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Subject: Bilateral Relations

1. Major World Events
2. India’s Interests in neighbourhood
3. Effects of our Policies

  • India and the Great Power rivalry

    Context

    Germany has become a weaker link in the Western coalition against Moscow and Beijing.

    The US-Russia-China power dynamics

    • There is a convergence between China and Russia on a range of issues from NATO expansion to the AUKUS alliance. 
    • Despite their problems with the US, both Moscow and Beijing want a productive partnership with Washington.
    • Both Russia and China want to leverage the united front to negotiate better terms from America.
    • Exploiting the contradiction between Russia and China: Washington, in turn, wants to explore the cleavages between Moscow and Beijing.
    • Focus on challenges from China: Biden’s outreach to Putin last year was based on the premise that the US could better focus on the challenges from China in the Indo-Pacific if there was a reasonable relationship with Russia in Europe.
    • Putin is trying to take advantage of that proposition by raising the stakes in Europe.
    • Exploiting economic means: If Putin is focused on military means to rewrite the European security order with the US, Xi is focused on the economic means to alter the US ties.
    • Xi is making a big play for the Wall Street bankers who see merits in engagement with Beijing and lobby Washington to scale down the confrontation with China.

    The US resilience

    •  The chaos of American domestic politics and the continuing arguments between the US and its European partners tend to amplify the disagreements within the West.
    •  It would be a mistake for Putin and Xi to mistake Western disagreements for strategic divergence.
    • Consensus on challenging China: The last few years have seen the quick emergence of a new US consensus on challenging China despite the polarisation of the American political class.
    • The idea that the US can’t risk a two-front challenge with Russia and China is popular but mistaken.
    • Power of the US and its allies: Despite the dramatic rise of China and its new partnership with Russia, the united front can’t really match the comprehensive national power of the US and its allies.
    • India is now a strategic partner of the US and faces growing challenges from China.
    • In Asia, Biden has revived the Anglosphere (the AUKUS alliance with the UK and Australia), elevated the Quad to the summit level, and reached out to the ASEAN.
    • In Europe, the US is getting NATO in order.
    • Britain has taken the lead in the diplomatic confrontation with Russia.
    • French President Emmanuel Macron is coordinating with the US in dealing with the Ukraine crisis.
    • Beyond the rebuilding of US alliances, Washington has an important lever which is the exploitation of the domestic political vulnerabilities of “Czar Putin” and “Emperor Xi”.

    Challenge for India

    • New dynamics between two coalitions: India’s approach will depend upon the new dynamic between the two coalitions as well as its own relations with China, Russia, and the US.
    • As both sides consolidate their global coalitions, it will get harder to be in the middle.
    • India would like to see Russia find accommodation with the West in Europe; but if Russia’s relations with the West deteriorate further in Europe, Delhi is unlikely to let Moscow undermine its growing partnership with the US and its allies.

    Conclusion

    With the return of great power rivalry coinciding with India’s deteriorating ties with China, Delhi now stands closer than ever before to the West.

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  • Unitary Digital Identity Framework (UDIF)

    India has agreed to provide a grant to Sri Lanka to implement a ‘Unitary Digital Identity Framework’, apparently modelled on the Aadhaar Card.

    What is UDIF?

    • UDIF is apparently similar to India’s own Aadhaar.
    • Under the proposed UDIF it is expected to introduce a:
    1. Personal identity verification device based on biometric data
    2. Digital tool that can represent the identities of individuals in cyberspace and
    3. Identification of individual identities that can be accurately verified in digital and physical environments by combining the two devices

    (More updates awaited)

    Why such move?

    • SL has been receiving substantive economic assistance from India – totalling $ 1.4 billion since the beginning of this year.
    • India is helping the island nation cope with its dollar crunch, and import food, medicines and fuel amid frequent shortages.

     

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  • Anchoring the United Kingdom economically to the Indo-Pacific

    Context

    January this year saw the formal launch of negotiations for an India-United Kingdom free trade agreement (FTA).

    Momentum in India-UK engagement

    • Despite some potential challenges, there is a new momentum in the India-U.K. bilateral engagement these days with both sides confident of moving forward swiftly.
    • Greater role for UK in Indo-Pacific: Britain has made a trade pact with India one of its post-Brexit priorities as it seeks a greater role in the Indo-Pacific.
    • Brexit has necessitated greater access to non-EU markets, and the U.K.’s changing relationship with China requires a diversification of trading partners.
    • The FTA negotiations were aimed at achieving a “fair and balanced” FTA and cover more than 90% of tariff lines so as to reach the bilateral trade target of around $100 billion by 2030.
    • There have been indications that instead of the two nations trying to tackle all sensitive issues in one go, there could be an interim pact or early harvest deal.

    UK’s Indo-Pacific strategy

    • India is at the heart of the U.K.’s Indo-Pacific ‘tilt’, which has generated considerable interest around the world.
    • A range of factors have contributed for the U.K. to adopt a more robust Indo-Pacific strategy:
    • a) the trading implications of Brexit;
    • b) the U.K.’s changing approach towards China — shifting from being a major proponent of China to perhaps the most hawkish in Europe;
    • c) and the fact that the U.S. remains firmly focused on the Indo-Pacific.
    • The U.K. recognizes the importance of a free and open Indo-Pacific to global stability and prosperity and has made clear its intentions to deploy strategic assets to this end.
    • The trilateral security partnership AUKUS has given London a greater voice in the region.

    Consider the question “Various factors have contributed towards enhanced India-UK engagement. Examine the factors and the possibilities it offered to the two countries.”

    Conclusion

    The U.K. is finally carving out a direction and purpose to its post-Brexit foreign policy and this prioritization has opened up a new window for New Delhi and London to quickly finalize their FTA. It is a unique “now or never” moment and the two sides seem willing to seize it despite the challenges.

  • India-Britain free trade agreement

    Context

    In May last year, Prime Ministers Narendra Modi and Boris Johnson announced their shared vision for a transformative decade for the India-United Kingdom partnership. These words have now been made real.

    Transforming India-UK partnership

    • Doubling bilateral trade: The two leaders had declared their ambition to more than double bilateral trade by 2030, which totalled over £23 billion in 2019.
    • Reduce barriers to trade: They directed their governments to take rapid steps to reduce barriers to trade.
    • FTA: The groundwork necessary to begin work on a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) had to be prepared by the end of 2021.
    • Both governments have already taken action; for example, unlocking the export of British apples to India and enabling a greater number of Indian fisheries to export shrimp to the U.K.
    • The big next step was the launch of FTA negotiations last month.

    Trade relations at present

    • Bilateral trade: The bilateral trade between the two countries stood at 15.5 billion USD in 2019-20. India has engaged with the UK in sectors like pharma, textiles, leather, industrial machinery, furniture, and toys.
      • Britain is among the top investors in India and India is the second-biggest investor and a major job creator in Britain. Recently, the Serum Institute of India has announced setting up its research facilities in the UK.
    • Indian Diaspora: Around 1.5 million people of Indian origin live in Britain. This includes 15 Members of Parliament, three members in Cabinet, and two in high office as Finance and Home Ministers.
    • India is already a big investor in the U.K. — especially in dynamic sectors such as fintech, electric vehicles, and batteries.
    • India has an extraordinary opportunity to transform its economy and society in the next 30 years, as it hits its demographic sweet spot, at the heart of the Indo-Pacific region where half the world’s people live and 50% of global economic growth is produced.

    Benefits of FTA

    • A U.K.-India trade agreement will stimulate growth and employment in both countries. 
    • Lower barriers coupled with greater regulatory certainty would incentivize new small and medium-sized enterprises to export their goods and services.
    • An agreement also means Indian and British consumers see improvements in the variety and affordability of products.
    • Strategic reasons: The British Government’s Integrated Review of our overseas policy, describes the world we are in; messier, with the more geostrategic competition.
    • It is one in which two dynamic democracies such as India and the U.K. need to work closely together to promote open economies.

    Consider the question “Colonial prism has long distorted the perception of India-UK relation. However, both the countries stand to gain by finding a fresh basis for sustaining bilateral relations. Comment.”  

    Conclusion

    An FTA would mark a new way of working between the U.K. and India. It gives a new framework within which the two countries can grow and flourish together, putting the colonial economic relationship where it belongs — in the history books.

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  • India- Central Asia Relations

    Context

    The inaugural India-Central Asia Summit, the India-Central Asia Dialogue, and the Regional Security Dialogue on Afghanistan in New Delhi — all held over the past four months — collectively indicate a renewed enthusiasm in New Delhi to engage the Central Asian region.

    Significance of Central Asia for India

    • India has limited economic and other stakes in the region, primarily due to lack of physical access.
    • And yet, the region appears to have gained a great deal of significance in India’s strategic thinking over the years, particularly in the recent past.
    • New geopolitical realities: India’s mission Central Asia today reflects, and is responsive to, the new geopolitical, if not the geo-economic, realities in the region.

    Factors driving India’s engagement

    • One of the factors driving this engagement and shaping it is the great power dynamics there.
    • Withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan: The decline of American presence and power in the broader region (due primarily to the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan) has led to a reassertion by China and Russia seeking to fill the power vacuum.
    • India-Russia relations: Moscow considers India to be a useful partner in the region: it helps it to not only win back New Delhi, which is moving towards the U.S., but also to subtly checkmate the rising Chinese influence in its backyard.
    • For the U.S., while growing India-Russia relations is not a welcome development, it recognises the utility of Moscow-New Delhi relations in Central Asia to offset Beijing’s ever-growing influence there.
    • India’s dilemma:  In the wake of the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, New Delhi faces a major dilemma in the wider region, not just in the pre-existing theatres like the Line of Control and the Line of Actual Control.
    • India’s China challenge: India in the region might get further hemmed in due to the combined efforts by China, Pakistan and Taliban-led Afghanistan.
    • If so, it must ensure that there is no China-led strategic gang up with Pakistan and the Taliban against India in the region, which, if it becomes a reality, would severely damage Indian interests.
    • Consolidation of Afghan policy: India’s engagement of Central Asia would also help it to consolidate its post-American Afghan policy.
    • Now that the Taliban have returned to Kabul, New Delhi is forced to devise new ways of engaging Afghanistan.
    • That’s where the Central Asian Republics (CARs) and Russia could be helpful. 
    • The announcement of a Joint Working Group on Afghanistan during the summit between India and the CARs is surely indicative of such interest.

    Russia’s prominence

    • In India’s current vision for a regional security architecture, Russia appears prominent
    • Countering China: By courting Russia — its traditional partner, also close to China and getting closer to Pakistan — to help it re-establish its presence in the Central Asian region, India is seeking to work with one of the region’s strongest powers and also potentially create a rift between China and Russia.
    • Joint defence production by India and Russia has been on the rise and the CARs could play a key role in it.
    • India’s non-critical stance on developments in Ukrain and Kazakhstan: This growing India-Russia partnership also explains India’s non-critical stance on the developments in Ukraine and Kazakhstan.

    Challenges in India’s engagement with Central Asia

    • China’s dominance in the region:  China, which shares a land border with the region, is already a major investor there.
    • Iran’s role: An even bigger challenge for India may be Iran.
    • India’s best shot at reaching the CARs is by using a hybrid model – via sea to Chabahar and then by road/rail through Iran (and Afghanistan) to the CARs.
    •  So, for New Delhi, the ongoing re-negotiations on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action are of crucial importance.
    • While Iran getting close to the West is not preferred by Russia (but preferred by India), if and when it becomes a reality, India would be able to use it to its advantage and join Russia in engaging the CARs.
    • Delivering on the commitment: Most importantly, India will have to walk the talk on its commitments to Central Asia.
    • Does it have the political will, material capability and diplomatic wherewithal to stay the course in the region?

    Conclusion

    India’s renewed engagement of Central Asia is in the right direction for the simple reason that while the gains from an engagement of Central Asia may be minimal, the disadvantages of non-engagement could be costly in the longer run.

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  • Delinking Depsang from the ongoing Ladakh border crisis is worrying

    Context

    In a recent television interview, the Indian Army Chief, General M.M. Naravane, argued that “out of the five or six friction points (in Ladakh), five have been solved”.

    Friction points in Ladakh

    • ‘Friction point’ are the points of Chinese ingress into hitherto India-controlled territory in Ladakh, where this control is exercised by the Army and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP) through regular patrols to the claimed areas.
    • These ‘friction points’ are Depsang, Galwan, Hot Springs, Gogra, North bank of Pangong Tso, Kailash Range and Demchok.
    • By asserting that only one of the friction points is remaining to be resolved —  Hot Springs or PP15, Army Chief implicitly ruled out Depsang as an area to be resolved.
    • This attempt to delink the strategically important area of Depsang from the ongoing Ladakh border crisis is worrying.

    Significance of Depsang

    • Depsang is an enclave of flat terrain located in an area the Army classifies as Sub-Sector North (SSN), which provides land access to Central Asia through the Karakoram Pass.
    • The Army has always identified Depsang plains as where it finds itself most vulnerable in Ladakh, devising plans to tackle the major Chinese challenge.
    • SSN’s flat terrain of Depsang, Trig Heights and DBO — which provides direct access to Aksai Chin — is suited for mechanised warfare but is located at the end of only one very long and tenuous communication axis for India.
    • China, in turn, has multiple roads that provide easy access to the area.
    • This leaves SSN highly vulnerable to capture by the PLA, with a few thousands of square kilometres from the Karakoram Pass to Burtse, likely to be lost.
    • Nowhere else in Ladakh is the PLA likely to gain so much territory in a single swoop.
    • SSN lies to the east of Siachen, located between the Saltoro ridge on the Pakistani border and the Saser ridge close to the Chinese border.
    • On paper, it is the only place where a physical military collusion can take place between Pakistan and China — and the challenge of a two-front war can become real in the worst-case scenario.
    • If India loses this area, it will be nearly impossible to launch a military operation to wrest back Gilgit-Baltistan from Pakistan.

    Dangers of delinking Depsang

    • Invalidation of Indian claims: The biggest danger of delinking Depsang from the current border crisis in Ladakh, however, is of corroborating the Chinese argument, which invalidates the rightful Indian claim over a large swathe of territory. 
    • In sparsely populated areas like Ladakh, with limited forward deployment of troops, the only assertion of territorial claims is by regular patrolling. 
    • By arguing that the blockade at Y-junction predates the current stand-off — a ‘legacy issue’ that goes back years — the Chinese side can affirm that Indian patrols never had access to this area and thus India has no valid claim on the territory.

    Conclusion

    As was demonstrated by China in the aftermath of the 1962 War, there should be no holding back in painstakingly asserting one’s claims when it comes to safeguarding the territory.

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  • 30 years of India-Israel Diplomatic Relations

    A recent speech by the PM Modi has marked three decades since New Delhi established formal diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv on January 29, 1992, when P.V. Narasimha Rao was the Prime Minister.

    India-Israel Relation: A Backgrounder

    (I) Recognition of Israel

    • Both nations became independent almost at the same time, in the late 1940s, following a long struggle against British Colonialism.
    • Though India had recognized Israel on September 17, 1950, full-fledged diplomatic relations between the countries were established on January 29, 1992.
    • Their diplomatic relationship was previously based on popular consensus and only much later became official.

    (II) India’s reluctance for extending ties

    • The popular perception of Israel was negative as it was a state formed on religion and analogous to Pakistan.
    • This was because during that time India was a young state that needed to take into account Arab states’ numerical impact at the United Nations.
    • Furthermore, it could not afford to antagonize its Muslim population by establishing ties with a Jewish state.
    • Sympathizing the Palestinian cause is a by-product of these motives.

    (III) India’s shift towards Israel

    • Though India voted against a UN resolution for the creation of Israel, once Israel is created, India officially recognized Israel (in 1950).
    • But full diplomatic ties were established only in 1992.

    Reasons for India prioritizing Israel

    • India’s exclusion from OIC: The formation of an Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) in 1969 which neglected the sentiments of Indian Muslims by blocking India’s membership to this group by Pakistan is one of the primary triggers for the change instance.
    • Backing of Kashmir: India has received no backing from the Arab countries on the Kashmir Issue. There have been no serious attempts by the Arab world to put pressure on Pakistan to reign in the cross-border insurgency in Kashmir.
    • Support in crucial wars: Israel supported India during the Indo-Pak wars even before full diplomatic ties were established.
    • India’s US allegiance: With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of the US as a superpower, India started aligning itself with the US, and this further added to our improved relations with Israel.
    • Deviation from NAM: After decades of Non-Alignment and Pro-Arab policy, in 1992 India changed its stance and established full diplomatic ties with Israel.
    • Support at global forums: Israel has always been a vocal supporter of India’s permanent seat in the UNSC.
    • Technology: India’s world-class institutes of higher education could benefit from the strong culture of research and high-end innovation that thrives in Israel.

    Israeli interests in India

    • India presents a massive market for Israel’s manufactured goods and technology.
    • India has for long enjoyed great goodwill among Israel’s citizens as the only country in the world where Jews have not faced anti-Semitism.
    • There are many instances of Jews under Hitler’s persecution finding shelter in India including some that were said to have been facilitated by Nehru.
    • The minuscule Jew community was able to rise to eminence in various fields.
    • Israel cherishes its admirers in India for its ability to thrive in spite of very adverse situations in its short history as an independent nation.

    Collaborations between India and Israel

    [A] Military collaboration

    • Against terrorism: India and Israel have increased collaboration in military ventures since both nations face the threats of rising radical terrorism and separatism.
    • Arms trade: India is the largest buyer of Israeli military equipment and Israel is the second-largest defense supplier to India after Russia.
    • Security: Working groups in areas of border management, internal security and public safety, police modernization, and capacity building for combating crime, crime prevention, and cybercrime were established.
    • Defence R&D: IAI is developing the Barak 8 missile for the Indian Navy and Indian Air Force which is capable of protecting sea vessels and ground facilities from aircraft and cruise missiles.

    [B] Political collaboration

    • Since the up-gradation of relations in 1992, defense and agriculture have become the two main pillars of the bilateral engagement.
    • The political ties have become especially cordial under the Modi Government.
    • In 2017, Prime Minister Modi became the first-ever Indian Prime Minister to visit Israel.

    [C] Agriculture collaboration

    • India has chosen Israel as a strategic partner (G2G) in the field of agriculture.
    • This partnership evolved into the Indo-Israel Agricultural Project (IIAP), under the Indo-Israel Action Plan, based on an MOU signed by Indian and Israeli ministers of Agriculture in 2006.
    • The partnership aims to introduce crop diversity, increase productivity & increase water use efficiency.
    • India has a lot to learn from the dryland agriculture of Israel. The Economic Survey 2016-17 batted for Indo-Israel cooperation in drip-irrigation technologies.

    [D] Economic collaboration

    • India is Israel’s third-largest trading partner in Asia after China and Hong Kong.
    • In recent years, bilateral trade has diversified to include several sectors like pharmaceuticals, agriculture, IT and telecom, and homeland security.
    • Major exports from India to Israel include precious stones and metals, chemical products, textiles, etc.
    • Major imports from Israel include chemicals and mineral products, base metals and machinery, and transport equipment. Potash is a major item of Israel’s exports to India.

    Various deterrents in ties

    • Bilateral Trade and investment still below potential: From just $200 million in 1992, bilateral trade (excluding defense) peaked at about $5 billion in 2012 but since then it has dropped to about $4 billion. Also, bilateral trade has not diversified much—diamonds and chemicals still make up for the large chunk of the pie.
    • Connectivity between the two countries is still poor with just one direct flight from Mumbai 3 times a week and no direct flights from Delhi.
    • Historical retrenchment: India’s consistent support for a sovereign, independent, viable, and united Palestinian state with East Jerusalem as its capital, living within secure and recognized borders, side by side, and at peace with Israel and Pro-Arab stance has been a sticky point.
    • Limited People to People ties and cultural differences: Israelis and Indian approach business differently and often find it difficult to get on the same page.
    • India’s support for Palestinian Cause: Though formal ties were established in 1992, the ideological divide resurfaces time and again due to India’s affinity for Palestine.

    Way forward

    • Indian policy appears to be guided primarily by strategic considerations.
    • There is a strong need to use soft power diplomacy to build people-to-people bridges and to add to economic benefits through robust inter-country tourism.
    • The Indian and Israeli markets do not compete with one another but complete one another.
    • A potential quadrilateral with US and UAE can help this relationship soar to new heights.

     

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    Also read:

    Indo-Abrahamic Accord: A new QUAD

  • India-Oman Relations

    India is laying out the red carpet for Oman’s top defence official Mohammed Nasser Al Zaabi, who will be in India for a four-day official visit.

    India-Oman Relations: A Backgrounder

    • The Sultanate of Oman is a strategic partner of India in the Gulf.
    • Both nations are linked by geography, history and culture and enjoy warm and cordial relations.
    • An Indian consulate was opened in Muscat in February 1955 which was upgraded to a consulate general in 1960 and later into a full-fledged embassy in 1971.
    • The first ambassador of India arrived in Muscat in 1973.

    History of the ties

    • Oman, for many years, was ruled by Sultan Qaboos bin Said al Said, who was a friend of India.
    • Sultan Qaboos, the longest-reigning leader of the modern Arab world, died in January ‘2020 at the age of 79.
    • He was a man who was, as a student, taught by Shankar Dayal Sharma who went on to become the President of India.
    • Sultan Qaboos’s father, an alumnus of Ajmer’s Mayo College, sent his son to study in Pune for some time, where he was former President Shankar Dayal Sharma’s student.

    Economic ties

    • Expatriate community: Oman has over five hundred thousand Indian nationals living there making them the largest expatriate community in Oman. They annually remit $780 million to India.
    • Bilateral trade: In 2010, bilateral trade between India and Oman stood at $4.5 billion. India was Oman’s second-largest destination for its non-oil exports and its fourth-largest source for Indian imports.
    • Energy: India has been considering the construction of a 1,100-km-long underwater natural gas pipeline from Oman called the South Asia Gas Enterprise (SAGE).

    Defense cooperation

    Oman is the first Gulf nation to have formalized defense relations with India.

    • Naval cooperation: The Indian Navy has berthing rights in Oman, and has been utilizing Oman’s ports as bases for conducting anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden.
    • Tri-services base: In February 2018, India announced that it had secured access to the facilities at Duqm for the Indian Air Force and the Indian Navy. Duqm had previously served as a port for the INS Mumbai.
    • Arms trade: The standard issue rifle of the Royal Army of Oman is India’s INSAS rifle.
    • Bilateral exercises: Naseem al-Bahr (Arabic for Sea Breeze) is a bilateral maritime exercise between India and Oman. The exercise was first held in 1993.

    Significance of Oman for India

    • Oman is India’s closest defense partner in the Gulf region and an important anchor for India’s defense and strategic interests.
    • It is the only country in the Gulf region with which all three services of the Indian armed forces conduct regular bilateral exercises and staff talks, enabling close cooperation and trust at the professional level.
    • It also provides critical operational support to Indian naval deployments in the Arabian sea for anti-piracy missions.

    Duqm port and its strategic imperative

    • In a strategic move to expand its footprint in the Indian Ocean region, India has secured access to the key Port of Duqm in Oman for military use and logistical support.
    • This is part of India’s maritime strategy to counter Chinese influence and activities in the region.
    • The Port of Duqm is strategically located, in close proximity to the Chabahar port in Iran.
    • With the Assumption Island being developed in Seychelles and Agalega in Mauritius, Duqm fits into India’s proactive maritime security roadmap.
    • In recent years, India had deployed an attack submarine to this port in the western Arabian Sea.

    Deterrent in ties: Chinese influence in Oman

    • China started cultivating ties with the Arab countries following the former Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan.
    • Beijing has cultivated close ties with Oman and the latter was, in fact, the first country to deliver oil to China.
    • As of today, 92.99 per cent of Oman’s oil exports go to China, making China Oman’s largest oil importer.
    • Oman and China signed an agreement to establish an Oman-China Industrial Park at Duqm in 2016.
    • China has identified Oman as a key country in the region and has been enhancing defence ties with it steadily.

    Way forward

    • India does not have enough energy resources to serve its current or future energy requirements. The rapidly growing energy demand has contributed to the need for long term energy partnerships with countries like Oman.
    • Oman’s Duqm Port is situated in the middle of international shipping lanes connecting East with West Asia.
    • India needs to engage with Oman and take initiatives to utilise opportunities arising out of the Duqm Port industrial city.

     

  • Places in the news: Sittwe Port

    Context

    Notwithstanding the unfortunate developments since the Tatmadaw took over, a recalibration exercise for developing a robust relationship with Naypyidaw is the need of the hour.

    Need for proactive neighbourhood policy with Myanmar

    • Security and economic interests: India should implement an unbiased and proactive “Neighbourhood First” strategy that facilitates the Act East policy crucial for India’s long-term security and economic interests.
    • Myanmar — regardless of who governs its polity — is not only the decisive lynchpin for India’s Act East policy but critical for the economic development and security of India’s Northeast.
    • China factor: Such a policy should take into account the measures that China has taken to arm the Tatmadaw.

    How to support Myanmar?

    • Critical requirements: India should find ways to support Naypyidaw for its critical requirements of systems and platforms like UAVs, surveillance systems and communication equipment.
    • Economic engagement: There is a need for dynamic economic engagement with Myanmar, to expedite the completion of the earlier agreement on the operationalisation of the Sittwe port, the establishment of an oil refinery and joint vaccine production facilities at a cost of $6 billion.
    • People-to-people goodwill: India also needs to proactively employ the existing “people-to-people” goodwill and proximate ties between the two armies.
    • Engage with military leadership to stop highhandedness: India has the singular advantage of acceptability from both factions in Myanmar and it is, therefore, imperative that it takes the lead in engaging with the ruling military leadership, to stop the highhandedness.
    • The visit by India’s Foreign Secretary to Myanmar in the last week of December 2021 was significant.
    • It conveyed the message that India, notwithstanding its commitment to democracy, is amenable to conduct business with the country, regardless of who is in the seat of power.

    Conclusion

    It is of the utmost importance for India to positively engage Naypyidaw and stave off attempts to exploit Myanmar by countries inimical to India’s growth. Any ambiguity or delay in India’s constructive engagement with Myanmar would only serve the interests of anti-India forces.

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  • India’s challenge in European geopolitics

    Context

    For India, an important strategic priority today is to rebalance the Indo-Pacific. Delhi, however, recognises that this expansive challenge can’t be met by any one power, including the US. A larger European role in securing Asia therefore becomes critical.

    Importance of Russia in balancing China

    • Peace with Russia in Europe might be necessary for America to focus on Asia has been the key motivation behind President Joe Biden’s decision to intensify engagement with Vladimir Putin in the last few months.
    • On the question of Ukraine’s membership of NATO, the US and its European allies have suggested that membership is certainly not imminent; but they are unwilling to say Ukraine will “never” be admitted.

    Contradiction in Europe

    • 1] Europe remains geopolitically unstable: None of the three European settlements of the 20th century — in 1919 after the First World War, in 1945 after the Second World War, and in 1991 after the Cold War — has endured.
    • 2] The difficulty of integrating Russia into a European order: Russia was part of the great power system in Europe through the 18th and 19th centuries.
    • If the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution put Russia and the West at odds with each other, the collapse of the Soviet Union has not resolved the contradiction.
    • 3] Growing tension between the US and Europe: Since the Second World War, Europe has relied on the US for its security.
    • However, Europe has never stopped resenting the American dominance over its geopolitics.
    • The EU’s foreign policy chief, Josep Borrell, has repeatedly objected to the US and Russia deciding the future of Ukraine over European heads.
    • But Russia does not take the EU seriously and is betting on negotiations with the US.
    • 4] Europe still remains a weak security actor:  While the EU has become a powerful economic entity (with its $17 trillion GDP), it remains a weak security actor.
    • Whatever might be the outcome from the gathering conflict over Ukraine, these European contradictions are not going to disappear any time soon.

    Why Europe remains a weak security actor?

    • Dominance of the US and Russia: The ambition to construct a strong geopolitical personality for the EU is hobbled by divisions over the role of Russia and the US in the region.
    • Mutual suspicions: The historically rooted mutual suspicions among European states also plays role.
    • Reluctance to spend on defence: This is compounded by the reluctance to spend more on defence and the inability to develop collective defence arrangements outside of NATO led by the US.

    Suggestions for India

    • The contradictions in Europe demand that Delhi discard its tendency to view the region through the “East versus West” binary.
    • Delhi today could profitably take a leaf out of the book of the Indian national movement.
    • In the late 18th century, as European powers competed for influence in the subcontinent, many Indian princes sought to take advantage of the contradictions between Britain and France.
    • Imperial Germany supported the formation of a nationalist government of India in Kabul in 1915 headed by Raja Mahendra Pratap Singh.
    • Eager to accelerate Indian independence during the Second World War, Netaji turned to Germany and Japan, the world’s newest great power.
    • The sharpening struggle for Indian independence, and more broadly the liberation of Asia between the two World Wars, inevitably involved exploiting the contradictions between different imperial powers.
    •  This was complicated, however, by rapid realignment among the major powers —friends became adversaries and enemies became allies.
    • The Indian and Asian national movements were deeply divided in coping with the shifting great power dynamic.
    • The world enters a similar moment today that could rearrange relations between the US, UK, Europe, Russia, China and Japan.

    Consider the question “What are the contradictions in Europe today? How these contradiction can play role in India’s international relations with the European countries?”

    Conclusion

    Greater engagement with Europe and dealing with its multiple contradictions must necessarily be important elements of India’s international relations today.

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