflicts with India’s multipolar vision: A U.S.-China-led order reduces India’s strategic space in Asia.
    4. India must plan beyond rhetoric: New Delhi must respond to evolving U.S. policies rather than symbolic diplomatic gestures.

    Conclusion

    The PACOM rename is a diagnostic signal, not a trivial semantic change. The U.S. has shifted from the Indo-Pacific framework toward a U.S.-China bilateral accommodation, leaving the Quad without doctrinal support, India’s West Asia position exposed by the Islamabad MoU, and South Asia under direct U.S.-China competitive pressure. India’s response cannot be confined to diplomatic optics. It requires simultaneous action: reviving alternative maritime coalitions such as the Australia-India-Japan trilateral, revising its West Asia policy on Iranian oil and Chabahar, and reasserting pan-regional leadership through BIMSTEC, SAARC, and the Indian Ocean Rim Association before both the U.S. and China entrench positions that leave India peripheral to its own neighbourhood.

  • [23rd June 2026] The Hindu OpED: The challenge of India’s digital sovereignty

    PYQ Relevance[UPSC 2024] Describe the context and salient features of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023
    Linkage: Data sovereignty is a critical pillar of digital sovereignty, aimed at keeping sensitive information under domestic jurisdiction and protecting it from foreign access. 

    Mentor’s Comment

    Digital sovereignty is no longer limited to data localization; it encompasses control over digital infrastructure, cloud services, semiconductors, AI, software, and defence technologies. For UPSC, link this topic with Atmanirbhar Bharat, Digital Public Infrastructure (UPI, Aadhaar, ONDC), National Security, Semiconductor Mission, AI governance, cyber security, and strategic autonomy. A balanced answer should advocate indigenous innovation, higher R&D spending, private sector participation, and trusted international partnerships rather than complete technological isolation.

    Why in the News?

    Recent incidents, including the compromise of Indian CCTV networks through foreign software, the denial of digital services to Nayara Energy due to EU sanctions, and India’s growing focus on semiconductor manufacturing, indigenous digital platforms, and trusted technology partnerships such as Pax Silica, have renewed the debate on India’s digital sovereignty and technological self reliance.

    What is digital sovereignty? 

    Digital sovereignty is a nation’s ability to control its digital infrastructure, data, technologies, and critical digital services without undue dependence on foreign entities.

    Why is it important for India?

    • Strategic Autonomy: Ensures independent decision making in technology and security. Eg: Indigenous UPI and RuPay payment systems.
    • National Security: Protects critical infrastructure from external interference. Eg: Reducing reliance on foreign cloud platforms for defence data.
    • Data Sovereignty: Keeps sensitive data under domestic jurisdiction. Eg: Government authentication and cloud services hosted on Indian platforms.
    • Economic Competitiveness: Promotes innovation and domestic digital industries. Eg: India’s semiconductor ecosystem and digital public infrastructure.

    Why does dependence on foreign digital infrastructure pose risks?

    • National Security Risk: Foreign entities may compromise critical infrastructure. Eg: CCTV networks allegedly compromised through EseeCloud software.
    • External Sovereign Control: Foreign governments can influence technology providers. Eg: Microsoft’s denial of services to Nayara Energy following EU sanctions.
    • Data Security: Sensitive information may become accessible to foreign jurisdictions. Eg: Cloud companies compelled to share data with home governments.
    • Defence Vulnerability: Software controlled abroad may affect military capabilities. Eg: GPS restrictions during the 1999 Kargil conflict.
    • Economic Disruption: Suspension of digital services can halt business operations. Eg: Loss of access to corporate email and collaboration platforms.

    How can India strengthen its digital sovereignty?

    • Indigenous Innovation: Develop domestic digital infrastructure and technologies. Eg: UPI, RuPay, NavIC, Zoho adoption in government systems.
    • Private Sector Participation: Encourage competitive domestic technology development. Eg: Private sector involvement in the Advanced Medium Combat Aircraft (AMCA).
    • Semiconductor Ecosystem: Build domestic chip manufacturing capabilities. Eg: Micron’s ATMP facility in Sanand.
    • Trusted International Partnerships: Develop technologies through strategic collaborations. Eg: BrahMos missile programme and Pax Silica initiative.
    • Higher R&D Investment: Strengthen innovation capacity and technological leadership. Eg: Increasing R&D expenditure beyond the current 0.74% of GDP.

    Which global practices can India adopt for digital sovereignty?

    • Sovereign Digital Platforms: Develop domestic alternatives for government services. Eg: France replacing Microsoft Teams and Zoom with a sovereign platform.
    • Independent Cloud Infrastructure: Reduce reliance on foreign cloud providers. Eg: European Union’s sovereign cloud initiatives.
    • Localization of Critical Software: Promote indigenous productivity and enterprise software. Eg: Germany, Denmark, and the Netherlands exploring domestic alternatives.
    • Trusted Technology Partnerships: Build technology ecosystems with like minded nations. Eg: Pax Silica initiative on AI and supply chain security.
    • Public Private Innovation Model: Government support with private sector execution. Eg: U.S. defence production and procurement model.

    What are the implications of enhancing India’s digital sovereignty?

    • Strategic Autonomy: Reduces dependence on foreign powers for critical technologies. Eg: NavIC providing indigenous satellite navigation.
    • National Security: Improves resilience against cyber threats and external coercion. Eg: Indigenous defence software and secure cloud infrastructure.
    • Economic Growth: Strengthens domestic digital industries and high value manufacturing. Eg: Expansion of the semiconductor and AI ecosystem.
    • Technological Leadership: Encourages innovation and global competitiveness. Eg: Success of Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) such as UPI.
    • Resilient Supply Chains: Minimizes disruptions from geopolitical tensions and sanctions. Eg: Diversified technology partnerships through Micron and Pax Silica.
    • Global Influence: Positions India as a trusted technology and digital governance leader. Eg: Export of India’s DPI model to partner countries.

    Conclusion

    Digital sovereignty is the cornerstone of India’s technological security, economic resilience, and strategic autonomy. By strengthening indigenous innovation, investing in R&D, promoting public private collaboration, and building trusted global partnerships, India can reduce external vulnerabilities and emerge as a secure, self reliant, and globally competitive digital power in an increasingly technology driven world.

  • Economic ties between India and Japan, while growing in recent years, are still far below their potential. Elucidate the policy constraints which are inhibiting this growth.

  • Discuss the political developments in Maldives in the last two years. Should they be of any cause of concern to India?

  • With respect to the South China sea, maritime territorial disputes and rising tension affirm the need for safeguarding maritime security to ensure freedom of navigation and over flight throughout the region. In this context, discuss the bilateral issues between India and China.

  • Increasing interest of India in Africa has its pros and cons. Critically examine.

  • India’s relations with Israel have, of late, acquired a depth and diversity, which cannot be rolled back.” Discuss.

    India and Israel relations, though formally established only in 1992, have evolved from a transactional defense relationship into a multidimensional strategic partnership.

    Depth and Diversity in India-Israel relations

    Geopolitical Convergence

    2017 Modi visit to Israel (first ever by an Indian PM) and reciprocal visits institutionalized the partnership through Joint Working Groups and 2+2 dialogues.

    Strategic autonomy- India has successfully balanced ties with Israel, Palestine, and Gulf states

    Indo-Abrahamic Bloc- India’s participation in I2U2 (India, Israel, UAE, US), reflect shared Indo-Pacific interests.

    Defense and Security Cooperation

    Defense Procurement- Israel is one of India’s top three defense suppliers. Eg- Heron and Searcher UAVs, Barak missiles, and Spyder air defense systems.

    Counterterrorism Cooperation- Intelligence-sharing and joint training have strengthened India’s counterterrorism capabilities post-26/11.

    Maritime Security- Joint initiatives in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea strengthen India’s position in West Asian maritime architecture.

    Technology, Agriculture, and Water Cooperation

    The India-Israel Agricultural Project (IIAP) has established over 30 Centers of Excellence across Indian states.

    Water Management- Collaboration in drip irrigation, desalination, and wastewater recycling.

    The India-Israel Industrial R&D and Technological Innovation Fund (I4F) supports joint projects in AI, quantum computing, water tech, etc.

    Economic and Trade Relations

    Bilateral Trade- Increased from $200 million in 1992 to over $10.7 billion in 2023, with focus shifting from diamonds to pharmaceuticals, defense electronics, and agri-tech.

    Negotiations for a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) to deepen commercial linkages.

    India and Israel have signed a fresh bilateral investment treaty.( first OECD country to adopt India’s new investment treaty model.)

    People-to-People and Cultural Ties – Shared democratic values, historical goodwill, and academic and cultural exchanges

    Major Areas-of Friction

    India maintains a principled support for Palestine and the two-state solution. Eg- India abstained from a UNGA resolution on Gaza ceasefire in October 2023.

    India walk a tightrope between its strategic embrace of Israel and economic entrenchment in the Gulf. – Harsh V. Pant (ORF)

    Non-defense trade remains modest and over-reliant on diamonds and agriculture.

    The India-Israel Free Trade Agreement, under negotiation since 2010 (14 rounds held), remains inconclusive.

    Domestic Political Issues – left-leaning and minority groups, criticize deepening ties with Israel.

    Way Forward

    Partnership based on Enlightened Self interest

    Joint Collaboration for development projects in Africa and South Asia under platforms like I2U2.

    As Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu stated, “The sky is the limit for India-Israel cooperation” – symbolizing deep mutual trust and strategic alignment.

  • “What introduces friction into the ties between India and the United States is that Washington is still unable to find for India a position in its global strategy, which would satisfy India’s National self-esteem and ambitions” Explain with suitable examples.

    Former US president Barack Obama called India-US relationship as the most defining partnership of the 21st century. However, in recent years there has been friction in ties due to geopolitical and geoeconomic divergence.

    Roots of Friction- Divergent Strategic Worldviews

    India’s Pursuit of Strategic Autonomy vs US Alliance Model – India’s “strategic hedging” with neutral stance on the Russia-Ukraine war (2022-24) frustrated the US. Eg- 50% Tariff

    USA’s relationship with Pakistan (recent mineral deal) weakens India’s efforts against Terrorism.

    Fear of USA’s policy of Bait and Bloodletting in India-China relations

    Gap between expectation and recognition – Eg- While the US promotes India as a “pillar of the Indo-Pacific strategy,” it doesn’t offer India the same status as treaty allies like Japan or Australia

    Divergence in Regional Priorities – India’s immediate concerns include China, Pakistan, and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), whereas US priorities Pacific Ocean in QUAD.

    Geoeconomic Issues – US tightening H-1B visa policies or reinstate Generalized System of Preferences (GSP).

    U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan (2021) and its aftermath posed regional security concerns for India

    Multilateralism issues – Eg- Disputes on data localization, intellectual property, and agricultural access under WTO

    US sanctions under CAATSA threatened S-400 missile system deal and Chabahar port in Iran

    Human Rights – US criticism of India’s domestic policies (e.g., on religious freedom, digital regulation, or Kashmir) is viewed by India as interference in internal affairs.

    India’s National Self-Esteem and Strategic Ambitions

    Strategic Autonomy and issue based partnerships based on enlightened self interest

    Recognition as an independent global power – Rightful Place in comity of nations.

    Permanent membership in the UN Security Council.

    Technology access and defense co-production as an equal partner.

    Leadership in Global South diplomacy.

    Efforts to Bridge the Gap

    India-US civil nuclear deal of 2008

    Initiatives on Critical and Emerging Technologies (iCET) aim for joint R&D in AI, 5G, and quantum tech.

    GE-HAL jet engine co-production, semiconductor MoUs, and defense logistics agreements (LEMOA, COMCASA, BECA).

    Framework agreement to expand defence cooperation over the next 10-years.

    Way Forward

    Balance Strategic Autonomy with Global Cooperation on shared interests – counterterrorism, climate change, and technology governance.

    Engage more actively in the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), promote supply chain resilience, and sustainable infrastructure partnerships.

    Prioritize co-production and joint R&D in advanced defense technologies such as cybersecurity, autonomous systems, and surveillance.

    A stronger India-US partnership anchored in mutual respect, collaboration, and global leadership can advance regional stability and multipolar global governance

  • ‘The time has come for India and Japan to build a strong contemporary relationship, one involving global and strategic partnership that will have a great significance for Asia and the world as a whole.’ Comment.

    Shinzo Abe in his book “Towards a beautiful nation” termed India as Japan’s natural ally as they have no conflict of strategic interest and share common goals to build a free and open Indo-Pacific.

    Reasons for strong India-Japan Relations

    Geopolitical – Cold war 2.0, G-2

    Geoeconomic – Weaponisation of supply chains by China, Trump’s Tariff Wars

    Defence and Security – China’s boiling frog strategy in Indo Pacific

    Connectivity – China’s debt trap diplomacy through BRI. Eg- Sri Lanka crisis

    Multilateralism – UNSC reforms (both are members of G-4)

    Building a Strong India-Japan Partnership for Stability in Asia

    Strengthen Strategic and Security Cooperation

    Institutionalize Indo-Pacific Defence Cooperation- Expand 2+2 ministerial dialogues, enhance joint military exercises (Malabar, JIMEX) and intelligence sharing.

    Maritime Security- Establish a Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) network in the Indian Ocean to ensure secure Sea Lanes of Communication (SLOCs).

    Regional Architecture- Coordinate policies within Quad, ASEAN, and East Asia Summit to promote regional security and crisis management.

    Deepen Economic and Connectivity Linkages

    Sustainable Infrastructure under the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) as a transparent alternative to China’s BRI.

    Develop joint critical mineral and semiconductor supply chains under the Japan-India Industrial Competitiveness Partnership (IJICP).

    Energy and Technological Cooperation – Partner in hydrogen energy, solar manufacturing, and battery storage technologies to drive Asia’s clean transition.

    Soft Power and People-to-People Ties – Encourage joint humanitarian and disaster relief operations (HADR) to reinforce India-Japan goodwill across Asia.

    Building a Strong India-Japan Partnership for Stability in the World

    Promote a Rules-Based Global Order

    UN Reforms- Work jointly for UN Security Council reform

    Global Governance- Align efforts in WTO, IMF, and World Bank to make global institutions more representative and equitable.

    Global Economic Leadership

    Promote rule based economic order to counter weaponisation by trade by US and China

    Technology and Trade Norms- Co-develop standards in AI ethics, data protection, and digital economy governance.

    Climate Action- Jointly lead green finance mechanisms and global partnerships on carbon neutrality, leveraging Japan’s technology and India’s markets.

    Collaboration in Global Commons

    Maritime Freedom- Cooperate to safeguard open seas in the Western Pacific and Africa’s eastern coast.

    Space and Cyber Cooperation- Develop joint frameworks for space situational awareness and cybersecurity, ensuring safe use of global commons.

    As Prof. C. Raja Mohan notes, India and Japan can be “anchor democracies in the Indo-Pacific”, balancing China’s rise

  • What is the significance of Indo-US defence deals over Indo-Russian defence deals? Discuss with reference to stability in the Indo-Pacific region.

    India’s defence partnerships have evolved in response to shifting geopolitical realities and regional security imperatives.

    Evolution of Defence Partnerships

    Indo-Russian Defence Ties- Based on Cold War-era cooperation, covering nuclear submarines, aircraft (Su-30MKI), and missile systems (S-400, BrahMos).

    Indo-US Defence Ties- Strengthened post-2005 with the India-US Civil Nuclear Agreement, followed by defence foundational agreements – LEMOA (2016), COMCASA (2018), BECA (2020), and iCET (2023) – facilitating interoperability, logistics, and technology sharing.

    Significance of Indo-US Defence Deals over Indo-Russian Defence Deals in the Indo-Pacific Context

    Alignment with the Indo-Pacific Vision –

    shared commitment to a Free, Open, and Rules-Based Indo-Pacific (FOIP).

    Regional Presence- The US is a Pacific power with a direct military presence, unlike Russia, whose focus remains continental (Eurasian).

    The LEMOA (2016) enables reciprocal access to military bases – giving India strategic reach from Diego Garcia to Guam, enhancing maritime stability.

    Strengthening Maritime Security and Deterrence

    Operational Interoperability- Foundational agreements such as COMCASA (2018) and BECA (2020) enhance real-time intelligence and data sharing, critical for tracking Chinese naval movements.

    Joint Naval Exercises- India’s participation in the Quad-led Malabar exercises with the US, Japan, and Australia ensures freedom of navigation in the Indo-Pacific sea lanes.

    Indo-Russian defence engagements, like the BrahMos missile project and S-400 systems are less relevant to Indo-Pacific maritime operations.

    Access to Advanced Defence Technologies

    P-8I maritime patrol aircraft, Predator drones, and C-17 Globemasters that enhance India’s maritime strike capability.

    The iCET (Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technologies) deepens cooperation in AI, space, cybersecurity, and jet engine co-development, advancing India’s defence self-reliance.

    In contrast, Russian defence systems are based on legacy technologies, offering limited cooperation in next-generation warfare domains like cyber, space, and AI.

    Strategic Balance and Regional Stability

    The Indo-US defence partnership enhances collective deterrence in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

    Through coordination under the Quad, India and the US promote capacity building, HADR (Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief), and infrastructure resilience.

    Deepening defence ties with the US diversifies India’s procurement base, reducing overdependence on Russian arms.

    Challenges in Strengthening Indo-US Defence Cooperation

    Strategic Autonomy Concerns as the US expects greater policy alignment (e.g., on Ukraine, Iran sanctions).

    Dependence on Russian Systems – Over 60% of India’s defence inventory still originates from Russia (Su-30s, MiGs, T-90s, submarines). Shifts to US-origin platforms face interoperability and logistics challenges.

    Technology Transfer and Cost Issues – US defence exports involve limited technology transfer and high costs compared to Russia’s Make-in-India-friendly models (e.g., BrahMos).

    The CAATSA sanctions threat over India’s S-400 purchase exemplifies friction points that could impact future defence cooperation.

    Bureaucratic Constraints – Differences in procurement procedures, licensing regimes, and IPR frameworks often delay joint projects and technology-sharing initiatives.

    Way Forward

    Establish a “Defence Innovation Corridor” linking Indian and US industries to promote Make in India-Make for the World defence production.

    Enhance Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) and Naval Interoperability with Quad partners through Malabar, Tiger Triumph Exercises.

    Strengthen the Defence Industrial Base – Facilitate US defence manufacturers to establish production and maintenance hubs in India for regional supply chain security.

    Maintain Strategic Autonomy with issue-based convergence rather than alignment

    Use strategic dialogue platforms (2+2 Ministerial, DTTI, Quad) to address divergences

    The Indo-US defence partnership is vital for ensuring a free, open, and stable Indo-Pacific. It must be driven by trust, technology, and transparency.